#14
Argumenty i Fakty
No. 24
June 12, 2002
ELECTIONS: THE BIG GAME
Who will win the next presidential election?
Author: Konstantin Sergeev
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
JUST SIX MONTHS AGO, THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT PUTIN WOULD EASILY WIN THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. HOWEVER, NOW THE SITUATION IS LESS CLEAR, ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT'S POPULARITY RATING SEEMS FINE. ANALYSTS ARE PAYING ATTENTION TO SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL NUANCES.
Six months ago there was not a single doubt that Vladimir Putin would easily win the next presidential election in 2004. However, now the situation is less clear, although the president's popularity rating seems fine. Analysts are paying attention to significant political nuances.
Mikhail Kasianov has gradually and unnoticeably turned from a "technical" prime minister into a significant political figure. He publicly carries on polemics with the president concerning economic issues. He does not hurry to implement personnel and financial orders from Vladimir Putin. He manages to get his own way rather acute issues, such as a multi-million defense order to St. Petersburg "Severnaya Verf" enterprise; reforming the Transportation Ministry and the Russian Joint Energy Systems (RJES); privatization of Slavneft and others. Sometimes, he even manages to have the president change his decisions.
There is an impression that old Yeltsin's guards have preserved and even increased their financial-economic power and control of "security" structures in the economic bloc of the Russian government. They demonstrate to President Putin that the issue of supporting him at the next presidential elections has not been resolved yet. They hint that there are other candidates as well, and not from the government only....
Last year, Vladimir Putin must have seriously frightened the Family with his possibility to directly appeal to the people, to lean back on the army and security services, and to replace the leadership of the government and the presidential administration. As a result, a system of creation of "checks and balances" for the president has been invented and partially realized. Beside aforementioned financial- economic and personnel displays of power, another scenario seems to be realized on the Russian top.
The political center is being thoroughly split. Beside the United Russia, the People's Deputy party, parties of Gennady Seleznev, Sergey Mironov, Mikhail Prusak, numerous social-democratic parties are being formed. Meanwhile, the Communist Party is "purges itself" from opportunism and conformism with the regime. The People's Patriotic Union of Russia has intensified its activities in order to rule irreconcilable opposition. As a result, the left wing is highly likely to receive the majority of votes at the 2003 parliamentary elections.
Large figures from Putin's closest surrounding have openly opposed each other for the first time. Slavneft was the center of the latest scandal. No matter what they say, it is demonstration of the president's weakness rather than strength. It all immediately reminds of public scandals between defense minister and commander of the Joint Staff, prime minister and presidential economic aid, a conflict between the Interior Ministry and the Security Council of the Defense Ministry.
However, political constructions, serious conflicts and ordinary intrigues are highly likely to stop in the end, as their participants can always come to some agreements. However, there is another obstacle on Putin's way to the second presidency.
The one who will be able to control a surge of Russian national- patriotism will have a chance to become the next leader of the Russian Federation. It will be extremely difficult for the ncumbent president, who openly follows a pro-western course, to do this.
As a result of multi-stage combination, the Center pushed regional governors and presidents aside to political periphery. First, subjects of the Russian Federation were included in federal districts. Then, they were deprived of the majority of financial resources. After this, a law that restricted regional governors from re-electing for a third term was passed. Another law liquidated regional parties and movements. Eventually, recently the Russian parliament made an amendment, in accordance with which 50% seats in regional legislative assemblies are to be deputized from party lists, which means from lists of Moscow parties.
The only thing left is to cancel elections and to start appointing regional governors by presidential orders. Or, it is also possible to "consolidate" the Federation, reducing the number of regions to two dozens, and to start administratively ruling territories in a unitary state. However, these two measures would require reconsideration of the Constitution.
On the other hand, the regional elite, that has been driven into a corner, can start counter-attacking. It has several options. For instance, regional leaders may support the Communist Party at the next parliamentary elections to the Duma. It is also possible to replace the presidential-gubernatorial power structure in regions with a "parliamentary" model. Finally, the most far-seeing and cautious regional leaders may pretend that they had accepted Kremlin's game rules and will try to lead reforms in their regions. Mintimer Shaimiev in Tatarstan and Mikhail Luzhkov in Moscow have already followed this way. Moreover, party projects that are being realized in the Federation Council, like the Party of Life, may also be implementation of such efforts.
It would be reasonable to expect intensification of attempts to begin direct election of members of the Federation Council, two from each subject of the Russian Federation. This would allow the upper house of parliament to avoid direct influence from the Kremlin.
The failure of restriction for some regional governors to be reelected for a third turn during consideration in the Constitutional Court also proves that regions are still politically strong. After active, though not public efforts of such political heavyweights as Moscow Mayor Yuru Luzhkov, Sverdlovsk Governor Eduard Rossel, Bashkortostan President Rakhimov, and Novgorod Governor Mikhail Prusak, the kremlin had to surrender and let the Constitutional Court know that it was ready to soften its position.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova )
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