Johnson's Russia List
#6339
5 July 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Moscow Times editorial: Slavneft Saga Shows Putin's Weak Side.
2. Sky News (UK): Geoff Meade, Russia Introduces ID Cards.
3. Washington Times: Anders Aslund and John Hewko, Reality to clash with
idealism when communism collapses.
4. Moscow Tribune: Stanlislav Menshikov, PUTIN AS SEEN BY TALBOTT.
Change of style, not substance.
5. BBC Monitoring: Newspaper predicts end of Russian leading spin doctor's
career. (Kommersant on Pavlovsky)
6. Moscow Times: Victoria Lavrentieva, Russians Find Solace in Enron.
7. Christian Science Monitor: Scott Peterson, Human rights inch ahead in
Uzbekistan.
8. RFE/RL: Zamira Eshanova, Central Asia: Has New Alliance With West
Helped Opposition Movements?
9. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Putin's Wife Lyudmila on Language Reform, Family
Issues, With Education Minister Filippov.]
*******
#1
Moscow Times
July 5, 2002
Editorial
Slavneft Saga Shows Putin's Weak Side
Editorial President Vladimir Putin might well have allowed himself a
discrete smile at the G-8 meeting last week in Canada when for once the
heat was not on him but on his friend George W. Bush for the dubious
practices of his country's business elite.
However, the smile would soon have been wiped from his face on hearing of
the latest round in a heavyweight slogging match for control of Slavneft.
In a nutshell, former Slavneft CEO Mikhail Gutseriyev was removed from his
post and replaced by vice president Yury Sukhanov at an extraordinary
shareholders meeting on May 13. The process should have been
straightforward: The government holds 75 percent of Slavneft and Prime
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov endorsed Sukhanov.
But no. Both Gutseriyev and Sukhanov have powerful state and oligarch
patrons who are said to be maneuvering for control in the run-up to a
privatization of 20 percent of Slavneft shares later this year.
What ensued was an orgy of strong-arm tactics, most visibly by Gutseriyev &
Co., once it became clear they had been outmaneuvered behind the scenes.
Despite the brouhaha, Putin has maintained his silence. Not even a brazen
attempt to embarrass him in front of the U.S. president -- by having
Slavneft's headquarters raided while Bush was in town in May -- was able to
stir Putin from his silence. And with the government holding a controlling
stake, his favorite refrain about the state not interfering in business
disputes isn't going to cut it this time.
Putin's silence can only really be interpreted as weakness, and a far cry
from the image of a president who has cowed and corraled the once mighty
oligarchs that his spin doctors would have us believe. The Putin regime's
whole mantra about restoring the vertikal vlasti and distancing the
oligarchs from the state feeding trough rings rather hollow in view of his
handling of events. Surely, if reality were in step with the rhetoric,
Putin would not have hesitated to put the warring factions in their place
-- especially after being embarrassed so publicly.
His failure to do so sends out a signal that, far from ruling the roost,
Putin is impotent before the powerful clans that surround him. Or even
worse, that he is in some way in hock to the powerful interests battling it
out.
And if Putin can't keep his own house in order, what hope is there for
establishing the fabled level playing field for doing business?
Putin's ongoing silence comes across not so much as golden but as beholden.
And, if that's the case, beholden to a pretty shady bunch of characters.
*******
#2
Sky News (UK)
4 July 2002
Russia Introduces ID Cards
Surprisingly in a country whose totalitarian past has bequeathed tight
controls on its citizens and which often pays lip service to human rights,
it's only since July 1st that democratic Russia has demanded compulsory
photo ID, writes Sky News correspondent Geoff Meade in Moscow.
Last December, Parliament, the Duma, voted to extend internal passports
across the federation as part of its war on terrorism.
Looking just like international travel documents, its brown cover bearing
the national emblem double-headed eagle, the passport contains the bearer's
name, age, birthplace, and the municipality they're entitled to live in.
Mixed reception
That's because, without legal restraints, the authorities feared millions
would flock to the relative prosperity of cities from the impoverished
regions.
Now the residence permits, which like those envisaged in Britain have to be
produced to access health or other services, can be demanded by police
across the world's biggest country, with arrest for any citizen over 14
unable to produce the document.
Those unqualified to live where they're detained are sent under police
guard back to their home province. So far though there's been little
visible enforcement or street checks. Police officers told Sky News they
were giving the public time to get used to the new rule before clamping down.
There's been a mixed reception on the streets of the capital.
Some resent being forced to pay £1.40 for the new document. "The
government's only using this as a way of raising money," said Tatiana, 19.
"Real criminals or terrorists can easily forge fake ones."
'Forgetfulness a crime'
While Hazbulat, a 43-year-old from the southern republic of Dagestan
spotted another problem. "I keep mislaying mine. Three times I've come out
without it. It's worrying to think that forgetfulness is now a crime."
It was the bombing of apartment blocks in Moscow and other cities nearly
three years ago that began not only the second Chechen war but also near
panic over internal security. Civil liberties groups have since expressed
concern that spot checks are used predominantly against those from Chechnya
and other darker-skinned Caucasians, fuelling racism in an already
intolerant society.
But whether you're a foreigner or one of nearly 150m Russians you now have
to carry at all times official proof that you are who you say. Failure will
cost you a spot fine. It's only £2.50 but a significant sum for most
people. Yet far better than the dark days still remembered here when
crossing the authorities meant you and your identity simply disappeared.
*******
#3
Washington Times
July 2, 2002
Reality to clash with idealism when communism collapses
By Anders Aslund and John Hewko
Anders Aslund and John Hewko are with the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. They have advised several post-communist governments
during the past decade.
Regardless of when the United States eases its embargo on Cuba, the
country's communist days are numbered.
With an economy in shambles, support from the Soviet Union gone, and
contacts with the capitalist world increasing daily, it is only a matter of
time before this failed system crumbles and opens its doors to political and
economic reform. Anticipating the fall, hordes of foreign investors and Cuban
emigres are poised to rush to Havana.
In preparing for the stampede, investors and emigres would be
well-advised to consider the experience of Central and Eastern Europe after
the collapse of communism.
There, the clash between the naive idealism of returning emigres and the
harsh reality of those who stayed behind was pronounced and painful.
The effects of communism on the mentality of the population were
immense. Decades of stifling bureaucracy, incessant propaganda and an extreme
nanny state destroyed people's will to work. Entitlements became a way of
life. No one expected to get fired, and the government was viewed as the
solution to all problems.
As a result, most people older than 40 were lost, and it was left to the
youth to forge a future.
Life under communism was simple. Most things — even the lines, the
shortages, and the inefficiencies — were predictable. Everyone but the
communist elite was equally poor. Nobody worried about investments, college
tuition or mortgage payments. For the simple worker -- peasant or civil
servant, loath to worry or think -- the system had considerable attractions.
The arrival of capitalism with its plethora of choices and risks upset
that predictability and proved unnerving to most of the working class and
older generation.
