Johnson's Russia List
#6352
12 July 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. The Mirror (UK): Oonagh Blackman, GORBACHEV: I FEAR BUSH AND BLAIR
WAR PLAN.
2. Washington Post: David Hoffman, A Literary Spring in Russia.
After Decade of Uncertainty, Writers Are Again Popular -- and
Controversial.
3. Los Angeles Times: Maura Reynolds, Russia Targets Writer in Porn
Investigation. (Sorokin)
4. AFP: Top general appointed to Russia economics ministry.
5. Novaya Gazeta: Alexander Golov, INTERIOR MINISTRY OR THE FEDERAL
SECURITY SERVICE? Whose class interests do the special agencies
represent? (poll)
6. Komsomolskaya Pravda: PUTIN'S POLICY: THE DESPERATION OF THE WEAK,
OR THE CONFIDENCE OF THE STRONG? Russian political experts are pondering
Putin's political future. (Tsipko and Nikonov)
7. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Vladimir Georgiyev, THE GENERAL STAFF RELEASES
CRIME STATISTICS. Serious social problems in the Russian Armed Forces.
8. CNN: China-Russia wargames confirmed.
9. AP: Swiss Accept Part of Blame for Crash.
10. The Guardian (UK): Crash exposes conflict in pilot rules. Conflict
on pilot rules exposed.
11. World Press Review/L’Express: Eric Chol with Alla Chevelkina,
Back from the Abyss. Russia's Fragile Recovery.
12. Keston Institute: Mari paganism - traditional religion or
destructive cult?]
*******
#1
The Mirror (UK)
July 12, 2002
GORBACHEV: I FEAR BUSH AND BLAIR WAR PLAN
By Oonagh Blackman
Deputy Political Editor
MIKHAIL Gorbachev last night branded George W Bush and Tony Blair a threat
to world peace.
The former Russian president said US and British plans to attack Iraq and
topple Saddam Hussein would wreck the international coalition against
terrorism.
And he singled out Bush's go-it-alone policy in the face of concern from
world leaders as the key component to putting global security at risk.
Mr Gorbachev, who dragged the former Soviet Union out of the Cold War era,
insisted political negotiation was the only way to achieve peace throughout
the world.
The 71-year-old said: "I strongly hope the US and Britain will not be
fighting a war in the Middle East.
"They should be using political means not military.
"I am generally concerned about the situation in the Middle East.
"The right approach to this issue can only be developed in co-operation
with the United States and Russia as co-sponsors of the peace process, the
European Union and the Arab countries. They should all work together."
On US plans for a large-scale military invasion of Iraq, Mr Gorbachev said:
"I believe very strongly such plans should not be made.
"We have a full set of political, economic and diplomatic methods that
should be used to deal with Iraq. America must not ignore the UN Security
Council.
"Important and serious political decisions should not be taken unilaterally.
"If such decisions are taken unilaterally that could destroy the coalition
against terror, that is the reality.
"Iraq is an important country and both that nation and the world should not
be put at risk without really trying all the other various measures and
approaches available."
His swipe at joint Anglo-American military projects will be embarrassing to
No10.
Mr Blair has been widely regarded as President Bush's "poodle" for his
unswerving backing of his strike plans.
Mr Gorbachev said the PM should revert to the "political path" used in the
Northern Ireland peace process.
Speaking in Portcullis House, the new building for MPs at Westminster, he
added: "Even though there are still problems there, you took the right
path. The path of the political settlement. That is a good message for
Britain and all others.
"Such things should be addressed politically."
He also criticised Britain's controversial decision to export parts for
F-16 fighter jets via the US for use in Israel against Palestinians - which
was approved by the Prime Minister.
His damning indictment of US-British policy came on a two-day visit to
Britain to appeal to world leaders for help in destroying Russia's
stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.
Mr Gorbachev earned worldwide admiration for ushering in the era of
glasnost and perestroika in Russia.
He worked relentlessly to force the US and others to join his campaign to
cut weapons of mass destruction and improve world security.
But yesterday he was despairing of the aggressive agenda coming from the
White House, supported by Downing Street, on Iraq and the Middle East.
In a warning to Mr Blair Mr Gorbachev said: "Allies of the US should be
saying 'don't launch a new arms race. I am concerned at growing military
budgets.
"President Bush is concerned about the security of his nation, we
understand that.
"But we are still dealing with the consequences of the old arms race
without starting a new one.
"Why do that when we are looking for money to cut weapons of mass
destruction and to cut poverty in the world, which is often the cause of
terrorism.
"I am trying very hard to project a certain logic on this to the people in
a position to take decisions."
Hours after speaking to the Daily Mirror yesterday, Mr Gorbachev joined
members of the public to watch Mr Blair at Question Time in the Commons.
Mr Gorbachev is founder of the Green Cross international campaign to slash
stockpiles of large weapons.
Western intelligence agencies have warned corrupt ex-KGB officers and
military officials could net huge bribes from terrorist groups and Mafia
outfits to sell nuclear materials or nerve agents.
He said the "terrible legacy" of the Cold War could be exploited by rogue
states and terrorists like al-Qaeda.
Mr Gorbachev warned: "The battle against al-Qaeda should be continued
because they are a big organisation and they are a danger.
"Groups will try to acquire these weapons."
He wants more EU cash to get rid of the massive arsenal of chemical weapons
being stored unsafely in Russia.
Mr Gorbachev said: "The US and the Soviet Union each spent the equivalent
of 10 trillion dollars on the arms race. Now hundreds of billions will be
needed to destroy these weapons."
*******
#2
Washington Post
July 12, 2002
A Literary Spring in Russia
After Decade of Uncertainty, Writers Are Again Popular -- and Controversial
By David Hoffman
Washington Post Foreign Service
MOSCOW, July 11 -- Outside the Bolshoi Theater a few weeks ago, a youth
group affiliated with President Vladimir Putin staged an unusual
demonstration, protesting a planned new opera. Earlier, the group, called
Marching Together, whose members wore T-shirts bearing the image of Putin,
also demonstrated outside the Ministry of Culture, denouncing a new book.
The object of their anger in both cases was Vladimir Sorokin, a popular
Russian author whose prose -- profane, bizarre and grotesque -- has drawn a
devoted following. The Putin youth group condemned Sorokin's work,
including the libretto to the new opera, as pornography. At the
demonstration, they displayed posters quoting Sorokin's most shocking
prose, while outraged pensioners tore up pages of his novel "Blue Lard" and
threw them into an oversize cardboard toilet.
Today, the Moscow police, acting on a complaint by the youth group,
announced they were opening a criminal case against Sorokin on grounds of
disseminating pornography.
The episode might be seen as another step in Putin's campaign to impose
strict controls on Russian society. But to authors here, the protests had
another meaning. They said the fact that a novel was at issue, and not
politics or economics, was a sure sign that literature is making a popular
comeback in Russia after a decade of uncertainty.
"It was a demonstration about literature, and against literature," mused
Sorokin, sitting in a breezy, spartan Moscow apartment in shorts and a
T-shirt. "I can't imagine an action like that taking place seven years ago."
"Literature exists, it does exist!" enthused Vladimir Makanin, a writer and
chairman of a jury that later this year will choose the winner of the
Booker/Open Russia literary prize, a $12,500 award that is Russia's most
prestigious and is sponsored by a foundation created by a wealthy
businessman. Makanin described today's Russian literature as "like an
ember, it is glowing. Give us some wind, and there will be a fire."
