Johnson's Russia List
#6267
24 May 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Interfax: Novaya Gazeta To Appeal to Russian Supreme Court, European
Court Over Ruling.
2. Reuters: Russia will not win market access during Bush visit.
3. Reuters: New U.S.-Russia arms treaty is no panacea.
4. Reuters: Iran row cast shadow over Russia-U.S. summit.
5. Celeste Wallander: Visa stories.
6. Reuters: Russians skeptical about new U.S. friendship.
7. Strobe Talbott on Washington Post Live Online.
8. www.thenation.com/failsafe: Matt Bivens, Playing with Fire.
America's highest national security priority should be to keep Russia
from becoming a terrorist's Home Depot.
9. Izvestia: Mikhail Vidogradov, Yabloko Party Ready for New Elections.
Russian Justice Ministry has registered a reformed Yabloko party.
10. Financial Times (UK): Friendship is not enough. Mikhail Khodorkovsky
outlines his hopes for the Bush-Putin summit.
11. RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly: GEORGIA ON THEIR MINDS.
12. Russian Communist Party Statement on Bush's visit.
13. Wall Street Journal editorial: The Moscow Summit.]
*******
#1
Novaya Gazeta To Appeal to Russian Supreme Court, European Court Over Ruling
MOSCOW. May 22 (Interfax)- The Novaya Gazeta
newspaper plans to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg if Russian courts uphold a ruling that the newspaper should
pay a large sum as compensation to Mezhprombank, the newspaper's
editor-in-chief Dmitry Muratov told Interfax on Wednesday.
Under a court ruling, the Novaya Gazeta newspaper has been ordered to
pay some $500,000 as compensation to the bank. Mezhprombank filed a
lawsuit against the newspaper, claiming that its article allegedly
prompted a client to withdraw a large sum from his bank account. The
Basmanny district court granted the bank's lawsuit, which was upheld the
Moscow City Court as well.
Muratov said that Novaya Gazeta is facing "an unprecedented sum of
money. We cannot pay $500,000 as we simply do not have this money," the
editor-in-chief said.
Muratov said that as soon as the court's ruling is confirmed, bailiffs
may come to the newspaper's editorial office.
The editor-in-chief said that the newspaper plans to file an appeal
with the presidium of the Moscow City Court. Muratov said that the Moscow
City Court's presidium is highly likely to uphold the previous ruling,.
If so, the newspaper will appeal to the Russian Supreme Court. "And from
there it is not a long way to Strasbourg," the editor-in-chief said,
referring to the European Court of Human Rights.
Muratov believes that the lawsuit against the newspaper "has purely
political motives.'
The editor-in-chief said that Novaya Gazeta has been recently "facing
more and more lawsuits" related even to articles it published a few years
ago.
"The situation over NTV television channel and TV6 is not enough - now
they've decided to hit newspapers with lawsuits," Muratov said.
******
#2
Russia will not win market access during Bush visit
WASHINGTON, May 23 (Reuters) - Despite appeals from Russian President
Vladimir Putin, U.S. President George W. Bush does not plan to announce a
boost in Russia's access to the U.S. market during their summit, officials
said on Thursday.
But Bush will tell Putin that a decision on designating Russia a "market
economy," which would benefit Russian exporters, could come next month.
Putin had hoped that Bush would make the announcement himself during his
visit to Moscow, where on Friday the leaders will sign a treaty slashing
U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear arsenals by two-thirds.
Instead, U.S. officials said Bush would tell his Russian counterpart -- a
key ally in the war on terrorism -- that the country's economic status was
still under review at the U.S. Commerce Department and that a decision was
likely to come in June.
Declaring Russia a market economy would put a U.S. seal of approval on its
economic reforms since the collapse of the Soviet Union and provide some
momentum to Moscow's bid to join the World Trade Organization.
It would also be of real dollar-and-cents importance to Russia exporters
because of U.S. trade laws that make it easier for the Commerce Department
to impose steep anti-dumping and countervailing duties on "non-market
economies."
