6318
#9
World Energy Policy Journal
www.wep.ru
#4
June 2002
(Vitaly Tretyakov is editor of the Journal).
Being a junior partner to the US is not demeaning
Russia just needs to understand where its interests coincide with American
interests
By Nikolai Zlobin (nzlobin@cdi.org)
Director of the Russian and Asian programs at the Center for Defense
Information, US.
The Moscow summit of Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President George W. Bush had the capacity of giving Russian-American relations a new quality. We’ll be able to understand whether or not this happened only in several months. The formal success of the summit -- the signing of the joint agreements and declarations -- should not be considered the real success. It's clear that a vacuum of uncertainty remains now that the problem of joint arms control -- which lay at the heart of our relations for decades -- is no longer on the agenda. Today, we don't understand the foundation of our relations. Both sides lack an understanding of the basics of the political philosophy. What we need is a real intellectual breakthrough, a fundamentally new conception of Russian-American relations.
The fight against terrorism cannot be the new foundation, since relations cannot be built “against” something. Nor can economic cooperation be the foundation -- currently it’s not sufficient, and the difference in economic potentials is not conducive to parity. Even potential cooperation in the energy sphere cannot be the new foundation -- and to even be realized, it needs decades of hard work and billions of dollars in investment. Therefore, I think that the real success of the summit depends, firstly, on whether the two presidents managed to work out common positions and began to formulate the new philosophy of Russian-American relations and, secondly, on whether the elites of the two countries will accept this philosophy as a guide for actions. This will probably become clear in the fall or winter of this year.
The world order is changing
The circumstances surrounding the May summit of the Russian and American presidents were interesting, and rather unusual. First of all, a unique geopolitical situation has developed. We are experiencing a rapid re-evaluation of the very foundations of the world order; the structure of international relations is changing; old institutions and blocs are falling apart; the leading players’ conceptions of their national interests are rapidly evolving. Under these circumstances, each country tries to get as much long-term advantage and strategic political profit as it can. U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice likes to compare our time to the period between 1945 and 1947. It was then, that the foundations of the political order were set for the following half a century. It was then, that winners and losers were determined for decades. It was then, that governments and nations, political leaders and national elites, had to decide whose side they were on. Now as then, no nation in the world can avoid making such a decision.
Secondly, Russia and the U.S. are currently developing their foreign policy doctrines. This is not easy for them. After the collapse of the USSR, it was very difficult for the United States to determine its national interests and priorities. This could not but cause a number of foreign policy mistakes made by the Clinton administration. The Bush administration also began its term by seriously underestimating the changes that had occurred in the world. In part, this was because, until very recent times, Western theories of international relations were governed by the opinion that a unipolar world, a world with just one superpower, could not exist. It was maintained that, if there exists one superpower, then another country, or a group of countries will begin to create another superpower, which will challenge the first one, bringing about parity. It must be said, that all of the experiences of international relations during the XXth Century totally fit this concept.
Today, however, it is becoming increasingly obvious that -- in the near future -- no nation or group of nations will be able to reach the American proportions and begin a strategic competition with the US. For the next few decades, no one will be able to reach parity with the US, which will remain the world’s only superpower for a long time to come. This is a principally new situation. No force exists, or is likely to appear, that could alter it. Therefore, a certain unipolarity of international relations will be a long-term factor, regardless of the will and desire of nations and their leaders -- including the US.
One should presume that Washington will work to obtain the maximum long-term advantage out of the current situation. It would be strange if it did otherwise. Being simultaneously aware of its responsibilities, the cost of mistakes, and the importance of any steps, demands no small intellectual effort from the American political elite. I think that it’s far from ready for such a role. Nor are the elites of other countries ready for this. A unipolar world has not existed in recent history; it’s a new phenomenon, in many ways confusing.
The five main “national interests” of the U.S.
All of this poses major challenges for the U.S. leadership as it tries to formulate its foreign policy strategy. The events of September 11th, however, have significantly simplified the problem. There is now a certain understanding of the nature of the new threats. The major principles of the concept of U.S. national interests are being actively developed. They -- and the nation’s foreign policy concept as a whole -- should be completed at the end of the summer.
