#6334 #6335
[Third Issue of the Day]
#3
Date: Tue, 02 Jul 2002
From: "Celeste Wallander" <CWallander@csis.org>
Subject: A review of reviews of THE RUSSIA HAND
Reviews of Strobe Talbott's book have varied in their focus, degree of criticism, and basis for criticism or dissent, but have been essentially uniformly high quality and thought provoking. I have learned a lot, but would like to add my two cents on an aspect that has not been fully explored.
It is the answer to the question: just why do all the reviewers agree that it is a bad idea to "personalize" foreign policy? All agree that to the degree US policy toward Russia (either Yeltsin's Russia or Putin's Russia) depends on a particular leader, and the relationship of the American (or for that matter, German, British, or EU) president to that leader, this is something to be sagely rejected.
Less clear is why all so easily agree. In my view, the reason is very well-illustrated in THE RUSSIA HAND: time and again, the US foreign policy team worked hard to get an agreement from a president that could not deliver on actual policy. The personal relationship between the US and Russian president gave the US leverage, made the Russian president unwilling to say no to his friend, and encouraged a constant search for tactics that would result in an agreement. But the problem was that while President Yeltsin often agreed, Russia had not.
In a properly functioning political system, a leader generally does not agree at the international table to commitments he or she cannot deliver on. Leaders make mistakes, so sometimes treaties do not get ratified, to be sure. Since this is an embarrassing outcome both at home and abroad, however, there is an incentive not to agree to what you cannot deliver.
Needless to say, in the 1990s Russia was not a properly institutionalized political system, and Russia all too often did not deliver on what Russia's President had agreed to. That is not the fault of the US, of course. It was simply a reality of the domestic constraints on foreign policy.
However, while the US government cannot be held to account for what is in the realm of the possible within Russia, it can and should be expected to be hard-headed, realistic, and even cold-blooded, in assessing not just high profile agreements, but practical achievements.
On that basis, some of the achievements other reviewers have pointed to look less successful. Yes, there was an agreement to create the Permanent Joint Council as a way to get Yeltsin's relative acquiescence to NATO enlargement. But the PJC was not viewed as meaningful (and was mostly viewed with disdain or suspicion) within Russia's foreign and security policy elite, and its creation was a very hollow success. Yes, delegations of US and IMF officials achieved agreements on spending targets and various economic reforms, and Yeltsin's Russia got its IMF credits to support the Russian leadership. But since the agreements were not rooted in the politics of the possible within Russia, they cannot be counted as successful. Again, I am not arguing that it was the US fault that the policies were not successful. I am suggesting that a more realistic policy would aim at agreements that could be implemented, rather than those that Friend Boris would agree to.
This might not matter were there no price for Russian agreements not backed by Russian policies. But I think there was a price. For example, in the case of the IMF and easy credit, we (the West) gave up the leverage created by conditionality, we undermined the credibility of the IMF, and we allowed the Russian government to burden its population with debts that had to be repaid. As we all know from our personal finances, it is one thing to take on debt in order to make investments, it is another to go into debt to finance consumption. Because we relaxed the conditionality rules, Russia's IMF debt in the 1990s was not an investment in economic and institutional reform, but funded the consumption which kept the Russian president popular.
I offer this criticism of the reviews because I think it an important point for current and future policy. In particular, there is currently a lot of political support for getting Russia into the WTO. I think that is exactly the right policy objective, but it would an enormous mistake for the US to support Russian accession to the WTO for the reasons and in the manner we supported IMF credits, or for that matter the adaptation of the G7 to Yeltsin's "Big 8." International institutions matter because they have rules and membership criteria that mean something in terms of performance. Russian membership in the WTO will be important if it is the result of changes in Russia's economic policies, political rules and institutions, and business interests in such a way as to make Russia ready to be a competitive economy on the world scene. As with any country, there are going to be winners and losers within the Russian economy to meeting standards and requirements. Maybe the domestic politics of Russia's economy will prevent Russian membership in the WTO by current standards. Whether WTO membership is on balance worth it is for Russia's political leaders and citizens to work out.
What WTO membership should not be is a reward to President Putin from President Bush, either as a result of their friendly personal relationship, or as a reward for agreements on the security scene. The goal should be agreements on WTO membership that are both meaningful in terms of getting Russia ready to compete and benefiting from the standards that contribute to economic performance, and agreements that result from what is possible and sustainable within Russia's domestic political and economic landscape.
Celeste A. Wallander
Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K St., NW
Washington DC 20006
Tel: (202)775-3233
Fax: (202)775-3199
mail: cwalland@csis.org
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