Supporters of the change have been encouraged by the Commerce Department's
recent decision to reclassify Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic, as a
market economy.
The Commerce Department has done the same for Hungary, the Czech Republic,
the Slovak Republic, Poland and Latvia since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, and is weighing requests from Ukraine and Moldova as well as Russia.
Putin had also hoped that Washington would lift three-decade-old
"Jackson-Vanik" trade restrictions to mark Bush's visit.
But rather than scrapping the restrictions, the U.S. Senate on Wednesday
adopted a non-binding resolution calling for the United States to establish
permanent normal trade relations with Russia "in an appropriate and timely
fashion."
"This is a strange decision," Putin said on Thursday. "People who regard
our relations not as U.S.-Russian but U.S.-Soviet still wield a lot of
power in the United States."
********
#3
ANALYSIS-New U.S.-Russia arms treaty is no panacea
By Carol Giacomo
WASHINGTON, May 23 (Reuters) - A U.S.-Russia nuclear arms treaty to be
signed at the Moscow summit on Friday is being hailed as burying the Cold
War and opening a bright new era in bilateral ties, but it is not the
panacea some suggest.
While the deal was initially welcomed with enthusiasm, critics have
expressed increasing concern that the minimalist four-page pact has been
oversold and does not go far enough.
They also fear it is drawing attention away from the danger that for
President George W. Bush looms largest after the Sept. 11 attacks on the
United States -- the possible acquisition and use of nuclear, biological
and chemical arms by terrorists.
The treaty Bush and President Vladimir Putin will sign is aimed at reducing
U.S. and Russian deployed strategic warheads over 10 years to 1,700-2,200
each from current levels of 5,000-6,000.
The two major powers, still wedded to a nuclear deterrent, have much work
left to do on security, like securing Russia's nuclear stocks and resolving
a long-standing row over Moscow's cooperation with Iran, officials and
analysts say.
The new pact "simply formalizes what each leader previously announced he
planned to do unilaterally," according to Graham Allison of the Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government.
Writing in the Boston Globe, he argued that at current levels, strategic
warhead numbers are essentially symbolic. What really mattered was the
likelihood each side would use a nuclear weapon, and factors like
early-warning systems, command and control systems and the decision time
available to each president in a crisis, he said.
"Unfortunately, both sides appear to have agreed to avoid these difficult
issues," Allison added.
Joe Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also took
issue with the administration's description of the accord, asserting, "The
treaty will not liquidate the legacy of the Cold War as President Bush has
claimed.
"Ten years from now, the U.S. will still field a large dispersed force of
strategic weapons whose only justification is to target and destroy Russian
military, industrial and political sites," he said.
PACT GIVES U.S. FLEXIBILITY
Like Russia, arms control advocates worry that the pact gives the United
States too much flexibility, allowing it to store rather than dismantle
warheads removed from delivery vehicles. Bush is expected to keep at least
2,400 of the warheads in a so-called responsive force, meaning the weapons
could be redeployed within weeks or months.
Under this scenario, the United States would have 4,600 warheads available
for deployment up to three years after the pact expires, according to the
Arms Control Association.
The treaty does not even attempt to deal with thousands of short-range
tactical nuclear weapons that are still part of the U.S. and Russian arsenals.
For many analysts, talk of slashing nuclear arms is also undercut by a
multibillion-dollar increase in new U.S. defense spending and a Pentagon
policy review that raises the possibility of developing new types of
nuclear weapons.
Since Sept. 11, Bush has stressed the need to keep weapons of mass
destruction away from terrorists as well as from Iran, Iraq and North Korea
-- countries that he has judged to form an "axis of evil" for developing
those weapons and having links with terrorists.
Until Thursday, when he addressed the issue in answer to a reporter's
question, Bush and his aides had largely played down the Russia-Iran link,
focusing instead on America's evolving new relationship with its former
Cold War enemy.
Russia, in the long-held U.S. view, is a major supplier to Iran, providing
vital assistance to Tehran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs as well
as conventional arms.
