Johnson's Russia List
#6349
11 July 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Moscow Times editorial: Report Only Reinforces the Rip Off.
(re Moscow cost of living)
2. BBC: Ale Ritson, Ikea builds Russian mega-mall.
3. Wall Street Journal: Mark Schoofs, Russian AIDS Epidemic May Shift To
New Population, Study Suggests.
4. Dow Jones/AP: Russian Rights Grps To End Monthly Meetings In Chechnya.
5. AFP: Sign of the times in troubled Russia.
6. National Review Online: David Satter, Not So Quick. Is Russia really
becoming part of the West?
7. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Maxim Glinkin, TERMS IN OFFICE WILL BE TIMED BY
THE KREMLIN CHIMES. Russia heads back into feudalism.
8. Argumenty i Fakty: THE NUMBER OF REGIONS MAY BE REDUCED. Some of
Russia's regions may merge over the next year or two.
9. Civil Society and Governance Programme.
10. Wall Street Journal: Guy Chazan, Russia Passes Law to Protect Firms
From Rigged Bankruptcy.
11. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Columnist Urges Viewing Chinese Migrants As
Benefit for Russian Economy.
12. The Guardian (UK): Tom Service, Opera. The Embalmer.
13. The Times (UK): Alexander Anichkin, Villains of the peace. In Western
eyes, Russia is a third-rate, sloppy, inept nation.
14. Newsday: Liam Pleven, Russia Shifts Ties With Iraq. Oil firms seek
deals in West.
15. The Spectator (UK): Democracy: who needs it? Turkmenistan may not be
a free country, says Katie Grant, but there is no trash culture, no graffiti,
and the people are happy.
16. Moscow News: Vadim Rechkalov, Sausage, Shahid's Dream. A new generation
of fighters has grown in the Chechen mountains - they had barely turned 10
when the war began.]
*******
#1
Moscow Times
July 11, 2002
Editorial
Report Only Reinforces the Rip Off
Earlier this week, Geneva-based Mercer Human Resource Consulting released
its annual cost-of-living survey, which ranks Moscow as the most expensive
city in Europe and the second most expensive in the world (after Hong Kong).
This comes on top of a "quality of life survey" earlier in the year,
ranking Moscow at 150 out of 215 cities worldwide.
A press release informs us of the noble raison d'etre of the survey: "The
information is used by governments and major companies to protect the
purchasing power of their employees when transferred abroad."
Just to provide a taster, the 12-page report on Moscow states that the
cheapest unfurnished 1-bedroom apartment fit for expat habitation costs
$1,900, while prepayment of three to 12 months' rent is the norm according
to a handy footnote. And if the price sounds a bit on the high side, try to
guess who so magnanimously supplied the information: four Moscow-based real
estate agents (whose phone numbers are helpfully included).
Keep on leafing and you can learn more weird and wonderful things such as
that the cheapest an expat can get a local newspaper for is $3.30 (maybe
the decimal point slipped).
And in the section on business travel expenses, we are told that a taxi
ride "from airport to city" (presumably Sheremetyevo) will set you back
somewhere between $50 to $70. But this time, there are no handy footnotes
explaining that if you side-step the taxi mafia, you can get a perfectly
comfortable ride for $20.
Overall the report leaves itself wide open to accusations of being highly
misleading and contributing to the ridiculously inflated prices that are a
very real part of Moscow life.
While it may help to pad the housing allowances, hardship allowances and
expense accounts of expat businessmen and foreign diplomats, and while it
certainly does a huge service to greedy real estate agents, restaurant
owners and the taxi racket -- it does an equally huge disservice to just
about everyone else living in Moscow (as well as to the taxpayer back home)
by helping to sustain artificially high prices and reinforcing the status quo.
And it does precious little to protect the "purchasing power" of poor expat
businessmen and government employees once they arrive in Moscow from the
numerous scams and rip offs that go on.
Meanwhile, for the average Muscovite news that their city has once again
been ranked second most expensive city in the world would no doubt be met
with detached bemusement.
*******
#2
BBC
10 July 2002
Ikea builds Russian mega-mall
By Alex Ritson
reporting from Moscow
Construction work is well underway on the biggest shopping complex Russia has
ever seen.
Moscow's $250m (£161m) mega-mall will open in December, and promises to be
one of the biggest innovations for local shoppers since the arrival of the
city's first McDonalds fast food restaurant more than a decade ago.
And once again, an international retailing giant is calling the shots - the
project is the brainchild of the Swedish furniture group, Ikea.
"There will be shops everywhere," said Claes-Goran Dyhlen, the man in charge
of building the mega mall.
The figures speak for themselves - there will be a hypermarket, 250 shops,
two kilometres of shop fronts, a skating rink, and Russia's biggest cinema
complex.
Those two-hundred-and-fifty retailers will be paying rent to the Swedish
furniture giant, Ikea.
Swedish success
It built its first store in Moscow just two years ago.
Spokesman Peter Odlund says the mega-mall is a fascinating experiment.
"We have noticed that when we build an Ikea store, very shortly thereafter we
have an entourage of retailers surrounding us, because Ikea manages to draw
from a great area," Mr Odlund said.
"We have people driving four hours and here in Moscow they even come from St
Petersburg," he said.
Ikea believes the centre will attract between 25 and 40 million visitors a
year.
'A great economy'
That would be highly lucrative if the mega-mall were in Europe, or North
America, but in Russia the average wage is barely $150 a month.
That is not a problem, according to Peter Odlund.
"I think it is a well known fact that most Russians have one official job,
and have six others. It's a great economy here," he said.
"Our projection for our first store was that we would reach $60m turnover
after three years - we reached $100m in the first year."
That optimism seems to be shared by the centre's prospective tenants.
Retail tales
Already signed up are international brand names including fashion chains such
as Tommy Hilfiger, Levi's and Reebok.
Martin Shankland runs the Russian operations of the German sportswear chain
Adidas and claims Russia's retail economy is finally coming of age.
"At trading centres in Moscow, there's lots of shops and things to buy but
you wouldn't want to spend the day there," he said.
"This project brings the opportunity to the retailer to attract families for
a whole day."
The mega-mall's 150,000 square metres of shops are due to open two weeks
before Christmas.
It is only then that Ikea will be in a position to judge whether its
investment of a quarter of a billion dollars was money well spent.
*******
#3
Wall Street Journal
July 11, 2002
Russian AIDS Epidemic May Shift To New Population, Study Suggests
By MARK SCHOOFS
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
BARCELONA, Spain -- New statistics from Russia suggest that the
skyrocketing rate of HIV infection among drug users may be slowing, but
research presented at an AIDS conference here suggests that an epidemic of
sexually transmitted infections may be looming.
Russia is a major focus of attention and fear because the annual number of
new infections with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, soared from 1996 to
2001. Meteoric increases aren't uncommon in HIV epidemics among intravenous
drug users, because sharing used syringes is a much more efficient method
of transmitting the virus than sexual intercourse. As many as 90% of
Russia's infections appear to be caused through intravenous drug use, which
rose amid social dislocation caused by the collapse of the former Soviet
Union.
New data from the federal AIDS center in Moscow through July 1 show that
the annualized number of registered new HIV infections has fallen from
87,000 last year to about 42,000. If this trend continues, it could
indicate that the spread of HIV in the country is slowing. But it might
also mean that the Russian HIV surveillance system isn't looking at the
population into which the virus is spreading.
That is why researchers from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and the Russian Association for STI Prevention looked at
homeless shelters in Moscow, where people picked up off the streets are
detained for a week.
