Johnson's Russia List
#6356
16 July 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Moscow Times/AP: A Chechnya Protest on a Riverboat.
2. Dow Jones/AP: Russian 1999 Bombings Suspect Extradited From Georgia.
3. Interfax: Suspect in 1999 apartment house bombing gives evidence.
4. Reuters: Suspect in 1999 apartment house bombing gives evidence.
5. Vremya Novostei: Maria Nikiforova, ADVANCES AND DEBTS. Alexander
Veshnyakov is pleased with the law on political parties.
6. Autumn Lerner: Sex Education in Russia.
7. Gazeta: Vitaly Mikhailov, WE ARE WORSE OFF THAN VAGRANTS.
The government has learned the truth about life in the military.
8. Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie: Aira Gelfand, Lekhlan Forrow, Michael
McKelly, Robert Musil, AFTER THE HISTORIC SUMMIT IN MOSCOW.
Russia's limited nuclear arsenals could still destroy the US.
9. Louis Menashe: Widow of the Revolution: The Anna Larina Story.
10. New York Times: Sophia Kishkovsky, Russian Writer, Facing Charges,
Warns Free Expression Is at Risk. (Sorokin)
11. The Observer (UK): Nick Paton Walsh, Putin turns 007 in new thriller
novel.
12. Interfax: Govt official advises Russians to keep savings in U.S.
dollars and euros.
13. RIA Novosti: HEAD OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION SPEAKS HIGHLY
OF NEW LABOUR CODE OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
14. Moscow Times: Chris Weafer, Putin's 8-Year Plan.
15. Chicago Tribune: Alex Rodriguez, New Vatican dioceses rile Russian
church.
16. Newsweek Web Exclusive: Ken Stier, Georgia’s Challenge. A spate of
kidnappings is raising questions about the former Soviet republic’s
commitment to Western-style reform.
17. Wall Street Journal: Robert Greskovic, DANCE. A Glorious Restoration
From the Kirov.
18. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Mark Mackinnon, Russians can't find
spacecraft. Loss of experimental vessel over Siberia another blow to
problem-plagued program.
19. Reuters: Five Russians on trial for rampage through market.]
********
#1
Moscow Times
July 16, 2002
A Chechnya Protest on a Riverboat
The Associated Press
A small but vocal political group that opposes the Russian government's war
in Chechnya used a riverboat Monday to deliver an anti-war message to its
direct address: the Kremlin.
Members of the Transnational Radical Party boarded one of the ferries that
takes tourists on cruises along the Moscow River. As the boat chugged past
the crenelated red brick wall of the Kremlin, they unfurled a banner
calling for immediate peace talks between President Vladimir Putin and
Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov.
There was no visible reaction from the Kremlin, where Putin's office is
located, and the Kremlin press service declined to comment.
A Transnational Radical Party member, Andrei Rodionov, said the action was
meant to "draw society's attention to the need for an end to the war in
Chechnya through peace negotiations." The banner read "Putin-Maskhadov
Negotiations Immediately."
The group chose Monday to deliver its message because Maskhadov sent a
letter to Putin last month offering to suspend fighting on July 15 and
revive peace talks, Rodionov said.
At the time, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov rejected the idea, saying
negotiations with Maskhadov "are possible only if he comes with his hands
up and if the talks are conducted by a prosecutor."
Only one attempt at negotiations has been made since the current conflict
began in 1999: In November, a Putin envoy met with a Maskhadov
representative. Putin's envoy said afterward that the meeting was
unproductive because the Chechens refused to accept the Kremlin's main
condition -- that the talks concern only the rebels' disarmament and not
Chechnya's political status.
Putin has repeatedly asserted that the war in Chechnya is essentially over.
However, Russian troops and Chechen police are killed almost every day in
rebel attacks, and human rights groups have accused the military of
torture, killings and other abuses of Chechen civilians.
On Monday, gunmen attacked the homes of several policemen in the town of
Achkhoi-Martan, killing two people and wounding five, Itar-Tass reported.
Many Russians still support the war, but as the fighting drags on,
opposition has mounted.
"Our president is acting against the wishes of the Russian people,"
Rodionov said. Maria Kukladesha, a woman from the Siberian city of Surgut
who was visiting Moscow for the first time and was walking along the
embankment in front of the Kremlin before the boat and banner passed by,
said she was part of a group in her hometown that sends canned goods and
other aid to Chechnya. She said she wanted an end to the war there.
"People are dying," she said.
********
#2
Russian 1999 Bombings Suspect Extradited From Georgia
July 16, 2002
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
MOSCOW (AP)--A man suspected of involvement in deadly 1999 apartment
bombings that helped prompt Russia to send troops to Chechnya has been
extradited to Moscow following his arrest in Georgia, officials said Tuesday.
Russian authorities suspect the man, identified as Adam Dekkushev, of
plotting and carrying out two apartment-house explosions in Moscow and one
in the southern Russian city of Volgodonsk, Russia's Federal Security
Service, or FSB and Prosecutor General's Office said in a joint statement.
Those blasts and one other in September 1999 killed at least 300 people.
Dekkushev was extradited Sunday and put in the FSB's Lefortovo jail in
Moscow, where he has already been questioned by investigators who confirmed
his identity, the statement said.
Russian authorities blamed Chechen separatists for the apartment bombings,
and weeks later renewed the military campaign in Chechnya that has
continued ever since.
********
#3
Suspect in 1999 apartment house bombing gives evidence
MOSCOW. July 16 (Interfax) - Adam Dekkushev, who is implicated in the
apartment house bombings that occurred in Moscow and Volgodonsk in 1999, is
currently in the Lefortovo detention facility and is already giving
evidence, the Federal Security Service and the information and public
relations department of the Prosecutor General's Office told Interfax.
On July 14, 2002, Dekkushev, for whom international arrest warrants had
been issued, was extradited to Russia from Georgia.
"This was preceded by a lot of work, including meetings between the
operative services of the Russian Federal Security Service, the Georgian
Security Ministry, and also the prosecutor's offices of both countries,"
the release reads.
Dekkushev has already been identified and questioned by Federal Security
Service investigators who are looking into the apartment house blasts, the
document reads.
********
#4
Suspect in 1999 apartment house bombing gives evidence
MOSCOW, July 16 (Reuters) - Russia is unlikely to accumulate as much money
as planned in a fund designed to help it meet its 2003 foreign debt
payments due to poor fiscal discipline and lower oil prices, a Finance
Ministry source said on Tuesday.
The government wants to funnel 197.8 billion roubles ($6.28 billion) into a
special financial reserve to help service $17 billion of debt in 2003. But
the fund may be only half the intended size by year's end.
The source said the reserve had shrunk to 38-40 billion roubles from 88
billion roubles at the start of the year, and the ministry expected it to
increase by just 71 billion roubles.
"We now understand we are living under a less favourable situation," the
source told reporters. "It looks unlikely that we can accumulate the
financial reserves we planned."
He blamed the shortfall on tax arrears, non-repayment of government credits
and lower prices for the country's main export, oil.
He said the average price for Russia's main crude oil blend, Urals, was
$22.2 per barrel in the first half of the year, while the budget is
calculated on the basis of $23.5.
