#3
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2002
From: Lilia Shevtsova <lilia@carnegie.ru>
Subject: Comment on Talbott's book
Dear David,
I am sending you my contribution to the discussion on Strobe Talbott's book.
Yours, Lilia Shevtsova
Is America responsible for Russia’s fate? Once
more on “The Russia Hand”
Lilia Shevtsova,
Moscow Carnegie Center
[DJ: Although the numbering below may indicate gaps all the text of this important piece is here.]
The recent exchange between Anne Applebaum and Strobe Talbott and numerous comments on Talbott”s “The Russia Hand,” follow up in Russian media have pushed me to join the discussion and suggest my Russian perspective- for a change.
Frankly, I found Talbott’s book the most fascinating and thought provoking memoir on recent political history for at least three reasons: it is brilliantly written, it provides insight into a subject that is often distorted and misinterpreted, and, most importantly, it helps explain the influence of external factors on Russia’s domestic transformation. Moreover, this book graciously tackles what are for Russia, with its many complexes, some very sensitive subjects. Not only is this an honest book, but its author has the courage to admit when he has been wrong.
For clarity’s sake, my view of Yeltsin’s regime and Yeltsin’s Russia does not differ from Anne Applebaum’s, as my book “Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality” demonstrates. However, my current assessment of Clinton’s Russia policy and Talbott’s approach to Russia is different from Anne’s .
There are two ways to view political developments: objectively, by trying to view them from a distance, within a historic framework or from a humanistic point of view. Anne Appelbaum has been discussing Russia using this second approach. Having lived through Russia’s transformation, I will try to suppress my negative views of Yeltsin’s regime and look at this period in a more rational manner.
Talbott’s book addresses some of the major issues of Russia’s transformation. How to preserve stability in Russian society while simultaneously promoting liberal democracy? How to influence Russian domestic development from the outside? How to pursue the interests of the West without doing harm to Russian reforms? Finally, how to force bad boys to behave in positive ways? Many opponents have criticized the answers that the Clinton-Talbott duo gave to these questions. In the 1990s, I myself was critical of Clinton’s acquiescence to Yeltsin’s elected monarchy. In retrospect, by putting US-Russian relations into a geopolitical framework and taking account of the nature of Russia’s political class, I can see more clearly the stumbling blocks that constrained Clinton’s team in their policy toward Russia. Moreover, when comparing Clinton and George W. Bush and their respective attitudes toward Russia, I can see the positive elements of Clinton’s approach more clearly.
Today I build my assessment of Clinton’s Russia policy on the following criterion: how this policy influenced the pro-Western orientation of Russia? Did it hinder or strengthen this orientation? I strongly believe now that the attitude toward the West within Russian society is the major prerequisite for democracy and a market economy. At the same time, anti-Western moods are the main constraint on Russia’s transformation. Did Clinton’s policy provoke anti-Western shift in Russia? We should bear in mind that in the 1990s the United States forced Yeltsin to perform the unthinkable (the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics, the acceptance of NATO enlargement, etc…). This was like forcing the Russian elite to go through a masochist experiment. The outcome of this policy on the Russian mentality has been amazing. Over the course of the last decade, about 68% of Russians continued (according to Vtsiom) to consider America a benevolent power. It is true that during NATO enlargement and the Kosovo crisis, while under the influence of the elite’s hysteria, this number fell to 43%, but it quickly rebounded!
That means that not only were Russians more pragmatic than is sometimes thought, but the manner in which Washington pursued its interests in its relations with Moscow during the 1990s did not provoke anti-Western and anti-American sentiment in Russia. Moreover, Russians continue to view America positively despite the chronically anti-American Russian elite. The most remarkable achievement of the Clinton-Yeltsin partnership was the help Clinton gave Yeltsin in stripping Russia of some of the imperial burden that was such a powerful constraint on its ability to modernize. This is the major reason that the Clinton-Yeltsin’s partnership is the subject of such vehement attack from Russia’s great power advocates. In fact, Putin’s pro-Western shift in 2001 would have never been possible had Clinton-Yeltsin not done the “dirty work” of tidying up the leftovers of the Soviet Empire.
My insistence on a positive overall assessment of Clinton’s policy, despite the fact that I view some aspects of this policy critically, is politically motivated as well. Considering that the anti-Western mood among Russia’s elite is the major obstacle to Russia’s transformation, I view the attempts to blame Clinton for our own failures as indirect support of this anti-Americanism of Russia’s elite.