Among 400 homeless women studied, the HIV rate is still less than 3%, but
the number engaging in risky behavior is high. Forty-five percent of the
women under 18-years old and 54% of the adult women exchanged sex for drugs
or money. Among the women who exchanged sex, more than 38% tested positive
for syphilis, and 29% had genital herpes.
Because these sexually transmitted diseases are spread in the same way as
HIV, they suggest that HIV is likely to spread in this group. Furthermore,
such diseases work biologically to increase the odds that a person will
either acquire or transmit HIV.
These factors, and the fact that the women are selling sex, "are worrisome
for the potential of HIV spread," the authors concluded.
Indeed, many homeless women look for sex clients at Komsomolskaya Ploshchad
in Moscow, a square famous for its three train stations. "If you think
about how central Moscow is and how the trains go everywhere," then it is
easy to see how the virus could spread, said Sevgi Aral, another CDC
researcher who has studied homeless women in Moscow.
*******
#4
Russian Rights Grps To End Monthly Meetings In Chechnya
July 10, 2002
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
MOSCOW (AP)--Some of Russia's leading human rights groups said Wednesday
they will no longer take part in monthly meetings with authorities in the
Chechen capital Grozny, saying the meetings have failed to improve the
treatment of civilians in Chechnya and have become a smoke screen for
continued abuses by the Russian military.
"We do not want the joint activity of the authorities and nongovernment
organizations on observing human rights in Chechnya to just be a screen
that hides continuing arbitrariness and illegal violence," the respected
human rights group Memorial said in a statement.
Memorial and other organizations also said Russian troops are forcing
Chechen refugees to return to Grozny from camps in northern Chechnya and
the neighboring Russian republic of Ingushetia, despite promises by
officials that the resettlement process would be strictly voluntary.
The meetings between human rights groups and Russian military, security,
and prosecutor's office officials began in December of last year as a way
to exchange information, said Tatyana Kasatkina, executive director of
Memorial. The last one, which took place on Monday in the Grozny office of
Russia's human rights envoy Viktor Kalamanov, drew complaints from the
human rights groups. Many of the military representatives who were due to
take part failed to show up, and those that did said they weren't prepared.
"We thought something might change as a result of those meetings, but
nothing did," Kasatkina said.
Memorial said its representatives, who just returned from a tour of
Chechnya, had witnessed "undisguised" pressure on refugees and even "direct
violence" to force them to relocate to Grozny, despite the fact that there
isn't enough housing to accommodate them there.
On Tuesday, the humanitarian group Doctors Without Borders condemned the
recent closure of the Znamenskoye refugee camp in northern Chechnya, saying
it had been accomplished through an "organized campaign of harassment and
coercion" by authorities, who tore down tents and latrines and told
refugees that their water, gas and electricity would be cut off.
The United Nations estimates that more than 300,000 people have lost their
homes in the Chechen conflict -160,000 of them displaced within Chechnya
and another 150,000 in Ingushetia - about half of them children.
Russian troops left Chechnya in 1996, after an unsuccessful two-year
campaign against the rebels, but returned in 1999, following rebel
incursions into the neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan and after a
series of apartment house bombings in Russia that killed some 300 people.
Russian officials blamed the explosions on rebels.
While Russian forces have established control over most of Chechen
territory, they are subjected to constant rebel hit-and-run attacks and
mine explosions.
Over the past 24 hours, at least seven Russian soldiers and Chechen police
were killed and six wounded in rebel attacks, said an official in the
Moscow-backed administration in Chechnya.
Russian servicemen killed two rebels caught trying to plant a road mine in
Grozny, and Russian sappers defused four other explosive devices in the
capital, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
********
#5
Sign of the times in troubled Russia
July 10, 2002
AFP
Kaliningrad, Russia - The Russian interior ministry advised citizens to
exercise caution with home-made placards and other suspicious objects on
Wednesday after a man in Kaliningrad was killed as he tried to remove a
booby-trapped sign.
Yury Antipenko, 50, who was walking his dog near his home in the western
Russian enclave's town of Baltiysk, triggered the explosive device left
outside his apartment block, the local emergency ministry said.
The sign read "Kovol bastard," in a reference police believe was intended
for one of the building's residents, a 24-year-old Ukrainian man named
Kovolenko.
A woman accompanying Antipenko was seriously injured, a police spokesman
said.
The attack was the first fatality following three similar incidents in
recent weeks involving booby-trapped anti-Semitic signs which caused
injuries in Moscow, Vladivostok in the Far East and the Siberian city of
Tomsk.
The interior ministry in Moscow issued a statement "asking citizens not to
touch suspicious objects or tear down placards, and to phone the police,
especially when children or vital facilities are nearby," the Interfax news
agency reported.
Police said there was no evidence of an anti-Semitic motive in the latest
incident.
"An anti-Semitic motive has not been ruled out, but it is unlikely," the
police spokesman said.
On Monday, two people were seriously injured by the explosion of a
booby-trapped sign with an anti-Semitic slogan in Tomsk.
On May 27, a young woman was seriously burned when she tried to remove a
booby-trapped sign in a Moscow suburb that read "Death to Jews".
Racist and anti-Semitic acts have increased in Russia in recent months,
causing alarm among local authorities and the Jewish community.
Last week, the Russian parliament approved Kremlin-sponsored legislation
intended to crack down on extremist and racist groups. - Sapa-AFP
********
#6
National Review Online
July 10, 2002
Not So Quick
Is Russia really becoming part of the West?
By David Satter
David Satter is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a visiting
scholar at the Johns Hopkins Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
(SAIS). His book, Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State
will be out in early 2003 from the Yale University Press.
As the United States looks anxiously for allies in the fight against
Islamic terrorism, Russia is increasingly being welcomed as a bona fide
member of the Western community of nations.
At the G8 summit last month in Kananaskis, Alberta, not only was Russia an
important participant in talks on terrorism and nuclear proliferation but a
decision was made to hold a G8 summit meeting in Russia in 2006. According
to an official G8 statement, Russia's enhanced role was recognition of the
"remarkable economic and democratic transformation that has occurred in
Russia in recent years, particularly under the leadership of President Putin."
The "era of good feelings" in U.S.-Russian relations, however, may prove
short lived. The reason is that geopolitical interests notwithstanding, the
Russian leadership has made no real effort to adopt Western values,
particularly respect for the individual and the value of human life.
In the two years since Putin became Russia's president, he has become a
hero in the West but his country has become less democratic rather than
more. This has been reflected in the systematic elimination of independent
centers of power and the prosecution of the increasingly barbaric war in
Chechnya.
If the tendency toward authoritarianism is not reversed, Russia will
increasingly find itself at odds with its new partners and a reversion to
an anti-Western policy could become necessary in order for the ruling elite
to survive.
Of the authoritarian aspects of Putin's Russia, the most commented upon is
the establishment of a "power vertical," as opposed to a separation of
powers.
Beginning in late 1999, Putin created a virtual presidential dictatorship.
The second Chechen war, which was launched in September, 1999, strongly
affected the elections to the Duma which were held three months later,
leading to a groundswell of support for pro-Putin parties who gained a
strong majority in the legislative chamber. The combination of a
constitution that gave the president vast powers to rule by decree and a
newly pliant legislature made Putin unchallengeable in Russia.
After he was elected president, Putin used his power to enact two measures
that increased his authority still further. The first was to remove
Russia's governors from the Council of the Federation, the upper chamber of
the parliament, and the second was to name presidential representatives in
seven new districts or okrugs to reinforce the authority of federal
ministries in the regions.
The result of these changes was that Putin became unassailable both at the
federal level and in the regions.
The elimination of independent centers of power in the government, in turn,
was accompanied by a crackdown by the government on civil society.
The first attack on civil society was the suppression of the independent
media.