The source said the government planned to allocate an extra 14 billion
roubles to cover the cost of the clean up following recent devastating
floods in southern Russia, which killed nearly 100 people and damaged
buildings and infrastructure.
He said he did not rule out a redistribution of spending set out in the
budget. However, the source said that the government expected to meet the
overall budget targets.
($ - 31.4779 roubles)
*******
#5
Vremya Novostei
July 16, 2002
ADVANCES AND DEBTS
Alexander Veshnyakov is pleased with the law on political parties
Author: Maria Nikiforova
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
A DISCUSSION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE LAW ON POLITICAL PARTIES THAT WAS
ADOPTED A YEAR AGO. THERE ARE 23 POLITICAL PARTIES REGISTERED WITH THE
JUSTICE MINISTRY: THUS, THIS LAW HAS NOT LED TO A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM,
DESPITE THE PREDICTIONS OF MANY ANALYSTS.
On July 15, Central Election Commission (CEC) Chairman Alexander
Veshnyakov and Deputy Justice Minister Yevgeny Sidorenko summed up the
impact of the law on political parties that was adopted a year ago, to
introduce some order into the chaotic Russian political system.
Veshnyakov reported, "The law is working well, it is
implementable, and has supporters."
According to him, 56 party congresses have been held. There are
23 political parties registered with the Justice Ministry. Thus, this
law has not led to a two-party system, despite the predictions of many
analysts. However, only eight parties have completed re-registration
of regional branches; a party should have branches in at least half of
Russia's 89 regions. The parties that have completed regional re-
registration are: the People's Party of the Russian Federation, the
Democratic Party of Russia, United Russia, the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the
Russian Political Party of Peace and Unity, the Conservative Party of
Russia, and the Russian Party of Peace. These parties are now entitled
to run in the parliamentary election of 2003. According to
Veshnyakov's forecasts, after the transition period expires on July
14, 2003, there will be about 30 political parties in Russia, and five
of them are likely to get into the Duma in the next parliamentary
election.
At the same time, Veshnyakov noted that registration of parties
is not always a smooth process. He said the Justice Ministry has
refused to register 10 parties. Among them were Liberal Russia, headed
by Boris Berezovsky; and the Christian Democratic Party, led by
Alexander Chuev. According to Sidorenko, parties are most often denied
registration in two cases: if their regulations are imprecisely
formulated (as in the case of Liberal Russia) or "if there is anything
unlawful in the party's title" (as in the case of the Christian
Democratic Party). Sidorenko denied claims by Liberal Russia that the
denial of registration was politically motivated. According to him,
the personality of Berezovsky was not a factor at all, although it was
possible because of his "special relations with the Prosecutor
General's Office). Veshnyakov, in turn, reported that nothing prevents
Liberal Russia from altering its regulations to comply with the
requirements of the law, and re-submitting its registration
application.
Veshnyakov noted that 21 electoral blocs that did not get more
than 2% of the vote in the last election still have debts to state-run
media for publishing and broadcasting their campaign. The Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, is among the
debtors too. Veshnyakov reported that if the debtors do not repay
their debts, they will go into the next election without access to
free air time and newspaper space. Besides, they will not receive
travel allowances for campaigning in the regions. Veshnyakov said in
this connection that it is probably good, since "the state cannot
always be supporting those who are nonentities."
(Translated by Kirill Frolov)
*********
#6
From: "Autumn Lerner"
Subject: Sex Education in Russia
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2002
"Sexual Silence and the Challenge of Sex Education in Contemporary Russia"
Master's Thesis and Research by Autumn M. Lerner
The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington
2002
The full text and useful research and links may be found at
http://www.jasonandautumn.com/us/russexed/index.htm
INTRODUCTION:
"For the past decade Russia has been characterized as a state in transition.
The revolutionary nature of Russia’s transition not only pertains to
politics and economics, but also sexual culture. While the Soviet Union has
crumbled, its ideological legacy of silence in regard to sexual issues has
remained to influence how Russian society has reacted to new sexual freedom
and the consequent health and social risks involved in such freedom. There
has been a dangerous imbalance in the number of sex education programs in
relation to rising rates of sexually transmitted diseases and sex crimes.
Furthermore, beginning during perestroika and exploding in the early 1990s,
raw sexual imagery has pervaded all levels of society, leaving even young
children overwhelmed with images and thoughts, but ignorant of the realities
of sex and relationships. Therefore I will argue that the perpetuation of
Soviet silence on sexual topics has led to a dangerous resistance to
comprehensive sex education programs and the lack of an open discourse on
sexual issues has been detrimental to Russia’s transition.
I will begin this study with an examination of the relevant
literature and contemporary approaches to the topic. In my introduction I
will distinguish my evolutionary approach from the established
“shock-therapy” and conservative approaches.
In chapter one I will focus on how the emotional nature of the sex education
debate and the persistence of sexual silence has shaped the development of
contemporary schools of thought on Russian sexuality and the sex education
question.
In chapter two I will examine the roots of sexual silence
throughout Russian history with particular attention paid to the early
Soviet era as a formative period for the cultural hexing of sexual
discourse. I consider this historical cultural analysis to be the foundation
of my thesis that the problematic nature of Russia’s contemporary sexual
revolution is uniquely shaped by the upholding of Soviet sexual silence.
Thus, my argument, while taking into account contemporary political, social,
and economic influential factors, is essentially historical in nature.
It is in chapter three that I will illustrate how sexual silence
has been detrimental to Russian society during its sexual revolution and
social transition from communism to democracy. In particular, I will examine
the issues of sexual health, systemic inefficiency, and the eroticization of
the Russian media in the 1990s. Throughout my analysis I will emphasize that
attention paid to the problems associated with the sexual revolution has
been grossly inadequate.
Finally, in chapter four I will address the issue of sex
education and detail the diverse programs that have developed in response to
the sexual revolution. I will illustrate the challenges involved in the
organization of sex education programs and how these organizations have
developed meaningful approaches. I will discuss how the topic of sex
education has itself resulted in an intensely emotional social debate. The
question of how to approach the issue of sex with the nation’s youth is
intrinsically related to the question of social and cultural definition in
the post-Soviet era. This question in itself is not resolved and is
continually debated within every possible venue.
Overall, in this paper I will illustrate how the combination of
Soviet sexual culture and contemporary Russian sexuality has created an
increasingly volatile situation. While, Soviet silence has been overcome in
certain venues, such as the media and youth culture, silence has inhibited
the development of comprehensive sex education programs and public discourse
on sexual issues. The negative results of such sexual ignorance are already
exhibited in epidemic rates of STDs, abortion, and HIV/AIDS; however, there
is no evidence that the government is prepared to address these
controversial issues."
*******
#7
Gazeta
July 16, 2002
WE ARE WORSE OFF THAN VAGRANTS
The government has learned the truth about life in the military
Author: Vitaly Mikhailov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
LAST YEAR, EXPERTS PREPARED A SPECIAL REPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
ABOUT THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND LEGAL STATUS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL. IT
PAINTS AN EXTREMELY DISTURBING PICTURE. THE REPORT FOUND THAT 46.2% OF
MILITARY FAMILIES WERE LIVING BELOW THE POVERTY LINE IN 2001.