3. Before undertaking to judge Clinton-Talbott policy toward Russia, we should first decide how important US influence on Russian domestic developments was. Was it a crucial variable or just one of the many external factors that had an indirect impact on some aspects of Yeltsin’s leadership? Could the US have stopped the Chechen war? Would Yeltsin have listened to Clinton’s preaching on democracy? Having observed the reality of Russian policy from the inside, I would offer that Russian domestic policy had and continues to have its own inherent logic and any external influence could hardly change it substantially. Thus, even strong American pressure could hardly have prevented the Chechen war. I cannot deny that such pressure might have helped to end the war earlier. But I don’t believe that American or any Western influence would have changed the nature of Russia’s privatization or prevented the Russian government from doing “loans for shares”. Washington’s attempt to persuade the Russian government to pay more attention to therapy hardly had any impact on Russia’s reformers.
During the 1990s, the West, including the US, was not a decisive factor in Russia’s transformation The whole debate “Who lost Russia” and attempts to accuse Clinton-Talbott of major Russian failures has no merit. Russians are responsible for their own destiny. That does not mean that Russia was doomed to have what is has now. The available options and scenarios could have been influenced from the inside. But history does not tolerate conjecture.
4. I think – and Talbott’s book strengthened this view - that, having analyzed the priorities connected with Russia’s transformation, Clinton’s team chose the policy that might be tentatively called “superpower decline control.” First and foremost, this policy envisaged the solution of outstanding security issues and the neutralization of nuclear threats resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Promoting democracy in this context could only have been secondary. Talbott does write about various measures that were intended to help develop civil society in Russia, but this assistance could only have been truly helpful had there been a strong democratic movement from the bottom and a strong, “electable” democratic alternative to Yeltsin at the top.
5. In fact, the US administration was caught in a trap. More criticism of Yeltsin’s internal policy (more pressure on him on Chechnya, etc...) would have ruined the personal rapport between the leaders. This might have made it difficult for the Americans to handle the security agenda that that was so crucial for American and Western interests. Clinton’s team had to make an inevitable trade off and chose to advance what was critical for the security of the United States and the West. Withdrawing nukes from the former Soviet space, getting Russian troops out of the Baltic states, getting Russia to take part in Balkans peace keeping, all these steps negotiated by Talbott’s team were in the national interest of the US. What is also important is that these steps were in the national interest of Russia as well.
These steps later allowed Putin to make his “foreign policy revolution” in September 2001. Thus, the Clinton-Talbott partnership should be given its due for promoting an agenda that was in the strategic interests of both countries.
Having said all that, I would also mention that not all of Clinton’s initiatives were in Russia’s interests. Should we have expected that the work of “The Russia Hand” would have been done by a Russian hand?
Success in promoting a security agenda with Russia often has come at the expense of democracy promotion. This is an old story. President Bush today is trying to find his own way of solving this dilemma by offering his own Faustian bargain.
6. Of course, the “superpower decline control” initiatives engineered by the US could have been different. A “cold shower” approach may have been in order . This was the policy that Bush adopted when he came to power. Clinton chose to trade symbolism for substance. He preferred to have friendly relations with Yeltsin, giving him toys like membership in the G-8, in exchange for a gradual rejection of old Russian ambitions. I may agree, however, that the architects of Clinton’s policy were not thinking about their goals in as cynical a way as I have put forth here. In any case, Talbott and his team worked like anesthesiologists making Russia’s decline less painful for Russia’s elite and Russian society. What was behind it- pragmatism, humane feelings, pity for Russia, understanding of its drama- may not be that important. History remembers outcomes, not motives. In Talbott’s case, knowing his Russian connections and credentials, it goes without saying that he cared about the country he was dealing with. His book shows that he continues to care. I am convinced that it was sheer luck for us, Russians, to have that man in that place at that historic moment.
7. Many Russian observers are now complaining about how humiliating this trade off of substance for symbolism was for Russia. Yes, humiliating because Russia’s ruling team had neither the vision nor the courage to form its own agenda and was forced to adjust to reality by another power!
But what was the alternative to this trade off, squeezing Russian pride without coddling? Surgery without anesthesia? And what would have been the result of such a ‘cold shower’ policy? We saw Moscow’s reaction to US policy a year ago when Russian jets flew over Kitty Hawk and Putin decorated the pilots for their performance. Earlier we witnessed the “Pristina dash,” another example of Russians showing off. Talbott shows that this was one of the most dramatic moments, when Russia and NATO found themselves on the verge of military confrontation.