On June 7, the property of Novaya Gazeta, Russia's most important
independent newspaper, was seized to satisfy a libel judgment of $500,000
in favor of Mezhprombank, which the paper accused of participation in the
Bank of New York scandal. The fine was roughly 100 times the size of the
largest previous libel judgment against the Russian media and is widely
believed to be the result of a political decision to close the paper. It
came shortly after the sale of Obshchaya Gazeta, the only other independent
Russian newspaper, to a St. Petersburg businessman who fired the paper's
entire staff and suspended publication.
The loss of Russia's two most courageous newspapers came after the removal
of management at the country's only independent television stations, NTV
and TV-6, as a result of pressure from state-owned energy companies that
had ties to the stations.
The result is that the Russian media is now completely under the Kremlin's
control. Limited criticism is still possible but exposes of fundamental
importance — for example, the reporting in Novaya Gazeta and on NTV about
the 1999 apartment-house bombings — are now unlikely to appear in the
Russian press.
The tightened control over the Russian media was complemented by a
crackdown on independent social organizations.
The government began to create obstacles to the registration or
reregistration of human-rights organizations, independent trade unions,
national cultural organizations, and ecological groups concerned with
nuclear safety. In the Moscow region, only 12 percent of the previously
existing social organizations survived.
The government has advanced the claim that human-rights organizations need
to pay taxes on the services they provide and the beneficiaries of the help
need to pay taxes on the "value" of the assistance. When this is not done,
registration can be refused. In the case of unofficial trade unions,
registration has been refused on the grounds that there were two trade
unions in the same enterprise, in which case, the authorities registered
the trade union that cooperated with the government and with management.
The result of this pressure is that vulnerable Russian citizens are
deprived of their erstwhile defenders and government agencies and criminal
groups can deal with them as they see fit.
Besides the suppression of independent sources of power in Russia, the
government is conducting a barbarous war in Chechnya that weakens still
further the democratic instincts of the society.
When the second Chechen war began, many Chechens hoped that the Russian
forces would bring order to what had become a lawless enclave. The behavior
of the Russian forces, however, has united the population against the
invader.
According to the best estimates, 2,000 persons have disappeared in Chechnya
since the beginning of the second Chechen war in 1999, after being stopped
at checkpoints or arrested in their homes.
The deaths of at least a thousand others have been confirmed because their
bodies were recovered in garbage dumps or fields. In some cases, the bodies
were blown up with hand grenades to conceal signs of torture.
In most cases, the Russian soldiers who arrested Chechens in security
sweeps were masked and without insignias. The numbers on their armored cars
were covered with dirt. In response to protests from Russian and
international human-rights organizations, the Russian defense ministry
issued order #80 which demanded that numbers should be visible on armored
personnel carriers taking part in security sweeps, that the commander
should tell the head of the local Chechen administration what unit was
involved, that soldiers that entered homes should introduce themselves and
that the prosecutor should receive a list of those detained. To date,
however, not a single point of this order has been fulfilled.
The scale of the killing is immense because, after years of warfare, there
are no more than 750,000 Chechens presently living on the territory of
Chechnya.
Besides indiscriminate killing, Russian troops in Chechnya have, since the
spring of 2000, also been kidnapping Chechens for ransom. The captives, who
vanish into Russian filtration camps, are often purchased back by their
relatives for prices of up to $5,000. In many cases, those rescued are
barely alive. The Russian forces also demand payment to return the corpses
of Chechens to their families.
The Russians also seek deliberately to humiliate Chechens. According to
corroborated reports, on July 12, 2001, in the city of Sernovodsk, 700
Chechen men were rounded up by Russian forces and forced to watch while a
Chechen woman was raped in front of them. The men were taunted with calls
to defend the woman's honor and when 62 of the men tried to intervene, they
were handcuffed to an armored personnel carrier and publicly raped. One of
the men later committed suicide.
The nature of Russian atrocities has inspired speculation that they are
part of a deliberate effort to prolong the war so that high-ranking Russian
military and political leaders can profit financially from looting, the
hostage trade or the illegal smuggling of Chechen oil.
Russia's increasing authoritarianism and the prolongation of the war in
Chechnya have been little noticed in the West but they are a problem that
cannot be ignored. The reason is that they lead to the degeneration of
Russian institutions and the country's further loss of moral orientation.
The potential seriousness of this situation is illustrated by the fact that
Russia is both one of the world's most corrupt societies and the site of
the world's largest poorly guarded stockpile of weapons of mass destruction.
Russia needs to cooperate with the West but such cooperation will only work
in the long run if Russia strengthens its democratic institutions. For this
reason, it is important not to suspend criticism of limitations on
democracy in Russia or human-rights violations in Chechnya. The alternative
is unwittingly to encourage developments in Russia that are not in our
interest as we allow deception on Putin's part to be met with self delusion
on ours.
********
#7
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
July 11, 2002
TERMS IN OFFICE WILL BE TIMED BY THE KREMLIN CHIMES
Russia heads back into feudalism
Author: Maxim Glinkin
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT HAS RULED THAT REGIONAL LEADERS HAVE THE
RIGHT TO RUN FOR THIRD OR FOURTH TERMS IN OFFICE. THE RESPONSE TO THIS
DECISION HAS BEEN AMBIVALENT. MANY CONSIDER THAT THE KREMLIN HAS THUS
GAINED CONTROL OF REGIONAL GOVERMENTS AND CAN NOW BARGAIN WITH THEM ON
VARIOUS ISSUES.
As expected, the Constitutional Court decision giving the green
light to regional leaders who wish to run for third or fourth terms in
office has drawn some contradictory responses in the political
community. Despite the diversity of assessments, observers agree that
a fundamentally new political situation has been created in Russia.
Now that legal restrictions on the number of terms for regional
leaders have been removed, this issue moves from law to informal
discussion, becoming the object of political bargaining between the
federal and regional elites.
As soon as the decision was announced, interpretations of it were
expressed - very actively and very diversely. Not only has the fate of
leaders in 24 regions been placed in question, but in regions whose
charters contained restrictions on the number of terms in office,
everything is now up to the regional parliaments. Even where regional
leaders have received an unconditional right to seek re-election,
their real opportunities turn out to be quite restricted.
The Kremlin has actually let it be understood that from now on,
the question of further terms in office is moving into the sphere of
behind-the-scenes agreements and adjustments. This is the situation in
Tatarstan, for example. According to our sources, last year Moscow
drew up a secret agreement with President Mintimer Shaimiev: he would
be permitted to run for a third term, but only on the condition that
he remains in power for eighteen months. By autumn, he is expected to
name a successor - and this is currently the point of intensive
consultations between Kazan and Moscow. This is what Rober Sadykov,
head of the Tatarstan Committee of the Communist Party and Shaimiev's
main rival at the last election, told us. According to Sadykov, the
question now is not whether Shaimiev will have a "Yeltsin-style"
departure, but whether Moscow and Kazan manage to agree on a suitable
successor.
Something similar is also happening in relations between the
federal government and Bashkortostan. According to Marat Ramazanov,
head of the Public Organizations Coordination Council in
Bashkortostan, the issue of another term for President Murtaza
Rakhimov was discussed the other day during President Putin's brief
visit to Ufa, the capital of Bashkortostan. Rakhimov's chances of
being re-elected are so doubtful that the discussion now concerns
whether it is advisable to hold an early election.
The Constitutional Court decision also promises great problems
for St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev. Leonid Romankov, a St.
Petersburg member of parliament, told us that Yakovlev currently has
no legal right to run for a third term without changing the city
charter. At the same time, the governor is unlikely to be able to push
a new charter through the parliament. "In the parliament's present
make-up, we will not allow that to pass," says Romankov. It is said
that the St. Petersburg legislature is controlled by the Kremlin
rather than by the St. Petersburg governor.