We have obtained a copy of a special report containing the
results of a survey of the socio-economic and legal status of military
personnel and persons discharged from the military, dated 2001. The
report was prepared by an interdepartmental working group including
representatives of the Labor Ministry, Defense Ministry, Interior
Ministry, FSB, FAGLI, Emergencies Ministry, and other ministries,
departments, and social organizations interested in this issue.
The situation as presented by these experts is shocking. Over
half of the respondents said that their financial position was
unsatisfactory. This self-assessment by military personnel coincides
with the findings of independent experts. According to the latter,
46.2% of military families were living below the poverty line in 2001.
The greatest hardship was observed among the families of border guards
(57%) and Interior Troops (53%). One of the respondents, a border
guard, said: "We are worse off than homeless vagrants. The state must
change its attitude to the military, or we will never have
professional forces." The most "favorable" situation was seen among
junior officers (30.2% living below the poverty line) and contract
soldiers and sergeants (38.9%). The point to note is that these
categories of personnel are less likely to have families.
Experts say that "the main cause of this situation is that the
government has not raised the salaries of military personnel since
December 2000". The recent pay rise, effective from July 1, will not
improve the situation - because the state is abolishing some benefits
at the same time. The pay rise is somewhat relative, since impending
reforms to housing and utilities, RJES, and other natural monopolies
will lead to rising prices. The authors of the report concluded:
"Cancellation of benefits and the rise of officers' salaries from July
1 will only improve the socio-economic situation of military personnel
if the state also grants extra compensatory payments for the specific
hardships of military service."
It turns out that military families are among the poorest
categories in society. In the survey, 45% of families reported being
unable to afford all necessary food; 70% could not afford new clothing
and footwear; and 72% of respondents said they could not afford
outings to theaters and the cinema.
Military personnel currently spend over half of their wages
(52.2%) on food, though two years ago such expenses did not exceed
44%. Experts say: "Military families have absolutely no hope of saving
enough money to buy new clothes, or a computer for their children, or
a summer vacation."
The report submitted to the government refutes the opinion that
there are no problems with health care in the Armed Forces. According
to the main military-medical department of the Defense Ministry, the
average level of spending on medicines per capita is only one-fifth of
the amount spent by civilians (the equivalent of $4 and $20
respectively).
Organization of vacations for military personnel is a separate
problem. They can expect to be allocated time at a health resort only
once every 12 years, despite the fact that the Defense Ministry has a
substantial number of health resorts (44).
Housing is probably the most urgent problem. This is a very
difficult task for the state. As at January 1, 2002 almost 168,500
military families (over 40% of the total number of families of
officers and ensigns) lacked housing. Experts say: "The current level
of funding for military housing programs (around 4.5 billion rubles a
year) makes it fundamentally impossible to solve this problem." The
housing problem is much more urgent for those discharged from the
military due to troop strength cuts: in this category, over 164,000
families need housing. Judging from the reform plans for the Armed
Forces, around 268,000 personnel will made redundant from the Armed
Forces in the near future; and most of them do not have housing.
According to the survey, working hours for military personnel
were 50% over the norm in 2001 - officers had to work more than 59
hours a week. Most officers have only three or four days off each
month.
In addition, the number of officers dissatisfied with military
service is growing. Almost 63% of military personnel surveyed in
spring 2000 intended to remain in the service. The number of such
enthusiasts decreased to 57% by autumn 2001. The campaign aimed at
retaining young officers has failed: only 46% of lieutenants intend to
continue military service under the current conditions.
(Translated by Alexander Dubovoi)
*******
#8
Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie
No. 23
July 12-18, 2002
AFTER THE HISTORIC SUMMIT IN MOSCOW
Russia's limited nuclear arsenals could still destroy the US
Author: Aira Gelfand, Lekhlan Forrow, Michael McKelly, Robert Musil
Source: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 23, July 12-18, 2002, p. 1
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE US CURRENTLY HAS AROUND 7,500 NUCLEAR WARHEADS. RUSSIA HAS 7,300
WARHEADS. CUTS TO THE US AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR ARSENALS WILL NOT SOLVE
THE PROBLEM OF THE NUCLEAR THREAT. BOTH THE US AND RUSSIA WOULD STILL
HAVE ENOUGH WARHEADS TO DESTROY EACH OTHER AND THE REST OF HUMAN
CIVILIZATION.
Although the nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia will be cut to
1,700 to 2,200 warheads each, both countries will still be capable of
destroying each other. This scenario does not appear unbelievable,
since nothing can rule out errors in the system of controlling
strategic nuclear forces, or provocations by Third World countries or
terrorist organizations, which could launch a missile along a
trajectory coinciding with the trajectory of a Russian or US ICBM.
Russia could hit the US with 2,000 nuclear warheads (550
kilograms each), which would be delivered to US territory by SS-18 and
S-19 ballistic missiles. This analysis was developed by experts on the
assumption that 25% of warheads could malfunction or be intercepted by
anti-missile systems.
According to the analysis (the actual plans of the Russian
General Staff are unknown) 2,000 Russian missiles would hit 1,249
targets in the US, including: 50 command centers, around 500 launch
sites of US strategic missiles, five air bases with strategic nuclear
bombers, 101 military airfields, 60 civilian airports, 11 industrial
enterprises producing weapons and military hardware, around 30 naval
bases, ten storehouses with nuclear weapons, 14 industrial enterprises
producing nuclear weapons, 33 command posts, 50 large cities, and 342
electric power plants. According to reports prepared in 1998, a strike
by one nuclear submarine carrying 68 nuclear warheads would kill 6.838
million people: one-fortieth of the US population.
Around 128,000 nuclear warheads have been produced in the world
since 1945: around 70,000 in the US and 55,000 in the USSR (Russia).
The current stockpiles of plutonium may be used for producing 85,000
nuclear warheads. According to a survey done by Robert Norris and
William Arkin, the nuclear arsenals of all nations have been shrinking
from the mid-1980s. As at late 2000, there were 35,535 nuclear
warheads around the world.
The US currently has around 7,500 nuclear warheads. Russia has
7,300 warheads. Around 2,000 Russian and 2,500 US warheads are combat-
ready.
Russia would need only four minutes to prepare for a nuclear
strike if a nuclear war should break out; the US would need three
minutes.
The nuclear explosion of each warhead would cover two square
kilometers. Almost everything would be destroyed within a radius of up
to ten kilometers. Huge areas of territory would be contaminated with
nuclear radiation.
A Russian nuclear missile attack would kill 252 million people in
the United States (plus or minus 2 million), leaving around ten
million people injured. The population of the US is 281.4 million
people. In other words, a nuclear attack on the US would have fatal
consequences. If at least 500 nuclear warheads reach US territory,
around 132 million people would die within minutes; 8 million people
will be wounded. If we assume that a quarter of 5,000 warheads misses
its target, such a strike would kill 97 million people.