One can, however already name the primary directions. There are five.
The first is the fight against international terrorism. The second is the creation of a reliable international system for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their acquirement by “irresponsible governments.” The third direction is the formation of a stable and predictable market for energy purveyors, in which the buyers and not the sellers play a determining role. The fourth is the formation of a “zone of peace and freedom” in the world -- not only within the traditional borders of Western civilization, but also in new regions, which lack well-developed democratic systems. And the fifth is the creation of conditions that provide for a peaceful solution of any possible disagreements involving China.
Russia ought to review the new directions of American foreign policy and decide to what extent the goals put forward by the U.S. coincide with its own goals. The fact that President Putin made it clear that Russia no longer contends for parity with the United States and is prepared to be a junior partner to the only superpower of the world can be seen as a highly intelligent move. It took too much effort and money to fight for parity, and Russia still lost every time, sending its citizens on new loops of unnecessary disappointment, hurt, anti-Americanism and heightened sense of inadequacy, that is so difficult to overcome today. Being a junior partner to the US is in no way insulting or demeaning. Most of the nations of the world were, or are, junior partners on the world arena. For example, all of the European nations combined, as well as separately, are junior partners to the U.S., but that doesn’t make them fall into national-patriotism. The difference in the potentials of different nations is, as the Americans say, a fact of life. For Russia, Putin’s admission of this is the result of the “reality check” of the contemporary world, the result of a pragmatic approach to the analysis of international relations.
There really is a major asymmetry between Russia and the US. It exists not only in economic, but also in military and political capabilities. A colossal asymmetry also exists in the extent to which the nations need each other. Russia needs the US a lot more than the US needs Russia. The United States really does not need Russia to solve the issues it is trying to deal with in the international arena.
However, many in the American political elite fully understand that, strategically, Russia is a very valuable and important ally. This is why Bush set aside three whole days in his highly busy and demanding schedule for visiting Moscow and St. Petersburg and signing an international agreement on the reduction of nuclear potential, which the United States did not really need. It was important for the Bush administration to demonstrate that its desire to establish trusting, friendly relations with Moscow, to support the course of President Vladimir Putin. It was a serious good will act. The visit proved that the American administration understands how much Putin and Russia need America.
But it was just as much of a gesture aimed at the solution of a concrete political problem. Those in Washington feel that -- if not today, then in 10-15 years -- the United States will need Moscow’s help, and its better to agree on this today. And, if Russia wants to successfully realize the political course chosen over the past year, it needs to begin proving its strategic value for the United States today. It’s necessary to find and define the aspects of international policy and the regions of the world where Russia can be a useful ally for the Western world, and, above all, for the United States. Moscow needs to concentrate its efforts there, where it can do something better than the US; achieve results more effectively, faster, and cheaper than Washington could on its own.
Naturally, the asymmetry between Russia and the US makes the kind of global parity that existed between the USSR and the US impossible. Russia will probably never be able to serve as an equal balance to America the way it did in the Cold-War years. In general, the concept of global parity in international relations ought to be sent to the archives. However, Russia has many levers of influence in various parts of the globe. This is especially true in the Eurasian region, and not only as it coincides with the borders of the former USSR. It includes the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea region, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, the Far East and etc. In these regions, Russia traditionally has stronger historical and geographic positions than the US, and it could work on solving problems and ensuring common interests on the basis of an “aligned agreement.” The list of these regions can change over time, but it is there that Russia can most fully and effectively act upon its capabilities and potential.
“Regional parity”
On the global scale, Russia is a junior partner to the United States and cannot contend for parity, but in separate regions and in Eurasia as a whole, Russia can be an equal, if not senior, partner to its Western allies.