Communism was a system of patent lies. Corruption, bribery and cronyism
were deeply embedded in the system. For most in the West, it was difficult to
imagine the importance of contacts, friends in high places and well-placed
relatives. Once the lid of repression was off, these forces of privilege
emerged with an uncontrollable vengeance, so that freedom initially
aggravated corruption and crime.
As the communist system collapsed, an oligarchy of former communist
managers thrived on the transitional chaos to amass enormous wealth. The
easiest fortunes were made on privileged trading between low state-controlled
prices and high market prices. The cost was borne by the older generation and
pensioners, too old to adapt to the rough and tumble of the market.
Yet, even as communism lay in ruins, the politics and people were real.
Emigres and foreign advisers arriving with a can-do swagger and the
confidence that they "know it all" often did not understand how society
functioned.
Under communism, people may have forgotten how to work and never learned
to use a credit card, but they were bright and had pride. The combination of
local pride and emigre arrogance excluded all but a handful of emigres from
prominent government positions. Without genuine humility, returning emigres
are not likely to succeed.
An awareness of these problems helps harness them. Cubans must be
mobilized and empowered. It is not enough to preach the principles of
capitalism. Early democratic elections to a new parliament are vital to
putting in place a functioning legislature that can adopt the hundreds of
laws a market economy requires. A popularly elected president cannot do it
alone, as President Boris Yeltsin experienced in Russia.
Early and thorough privatization is an economic necessity, but it is
also a good means of giving many a share in the new market economy.
Restitution has worked well for housing and family farms, though it has not
been politically acceptable for large enterprises, even in eastern Germany.
The first moment of economic reform is vital. The focus has to be on the
fundamental principles: maximum liberalization and financial stabilization.
When prices and markets are deregulated, inflation is bound to
skyrocket, requiring a firm fiscal and monetary policy. If the rulers
hesitate, the social costs of transition will only rise. Either you get onto
the right track or you do not. In the midst of transition, many statistics
become nearly meaningless and are best ignored.
Surely, the United States can and should help. New policy-makers need
relevant advice. A new class of entrepreneurs and civil servants will have to
be trained.
A cause of Cuba's collapse is likely to be its excessive external debt,
and Washington should give a post-communist government ample financial
support so that it can contain inflation, manage its debt and attain
sufficient reserves. Business investment, however, is best left to the
private sector.
Many mistakes were made after the fall of the Berlin Wall. We can only
hope that they will not be repeated when the Castro regime collapses.
*******
#4
Moscow Tribune
PUTIN AS SEEN BY TALBOTT
Change of style, not substance
By Stanislav Menshikov
Strobe Talbott, US Deputy Secretary of State under President Clinton, has
published his memoirs "The Russia Hand" (Random House, 2002). Most of it is
about Clinton's 18 meetings with Boris Yeltsin as Russia's president. It is
meant to demonstrate the efficiency of Clinton's personal diplomacy as
contrary to its critical assessment by George W. Bush in his presidential
campaign.
When measured by results, that efficiency, according to Talbott, boils down
to helping Yeltsin retain power against the left-wing opposition, making the
Kremlin agree to NATO expansion, obtaining Moscow's support to crushing
Bosnian Serbs and its help in achieving Milosevic's capitulation. Smaller
achievements were expediting Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltics,
halting Russian sales of rocket technology to India, removing nuclear
missiles from the Ukraine.
Precious little is said about the US record in promoting Russian democracy
and market institutions. The book supports the general impression that
Washington turned a blind eye to Russia's development into a corrupt state
and criminal type of capitalism. Clinton seemed also to have ignored further
reductions in nuclear armaments. The START-2 treaty signed by the previous
administration never actually took effect and Clinton made no effort to
press it through. The overall record in dealing with Russia was therefore
very mixed.
Clinton's victories over "ol Boris", who usually conducted business in a
drunken state, were the result of simple tactics. He patiently listened
through Yeltsin's initial thunderous objections made for the benefit of his
underlings and then took him aside for a tete-a-tete where the Russian
president would usually agree to Clinton's proposals. The Americans
privately called this tactic "feeding spinach to the Russians'. The latter
did not like spinach, but were being convinced that it was to their own
good.
The other trick was to proceed slowly and offer only as much 'spinach' as
Yeltsin could swallow in one gulp. This was called "kicking the can" a
couple of feet on. The final sweetener was profusely complimenting Yeltsin
on being a real democrat, the only leader that saw the right future for the
Russian people, etc. The tearful Yeltsin would reciprocate by saying that
only he and Clinton could do the job correctly. As a reward, Boris was
invited to the G-7. In US parlance, this was "anchoring" Yeltsin and Russia
to the West.
As Clinton once put it, 'Yeltsin drunk is better than most of the
alternatives sober'. So when teetotaller Putin became president in 2000,
the Americans were somewhat apprehensive. In their first encounter with the
new Kremlin man, they tried to convince him to agree to modify the ABM
Treaty. Putin refused. Clinton immediately complained to "ol Boris" asking
him to keep an eye on the new president and use his influence to keep him on
track. Yeltsin agreed but when George W. Bush appeared on the scene, he
struck a 'love-feast' with Putin at first glance.
Talbott is not convinced that Putin's 'conversion' is genuine. He sees the
new Russian president as a sly little hedgehog that is good at fooling the
surrounding more powerful foxes: "His style was entirely different from
Yeltsin's. Yeltsin said "no" when he meant "let's talk". With Putin it was
just the opposite Instead of slamming his fist, Putin would say, "You have
an interesting point." Or, "We've taken your criticism to heart. An artful
dodge like this was often the equivalent of the Big Nyet, and with Putin we
figured it was more likely to stick than it had been with Yeltsin".
However, the actual development of the Bush-Putin dialogue has so far been
completely different. Instead of the expected Big Nyet George W. Bush has
been mostly getting a Big Da even before the US president had the time to
ask. On September 11, 2001 Putin not only was the first to call to offer his
sympathy but he also terminated Russian military exercises then in process.
He decided to close military bases on Cuba and in Vietnam without waiting to
be asked. He immediately agreed to US air bases in Central Asia even though
his Defence Minister had just announced it was out of the question. He
called scrapping the ABM Treaty a "mistake" when even Yeltsin would have
used harsher words.
In exchange, Russia has so far mostly received promises. Its status as a
market economy is not yet fully recognised. Its membership in the World
Trade Organisation is years off. The value of its seat on the NATO Council
of Twenty is yet to be determined. But Putin personally has gained much
more. Now that Russia is treated as a full member of the G-8, the Russian
president, in one journalist's words, "has become a real member of the globe
's ruling class". Not a bad achievement in only two years in office.
Contrary to Clinton's request, Yeltsin did not have to keep an eye on his
successor to make that happen. The style of Moscow's foreign policy has
indeed changed dramatically, but not its substance. It is simply a second
printing of "ol Boris" in a teetotaller binding.
