Johnson's Russia List
#6340
5 July 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. UPI: Pilot had little time to avert mishap.
2. AP: Countries Push for NATO Membership.
3. Interfax: Most Russians bitter about police.
4. Vedomosti: Fedor Svarosvsky, DREADFUL LIFE. Successful and well-educated
Russians do not feel secure. Results of opinion polls indicate...
5. Washington Post: Masha Lipman, Joyless Victory Over Communists.
6. Izvestia: Svetlana Babayeva and Nataliya Ratiani, MILLIONS OF THEM.
Plans to reduce Russia's vast army of state officials.
7. Moscow Times: Michele A. Berdy, Conditionality Homegrown, Not Imposed.
8. Zavtra: Vladislav Shurygin, SURRENDER OF CHECHNYA. The myth about
"Putin the Patriot" is to come to an end really soon.
9. Izvestia: Georgy Ilyichev, THREE-HEADED CASSANDRA. A series of
political crises is in store for Russia.
10. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: State Duma Anticorruption Commission Leader
Interviewed on Corruption Issues.
11. Eurasianet.org: Ruzanna Hakobyan, BOOK REVIEW: EXAMINING THE
POTENTIAL FOR A MOSCOW-TEHRAN ALLIANCE.
12. Jerusalem Post: Tovah Lazaroff, Former Soviet Jews form congress.
13. Moscow News: Oksana Dmitrieva, Economic Myths Debunked.
14. Profil: Vladimir Zmeyushchenko, EUROPE VS. USA CONFRONTATION AND
RUSSIA.]
********
#1
Pilot had little time to avert mishap
By Mike Gallagher
UEBERLINGEN, Germany, July 5 (UPI) -- Relatives of those killed in Monday's
mid-air collision over southern Germany placed flowers near the wreckage
and Swiss authorities opened a criminal investigation into the mishap
involving a Russian airliner and a DHL cargo plane.
Swiss authorities also said Thursday the Russian pilot had been given only
44 seconds to prevent the mishap that killed 71 people, mostly gifted
Russian students on a trip to Spain.
Around 150 members of the families of the passengers of the Russian Tupolev
T154, which collided with the DHL cargo plane, were flown into the nearby
town of Friedrichshafen on the edge of Lake Constance and after a brief
memorial service Thursday at a local church, were taken by bus to the crash
site.
They were shown the still intact section of the tail of the plane where the
grieving relatives laid flowers and wept. The relatives came in two groups
and each spent more than an hour at the site.
A small group of medical personnel traveled to the site of the crash with
them, including two doctors and several psychologists. Also present was a
Russian Orthodox minister and a Muslim cleric.
A heavy cordon of police and security troops sealed off the area and pushed
the media back to allow the families some time to reflect on the loss of
their loved ones.
The families came clutching bags of items belonging to some of the more
than 50 teenagers who were killed in the accident. German government
forensic investigators had asked them to bring along anything that would
help them to identify the bodies using DNA profiling.
They carried several large wreaths and many more carried bouquets of
flowers that they placed in and around the tail section with its three
intact engines still attached.
The wreckage crashed down into a patch of farmland and the relatives walked
a small distance along a path that took them through fields of barley and
maize. Less than a hundred yards away lay the cockpit section of the plane
where forensic teams were still working.
Meanwhile, Swiss and German prosecutors launched separate investigations
into the causes of the mishap. Swiss authorities said the investigation was
opened because of the possibility of negligent homicide. The investigation
will focus on whether Skyguide air traffic controllers acted correctly just
prior to the crash.
"The probe will carefully investigate the exact chain of events during the
time Skyguide was tracking these aircraft from Zurich airport," said Bülach
District Attorney Christoph Naef.
Skyguide is responsible for flights over the area of southern Germany where
the accident occurred.
In a related development, German authorities said the Russian pilot had
only a 44-second warning to prevent the accident. They said recordings from
the Russian plane's black box showed that Skyguide's air-traffic
controllers told the plane to descend only 44 seconds before the impact.
"The TU-154 was only ordered to start descending 44 seconds before the
crossing point, and the descent only began 14 seconds later after a second
request," said Peter Schlegel, the head of the air accident office in Germany.
He also said Skyguide failed to contact the DHL crew. Both DHL pilots were
also killed.
Earlier, flags throughout Germany flew at half-staff since the news of the
disaster broke and at the town of Uberlingen a book of condolence was opened.
In the center of the town, floral tributes to the more than 70 victims of
the crash were laid at the side of a small fountain in the Market Platz
part of the town.
Hundreds of candles were lit and a small service was held there in the
early evening sunshine.
In the hills above the town, more than 600 police officers continued the
painstaking search for the remaining bodies. Sections of the wreckage of
the Tupolev were being taken by trucks to an assembly point in a hangar at
the airport in Friedrichshafen. A 10-ton section was removed from right
outside the front door of a cottage.
Josef Reichenau, 16, the son of a local farmer who was walking along the
edge of the nearby lake said he feared for his life as blazing wreckage
came falling out of the sky.
"We tried to get away from all of the fires," he said. "Everything seemed
to be on fire and I was trying to make my way home when I came across one
of the bodies lying on the side of the road. It was a female and her body
was more or less intact. She was badly burned and most of her clothes were
missing. I just ran. It was almost midnight and I didn't know what to do. I
just wanted to go home. It was my first thought."
********
#2
Countries Push for NATO Membership
July 5, 2002
By J. MICHAEL LYONS
RIGA, Latvia (AP) - Leaders from 10 former East Bloc countries were
optimistic on Friday as they began a final collective bid to join NATO
ahead of a November summit in Prague.
The three ex-Soviet Baltic republics of Estonian, Latvia and Lithuania
along with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia lead the list of
countries expected to get the coveted invitations and are looking at this
week's summit, in part, as a celebration.
``We're not exactly popping the champagne bottles yet, but to some extent
we're celebrating what will be an important historical event,'' Latvian
Foreign Minister Indulis Berzins said.
Discussions during the two-day summit in Riga will focus on ``values''
problems like corruption, anti-Semitism and freedom of the press that
persist in the former communist countries.
But the U.S.-led global fight against terrorism also was high on the
agenda, with five American lawmakers led by Senate Republican Leader Trent
Lott of Mississippi in attendance.
``Sept. 11 accelerated the process and the number of countries that might
be added,'' Lott said in an interview.
Video addresses by President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair
will be played on Friday.
Since the attacks, NATO leaders have stressed that expansion is now as much
about securing democracy across Europe as tangible defense contributions
from the applicants, most of which have small militaries.
``Getting into NATO has become more than just meeting the (criteria)
necessary to be considered for accession,'' Lott said. ``It has moved
toward the values that we all talk about now - free markets, free trade and
freedom for the people.''
The prime ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were at the meetings,
along with defense officials and legislators, including several from the 19
NATO member states.
The summit, dubbed ``the Bridge to Prague,'' is the final meeting of top
leaders from the candidate countries before NATO leaders meet in November
in Prague. The expansion to be finalized then is the biggest change to the
alliance since it was formed 53 years ago.
Security in Riga, the Latvian capital, has been heightened, though few
protesters are expected, police spokesman Krists Leiskalns said.