The last year or two has brought a renaissance in fiction, after a long
period of doubt. In the 1990s, as the country sought to find its footing
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many writers wondered if literature
had lost its traditional role in Russian life. With an onrush of
commercialism and competition from television, the first experience of
open, free speech in decades, and simultaneous political and economic
revolutions underway, writers seemed to be as distracted as the rest of the
country.
But now a decade of revolutionary change has calmed a bit, and a writer's
spring is unfolding. Every few months an author captures the country's
imagination, and bookstores are jammed; tables are piled high with
inexpensive paperbacks.
Moreover, a new generation of popular writers has appeared, and they
reflect the enormous changes that have swept the country in the last decade.
For more than a century, writers held a revered place in Russian life.
Literature was at the forefront of opposition to autocracy; writers were
often viewed as the conscience of the nation.
In the Soviet years, rulers went to special lengths to coerce writers to
conform to socialist realism, the style of art and writing that was
sanctioned by the Communist Party and celebrated socialism and the party
line. Writers who obeyed were rewarded with massive print runs, while those
who did not conform were simply unpublished, and some circulated their
works underground. Many were prosecuted and imprisoned, others were exiled.
"In Russian literature a writer is often a teacher," said Makanin. After a
few novels, the writer "starts to lecture people about who to vote for, how
to cook lunch, how to make do. He's only good at writing, but tradition
forces the writer into it.
"Now our young writers are different," he added. "They are acting in a new
space. They don't want to lecture. They think about whether a book is
interesting, and whether it will sell, and whether they have expressed
themselves."
Sorokin, whose books are controversial and described by some as unreadable,
said he never thought of himself as the conscience of society like the
writers of the 19th and 20th centuries.
"It was good that people were reading a lot then," he said. "But it was bad
because it became a big temptation for the writers. Even Tolstoy felt he
was a predictor, and people came to him, as to a saint, and they asked him
questions. How to live? Do I need to marry?
"I never wanted such a role," said Sorokin, 46, who began as an underground
writer in the Soviet era; he was not published openly until after the
Soviet collapse in 1991. "All my life I have been writing for myself and
myself only," he added.
"I have a simple approach: Literature is a narcotic. Without it, we can't
survive, as without art in general. If it's a drug and I am a person
producing a narcotic, then my main task is to make it strong enough and
clean. How they take it, how they distribute it, how they sell it and how
it works -- this is not my business."
Lyudmila Ulitskaya, a writer who won last year's Russian Booker prize and
whose works have been translated into 20 languages, said that Alexander
Solzhenitsyn was the last of the previous generation, "the writer who could
actually change the social process or at least has ambitions for that."
Solzhenitsyn was exiled in the 1970s for his courageous writing about
Soviet prison camps in which millions died; he later returned to Russia
after the Soviet collapse. But today, Ulitskaya said, the role of writer as
conscience "has gone away completely, and today's modern literature looks
very much the same as all over the world."
The best evidence is the extraordinary success of Grigory Chkhartishvili, a
bald, bearded author who once was a scholar and translated Japanese
literature but is now Russia's hottest novelist, writing under the name
Boris Akunin.
He created a fictional late 19th-century detective, Erast Petrovich
Fandorin, whose exploits have topped bestseller lists and sold more than 6
million copies. The Fandorin novels have brought him film deals, including
one just signed with director Paul Verhoeven, and the books are being
translated abroad. In the Russian provinces, where many people live on
meager incomes, the novels are sometimes not sold at street kiosks but lent
for the equivalent of a few pennies, a testament to the huge demand.
Through the 1990s, Russia was awash in pulp fiction, and classics always
were available. But the middle ground was lacking, as was a middle class
that would want good fiction, a cut above the trash novel. Now,
Chkhartishvili appears to have tapped into the niche.
"These are people with an absolutely new mentality that are used to relying
on themselves, not on the government," he said of his readers. "These are
people thinking big of themselves. Besides, most of them have a high level
of education, which means they need to have good-quality leisure. They are
not interested in reading trash."
In Fandorin, Chkhartishvili created a respectable hero, quite unlike the
thick-necked bandits of early 1990s pulp fiction. He said Fandorin is
intended to be the kind of gentleman hero that Russians can aspire to,
rather than find repugnant. Fandorin's story is set in an earlier time,
which many have described as a golden age in Russia, before the Bolshevik
Revolution.
In contrast to Chkhartishvili, many new writers strive for novels that are
daring and experimental in style. Some, like Sorokin, had been circulating
their works underground, then brought them into the sunlight. "Writers with
talent tend to experiment or do something on the margin, to shock and
attract those who want something new," said Masha Lipman, deputy editor of
Ezhenedel'ny Zhurnal, a weekly newsmagazine. "They try to shock and to be
cynical, to write about the obscene and violent -- the last thing they want
is to come across as mundane."
It has been much more difficult for the new generation of writers to
grapple seriously with the upheavals of the last decade -- riotous politics
and rapacious capitalism. But some authors have tried to capture the era,
including Victor Pelevin, whose novel "Generation P" (published in the
United States this year as "Homo Zapiens") was a bestseller here in 1999.
The novel features the adventures of a young man, Tatarsky, who explores
the absurdity of Russia's new market economy as an advertising copywriter.
A friend recruits Tatarsky by saying, according to the English translation:
"This is a very special time. There's never been a time like it and there
will never be again. It's a gold-rush, just like the Klondyke."
Early in the decade, Makanin also explored the great uncertainty about
Russia's future in "Escape Hatch," a novel in which the central character
lives in two different worlds. One is a dark, deserted place where angry
mobs roam the streets, the other a light-filled, prosperous and orderly
cafe society. The character moves between the two worlds by climbing
through a hole in the earth. Makanin wrote the novel as the Soviet Union
was disintegrating, not knowing which way the new Russia would go.
But critics and authors say contemporary Russian literature has yet to
confront the tumultuous times of the last decade.
"After 10 years, people are reflecting on what happened to them," said
Irina Prokhorova, editor of the New Literary Review and a publisher who
began her business a decade ago. "We are only at the start." She suggested
it may take 10 or 20 more years for Russian writers to really dissect what
happened. Right now, "you can't express the feelings of the 1990s. It was
so fantastic. If you want to judge what's happened in Russia, you can't
find it in literature."
The new generation of writers has found many other themes that resonate,
however, and book sales are soaring.
Said Prokhorova, "We are at the center of a cyclone."
For Sorokin, the cyclone meant a recent visit to a police inspector, to
respond to the legal complaint filed by the Putin youth group. He said he
explained, patiently, that his literature was not pornography. "It's
completely stupid," he said of the protest in a radio interview. "It's a
novel, a work of literature. So it uses explicit language and doesn't leave
a lot to the imagination, but that doesn't make it pornography. Literature,
like culture, has to have teeth if it wants to keep pace with the crazy
times we live in. Culture shouldn't be like a neutered tomcat: comfortable,
fat and predictable."
*******
#3
Los Angeles Times
July 12, 2002
Russia Targets Writer in Porn Investigation
By MAURA REYNOLDS, TIMES STAFF WRITER
MOSCOW -- It is safe to say that this is not a prudish city. Here, erotic
dancing is standard restaurant entertainment. Television networks broadcast
frontal nudity during prime time and soft porn after midnight. Some teen
girls describe prostitution as a glamorous profession.
So when Moscow's general prosecutor opened a pornography investigation
Thursday against a prominent writer who has won several literary prizes,
many would be forgiven for considering the move at least inconsistent,
perhaps even hypocritical.