There are about 6,000 hospitals in the US. A quarter of them are
located in the zone of a potential nuclear strike, and it is very
likely that they would be destroyed. This means that millions of
people injured as a result of a nuclear strike would not receive
medical aid.
This means that Russian and US nuclear arsenals pose a colossal
threat, and could still destroy both countries, along with the rest of
human civilization.
(Translated by Alexander Dubovoi)
*******
#9
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2002
From: Louis Menashe
Subject: "Widow of the Revolution"
Dear David:
The attached review of "Widow of the Revolution: The Anna Larina Story"
appeared in the "Short Takes" section of the Summer, 2002 issue of
Cineaste magazine. You can run the review in full in JRL or cite it with
the Cineaste Website (www.cineaste.com).
Many thanks,
Lou
Widow of the Revolution: The Anna Larina Story
Louis Menashe
Lenin once described Nikolai Bukharin as the darling of the whole Soviet
Communist Party. That counted for little later on when Stalin, once
Bukharin's close friend and political comrade, put him in the dock at the
last of the grotesque Moscow show trials, and had him executed in 1938.
The "Widow of the Revolution" -- an awkward and melodramatic title -- of
Rosemarie Reed's informative historical documentary is Anna Larina, the
unfortunate wife of the unfortunate Bukharin. As the widow of "an enemy of
the people," she had her infant son taken away from her, and Stalin
consigned her to two decades of labor camps and internal exile. It is a
compelling story, told here with archival footage, photos (including what
is possibly a shot of the arrested Bukharin being taken away to the
Lubyanka), and Larina's own recollections and commentary on camera before
her death in 1996. Bukharin's biographer, Stephen F. Cohen, who also became
close to the family, narrates, and excerpts from Larina's memoir, This I
Cannot Forget, are voiced over by Vanessa Redgrave. (Redgrave is an
amusing, ironic choice. Politically, she has leaned to Trotskyism, but
Trotsky was a chief ideological rival and political enemy of Bukharin.)
Not all viewers will share in the idealization of Bukharin, but compassion
for Larina is inevitable. She was still in her teens when she married the
older Bukharin, and at the time of his arrest he apologized to her in tears
for "ruining her life". The story has a comparatively happy ending, though.
Larina survived Stalin, was re-united with her son, remarried and raised a
family, and lived to see her enduring hope of Bukharin's rehabilitation
realized thanks to Gorbachev. A Widow of the Revolution vindicated by the
Last Heir of the Revolution. (Produced by Rosemarie Reed. Distributed by
Filmakers Library, 124 East 40th Street, New York, New York 10016, phone
(212) 808-4980)
*******
#10
New York Times
July 16, 2002
Russian Writer, Facing Charges, Warns Free Expression Is at Risk
By SOPHIA KISHKOVSKY
MOSCOW, July 15 — A popular postmodernist writer facing pornography charges
in Russia says he fears he could end up the subject of a show trial, in a
government effort to control free expression.
The charges were brought by prosecutors last Thursday against Vladimir G.
Sorokin in a victory for a youth group that supports President Vladimir V.
Putin and that is campaigning to purify Russian culture.
"I think this is connected to a general tendency in culture, to make it
more controllable and predictable," Mr. Sorokin, 46, said in an interview
on Friday. "A year ago there were more serious matters to deal with,
oligarchs to deal with. Now people have time to read."
The culture minister and a top government official have criticized the
charges, though, indicating that the case might not go very far.
In a telling post-Soviet range of reactions to the announcement on
Thursday, free speech advocates expressed alarm about censorship but some
literary critics who dislike the author say it is all a campaign to promote
sales of his books.
The charges are based on passages in a 1999 novel by Mr. Sorokin called
"Goluboye Salo," which describes, among other things, sexual acts between
clones of Stalin and Khrushchev. The title means "blue lard," but the
masculine form of the Russian word for blue is also a slang term for
homosexuals.
Mr. Sorokin has been called a master stylist for his ability to imitate the
nuances of classic 19th century works and Soviet socialist realist
literature and then skewer them with descriptions of gory violence and
unpleasant bodily functions. Some literary critics despise him, but his
books are popular with many intellectuals and young people.
The youth group that started the campaign, Moving Together, contends that
all the works by Mr. Sorokin, who is writing a libretto for the Bolshoi
Theater Opera, are degrading and immoral.
The last straw, Konstantin Lebedev, a spokesman for the youth group, said
on Friday, was the Bolshoi's decision to commission the libretto. "The
Bolshoi is saying that Sorokin is a classic Russian writer," he said. "But
he writes pornography and necrophilia."
A spokeswoman for the Bolshoi said on Friday that the "theater is not
planning to base its actions on the opinion of Moving Together or any other
organization."
*******
#11
The Observer (UK)
14 July 2002
Putin turns 007 in new thriller novel
Nick Paton Walsh in Moscow
Vladimir Putin is an unlikely hero for an action thriller, but the one-time
spy who failed to shine in his one KGB posting in Berlin has a new image to
contend with - as Russia's answer to 007.
A new thriller, written by a Latvian author for the Russian market, depicts
the authoritarian President as a post-Soviet version of James Bond,
personally hunting down and assassinating Chechen rebel leaders while doing
his bit for world peace.
The novel, yet to be published in Moscow, is already the topic of fierce
debate as pundits evaluate the latest offering to the personality cult that
now surrounds Putin. President, by Aleksandr Olbik, is a fictitious take on
Putin which casts him as Russia's saviour from Chechen terrorists.
'What I wrote is a literary version of the events that could have
occurred,' Olbik said. 'The former Soviet Union has not had a political
leader like Putin for a long time. Russia needs a strong leader because we
have strong enemies.'
The book explains away Putin's unpopular refusal to leave his weekend dacha
when the Kursk submarine sank in August 2000, killing 118 crew. Olbik
suggests that Putin was challenged to a duel by Shamil Basayev, the Chechen
rebel leader reportedly assassinated by the Federal Security Services
earlier this year. Putin travelled to Chechnya to kill the enemy of the
state, but was wounded, and hence was unable to comfort the Kursk families.
Olbik writes: 'His thoughts came to a letter. It was an ordinary page from
a school notebook, on which there were written, with some mistakes, only 25
words. But he will remember them all his life. "Putin: it is me who you
want to catch. Be a man. Try to do it with your own hands, and then we will
see on which side Allah is on."'
Olbik has been attacked for his glowing depiction of a national hero by
Moscow's biggest selling daily, Komsomolskaya Pravda.
He angrily refutes suggestions that he wrote the book at Putin's request,
adding that he has written to Putin's press attaché to inform him of the
publication date, their only contact to date.
Olbik also insists that the Duma's Security Committee has been asked to
assess whether he can be permitted to use Putin's name and whether the
novel discloses 'state secrets'. Olbik adds: 'I am not saying that [the
events of the book] were so; only Putin can say if they really happened or
not.'
President is the latest homage to Putin, who is increasingly idolised by
voters. Two students were recently forced to close Bar Putin, in
Chelyabinsk after local officials declared that the name had been used
without permission. He has also been praised in a pop song.
Sergei Markov, director of the Russian Institute of Political Studies,
said: 'Putin has become so popular that he has become a resource for mass
culture. Thatcher and Reagan had a similar appeal.'