*******
#5
BBC Monitoring
Newspaper predicts end of Russian leading spin doctor's career
Source: Kommersant, Moscow, in Russian 4 Jul 02
Commenting on his decision to transfer the Strana.ru web site and some
other Internet-based publications to the state, Russia's leading spin
doctor Gleb Pavlovskiy has said he was "happy to have finally disposed of
these media". He was quoted as admitting that the above media had been set
up "for political reasons" and that they were now cash-strapped. According
to the newspaper, the Kremlin is no longer keen to fund Pavlovskiy and his
projects, and this actually heralds an end to his political career. The
following is the text of a report published in the Russian newspaper
Kommersant on 4 July.
Gleb Pavlovskiy, president of the Effective Policy Foundation, stated to
Kommersant yesterday that he is transferring all of the Effective Policy
Foundation's Internet publications to the All-Russia State Television and
Radio Broadcasting Company [VGTRK] Internet directorate. By all accounts
this means that Mr Pavlovskiy has finally been removed from big-time
politics at the Kremlin.
The leader of the Effective Policy Foundation announced the intention to
sell his media outlets (Strana.ru, SMI.ru, Vesti.ru, and so forth) back in
June of last year. However, he failed to find any buyers among the
commercial structures at that time. Professional Internet people attributed
this to the frankly propagandist and pro-state thrust of the media managed
by the Effective Policy Foundation which inevitably deprived them of their
competitiveness in the market.
By December last year, Mr Pavlovskiy's position had clearly become
critical: He announced that the Effective Policy Foundation was not selling
but giving up its media. In an interview for Kommersant he attributed this
then to the "struggle in the upper echelons of power", explaining that he
was coming under "money pressure." It is patently obvious that at this
moment the Effective Policy Foundation's projects have simply been starved
of funding. Mr Pavlovskiy's colleagues in the Internet business were
convinced that the "St Petersburg section of Putin's team for whom
Pavlovskiy is an outsider and an unnecessary player in the political field
demanded an audit and sequestration of Effective Policy Foundation
expenditure which was traditionally carried out using friendly financial
structures dependent on the Kremlin".
The comment released by the VGTRK news service yesterday claims that the
Strana.ru information service "was in a near-default situation". This is
very close to the truth. In recent months, the Effective Policy
Foundation's media were literally living in a state of poverty. As staffers
of the Strana.ru newspaper complained in unofficial conversations, they
have not seen their wages for three months. At the Vesti.ru newspaper,
according to Kommersant's figures, they have not been paid for May either.
According to Kommersant's information, in the past six weeks the head of
the Effective Policy Foundation had held frantic and fruitless talks behind
the scenes in an attempt to obtain at least some benefit from the transfer
into state hands of the resources which had not lived up to expectations.
Gleb Pavlovskiy himself, on the other hand, has always demonstrated
optimism. In reply to Kommersant's question as to why he had failed to sell
his media, he objected cheerily: "Why have you made up your minds that I
had failed to sell them? We agreed with VGTRK not to disclose the
commercial element of this deal but there undoubtedly was a commercial
element." VGTRK representatives categorically refused to comment on Mr
Pavlovskiy's statement, even less to name the compensation figure paid to him.
In any event it is obvious that the president of the Effective Policy
Foundation is not pulling a fast one when he says that he is "happy to have
finally disposed of these media": "This is not our core activity! It is
simply that at a given moment and for political reasons we, as a
consultancy company, were drawn into the political struggle. And we chose
the Internet simply because all the non-Internet media had been rigidly
'carved up and shared out' among the oligarchs at that time."
From these revelations it is possible to draw the conclusion that Gleb
Pavlovskiy, the pioneer of political spin in the country, will no longer be
drawn into the political struggle. And in the election campaign that is
getting under way the Kremlin will entrust the general contract for state
propaganda to someone else.
*******
#6
Moscow Times
July 5, 2002
Russians Find Solace in Enron
By Victoria Lavrentieva
Staff Writer
After the U.S. financial scandals surrounding Enron, WorldCom and Xerox, a
number of Russians are feeling a sense of affirmation that their
graft-riddled corporate culture is no worse than that in the West.
The American Chamber of Commerce, impressed with how some Russian companies
have of late been cleaning up their act, intends to tell the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission that it should take a lesson from Russia.
The scale of theft in Russia in the 1990s was certainly of a greater
magnitude than anything that has been uncovered in the United States in
recent months.
But that means little to Russians weary of a decade of allegations about
corruption and money laundering.
"For many years we were told that Russians are corrupt and nontransparent,"
said Yevgeny Yuryev, president of the Aton brokerage. "Now this stereotype
has finally been broken and people will see that Russia is no worse than
other countries, probably even better."
Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref said an Enron-style
scandal in Russia would be years away because business is not yet
transparent enough to meet the international standards under which Enron
was being audited.
"It is too early to talk about the full transparency of Russian companies,"
Gref said at a news conference this week, answering a question from The
Moscow Times.
"They are not yet a part of the international accounting system, and this
might happen only after most Russian companies and banks -- not only the
large ones -- introduce generally accepted accounting principles or
international accounting standards," he said. "This will not happen earlier
than 2004."
Furthermore, Gref said, the financial consulting and auditing market in
Russia remains in its infancy.
Some Russian companies are already suggesting that this lack of financial
infrastructure might be to their advantage.
"I have already heard a lot of people saying: "Look how bad America is, why
do we need to improve ourselves?'" said William Browder, head of Hermitage
Capital Management.
But he cautioned: "If Russia uses America's problems as an excuse to stop
fully implementing the transparency and corporate governance reforms that
have been pushed in the last couple of years, then this will be doing harm
to Russia."
Browder said the major difference between the U.S. and Russian markets is
that in the United States people value companies as if everything is clean.
Therefore, investor confidence and stock prices dove during the current
scandals.
In contrast, Russian stocks tend to be cheap because people price in risks
such as possible corporate fraud, he said.
Andrew Somers, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia and
a lawyer, said the problem in the United States is that the rules of
running a business have become overly complicated.
"We often create rules on top of the rules. Although in the end they work
and people will be punished, it does not help make business more
transparent," he said.
As a result, lawyers and consultants often dominate business activities and
sometimes even the top managers don't have a clear picture of what is going
on in their companies, Somers said.
Yuryev agreed that the U.S. market is overregulated. "As the head of a
company that received a brokerage license in New York in the middle of the
Bank of New York [money-laundering] scandal, I can say that Russian
regulation is nothing compared with SEC rules," he said.
Somers said Russia was taking a better road than the United States with a
voluntary corporate governance code the Federal Securities Commission
approved last year.
He said he was going to present the code to the SEC as an example of what
it should be doing. "It looks like they have forgotten what their real
business is," he said.
Federal Securities Commission head Igor Kostikov said he was pleased that
Russia's corporate governance code was being considered a model.
"Before the scandal with Enron, a lot of U.S. laywers were criticizing us
for the wording and mechanisms in our code," said Kostikov, who spent
several days last week meeting with SEC officials and investors in New
York. "But those corporate scandals showed that Russia is looking to the
future with its corporate governance code."