"It is a big book, and there are only two bed scenes in it," said Vladimir
Sorokin, author of the offending tome, "Blue Lard." Sorokin, 46, is a
member of Russia's "postmodern" writers movement. He acknowledges that his
3-year-old book includes foul language and ribald scenes but insists that
its purpose is literary.
"My book is not pornographic," the long-haired, goateed writer said in a
telephone interview. "The goal of pornography is to turn readers on
sexually, whereas my book is a requiem to Russian literature."
"Blue Lard" is a disjointed, surrealistic fantasy laden with obscene
language and literary allusions. Political and literary figures from
various epochs interact, sometimes carnally. They include Josef Stalin,
Adolf Hitler and revered Russian writers such as Fyodor Dostoevsky, Anton
Chekhov and Anna Akhmatova.
Critics have taken particular umbrage at one scene, in which Stalin has sex
with his eventual successor, Nikita S. Khrushchev. But fans point out that
such episodes come across as comical. They compare Sorokin's style to James
Joyce--a cerebral writer who revels in vulgarity.
Except no one claims that Sorokin is on a level with Joyce or even Russia's
heretofore most renowned "pornographic" writer, Vladimir Nabokov.
"Some experts might consider a few of his scenes to be pornographic, but
that alone can't make him a pornographic author," said writer and critic
Alexander Kabakov. "I believe he is too cold-headed for that. He writes
from his head rather than from his emotions. In this sense he has a long
way to go before he could stand next to Henry Miller, for example."
The investigation, on charges of "distributing pornography," is believed to
be the first against a writer in the post-Soviet period. And this being
Russia, most everybody assumes that the anti-Sorokin campaign is part of
some kind of conspiracy.
Despite President Vladimir V. Putin's new pro-Western foreign policy, many
liberals see this as one more sign that social controls are increasing at
home. They point to the fact that officials from the former KGB and its
main successor agency, the Federal Security Service, or FSB, are
increasingly holding top government jobs. Two Russian journalists who asked
"improper" questions during a Putin news conference last month have been
disciplined, with one fired. An FSB spokesman was recently appointed to
serve as "chief of security" at the state television network RTR.
"I see this [investigation] as an indication that what these forces really
want is the resurrection of censorship in Russia," Sorokin said.
The pornography investigation was begun after weeks of campaigning by a
political youth movement called Marching Together. In the most publicized
event, Marching Together activists threw copies of Sorokin's books into an
enormous toilet bowl outside the Bolshoi Theater. The activists said they
were protesting the Bolshoi's decision to commission an opera libretto from
Sorokin.
"This marks the beginning of the moral recuperation of society," said Denis
Zaitsev, spokesman for Marching Together. "We consider the beginning of
this process a sign that the era of marginal writers--who describe in
obscene language all possible perversions and publicly promise to bury our
literature--is coming to an end."
Marching Together is strongly pro-Putin--its logo is a portrait of the
president--which raises the question of whether and to what extent the
anti-Sorokin campaign has Kremlin backing.
"No doubt we are dealing with a political case," said Mikhail Kotomin,
deputy director of Ad Marginem, which published Sorokin's book. "This
should be a very good test for the authorities."
For their part, government officials quickly distanced themselves from the
investigation.
"Literary creation is a very delicate thing," said Culture Minister Mikhail
Y. Shvydkoi. "I wouldn't pose here as an expert. I am not a fan of Sorokin,
but I will protect his right to expression."
Shvydkoi said he believes that the campaign was concocted as a publicity
stunt for Marching Together, a view shared by Kabakov, the critic.
Whether by accident or design, the anti-Sorokin campaign does appear to
work in Putin's favor: It gives his backers a chance to stand for
traditional values while providing the president an opportunity to silence
critics by defending Sorokin's freedom of expression.
At least so far, the campaign seems to be a win-win situation for all
involved, even its putative targets: Sorokin, whose name recognition has
skyrocketed, and his publisher, which has seen sales of "Blue Lard" rise
sharply.
"Thanks to this scandal, we are having quite a good trade in books by
Sorokin," said Yelena Skudina, who operates a book kiosk near a central
Moscow metro station. "I'm selling at least five 'Blue Lards' a day, which
is very good business by our standards."
Sergei L. Loiko of The Times' Moscow Bureau contributed to this report.
*******
#4
Top general appointed to Russia economics ministry
AFP
July 12, 2002
A top Russian general who specializes in the draft and military spending
will be appointed as a deputy to the liberal Economic and Development
Minister German Gref.
General Vladislav Putilin will be put in charge of a secret project aimed
at keeping Russia at a constant state of military readiness, several Moscow
newspapers reported.
A spokesman for Gref's ministry denied Putilin's appointment while a
defense ministry official confirmed to AFP that the general had been
relieved of his previous military post but refused to speculate on his new
assignment.
Russian press reported that Putilin's nomination was backed by Defense
Minister Igor Ivanov, a close ally of President Vladimir Putin who has been
put in charge of drafting the country's military reform program.
"I have not yet spoken to Gref, so I cannot saying anything about this
until I do," Putilin, 55, told the Izvestia daily.
The appointment, if confirmed, is seen by analysts as a government bid to
simplify the complicated relations between the economics ministry and the
military, who frequently bicker over spending and often have divergent
views on reforms.
*******
#5
Novaya Gazeta
No. 49
July 11-14, 2002
INTERIOR MINISTRY OR THE FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE?
Whose class interests do the special agencies represent?
Author: Alexander Golov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
IN GENERAL, THE RICHER PEOPLE ARE, THE HIGHER THEIR CONSUMER STATUS,
THE MORE CHANCES THEY HAVE OF NOTING THE STRENGTHENED INFLUENCE OF THE
SPECIAL AGENCIES. AROUND 39% OF YOUNG MEN AGED BETWEEN 24 AND 29
APPROVE OF THIS INCREASED INFLUENCE OF THE SPECIAL AGENCIES ON LIFE IN
RUSSIA.
As a rule, Russian citizens link their personal security - or the
lack of it - with the activity of the police. Polls done by the
National Public Opinion Research Center (VTSIOM) show that among those
who are satisfied with the performance of the police, 83% feel secure;
while only 14% of the unsatisfied feel secure.
The work of the police is only a part, not the main part, as many
Russians think, in the cause of combating organized crimes in Russia.
The Federal Security Service (FSB) is considered much more efficient.
Two-fifth (40%) supported the FSB as more efficient in this cause, and
one-fourth (24%) gave their votes in favor of the police and the
interior Ministry.
Well-to-do people who can afford durable goods (a TV set, a
refrigerator, etc.) mentioned the strengthened influence of the
Russian special agencies more often than others (46%). In general, the
richer people are, the higher their consumer status, the more chances
they have of noting the strengthened influence of the special
agencies. The poorer the respondent, the more often a decrease of this
influence was mentioned.
Undoubtedly, by no means everybody likes the increased influence
of the special agencies on life in Russia. Even though those who think
"this is definitely bad" only comprise 12%. Among the majority of the
Russians (49%) the increased influence of the special agencies whet
contradictory and mixed feelings: "it is bad in some aspects and good
in others." Each fourth (24%) is certain that "this is definitely
good."
Well-to-do Russians often (46%) notice, but comparatively seldom
(17%) approve of the increased influence of the special agencies. On
the contrary representatives of the "middle part of the middle
stratum" notice it comparatively often (43%) and approve (29%) of this
influence. Quite possibly, the special agencies often represent
interests of this very social stratum or a part of it, which is
insufficiently well-to-do financially. "The lower part of the middle
stratum" approve of the special agencies' activities rather rarer
(21%).