The Kremlin is said to fear that the cult of personality smacks of the days
of the old Soviet tyrants.
Andrei Riabov, of Moscow's Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
said: 'There is now a strange phenomenon where you can attack presidential
policy, but not Putin. For the people, he is about expectations.'
*******
#12
Govt official advises Russians to keep savings in U.S. dollars and euros
MOSCOW. July 16 (Interfax) - Mass flight by Russians from the dollar due to
the growth of the euro rate in European exchanges would be a big mistake,
Russian government official Alexander Volin has said.
"The main thing now is not to make sharp movements," Volin told Interfax.
Russians who keep their savings in foreign currency should keep some of
their money in U.S. dollars and some in euros, Volin said. This will help
minimize possible losses from changes in the exchange rates of these
currencies.
For those who travel to Europe often, it is better to keep savings in
euros, Volin said.
*******
#13
HEAD OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION SPEAKS HIGHLY OF NEW LABOUR CODE
OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION
MOSCOW, JULY 16, 2002. /FROM A RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT/--
Director-General of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Juan
Somavia highly estimates the new Labour Code of the Russian Federation. He
stated this after the talks with Minister of Labour and Social Development
of Russia Alexander Pochinok.
The ILO Director-General called the adopted Labour Code "a real
achievement", since it reflects "the necessary international norms in the
field of labour law".
But Juan Somavia also noted that "one thing is to adopt the Code, and it is
an altogether different thing to implement it". In his opinion, it is
necessary for the Russian side to concentrate its efforts and attention on
the practical side of the Code's operation.
Somavia noted the importance of the new Code as the legal base for carrying
out social reforms.
In his opinion, it is necessary to make further headway along the road of
the translation of this document into life, in particular, to ensure in
Russia training of judges on labour disputes and of labour inspectors, and
to practise collective talks.
Alexander Pochinok said that a package of 32 draft laws for the new Code
must be passed in Russia within a year, and asked the International Labour
Organisation for assistance.
*******
#14
Moscow Times
July 16, 2002
Putin's 8-Year Plan
By Chris Weafer
Chris Weafer, head of research at Troika Dialog Investment Bank,
contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
An increasing share of economic activity in Russia is moving under the
control of fewer and more powerful oligarchs, as current economic growth is
ever more dependent on commodities, in particular oil.
The government therefore has a problem in that it has to find a way to
boost very significantly investment capital flows into the noncommodity
parts of the economy to achieve higher annual GDP growth rates that can be
sustained in order to create a more diversified economy -- both in terms of
activity and ownership -- by the end of the decade.
If it fails to do so then Russia will end up as little more than a
Venezuela writ large, with a "boom to bust" commodity dependent economy.
Far from realizing the proclaimed goal of integration into the global
economy as an equal partner, Russia will be held hostage to the commodity
price cycle and a few very powerful individuals and companies.
It has also been made very clear by President Vladimir Putin that a very
significant element of the solution to this problem lies in the hands of
the oligarchs. He has clearly set out the terms of the carrot that will be
given for cooperation -- an amnesty for repatriated flight capital and a
continued forgiving attitude toward how state assets were acquired -- and
he has hinted strongly at what sticks might be deployed if the oligarchs
choose not to participate voluntarily in the next phase of the
administration's growth plan.
This stick would surely come in the form of much more aggressive scrutiny
of corporate activities, capital flight and tax audits, which in many
instances could result in prosecutions, heavy fines and even confiscation
of assets.
In an address to the oligarchs just after being elected president two years
ago, Putin made it clear that they had a two-year window to clean up their
acts and to start behaving as good corporate citizens. That period has now
come to an end.
Defenders of the oligarch system in Russia liken the development to that of
the robber barons in the United States and elsewhere, and therefore view it
not just as inevitable but as necessary. This line of argument naively
glosses over some very fundamental differences. In no other country did the
oligarchs (or their equivalent) not simply sit close to the heart of
government but largely displace and usurp it at a time when the largest
privatization of state assets in the history of the planet was taking place.
For example, there is no historical counterpart to the loans-for-shares
scheme that transformed mere millionaires into oligarch billionaires in the
mid-1990s
The result of the endgame that we are now entering will either see the
emergence of a Korean- or Japanese-style "Chaebol" system if the carrot is
accepted, with all of the long-term economic risks that this entails, or a
period of increased political and investment risk if the government ends up
wielding the stick.
A good way to look at the government's plan for economic reform is to break
Putin's likely two terms in office into four two-year periods, with each
having a specific objective and each having specific implications for
investment and risk.
The theme of the first period can best be described as the removal of
obstacles to future growth and the changing of attitude toward investment.
Some of the obstacles removed were economic; e.g. tax reform has clearly
broadened the tax paying base and permanently increased revenues, while
pushing for growth in oil production and exports has created an additional
safety zone in the budget and reduced vulnerability to oil price weakness.
Other obstacles were people, the removal of Central Bank Chairman Viktor
Gerashchenko and Gazprom CEO Rem Vyakhirev being the most high-profile
examples. Over this period investors were rewarded with strongly rising
asset prices. For example, over the three years to the end of June, the RTS
gained 188 percent compared to a loss of 24 percent for the average
emerging market and a loss of 44 percent for Nasdaq.
The theme of the next two-year period can be described as one of
preparation for future growth. Key obstacles have been removed but the
economy is not yet ready to grow at the 6 percent to 8 percent annual rate
being called for. That is still two years away in the third of the two-year
periods, and in order for the objectives of that period to be achieved a
sound investment infrastructure has to be put in place. This chiefly means
reforming the banking system to create the infrastructure for capital
flows, pension reform to create a local source of long-term investment
capital, and judicial reform to protect investors and their investments.
The theme of the third two-year period is seen as implementation, as
capital flows increase through the newly created investment infrastructure.
Like Putin's first two years in office, this third period is shaping up to
have the same high-risk, high-reward characteristics. If successful, then
the last of the four periods, covering Putin's final two years in office,
should see Russia become more closely integrated into the global economy
with significant benefits in the form of substantial long-term investment
flows.
However, it is the achievement of the objectives of the next phase of the
economic plan and the future of the oligarchs that are closely linked. More
than 50 percent of industrial capital investment is directed towards the
fuel sector, and most of this is used to grow production and exports ever
faster. So far this suits the government objective of lessening exposure to
oil price weakness, but rather than wishing to become the new Saudi Arabia
(a scenario that several of the oil oligarchs have publicly endorsed), it
is clear that the government's objective is for a one-off structural change
that will see oil exports raised to between 4.5 million and 5 million
barrels per day and then a substantial shift in capital investment into
developing other sectors of the economy.
A substantial amount of the estimated $160 billion of Russian capital held
in foreign bank accounts is under the control of commodity exporters and
oligarchs.
Investment spending in the noncommodity parts of the economy is today at a
negligible level and success in increasing this to desired levels will
depend on how successful the government is in either persuading, or
forcing, the owners and controllers of that capital to take it out of safe
foreign bank accounts and to significantly slow down oil-related capital
expenditures.