In short, everything now depends on the alignment of forces
within the triangle of the Kremlin, regional administrations, and
regional parliaments. Rotation - or rather the lack of rotation -
among regional governments becomes mostly a political issue, much less
dependent on the will of voters.
"Regional leaders who are loyal to the Putin administration and
who do not wish to step down have been thrown a life preserver," says
Ivan Melnikov, deputy leader of the Communist Party Central Committee.
As a corollary, it may be assumed that less loyal regional leaders
will now get some "personal attention", to put it in intelligence
agency language. To keep their posts, they will have to give the
Kremlin some help during the next federal parliamentary and
presidential elections. Those who manage to get re-elected before then
will necessarily "repay the debt during the federal election
campaign", according to Melnikov. This is very important, since the
elections of 2003-04 promise to be very difficult for the Kremlin.
With their position strengthened, regional elites will also be
able to repay their debts in a different way - initiating moves to
extend the term of the president himself, working through the
Federation Council (to five or seven years). There has been talk of
this for a long time. Although it will require amending the
Constitution, the latest Constitutional Court decision has shown that
nothing is impossible. The Kremlin can give regional leaders unlimited
rights, but it also can take everything away. Only the other day,
Putin proposed to simplify the procedures for dismissing a negligent
regional leader. This "simplification" is one step away from
introducing the practice of appointing and dismissing regional leaders
by presidential decree. After all, if room for maneuver has been
expanded so greatly for regional governments, why should the federal
government have its hands tied?
However, many politicians say this Constitutional Court decision
bodes ill for Russia. Boris Nemtsov, Union of Right Forces leader, has
made a very gloomy prediction: "The feudalization of Russia, and the
privatization of regions by ruling clans and businesses allied with
them, will continue."
Even some regional representatives in the Federation Council have
condemned the latest twist in the "third terms saga". Oganes
Oganesian, head of the Federation Council Economy Committee, did not
conceal his disappointment: "If we want to create appanage
principalities in Russia, and the institution of non-replaceable
governments in regions, where feudalism will develop, then we should
go ahead and lift all limits on the number of terms in office for
regional leaders."
(Translated by P. Pikhnovsky)
*******
#8
Argumenty i Fakty
No. 28
July 10, 2002
THE NUMBER OF REGIONS MAY BE REDUCED
Some of Russia's regions may merge over the next year or two
Author: not indicated
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
RUSSIA MAY SEE SOME AMALGAMATION OF ITS REGIONS OVER THE NEXT TWO
YEARS. THIS COULD BE PROMPTED BY A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISION ON
THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CONSECUTIVE TERMS IN OFFICE FOR REGIONAL
LEADERS.
Within the next year or two, there could be a new twist in the
intrigues over amalgamation of Russian regions. The foundation for
this may be provided by a Constitutional Court decision expected to be
issued within the next few days. The decision concerns terms in office
for regional leaders.
In general, the question of terms in office for regional leaders
has been dependent on specific circumstances for some time.
Originally, it was raised by Moscow-based tycoons who sought to
replace old regional leaders with their own associates. For instance,
in 2000 a special amendment restricted the maximum number of
consecutive terms in office to two. The Duma welcomed this idea, since
its members included 34 potential regional leaders.
However, President Mintimer Shaimiyev of Tatarstan derailed their
plans. He managed to convince Kremlin officials of his loyalty - and
the federal government made another amendment, with Shaimiyev in mind.
In consequence, around 69 other regional leaders gained the same
opportunities.
The authors of the first amendment, which restricted the number
of consecutive terms to two, appealed to the Constitutional Court -
which is now deciding the fate of regional leaders.
Most likely, the Constitutional Court will confirm the regulation
providing for only two consecutive terms in office. The question is
what will be considered as the starting point. There are two options.
The first applies when a region's charter or constitution permit two
terms in office. This is sure to cause problems for some regional
leaders, including Governor Eduard Rossel of the Sverdlovsk region,
President Murtaza Rakhimov of Bashkortostan, and Governor Mikhail
Prusak of the Pskov region. But Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov would be
able to run for a third term, or even a fourth, since the federal law
came into effect in Moscow only in 2000.
Nonetheless, the court may hand down a very strict decision: to
count the terms from the very first one. The majority of judges have
supported this idea from the start; but they are said to have suddenly
softened their attitude.
Regional leaders have an "emergency option" at their disposal:
merging regions. In other words, the Sverdlovsk region could merge
with the Kurgan region; the Novgorod region with the Pskov region; the
city of Moscow with the Moscow region. Their leaders will always be
able to reach agreement in the face of a common threat. As for
Bashkortostan, the situation is more problematic. The republic would
not unite with the Chelyabinsk or Orenburg regions. Neither is it
willing to amalgamate with its sister republic, Tatarstan. But still,
Bashkortostan does have its own option.
(Translated by Sergei Kolosov)
********
#9
Subject: Project on Civil Society and Governance.
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2002
From: "Karen Ross-Millianos"
Dear David,
I have been given your name by Laura Belin, who recommends I write to you
for help in disseminating the findings of our 3-year research project on
Civil Society and Governance. I am attaching a press release about the
project which may be suitable for inclusion in an email bulletin to your
list.
During the course of this three year project, we have amassed a great deal
of information about the nature of civil society in many parts of the
world. Any help you can give us in ensuring that this data reaches as
many interested parties as possible, would be very much appreciated. I
realise your list is concerned with Russia, which was not included in our
study. However I believe your members would find the outputs of the
project interesting from a comparative perspective.
Many thanks and best wishes,
Karen Ross-Millianos
Research Officer
Civil Society and Governance Programme
Institute of Development Studies
University of Sussex
Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RE
Tel: + 44 1273 877414
Email: K.Ross-Millianos@ids.ac.uk
P R E S S R E L E A S E
Looking for information on civil society-state relations in a specific
country? Then look no further.
Funded by the Ford Foundation and based at the Institute of Development
Studies, UK, the Civil Society and Governance Programme
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc is a 3-year research project involving
researchers in 22 countries, spanning 6 international regions: Africa,
Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the US.
Focusing specifically on the interplay between civil society and
government, the objective of the project is to gain a clearer understanding
of the character and functions of civil society, especially its promise and
limitations with regard to promoting good governance and social justice,
and to develop strategies to these ends.
Outputs include draft country reports mapping civil society in each of the
22 countries, and case studies of state-civil society interactions written
by in-country researchers, all of which are available on our website.
Study topics range from the nationwide campaign to prompt the rewriting of
the Thai constitution, to the equally successful efforts of villagers in
India to thwart government backed plans to sell communal land to private
enterprise.
The wealth of evidence covers various thematic sectors, and focuses on
successes and failures, weaknesses and strengths, large episodes and small,
and the activities of everything from single civil society organisations to
alliances of many of them. Links to other civil society oriented websites
and electronic discussion forums can also be found on the site. For
contact details for any of the researchers please email the programme
administrator, Julie McWilliam: J.A.McWilliam@ids.ac.uk
*******
#10
Wall Street Journal
July 11, 2002
Russia Passes Law to Protect Firms From Rigged Bankruptcy
By GUY CHAZAN
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
MOSCOW -- Russia's parliament has passed a law to protect companies from
corporate raiders using rigged bankruptcy proceedings to seize their assets
-- a practice that has badly tarnished Russia's reputation among investors.
The new bankruptcy legislation, passed Wednesday by the upper house of
parliament, replaces a 1998 law that was largely discredited after becoming
a major weapon in the fierce ownership battles that have plagued Russian
business in recent years.