In addition, the special agencies provide jobs, primarily for
young men. People aged between 24 and 29 approve of the increased
influence of the Russian special agencies on the life in Russia most
of all; 39% think "this is definitely good".
(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)
*******
#6
Komsomolskaya Pravda
July 12, 2002
PUTIN'S POLICY: THE DESPERATION OF THE WEAK, OR THE CONFIDENCE OF
THE STRONG?
Russian political experts are pondering Putin's political future
Author: not indicated
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
POLITICAL ANALYST ALEXANDER TSIPKO AND PRESIDENT OF THE POLITIKA
FOUNDATION AND CHAIRMAN OF THE POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY VYACHESLAV NIKONOV ARE EXPRESSING THEIR
POINTS OF VIEW ON VLADIMIR PUTIN'S INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
IN THE LIGHT OF THE UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
People wonder what makes Vladimir Putin leave the Kremlin for
oversea trips so often. Does he feel uncomfortable in the Kremlin?
Does he want to solve all problems by himself? Or has he just started
his election campaign being not sure of his victory in the next
presidential election despite forecasts of sociologists?
We have interviewed two Russian political experts: political
analyst Alexander Tsipko and President of the Politika foundation and
Chairman of the Political Science Department of the International
University Vyacheslav Nikonov.
Alexander Tsipko: Currently, PR campaigns are moving to the
foreground shadowing practical administration of the country because
Putin has failed to find an adequate substitution for propaganda and
the monotonous and disgusting panegyrics in his address.
During the first presidential campaign, this substitute was the
second Chechen war, protection of honor and dignity of the Russian
Army, combating terrorism, and restoration of territorial integrity of
the Russian Federation.
However, we have failed to replace the propaganda by actual
policies (which was not Putin's guilt). Despite liberals' accusations,
Putin has failed to become the powerful head of the country and create
a uniform government center justified by the current situation.
Instead of the division of power into executive and legislative
branches, in reality is has divided in to the power of the legitimate
president and that of the Yeltsin's clan, the so-called "family."
Government has been divided between the Kremlin and the Russian White
House.
The more power is taken by the Kremlin from lawmakers, the more
vivid is the split between the current president and "the family." The
polemics between Yeltsin and Putin in media is a good illustration of
this statement.
In reality, the "family" controlling the Cabinet and consequently
the actual regulation of the economy is more powerful than the current
president.
It is impossible to be the host of the country, in which the main
assets of national companied are deposited abroad and there is a
hunger for investments of foreign companies. Even those innumerous
tycoons who have been banished from the Kremlin have united with
regional princelings and are threatening the Kremlin with conspiracies
and riots. In my opinion, the early start of the second presidential
campaign was provoked not by the power and the plenitude of
administrative resources but by its deficit.
This means that the 2004 presidential election will be
accompanied by more risks, failures, and suspense than two years ago.
The administrative resource of the president is not too great because
of the preservation of the second administrative center in the White
House. The moral and psychological resource based on people's
expectation of a miracle, expectation of the patriotic president able
to raise Russia from its knees, is beginning to dwindle.
Even if the "family" agrees to peace and does not nominate
successful Kasianov as an alternative candidate for president, Putin
will have a very serious rival in the next presidential election. This
time, Putin the Liberal will have to fight the Putin of 2000, i.e. his
former image of "the president of hopes." It is clear that real life
with all its ugliness is doomed to lose the contest with a reckless
hope.
Vyacheslav Nikonov: Putin is most often criticized not for what
he is doing (it is a real bore to analyze his actions). He is mostly
criticized for the discrepancy between his policy and a certain
imaginary or utopist scheme. The president has deceived people's hope
for his becoming the dictator, gaining control of everyone and
everything, and proposing a mobilization model of economy based on
extensive methods and nationalized natural resources.
But the problem is that Putin has a different program and a
different logic, which, in my opinion, is more promising, productive,
and up-to-date.
Putin's prime task is to return Russia into the club of great
powers and return a normal living to people. Russia needs to become
part of the global economic system in order to reach a more rapid
pace, like that in China.
Successful market reforms are hampered by the absence of a normal
market legal environment and many other things. To create this
environment Putin has already passed some laws reducing taxes,
guaranteeing rights to property, including land property, and has
started the judiciary reform. Putin suggests that natural monopolies
be reformed because they raise their tariffs but keep their budgets
non-transparent for the government.
The president has outpaced the rest of the Russian political
elite in the field of understanding realities, since most of this
elite cannot part with the 20th century - still worshiping the
fetishes of enhancement of state regulation, support of ineffecient
sectors of industry, and isolation from the rest of the world.
Now I'd like to say a few words about Putin's "weakness"
allegedly making him start his election campaign so early. Yes, the
president does not control everything in the country. The largest
economic subjects of the Russian Federation function independently of
the president's will, quietly sabotage some of his decisions, and
continue embezzling the treasury. However, which leader has ever
controlled everything? If Stalin had controlled everything, he would
not have conducted repressions. Besides, do we really need one person
controlling everything? Modern administration methods support the
principle of distribution of powers among different levels. The
president should not be concerned with removal of garbage in the town
of Uryupinsk. Russia's problem is not a lack of state oversight, but
too much of it. In the latest rating of economic freedom Russia took
the 116th place out of 120 countries.
Our society has not been disappointed with Putin. If the
presidential election took place today, over half of Russian voters
would have supported him without any election campaign. His main
rival, Gennady Zyuganov, is supported by only 13% of voters. Putin
just does not have adequate rivals.
Thus, he has not even thought of starting an election campaign.
There are some people who would like Putin to be a provincial
socialist dictator. However, he has become a civilized conservative,
like de Gaulle and Reagan. So he has disappointed these people...
(Translated by Kirill Frolov)
*******
#7
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
July 12, 2002
THE GENERAL STAFF RELEASES CRIME STATISTICS
Serious social problems in the Russian Armed Forces
Author: Vladimir Georgiyev
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE FIGURES ON DEATHS IN THE MILITARY HAVE BEEN DECLASSIFIED FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA. THE MILITARY OFFICIALS SEEM TO BE
MOST ALARMED ABOUT THE GROWING NUMBER OF SUICIDES AMONG SERVICEMEN. A
REPORT ON THE NEWS CONFERENCE AT WHICH THESE FIGURES WERE REVEALED.
On July 11 the Defense Ministry released some previously-secret
data on emergency situations in the army and the navy. Lieutenant
General Vasily Smirnov, the chair-in-office of the Main Organization
and Documentation Department and Major General Alexander Moiseyenko,
first deputy head of the Department for Regime and Service of the
Armed Forces, held a joint news conference. According to our sources
at the Defense Ministry, this was part of a broader PR campaign now
being organized by government structures in order to improve the
regime's public image - by the Kremlin's indirect order. Apparently,
those speaking on behalf of the Defense Ministry set similar goals for
their news conference.
Firstly, they denied the statistics about desertion presented by
human rights organizations. For instance, General Smirnov questioned
the source used by the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers for the figure
of 40,000 deserters. "There are much fewer of them," Smirnov said. In
his words, there are now 2,265 deserters on the wanted list. That's
how many have deserted and escaped detention since May 1992. This
year, 2,270 servicemen have deserted. Some of them have been found,
but 860 soldiers who deserted from military units in January-June 2002
are still on the wanted list.
In terms of numbers, this is equivalent to almost two extended
mechanized infantry battalions. The generals tried to put a positive
spin on the information about armed deserters. "This year we have
registered only 18 cases of armed deserters, or 35% fewer than in
2001," Smirnov said. However, neither he nor his colleague managed to
state the reasons why soldiers desert; only saying that "the morale
department is handling those issues." But no officers of the Main
Morale Department attended the news conference, for some reason.