If the scenario involving four two-year plans is correct then we should
expect there to be increasing debate on the deployment of Russian-owned
capital, in parallel with the building of the domestic investment
infrastructure, between now and the March 2004 presidential election.
After that, those in the Kremlin who still harbor ambitions to finally
extract a fair price for state assets sold far too cheaply in the early and
mid-1990s may yet be given an opportunity to realize those ambitions. The
phrase "hydrocarbon windfall tax" might now only be mentioned in hushed
tones in government circles, but nonetheless it cannot have failed to come
to the attention of certain oligarchs.
Whether they choose to heed the warnings will be the subject of intense
scrutiny during this next phase of the economic development plan.
******
#15
Chicago Tribune
July 16, 2002
New Vatican dioceses rile Russian church
By Alex Rodriguez
Tribune foreign correspondent
MOSCOW -- The Russian Orthodox Church leveled new charges Monday that the
Vatican is proselytizing at Orthodoxy's expense after the Roman Catholic
Church established the first of two new dioceses in the former Soviet
republic of Ukraine.
The rift between the Holy See and Moscow's Orthodox patriarchate, which
dates to the 11th Century, has worsened since last summer, when Pope John
Paul II visited Ukraine, where Orthodoxy is the dominant faith.
Vatican officials say the goal of the new dioceses is to better serve
current Catholics, not to win over converts from Orthodoxy.
But Russian Orthodox Church leaders view the moves as part of a brazen
attempt by the Vatican to strengthen its foothold in the former Soviet
Union without regard to the impact on Russian Orthodoxy.
"The Russian Orthodox Church was simply presented with an accomplished
fact, notified of it only a few days in advance," said Archpriest Vsevolod
Chaplin, vice chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate's external church
relations department. "This is how a war is declared, not a fraternal
advice asked."
4 dioceses opened in Russia
The Vatican in February established four dioceses across Russia to minister
to an estimated 600,000 Catholics. During the weekend, the Vatican opened a
diocese that would serve about 3,000 Catholics in the Crimea and around the
southern Black Sea port city of Odessa. A second diocese will open soon in
eastern Ukraine, the Vatican announced.
Ukraine is home to an estimated 800,000 Roman Catholics and about 5.5
million so-called Greek Catholics, who celebrate the Byzantine rite but
bear allegiance to the pope. Ukraine is about three-quarters Orthodox and
Russia two-thirds.
When the Roman Catholic Church announced in February that it was
restructuring its four administrative districts covering Russia into
full-fledged dioceses, it called the action "a normal administrative move
triggered by the need to improve pastoral care for Catholics in this vast
region, who have insistently requested it."
But Russian Orthodox leaders viewed the move as an incursion. Earlier this
summer, patriarchate officials released a report outlining what they
asserted was proof that Catholic clergy were actively proselytizing in
Orthodox communities across Russia.
Religious instruction alleged
The report cited instances of the Catholic clergy providing instruction to
children who were baptized in the Orthodox faith and living in orphanages
in Siberia and Moscow. It also claimed that the Catholic Church was
building a network of monasteries throughout Russia to serve as a
foundation for missionary work.
"With the establishment of dioceses, the Catholic Church in Russia has
ceased to be a pastoral structure for ethnic minorities linked with the
Roman Catholic tradition and declared itself a church . . . whose duty and
responsibility is toward all the people living in Russia," the report
stated. Roman Catholic Church leaders denied the report's assertions.
On Monday, Russian Orthodox officials in Moscow said they were displeased
with the diocese openings in Ukraine.
"We see the formation of dioceses on the territory of Ukraine as further
expansion of the Catholics' missionary activity on the canonical territory
of the Moscow Patriarchate," said Father Alexander Abramov, spokesman for
the patriarchate in Moscow.
Orthodox leaders have been just as vehement in denying any connection with
the revocation of a Polish Catholic bishop's visa as he was trying to
re-enter Russia in April.
Bishop Jerzy Mazur oversaw the Catholic diocese based in the Siberian city
of Irkutsk and was one of the clergy cited by the Russian Orthodox Church
in its report on conversion this summer. He arrived at Moscow's
international airport April 19, was stripped of his visa by Russian
passport officials, and forced to return to Warsaw. That same month,
Russian officials took the visa of Italian Roman Catholic priest Stefano
Caprio and told him to leave the country.
After Mazur's visa was revoked, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman
Aleksandr Yakovenko told the Russian newspaper Kommersant that Russian
officials "had serious concerns about the activities" of the bishop, but
they would not detail what those concerns were.
"In accordance with widely accepted practice," Yakovenko said, "the reasons
for barring a foreign citizen from entering a country are not explained or
commented upon. Russian citizens have found themselves in similar
situations from time to time."
At the time, Mazur said he "had done nothing which would have justified"
the government's actions, and explained he had within his diocese thousands
of descendants of Eastern European Catholics once exiled to Siberia. "We
must bring them God's word. It's up to them to choose their church," he said.
The latest conflict between the two churches casts doubt on the pope's
long-standing desire to visit Russia. President Vladimir Putin has said the
Russian Orthodox Church would have to approve a papal visit before it would
be allowed. So far, the Russian Orthodoxy's patriarch, Alexy II, has
staunchly refused.
********
#16
Newsweek Web Exclusive
Georgia’s Challenge
A spate of kidnappings is raising questions about the former Soviet
republic’s commitment to Western-style reform
By Ken Stier
July 15 — The abduction had all the hallmarks of a professional
operation. On June 18, Peter Shaw was pulled over for an alleged traffic
violation by men claiming to be police in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi.
As the 57-year-old Briton was refusing to get in the imposters’ car,
another vehicle screeched up, disgorging four masked men wearing combat
fatigues and carrying machine guns.
SHOOTING INTO THE air, the new arrivals chased off a carload of
genuine police who had also arrived on the scene. Then they took Shaw.
The fate of Shaw, in Georgia on assignment for the European Union, is
still unknown. But his kidnapping underscores the enormous challenges still
facing the political stability and economic well-being of this strategic
former Soviet republic.
Shaw was at least the fourth foreigner to be kidnapped here in the
last 18 months. Two Spaniards, Antonio Tremino, 40, and Francisco
Rodriguez, 48, were released in December after spending more than a year in
captivity—most it chained to a wall in a tiny, dank cell.
Before that, Charbel Aoun, a Lebanese employee of the
American-owned food-distribution company Agritechnics, spent 77 days
blindfolded and chained to a bed. He was freed in a police raid; the
kidnappers escaped. And last December, Gunter Beuchel, a German national,
was beaten to death in front of his Tbilisi home by men wielding steel
knuckledusters. Friends say Beuchel had been attacked several times
previously. Another German, transportation executive Klaus Ditler Droig,
59, has been missing since July 2. Blood was found in his apartment and
money was missing from his safe, but Georgia’s Interior Minister Koba
Narchemashvili said last week it was premature to say that Droig had been
kidnapped or killed.
Who is behind these incidents? Many residents—including some senior
local officials—suspect that current or former members of the security
forces are responsible. “Only the well-trained special unit could commit
[a] crime like this,” says Minister of State Security Valeri
Khaburdzania of the Shaw kidnapping. And Minister of State Avtandil
Jorbenadze describes the kidnappings as the result of “collusion between
the criminal underworld and representatives of official structures.” Even
if not directly involved, police have singularly failed to make any arrests
in any of these cases.