I personally prefer bloody truth without coddling and oiling. But I am afraid that the majority of Russia’s political and intellectual class can’t cope with this new reality without soothing symbolism and make believe.
8. Returning to a question that worries American observers who really care about Russia, couldn’t Clinton have pressured Yeltsin, forcing him to move toward democracy? My answer in the 1990s was a definite “Yes.” I believed that when Russia was lacking strong democratic pressure from below, the West should have been tougher on Yeltsin, pushing him towards democracy. After painful deliberation on this issue, I am not sure that such pressure would have brought positive results. First, Russia does not like to be pushed around, even by a benevolent power. Second, Yeltsin was very weak, he was a leader who had to fight the parliament, oligarchs, regional barons, his own inadequacy. Any pressure from the outside might have ruined him- especially in such an anti-Western policy environment. Such pressure could only have been positive had the ruling class been ready for Western rules. Unfortunately, it was not.
Because of his weakness, Yeltsin had to be cajoled and supplied with symbols in order to allow him to do things like withdrawing troops form Baltics. Putin does not need such symbolism simply because he is much stronger. There is a huge difference between a president with a 3-7% approval rating and a president with a 62-73% approval rating!
9. In his response to Anne Applebaum, Strobe Talbott made an interesting point, saying that Clinton “saw Yeltsin as a leader focused on one task- which was to drive a stake through the heart of the Soviet System”. I think that despite of his naivete concerning Russia’s puzzles, Clinton understood the most important thing about Yeltsin’s role in Russian history- Yeltsin was a Destroyer, a Terminator. This attracted Clinton who was thinking first of all about demolishing what was left of the Soviet Empire. Yeltsin was not a bad partner for this kind of work despite all his zig-zagging. Talbott’s observation of Yeltsin’s major political role only confirms the nature of the Clinton-Yeltsin partnership. This partnership was about managing Russia’s continuing decline and handling its outcomes. It was about adjusting Russia to its new geopolitical role. Clinton succeeded in helping Yeltsin handle Russia’s shift from super power to regional power.
US-Russian policy in the 1990s was not about democracy building, even if people in Washington thought that it was. We can’t blame Clinton for this. The problem was not that Yeltsin was neither democrat, nor transformer. The Russian political class was not ready to operate in a democratic way. Even the liberals wanted a Russian Pinochet. How could Clinton promote democracy in a country where the liberals wanted an authoritarian regime?
One more point on democracy. One has to admit that there was a lot more democracy in Yeltsin’s Russia than in Putin’s Russia. How can we blame Clinton for acquiescing to Yeltsin’s undemocratic habits while forgeting Bush’s implicit acceptance of Putin’s autocratic regime?
11. Of course, both Talbott and Clinton knew about the true nature of Yeltsin’s regime. Then why did they support Yeltsin’s reelection? Only because they had a security agenda to pursue? Why did Russian democrats vote for Yeltsin? The answer is simple, there was no strong democratic alternative. The choice was between bad and very bad. Zyuganov was the second option. It is a mistake to say that it was American pressure that helped Yeltsin to get his second term. Ol’ Boris would have stayed in the Kremlin with or without American endorsement. The question at that moment was would he stay through elections or without them?
12. Why, despite all the best intentions on the part of the Americans, was the outcome of the Clinton-Yeltsin era a freezing of the US-Russian relations? We began with hopes and ended with mutual suspicion. Foreign policy and its architects on both sides can be blamed for the details, for the failure to predict and understand rapidly unfolding events. They can’t be blamed for the major trend: the “cold peace” between the US and Russia in the late 1990s. This “cold peace” was inevitable. The major reason was the asymmetry in both countries’ capabilities. America’s amazing ascendancy and Russia’s decline were simply happening too fast. Even more important was that Russia’s decline was not followed by an adequate change in the political mentality of its ruling class. In short, many people within the Russian elite were not and still are not ready to relinquish their great power ambitions. The mere existence of the lone world superpower is a reminder of what they have lost. Massaging their complexes with symbolism does not always help.
What is also amazing is that despite the distance put between Washington and Moscow in the end of the 1990s, the mood within Russian society continued to remain positive toward Americans (see Vtsiom surveys).
It is true that the US has used Russia’s decline to push forward its own global interests. It is also true that Russia failed to use the benevolent American attitude of Clinton’s tenure to pursue its own economic interests and its agenda of revival. We ourselves have to be blamed. Politics is not philanthropy. The United States could not prevent Russia’s decline!