In the meantime, for the first time in post-Soviet Russia the
General Staff has provided detailed figures on deaths among
servicemen. According to Smirnov and Moiseyenko, over the first six
months of 2002 the number of deaths in the service has been reduced in
comparison with 2001. The number of suicides decreased by almost one-
third (by the way, in Russia there are 40 suicides a year per 100,000
civilians, and six per 100,000 in the military). However, this year
the number of deaths among soldiers and officers outside the units is
rising.
The Defense Ministry is concerned about the fact that this year
civilians have caused the deaths of 25 soldiers more than last year
(85 people). The rate of deaths among officers is the highest in
transport. The overall number of suicides among servicemen off duty
has also increased. Last year, 70 soldiers, warrant officers, and
officers committed suicide, whereas this year this figure is 89.
Smirnov and Moiseyenko were unable to say why this happened; even
though six years ago former Defense Minister Igor Rodionov connected
this with social factors and disorder in living conditions. Nowadays
the same thing is happening in the military, according to independent
military analysts.
(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)
*******
#8
CNN
July 12, 2002
China-Russia wargames confirmed
By Willy Wo-Lap Lam
CNN Senior China Analyst
HONG KONG, China (CNN) --Beijing has denied speculation that joint
Chinese-Russian wargames set for next month are aimed at a third country.
Japanese and Hong Kong media have been rife with reports there was an
ulterior motive for the military exercises.
However, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao on Friday
dismissed the reports and said that the joint operation would focus on
"signal communication."
"The purpose of the military exercises is to test the reliability of signal
communication ... so as to prevent possible dangerous military activities
in the border areas and maintain peace and stability in the region,"
official media on Friday quoted Liu as saying.
Liu added that reports in overseas media which suggested the maneuvers were
aimed at a third country were "untrue and [circulated] with an ulterior
motive."
Border treaty
China and Russia signed in 1994 a treaty on the prevention of dangerous
military activities in areas along the two nations' boundary.
Liu said the two armies had in recent years held platoon-level drills to
improve communication.
He added similar exercises would be held in border areas in the Inner
Mongolia region in mid-August.
Diplomatic analysts in Beijing said while the Chinese leadership was
anxious to dispel speculation it was using the Russian card against the
U.S., China has been active cultivating the Russians.
The analysts said Beijing was disturbed by recent signs of Moscow's tilt
toward the U.S. and Europe, including the formation of a NATO-Russian
council on security matters.
Arms sales
One way Beijing is pursuing to boost ties with its erstwhile ally is to buy
arms from the foreign exchange-strapped country.
Chinese military officers told foreign reporters who toured a base outside
the east China city of Tianjin earlier this week that Beijing would be
buying more sophisticated Russian weapons.
Among recent procurements is the state-of-the-art AA12 air-to-air missiles,
which were recently tested during routine army maneuvers along the
southeast coast.
The Chinese Air Force is also due to purchase more Su-27 and Su-30 jet
fighters.
Western military analysts say about 48 advanced-model Su-30 jets will be
delivered to China in the coming year or so.
******
#9
Swiss Accept Part of Blame for Crash
July 12, 2002
By OLIVER SCHMALE
UEBERLINGEN, Germany (AP) - Switzerland conceded Friday that its air
traffic controllers were at least partly to blame for the collision of a
Russian charter jet and a cargo plane over Germany, and admitted lapses in
handling the aftermath of the crash, which killed 71 people.
At a memorial ceremony near the crash site in southern Germany, Swiss
Transport Minister Moritz Leuenberger sought to address Russian anger about
early statements from Swiss air traffic control that appeared to blame the
pilot of the Bashkirian Airlines plane, whose passengers included 45 school
students headed for a Spanish beach vacation.
``The confrontation with the terrible notion of being part of the cause of
the death of 71 people led us into helpless initial reactions, to confused
and confusing information, to lapses,'' Leuenberger said, expressing
condolences to the victims on behalf of Switzerland. ``Not every one of us
found the right words.''
Meanwhile, Swiss President Kaspar Villiger canceled plans to attend a
funeral Saturday in Russia for children killed in the collision after
authorities said they could not guarantee his security because of strong
emotions in the region, the Swiss Embassy in Russia said.
Switzerland is ready to offer compensation to the victims and will
cooperate fully in the German-led investigation into the July 1 crash,
Leuenberger said at the German ceremony attended by leaders from the
Russian region where the plane was from.
``Your pain is our pain, your suffering is our suffering,'' Leuenberger
said. ``Switzerland wants to see cause and responsibility brought to light.
It will make every effort to help establish the truth.''
Immediately after the crash, the Swiss said they had told the Russian pilot
several times to descend and received only one reply. German investigators
who listened to the black box recordings said the Russian pilot was
receiving contradictory instructions from the on-board warning system,
which told him to climb, and from the Swiss control tower, which said to
descend.
The pilot appeared to have heeded the control tower's instructions to
descend when it was repeated about 15 seconds after receiving the
contradictory instructions.
Had the pilot obeyed the cockpit warning instruction to climb, which was
issued simultaneously with instructions to the DHL plane to descend,
experts believe the crash would have been averted.
German investigators said Thursday that experts examining the wreckage
found no evidence of technical problems in the planes so far, but won't
close that part of the investigation for another two weeks.
******
#10
The Guardian (UK)
July 12, 2002
Crash exposes conflict in pilot rules
Conflict on pilot rules exposed
John Hooper in Berlin and Nick Paton Walsh in Moscow
The lives of air travellers around the world are being put at risk because
Russian pilots are flying by rules different from those followed in the
rest of Europe.
A lethal grey area has emerged in the aftermath of last week's mid-air
collision over Lake Constance in Germany between a Russian airliner and a
DHL cargo plane. The Guardian has established that both pilots were acting
in a way they had been told was correct.
European officials insist that international rules oblige pilots to follow
the orders of their onboard systems, and ignore conflicting advice from air
traffic control. But Russian officials this week insisted that their pilots
were expected to consider both the orders of air traffic control and
onboard systems before making their own decision.
Investigators at Braunschweig in Germany into last week's crash have
focused on the seconds before the collision. This week they said that the
planes' recovered flight recorders showed the Russian captain had ignored
the advice of his onboard collision warning system and instead followed
instructions given to him by Swiss air traffic control. In doing so, he put
his plane, with 69 passengers, including 52 schoolchildren, on a collision
course with the cargo flight.
Forty-four seconds before the crash, the Russian pilot's onboard aircraft
collision avoidance system (Acas) gave him a top-level emergency warning,
ordering the aircraft to climb. Simultaneously, the DHL plane's system,
which would be in communication with the one onboard the Russian aircraft,
told it to dive.
The flight recorders showed that one second later the air traffic
controller in Zurich -who would not have known about the Acas commands -
told the Russian pilot to dive. The order was repeated 14 seconds later.
The Russian captain, Alexander Gross, responded to the second instruction
from the ground and the two aircraft hurtled into one another at 35,000ft.
John Law, the project manager for the Acas system at the European air
traffic control centre, Eurocontrol, said instructions on procedures to
avoid aircraft collision were set out in International Civilian Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) documents.
One document - Acas performance-based training objectives - stipulates that
in the event of a clash between the instruction given by air traffic
control and a high-level alert from the onboard Acas system - known as a
resolution advisory - "the pilot should follow the resolution advisory".