On the Net:
Summit site: http://www.rigasummit.lv/en/
*******
#3
Most Russians bitter about police
MOSCOW. July 5 (Interfax) - As many as 48% of Russians think that the
police do not do their job properly, 38% think that they do it
satisfactorily and only 8% feel that they do it well.
These are the findings of a poll of 1,500 people taken by the Public
Opinion fund on June 29.
Of the 25% of the people in the poll sample who dealt with police
officers in the last two or three months, 18% have negative impressions
while 7% remember them with warm feelings.
*******
#4
Vedomosti
July 5, 2002
DREADFUL LIFE
Successful and well-educated Russians do not feel secure
Results of opinion polls indicate...
Author: Fedor Svarosvsky
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
EACH YEAR, THE NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH CENTER DOES A SURVEY
OF 1,600 RUSSIAN CITIZENS FROM DIFFERENT REGIONS. THEY ARE ASKED
WHETHER THEY FEEL SECURE. THIS YEAR, THE MORE WELL-EDUCATED
RESPONDENTS REPORTED FEELING LESS SECURE; THERE COULD BE A NUMBER OF
REASONS FOR THIS PATTERN.
Each year, the National Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM)
does a survey of 1,600 Russian citizens from different regions, cities
and rural areas. Researcher Alexander Golov analyzes the answers to
the question about whether the respondents feel secure. A clear trend
was detected in 2001: the higher the level of education, the more
secure people felt - 41% of respondents with a higher education felt
"quite secure" in 2001, against 29% this year. A different pattern is
reported this year. The less education people have, the more secure
they feel.
The optimism level of respondents who never completed high school
may be attributed to their increasing incomes. Before 2001, salaries
in Russia had mostly risen for qualified professionals and managers.
More recently, the rise in incomes has spread out to less-educated
workers: small business owners, menial workers, office staff, and so
on.
The morale of respondents with college degrees is affected by
factors other than the financial. "The correlation of political forces
is shifting in the direction of strong presidential rule," says
Grigori Kramskoy, head of the Team Psychology Center. Andrei Vozmitel
of the Sociology Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences believes
the intelligentsia may also be concerned about freedom of speech in
Russia. Last but not least, successful Russians may be worried about
their capital.
The latter assumption is supported by the results of a VTsIOM
opinion poll which emphasized social background rather than education.
Respondents from the highest layers of society who have ceased to feel
secure outnumber those with college degrees who no longer feel secure.
In June 2001, 42% of respondents from the highest ranks of society
said they felt quite confident and secure. In the latest poll, the
figure was only 13%.
As they earn more money and accumulate more assets, people start
worrying that they may lose it all.
On the other hand, the difference in attitudes between strata of
society may be attributed to their views of information. Successful
and well-educated citizens are more perceptive.
They read more, watch television news, and take current affairs
in Russia and abroad closer to heart. All the same, everyone is much
more concerned about what happens nearby. Some companies have already
noticed this trend and reacted accordingly.
The RESO-Garantia insurance company recently withdrew terrorist
attacks from the traditional list of force-majeur conditions covered
by its insurance policies. The company did so after the explosions in
Moscow. "During the first few days following the explosions we got a
lot of telephone calls. The callers wanted to know whether they could
insure their lives against terrorist attacks," says Igor Ivanov, RESO-
Garantia deputy general director.
As a rule, such calls stop after several days. People switch over
to something else.
"What am I afraid of? I fear that it is possible to convict
someone in Russia despite the law. I live in the central city, see
what is happening around me, and fear tyranny and lawlessness of the
municipal authorities. I'm horrified by the bureaucracy," says Anna
Golubeva, RTR channel deputy general director.
Andrei Vasiliev, a psychiatrist from St. Petersburg, is concerned
about the authorities much more than potential terrorist attacks. "I
fear the reaction of the authorities much more than terrorist attacks
themselves," he admits.
The report provided by VTsIOM includes an interesting detail.
Young women between 18 and 23 feel more secure nowadays. In last
year's poll, 36% of them said they felt secure; this year it was 55%.
Kramskoy says that young women have better opportunities now.
"Responsibility of the sexes is evening out," he said. "Employers are
much less concerned about gender these days. Women's chances of
landing a good job are better."
That is probably why young Russian women are placing their
careers above their personal life. Natalia Chernova, a secretary from
the Peugeot office in St. Petersburg, admits that she fears losing her
high-paid job more than anything else in life.
The parents of these young women are among the most vulnerable
stratum of society, according to the VTsIOM poll. Middle-aged men and
women between 40 and 49 are the least secure.
*******
#5
Washington Post
July 5, 2002
Joyless Victory Over Communists
By Masha Lipman
MOSCOW -- Once-mighty Communist power is slowly fading away. The
Communists' support in polls is still at 30 percent, but thanks to clever
maneuvering by the Kremlin, they have lost all chairmanships in the Duma.
Even more important, the Communist Gennady Seleznev, speaker of the Duma
and one of the most prominent politicians in Russia, refused to comply with
party discipline, and the Communist leadership was forced to expel him.
Smelling the impending decline in Communist fortunes, a couple of local
governors who had won on the party ticket announced their desertion, and
more are likely to follow.
This sounds like wonderful news to those, including myself, who hated the
oppressive Soviet Communist regime and thought of Boris Yeltsin's victory
over the party in 1991 as the most blissful moment in 20th century Russian
history. But today I'm not rejoicing.
President Yeltsin regarded ridding Russia of the Communist danger as his
historic mission. He dropped the Communist state symbols -- the anthem, the
flag, the emblem. He yearned to re-bury Lenin and, up until his last day in
office, he maintained a passionate desire to ban the Communist Party. There
was not a single day in his presidential years when he didn't have to repel
vehement Communist opposition.
Vladimir Putin, anointed president by Yeltsin, did not inherit this sense
of mission from his predecessor. The Kremlin's recent effort to reduce the
political weight of the Communists is purely situational tactics. The
Kremlin regards political parties as mere voting numbers, and reshapes them
as it sees fit.
Two and a half years ago, as the hastily mustered pro-Putin party Edinstvo
entered the Duma with limited voting strength, the Kremlin ordered it to
side with the Communists, thus alienating the pro-reform liberals and
discarding Yeltsin's anti-Communist legacy. Over the past year the Kremlin
has reshuffled the political parties and ensured a new, favorable majority
in the Duma.
So for a few months now, the Kremlin has pursued an anti-Communist
campaign. But in doing so it has sent hardly any message to the Russian
public as to what is so bad about the Communists -- except that their Duma
faction would not support the Kremlin's legislative initiatives. The
Communists' responsibility for the tragic history of 20th century Russia is
not an issue. Nor are they held accountable for the Soviet Union's economic
collapse or for the terrible damage the years of terror inflicted upon the
Russian identity.
Putin himself appears to be uncertain about his attitude toward the Soviet
past. He has vaguely blamed the current Russian economic disaster on "the
previous decades," which may be interpreted as a hint at the damaging
effects of the Communist economy. But he has barely said it point blank. On
the other hand, he thinks nothing of visiting the get-togethers of veterans
of the KGB, the very tool of the Communist Party dictatorship. He brought
back Stalin's anthem and is proud of it. In his public news conference on
June 24 he emphasized that this is where he breaks with Yeltsin's legacy.