Under the old law, creditors could easily persuade a court to put a big
company into bankruptcy, even if it had relatively small debts. The
creditors could then remove the old management and liquidate the assets --
even if shareholders came up with the money to settle the debt. The system
was often criticized for allowing corporate predators to destroy a rival's
business, or seize valuable companies at a fraction of their real value.
One casualty was BP PLC, which paid $484 million for a 10% stake in Russian
oil company OAO Sidanko in 1997. Sidanko was forced into bankruptcy
proceedings in 1998 and a year later, another firm, Tyumen Oil Co., wrested
control of its biggest oil fields over BP's objections. BP accused Tyumen
of manipulating the courts. The dispute between the two companies was later
settled.
The new law, seen as an important plank of President Vladimir Putin's
economic-overhaul agenda, was approved late last month by the lower house,
the Duma, and awaits Mr. Putin's signature before coming into force. It was
one of a number of liberal bills -- including one allowing the purchase and
sale of agricultural land for the first time since the Bolshevik revolution
in 1917 -- passed by the Duma before its summer recess.
Under the amended bankruptcy law, a creditor has to demonstrate that he has
tried and failed to recover a debt from a company -- such as by attaching
its assets -- before he can file a bankruptcy action against it. Debtors
will be allowed to pay off debts at any time, even after the bankruptcy
process has begun, and can suspend the process by applying for a two-year
financial-rehabilitation period. Third parties will be allowed to repay
debts on shareholders' behalf.
*******
#11
Columnist Urges Viewing Chinese Migrants As Benefit for Russian Economy
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
9 July 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "The Far Eastern Railroad Car"
A thought is being actively instilled from the
outside into Russian public awareness that the neighborhood with China
represents a threat to the future of our country. The more successfully
our one-billion neighbor transforms into a powerful modern state, the
more probable is its "creeping expansion" to the almost uninhabited lands
of Siberia and the Far East.
First of all, let us not forget that it is fate itself that decided that
our nations should live next to each other. It is impossible to "change
apartments" on the globe. It depends on ourselves whether or not we
will manage to take advantage of this neighborhood. If we frown and
look at the Chinese as our enemies, they may eventually become ones.
It is in our interests to behave differently, taking advantage of the
neighbor's dynamism to attach the Siberian and Far Eastern freight cars
to the speeding up Chinese express train and wisely use the Chinese labor
resources to start the development of uninhabited land east of the Urals.
The Chinese are oriented toward friendship with us as well -- and it is
not only because we are the ones who helped them build the foundation of
a modern industry, without which the success of their current reforms
would be unthinkable.
An equally important fact is that the Chinese friendliness is based on
their pragmatism. They experienced first-hand the negative geopolitical
consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since only one of the
two world's superpowers remained, the pressure on Beijing has grown
dramatically. In this situation, Russia has become a strategic rear
front for China -- just, as a matter of fact, China for Russia.
Now, let us talk about the "creeping expansion" and those who claim that
threats to Russia come from the East and salvation from the West.
Transborder migration of labor force is an integral feature of modern
times. We can only discuss how to regulate it. This is where we can
refer to two examples: American and Chinese. The largest Chinese
foreign-based community is not in Asia but in the United States. It
numbers 13 million people. As the Russian population is half as large
as that of the United States, the Chinese community in our country should
consist of 6-7 million people. At this point, however, the degree of
our "Sinoization" is by 100 times lower. Meanwhile, the presence of the
"Huaqiao" [overseas Chinese] in the United States means not only Chinese
laundries and fast-food bars. The Chinese community gave U.S. science
more Nobel Prize winners than Japan has. On the cutting edge of
technology, in Silicon Valley, the Chinese community can compete in size
only with emigrants from the former Soviet Union. Thus, it is not about
the quantity but the quality of migrants, about a contribution they can
make.
The Chinese example gives much food for thought here. Soon, China will
be celebrating the 5th anniversary of Hongkong's reunification with the
homeland. When the last British colony in Asia was about to go under
Beijing's jurisdiction, some of the local entrepreneurs feared that the
"most open economy in the world" might choke with an inpouring of crowds
from the north.
However, this never happened. Hongkong became a part of Chinese
territory in a sense that its residents can freely travel and do business
on the mainland. As for the rest of the Chinese, to go to work in
Hongkong they require a visa issued by the government of this special
administrative region. For example, there are jobs for 12 dentists, 28
computer programmers, and 80 experienced high-rise construction workers.
Then, as many permits are issued for annual contracts to be signed.
I think that the Hongkong model could lay groundwork for rules regulating
the inflow of labor from China into Russia. The authorities of
[Russian] federation components should be able to decide single-handedly
what categories of how many workers can be let into our country for how
long.
An idea to create another Hongkong on both sides of the Chinese-Russian
border was discussed in Beijing. Japanese companies would supply
equipment. Russia would provide land for the construction of workshops
and put together engineering and technical staff. Meanwhile, ordinary
Chinese workers could every day ride their bikes across the border. The
Chinese workforce could be effectively used to create a modern
infrastructure in the Far East. The Chinese are excellent building
specialists. The brigades of peasants from the province of Shangdong
working as concrete layers became so famous for the quality of their work
that the Chinese Defense Ministry orders them to build silos for
strategic missiles.
Finally, the simplest area is agricultural production. With only 7
percent of the world's arable land, China feeds 22 percent of the global
population. So, the Chinese farmers are unrivaled in industriousness
and effectiveness. Before the war, the Far East was inhabited by the
Koreans and Chinese, who provided the population with locally grown
vegetables. Once Stalin moved them to Central Asia, the vegetables
disappeared.
Therefore, the appearance of diligent leaseholding workers from China,
one of whom today's Rossiyskaya Gazeta tells about, it is a promising
feature of modern times. We should be wise enough not only to prevent
the neighborhood with China from becoming a threat to Russia but also to
use this neighborhood as a lever to develop the vast land of Siberia and
the Far East.
*******
#12
The Guardian (UK)
July 11, 2002
Opera
The Embalmer
3 stars
Almeida King's Cross, London
By Tom Service
Lenin's embalmed corpse is the strangest of inspirations for a piece of
music theatre. But Giorgio Battistelli's The Embalmer, which premiered last
night at the Almeida King's Cross, dramatises the ghoulish mechanics of
Lenin's mummification, as seen through the eyes of Dr Alexei Miscin.
The piece was designed for Ian McDiarmid, the Almeida's outgoing artistic
director, and is a staged melodrama for actor, ensemble (conducted by David
Parry) and electronic sounds (conceived by Alvise Vidolin).
Set in present day Moscow, the piece uses Lenin's cadaver as a symbol of
the evils of the Soviet regime. But Renzo Rosso's libretto does more than
illuminate the communist divisions between dictatorship and proletariat.
Miscin is no innocent everyman: McDiarmid paints a portrait of a sexual
obsessive, whose wife has thrown him out, and who drinks himself into a
stupor during the embalming procedure. His performance is outstanding, and
his energy and intensity make Miscin a grotesque, tragi-comic figure.
But he also captures the political and emotional ambiguities of the role.
As the monologue develops, the dead Lenin embodies not just the decay of
communism, but also the putrefaction of the contemporary free market.
Miscin's most impassioned outbursts are reserved not for Lenin, Stalin, or
any of the other "dickhead dictators", but for Russia's botched version of
capitalism: "There are gallons of coke, but no bucks, and hundreds of
whores, but no fucks."
But there are glimpses of sympathy as well as vitriol in McDiarmid's
performance. The most affecting moment - set to Battistelli's most
effective music - comes as Miscin relates the torture and murder of his
father and his mother's disappearance.
