#6329
#9
Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2002
From: Gordon Hahn <hahn@hoover.stanford.edu>
Subject: Gordon Hahn: Shevtsova & Kissinger et al
Dear David, some comments for JRL on Shevtsova/Talbott and Kissinger et al
ON SHEVTSOVA ON TALBOTT:
Can the following two views professed by Shevtsova be simultaneously correct? First, "the anti-Western mood among Russia's elite is the major obstacle to Russia's transformation." Second, "(i)n the 1990s, the West, including the US, was not a decisive factor in Russia's transformation"? These views can be held simultaneously, only if one believes that U.S. actions did not provoke or at least maintain the Russian elite's anti-Westernism. As I have proven in my past research, it was precisely the U.S. decision to move ahead with NATO expansion that sparked increased anti-Westernism among the Russian elite.
Among her list of questions she does not ask whether U.S. policy could explain the persistence and growth of elite anti-Westernism in Russia. Instead she asks: "Was it a crucial variable or just one of the many external factors that had an indirect impact on some aspects of Yeltsin's leadership? Could the US have stopped the Chechen war? Would Yeltsin have listened to Clinton's preaching on democracy?" These more narrow, but important questions, especially that regarding prevention of the Chechen war, are high thresholds, and leaves out the Chechens' responsibility for the conflict. Not achieving these goals does not mean the U.S. could or did not have considerable influence. Shevtsova even acknowledges that U.S. "pressure" could have ended the Chechen war sooner. But why suggest the weak instrument of 'pressure'? Why not ask about policies that preceded December 1994? For example, if it was U.S policy from 1992-93 that a long term goal was Russia's membership in NATO and an offer, public or secret, with concrete steps beginning to be undertaken, then maybe the leverage of threatening to suspend any Russian-NATO cooperation on the technical pretext that countries in the midst of war cannot enter NATO could have stayed Yeltsin's hand. At a minimum, such a threat could have been used to effect the Russian military's brutal methods of conducting the war.
I think that Shevtsova is more on track with her point 5, but it could have been drawn even more fully. Crucial was the diplomatic dilemma of decline (to offer another paraphrase of Stephen Sestanovich's phrase) of a nuclear superpower. Abandoning the Yeltsin regime, risked instability or extremist takeover, so the administration was forced TO A CERTAIN EXTENT to avoid antagonizing or weakening the Yeltsin gang. However, a more immediate engagement and cooperative initiatives (a mini-Marshal, quasi-invitation to NATO accession process) with Russia on a broader scale (and not delayed economic assistance and nothing else) in 1992-93 would have given us greater leverage for a subsequent careful couching of 'threats' of the kind I mentioned above to withdraw cooperation in selected areas once the bad boys of the 'party of war' began to hold sway.
Shevtsova asks: "How can we blame Clinton for acquiescing to Yeltsin's undemocratic habits while forgetting Bush's implicit acceptance of Putin's autocratic regime?"
One reason, I think, that Clinton deserves criticism for not pressuring Yeltsin is that initially in early 92 Yeltsin was not weak, the public was much more pro-American and pro-Western, and the elite was more ideologically confused and also generally more positively predisposed toward the West. Some real carrots tied to some real sticks could have done some real good. Instead, Russian was given too few carrots, which arrived late and in bad shape, and then clubbed over the head with a big stick: NATO expansion, which Dr. Shevtsova correctly notes. It drove the elite away from the West, something was not difficult to do given that the 'new' elite was anything but new. It was the old party-state nomenklatura, for the most part, and a few of their somewhat more liberal sons. Unlike Shevtsova, I am not convinced "that with NATO enlargement and the Balkans or without them, US-Russia relations were doomed to come to a standstill." This assumes that there were no other options besides expansion without Russia and no expansion.
While I do not think it is a good idea in general to let Putin get away, for example, with Chechnya cost-free and other less than democratic steps, it seems to me that Bush was pursuing a policy similar to Clinton's before 9/11. There was no real plan to exact costs for NTV and TV-6 or Chechnya. The symbolism on Chechnya was, if anything, more tough than under Clinton. The Bush adm met with Chechen reps in the State Dept. The Clinton would only do so outside State. The Bush Adm, post-9/11, has a rather compelling national security reason to turns its collective head away from what is happening in Chechnya. Therefore, to blame Clinton and 'forget' Bush's acquiescence is not an altogether unreasonable position. Not to mention that calling Putin's regime "autocratic", I think, is a bit much. It's a gray-zone state hovering between democracy and authoritarianism, in some areas moving forward, in others - back.
On the old point that Clinton backed Yeltsin because there was no democratic alternative and the equally old point that Russia voted for Yeltsin as the lesser of two evils suggests something I think that should be pretty obvious. Two entities -- the Clinton Administration and the Russian electorate -- presented with the same choice/dilemma made the same choice, which seems to me to endorse the decision. We all would have liked to see Yeltsin decide not to run in 96 and pick a democratic- and market-oriented successor then. Unfortunately, his excessive pride and attraction to power precluded that outcome.
I think Dr. Shevtsova is right to say that inter-personal relations between two leaders are not a sound basis for relations between two countries and for foreign policy-making. This is particularly true, if one or both leaders has a weak power base or little support for his foreign policy course. Under such circumstances, relations are vulnerable to abrupt shifts as one or both leaders is forced to change course or cannot ensure the continuation of his tenure or his policy after his tenure ends.
I must strongly disagree with Shevtsova's touchingly naive view that Clinton cared about the Russian people. He was a domestic policy wonk, who loved power and other dalliances. I do not suspect that his feet will touch on Russian soil much again, if at all. I think that Bush, because of his father's experience and thus his own, has a greater interest in Russia and intuitively understands now that Russia is an important player, despite (and because of) its problems. This is the basis of his interest in Putin.
ON KISSINGER & CO's Chechen Peace Proposal:
Kissinger and company propose to give Chechnya the kind of sovereignty enjoyed by Tatarstan. It would be good if these generalists would consult some experts before they stick their necks out. Tatarstan for the past year has been seeing its autonomy whittled away. In May its constitution was amended under Putin's legal harmonization drive to 'reintegrate Russia's legal space' and bring regional constitutions and laws into conformity with federal norms. Much of the legal basis for Kazan's sovereignty was stripped away. Numerous laws have been amended to the same end, and soon the remaining legal base for its autonomy -- the 14 February 1994 bilateral treaty between Tatarstan and Moscow -- will be either abrogated or amended. Also, federal prosecutors are pressuring the Tatarstan parliament to further amend the amended constitution. It is unlikely, therefore, that Putin would give Chechnya the kind of sovereignty Kazan enjoyed under the now largely dismantled 'Tatarstan model' of federal-regional relations, since Tatarstan no longer has it. Putin would open himself up to all sorts of problems with Kazan (and likely Bashkortostan and other republics who have recently amended their constitutions and laws under pressure from Moscow and lost much of their previous autonomy) if he in effect punished Tatarstan for playing by the rules and not seceding, while Chechnya is rewarded for grossly violating them by revolting against Moscow.
Gordon M. Hahn, Ph.D.
Visiting Scholar, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.
Political Analyst, The Russian Journal
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