During his latest visit to Poland, Putin paid homage to Polish workers shot
by the pro-Soviet Polish government. But he did it only as a matter of
diplomatic courtesy. He did not make a public statement, let alone an
appearance, on the 40th anniversary of the killing of Soviet workers in
Novocherkassk this spring. Nor has he ever visited any of the sites of
Stalin's mass executions, at least two of which lie abandoned within a
half-hour's drive from Moscow.
Putin's defenders say pragmatism is what counts: Once he has a solid
pro-Kremlin majority in the Duma, Putin can get his reform legislation
approved, and as the country reforms economically, everything else will
come into place. The point itself is not fully convincing, as Putin's loyal
elite includes both reform-minded liberals and KGB-mold hard-liners.
Putin's mixed signals encourage both factions to act on what they regard as
Putin's backing, thus pulling Russia in different directions.
Moreover, because of Putin's uncertain attitude toward the Soviet past, the
ugliest practices of the old system have become useful. In a recent
example, the Russian court used the expertise of one of the most notorious
institutions of the Soviet police regime, namely, forensic psychiatry, in
the trial of Col. Yuri Budanov, who kidnapped and killed a Chechen girl.
Because the evidence was impossible to deny and the military establishment
sought to protect one of its own, the colonel claimed temporary mental
impairment. To certify his mental incapacity, Budanov's military defenders
have resorted to the services of the same psychiatric "experts" who in the
1970s declared Soviet dissidents mentally ill and helped the Communist
regime lock them up indefinitely in asylums. Still there are grounds to
believe that somebody very important in the Kremlin is displeased about
unleashing the relics of the totalitarian past. At the end of Budanov's
trial, which has lasted for a year and a half, the judge postponed the
sentencing and ordered a new -- and third -- psychiatric evaluation.
The writer, deputy editor of the Russian newsmagazine Ezhenedel'ny Zhurnal,
writes a monthly column for The Post.
*******
#6
Izvestia
July 5, 2002
MILLIONS OF THEM
Plans to reduce Russia's vast army of state officials
Author: Svetlana Babayeva, Nataliya Ratiani
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
AT PRESENT, THERE ARE 1.14 MILLION STATE OFFICIALS IN RUSSIA. THE
NATION'S SPENDING ON STATE OFFICIALS CONTINUES TO GROW. THE LAW ON
REFORMS TO STATE SERVICE WILL BE DEBATED IN PARLIAMENT THIS AUTUMN; IT
IS SUPPOSED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF STATE OFFICIALS BY AROUND 15-20%.
At present, there are 1.14 million state officials in Russia.
That makes eight officials at various levels per 1,000 Russian
citizens. Executive officials make up almost 85% of them,
functionaries in the judiciary and prosecutor's offices - 11%. Over
the past eighteen months, the number of federal officials has slightly
decreased, whereas the number of judges and prosecutors increased (due
to reform of the judicial branch which is currently underway). For
some reason, however, the biggest growth was registered in the
legislative bodies - almost 25%, the State Statistics Committee
announced yesterday.
The figures match the start of the year, but on the whole they
reflect the situation in the sphere of government service and local
government. The number of government officials started to grow sharply
from 1997, especially at the federal and local governmental level. In
the regions, the number of officials declined (probably, they were
merely given the status of local government employees). The growth
decelerated in 2001. Compared with the last year, the number of
federal officials decreased 7% (377,000 people), regional officials -
3% (606,000 people). However, these figures prove availability of a
great number of vacant official jobs, rather than the lunched process
of reducing the state machinery within the framework of the reform
announced by the state.
Officials are not fired - they resign. There are many vacancies
among the superior, chief and leading experts in the state bodies,
Lyubov Revyakina, Deputy Director of the Department for Government
Service of the Labor Ministry told Izvestia. As reports of the Labor
Ministry have it, the largest share of dismissals is among the people
filling in these positions, due to small salaries.
The nation's spending on state officials continues to grow.
However, L. Revyakina said, a wage-push is out of the question - it
decreased, rather than increased. "In dollar terms, the average wage
of 1995 was $450 a month, whereas nowadays it is $160." The
government's decision to raise bonuses for unusual labor conditions
for officials since July 1, 2002 will help to stabilize the situation.
With 146 millions of population, we have over 4 millions of officials.
Before discussing reduction of the state machinery as such (it should
be reduced some 15-20%, as preliminary assessments have it), an
administrative reform would be necessary, Revyakina said. The reform
will exclude the same functions for the federal authorities; non-
typical functions will be passed to the local authorities. Having
determined responsibilities of any state department, the authorities
will easily count how many officials will have to be reduced. The real
and expedient reduction of the army of officials will only begin after
the law on reform of the government service, which will be submitted
to the Duma in autumn.
FROM OUR FILES:
"The state machinery must be efficient, concise and functional.
In order to make it comply with these demands, firstly, the structure
of the executive branch should be modernized on the whole... the
structure of the executive branch must be logically and rationally
built, whereas the state machinery is supposed to become a working
tool of implementing the economic policy.
Creation of efficient and strict technology of drawing up,
adopting and executing decisions is another phase of the
administrative reform. Thirdly, it would be necessary to analyze the
state functions being carried out and retained only indispensable
ones. Finally, it is necessary to define the list of information the
state bodies are obliged to make public; this is needed to develop
civil society, building the civilized business milieu."
Russia's president's website, section "Priorities:"
"It is necessary to reduce inefficient state obligations and
expenses... It is necessary to ensure competitiveness of the
government service at the labor market. The possibility of reducing
the staff of officials at the regional and local levels under
condition that if the constitutional powers of the federal subjects
and municipal entities are observed."
From the president's address on "Budget policy in 2003".
On June 26, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree raising
salaries for the federal officials. According to this, from June 30
the salaries of federal officials will rise by 50%. The document has
been expected for over six months, with hopes for a greater rise
(doubling or tripling salaries), but Putin decided not to raise the
salaries for officials before salaries in the military are raised (the
law came into effect from July 1). When the officials learned of this,
they were so disappointed that some of them started resigning from the
state structures (we reported on this topic February).
(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)
*******
#7
Moscow Times
July 5, 2002
Conditionality Homegrown, Not Imposed
By Michele A. Berdy
Uslovno: refers to an action or thing that is dependent on other
circumstances; can be translated as conditionally, provisionally; "sort of"
or "kind of" or "let's say"
The adverb uslovno and the adjective uslovnyi are headaches for the
translator. It seems simple -- it's based on the word for condition --
uslovie -- so it's "conditional" or "conditionally," right? Only when you
sit down to your text, you find that "conditionally" almost never fits.
One example when it does fit: My uslovno dogovorilis. Seichas nado vsyo
utochnit i napisat podrobnyi dogovor. (We came to a conditional agreement.
Now we have to clarify everything and write a detailed contract.)
But here's another example: Ya dam tebe primer. On zarabatyvaet 500
dollarov -- uslovno. Ot etikh 500 sot, on poluchaet 300 posle nalogov.