He said the Federal Securities Commission is now drafting a new code to
regulate the activities of analysts who work for investment banks. The
so-called Code of Conduct for Financial Analysts will be voluntary.
******
#7
Christian Science Monitor
July 5, 2002
Human rights inch ahead in Uzbekistan
By Scott Peterson | Special to The Christian Science Monitor
DORMAN VILLAGE, UZBEKISTAN – Farmer Gulomiddin Mamadaliev wept as he
scythed the wheat this year.
The seeds had been planted by his son, Alimuhamad, who later was detained
as a suspected Islamic militant and, on the day of his arrest, beaten to
death.
But for the grieving father, this year's harvest of sorrow also holds a
tiny grain of consolation: Two weeks ago, the Uzbek secret police who
killed his son were sent to jail.
It is a rare turn of justice in this country, where President Islam Karimov
rules with an iron hand, and the rights of the accused, and other human
rights hold little currency. The Mamadaliev case and another, in which four
policemen were each sentenced to 20-year terms in January for killing one
suspect and maiming another, are recent moves in Uzbekistan that point
toward a liberalization for the first time in Karimov's 12-year rule.
Most of the changes have taken place since Sept. 11. Looking for help in
waging its "war on terror," the US began courting Uzbekistan and other
repressive Central Asian regimes whose proximity to Afghanistan made them
key allies.
But critics charge that the recent progress is only window-dressing by
Uzbekistan to please its new ally – and that the US is compromising demands
for more far-reaching improvements in human rights at the expense of
short-term military needs.
"The Uzbek government is serious in recognizing the need to satisfy the US
on this ... but it is not sincere," says John Schoeberlein, head of the
Program on Central Asia and the Caucasus at Harvard University. "Basically,
it's just PR."
Uzbekistan abolished censorship in mid-May, and on Wednesday Karimov
ordered the creation of an independent agency with the task of ensuring
media freedom. The first official registration of a human rights group took
place in March, under strong US pressure – and just days before Karimov
visited Washington. For the first time, some 860 prisoners held on
political and religious charges were included last fall in an annual amnesty.
Closer ties
Washington and Tashkent signed a strategic partnership deal in March that
reportedly commits Uzbekistan to clean up its rights record – and shifts
Uzbekistan away from Russia and toward the West. Some 1,800 US Special
Forces troops now use the former Soviet base at Khanabad. Meanwhile, US aid
to Uzbekistan has tripled to $166 million this year.
Central Asia, including the lush Fergana Valley – source of much of this
region's Islamic militancy in the past decade – is where ancient empires
overlapped or collided, and where the Silk Route brought new ideas from
China and Europe. For decades part of the Soviet empire, the Central Asian
states have been led since the USSR's collapse by authoritarian
communist-era stalwarts like Karimov. Uzbek prisons are now filled with
6,500 religious and political inmates, often held on flimsy evidence, whom
the state calls "terrorists."
US officials say that closer ties are giving the US greater influence over
these regimes, and thus a way to press for change. "Human rights and
democracy are as essential today, if not more, than they were before the
[Sept. 11] terrorist attacks," Lorne Craner, asst. secretary of state in
charge of democracy and human rights, told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee last week.
Local rights activists praise the US Embassy here for providing support in
efforts to create a civil society, promoting human rights groups, and even
intervening in harassment cases. But they know there is a broader US
military agenda, too, that requires close ties with Karimov.
The Uzbeks have understood that while relations with the US have improved
substantially since Sept. 11, if they want to maintain them, they must move
forward, says a Western diplomat. Deputy Foreign Minister Sadiq Safaev says
the court cases are a first step: "It's a signal to all policemen that
there is no more cover for you from the state, and you will be punished ...
if you violate human rights."
Uzbekistan's aim – with American help, says Ismaf Khushev, editor of a
weekly government newspaper, is to join the world community. "Karimov is
very clever and can see the way of the future," he says. "Leaders who are
not democratic are seen as stupid. There is no other way now. Karimov knows
it."
Uzbeks cautiously welcome the moves toward openness. But results so far are
difficult to judge. In mid-May, for example, the head of the State Secrets
Committee – Uzbekistan's official censor – stopped showing up for work, and
so stopped reading newspapers before they were printed. Slowly, more
critical stories began to appear. Unemployment levels were explored; so
were the hard lives of pensioners. Even an opposition poet was back in
print – though his editor received complaints from the president's office,
according to the United Kingdom-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting.
But editors have also been warned – sometimes through threatening phone
calls – that they will be held accountable. Cases brought by the
authorities against journalists have multiplied. The author of the
unemployment story says that he was beaten up by thugs and warned by police
that next time he would know what to keep silent about.
"These incidents tell me that there is a new type of control going on,"
says Galima Bukharbaeva, director of the IWPR office in Tashkent.
One false start toward more press freedom occurred after a secret meeting a
1996 in which Karimov told a group of journalists, according to two who
were present, that he wanted a more critical press. But after four robustly
critical issues of Tashkent's Huriyet newspaper appeared, the editor was
told that government ministers had complained, and that he would be replaced.
The Uzbek government tried several times to create democracy, says
Huriyet's founder, Karim Bahriyev. The problem, he says, is that there is
no concept of democracy in a land ruled by kings and khans for 2,500 years.
Changes are also slow on human rights. Arrests are still being made, and
torture continues. Rights activists in the provinces say intimidation
includes gathering new information for files on them, opposition
sympathizers, and local journalists.
Some observers are feeling hopeful, says Matilda Bogner, head of the
Uzbekistan office for the New York-based Human Rights Watch. "But why isn't
there an order from the top that beating and torture are going to stop?"
she asks, adding: "Why are there only two [police brutality] cases in more
than seven months, when there is a fountain of information [about similar
incidents] if they want it?"
Yusuf Abdukarimov, the Fergana City prosecutor who brought the landmark
case against the three officers in the killing of wheat farmer Alimuhamad
Mamadaliev, says he has two more cases pending of abuse by police. "People
are amazed, because they are not used to hearing such things," he says. "A
big process is going on to improve." Earlier this year – in a program
unique here – Mr. Abdukarimov began issuing 28 different leaflets, to 905
local councils, offering tips to citizens on everything from facing down
bureaucracy, to legally pursuing unpaid salaries and pensions. "Now people
are starting to realize and demand their rights," he says.
A father's crusade
Alimuhamad's father has already learned lessons about pursuing rights and
justice. "I am struggling all the time to punish these people, because my
son did nothing [wrong], and worked all the time," says Gulomiddin
Mamadaliev, his broad hands deeply tanned from years in the fields. "He was
religious, and prayed five times a day when he could."
One of the few farmers in the area who met the official cotton and wheat
quota, Alimuhamad, a father of two, was praised last fall by the regional
leader, or hakim, for being a good farmer.
After success in the courts, the father two weeks ago appealed – to go
after bigger bosses, and the informants who put his son's name on a list of
people suspected of being Islamic militants.