Yet even McDiarmid's mesmerising presence cannot disguise the serious
problems at the heart of The Embalmer. Melodrama has always been the most
difficult of musical and dramatic forms to get right, and Battistelli's
score does not solve the problems. His music provides an expressionist
underscore to the whole 90 minute show. But instead of enhancing the drama,
the score deadens the pace of the performance. The music cannot react
quickly enough to the events on stage. Only in the coup de théatre of the
ending does Battistelli's music mesh with the dramatic action.
There is no doubt that McDiarmid's portrayal of Miscin is a fitting
performance to celebrate his 12 years in charge of the Almeida Theatre
Company. But as a whole, The Embalmer is an unsuccessful stitching of music
with words.
Until Sunday. Box office: 020-7359 4404.
*******
#13
The Times (UK)
July 08, 2002
Viewpoint
Villains of the peace
In Western eyes, Russia is a third-rate, sloppy, inept nation
By Alexander Anichkin
The author is a former deputy editor of Izvestia
As soon as we heard the devastating news that a plane carrying 54
holidaying teenagers had crashed over Germany I had a familiar sinking
feeling: there was a Russian plane involved, so whatever had happened it
would be the Russians’ fault.
Sure enough, before the first tears had splashed the dust, blame for the
midair collision in which 71 people died was being flung in our direction:
“Russian pilot ‘ignored’ warnings” screamed the tabloid headlines; “Russian
pilot failed to act”. Even after five years of living in Britain I still
can’t get used to the ease with which Russia is blamed for any disaster to
which we are remotely connected. In Russia there was, rightly, fury at the
assumptions that either the Russian pilot or Russian plane must have been
at fault.
When it appeared that the Russian pilot, far from failing to act, may have
tried to warn Swiss air traffic control that he was on a collision course
90 seconds before the crash, and that vital security systems had been
switched off by Swiss air traffic controllers, we felt vindicated but still
angry.
The readiness with which the West assumed that it was a Russian fault shows
that for all the talk by world leaders about Russia as a strategic partner
of Europe or the US, a serious player on the world stage, deep down we are
still seen as an international joke, a nation of drunks and incompetents.
It is, as a compatriot observed, a Hollywood view of Russia — but one which
persists. Ever since the days of the Reds Under the Bed scares, Russia has
been — certainly in tabloid and entertainment industry shorthand — the root
of world evil, the eternal baddie.
Of course some of it is our own fault. Who could forget the notorious
incident when a pilot let his young son take the controls of his plane
which then plunged into the Siberian taiga? Or Chernobyl nuclear station
going into meltdown when people there staged an unauthorised experiment?
And former President Boris Yeltsin didn’t help our image as a nation of
drunks: despite his awesome achievements in overseeing the transition to
democracy he is remembered as much for being too “tired” to get off the
plane at Shannon airport to meet the Irish Prime Minister as for his famous
tank- top resistance to the hardline coup attempt. We Russians laugh and
cry with embarrassment over these incidents. But the scars left by them on
our national psyche are deeper than most Westerners realise. Ever since
Peter the Great started modernising Byzantine Russia in the 1700s we have
been battling with the discrepancy between our image as a superpower, the
birthplace of Pushkin and Tolstoy — and a country of Third World sloppiness.
The 19th-century writer Ivan Turgenev summed it up when he observed: “I can
tell a Russian from afar, mostly by the sudden changes on his face, one
minute arrogant and full of grandeur, another all cautious and meek,
checking to see if anyone is laughing at him.”
Stereotypes, as we know, are born of fear and ignorance, and to the
majority of Westerners, despite the opening of our borders, Russia is still
an unknown territory. But blaming everything bad on Russia is not just
hurtful to individuals like me. The fury in Moscow at the way Russia was,
again, guilty until proven innocent shows that Russians have had enough of
old Cold War attitudes.
Many in Russia are beginning to blame the West for her post-Soviet
difficulties. When it becomes clear that the West still sees Russia as a
third-class citizen, it is difficult to convince them that they are being
paranoid. But we clearly have a long way to go before we emerge from what I
had believed were the bad old days of mutual suspicion and insult-throwing.
*******
#14
Newsday
July 10, 2002
Russia Shifts Ties With Iraq
Oil firms seek deals in West
By Liam Pleven
RUSSIA CORRESPONDENT
Moscow - Vladimir Kopyshevsky's oil pipeline company has been working in
Iraq so long that he calls it a "second motherland," but when asked about
the prospect of an American invasion to oust the Iraqi dictator, the
silver-haired Russia oilman would not immediately jump to Iraq's defense.
Instead, Kopyshevsky emphasized ties between his company and American
businesses, and he abruptly switched to English to add a cold-eyed
capitalist observation: "Business is business."
The reticence of Russian oil industry executives to voice opposition to any
potential United States military action against Iraq, despite a lucrative
relationship with the Baghdad regime, may be an indication of changing
attitudes in Russia about that country's traditional support for Iraq.
For years, Russia has been seen as Iraq's main champion on the United
Nations Security Council. Its oil companies have been rewarded for that
support, with contracts to export Baghdad's oil under United Nations
sanctions and to develop new fields when they are lifted.
The conventional wisdom is that the Russian oil industry would be an
obstacle to American action in Iraq. As the Bush administration continues
to make detailed war plans to force a change of leadership in Iraq,
however, some analysts now think the position of Russian oil companies in
an increasingly Western-style industry may not be so clear-cut.
"I don't think the oil companies would have any problem with any kind of
regime change, if they get an opportunity" for expanded business, said Adam
Landes, an industry analyst with Renaissance Capital, an investment bank in
Moscow.
And the perspective of the Russian government may be evolving as well. In
May, Russia supported amendments to the sanctions promoted by the United
States but opposed by Iraq, freeing up $740-million worth of Russian
contracts with Iraq that had been frozen by the Security Council.
Moreover, with Russia's increasingly elaborate ties with the West -
including nearly full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and the Group of Eight industrial powers - some Russian analysts have
concluded that even if the Kremlin does not endorse any hostile U.S. action
against Iraq, neither will it side with Saddam Hussein.
"After Sept. 11, Russia did its best to be closer to the West. That's why I
think that Russia is ready ... at the top level, of course, to accept all
the measures against Iraq," said Alexei Malashenko, an analyst with the
Carnegie Center in Moscow.
"Perhaps Russia will play ... on the distinctions between the position of
America and Western Europe," Malashenko added, referring to any
reservations that traditional U.S. allies may have about invading Iraq. "It
will be a choice not between Saddam Hussein and Bush, but between Bush and
some Europeans."
Russia's deepening involvement with the West is particularly visible in the
country's oil industry, symbolized last week by the first ever direct
shipment of oil by a Russian company to the United States. Western oil
companies also are investing heavily in the Russian oil sector, which is
rapidly modernizing to better exploit the world's largest oil reserves,
after Saudi Arabia's.
Iraq has sought to retain Russian support by emphasizing the preferred
status that Russian oil firms already enjoy in Iraq, and the potential for
even more in the future. Iraq's new ambassador to Russia told reporters in
Moscow last week that Baghdad wants broader ties with Russia in the oil
sector because it believes the business should be handled by "friends,"
according to the Interfax news agency.
Russian firms, such as Kopyshevsky's Zangas, already play a substantial
role in the UN-monitored program that allows Iraq to sell oil in order to
buy food, medicines and other necessities. In the most recent phase of the
program, for instance, companies from Russia won almost three times as many
contracts as any other country.
But potentially more lucrative, according to industry analysts, is the
opportunity for Russian firms after sanctions are lifted in Iraq. Already,
Russian companies have long-term contracts there that are estimated to be
worth tens of billions of dollars.