Kidnapping has a long tradition in this rugged Caucasus region. But
10 years after breaking free from the Soviet Union and receiving close to
$3 billion in Western aid—$1 billion of that in bilateral aid from the
United States alone—foreign governments want to see a Georgia that is
closer to establishing a system of basic law and order.
One reason for their interest: the country—a key player in the
revived Silk Road project linking Central Asia with Europe—is about to play
permanent host to a multibillion-dollar pipeline project to bring Caspian
energy resources to Western markets. Such strategic stakes have recently
encouraged Washington to send 150 military advisers to train four special
battalions—the intended core of a wholly revamped army and another step
drawing Georgia away from Moscow’s sphere of influence and eventually,
Georgians hope, into NATO.
The latest kidnapping—in broad daylight and in an affluent part of
the capital—demonstrates how far Georgia still has to go. It not only
deters much-needed foreign tourists, but it also raises questions of just
how committed the country is to the Western-style reform process like the
free market economy promoted by President Eduard Shevardnadze. Georgian
business executives are more comfortable with muscle-enforced monopolies,
and foreigners perceived to be challenging local concerns may have been
targeted because they were seen as threats by those businesses. “Before the
kidnapping of Shaw we had not been trying to get people in, because it is
almost impossible to do that, but we had been trying to convince the people
who were already in not to leave the country,” Fady Asly, president of the
American Chamber of Commerce in Georgia and managing director of
Agritechnics, told NEWSWEEK. Asly himself is always accompanied by an armed
escort after a rocket-propelled grenade was fired last year into a wall of
the office where he oversees Agritechnics.
Abducted Briton Peter Shaw in an undated file photo
Shaw, the latest kidnap victim, spent six years working in
Georgia as a banking consultant, most recently with the European
Union-funded Agro-Business Bank of Georgia—a pilot project that Brussels
considered a model for others serving the banking-deprived rural areas of
Georgia and other former Soviet republics. Shevardnadze attended the
ribbon-cutting opening ceremony in February 2000.
At this stage, it is still unclear whether the reasons for Shaw’s
kidnap were personal, political or just plain mercenary. Local reports say
the Briton’s kidnappers have asked for a ransom of $2 million, but these
reports are unconfirmed. Shaw may have been targeted for revenge, say some,
for his role in the foreclosure of six Georgian banks some years ago.
Additional speculation has focused on whether Shaw could have been engaged
in private business dealings outside his EU job.
As in previous kidnappings, most Georgian press accounts suggest
the victims were somehow responsible for their own misfortunes. “The
Ministry of Agriculture considers Shaw a dishonest businessman,” began one
recent article in a publication called The New Version, “but the National
Bank [of Georgia] has a different opinion.”
Friends and diplomats, however, insist Shaw was just doing his job.
The morning of the kidnapping he was praised at a meeting about the bank
with six European ambassadors. “These rumors are totally incorrect,” says
Archil Kbilashvili, who served as a legal advisor to the Agro-Business
bank. Murtaz Kikoria, the head of the national bank’s department for
banking supervision and regulation says he didn’t see “any connection
between the activities of the bank and the kidnapping of Mr. Shaw.”
Whatever the motivation, Shaw’s kidnapping could have significant
fallout for Georgia. Because Shaw had close diplomatic ties—”he was one of
us,” says an EU diplomat—and because his project is considered a key part
of the EU program here, Brussels has reacted strongly to his disappearance.
On June 24, EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten wrote to
Shevardnadze that under the circumstances there could not be “business as
usual” between Georgia and the EU. Brussels has also warned that it could
cut its annual aid program of almost $45 million if Shaw is not released by
mid-July.
It is still uncertain if Brussels will actually follow through on
this threat. Georgian officials are arguing against such a move, warning
that an aid suspension could threaten the central government’s already
tenuous control on some parts of the country and possibly cause a rise in
crime. “Their halts bring huge dangers to the Georgian state,” Deputy
Foreign Minister Tamar Beruchashvili told Reuters.
For his part, Shevardnadze has busied himself assuring foreigners
he is doing all he can, quickly dispatching a letter to EU President Romano
Prodi to that effect. “This case must be solved in the nearest future even
if it costs law enforcers their lives,” Shevardnadze said in his weekly
radio address last Monday. “We will do our best to ensure that the
kidnapped businessman returns to his family safe and sound.”
That may be easier said than done. Shevardnadze, 74, has relied on
the police as his main pillar of power since he served as the republic’s
interior minister in the 1970s. These days, it is less clear just who is
propping up whom.
********
#17
Wall Street Journal
July 16, 2002
DANCE
A Glorious Restoration From the Kirov
By ROBERT GRESKOVIC
New York
Since first touring here in 1961, Russia's 219-year-old Kirov Ballet has
been opening windows on the past. However much U.S. audiences might have
already known about works accepted as classics and presented by American or
Western European ballet troupes, Kirov presentations offered new insights
and fresh perceptions. These illuminating moments could spring from the
mien of a performer, the tone of a certain dance number or even from the
detailing on a costume.
This season, to open the current Lincoln Center Festival, the Kirov Ballet
presented a production too marvelous to be regarded merely as a window.
After much research in its own archives and those of the Harvard Theatre
Collection, it has produced Marius Petipa's "La Bayadere," which it first
performed in 1877 and significantly revised in 1900. From now on, no
production of this classical ballet about life in Hindu India can afford to
ignore the verities of this staging.
The nearly four-hour, four-act spectacle, which is set near the Himalayas
and concerns love, betrayal, murder and divine retribution, remained all
but unknown at its full length in the West until 1980. That year, former
Kirov ballerina Natalia Makarova staged a three-act version of the ballet
for American Ballet Theatre. (Two decades earlier, the Kirov had amazed New
York with performances of the ballet's so-called pure dance scene, "The
Kingdom of the Shades.") Her presentation and subsequent ones outside
Russia -- in Paris, Korea and South Africa -- were mostly based on the
staging that survived in the Kirov's repertory as a mid-20th-century revision.
Now, in an act of faith all but unthinkable before the fall of the Soviet
Union, when no one but its own balletmasters were considered last-word
experts, the Kirov has scrapped its very own staging of the work and come
up with the most authentic version of a 19th-century ballet of this genre
that we have seen in our time.
The restoration involved piecing together Ludwig Minkus's original 1877
score and resurrecting the ballet's long-lost final act, not heard anywhere
since the mid-1920s. But the real revelation is the staging of the
concluding act, with its "Wrath of the Gods" theme. Though Ms. Makarova and
others have attempted to patch together some music and dances to suggest
the climactic scene in which the temple dancer Nikiya haunts the wedding of
the lover who betrayed her and the princess who had her killed, none made
much impact. The charm and chill of the Kirov staging is the
straightforward way in which the ghost of Nikiya, dressed in a snow-white
tutu fitted with gossamer, winglike sleeves, intrudes upon the ceremony in
the temple, detailed with ornately painted architecture and opulently
costumed characters. The formal dance that dominates this act is a grand
pas d'action, or a classical dance number arranged to carry forward the
story; it was moved by the previous Kirov staging to an earlier act, but
here the dance for the three leading characters and four framing ones
appears in its intended place, where it releases its full dramatic and
formal power.