14. There were two really serious blows to US-Russian relations: NATO enlargement and the Balkan crisis. NATO enlargement created problems for Russian democrats and the pro-Western public thus becoming a constraint on democratic reform in Russia. I do believe that, in the context of Western and US relations with Russia at that particular moment, NATO enlargement was a mistake. But the logic of enlargement was driven by other considerations.
However, if we look at NATO enlargement from the current Russian perspective, it doesn’t bother Russian democrats any more because the enlargement itself is being portrayed as a sign that NATO is losing its mission. The new NATO mission can’t be found without Russia .
15. As for Balkan crisis, I don’t think that there is a single political actor who deserves a decoration for its handling. I have to admit that as a result of this crisis, Moscow now tries to avoid any new “Milosevich syndrome.” My hunch is that its Balkan experience will influence Moscow’s behavior toward Iraq and other dictatorships. While initially a negative experience that worked on the ulcers of Russian and Western politicians, the results have been positive.
I will repeat that with NATO enlargement and the Balkans or without them, US-Russia relations were doomed to come to a standstill- sooner or later. The growing disparity between the two countries and great power aspirations are still the blood and air of Russia’s ruling class. “The Russia Hand” is about quite an amazing relationship between two very different people. In fact, this is a fascinating textbook not only on politics but on political psychology as well. It was a revelation to read how these two leaders, each belonging to very different cultures and even epochs, worked together. There had to be genuine sympathy and trust between them.
However, I am still not convinced that personal chemistry is the best way to pursue foreign policy. Yes, the personal rapport between Clinton and Yeltsin helped the United States to achieve its goals. It helped Russia as well when American and Russian interests coincided. But personal chemistry, as this relationship proved, has a flip side. Leaders who like each other are not always ready to make each other unhappy by saying blatant and unpleasant things. Did not Clinton resist the temptation to say everything he thought about Yeltsin’s style of governance for fear of endangering the security dialogue? Is Bush not repeating the same pattern in his relations with Putin by being intentionally soft on democracy and Chechnya while trying to secure Russia’s role in an antiterrorism campaign?
I also understand that without a personal rapport, successful “superpower decline control” would not have been possible. The problem is that in promoting a personal rapport politicians must not loose the bigger idea and must keep their eyes fixed on the strategic goal. I am talking about both the art of diplomacy and the ability to think Big. Not all leaders are capable of this.
Talbott’s book demonstrates a lot of the naiveté in Clinton’s perception of Yeltsin. It is really very difficult for a Western politician brought up in a liberal culture to perceive the hybrid nature of Yeltsin’s personality and his multiple political identities. What is worth noting is that this naivete did not prevent Clinton from achieving all of the major goals on his damage control agenda in relations with Russia. He may have failed to handle the main source of tension between our two countries, Russian resentment and the growing gap between us, but only Russians themselves can cope with this gap.
Finally, in looking at the balance sheet of US-Russian relations in the 1990s and their impact on Russia’s domestic development I still believe that on: 1) Chechnya, 2) the pattern of economic reform, 3) Yeltsin’s approach toward democratic institutions, American influence could have been stronger. It could have at least influenced details without endangering the security agenda.
At the same time, when we look at the list of American presidents, Clinton so far is the only president who made Russia his foreign policy mission. When we look at the people who were forming America’s Russia policy, nobody spent as much energy, time, or brain power for the sake of Russia as the author of “The Russia Hand.” Nobody had so much sympathy for its people either. Russians, albeit grudgingly, are beginning to appreciate Clinton-Talbott intentions and their policy when compared to the new winds in the White House. Sooner or later Russians and, I hope, Americans will come to the conclusion that Clinton’s handling of the continuing Soviet collapse (this is what was going on in the 1990s) was quite successful, both from the point of view of American and Russian interests.
In any case, we, Russians, can’t blame Clinton or Americans in general for our own failures and impotence. Building democracy and the rule of law, the fight with corruption, etc- this is not the task for an American “Russia Hand”. This is Russia’s own agenda. This is the agenda for the indigenous Russian hands.
P.S. This is my desperate attempt to look at Russia’s development from a rational perspective. As for my humane perspective- I continue to be bitter about imitation democracy, clumsy leadership, corruption and a lack of perspective. These are the usual complaints. But this bitterness is the price for having the luxury living inside of an experiment.
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