"The performance-based training objectives were sent out to all states by
an ICAO state letter in 1997. The Russians will have received the ICAO
guidance," Mr Law said.
But his version of the rules was challenged by Yuri Tarshin, the head of
the department of aviation standards at the Russian ministry of transport.
"Russian aviation companies who fly in Europe do so under European rules,"
Mr Tarshin said. "In European rules for training of pilots, you can find
nowhere where it says what is the priority [system to be obeyed in such
incidents]. The decision is up to the main pilot. He has to take into
account all the information, particularly when there is a resolution advisory.
"We follow the European standards of the countries in whose airspace we
fly. If we had a document saying that the pilot should, in any case, obey
the signals of the Acas, then we would follow it. But that document does
not exist."
He said the issue was dealt with in a "low-level" document.
But John Law insisted: "I would not call [the training document] a
low-level document. To me there is no confusion."
*******
#11
World Press Review
www.worldpress.org
August 2002
Back from the Abyss
Russia's Fragile Recovery
Eric Chol, with Alla Chevelkina, L’Express (centrist newsmagazine), Paris,
France, May 23, 2002
Spurred by current oil prices, the Russian economy has taken off. The
stores are never empty and the oligarchs have turned over a new leaf.
This past April 25, at the crack of dawn, Mikhail Khodorkovsky left Moscow
to attend a colloquium in Paris. It will be a chance for the head of Yukos,
the most profitable oil company in Russia, to meet with other participants,
who include Qatar’s minister of energy and the head of TotalFinaElf. He
will also answer questions from journalists who will be pressing around him
in far greater numbers than last year. This is because Khodorkovsky, who in
a few years has become the richest man in Russia, (worth US$3.7 billion),
is an enigma.
The former oligarch, once accustomed to crooked financial deals, is now
being wooed by the full array of foreign investors. Not satisfied with
having transformed his group into a veritable cash machine, he himself has
donned the garb of “Mr. Clean.”
The great cleanup has begun, and time is pressing for the promise made by
Vladimir Putin when he took power—to attain, in 15 years—the same living
standard as Portugal. For the time being, he can count on an economic
situation that seems very rosy indeed, but things could become gloomier if
the price of a barrel of oil were to drop again.
In the Moscow suburb Teply Stan, a constant procession of cranes and trucks
is completing the construction of the largest shopping mall in Eastern
Europe. But, even now, free shuttles cross the city’s ring road to pick up
customers from the nearest metro stops. The more well-heeled customers have
parked their Ladas, Peugeots, or Fiats in the gigantic parking lot.
Since Dec. 14, 2001, when the IKEA store opened, the crowds haven’t
dissipated. With its pine shelves and children’s beds, the Swedish brand
has become a big hit in Moscow, so much so that it has broken records for
the number of visitors.
Thanks to renewed economic growth, Russians are recovering from a serious
hangover and are once again finding their appetite as consumers. In Moscow,
even the luxury boutiques are coming back. On April 17, a pack of
photographers elbowed its way through to catch a glimpse of the bevy of
stars invited for the opening of the Bulgari store.
Less glamorous, but more revealing, are the register tills at the Seventh
Continent supermarket chain, which, to the great joy of Vladimir
Yaroshevsky, fill up with rubles. At the age of 34, this former Russian
diplomat recently began running the premier retail distribution chain in
Moscow, with 25 stores. “The purchasing power of our customer base has
surpassed the level before the 1998 crisis,” he asserts. The result is that
sales, which reached US$200 million, are growing at an annual rate of 50
percent! Once the reserve of Moscow’s elite, the chain offers a variety of
products stamped “Made in Russia,” which are much more affordable than
foreign brands, thanks to the ruble’s devaluation.
All of this is filling up the order books of local producers. Thus, Belaya
Dacha (the White Dacha), a prosperous small business on the outskirts of
Moscow, sees its tomatoes, lettuce, and eggplant selling like mad. “After
the 1998 crisis, the company was headed straight for bankruptcy. But our
customers now understand that it is a lot more advantageous to grow produce
in Russia than to import fresh produce from foreign countries,” comments
Vladimir Landishev, the young head of this former collective farm converted
into a shareholder corporation.
In 1993, when privatization was getting under way, specialists from Belaya
Dacha were sent to the Netherlands, Finland, and Israel to study
cultivation methods, and all superfluous jobs were eliminated. Under
Landishev’s leadership, yields have doubled: 40 kilograms of tomatoes per
square meter, compared to 16 five years ago.
Belaya Dacha is not the only Russian producer to benefit from the crisis.
In the food sector, the Wimm-Bill-Dann group, a completely Russian firm
despite its name, has become the king of yogurt and fruit juice. So much so
that it has begun to lure foreign investors: In early February, the company
was listed on the New York Stock Exchange with great fanfare. Danone took
advantage of this opening to acquire 4 percent of the company.
But isn’t it true that the Russian economy is too dependent on black gold?
After all, oil is largely responsible for Russia’s economic resurgence. No
sooner had he come to power than Putin benefited from the rising price in
oil: From $10 per barrel in 1998, it has hovered about an average of $23
per barrel for the past three years.
With 1 million barrels more per day than two years ago, the country has
become the number-one producer of crude oil in the world, ranking ahead of
Saudi Arabia. This did not fail to have an impact on the tax revenues of
the country, which have tripled since 1999. The money from petroleum has
made possible the stabilization of public finances and paying down a
portion of Russia’s debt.
“The manna from oil revenues has also helped to calm social tensions: The
population’s income grew 6 percent last year, after increasing by 9 percent
in 2000,” notes Otto Latsis, the deputy editor of the daily Novye
Izvestiya. As for Putin, he has benefited from the return to a degree of
political stability, managing to get some reforms passed regarding taxes,
the justice system, and land privatization.
“In four years, the situation has turned around completely,” asserts
William Browder, the head of Hermitage Capital Management. “At that time,
the prices for raw materials were at their lowest point; the regime was
threatened by political instability; Russia was cut off from foreign
financing; a feeling of inertia and pessimism was pervasive. Today, not
only is the economic climate more favorable, but on a scale of 1 to 10, the
government deserves a grade of 11 for its reforms.”
True, the Wild West feel has not totally vanished, and the security
companies still have many bright days before them. Similarly, it is still
inadvisable for Russian journalists to take too great an interest in
certain matters. At the end of April, the editor in chief of a newspaper in
the Volga River town of Togliatti, who was looking into a corruption
scandal, was found dead in his car, his body riddled with bullets.
Yet, the rule of law is finally emerging. The paradox is to see it taking
hold where you least expect it: in the large companies that are in the
hands of the Russian oligarchs, the very ones who divvied up among
themselves the country’s riches during privatization.
Khodorkovsky is one of them. His 38-year journey, recounted in rich detail
by the U.S. journalist David E. Hoffman, is a saga of the Russian
oligarchs. [Hoffman’s book The Oligarchs was published this past January by
PublicAffairs.—WPR] The former Komsomol (Communist youth) official first
became a smuggler, then went on to become a banker, a government adviser,
and finally, an industrialist.
The Russian took advantage of his influence to gain control of Yukos’ oil
fields for next to nothing ($350 million) during privatization in 1995. By
pressuring and threatening the min-ority shareholders and taking advantage
of the shady accounting of the time, he imposed his will—sometimes
brutally—pushing aside anyone who got in the way.
There was a time when the name Yukos had a sinister ring. Hoffman recounts
how Khodorkovsky, after taking over, sent out a force of 300 armed men to
take possession of the wells and refineries in Siberia. And how he took
advantage of the 1998 crisis to get out of paying his creditors in the
West, all the while carefully squirreling away the company’s money in tax
havens.