Despite the historically significant restoration, however, this staging's
protracted display of pantomime, its sharply rendered settings alongside
freely adapted Indian costuming and its leisurely length have not won many
enthusiasts. Both the press and the public were underwhelmed, here and in
Russia . But it takes time for audiences and critics to warm to the tastes
and pace of another era, and the Kirov's staging team, overseen by company
head Makharbek Vaziev and director Sergei Vikharev, deserves great credit
for reclaiming the work's intentions.
Even the central, classical showpiece, with 32 corps de ballet women
performing as luminously as such heavenly scenes demand, has a new
dimension. This scene plays out in a mysterious, rocky landscape from which
the shades, or ghostly spirits from the underworld, issue. And, thanks to
new design research, their normally pure-white costuming has been
delicately shaded in warm white accents. Among the various casts the Kirov
presented, every dancer proved capable of bringing a role to full life,
though special honors go to Svetlana Zakharova and Diana Vishneva, who each
performed Nikiya, the former as delicately flexible as a wisp of incense
vapor and the latter as smoothly sinuous as a tendrilled vine.
To complete its two-weekend season, the Kirov has brought more time-tested
productions, which continue through Saturday. ("La Bayadere" has ended its
run.) "Swan Lake," the four-act 19th-century Tchaikovsky masterwork, now
replete with 20th-century choreographic touches, was beautifully danced on
its first night by the sweet and unaffected Ms. Zakharova and the dashing
and deft Danila Korsuntsev. The remaining repertory also includes the
company's tried and true staging of Petipa's "Don Quixote," another ballet
set to Minkus music, this time in a cheery Spanish mode. Finally, a staging
of George Balanchine's masterly 1967 "Jewels" will cap the season as a
so-called full-evening "abstract" ballet. Ironically, Balanchine fled
Soviet Russia , where companies like his Kirov alma mater spent most of the
past century thinking such "formalist" works to be empty at best and
subversive at worst.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union such thinking has been
discredited, and Balanchine's ballets have found a showcase in Kirov
programming. Now, however, works such as the restored "La Bayadere" strike
some Russians as subversive in a different way, as they resist any attempt
to turn back the clock. Luckily for the history and elucidation of ballet's
past, Mr. Vaziev and his staff are facing their naysayers undaunted. Those
who cling passionately to the Kirov's current but hardly definitive staging
of "Swan Lake" had best see it now. A new old one is likely just around the
corner.
Mr. Greskovic last wrote on the American Ballet Theatre and New York City
Ballet for the Journal.
*******
#18
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
July 16, 2002
Russians can't find spacecraft
Loss of experimental vessel over Siberia another blow to problem-plagued
program
By MARK MACKINNON
MOSCOW -- Barely a week after Russia told the world it plans to put a
cosmonaut on Mars, the country's space program found itself scouring the
Siberian wilderness for a missing spacecraft yesterday.
An experimental next-generation spacecraft, known as the Demonstrator-2,
disappeared over the Siberian land mass on its way back to Earth at the end
of a test mission three days ago.
Yesterday, helicopters were seen buzzing over the area, searching for the
craft that was designed to ferry passengers and cargo back and forth from
the International Space Station.
"We are still looking on the peninsula," Lidia Avdeyeva, spokeswoman for
the Babakin Space Centre, said last night.
The apparent crash-landing comes on the heels of a Moscow news conference
last week when Russian space officials outlined a 440-day, $20-billion
(U.S.) trip in which a six-person mission would reach Mars by 2015.
Many Western analysts are skeptical of the proposal, and the apparent
disappearance of the Demonstrator-2 would be another blow to the Russian
space program's prestige.
In May, the program experienced a major setback with the collapse of the
roof of its main rocket-launch site, the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.
The collapse, which killed eight people and destroyed one of the last
remnants of the Soviet lunar-landing program, was seen as symbolic of the
state of the Russian space efforts: ambitious but underfunded.
The cash shortage is substantial. Last year, the Mir space station -- the
pride of the Soviet space program -- was brought crashing down to Earth
after the Russian government couldn't come up with the $200-million needed
to keep it in orbit.
The only space shuttle built by the Soviet space program -- the Buran,
which completed one unmanned journey around Earth -- sits in Moscow's Gorky
Park as an amusement ride for children.
Lately, financial problems have forced the space program to endure the
ignominy of taking "space tourists" into orbit. Two tourists have paid
$20-million each in direly needed cash for the no-gravity ride, and Lance
Bass, a singer with the U.S. boy band 'Nsync, is negotiating to be taken up
in the fall.
Canadian astronaut Chris Hadfield, who works at Russia's Star City as
NASA's top attaché, said that funding for Russia's space program "isn't
lavish," but he added that it is unfair to paint the program as falling apart.
"The Demonstrator-2 was a good idea, and they were trying to test it as
cost-effectively as they could," he said yesterday. "I'm sure they'll learn
from this, just as they would from any successful or partially successful
test."
The test craft is a sphere 79 centimetres in diameter that was launched
into orbit atop a remodelled intercontinental ballistic missile. Upon
release, two sail-like panels -- the craft's distinguishing features --
were to inflate one inside the other as the craft drifted back to Earth.
What went wrong will not be known until recovery. Hope remains that the
concept could be used with an emergency-recovery or bailout craft.
*******
#19
Five Russians on trial for rampage through market
MOSCOW, July 16 (Reuters) - Five young Muscovites went on trial on Tuesday
charged with public order violations and conspiracy to murder relating to a
racist rampage through a Moscow street market last year.
Hundreds of right-wing "skinhead" extremists brandishing iron bars charged
through market stalls at Tsarytsyno market run by traders from southern
Russia and then fanned out to other districts. Three people were killed and
30 hurt.
Aged from 18 to 23, those charged stood defiantly in a metal cage reserved
for defendants. One had his head clean shaven and sported a Nazi-like
insignia on his neck.
All except one deny the charges.
"My client said he was not there during the riots and I trust him. We will
establish the truth during court hearings," lawyer Dmitry Davydenko told
Reuters.
Defence lawyers said they expected the trial to last for weeks in view of
the large amount of evidence.
Among those attending the initial hearing was an Azeri trader hurt in the
fracas last October.
Members of Russian National Unity, a right-wing paramilitary group that
also wears insignia similar to a Nazi swastika, gathered outside the court
but there were no incidents.
Russia has recently seen a surge of racist violence often directed against
ethnic groups from the Caucasus region which occupy large sections of
street markets in big cities.
Last month, in Moscow's worst violence in years, hundreds of young soccer
fans smashed and set fire to cars a short walk from the Kremlin after
Russia lost to Japan in the World Cup finals. One schoolboy was killed in
the melee.
A law aimed at clamping down on extremist activity was rushed through
parliament in less than a month and is now to be signed into law by
President Vladimir Putin.
*******
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