#6334 #6335
[Third Issue of the Day]
#10
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002
From: Vogel.heinrich@gmx.de (Heinrich
Vogel)
Subject: Re: Helping Putin?
Dear David,
the enclosed paper may be of some interest for your American readers.
Best regards
Heinrich Vogel
Compensating, Rewarding, or Helping Putin - why and
how?
By Heinrich Vogel
Remarks for a Workshop of the American Institute for Advanced German Studies in
Berlin, June 21, 2002
The transformation of Mr. Putin from president to politician came as a surprise for most observers. The skeptics have been embarrassed by his reform oriented performance and the success of his shrewd maneuvers to strengthen the formal power of the Kremlin. Despite obvious improvements of the economic situation (a combination of windfalls and serious efforts) and the consolidation of control over the regions, President Putin has resisted temptations of complacency with the undeniable achievements of the last two years. His latest message to the nation is a perfect account of the remaining problems ahead - inadequate economic growth, administrative inertia, political irresponsibility, and a growing rift between the rich and the poor.
The question "Who is Putin?" is not really obsolete in view of the established political system of checks without balances, based on the intimidation of critics and on privileges for loyal supporters. In this framework all power belongs to the Kremlin while criticism is being equaled to opposition - the new four-letter word in Russian politics - and the person at the helm matters a lot. So far, the invariably high ranking of the president in opinion polls over the last 18 months is a plausible public reaction to his frankness in naming failures on lower ranks and to his general hands-on attitude which differs from the traditional style of Russian politics.
His message of sweat and tears is credible and the technocratic argument of the reformers that people gain more from business and employment growth than they lose as a result of decreased state spending may be technically correct. But the notorious patience of Russian citizens is wearing thin; a recent report on the general mood of the population states: "The air is filled with the spirit of 1998" as the numbers and the intensity of public protests are rising. Putin's cautious strategy of staying aloof from the frustrating quarrels which surround the next stage of reforms is about to lose credibility; the really painful structural reforms cannot be put off much longer.
However intense the domestic efforts of Russian reformers, modernization in all relevant dimensions - production, infrastructure, and public sector - needs more capital input than will be available even if the high economic growth rates of the last 18 months should persist. The key argument of Putin's foreign policy has been that maintaining the momentum of reforms and safeguarding minimal support of this dramatically strained Russian society will be possible only in an environment of friendly co-operation with the West. Patriotic foreign policy élites in the ministries of foreign policy and defence, however, insisted in face saving and traditional polemic against US and NATO policies, watching out for opportunities to continue old bargaining games. US policies of renouncing ABM and abrogating a whole range of international agreements and treaties only confirmed the arguments of the patriots clinging to their suspicions of "the West" and its hidden agenda.
In this perspective September 11 created a breathing spell for Putin
· enabling him to break free from the traditional lamento among Russian political élites about US unilateralism and condescendent disregard for Russia's true global importance. Closing ranks with the US not only became a matter of solidarity and honor but it also presented an opportunity to be elevated to the heights of partnership with the leader in the coalition against the global challenge of terrorism (if in the role of a junior-partner);
· undercutting Russian specialist criticism of US intransigence on issues of arms reduction because strategic weapons were no longer significant facing the new threat of international terrorism;
· moving Western criticism of the use of excessive military force and violation of human rights of the civilian population in Chechnya to the very end in the agenda of foreign policy. The new paradigm of "war against terror" turned out to be a convenient argument for the absolution of all atrocities and crimes committed by Russian forces, past and future;
· shelving justifiable doubts regarding the official Russian version of the origins of appartment bombings by alleged Chechen terrorists in September 1999 which paved the way for Putin's landslide victory into oblivion, and
· supporting the idea of WTO and market economy-status for Russia to be earned at discount conditions.
Compensation for whom?