It is expected that Bush will raise the Iran issue with Putin and that a
new U.S.-Russia strategic framework document due for release at the summit
will commit the two sides to cooperate generally against nuclear and arms
proliferation.
While there are signs of new thinking that could eventually see the United
States offer economic incentives in return for Russia ending its
cooperation with Iran, officials said it was unlikely the summit would
produce a breakthrough.
Republican Sen. Richard Lugar of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
Ashton Carter, a former Clinton administration official, said Bush and
Putin should exploit improving ties to "declare a new front" against
terrorism.
"The goal would be the formation of a coalition to safeguard nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their component materials and technology
so they do not fall into the wrong hands," they wrote in the Financial Times.
The heaviest concentration of these materials is in Russia, but
weapons-grade uranium exists in research reactors in scores of countries
around the world, they said.
*******
#4
Iran row cast shadow over Russia-U.S. summit
By Richard Balmforth
MOSCOW, May 24 (Reuters) - Russian leader Vladimir Putin and U.S. President
George W. Bush sign a landmark arms treaty on Friday, but a row over
Moscow's links with Iran, which Washington says sponsors terrorism,
threatens to spoil the party.
Bush flew into Moscow from Germany where, signalling the war on terror
would be the core theme of his Europe tour, he told his European allies to
put differences aside and transform the NATO alliance into a potent force
to fight terrorism.
Bush and Putin, after a first round of talks on Friday, will sign an accord
in the Kremlin to cut their countries' huge Cold War stocks of long-range
nuclear warheads by two-thirds over the next decade.
The Treaty of Moscow, the first major disarmament pact between the two
nuclear giants in nearly 10 years, has been billed as the highpoint of the
four-day summit finally burying the old rivalry between the former
superpowers.
But even before Bush touched down on his first visit to Russia, the dispute
over Moscow's nuclear technology cooperation with Iran had returned to
haunt the relationship.
Bush has described Iran, Iraq and North Korea as forming an "axis of evil."
In Berlin, Bush suggested at a news conference that Moscow was contributing
to weapons' proliferation for helping Iran build a nuclear power plant at
Bushehr.
"Russia needs to be concerned about proliferation into a country that might
view them as an enemy at some time and if Iran gets a weapon of mass
destruction deliverable by a missile, that's going to be a problem...for
all of us, including Russia," Bush said.
'PROLIFERATION THREAT'
A senior Bush administration official, speaking on Air Force One, called
Russian assistance for Iran's nuclear programme "the single-most important
proliferation threat there is."
"Frankly we haven't been able to see eye to eye about it," the official said.
In Moscow, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov immediately rejected the U.S. fears
as groundless.
"Russia is firmly loyal to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction," he told an NTV television chat show.
"Yes, we are taking part in building the nuclear power station in Iran, but
I wish to stress that this power plant is under the control of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, an international organisation," he said.
Russia is also ill at ease over the Bush administration's increasingly
shrill attacks on Iraq, with whom Moscow has close economic ties.
Asked what Moscow's attitude would be if the United States did finally
launch military strikes on Saddam Hussein, Ivanov replied: "Russia is
against this and Russia is doing everything to prevent such an operation
beginning."
Hours before Bush arrived in Moscow, about 300 people protested outside the
U.S. embassy in Moscow, burning the American flag and denouncing Bush. But
the protests were small compared with the Berlin demonstrations, which
brought thousands out on to the streets.
BUSH, PUTIN HAVE STRONG BOND
Both Bush and Putin, who formed a strong bond at their two previous
summits, want this get-together to give new impetus to their partnership
forged in the common fight against terrorism following the September 11
attacks in the United States.
Putin, who shows Bush around his home town of St Petersburg on Saturday
after a full day of summitry in Moscow, seeks vital western support for
Russia's stumbling economy.
But he also needs to show that his pro-western policies, which he has
pursued at political risk from military and conservative hawks at home, are
not a case of purely one-way concessions to Washington.