In such situations, the United States will prefer to give the leading role to Moscow. This will be the “regional parity” between Russia and the United States. The deeper allied relations between the two nations develop, the wider will be the area covered by the “regional parity.” Furthermore, if Russia chooses to represent and protect the interests of its Western partners in Eurasia, one can assume that they will represent and protect Russia’s interest in other regions of the world. This is the way that NATO functions, and this is what the European Union aspires to. The United States openly says that this is the sphere into which it would like to transfer relations with the Kremlin -- introducing allied relations based not on agreements, but on the commonality of world views and value systems, and on the unity of goals and priorities in international relations.
The policy of engagement
In formulating its foreign policy doctrine, the United States is intensively seeking a replacement for the policy of containment that governed international relations in the second half of the XXth Century. It will be replaced by a policy of engagement, involvement, and integration of various countries into the solution of the aforementioned foreign policy challenges.
Of course the engagement will not be forced. Containment and confrontation will -- in the opinion of American experts -- be replaced by a (fairly active and large-scale) process of blocking nations together with the US, together with its foreign policy doctrine and priorities. The experts feel that a new “zone of freedom” will be formed as a result of engagement. In this way, the involvement and alignment with the US will become the primary direction of the contemporary political process. Only the nations that reject Washington’s foreign policy values for ideological reasons will be left outside of the process. There are not many; they include Iran, Iraq, and a number of nations in Asia, the Middle East and Northern Africa.
The United States completely supports Russia’s integration into Europe and is prepared to put a certain amount of pressure on European leaders; however Washington would be disappointed if that meant that Russia’s positions in Eurasia and Asia as a whole would be weakened. Attaining real stability and security in the region, and achieving predictability and reliability in the energy market is much easier for the US with Russia’s help than by acting directly. The myth, which exists in Russia, that the US is trying to drive a wedge between Moscow and the Asian region, to push Russia out of Asia, in no way corresponds to reality. On the contrary, Washington would like Russia to be its Eurasian ally and partner. Despite the importance of the Westward direction, it is vital for Moscow not to go overboard and lose the useful, and potentially even more useful, positions in Asia.
Limited Sovereignty
The United States considers the concept of “limited sovereignty” to be one of the methods for expanding the “freedom zone.” The sovereignty of all state governments is considered absolute and untouchable, but only as long as the governments fulfill three conditions set for them by the international community. One -- do not kill your people. Two -- do not promote the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Three -- do not in any way help terrorists, do not harbor or support them. If sovereign states break these conditions, then, by the decision of international organizations -- the United Nations, for example -- the governments lose their right to sovereignty and other nations can and should interfere. In this way, the world community must guarantee its security and fight against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and human rights abuses. From one side, this concept is based on Washington’s purely political approach, from another -- on the American missionary zeal, morals, and value systems. One can agree with it or not, but one must remain a realist: The United States and their allies are totally capable of acting this out. By remaining outside the line of allies, Russia can lose an important lever for influencing decisions on this question.
From the G-8 to the G-3
The May summit of the two presidents served as the beginning of a large-scale strategic economic partnership -- not just between Russia and the United States. It’s obvious that Japan is currently going through a long-term economic crisis, which, together with the political and demographic crises, will exclude it from the group of world economic leaders for many years,. At the same time, Europe is uniting, and the day when the Old World will speak with one voice is not that far away. Then, it will not be a G-7 (or G-8) that will supervise the world economy, but a G-2: The United States, and the European Union.
Unifying economic processes will also inevitably gain strength in the Eurasian region. It is not unlikely that some country will gain enough power and influence to try to represent the main economic and political interest of the regions. China or India could, for example, become that country. However, there is nothing today to prevent Russia for taking that role. First of all, it is more ready for that role, and secondly, the United States and its allies would much prefer it to other countries in the region.
Thus, the creation of an “economic troika” -- a G-3 of the European Union, the United States, and Russia, which would represent the Eurasian/Asian region -- could be a strategic goal. This is a highly ambitious idea, comparable only to the ambitions of the USSR in the second half of the 1940’s. Let’s recall that, at that time, Moscow received geopolitical advantages that allowed for the establishment of global parity. Today the situation is even more favorable -- the United States is ready to support Moscow.
translated by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu)
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