(I'll give you an example. Let's say he makes 500 dollars. Out of those
500, he gets 300 after taxes).
There is also something about this word that can make for good humor. I
recall a conversation I once had with a guy at a party. After he made a
reference to his family, I asked if he were married.
- Nu, kak vam skazat?
- Skazhite, kak est..
- Nu, skazhem -- da. Uslovno.
How should I say this?
Say it like it is.
Well, let's say yes. Sort of.
Or take a recent court case. A man was convicted of ordering a contract
killing (in Russian you say simply, "on ego zakazal" -- "he ordered the
hit"). And he was sentenced to "shest let uslovno. " In English you'd say
"he was sentenced to six years probation," or "he received a suspended
sentence of six years." Except, of course, you wouldn't have much cause to
say that in English, because there aren't many mitigating circumstances
(smyagchayushchie obstoyatelstva) that allow a convicted murderer to walk
out of the courtroom on a suspended sentence. The only thing I can figure
is that the judge thought the hit deserved to die.
My favorite form of "sort-of-ness" is the UE: uslovnye edinitsy. UE are, to
my mind, one of the finest manifestations of the Russian genius for getting
around an inconvenient law. Once upon a time, somebody screamed that it was
a national shame for Russians to price goods in dollars in their stores. U
nas svoi dengi -- rubli. Pust tseny budut vyrazheny v rublyakh! (We've got
our own money -- rubles. The prices should be in rubles!) Makes sense, only
this was a time of galloping inflation, so an imported washing machine that
cost 14,000 rubles one day would cost 14,500 the next, and 15,000 the day
after that. No one could afford to change the price tags every day or hour,
so they came up with "uslovnye edinitsy" -- provisional monetary units --
that just happened to have the same value as the dollar.
This is a case in which the so-called correct translation of "provisional
monetary units" isn't useful at all, unless you are sure your audience
knows that these provisional units are always the value of the dollar. If
they don't, it's better to translate them as "dollar equivalents." One of
my business colleagues jokingly declines UE, so that his prices sound like
this: Tirazh stoit 5 tysyach uyov. For clarity, I'd translate this as "Your
print run will cost 5 thousand dollar equivalents." Now, this is also a
little crazy in English, but don't shoot the translator: we're only
reflecting reality.
Michele A. Berdy, a Moscow-based translator and interpreter, is co-author
of a Russian-English dictionary.
******
#8
Zavtra
July 4, 2002
SURRENDER OF CHECHNYA
The myth about "Putin the Patriot" is to come to an end really soon
Author: Vladislav Shurygin
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE HISTORY OF LITTLE LIEUTENANT COLONEL PUTIN IS COMING TO AN END.
HE HAS FAILED TO KEEP HIS PROMISES GIVEN TO VOTERS IN 2000. BUT HIS
WORST BLUNDER IS THE SURRENDER OF CHECHNYA. IT IS NOT RULED OUT THAT
CHECHEN GUERRILLAS WILL SOON ATTACK AND OCCUPY THE LARGEST CITIES IN
CHECHNYA.
The history of little lieutenant colonel Putin is coming to an
end. He has failed to become a second Peter the Great.
The growth of the industrial manufacturing does not reach 1% a
year. Inflation leaps up to 30% a year, and industry is degrading.
There is a specter of another default in Russia.
Putin has failed to make the second Gorchakov (a prominent
Russian diplomat of the first half of the 19th century - translator's
note) or Tamerlan (a prominent medieval Tatar khan famous for his
conquests - translator's note). Instead of the external security
promised by him, Russia has NATO divisions around its borders, the
Kaliningrad Region is insulated from the country, Americans have
occupied Central Asia, and there are American troops in Georgia. The
only thing left for him is PR: a ridiculous lot of a small man.
Here he is, giving his blessings to graduates of military schools
and academies, talking about the strength of the Russian Army, raising
his wineglass, and smiling, as if he is unaware that half a year
later, there will be fewer than half of these officers in the army.
They have nothing to fly in or sail on or shoot with. According to
secret estimates of the Main Technical Department, there is only one
tank out of ten that can go out to a testing area. As for crews able
to manage a modern tank, there are no more than two companies of them
in every regiment. There are some skillful commanders left only
because some officers and ensigns started their service back in the
Soviet era.
In a few years, 70 trained pilots out of every 100 will resign
for long service. They will be replaced by no more than 10, and they
will have nothing to fly in, for today, only 30% of the airplane fleet
of the Air Force and the Anti-Aircraft Troops are in good repair, and
in the following five years, half of them will be excluded from the
fleet as scrap metal.
Putin seems to be unaware of the fact that ships of the Russian
Navy are now able to sail only near the shore. They do not have
foreign bases, nor tankers, intelligence, etc., and they do not differ
much from targets on testing areas. In about four years, only half of
these ships will remain in the arsenal. Most of the ships subject for
utilization will be vessels of the first and second classes.
What is left for Putin? Chechnya. After the Khasavyurt
humiliation, it is the rapid and energetic campaign launched under
Putin's guidance that helped him win over hearts of voters and become
president. People and the army viewed him as a person able to stop
separatism and discontinue the ruin of Russia.
However, today, only empty words are left of the president's
previous strict position. For half a year, Chechnya has been being
gradually surrendered to gunmen of Maskhadov and Basaev.
A year and a half ago, Putin's financiers deprived Russian
servicemen of combat rewards, which had made the war at least worth
risking.
Although Putin used to swear that servicemen in Chechnya would
earn at least $1,000 a month, he silently swallowed his pill of
Kasyanov's. A certain official calculated that Chechnya was calm
enough and only 25% of the forces located in Chechnya should receive
combat rewards. The logic was simple: only those officers or soldiers
who directly participated in combats were to get combat rewards.
Others were to get ordinary allowances. But doesn't a military driver
or a military doctor take as much risk as a special troops serviceman?
Are cooks and helicopter mechanics extra people in the combat area?
Humiliating squabbling has started in the army for those combat
rewards that have been left for it. To preserve a semblance of
justice, military units started to introduce coefficients showing how
many days should be paid to this or that category of servicemen from
the reserves of the combat rewards. As a result, the troops fighting
in Chechnya have been transformed into a wrathful and disappointed
mass of people losing their belief in justice and their desire to
fight for this kind of Russia. How the Chechen group of forces is in
the same state as it was in the time when dipsomaniac Yeltsin pushed
it on Maskhadov's gangs. The army is deprived of the initiative,
driven into garrisons and barracks, paralyzed, and demoralized. The
number of soldiers and officers refusing to go to Chechnya is
increasing every month.
At the same time, the command and military analysts are concerned
about the fact that the Kremlin is giving Kadyrov and his
administration he full authority over Chechnya. Chechen security
structures are being hurriedly formed now. There are no serious checks
of those entering these structures. A person should have a couple of
references and a new Russian passport to get a new uniform and a
certificate of the Russian Interior Ministry. This makes ideal
conditions for gunmen who want to get into administrative structures
of the Chechen Republic.
Law enforcement agencies employees working in Chechnya are openly
saying that entire interior affairs directorates are fully controlled
by Chechen gunmen.