Abandoning the $800 million Bushehr project in exchange only for more U.S.
goodwill would be a costly trade-off for Putin, making the Iran question a
tricky one for him to finesse.
Some U.S. officials have suggested possible compensation to Moscow for
dropping the Bushehr project could be made in the form of relief on
Soviet-era debt to western governments by Washington lobbying the Group of
Seven industrialised nations.
On trade, a vital area of discussions for Russia, Putin will listen
carefully for further signs of U.S. support for Russian membership of the
World Trade Organisation which could help it with foreign debt reduction.
U.S.-Russian trade relations have been under strain, with Russia briefly
banning American poultry imports this year over health concerns and new
U.S. import tariffs on steel hurting the Russian steel industry, a big
employer.
RUSSIAN FRUSTRATION WITH SENATE
And shortly before Bush's arrival, Putin expressed frustration at a U.S.
Senate decision to maintain the Soviet-era "Jackson-Vanik" trade
restrictions against Russia, calling it a strange move that smacked of the
Cold War.
Bush and Putin hold a joint news conference after signing the Treaty of
Moscow arms agreement, go on a walking tour of the Kremlin and then end the
day with dinner at Putin's residence.
On Saturday, Putin takes his American guest to St Petersburg, the old
imperial capital, where Bush will tour cultural spots and meet university
students.
Bush flies on to Paris on Sunday, but will meet up with Putin again next
Tuesday at a NATO-Russia summit in Rome at which Russia will be given a
role in some alliance decision-making.
*******
#5
From: Celeste Wallander [CWallander@csis.org]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002
Subject: Visa stories
Given the discussions on the list on the difficulties involved for
Russians in getting visas to visit the US, I thought the following would
be of interest.
The Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) has its
yearly academic conference for members next week, and we have invited
several new scholars from Russia and Ukraine to participate. One,
coming from Ulan Ude, experienced a series of very frustrating delays in
being able to obtain and submit the necessary paperwork (some related to
being so far from Moscow, others related to the May holiday closings).
When all was finally properly processed, he was given an interview on
May 28th, which is the day he was leaving for our conference.
Unfortuntately, after the interview and approval it takes a couple of
days to process the visa, so it was not going to work.
I wrote to the consular services using the email address provided
recently on your list explaining the problem and asking if anything
could be done. Within less than 24 hours I received an answer from the
consular services office informing me that they had rescheduled the
interview for the 24th of May to make it possible for him to receive his
visa in time to leave Moscow for the US on the 28th of May.
Now, unfortunately, our colleague cannot get to Moscow in time for the
interview, because the Ulan Ude to Moscow flight that would have got him
there, we just learned, has been cancelled. So he won't be able to
attend the conference in the end.
That is not my point. My point to all is that I think the consular
office did all they could to work within the time and logistical
constraints, were incredibly responsive and helpful, and deserve to have
a nice story reported about their efforts to balance the negative ones
that get more notice.
thanks,
Celeste
Celeste A. Wallander
Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K St., NW
Washington DC 20006
Tel: (202)775-3233
Fax: (202)775-3132
Email: cwalland@csis.org
********
#6
Russians skeptical about new U.S. friendship
May 23, 2002
By Peter Graff
MOSCOW (Reuters) - U.S. and Russian officials may be writing obituaries for
the Cold War, but ordinary Russians have not quite warmed to their former
foes.
"It is important to show the world that we are no longer enemies," President
Bush told Russians in a television interview aired on the eve of a four-day
summit that will feature the signing of a major arms reduction pact.
"I'm very happy to think that I'm going to be spending some time with
Vladimir," he said of Russia's President Putin.
But as they prepared to welcome Bush to their two cities, Muscovites and St.
Petersburgers said giddy talk of new East-West harmony was overblown.
"I think, in fact, there is no such friendship at all," said Felix, a
Muscovite in his 20s enjoying the May sunshine near Red Square with a friend.
"I think the media is just creating the illusion of friendship. America is
never going to turn away from its private interests."