"We believe that sooner or later, sanctions will be lifted, and of course
... companies will rush to Iraq," said Dmitri Dolgov, a spokesman for
Lukoil, a major Russian oil company that signed a 23-year contract in 1997
to develop one of the largest oilfields in Iraq.
For now, however, contracts such as Lukoil's are basically on hold, and
will likely remain so while Hussein is in power. Given the uncertainty,
said Steven Dashevsky, an oil industry analyst at Aton Capital in Moscow,
the prospect of doing business in Iraq "is not something that people really
pin their future to."
*******
#15
The Spectator (UK)
June 29, 2002
Democracy: who needs it?
Turkmenistan may not be a free country, says Katie Grant, but there is no
trash culture, no graffiti, and the people are happy
By any standards apart from his own, President Nyazov of Turkmenistan is
not a democrat. True, in 1992, with universal suffrage, 99.5 per cent of
the population of the former Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic voted him in
for a five-year term. Equally true, when Nyazov, a former Communist party
supremo, was made president for life by the 50-seat assembly, also elected
by popular vote, nobody objected. But then, since the great man has
outlawed opposition parties and approves all the elected officials himself,
neither of the above was what we call an exercise in free choice.
Saparmyrat Turkmenbashi, or Leader of All Turkmen, as he styles himself,
reigns supreme. He is the chief of state and head of government. Colleagues
who get above themselves end up in the clink. I don’t expect that serving
time at Turkmenbashi’s pleasure is very nice.
The same, however, cannot be said about spending time in Ashgabat. The
Turkmen capital is a jolly place. The people are smiling and friendly, even
to foreigners. There is no climate of fear. Of course Westerners smirk at
the President’s huge marble palaces and the monumental golden statues of
himself that grace the roads into the city. Of course we sniff when the
screens of Turkmenistan Airlines continuously exhort us to ‘glorify the
Motherland’. And of course we frown at the President’s decision to forget
about the pot-holed tracks along which most people travel, and create for
himself 25 miles of tarmacked superhighway so that his vast limousines can
glide up to his blancmange-pink dacha. But when, in my rather dot-and-carry
Russian, I put this last to a Turkmen lady, she shrugged. ‘Why would I
mind?’ she asked with impeccable logic. ‘I don’t have a car.’
This is where Guardian readers would find themselves in difficulties. For,
provide as you may a litany of examples of religious repression, political
corruption and generally poor behaviour, it is difficult to make the
Turkmen cross with their President. Few are rich and their life-expectancy
is a paltry 61, there are no independent newspapers and anti-President
websites are blocked, but, as a most effective counterbalance, Turkmenbashi
provides the people — his people, as he would doubtless style them — with
almost-free gas and electricity, house rents so low as to be negligible,
and cheap wheat. As the icing on the cake, racing at the Hippodrome, while
it is certainly not Royal Ascot, carries no charge. This is
bread-and-circuses country.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that when I ask a woman in her
mid-twenties who works for a foreign company whether she would like to
leave, even though she has experienced persecution for her religious
beliefs, she says no. Perhaps in a public place she dares say nothing else?
This does not seem to be so. ‘Life is good here,’ she says, as she sips her
imported beer and I admire her stylish leather jacket. Her salary combined
with the ludicrously low cost of living makes her rich. But doesn’t she
miss Western consumer choice? She looks puzzled. ‘You can get pretty much
anything in Ashgabat,’ she says. She is right. There may be no Burberrys or
Prada, but in the out-of-town Sunday market you can buy anything from a
camel to a PlayStation. No wonder neither Turkmenbashi nor many of his
people are keen to conclude an IMF-backed stabilisation programme. The IMF
would demand the slashing of consumer subsidies. The Turkmen are not keen
on that — not keen at all.
For the visitor, the benefits of Turkmenbashi’s regime are legion. There is
no litter, no graffiti, no begging. The women are elegant in their velvet
dresses with embroidered collars. There are people in short skirts, too.
But there is no American trash culture, nor any feeling of threat as you
walk about, even at night. The people, the majority Sunni rather than
Shi’ite Muslims, are peaceful. If you get angry on their behalf, they just
smile as if you were a half-wit. London? Sounds horrible. New York? Sounds
worse. No wonder Boris Shikhmuradov, the former Turkmen ambassador to China
who is trying to drum up support to oust Nyazov, is finding it hard-going.
In a tribal society with no tradition of democracy, where sheeps’ skulls
are still stuck on fenceposts to ward off the evil eye, it has been easy
for President Nyazov to deify himself as the saviour of his people. But as
his picture, his hair constantly recoloured black, stares down with a
benign smile from every flat surface, you find yourself, the sun on your
back and no traffic to speak of, hard put sometimes not to smile back.
It is hardly possible in polite society to admit it, but provided the
dictator does not go mad and assuming that your basic needs are met, the
rule of an autocrat does have an upside. We extol democracy, which allows
societies to operate on the level of the lowest common denominator, as the
best way to function. But when you compare our filthy streets and yob
culture with the dignity of the Turkmen, democracy seems a shoddy affair.
We haven’t risen to Bach, we have sunk to Marilyn Manson. Most Turkmen may
never have heard of Bach, but if along with Bach comes Marilyn Manson, is
this such a calamity?
The Turkmen have certainly got the measure of us democrats when it comes to
manners. When a small group of us, including a small herd of horses, found
ourselves stranded in the desert and asked an astounded family in an oasis
for shelter, they opened their doors without question. Can you imagine the
same happening here? As they provided dinner and mattresses under the
stars, the man of the house proudly told us that he loved Turkmenbashi
since, on learning that three generations had farmed the same spot, he
immediately ordered that the family be given the smallholding in
perpetuity. To be sure, his wife did have some complaints, but they were
the universal complaints of womankind. ‘I could finish this carpet in a
month,’ she said, ‘if only I didn’t have a husband, children and a house to
look after. Don’t you find the same?’ Her house was a two-roomed affair
made of sand and straw, and her loom came straight out of the Bible, but
mutatis mutandis we were in complete agreement.
It is only when you talk about the President’s new venture, the promotion
of his new book The Ruhnama, that the Turkmen look a little coy. This book,
a compilation by Turkmenbashi of the history, traditions and sayings of
Turkmenistan, bound in a fetching icing-pink and lime-green cover, is now
officially required reading. The great communist is now an
arch-nationalist. He wants Russian and English to be abandoned in favour of
a language incomprehensible to the international community. This led to
another Guardian moment. ‘Do you mind?’ I ask an Ashgabat mother. She
shrugged. ‘You could always learn Turkmen instead of Russian,’ she replied
with an enigmatic smile.
There are a million things wrong in Turkmenistan: old women still lug water
up flights of stairs, the poor get no richer, there is massive corruption,
and the Turkmen learn nothing that the President does not wish them to
learn. But those who try to export Western democratic values should
remember that for many of the Turkmen people there are a good many things
that are right. When we export democracy, we export Big Brother. When we
insist on the supremacy of individual rights, we export family breakdown
and the culture of whinge and litigation. It may be that we feel these are
a price worth paying. But if the Turkmen do not, rather than thinking them
naive, should we not listen to what they say and, with some humility,
accept that democracy has its drawbacks too?
*******
#16
Moscow News
July 10-16, 2002
Sausage, Shahid's Dream
A new generation of fighters has grown in the Chechen mountains - they had
barely turned 10 when the war began
By Vadim Rechkalov
We fly over Chechnya in three helicopters. Our Dragonfly is covered from
behind by two ground-attack Crocodiles. A couple of feet away, a young
machinegunner, an ex-hunter from Yakutsk, sits by the open door, peering
into the mountains below. If attacked from the ground, the Dragonfly is to
duck while the Crocodiles will start pounding the area. Underneath is a
gorge with the muddy Argun river and the slopes masked by dense vegetation;
terrified sheep scatter in all directions, and immobile humans look up into
the sky. The Dragonfly vibrates like mad. I turn away from the window.