Quite recently Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov demonstrated the
documents allegedly intercepted from Aslan Maskhadov, in which he
plans a seizure of Grozny. Ivanov proudly announced that the seizure
was disrupted. But the minister seems to have failed to understand the
main point: Maskhadov will not rush into a trap and will not get into
a dubious battle. If Maskhadov is planning a seizure of Grozny, this
means that he has thoroughly weighed up all chances and alternatives.
Ivanov did not understand that the plan of the seizure shows that
gunmen have enough forces to seize the capital city of the republic,
whereas a year ago they would not date attack a hamlet. Russian spies
are reporting now that Chechen gunmen are intensively accumulating
weapons in Grozny, Gudermes, and Argun. It is also rumored that gunmen
arrive in these cities and occupy secret apartments. They are
allegedly arranging camps there. Headquarters and filled with reports
that Russian checkpoints are permanently watched and that Chechen
gunmen are studying approaches to them and their inner structures.
Analysts note that a large-scale attack of Chechen gunmen may be
expected in two or three weeks.
The history is repeating. All this has taken place already,
including abolition of checkpoints on roads and in the outskirts of
Grozny, paralysis of the Army, the solemn transference of power to the
local administration, and even the president's announcements that the
war is over.
There is no doubt that soon Maskhadov give his estimate to
Putin's Chechen policy. The world will see enraptured gunmen marching
along streets of Grozny, Argun, Shali, and Bamut. This will be the end
of the myth about "Putin the Patriot."
(Translated by Kirill Frolov)
******
#9
Izvestia
July 5, 2002
THREE-HEADED CASSANDRA
A series of political crises is in store for Russia.
Author: Georgy Ilyichev
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
POLITICAL CONSULTANTS HAVE GATHERED IN MOSCOW FOR THE NEW ELECTORAL
TECHNIQUES CONFERENCE. SOME OF THEM PREDICT A SERIES OF CRISES IN
RUSSIA OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. GLEB PAVLOVSKY BELIEVES THAT SOMEONE
FROM THE RIGHT WING, NOT A COMMUNIST, WILL BE THE FRONT-RUNNER FOR THE
PRESIDENCY IN 2008.
Prominent political consultants have gathered at the fourth New
Electoral Techniques Conference that opened in Moscow on July 4. Among
the forecasts made by participants of the conference are destruction
of the current government structure and a new series of political
crises and pogroms.
Political analyst Mikhail Dymshits, General Director of the
agency Dymshits and Partners, considers that in 2008-2010, a large-
scale political crisis will start in Russia. In his report Dymshits
described this crisis in detail. Today, the power in Russia is held by
members of the Soviet baby boom generation (born 1951-1965): they
gained this power in a battle with members of the wartime generation.
According to Dymshits, the last representatives of the wartime
generation were Gorbachev and Yeltsin. But in a while, those born in
the middle of the 1980s will come to power, and political consultants
fear them more than communists.
The generation finishing school now is the most numerous one over
the past 50 years. By 2008, its representatives will dominate on the
job market and dictate their conditions to the government. But the
most dangerous thing is that this generation is living in the
information space that differs greatly from that of the rest of the
society (the internet, cellular phones, etc.). At the same time, this
generation does not know anything about the government system in the
country and does not wish to. Therefore, as soon as this generation
feels its strength, "it may not only demand that powers be
redistributed in their favor but also ruin the entire system of the
Russian government that has been so painfully constructed over the
past decade," Dymshits has said.
President of the Effective Policy Foundation Gleb Pavlovsky did
not sound so dramatic: he touched on more concrete things, e.g. the
election cycle of 2003-2004. In his opinion, the main intrigue of this
campaign is the fight for the second place in the presidential
election. Pavlovsky stressed, "No one will wait for 2008." None of the
participants of the conference doubted Putin's victory in the
election. As for the second place, Pavlovsky believes that someone
from the right wing, not a Communist, will be the front-runner for the
presidency in 2008.
Besides, Pavlovsky, who constantly plays the role of Cassandra,
predicted that "quite a series of rather serious crises is in store
for us, for which all of us are practically ready, in principle."
(Translated by Kirill Frolov)
******
#10
State Duma Anticorruption Commission Leader Interviewed on Corruption Issues
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
29 June 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with Nikolay Kovalev, chairman of the State Duma Commission
for Combating Corruption, by Tamara Shkel; place and date not given:
"Diagnosis: Bribery. Russia's Chronic Disease"
Our interlocutor can be fully regarded as one of
the most competent persons in the field of combating corruption. First,
because in the early 1990's Nikolay Kovalev led a competent organization
-- the Federal Security Service and second, because he is the incumbent
head of the State Duma Commission for Combating Corruption.
[Shkel] Nikolay Dmitriyevich, there are two extreme opinions about
corruption. The first is: "Corruption is immortal." The second:
"If a functionary is paid higher wages he will not take bribes." Which
of these opinions is more correct?
[Kovalev] The truth always lies somewhere in between. The history of
corruption is as long as the history of human civilization no matter
where it was established -- in Egypt, Rome, or Judea. Bribery is
mentioned in the 13th-century Russian chronicles. The first legislative
restriction on corruption was imposed by Ivan III, and his grandson Ivan
the Terrible introduced the death penalty for "overindulgence in
bribery."
Historic experience shows that it is impossible to eradicate corruption
completely either by executions (present-day China can serve as an
example) or by complete liberalization of the economy (a banker taking
bribes was unexpectedly exposed in respectful Switzerland!).
Nevertheless, it is possible to lower the level of this evil phenomenon,
including by means of higher salaries. However, it is unrealistic to
sharply raise overnight the salaries of all Russian functionaries of the
extremely overblown bureaucratic machine. Therefore, we have to start
from the downsizing of the army of bureaucrats.
There is another problem also. Even functionaries at the highest
federal level who have honestly served the state all their life retire
into "civilian life" absolutely penniless. Meanwhile, those people
decided the fates of multibillion transactions. In fact, the state
itself pushes functionaries toward corruption.
[Shkel] What is the situation in other states?
[Kovalev] In civilized countries a functionary knows that when he
retires he will receive a lump-sum retirement benefit sufficient to start
a private business. If he does not want to start it, he can live
decently on mere interest generated by that sum. Plus he is paid a good
pension. We do not have any of these things -- either retirement
benefits or decent pensions.
[Shkel] Bribes are taken (and given) in the whole world. However, how
come this phenomenon has acquired such threatening dimensions in Russia?
Shocking figures are cited.
[Kovalev] The state's losses caused by corruption, indeed, can reach
$10-20 billion per year by the most optimistic estimates. However, the
scale of this evil phenomenon cannot be measured in dollars alone.
Corruption does great damage to the nation's moral health, its attitude
to organs of power, the establishment of democratic institutions, and the
development of civic society. It is rust destroying the foundations of
the state. Any state, for Russia really is not an exception. The
corruption level objectively increases in a country undergoing
modernization. Russia is currently undergoing not just modernization
but radical reform due to its transition from an absolutely centralized
to a market economy. Admittedly, we have our purely Russian
distinctions also: The tradition to obey not the law but instructions
and bosses.
[Shkel] People say that corruption currently threatens Russian
security.
