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July 10, 2002:    #6346    #6347    Day in progress

[Second Issue of the Day]

#9
Ezhenedelny Zhurnal
No. 26
July 9, 2002
MUCH POWER OUT OF NOTHING
How the Kremlin manages the lower house of parliament
Author: Alexander Ryklin
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

SOME PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS THINK IT IS HIGH TIME TO PUT AN END TO THE MONOPOLY OF THE OLD KREMLIN TEAM IN RELATIONS WITH THE DUMA. CONFLICT WITHIN THE KREMLIN ADMINISTRATION HAS SERIOUSLY COMPLICATED THINGS FOR THE PRO-PRESIDENTIAL GROUPS IN THE PARLIAMENT, AND HAS ALREADY AFFECTED THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS.

Informal contacts between the Duma and the Kremlin have not particularly changed; in any case, the technique remains the same. As in former times, there are teams of young men who scurry around the Duma. Their activity increases between the first and the second reading of bills. When the Duma is considering some very important bills, the big guns are brought out - the faction leaders are invited to the Kremlin for instructions. The Kremlin chiefs do not shrink from visiting the Duma themselves. For example, deputy chief of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov is a frequent visitor to the Duma meeting hall. In fact, Surkov, one of the founders of Unity, has been the Kremlin's man in charge of work with the Duma for the past few years. Now his position is difficult, because some presidential advisers think it is high time to put an end to the monopoly of the old Kremlin team in relations with the Duma. First of all, this concerns the other deputy chiefs of the Presidential Administration, Igor Setchin and Victor Ivanov (responsible for personnel policy within the administration). The conflict within the Kremlin administration has seriously complicated things for the pro- presidential groups in the parliament, and has already affected the legislative process.

The struggle for influence over the power group began last autumn. Then Alexander Bespalov, former assistant to the presidential envoy in the Central federal district and former advisor to St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak, became the virtual leader of United Russia. It was then that Emergency Minister Sergei Shoigu was practically barred from the party management. By the start of 2002, the party had been cleared of Shoigu's proteges. Their places were taken by Bespalov's proteges. As usual, they were brought in from St. Petersburg. Surkov's influence over United Russia diminished and, of course, he did not resign himself to such a state of things. He made some harsh statements directed to activists of United Russia in February in one of the resorts near Moscow, and they were explained by some analysts as an attempt to hold his own. To all appearances, this attempt was a vain one. At least, according to our sources, Bespalov has tried to calm the party activists, who have been frightened by his aggressive words, and he has also asked them not to take them too close to their hearts.

However, one thing is to control the party, to dismiss or to appoint leaders, to teach common members some good sense, to conduct political lectures, and, of course, another thing is to control the Duma's deputies. An attempt to take four centrist parties under control is just another phase of the "St. Petersburg's expansion".

The first act of the struggle for influence over the Duma was the consideration of the draft law on the citizenship in Russia. It changed beyond recognition, although it had been approved by the deputies in the first reading. Before the second reading , the State Construction Committee (it had prepared the project for the second reading) received several amendments from the Presidential Administration. There were some items, subjected to criticism of the right. For example, the possibility of the naturalization only five years later after getting the residential permit, the obligatory knowledge of the Russian language, the knowledge of the Constitution of Russia (by the word, an applicant should be examined by officials of the Interior Ministry). "We learned at the last moment that Setchin managed to persuade the president to toughen the law; they never interfered in our business. In this case, the most important thing is not the substance of the amendments, but the fact that we were moved away of the process," said one of the officials of the Presidential Administration, close to Vladislav Surkov, in the interview to our correspondent.

The main idea of the inner Kremlin's opposition is concluded in the last words of our interlocutor. The conflict within the Kremlin is not the fight between good and evil, described in terms as the "bad St. Petersburg's" special services agents struggle for power against the liberal "family" team. The former, security ministers in their majority, are not doves, but their every effort is bent to the reinforcement of the state control in all directions, but the liberalism of the "family" politicians is very relative. As far as we remember, the ideological cover in the time of abolition of NTV was created by the Presidential Administration where then nobody heard about any "St. Petersburgers". Surkov has gained a status of the conductor of the Duma only because of his own managerial talents and his coat-tails but not because of the fact that he has some definite principles or views. The struggle for this status takes place in the Kremlin.

It is obvious that the opposition between two Kremlin groups complicated the life of the Duma's centrist parties. On the one hand, security ministers are inwardly closer to them than the representatives of the "old Kremlin Guards". On the other hand, the centrists cannot stop replying to Surkov's calls; nobody gave them such an instruction. Especially because it is not clear who will be the winner in this battle of giants. The dismay of the leaders of the Duma's majority influenced the legislative process. The best illustration of this problem is the adoption of the law on agricultural lands turnover and the law on alternative civil service. In the former case the centrists had to change their point of view into an almost opposite one. At first, they were not against the sale of lands to foreigners. They did not insist on the item in the law, stipulating the prior right of the local administrations during the purchase and sale bargains. However, contradictory regulations were coming from the Kremlin. "We nearly went crazy. There was no clarity at all, to the very end. The same situation applied with the law on alternative military service. Three and a half years, four years, domiciliary, an extra-territorial principle, in the army, not in the army - every item had been discussed with the Kremlin for a long time. If they do not appoint a curator until autumn, I do not know how we will continue working," said a political consultant close to Fatherland. In any case, the position of the centrists is unenviable. There are a lot of other people wishing to influence the legislative process, not only the Kremlin political consultants, e.g. different lobbyists, oligarchs, and finally the government itself.

The centrists can hope that the president makes a radical political decision over summer and chooses one of the Kremlin groups. For example, it is very important who will become Putin's campaign manager. Most likely, this person will be responsible for the pro- presidential groups. If this issue is not clarified, Duma deputies will have to continue to play with this puzzle with the Kremlin. By the way, this game will be rather like Russian roulette, in view of the upcoming elections. If you make a mistake in choosing the boss, you will not be included on the party election list.

(Translated by Gregory Malutin)

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July 10, 2002:    #6346    #6347    Day in progress

 

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