There is a patch of dry blood on the fuel tank. I look to the sharp-sighted
Yakut marksman with hope. He has dozed off.
Age, 20; Weight, 50 kg; Combat Tally, 10 Men,
"The bandits are no longer what they used to be," Gudgeon says. "We caught
one the other day: a puny, narrow-chested, ragged 20-year-old, weighs just
50 kilograms, but has already killed 10 men; took part in abductions and
bomb attacks. Code name, Sultan."
Gudgeon is also a code name. My interlocutor is an intelligence officer
whose job is to catch gunmen in the mountainous areas of South Chechnya.
On his bedside table there is a copy of Omar Khayyam poems. On the bed, a
pair of brand-new U.S.-made climbing shoes: Gudgeon shelled out a cool $200
for them in Rostov. Before going to Chechnya, he went to a library to study
Islam, the history of the Caucasus, and Wahhabism.
"Sultan was a disappointment," Gudgeon says. "I tried to talk to him about
Imam Shamil, but he did not even know who Maskhadov was. I wanted to
understand his convictions, but there was nothing to understand. A common
thug. In Rostov, he would be robbing street vendors, but here he is a
deputy emir. I asked him how he had come to join the gang. He said they'd
offered him a free course in Arabic. He is a nitwit, really. I had little
problem making him talk. I threatened to report him to his gang for
incompetence: He had failed an operation, blown the safe houses, and lost
his men. He believed me, got scared, and instantly gave me all the names."
Operatives working in the mountains point to changes in the enemy camp. The
number of highly paid foreign mercenaries has declined. It is the
unassuming Chechens and Dagestanis who make up the bulk of the insurgent
force. There is little or no ideological commitment now. Morale is low.
Before, even prisoners kept their dignity. Now they behave like common
criminals: They easily betray their comrades and quickly agree to
cooperate. No one ever says a word about an Islamic state or jihad. The war
has turned into a marginal business. The same people can attack a
checkpoint and rob a shop. The more enterprising ones have long stopped
fighting and now steal oil or deal in drugs. There is yet another change: a
growing proportion of teens and youngsters in their early twenties among
those who take part in hit-and-run attacks.
Recently the town of Shatoi came under fire. According to various accounts,
there were between 10 and 40 attackers. They fired continuously but
senselessly for 40 minutes on commandant's office, police and Federal
Security Service field office buildings, hitting no one and losing one
fighter, then fled, leaving their black flag in the dirt.
"The attack was led by a professional," Gudgeon surmises. "This much is
clear from the fact that our pursuit ran into a minefield. But no one was
hurt because the mines were laid inexpertly. All fragments flew toward the
river. Their engineers are obviously inexperienced, presumably, young
people. They have no means of getting others."
Between War and Prison
An FSB informer reported that all boys in one family had joined a band.
"They had all been here but suddenly disappeared yesterday," he said. "All
without exception - ages 12 to 18."
The report was checked. It transpired that the parents had taken the
children to a place beyond the Urals, to hide them not from mopping-up
operations but from Wahhabi recruiters.
"There is an increasing number of teenagers, aged 14 to 16, in the gangs,"
confirms Boris Okhtinsky, a psychologist, president of the St. Petersburg
Conflict Management Club, now colonel at the federal army headquarters in
Chechnya. "They lay mines and fire on checkpoints. They do not make much
money - this is the prerogative of adults. They get killed. They are,
basically, cannon fodder."
The colonel takes out a notebook that was found on the body of a
17-year-old gunman. The first few pages contain a description of how to
make a plastic bottle into a high-explosive mine. The other pages are in
Arabic - the lad had been studying the language. Samples of writing, a
glossary: "dolphin," "pan," "candy," "helicopter," "turtle."
"The teenager does not even understand why he is killed," Okhtinsky goes
on. "He imagines he is doing the right thing. A bearded man came and
invited him to join their camp: 'It's real cool, and all the good guys are
there. They also pay 60 rubles a day. We will give you a dagger. We are
noble people while Russians aren't even human - they are like dogs. If you
blow up an armored personnel carrier, this dog's box, we'll give you $200.'
No one had ever offered a 14-year-old a better deal. I asked one of the
failed suicide bombers what he would want to have most of all. 'Sausage,'
he said. Utter despair."
"What about children who have seen nothing but war?" I asked the psychologist.
"Youth labor camps may be the answer," Col. Okhtinsky says.
"Lock them up there and teach them the ABCs of civilization."
Indoctrination
"Remember me, Chief?" a cheeky urchin winks at a Russian colonel.
"Afraid I don't," the officer says coolly.
"Last year I brought you an 82-mm mine," the boy goes on.
"You gave me some flour for that. Do you have any condensed milk?"
"Look here, boy," Col. Safin says softly. "I'll give you condensed milk but
please don't bring anything. Better show us where it is and we'll pick it up."
The young Chechen snorts and runs off. Half an hour later he returns with a
fragmentation grenade. He gets his milk.
Vyacheslav Safin came to Chechnya with 100 servicemen from Perm for a
six-month stint. He is commander of a temporary internal affairs department
in the town of Vedeno. It is a dangerous district, the turf of the Basaev
clan. According to intelligence reports, approximately 300 well armed
fighters are concentrated in three large villages there. There are 9,000
children under 18 in the district. About 700 of them became orphans during
the war.
"In summer, there is nothing for children to do," Col. Safin says. "They
hang around outside our department - 10- to 13-year-olds. Some come to
talk, out of curiosity. I do not rule out that some are spies. Many
moonlight by selling vodka to fighters or exchanging ammunition they find
in the forest for canned food."
Perm policemen have come to Vedeno for a second time. They gave children
textbooks, chess sets, seven bicycles, and two footballs. The children were
happy. But a week later gunmen blew up a group of police officers, in broad
daylight, right in front of the children. Dmitry Skachilov, 29, could only
be identified by his personal tag. His son had just turned five.
Before leaving, I call on Aslambek Usumov, head of the Vedeno public
education department to ask how children relate to Russian army servicemen.
"Thus far there have been no marked protests against the new ruling
authorities on the part of the children, including orphans," Aslambek says.
"What do you mean, thus far?"
"Children will be children," he replies vaguely.
Then he remembers suddenly:
"We get them involved in clubs and interest groups, and so knock combat
traditions out of children's minds. Our task is to raise a new generation,
to prepare a worthy replacement."
----
Two weeks ago, there was a tragedy. During a clean-up operation, a
desperate father reported his gunman son to the authorities. Trying to
escape, the lad threw a grenade at a special force group, but killed only
himself. A belt packed with explosives was found on his body. The suicide
bomber was 14.
Verbatim
Col. Ilya Shabalkin, representative of the headquarters on the
antiterrorist operation in the North Caucasus:
Today there are 1,000 to 1,200 active fighters in the Chechen Republic.
The overwhelming majority are aged 20 to 35. Most of the 18- to
20-year-olds have not completed more than four grades in school. According
to intelligence reports, this past June, at least 150 Chechen teenagers
aged 13 through16 received invitations to go to Islamic military schools
for a free course of study. Recruitment is conducted by foreign
mercenaries, but even local Wahhabis are not in a hurry to give them their
children. They believe that these schools will be training not religious
activists but suicide terrorists for the Middle East. I believe there are
200 to 300 young Chechens in such schools now, who were sent abroad back
under Maskhadov. It is anybody's guess how many children have been
recruited for the local gangs.
*******
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