Today, the company headed by Khodorkovsky is not merely extremely wealthy.
It has the highest market capitalization in the country ($24.6 billion as
of May 17); on revenue of $7.4 billion in 2001, it had $3.7 billion in
profits. Still, it has cleaned up its image, thus becoming the country’s
model corporation.
This is a revolution that is easily explained. First of all, the arrival of
Putin in the Kremlin has reshuffled the cards. Mistrustful of Russian
capitalists, the former KGB colonel made himself quite clear. “Shortly
after his election in March 2000, he summoned some 50 business leaders to
the Kremlin,” recounts Chris Weafer, chief of research at Troika Dialog, a
Moscow brokerage firm. “He gave them two years to clean up their act, pay
their taxes, and obey the law. In return, he promised that he would not
launch any witch hunts.”
Two years later, with the exception of Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir
Gusinsky, two billionaires who went into exile, the oligarchs have no
regrets. True, they no longer call the shots in the Kremlin, as they did in
Yeltsin’s time, but their economic power has been strengthened. “About 20
of them control 40 percent of the gross national product and 90 percent of
Russia’s exports,” says Andrei Ryabov, a political researcher at the
Carnegie Center in Moscow.
There remains the question of opening up Yukos to foreigners. The group’s
main shareholders, Khodorkovsky in particular, have announced that they
want to reduce their holdings from 63 to 51 percent. Khodorkovsky, the
first to make the transition to transparency, is first in line, of course.
Why so much eagerness? Quite simply, the motivations have changed. “Under
Yeltsin, the oligarchs were in a race to grab up the country’s assets,”
explains Jim Henderson of Renaissance Capital investment bank. “It was a
matter of getting the companies to generate as much money as possible as
quickly as possible, so their rivals would not end up gobbling everything
up. Today, they have time on their side, and they can think about long-term
strategies.”
Already, growth in recent years is showing signs of running out of steam.
After reaching 8.3 percent in 2000, and 5.3 percent in 2001, it is expected
to fall to 3.2 percent this year. The government’s room for maneuvering is
narrowing while reform projects are only just being implemented. And there
is a huge amount that remains to be done, with the Kremlin’s first target
being the bureaucracy inherited from the Soviet era. While the number of
public officials has decreased on the federal level, the regional ranks
have swelled, slowing down every initiative and blocking the implementation
of reforms.
Under such conditions, we can well understand why the level of foreign
investment remains exceptionally low: less than $30 per inhabitant, in
contrast to $250 per inhabitant in Poland or $460 in the Czech Republic.
Aware of the difficulties, Putin has set as a priority Russia’s accession
to the World Trade Organization by 2004. Is this simply a polite gesture
for the White House, just a few days before President George W. Bush’s
visit to the Kremlin? No, because the head of state of Russia, where 40
million inhabitants live below the poverty level, understands that if he
wants to keep the promise he made in December 1999, i.e., to catch up to
Portugal by 2015, he no longer has any choice.
The Troika Dialog firm has done the calculations. At present, the annual
income per capita in Russia is $2,300, a fifth that of Portugal. With a
4-percent growth rate, Russia will have to wait until 2065 to surpass
Portugal. If it manages to spur its growth rate to 8 percent per year, it
can expect to catch up in 20 years as long as the oil continues to flow
abundantly.
******
#12
From: keston.institute@keston.org
Subject: KNS RUSSIA: Mari paganism - traditional religion or destructive cult?
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002
KESTON INSTITUTE, OXFORD, UK
KESTON NEWS SERVICE: 11.00, 12 July 2002
Reporting on violations of religious liberty and on religion in
communist and post-communist lands.
I. RUSSIA: MARI PAGANISM - HISTORICAL CONFESSION
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES. Despite being accorded "respect" by
Russia's 1997 law on religion, paganism in the republic of Mari-El
(approximately 500 miles or 800 kilometres east of Moscow) is
struggling to acquire legal status. During the Soviet period, religious
rites were permitted only in worship buildings, and, since Mari pagans
did not possess any worship buildings, they were unable to register.
They registered in 1991 in Moscow but under the 1997 law must
register again as a local religious organisation. Until they do, they
have no legal status and so cannot have their sacred groves formally
returned to them. Organisational problems are the main obstacle, Mari
anthropologist Nikandr Popov told Keston News Service, especially
the difficulty for the mainly rural pagan elders of coping with the
complex registration process.
II. MARI PAGANISM: TRADITIONAL RELIGION OR
DESTRUCTIVE CULT? (first published in Russian on 11 July 2002
on the religious affairs website of Russian Journal
(http://religion.russ.ru) The Moscow Patriarchate is obliged by
Russia's 1997 law on religion to respect historical paganism, but in
accordance with Orthodox belief, it would do the exact opposite. In
the republic of Mari-El, the Orthodox have reservations about being
obliged to respect a religion which, were it not for its claim to
traditional status, they would surely rank as a destructive cult. The
local bishop told Keston News Service he viewed the revival of
paganism as having taken place "purely on political grounds" - as a
way of bolstering Mari nationhood and with it Mari-El's justification
for relative autonomy from Moscow. The Mari republican authorities
are unequivocal in their support for "the ancient Mari religion", but a
local Baptist pastor ascribed the high rate of suicide in the republic to
the strength of local paganism.
I. RUSSIA: MARI PAGANISM - HISTORICAL CONFESSION
WITHOUT PRIVILEGES
by Geraldine Fagan, Keston News Service
Despite being accorded "respect" by Russia's 1997 law on religion
(see separate KNS article), paganism in the republic of Mari-El
(approximately 500 miles or 800 kilometres east of Moscow) is
struggling to acquire legal status.
The main reason for this, admits Mari anthropologist Nikandr Popov,
is the weak organisational skills of the pagans themselves. The 1997
law favours those with long-established religious structures and
resources, he indicated to Keston News Service in an interview in the
Mari capital, Ioshkar-Ola, on 31 May. "There are no official
obstructions to registration, but it has to be within the law, and that
makes things hard." Specifically, he explained, it is difficult for the
elders of the pagan community - the karts or priests - to get to grips
with the complex registration process, since "they aren't used to legal
questions." While the karts all lived in the countryside, for example,
Popov pointed out that constant liaison with the authorities regarding
their registration application meant the burden of frequent travel to
Ioshkar-Ola.
Another problem, according to Popov, is posed by the splintered
nature of the pagan movement after decades of Soviet persecution.
"Mari pagans weren't officially registered anywhere until 1991, so
there were no documents of any kind." Until perestroika under
Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, he told Keston, the organisers of
prayer meetings could end up in prison: "Those who took care of any
left-over donations for sacrificial animals between prayer meetings
were accused of theft." During the 1970s, moreover, "increased effort
was put into destroying sacred groves - directors of collective farms
were ordered by Communist Party bosses to destroy them." Keston
was shown one such grove just outside Ioshkar-Ola, the trees of half
of which had been felled and a small electricity installation put in their
place to prevent further use of the site.
Popov pointed out to Keston that, in accordance with Soviet law,
religious rites were permitted only in worship buildings, and, since
Mari pagans did not possess any worship buildings, they were unable
to register. Today, he complained, this vicious circle works in reverse:
since Mari pagans are nowhere registered, they do not have legal
status and so cannot have their sacred groves formally returned to
them. With the pagans' loss of legal status following the 1997 law,
said Popov, the legal document giving them a major site near Ioshkar-
Ola, Oak Grove, became void.