"They provoked this whole case," the farmer says.
Activist says human rights progress is 'good but little'
From the clutter of his dim apartment, Mikhail Ardzinov, Uzbekistan's most
prominent human rights activist, retrieves what he laughingly calls "one of
my most popular tracts."
The booklet is 10 pages long – one for each year of Uzbekistan's
independence when Mr. Ardzinov put it together two years ago – and is
titled: "Human Rights and Democracy in Uzbekistan." Every page is blank,
except the note at the end, which says: "To be continued...." Now there
should be an update, he says: In March, his Independent Human Rights
Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU) became the first rights group ever to be
officially registered in this Central Asian nation.
Receiving official permission to operate is one of several positive steps
here that Ardzinov says are "good, but very little. We want very big."
Ardzinov, who was first questioned by the KGB in 1973, when Uzbekistan was
part of the Soviet Union, says: "We are an authoritarian regime, and have a
cult of personality with [President Islam] Karimov, who has a Napoleon
complex." He jokes about a questionable referendum in January – which
extended Karimov's rule one more time, to 2007 and also yielded the
creation of a bicameral parliament.
"It took [Karimov] 10 years to understand that a two-chamber parliament is
better than one," says Ardzinov. "In 10 more years, maybe he will say it is
good for MPs to debate in parliament, and that TV can show it – but not now!"
Ardzinov was sitting in this apartment in 1981, when some paint fell from
the ceiling and a KGB microphone slipped through. "I wanted to pull it
down, but somebody pulled it up," Ardzinov recalls. "That really frightened
me."
His problems were not over after Uzbek independence. In 1992, the KGB
blasted his front door open – the shrapnel still mars the entryway and
elevator wall. Ardzinov lost 28 pounds during a 10-day hunger strike while
in custody.
In 1999, Ardzinov was beaten up by thugs who took his files and computers
and bloodied his face. US and European donors replaced the hardware. The
files were returned when his organization's registration was approved,
after a five-year effort that he says was given a critical boost by US
pressure. He received the final papers just days before Karimov traveled in
March to visit George Bush at the White House, to receive praise as a key
member of Washington's antiterror coalition. "Without the US and others, we
would have been registered earlier," Ardzinov says drily, "but only for our
graves."
*******
#8
Central Asia: Has New Alliance With West Helped Opposition Movements?
By Zamira Eshanova
Since the independence of their respective countries, opposition movements
in Central Asia have been under constant attack from the largely
authoritarian governments in the region. Central Asia's relations with the
West have deepened since 11 September following many of its states'
cooperation with the war on terrorism. Some observers have criticized
Washington for ignoring human rights abuses to gain such cooperation, while
others believe increased attention to the region will bring about benefits.
RFE/RL correspondent Zamira Eshanova talks to opposition leaders to find
out what affect, if any, they believe this increased attention has had on
their movements.
Prague, 4 July 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Historically, there has never been an
institutionalized opposition in Central Asia. Those who criticized the
rulers were often either killed or forced into exile.
The Soviet period of rule and then independence for the nations of Central
Asia in 1991 changed little, if anything. Being in the political opposition
in Central Asia is often still a dangerous occupation.
Feliks Kulov, the leading opposition figure in the most democratic country
of the region, Kyrgyzstan, was sentenced to 10 years in jail in May on
embezzlement charges that his supporters say were politically motivated.
Mukhtar Ablyazov, a leader of Kazakhstan's Democratic Choice Movement, is
facing charges of financial corruption that his lawyers say are also
politically motivated.
Last month, an appeals court in Kyrgyzstan upheld the conviction for abuse
of office of opposition parliamentarian Azimbek Beknazarov. His arrest
prompted violent protests in which at least five protesters were killed.
And the opposition in Kazakhstan says new rules for registering political
parties are simply an attempt by the government to stifle dissent.
Much has been made about the close cooperation between the West and the
nations of Central Asia in the war on terrorism. But has this new alliance
with the West, particularly with the U.S., resulted in any improvements for
the opposition in Central Asia?
Mohammad Solih is the chairman of the Erk democratic party of Uzbekistan.
He started his opposition activities during the Soviet perestroika era. He
is one of the founders of the first opposition movement Birlik, and the
first political party Erk.
In 1992, Solih was the only challenger to current Uzbek President Islam
Karimov in the first presidential elections. After years of harassment,
Solih was forced to flee Uzbekistan in 1993. After living in Turkey and
Germany, he received political refugee status in Norway in 1999.
Solih tells RFE/RL that Central Asia's new alliance with the U.S. and
growing interest in the region have not changed the fate of the political
opposition in Uzbekistan so far.
"Frankly, the situation of dissidents and the political opposition in
Uzbekistan has not been changed a bit. The U.S. representative, Mr. [Lorne]
Craner (assistant U.S. secretary for human rights) in his testimony [to the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 June] has expressed his hope
that soon the opposition Birlik party would be registered in Uzbekistan. If
the Uzbek government takes this step, we happily support it. But if the
Uzbek government hopes that by registering the Birlik party it would get
rid of the 'headache' called the opposition, it would be a big mistake. It
will not mean the recognition of the political opposition at all, while the
real opposition force -- which for most of population, for the government
itself, and for Mr. Karimov is the Erk party -- remains out of the legal
political spectrum. To say that the opposition in Uzbekistan is recognized
would be a lie."
Boris Shikhmuradov is the founder of the People's Democratic Movement of
Turkmenistan. Shikhmuradov was foreign minister from 1995 to 2000 and
declared his opposition to President Saparmurat Niyazov in November 2001.
Shikhmuradov, who currently lives abroad, says that, so far, nothing about
the political situation in Turkmenistan has changed. At the same time, he
believes political conditions in the country are receiving more attention
from the U.S. and the West.
"I can declare that such [Western] support exists, and it has achieved a
certain evolution. If at the beginning it was cautious attention, then it
developed into deeper understanding. Today, we can declare the presence of
strong support."
Akezhan Kazhegeldin is a founder and chairman of the Republican People's
Party of Kazakhstan, which has become one of the leading opposition
organizations in the country. He served as prime minister of Kazakhstan
from 1994 to 1997.
Kazhegeldin believes that during the last five years, opposition groups in
Central Asia have been trying to enlighten Western society about what's
been happening in the region.
Kazhegeldin says developments since 11 September have sped up this process,
and that once the U.S. got directly involved in the situation by locating
thousands of its troops in Central Asia, the situation "fundamentally
changed."
"Leading Western countries, which are fighting for freedom, are interested
in democratic reforms, in seeing the region with liberal economies and
civil societies. They want to understand that in each country of the region
there are democratic political opposition organizations, with whom they can
work and who are offering a different vector, a different way of developing
these states."
Kazhegeldin and Shikhmuradov both believe that Western interest in their
cases is genuine and that support for democratic forces in the region will
gradually increase.
These leading opposition figures of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and
Kazakhstan say that all they want is for the West to defend the ideals of
democracy and freedom, and for its political leaders to stand behind their
statements. Solih:
"When we asked for help from the West, we never asked anything impossible.