So what about the smiles and witty repartee that have featured in previous
installments of the George and Vlad show?
"At the top, they always have to be friends. How can you avoid it?" said
Yevgeny Smirnov, visiting the capital from the remote town of Solikamsk in
the Ural Mountains.
"If I had a chance, I would say something to Bush. Something unpleasant. But
hey, you have to keep up appearances."
Irina, a pensioner buying sweets from a street vendor on St Petersburg's main
Nevsky Avenue said of Bush: "Let him come. We'll be happy to see him. Let him
get to know us better."
But she added with a note of skepticism: "For now, 'peace and friendship'.
But then we'll see what they are really like."
SOME SEE VISIT AS HEADACHE
And Alexander, a security guard at a nearby supermarket, could not see what
the fuss was about.
"It's just another headache. Extra people on the streets. Tense atmosphere.
Like all security teams, we will have to work on a tight schedule," said
Alexander.
Protesters taking part in demonstrations in the country's two largest cities
were more forthright in denouncing both Bush and Putin's new pro-U.S. stance
in international affairs.
"We do not like the policies of Bush or Putin," said one of several dozen
demonstrators in St. Petersburg, who identified himself as a bus driver.
"They make the rich richer and the poor poorer."
Russians have run hot and cold on America since the Soviet Union broke up.
In the early 1990s, Muscovites lined around the block for McDonald's. But by
1999, when NATO forces bombed Russia's ally Yugoslavia, crowds of angry
demonstrators trashed the facade of the U.S. embassy with paint bombs.
Russians were sincerely moved when New York and Washington were struck by the
Sept. 11 attacks. But the Salt Lake City Olympics left a sour taste in
Russian mouths that has yet to wear off.
Russians were furious when the country's figure skating pair was forced to
share a gold medal with Canadians after an outcry in North American media,
and top Russian skiers were stripped of medals for taking a drug not on the
banned substance list.
"I have a negative view of America after those winter Olympics," said Olga, a
middle-aged Muscovite.
"But let them come. In the end, they're coming to us, which means they need
us."
(Additional reporting by Konstantin Trifonov in St Petersburg)
*******
#7
Washington Post Live Online
"The Russia Hand:
A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy"
With Strobe Talbott
Former Deputy Secretary of State
May 23, 2002
During the past 10 years, few issues have mattered more to America's vital
interests than Russia's fate. The challenge of helping to steer post-Soviet
Russia -- with its thousands of nuclear weapons and seething ethnic and
political tensions -- has shaped the foreign policy of the past three
administrations.
In his new book, "The Russia Hand," former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott delves into the many challenges President Clinton faced -- from
Ukrainian nuclear weapons and NATO expansion to Yeltsin's alcoholism and
Putin's rise to power.
Talbott was online to take your questions and comments on the book and
Russian foreign policy under Clinton and the current administration.
The transcript follows.
Talbott joined the Clinton administration in 1993 with the responsibility
for Russia and the other new independent states of the former Soviet Union.
He is the author of six books on U.S.-Soviet relations and the
translator/editor of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs. He is now the director of
the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization and will assume the
presidency of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., later this year.
Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over
Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests
and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.
Alexandria, Va.: Did President Clinton limit your role to only the former
Soviet Union or did you advise him on a variety of foreign policy issues?
Strobe Talbott: During the first year of the administration I was
responsible for just the former Soviet Union but in early 1994 I became
Dept. Sec. of State and my responsibility included the full range of
foreign policy issues.
Harrisburg, Pa.: It is my impression that Russia is a third-world country
with nuclear weapons. Indeed, it was the focus on military spending that
collapsed the Soviet economy. What do you see as the future for the Russian
economy, and is there hope that the Russian people will see significant
improvements in their economic standing in the near future?
Strobe Talbott: The Russian economy is unquestionably a mess. That is
largely because of the legacy of communism. For Russia to succeed
economically it needs to replace a corrupt and outmoded system with a
modern system of taxation, fair regulatory practices and laws that protect
private property and investment.