[Kovalev] It is not an exaggeration. Present-day corruption is
tightly woven-together with organized crime. Criminal dons maintain
senior state officials of various ranks, for they logically assume that
at the right moment the corrupt representative of power and
administration will do as he is told. According to estimates by the
Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 2000 organized crime
controlled to a smaller or greater extent 40 percent of private and 60
percent of state-run enterprises and 50-85 percent of banks. It is due
to corruption among senior functionaries and their slipshod performance
of official duties that the volume of the shadow economy has achieved 40
percent of the country's GDP.
[Shkel] The State Duma commission has proof of numerous cases of abuse
of office by functionaries. How do law enforcement organs react to
these facts?
[Kovalev] We do not have the powers to conduct a comprehensive
legislative investigation, which is common practice in a number of other
countries, let alone operational-investigative activities. The
commission merely has the right to ask the prosecutor's office, judiciary
and law enforcement organs to specify the circumstances that indirectly
attest to corruption activities on the part of senior functionaries.
Sometimes the responses obtained allow us to say: Yes, this functionary
has sticky fingers. However, they are obviously insufficient to take
criminal proceedings against them, as was the case with a number of
former ministers.
We have prepared the draft law "On Legislative Investigations" which
should facilitate the fight against corruption, including deputies'
fight.
[Shkel] The leaders of law enforcement organs often complain that
legislators have not provided them with all necessary tools to combat
corruption. Are these complaints correct?
[Kovalev] Not exactly. The main problem is not the lack of relevant
laws but inadequate application of existing laws. I would cite one
example only: The taking of criminal proceedings against former
Railways Minister Aksenenko. Back in 1999, documents provided by our
commission, the Ministry of Finance, and a number of other departments,
as well as conclusions drawn by the Comptroller's Office confirming the
facts of serious violations within the Railways Ministry system were
submitted to the General Prosecutor's Office, but it refused to take
criminal proceedings. Little time passed, the new president came, the
situation in the country changed, and in October 2001 the General
Prosecutor's Office, based on virtually the same materials supplemented
by an additional investigation conducted by the General Prosecutor's
Office, somewhat unexpectedly took criminal proceedings against Aksenenko
and pressed charges of abuse of office causing severe consequences.
Therefore, it was not the absence of the anticorruption law that was the
reason, was it?
Nevertheless new laws are being drafted. The Code of Conduct for Public
Servants was recently passed at first reading. Despite all its flaws it
is an important and necessary document, for it specifies what a public
servant can and cannot do and what conduct is considered corruption. Of
course, thus far it is mostly a declaration. However, the adoption of
the Law on "Combating Corruption" is close at hand. I am one of the
authors of the draft. Amendments to the law on public service
addressing the fight against corruption are being prepared. There are
other problems also, and we are trying to solve them.
[Shkel] General Prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov recently criticized
legislators who allegedly elaborated a lot of laws in the economic area
that provoke corruption. Do you agree with him?
[Kovalev] I have to admit that the General Prosecutor's criticism is
justified. Due to the fact that Russian legislation is very convoluted
and contradictory, it is the functionary who interprets the law in
practice. And in many cases not only does he interpret it to his own
advantage; he also creates such conditions where an illegal deal is the
only solution. Therefore, we need a special organ that would analyze
laws -- both existing and those still being drafted to eliminate those
kinds of provocative provisions.
[Shkel] I heard many times from leaders of law enforcement organs in
the provinces that they have all but complete lists of functionaries
linked to criminals. They can as well attach to their office doors
signs reading "corrupt official" or "bribe taker." Having said that,
even without such signs people know who among functionaries take bribes
and how much they have to pay them for their "services." How come this
knowledge does not produce any results?
[Kovalev] I can tell you why. Because of low professionalism of
activities. Aces, top-notch specialists have left law enforcement
organs. How can an investigator who is a third-year student collect
evidence to accuse an experienced bribe taker? Virtually all of us in
the broad meaning of the word put up with corruption. The point is it
is much easier to pay the money and have the problem solved than go
through all the procedures envisioned by the law when a functionary
harasses you and introduces changes to documents, let us say, during the
registration of an enterprise. I dare to claim that in Russia in almost
all cases there is no extortion, for there is no need for it: People
voluntarily offer bribes. Therefore, on the one hand society complains,
but on the other hand it provokes corruption and does not want to fight
it. It is both an ailment of our society and its diagnosis.
Where There Is More Bribery and Fewer Prison Terms
Data on crime involving bribery over the first five months of 2002
(according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs):
Russia as a whole:
Instances of bribery -- 2,995 (as compared to 2001 -- a drop of 4.4
percent); cases exposed -- 2,774 (as compared to 2001 -- an increase of
8.1 percent); cases referred to court -- 1,975 (as compared to 2001 -- an
increase of 0.6 percent).
Central Federal District: Instances of bribery -- 1,208 (as compared to
2001 -- a drop of 9.9 percent); cases exposed -- 826 (as compared to 2001
-- an increase of 5.0 percent); cases referred to court -- 634 (as
compared to 2001 -- an increase of 1.1 percent).
Northwestern Federal District: Instances of bribery -- 266 (as compared
to 2001 -- a drop of 25.3 percent); cases exposed -- 198 (as compared to
2001 -- a drop of 29.0 percent); cases referred to court -- 143 (as
compared to 2001 -- a drop of 19.2 percent).
Southern Federal District: Instances of bribery -- 605 (as compared to
2001 -- an increase of 1.0 percent); cases exposed -- 388 (as compared to
2001 -- an increase of 24.8 percent); cases referred to court -- 307 (as
compared to 2001 -- an increase of 26.9 percent).
Volga Federal District: Instances of bribery -- 750 (as compared to
2001 -- an increase of 3.7 percent); cases exposed -- 594 (as compared to
2001 -- an increase of 45.6 percent); cases referred to court -- 382 (as
compared to 2001 -- an increase of 10.4 percent).
Ural Federal District: Instances of bribery -- 239 (as compared to 2001
-- a drop of 26.0 percent); cases exposed -- 142 (as compared to 2001 --
a drop of 43.7 percent); cases referred to court -- 102 (as compared to
2001 -- a drop of 41.4 percent).
Siberian Federal District: Instances of bribery -- 569 (as compared to
2001 -- an increase of 28.7 percent); cases exposed -- 365 (as compared
to 2001 -- an increase of 35.7 percent); cases referred to court -- 225
(as compared to 2001 -- an increase of 19.7 percent).
Far East Federal District: Instances of bribery -- 157 (as compared to
2001 -- an increase of 14.6 percent); cases exposed -- 132 (as compared
to 2001 -- an increase of 46.7 percent); cases referred to court -- 81
(as compared to 2001 -- an increase of 32.8 percent).
*******
#11
Eurasianet.org
July 3, 2002
BOOK REVIEW: EXAMINING THE POTENTIAL FOR A MOSCOW-TEHRAN ALLIANCE
By Ruzanna Hakobyan
Iran and the Eurasian Idea: Axis Moscow-Tehran
by Igor Mouradyan and Samvel Manoukyan
103 pages: $1.00 (in Russian)
Yerevan: Fund of High Technologies, 1997
The United States has long been interested in the development of the Caspian
Basin’s natural resources. Since the start of the global campaign against
terrorism, Washington has also become more focused on Caucasus geopolitical
events. US military advisers are now found in Georgia, and construction has
finally started on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, an energy export project
long championed by US leaders. The increased US regional profile is not
welcomed by all, however. Two Armenian political observers offer suggestions
on how other regional powers can counter a rise in US influence in their book
"Iran and the Eurasian Idea: Axis Moscow –Tehran."