We asked what the West itself was repeating at every step -- to make the
Central Asian rulers give their people the rights guaranteed by their
constitutions. We are in opposition not because we want to please the West
or the U.S. What we are doing is for our people, for their escape from
repression and for their freedom. In this ordeal, we rely first of all on
the help of our people. Of course, we need Western support, too, but it
should be genuine."
All three of these Central Asian opposition leaders agree that now is the
time to coordinate their efforts. On 8 July, Central Asian opposition
groups are organizing an event in Berlin in conjunction with the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. They believe it can be
the first serious united step by the opposition to attract more attention
to the fate of democracy and human rights in the region.
*******
#9
Putin's Wife Lyudmila on Language Reform, Family Issues, With Education
Minister Filippov
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
27 June 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Reader interview, under the rubric "Working Breakfast," with Lyudmila
Aleksandrovna Putina, wife of Russia's president, and Vladimir
Mikhaylovich Filippov, RF minister of education, prepared by Irina
Krasnopolskaya, Yadviga Yuferova, and Nataliya Yachmennikova at the
Rossiyskaya Gazeta editorial office; date not given: "Russian Lessons"
"There cannot be too much love," said the wife
of the president of Russia in a dialogue with Rossiyskaya Gazeta readers.
As we have already reported, Lyudmila Putina, the wife of the
president of Russia, together with Vladimir Filippov, the RF minister of
education, took part in a "working breakfast" at the Rossiyskaya Gazeta
editorial office.
There proved to be a lot of reader questions, and they dealt not only
with the Russian language, to which Lyudmila Putina, a philologist by
education, devotes special attention. In any country the wife of a
public politician produces heightened interest-in this respect we are no
exception.
[correspondent] Lyudmila Aleksandrovna, does your husband know
where you are spending time today?
[Putina] Generally he knows that I was planning to go to
Rossiyskaya Gazeta. But that it was specifically today, that is
unlikely... He is very busy and has a thousand problems.
[correspondent] So then do you have to make an appointment too?
[Putina] Sometimes I joke: please put me on the schedule.
1`
[correspondent] Well then, does he?
[Putina] Not always.
[correspondent] When he learned of your visit to us, did he give
you any advice?
[Putina] I told him we plan to talk, in particular, about the
reform of the Russian language. I shared my thoughts in that regard.
I did not have time to talk about the rest.
[correspondent] Debates continue in society about the reform of
orthography and the draft law on the Russian language. Many readers (S.
A. Petrenko from Orel and A. A. Shibanov from Dmitrov) are asking: do the
established rules have to be changed at all? After all, it is no secret
that illiterate people will not become more literate because of it. And
those who are used to the particular rules will begin getting confused,
and we will have a totally illiterate population.
[Putina] As I already said, there is no single opinion regarding
changing the rules, even among linguists. If we want to reform the
language, it must be a very well thought-out and calculated step. This
is no place for revolutions.
[correspondent] Do you know the figure that the commission
requested for reform of the Russian language?
[Putina] Obviously an enormous amount of money is needed. I would
like to appeal to ordinary everyday logic and to some elementary civil
patriotism. After all, textbooks and dictionaries will have to be
reprinted and teachers retrained, and we will have to retrain ourselves.
Money will have to be spent for the reform that presently many
specialists have doubts about.
As a philologist specializing in Romance languages, specifically
Romance languages rather than the Russian language, I have my own special
anguish. I would like the Russian language to be studied throughout the
world. I have often thought, why do only a few foreigners study
Russian? Named among the reasons are the complex rules in the Russian
language and the complex grammar. In other words, it is not only the
Cyrillic alphabet, which in itself is difficult for a foreigner. And if
the reform were conducted in the direction of simplifying or in some way
standardizing the rules, it would be understandable. But that is not
the case either. For what purpose is the reform conceived?
[Filippov] There has in fact been some attempt at simplification in
the proposals (notes Vladimir Filippov). But indeed, as before, the
words "god" and "tsar" must be written with a small letter, and the word
Communist (party)--with a capital letter.
[correspondent] As Solzhenitsyn commented, we were born in a
country where the KGB was written in capital letters, and god with a
small letter. We are still fighting our correction: the Roman pope is
written in lower case, but "government" and "minister" are required to be
written in the upper case.
[reader] (Polina Nikolayevna Ivanova from St. Petersburg:) Could
our "top people" maybe be taught to speak by the rules that exist, and
only then start the reforms?
[reader] (Continuing the question, Yelena Sotnikova, a teacher from
Orel Oblast:) Contemporary Russian language must be "cleared of mines"
without delay. It is simply cluttered with all kinds of little words
that are introduced by second-rate books and advertising clips. A
delayed action mine has been laid under "great and powerful." Young
people no longer talk, but express themselves in a language that cannot
be understood.
[Putina] It seems to me that bans on language would not help.
[Filippov] I want to support Lyudmila Aleksandrovna (said Vladimir
Mikhaylovich). We are always trying to ban something in different
areas.
[correspondent] One of the newspapers even wrote: "Philologists in
civilian clothes are urgently needed."
[Filippov] The Russian language is a living organism, and it is
developing. And if it develops, some sores and weeds that must be
"pulled out" appear. But the most important thing is that we are doing
very little to promote how Russian should be spoken correctly.
Consequently, now we, for example, are preparing a dictionary of 800
words that are difficult for officials. How should a sentence be
constructed properly? Where should the accent go? All this will be in
the dictionary that on 1 September I will give to all deputies and my
colleagues who are ministers.
[correspondent] The deputies are not the only ones who need such a
dictionary. We would be glad to publish it in Rossiyskaya Gazeta under
the rubric "Useful Booklet."
[Filippov] Agreed (the minister drew the subject to a close).
[correspondent] People say that when the Schroeders visited you, in
front of the family fireplace at 0300 hours, you and Frau Doris came up
with the idea of conducting a youth forum "Together in the 21st Century."
You recently returned from Germany where the winners of the
competitions got together. Will they teach Russian there?
[Putina] That is not a simple question. The more durable and
stronger the state and the state system, the easier it is for the
language to prove its soundness on the international scale. Will
Russian be taught in Germany? There must be motivation for that.
Unfortunately, Russian is not supported in Germany on the government
level, nor are any other foreign languages promoted. Moreover, it has
been established there that children must choose a language of their own
free will. This has been left up to the schools themselves.
[correspondent] Do the trustee councils decide?
[Putina] Yes. Moreover, each state has its own laws.
Incidentally, even language competitions were not held before the
language forum in Germany that we recently conducted.
[correspondent] Is it easier to conduct a German competition in
Russia?
[Putina] Much. The people I dealt with have made up their minds
to develop such cooperation.
[reader] (Yelena Fedotova from Kaliningrad asks:) What does
"zemlyachestvo" [community of people born in the same area] mean to you,
and whom do you consider your compatriots?