The Mari pagan community did register as an organisation -
"Oshmari-Chimari" - in 1991, according to Popov, but this was done
in Moscow. Re-registration under the 1997 law presupposes that the
Mari pagan community would submit its application to the Mari-El
regional authority as a local religious organisation - since the Mari
pagans are not resident in Moscow, they could not simply re-register
their organisation there.
By 1997, however, Popov told Keston, a conflict had in any case
arisen between one of the original leaders of Oshmari-Chimari,
Aleksei Yakimov, and another claimant to the title of head kart,
Aleksandr Tanygin: "They argued for so long they didn't give in
material [for re-registration]." Speaking to Keston on 31 May,
Yakimov maintained that, under a slightly different title, he intended
to register Oshmari-Chimari anew, since "it doesn't look good if the
national religion is sidelined." However, he said, "according to the law
it is very difficult for small religions to make their way."
According to Popov, there are currently no obstructions from the state
to pagan worship, "but it will be more difficult for karts to carry out
their work without registration." For example, he said, Orthodox
culture could well be introduced as a subject into state schools, "in
which case there will be parents wanting the traditional faith to be
taught, but we would need to register at the very least in order to sign
a contract with the local education ministry".
Mari-El's official dealing with religious affairs, Valentina Kutasova,
insisted that, although the sacred groves had not been returned to
believers, they were protected as "monuments of the natural
landscape" in a general catalogue of historical and cultural monuments
maintained by the republic's Ministry of Culture. "You are not allowed
to uproot anything there," she told Keston on 31 May. Yakimov
mentioned to Keston his desire to build a temple for winter pagan
worship in Ioshkar-Ola itself, but Kutasova said there would not be
state support for this project. Notwithstanding the pagans' lack of
organisational ability, she said, "people still need to put their work and
effort into a place of worship – if the state builds a church or temple,
who will go there?" (END)
II. MARI PAGANISM: TRADITIONAL RELIGION OR
DESTRUCTIVE CULT?
This article by Keston News Service's Moscow correspondent was
first published in Russian on 11 July 2002 on the religious affairs
website of Russian Journal (http://religion.russ.ru)
by Geraldine Fagan
In accordance with Russia's 1997 law on religion - for which it
lobbied - the Moscow Patriarchate is obliged to respect historical
paganism. In accordance with Orthodox belief, however, it would do
the exact opposite.
The 1997 law's preamble states that religions "constituting an
inseparable part of the historical heritage of Russia's peoples" are to be
accorded respect. The law's official commentary specifies that such
religions include "ancient pagan cults, which have been preserved or
are being revived in the republics of Komi, Mari-El, Udmurtia,
Chuvashia, Chukhotka and several other subjects of the Russian
Federation."
This state of affairs does not appear to cause disquiet at the highest
level of the Russian Orthodox Church, however. At the consecration
of Ioan (Timofeyev) as bishop of the newly-created diocese of
Ioshkar-Ola and Mari-El in 1993, Patriarch Aleksi II pointed out that
Protestant missionaries pose a great danger to the republic but
emphasised that local beliefs should be respected.
Unlike in western Europe, paganism among the Mari constitutes an
unbroken tradition rather than a New Age construction. Mari
anthropologist Nikandr Popov points out that pagan prayer meetings
were permitted by decree during the Second World War - with
collections being made for the front – and survived subsequent Soviet
attempts to suppress them. Today Mari pagans gather together for
approximately 20 festivals annually, at which they offer animal
sacrifices in specially designated sacred groves. There are now 360
such groves in the republic and around 120 karts (pagan priests),
according to one of the claimants to the title of head kart, Aleksei
Yakimov.
Formerly chairman of Mari Ushem ("Union"), a Mari national
organisation, Popov is assisting the pagan movement by deepening the
karts' knowledge of pre-revolutionary pagan traditions since "they
often didn't used to think about what was being done, or why it was
being done." Popov stresses the benefits he believes the Mari draw
from their faith: "There is a great richness in the ancient belief - it
allows direct communion with the cosmos, which pagans call God,
and emphasises the preservation of nature."
The benefits of paganism are disputed, however. According to local
Baptist pastor Timothy Gerega, Mari-El has the highest suicide rate in
the CIS – up to 17 a week - which he ascribes to the strength of local
paganism. "There are usually two rival groupings, each with their own
kart, in every village," he says. "The karts are constantly putting
curses upon the other faction." In addition to prayer gatherings, Popov
admits, traditional Mari pagan practices include magic healing and
witchcraft (koldovstvo).
Locally, the Orthodox also have reservations about being obliged to
respect a religion which, were it not for its claim to traditional status,
they would surely rank as a destructive cult. In an interview with
Keston News Service on 31 May, Bishop Ioan described pagan
gatherings as "occult perversions of traditional paganism." Despite the
fact that elements of Russia's 1997 law on religion kept the Orthodox
"in a certain place," he said, they nevertheless related to paganism in
Mari-El "as our consciences dictate - we regard individuals with
respect, but view paganism negatively. There cannot be any question
when we are talking about the truth – there cannot be multiple truths."
Bishop Ioan is particularly concerned about support given to Mari-El
"as a sort of pagan reservation" by scholars from fellow Finno-Ugric
nations Finland and Hungary. "We cannot return to the Stone Age, but
that is what they want. When people take up neopaganism in Europe
they view it as an experiment, but for me it means the loss of people."
Asked whether he was able to express his views openly, Bishop Ioan
pointed out that the 1997 law on religion outlawed incitement to
religious hatred. "I can say what I like if I am asked in private," he
said, "but I cannot criticise pagan representatives openly."
While Nikandr Popov confirmed that Bishop Ioan is not particularly
outspoken about paganism, he maintained that there are some
Orthodox priests "active in that line." Initially stating that "a certain
threat" to the pagans' sacred groves came from representatives of the
Orthodox Church, Popov admitted that he did not know for a fact who
was responsible, but went on to describe serious damage carried out to
one of the major pagan sites, Oak Grove, last year. "They sawed into a
very important 100-year-old oak – a very deep cut - so that it would
dry out. What blasphemy!"
The Mari republican authorities are unequivocal in their support for
paganism - or, in the words of the local official dealing with religious
affairs, Valentina Kutasova, "the ancient Mari religion". Paganism is
officially one of the republic's traditional religions alongside
Orthodoxy and Islam, and the leaders of all three are regularly invited
to state events. (With some glee, Aleksei Yakimov related to Keston
that the Orthodox had not wanted to see the pagans represented during
Patriarch Aleksi's official visit to Mari-El in 1993, "but we got in all
the same!") Leaders of the three traditional Mari religions are also,
says Kutasova, members of a state body which meets every quarter in
order to discuss implementation of the 1997 law on religion in the
republic. It is in accordance with this law, she maintains, that the Mari
authorities "work to prevent the traditional religions from opposing
one another," and not due to some local policy.
Bishop Ioan, however, disagrees, seeing the revival of paganism to
have taken place "purely on political grounds" - as a way of bolstering
Mari nationhood and with it Mari-El's justification for relative
autonomy from Moscow. To some extent Popov confirms this view.
"Without the Mari religion our people might die," he says. "I don't see
any other institution which would preserve them. The statehood which
we were given does not protect our people." Here the 1997 law on
religion is on the pagans' side. Asked if the Orthodox posed any threat
to Mari paganism, Yakimov laughed. "They once threw us out of a
building, five years ago," he said. "But they can't do anything against
us as they don't have the right to." (END)
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