This book was written in 1997 when the new disposition of forces in Eurasia
was already identifiable. In the book, the authors analyze new political
realities and suggest solutions to the problems facing the regional states.
Of course, a lot has changed since but the problems discussed are still
there. So, the suggested solutions remain pertinent.
The authors - prominent Armenian political scientist Igor Mouradyan and an
expert on national ideology Samvel Manoukyan - argue that since the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991, Western liberalism is attempting to absorb
Eurasia, destroying traditional Eurasian values. At the same time, the
authors assert Turkey is trying to unite nations of Turkic origin and
establish its dominance in the region.
These trends clearly pose a threat to the interests of Russia and Iran. And
of the three Caucasus states, Armenia stands to lose the most from the new
geopolitical alignment. Yerevan has long been a strong partner of Russia,
while having hostile relations with both Turkey and Azerbaijan.
The book argues that Russia and Iran need to forge a geostrategic axis in
order to limit US encroachment in Eurasia. Such a partnership could promote
unity among small states that share common Indo-Iranian heritage and are
characterized by more or less equal potential and developmental patterns:
similar goals in economics, politics and culture.
The book is a collection of 14 articles. Based on the topics discussed the
articles can be grouped in three main groups.
The first group is about Iran. The authors briefly present Iran's religion,
history and economics. They add that despite economic sanctions and the
legacy of the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran retains economic development potential,
especially in the energy sector. The country's inability to gain access to
the Mediterranean Sea, and thus European Markets, is identified as a major
obstacle to Iran's realizing its economic potential. In this sense, closer
ties with Russia make sense in that such a relationship could create
alternate trade routes for Iran.
Since 1991, Russian-Iranian relations, as well as Tehran's ties with other
Christian states in the region, have developed more rapidly than those with
many Muslim countries. Though strange at first glance, this phenomenon is
easy to explain. According to the authors, the United States is trying to
transform the Caspian Basin into an area of its influence; Turkey is trying
to create a union of nations of Turkic origin. So, Iran feels insecure. Under
such circumstances the only powerful ally it can count on is Russia.
The authors argue that the cooperation of these two major regional powers may
be carried out through the division of functions: Russia could dominate in
military and technological areas, and Iran - in religious and
cultural-political areas.
The second group of articles deals with Russia. In this section, the authors
provide a brief summary of the Eurasian idea. This doctrine was born in the
end of the 19th century, and is rooted in the notion that Russia should align
itself with the Turkic nations inhabiting the steppes of Europe and Asia.
The Eurasian idea has experienced a revival over the last decade, as Moscow,
for a variety of reasons, has discovered that Western Europe's suspicion of
Russia would not quickly dissipate. Espousing the idea of Eurasianism is not
the same as implementing it, however. It is important to note that the
Eurasianists in Russia do not appear to have an ally in President Vladimir
Putin, who has pursued an integrationist policy with the West.
In any event, present-day Russia lacks the necessary military, political and
economic power to establish its predominance in Eurasia. That Turkey is also
busy trying to expand its influence among Turkic states merely adds to
Russia's challenges.
The only way that Eurasianists in Russia could realize their plan, the
authors argue, is through a strong strategic alliance with Iran. Unlike
Turkey, Iran has its own natural resources and is not after the natural
resources of the regional states. Besides, its powerful cultural traditions
have always been strong in the region. So, Iran appears to be a better option
for the regional states than Turkey. What it lacks today is technological
power. And that is where the two major regional powers can cooperate.
The third group of articles concerns Armenia and Azerbaijan. Since its
independence in 1991 Yerevan has developed a close relationship with Iran,
while Tehran sees Armenia as an important partner in its efforts to contain
the expansion of Turkish. Iran is also interested in the preservation of
Armenia's control over Karabakh as a strategically important territory. At
the same time, Iran's relationship with Azerbaijan remains tense, despite
Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliyev's recent visit to Iran. [For background
see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Iranian-Azerbaijani tension is linked to Baku's close relationship to Turkey.
Those strong ties render it impossible for Iran to consider Azerbaijan as a
reliable partner. On the other hand, Armenia is important for Iran because it
has a close relationship with Russia and can act as a link between the two
major regional powers.
But the authors are realistic about the real possibilities confronting
Armenia. They recognize that Armenia is likely to be a minor player in the
geopolitical contest in the Caucasus, and, in the worst case scenario, little
more than a semi-colonial source of raw materials for the stronger powers of
the region.
Meanwhile, the authors see Azerbaijan as becoming a one-product economy
oriented towards oil and gas. They note that Azerbaijan has sought to become
"a zone of US vital interests," suggesting that eventually Washington will
establish a military presence there.
It is easy to see that many observations made by the authors have been shown
to be accurate, and that the problems discussed in the book are as important
today as they were five years ago. Of course, there are also issues that
continue to divide Russia and Iran, especially the question of the Caspian
Sea's division. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Nevertheless, Mouradyan's and Manoukyan's book, and the doctrine it
discusses, merit close consideration.
Editor's Note: Ruzanna Hakobyan is a freelance journalist based in Yerevan.
*******
#12
Jerusalem Post
July 3, 2002
Former Soviet Jews form congress
By TOVAH LAZAROFF
Ten years ago, Jews in the former Soviet Union were afraid to admit their
identity. Today they feel confident enough to form a new international
organization called the World Congress of Russian Jewry, Chief Rabbi of
Russia Berel Lazar said yesterday.
Lazar was speaking at Beit Hanassi in Jerusalem to a portion of the
220-member congress which convened for two days in Moscow before flying here
to finish ironing out its agenda of supporting Israel, fighting terror and
anti-Semitism, improving Jewish education, and helping former Soviet Union
Jews integrate into their new host countries. The congress, funded by private
donors, includes delegates from 22 FSU countries as well as England,
Australia, Israel, the US, Canada, Austria and Germany.
Delegates yesterday visited the Knesset and stood in solidarity at Sbarro's
pizzeria in downtown Jerusalem, the site of a suicide bomb attack last summer
that killed 15.
Deputy Absorption Minister Yuli Edelstein, who spoke in Moscow at the
Congress on Monday, said that it had an important role to play in "organizing
the energy still hidden in Russian Jews."
Ten years ago an organization like this would not have been possible, said
Edelstein, who himself immigrated from the FSU. The FSU Jews lack the
financial backing or political connections to create something so large and
powerful, Edelstein said.
Valery Engel, who chairs the Congress's organization committee, said it plans
to open an office in New York and another in Moscow immediately. A third
office will be opened in Berlin and a fourth in Jerusalem at a later date,
Engel said.
Improving Jewish education and making texts available in Russian will be an
important task for the Congress so that it can better fight assimilation.
"FSU Jews have strayed very far from their roots," Engel said.