[Putina] What is "zemlyachestvo"? I doubt whether I would give
the dictionary definition. But when I am asked who my fellow
compatriots are, I, of course, answer Kaliningraders.
[reader] What about St. Petersburgers?
[Putina] It seems to me that compatriots are people who are similar
by birth.
[reader] (The driver Sergey Nechiporuk:) Do you maintain any
informal ties with Kaliningrad?
[Putina] Kaliningrad has the Center for Development of the Russian
Language. And I support undertakings related to the Russian language.
That is in fact what my informal ties with Kaliningrad are. But it is
virtually impossible to maintain relations with my classmates or simply
former friends. After all I left there long ago.
[reader] The situation with Kaliningrad now is complex: on the one
hand, it is a kind of bridge between Russia and the West, and on the
other-it may turn out to be a closed enclave with no connection to
Russia. How do you as a native of Kaliningrad see this situation?
(Asks Sergey Dadochkin from Chernyakhovsk.)
[Putina] Of course, I would like my compatriots to be able to come
to Russia at any time without any obstacles. I hope that the European
community in the contemporary democratic world will not actually start
taking any harsh steps, but will find the right solution to the problem.
People are reasonable, after all! There must be free movement of
Russia's citizens throughout the country's entire territory, and
Kaliningraders are citizens of Russia too.
[reader] (A question from teacher Olga Glazunova from Voronezh:)
Lyudmila Aleksandrovna, who took care of bringing up your daughters at
preschool age? Which is better, in your opinion, being brought up at
home or in kindergarten?
[Putina] There should be both. If a child is raised only at home,
later he has problems in relation to his peers when he is already in
school. And school is not kindergarten; a child is required to go to
school. So it seems to me that small children should go to
kindergarten. But at the same time, under no circumstances should they
be deprived of their upbringing at home. Everything in moderation. I
took care of raising our daughters myself. I devoted a great deal of
time to it. Practically 14 years on the dot, as I say, were devoted to
my children. And I think that this produced very good results. But
starting at one and one-half years of age, each daughter went to nursery
school.
[correspondent] What do you think, is it right that if a small
child gets sick and ends up in the hospital, the mother is not allowed to
be with him? (This is a question from three readers' letters-from
Novosibirsk, Tula, and Kineshma.) Even in the most advanced Moscow
clinics.
[Putina] That produces trauma in the child: alone, without his
parents, he considers himself abandoned. We have all read Zoshchenko,
who depicts that experiences as a small child, although we do not even
remember them, later leave an indelible mark.
When we were in Austria and visited a children's hospital, the mother
was perfectly free to be with her child there, no matter what age he was,
and mingle with the other children. That is absolutely normal.
Moreover, pensioners there can come to see the children in the hospital.
Simply to help or to spend three hours or so reading books to them, in
sum, to do as much as they can. The elderly people do not feel alone,
and it is also very important socially. And the children feel good, and
the pensioners themselves are constantly busy and not left to their own
illnesses.
[correspondent] What can we do in our country? Can you perhaps
suggest something to RF Minister of Health Yuriy Leonidovich Shevchenko?
[Putina] I personally have difficulty imagining any request that I
could make to any minister, Shevchenko included.
[Filippov] I want to officially say (Vladimir Filippov elaborates)
that there is an instructional letter on this subject from the Ministry
of Health which clearly gives the rule that a child under three can be
taken to the hospital only with his parents. It is another matter that
as always in Russia, it is not the law that is bad, but its fulfillment.
[reader] (Faina Serdyukova from Pskov:) Most older students have
problems with their spines. Largely because the school furniture has a
disastrous effect on their carriage, and hence, on the health of our
children. Will there be different furniture?
[Putina] I doubt we can influence furniture production. But the
problem of carriage can also be resolved in a slightly different way.
Even now reduce the number of hours that children spend in uncomfortable
desks. This topic was discussed at a roundtable discussion at the
Center for Development of the Russian Language, which I took part in.
And present there were directors of schools, parents, schoolchildren,
representatives of public organizations, and the minister of education.
We reached the opinion that we can reduce the number of hours children
spend in school, including by raising teachers' pay: we must stop paying
them by the hour. And we must devise a different evaluation of their
activity that would suit teachers, and parents, and children. I am
nostalgic for those times when kids in the lower grades had four classes,
while those in the higher grades had no more than six. And children had
time left to work on other things, their carriage included.
[Filippov] There are no problems with manufacturing contemporary
school furniture: we see it at exhibits (Vladimir Filippov adds). But
then it is not in the schools. That is a question like the one of why,
as I reported a few days ago to Valentina Ivanovna Matviyenko, have our
teachers in some rayons of Irkutsk Oblast not received wages for five
months? But there are a considerable number of schools in Moscow and in
the regions where parents themselves are resolving the problem of school
furniture and of feeding the schoolchildren. They understand that there
is not enough budget money and are creating trustee councils and bringing
in their own money to protect children's health.
[correspondent] Does a school need a school doctor?
[Filippov] Of course. I doubt anyone questions that.
[correspondent] But there isn't one.
[Filippov] What do you mean? When we were in school, there was.
[correspondent] Lyudmila Aleksandrovna, when we published the
announcements that we would have a "Working Breakfast" with you, the
first phone call that came in was from a mother whose daughter is a
teenager. The mother said that she and her daughter do not get along
well at all; generally speaking, a conflict between parents and children.
And her question was: "How do you structure your relations with your
daughters? To what extent do you understand one another, and do you
sometimes have conflicts? If so, how do you resolve them?
[Putina] I have never had any profound conflicts with my children.
I never prohibited my children from doing something just for its own
sake, and the motivation behind absolutely every action was, is it
justified or not justified. To me my children are above all people who
should be healthy, happy, and educated. I have always been guided by
these principles. And of course, I love my children. I tell them
that. Because I know from my own experience that children do not get
enough of that; children must be told that you love them. It only seems
to us that yes, naturally we love them, don't they really understand?
But really they do not understand. Very often children think: my
parents do not love me. Especially if there are two or three in the
family--they love him more than me. I would always say to them that
they are the prettiest and the best, princesses. Your reader probably
needs to try to make contact with her child. To understand that she is
an adult and the child has a lot of her own problems and little
experience. You must always share your own experience, but the main
thing is to love them.
[reader] (Vera Dmitriyevna Gushchina from Chelyabinsk comments:) My
child is one and one-half years old. He is not talking yet, but he
already knows the word "beer." All the television channels have the
very same advertising. Does this really make life worth living? Beer?
[Putina] That is a wise question. We need to seek the answer
together. Society and the state should not abandon their mission of
raising children. But for a small child, a good family is certainly a
good state.
[correspondent] And how many languages do your children know?
[Putina] Each of them knows four--Russian, German, English, and
French.
[correspondent] The idea of teaching children starting at the age
of six has been revived once again. What do you think of early
instruction, and what age did your children start studying?