These implicit but very obvious arguments motivating the accession to the alliance against terror remained within the black-box of Russian foreign policy, the inner circle of the Kremlin. Counter-arguments voiced in conservative Russian newspapers and journals (a.o. alienation of traditional client states in the Near and Middle East, hopeless asymmetry of nuclear defenses) and demands of compensation in terms of arms reduction or access to NATO never reached the official agenda of the Kremlin; Putin openly refused the very idea of asking for compensation because he cannot even afford being compensated.
It was in the debate of Western observers who had been taken by surprise and worried about the dynastic power of Putin that considerations of a compensation surfaced. Indeed, credible reports about a (post-festum) debate of the Russian president with officials of MID, MOD, Duma-deputies, and defense experts suggested that Putin's decision was a pretty lonely one. The real issue, therefore, is the sustainability of this dramatic shift in Russian foreign policy. The prevailing system, where strategic decisions are reserved to an inner circle of mostly anonymous insiders who believe they can afford to disregard parliamentary debates and who could not care less about public opinion at large may be convenient in the short term and for ad-hoc coalitions. But "structury" like these, typical for the illiberal democracies world-wide, also imply the risk of high volatility, and the possession of weapons of mass destruction makes a real difference between Russia or, let's say, Turkey.
For the time being the only issue that really matters in Russian politics is reelection of the incumbent president in March 2004 - which can be taken for granted, due to the combination of authentic public support for Putin, built-in controls over the media, and de-facto elimination of political opposition to the Kremlin. Any rival will be smashed from the very outset. And yet, doubts remain to what extent the established formal framework of centralized power in Russia will resist the strains of alternative, i.e. less pleasant, scenarios for economic development and social cohesion which are by no means unrealistic.
If the new Russian foreign and security policy is not much more than the "one-man show" of poor lonely Vladimir Putin this isolated leader and his entourage of political technologists, lobbyists of big business, and FSB-wizards can indeed use some support from outside. Acts of symbolic policy will not do to moderate the wrath over lost great power status, not to mention a change of the conservative mental map of the Russian polity. In the longer run it will be even more important to help sustain the confidence of the Russian public in the future of their country.
The Agenda Remains Difficult
The majority of Russian experts and political commentators have yet to convinced of the strategic value of the agreements signed in Moscow and Rome. The general impression is that the US received everything they wanted while Russia barely kept what it could afford - a painful but realistic assessment of fundamental asymmetry. The fact that the US agreed after long negotiations to upgrade the accord on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms by making it contingent on parliamentary ratification does not heal Russian feelings of being at the disposition of American assessments and ambitions (it will be harder to reach ratification in Washington anyway). Moscow abandoned former non-negotiable positions regarding NATO-accession of the Baltic states, the ABM-treaty, the linkage between offensive and defensive strategic weapons, and the off-limits signals surrounding Central Asia and the Caucasus. Particularly the agreement about destroying the Russian nuclear warheads while storing some of the those dismantled on the American side hardly supports the rhetorics of "new strategic relations". The ground-wave of cynicism is best characterized in the mocking apercu of US plans for "friendly nuclear strikes against Russia".
The open acknowledgement of the US being more equal has found some compensation in the documents signed in Reykjavik and Rome: the construction of a new Russia-NATO-Council which admits Russia to the discussions of the inner circle of members (on issues short of Article 5) and the recent move of the United States declaring Russia to be a market economy. The proof of both cakes is in the eating - it remains to be seen how the new semi-member Russia will argue in front of an agenda of admitting the Baltic states or of out-of-area missions reaching way into the CIS and the Middle East. On the other hand, the new market economy status will make life a lot more difficult for Russian exporters outside the energy sector inviting a host of problems over allegations of dumping in US trade with Russia. By the way: Putin's promises in Weimar and Essen (to the Europeans) and in Moscow and St.Petersburg (to the Americans) implicitly demonstrate the degree of control Moscow has over strategic decisions of the Russian energy-sector so often presented as driven by market-forces only.
