#6304
#5
From: Tomas Valasek (tvalasek@cdi.org)
Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002
Subject: Reply to Nikolai Zlobin/6293
David,
I would like to reply to Nikolai Zlobin's thoughts on Russia's potential cooperation with the United States on "solving the problems" in the Central Asia/Caucasus region (JRL #6293). Hope you can publish these few thoughts in JRL.
Tomas Valasek
Senior analyst, Center for Defense Information
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In JRL #6293, Nikolai Zlobin makes a case for the United States to enroll Russia as a partner in policing the Eurasia region. "Then there are Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq, Asian countries, Central Asia, the Far East, etc., where the Americans may try to solve these questions on their own, but they will not be able to solve them as effectively as Russia can solve them," he said in a June 4 press conference in Moscow.
Dr. Zlobin is not specific on what it is that Moscow could and would do, but any sort of involvement is certain to be of limited utility. I'd distinguish between the kind of diplomatic exercise Putin is engaged in vis-à-vis India and Pakistan, and a broader role for Moscow as a stabilizer in Eurasia, using its military, political and economic power. There are some opportunities in the former category but precious few in the latter.
On the diplomatic front, Russia could indeed help the U.S. in reaching out to India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and a few other countries out there, the theory being that since Washington has effectively severed ties with some of these countries, it needs an influential interlocutor to bring about things like non-proliferation of nuclear arms and technology and/or diffusion of tensions. (That's certainly true for Iran and Iraq; less so for India/Pakistan.) But what are the other comparative advantages of involving Russia rather than Washington? A senior State Dept. hand recently complained in a private discourse that our problem with India and Pakistan is that we have no levers, no real sticks and carrots, especially vis-à-vis India. But Russia has even less influence than we do, so in this sense it is of little help. The idea that Russia's importance will increase as Japan's economy flounders holds little water -- a struggling Japan still wields far more economic influence than Russia will in the foreseeable future.
Moscow has been able to squeeze maximum leverage from its status as a (former) superpower, and to position itself as an arbiter based on little more than its past power and prestige. It is also on the UN Security Council -- a fact that Iraq, for example, used and abused to advance its goals. But it is much easier to play a spoiler of U.S. policies than to be a constructive help. Much of Moscow's influence comes from the fact that it is NOT the United States, not even particularly close to us. Hence those countries that prefer to keep the United States at bay turn to Moscow for help -- sometimes to block a UN resolution, other times to mediate in conflicts where a direct U.S. role is out of question for the parties involved. But should Russia align itself with Washington, as Zlobin proposes, particularly if it clearly does so from a position of a junior partner, would this not take away what made Russia so appealing as an arbiter in the first place?
In terms of Russia using its military, political and economic power in Eurasia to "guarantee" peace and stability the way that NATO did in Europe, I think hopes on this count are misplaced. Most states of the region won't be open to direct Russian military or political involvement, be it peacekeeping or other form of security assistance. In Central Asia, perhaps, but even there the situation has changed -- in the early 1990s it was the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs who wanted to continue close relations, as a way of keeping the economies afloat (with Russian trade, subsidies and know-how), and to keep the Islamic influence out. But little help came, so the regimes there went through -- and survived -- both the post-Soviet economic collapse as well as (what may have been) the high-water mark for Islamic resurgence, the 2000 Fergana valley excursions. With U.S. forces now deployed in Afghanistan and al Qaeda dispersed all over the world, the IMU will likely never be the same threat again (although we shouldn't underestimate the ability of local strongmen to alienate their populations and thus incite another revolt). The Central Asian regimes may simply no longer feel the need for Russian assistance they did two or three years ago.
In the South Caucasus, there never was a desire post-USSR for strong relations with Russia. Unlike the Central Asians, who were pushed out of the Federation kicking and screaming, the Georgians, Azeris or even the Armenians were ready to get the hell out of there. Notice that the movements opposing the Soviet forces in those countries were all nationalist in nature. Even Armenia, whose economy and indeed survival today are almost completely dependent on Russia's assistance is officially keeping its alignment options open (they call it 'complementarity'), even as it sells one strategic enterprise after another to Russia in order to keep Russian troops in and Russian weapons and goods flowing. Georgia is outright allergic to anything Russian, and has only agreed to Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia under extreme duress. The government in Baku had done its best to keep the Russians out and Azerbaijan firmly tied to Turkey and, by extension, Europe and the United States.
And lastly, let us not forget how many of the current troubles in Central Asia and the Caucasus are, frankly, of Soviet and Russian making, starting with Stalin's creative map drawing specifically designed to pit different ethnic groups against one another and thus perpetuate the need for the Russian "guarantor." The tradition continued well beyond 1991, with mercenaries financed by Russia fighting against Georgian forces in Abkhazia and the Russian government treating the heads of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as de facto heads of states even as Georgia tried to consolidate its control over those territories. Given the ancient and recent history, Russia will have an extremely tough time establishing itself as a neutral guarantor in the Caucasus.
The points above are especially relevant since Zlobin views Russia's stabilizing role in the former Soviet south as the main pillar of the U.S.-Russian relationship. I agree with him in the sense that I do not see other issues (economy, oil/gas, missiles) as fueling in the future a relationship as close as the one we're pursuing. It is also clear that we are engaging Russia at a level that is far deeper than what can be explained with the usual arms control arguments. It seems that the Bush administration is serious both about reforming NATO and bringing Russia in. This runs counter to the idea that NATO-Russia cooperation is essentially symbolic because the United States is not taking NATO seriously anymore -- it apparently is, which would indicate that it is also serious about military cooperation with Russia through NATO. So a new agenda is clearly needed but the idea of Moscow policing Eurasia in a contract with the United States is very far-fetched, for all the reasons listed above.
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