[Putina] I have quite a lot of experience here too. It seems to
me that this cannot be resolved so categorically. Some can go to school
starting at five years of age, while others cannot handle it even at
eight. My younger daughter, for example, was not ready for school at
seven years of age. But since the older Masha was already in school,
the younger Katya was always trying to keep up with her. Of course, an
individual approach is best of all. Although that is certainly very
difficult to do on the scale of the state. And perhaps even impossible.
By the way, Katya skipped one grade and caught up to my older daughter
and is now at the same level as her sister.
[correspondent] And how many years should children study--11 or 12?
[Putina] Their entire lives would be best of all.
[reader] (Yelena Pichugina from Volgograd:) It has already been
14 years that my son and I have been living alone. My Dima has now
finished 10th grade, and he is a very good student. But I do not have
the money or the potential to support his studies further. There are
probably quite a lot of people like my son and me in the country. Isn't
there a possibility of giving gifted kids from poor families at least
some educational stipends? After all, even in tsarist Russia, that was
the case.
[Filippov] I recall that in the spring the president met in the
Kremlin with some gifted children (Vladimir Mikhaylovich continues the
conversation). No, there is not enough money for everything. But at
the meeting the president emphasized that financing for the "Gifted
Children" program would be quadrupled for next year. That is the case
even though the national budget will increase by only 20-30 percent.
But that is the directive the president gave us. It is something else
entirely that these financial investments were targeted.
Today I was working with one such girl whose mother has been raising
three children alone. After graduating from a specialized school, the
girl has not been able to get into the Moscow Art School for two years.
She wants to restore paintings. How can I help such people? It would
be nice if each Lomonosov had a sponsor that could help him get from
Kholmogory to Moscow. There are now many foundations that work with
gifted children. And we know that some of them are purportedly in
operation. But it is difficult to track where this money actually goes.
[correspondent] What do you think of the experiment to introduce a
single state exam? To what extent does that level out the chances
during enrollment for graduates of Moscow schools and rural ones.
[Putina] Vladimir Mikhaylovich (Lyudmila Putina smiles) is a great
fan of the experiment. And it seems to me that there is a lot that is
positive about this. The experiment itself and time will tell if there
is enough that is positive. It is important that nothing is introduced
on a command basis. Here once again specialists should make the final
decision.
Of course, the grading system is imperfect. We know that grades
often cause psychological damage in schoolchildren. The five point
system is probably insufficient to evaluate knowledge. It makes many
pupils think only about how to get a good grade. I have always told my
daughters: it is not important what grade you get. I never demanded
either "5s" [A's] or "4s" [B's] from them. I would say: you must
understand that the knowledge is most important. I always wanted to
prevent a grade having a negative effect on my children's psyche. And
it seems to me that I was successful. Most likely the grading system
will be revised, since a great many people are talking about it.
Vladimir Mikhaylovich, can you perhaps add something?
[Filippov] At this point, in order to enroll in VUZes in the
capital (the minister says), a child from Siberia must buy a ticket and
go somewhere to pass the exams. But under the new system, the high
school graduate would take the exams at home and send their results to,
let us suppose, 10 VUZes. And he wouldn't go anywhere. Is that easier
for a rural child or not? The answer is obvious. It is another matter
that the grades on the school certificates in physics, for example, from
a Moscow school and from a village school, as they say in Odessa, are two
big differences. Is that a state evaluation? Or is it the evaluation
by the teacher of his own labor and the school? For now it is clearly
not a state evaluation.
The single state exams are just over. Did you ever see a "2" [D] on
a school certificate? You never did, true? But now based on the
results of the single exam in physics, 8 percent are 2s. And there are
regions where there are even more of them--up to 20 percent "2s."
[correspondent] So then did they put them on the certificate?
[Filippov] But this is an experiment, you know! That was why we
agreed that there have been no "2s" on a certificate yet: if the everyday
grade for a subject is a "3" [C], it will indeed be on the certificate.
[reader] (Question from Lyudmila Tarasova, chairwoman of the
Voronezh Women's Social Organization:) Lyudmila Aleksandrovna, what do
you think, is it possible for us in Russia to have real equality between
men and women in politics and economics?
[Putina] Of course, it is possible, just as it is possible
throughout the entire world. It is a question of time and searching for
ways to accomplish it. This problem certainly exists in all countries.
Even in those that are customarily called civilized and democratic and
have attempted to resolve this problem with quotas. Quotas in
parliament and quotas in party representation. But it is unlikely that
at this stage that path will take root in Russia. Perhaps later. We
have a great many very intelligent and good women--in politics, and in
business, and in science, and in culture... But since women in Russia
were actually emancipated only at the end of the 19th century, they began
to be educated much later than men. So the generation of women who will
attain 30 percent in the Government still has to grow up.
But even so, it seems to me that even if a woman is actively involved
in politics and she has a ministerial or other prominent post, she should
still act like a woman.
[reader] (Wife of a Hero of the Soviet Union, Nataliya Timofeyevna
Karmatskaya:) I wanted to personally give Lyudmila Putina the book
Soldiers of the 20th Century, but I was not allowed in. I have many
questions: how can I meet you, how can I speak with you and deliver it?
What is the wife of the president asked to do, generally speaking? Do
you indeed not have a real lever of influence? You said that you cannot
call any minister. But can you ask your husband about it?
[Putina] I do that very rarely. People come to me with various
requests. And if they are truly appeals from disabled persons,
pensioners, or people in emergency situations, I try to forward them to
the right place. But the president's wife cannot resolve all problems.
I receive very nice letters from our citizens who understand the
situation. They understand and their request is: "Take care of the
president."
[correspondent] Do you?
[Putina] I try. Often I receive requests to become the head of
various foundations. It seems to me that if a person undertakes some
noble cause, he is somehow counting on his own strengths and on some
resources. And it is really great that people set up charity foundations.
But it is certainly not necessary for the wife of the president to be
the head of them.
[reader] (A question from the journalist Simon Peterson:) Do you
read what they write about you in the newspapers, and how do you feel
about it? Entire books have already appeared about you and your family.
[Putina] I read them. I take a calm attitude toward the
publications. It is too bad when they write a lie. There are a great
many suppositions and fantasies, things that are not in keeping with
reality. That is sad.
[correspondent] Tell us, do you consider Irene Pitch's book A
Piquant Friendship among these suppositions and fantasies?
[Putina] Her attitude toward Russia is laid out in this book, and
in that context it is also her attitude toward me. But she has a
negative attitude toward Russia, and accordingly her attitude toward me
and toward other Russian women is negative.
[correspondent] On behalf of our readers, we thank you for
participating in the "Working Breakfast," and we are handing over all the
questions that we did not have time to ask and sincerely hope there are
more meetings. At the start of September, we will honor the 50 winners
of the international competition "My Language Is Your Language" and our
laureates of the Pushkin Prize for Russian teachers in the near abroad.
We invite you too.
[Putina] Thank you for the invitation and for the possibility of a
dialogue with the readers of the newspaper, which I sincerely hope has a
circulation of a million very soon.
*******
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