Welcome as they are, Russian assurances of cooperation in support of the global economy against pressures from OPEC should not be seen as major concessions on the Russian side. As one of the leading exporters of energy and raw materials Russia has been a notorious winner in any international crisis. Resisting the temptation of short-term maximization of the export revenues pays in the medium and longer term because it improves Russia's image as a responsible partner in sheltering the global economy. At the same time, the persistent uncertainties in the Near and Middle East, particularly of military US action against Iraq, increases the probability of higher export revenue for Russia anyway.
The much more imposing style of Russian negotiators dealing with the Europeans on Kaliningrad and Chjechnya, with the Paris Club about rescheduling of debts, and the disinterest in closer co-operation with the evolving structures of the European Security and Defence Policy tells a lot about Putin's preferences. Right or wrong as this outlook on the partnership with Europe may be - it increases the responsibility on the side of the US to come up with adequate answers to the short-term dilemmas which surround any partnership with Russia.
Conservative patriots in Russia (military, defence industry, intelligence, and foreign service) are the toughest target of renewed Western efforts to engage Russia. Their suspicion of open and hidden strategies of the US will not be cured by mere declarations of mutual trust. These are good enough for the communiqués of feel-good summitry. The growing discrepancy in verification capabilities (e.g. the collapse of large parts of the Russian intelligence satellites) remains a horror for these groups and it should be a matter of serious concern for the American side as well. For the time being, a partnership based on mutual trust - if sincerely intended on both sides - remains extremely vulnerable to acts of unilateral neglect, condescension, or intervention. Vladimir I. Lenin's and Ronald Reagan's guideline of "Trust but verify" remains critical - at least for the immediate future time in Russian.
This is not an appeal to continue strategies of Mutually Assured Destruction which has become obsolete also for military strategists in Russia. But the remaining gap of mutual political perceptions is too big to be left unchecked. In addition to the areas recently confirmed for intensified co-operation (energy, non-proliferation, co-operative threat reduction, intelligence sharing, health) large-scale exchange of military personnel and the crucial field of innovative technologies for defence have been left aside despite many signals of Russian interest in projects for joint defence. The fact that past performance of Russian partners has not been optimal in the context of Nunn-Lugar and other programs is no excuse for not trying again and trying harder. Sharing, not skimming, the technological achievements of defence efforts along the lines of Russian-Israeli programs (including TMD, where Russian defence industries have something to contribute) would be an obvious way to building confidence. The negative response of neo-conservative defence-planners in the US to this approach can be taken for granted. Therefore, the incompatibility of logic zero-sum thinking in traditional Russian foreign policy and the American logic of "the winner takes all" can be assumed to corrode the recent success of symbolic politics.
Last but not least, Chechnya remains an issue because the predictable price of Russian military "stabilization" is continued destabilization with fall-out way beyond the Caucasus and Russia. Now to sacrifice the principles of international law for pussyfooted diplomacy in the hope of winning more sympathies in Moscow is bound to fire back because it will be discouraging the weak democratic forces in Russia, paving the way for a world-wide alliance of illiberal states. Here Europe's approach remains outspokenly critical because, interested in a more democratic future for Russia, it is not being defended in the Caucasus but at the limits of it's own moral credibility. Any talk of a "moral alliance of Russia with the West" lacks the necessary responsibility.
The underlying issue of the post-Reykjavik/post-Rome agenda with Russia still is the stabilisation of reforms by strengthening the weak democratic institutions. This task tends to be forgotten in the media-oriented rhetoric of "helping", "compensating", or "rewarding" the president in office. Vladimir Putin, the politician, is indispensable only as long as the institutions of state and society in Russia remain weak. Without democratic controls Putin's (or his successor's) foreign policy can change again - not necessarily in the direction we would like to see. Nationalistic flash-backs are perfectly possible while Russia's disruptive military and political potential remains impressive. The alternative to neo-containment, therefore, is confidence building by substantive cooperation, also in sensitive areas. The truly critical target group in Russian politics are the conservatives. If we fail to engage them, not the democrats, the new achievements of symbolic politics are bound to corrode in due course.
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