Speaking to his guests yesterday, President Moshe Katsav spoke of the
importance FSU Jews played in the country's history. Israel would be
different if it had not accepted the waves of FSU immigration over the years
because they have strengthened the country sonically, economically, and
politically.
"One factor that enables peace is a large Jewish population," Katsav said.
"Not only do we have a common past but we have a common problem," Katsav
added, explaining that terror and anti-Semitism are a global threat.
Lazar said that Israel and its new relationship with the former Soviet
republics has made a big difference for the Jews. He recalled how emotional
it was to pass by the Kremlin last year and see the Israeli flag flying in
honor of a visit by the Israeli president.
"This is an historic event that the president is hosting. Who would have
dreamt 20 or 30 years that the Jews of the former Soviet Union would all come
together here in the president's residence."
"We used to think that maybe our grandchildren would see these miracles,"
Lazar added.
*******
#13
Moscow News
July 3-9, 2002
Economic Myths Debunked
By Oksana Dmitrieva
Myth 1: The country has been seeing stable economic growth. The only
question is whether it will be 4% or 6%. Actually, economic growth has been
slackening. A year ago, it was 5 percent, but now it is at best 3 percent.
I believe that economic growth has been a product of two factors. The
first, the effect of the ruble's forced devaluation in 1998, boosted import
substitution and strengthened exporters' positions. This effect has now
effectively worn off. The second source of growth is oil prices. They
remain high (generating additional budget revenues), but have stopped
growing. Meanwhile, the government has done little else to ensure economic
growth - whether by stimulating investment or supporting small business or
developing basic sectors of industry that would be relatively competitive.
Myth 2: Inflation is falling, and by the end of the year will reach the
expected level of 12% to 14%. In fact, I believe it will be at last year's
level of 18 percent to 20 percent, if not higher. After all, in the first
five months of this year inflation has already reached 9 percent.
Furthermore, recently a decision was made to raise natural monopoly tariffs
while inflation is largely stoked by growth of raw materials and energy
prices. Besides, it is still affected by the heavy tax burden. The most
harmful thing is a combination of high VAT and sales tax. These taxes make
our products ever more costly and less competitive. In an effort to curb
inflation, the government limits the money supply while the resultant
revenues, instead of being invested in the domestic economy are spent on
foreign debt servicing.
Myth 3: People's incomes are growing. The State Committee for Statistics
recorded a 10-percent rise in the year to March. But even despite the wage
increase for public-sector employees, we are still below the pre-crisis
income level. I believe that by the end of the year we will have to contend
with a situation where the highest basic wage will be below the official
subsistence level. Furthermore, no wage indexation for the public sector is
planned for next year. As for pensions, they have risen even less - by 24
percent, that is to say, have been effectively absorbed by inflation.
Myth 4: The introduction of a flat 13 percent income tax has eliminated
shadow wage schemes. The fact is that with a progressive income tax scale,
the minimum tax rate was 12 percent, which was paid by 80 percent of
individuals. Now they have to pay 1 percent more, so for them the fiscal
situation has actually worsened. Also, the taxable base has expanded: The
income tax is now paid by military servicemen, all of whose tax breaks have
now been canceled, including on financial assistance, subsidized vacations
and lunches. So I think there is little cause to say that shadow wage
schemes are being effectively eliminated.
Myth 5: Housing and utilities reform is being successfully implemented.
Thus far the reform is confined to an attempt to transfer general housing
credits to targeted subsidies. Importantly, the same categories of people
are entitled to these subsidies: OAPs, single mothers, large families, etc.
Except that now there are more hassles involved: They have to haunt the
doorsteps of various official agencies, collecting countless certificates
to prove their eligibility. Nothing else has changed in the housing and
utilities sector. The federal budget still has to subsidize it to avert a
major growth in tariffs that would be fraught with a social upheaval.
Listening to recent statements by the president and government members, I
get the impression that, though all the right words are being said, things
are not looking up. There has been nothing but foot-dragging on small
business support, tax reform, mortgages, you name it. This is a very
lenient assessment of what has been done in the economic sphere in the
first half of the year.
*******
#14
Profil
No. 25
July 2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
EUROPE VS. USA CONFRONTATION AND RUSSIA
Vladimir ZMEYUSHCHENKO
As it is usually said, political and economic life dies
away in summer.
However, this does not always take place. This summer,
when it seems to be the time to calm down and start vacation
preparations, people continue to follow world news excitedly.
The reason is simple enough: everyone wants to see the outcome
of the struggle between the USA and Europe. Citizens try to
sort things out with the US greenback, which has become as
close to their heart as the Russian roubles, and with the
hardly known and somewhat indecently many-coloured euros.
The sharp appreciation of the euro rate to the US dollar
is evidence of the fact that united Europe is really getting
stronger while the USA begins to lose its positions. The
Western mass media have started to discuss widely the crisis of
the US business model, predicting further fall in the US dollar
and focusing on the host of problems that will befall George
Bush.
The US President has more than enough problems today: a series
of unsuccessful anti-terrorist operations, new threats of
terrorist acts, a complete failure of the new Middle East
settlement plan and, on top of that, united Europe.
The USA has to urgently look for a way out. The most
obvious solution to the problem is to sow discord in the
enemy's camp, and introduce an element of rivalry and confusion
into the EU single front. There are no doubts about the fact
that the USA will make such attempts, all the more so as this
will not be difficult to implement. The point is that Europe
has not become and will hardly become a really integral entity
in the near future. The difference between the economies of the
EU member states is too great as are the ambitions of each of
them. The situation may be destabilised, for example, by the
admission of a new group of East European countries into the EU
in 2003 or by some small trade war between French and Italian
wine producers.
This may also involve something else that will be no less
pleasant for the USA.
In any case, the intensification of the tug of war between
Europe and the USA is inevitable. It seems that Russia can
quite participate in this process. The desire of the EU and the
USA to see Russia as a partner is quite obvious. The recent
summit in Kananaskis is another proof of that. Most Western
mass media have characterised the summit as the triumph of
Putin. In their opinion, the Russian President has not only
become a full member of the G8 group but has also achieved what
Boris Yeltsin had never been able to do: to convince the other
members of the world's elite club to hold its full-fledged
summit in Russia in 2006. Apart from that, he has also received
the laurels of the champion in the struggle against terrorism
(George Bush said that Russia had achieved great successes in
the struggle against terrorism. Moreover, he did not even say a
word about the abuse of human rights in Chechnya!), and has
enabled Russia to earn $20 billion, which the developed
countries promised to allocate for the liquidation of mass
destruction weapons. On top of that, (and this must also be
credited to Putin), Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov has said
that the growth rates of the Russian economy will be higher
than those of the European or the US economy.
In a word, the West wants to be friends with Russia. It is
possible to speak for long about the fact that the USA and
Europe will in actual fact use this friendship exclusively in
their own interests but the fact of this friendship is evident.
Both proposals are advantageous for Russia. It only has to
choose whom to be friends with and against whom. Or it should
try to be friends with both. It is like the situation with the
US dollar and the euro: you can either torment yourself for
long over the choice of the currency or simply convert half of
your savings in euros and the other half in US dollars.
******
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