Rockville, Md.: Dear Mr. Talbott,
If the Baltic countries are accepted into NATO this year, will it cause a
crisis in Russia or in Russian foreign policy? Has this become a non-issue
in Russia or does it still have legs? Is, in your opinion, the U.S. right
to support NATO expansion to Russia's borders?
Thank you.
Strobe Talbott: Yes, we should continue to expand NATO and certainly not
exclude former Soviet Republics. I believe all three Baltic states will be
brought into NATO in the fall. I do not think it will cause a crisis in
US-Russian relations. Putin and many other Russians seem to have accepted
this fact and are concentrating their energies not on trying to block NATO
enlargement but on strengthening NATO-Russian cooperation. Some Russians
will continue to complain but the problem is manageable.
San Francisco, Calif.: What should the U.S. government do to prevent
nuclear war between India and Pakistan?
Strobe Talbott: It should continue to do what it is doing now: using its
still significant influence with both parties to get them to back away from
the brink. Over the longer haul the US is uniquely positioned to help reach
a compromise on Kashmir.
Mt. Lebanon, Pa.: Is there any sign that Putin has overstayed his welcome
so far as Russian public sentiment is concerned or, like the Energizer
bunny, is it a real likelihood that he could be in power for decades? And
what are the consequences for the U.S. if we once again, back the wrong
horse -- Gorbachev-Yeltsin episode -- throwing our chips to Putin when the
next guy is already coming to power? Thanks much.
Strobe Talbott: Putin is still very popular in Russia. There is no apparent
preferable and plausible alternative to him on the scene at this time. He
will be around for some years and President Bush is right to work with him
just as Clinton worked with Yeltsin.
Alexandria, Va.: When you worked for Time magazine decades ago you wrote an
essay that was harshly critical of Israel.
Did you have trouble adjusting to President Clinton's foreign policy, which
was quite friendly toward Israel?
How have your attitudes toward the Middle East evolved over the years?
Strobe Talbott: My writings in Time were not critical of Israel. They were
critical of the Likud government of that time. I feel many of those
criticisms, particularly to the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, have been borne out by recent events.
Washington, D.C.: Regarding deals to improve relations between the U.S. and
Russia, in March 2001 the Bush Administration expelled several Russians
from the US and there was talk about reducing the level of spying by both
counties given the end of the Cold War. Anything new on this topic? Do you
think embassies can/will ever move away from the Soviet model of outposts
for espionage toward diplomacy? (Statesmen such as George Kennan, George
Shultz and D.P. Moynihan have all suggested the need to and benefits of
moving in this direction...)
Strobe Talbott: Spying in many directions will continue for the foreseeable
future. Russia however has maintained a disproportionate number of spies
under diplomatic cover abroad and particularly in the U.S. This issue will
continue to come up behind closed doors even in otherwise friendly and
productive meeting like the ones in the coming days.
Harrisburg, Pa.: Russia relies on Iraq for much of its oil. Obviously, they
are concerned if the United States would ever go to war with Iraq. What
energy source alternatives are available to Russia, and what degree do you
believe Russia would go towards protecting Iraq?
Strobe Talbott: Russia relies on Iraq not so much for oil as for money that
Iraq owes Russia for years past. Russia has plenty of oil on its own.
Getting Russian support for pressure and possible military action against
Iraq will probably require assurances to Russia that Iraqi debts will
eventually be paid.
Vienna, Va.: With the breakup of the former USSR into so many autonomus
republics today, why is there so much resistance in Moscow to letting
Chechnya break away also? The Chechnians are not asking for anything that
that the Ukranians, Georgians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, etc... have not already
asked for and got, yet Moscow fights a bloody war to keep Chechnya from
seceeding. What is so valuable about this province that Moscow absolutely
will not let it go?
Strobe Talbott: The difference between Chechnya and the other countries you
mentioned is the following: Ukraine, Georgia, etc. were republics of the
old USSR, separate from the Russian federation. Chechnya, by contrast, was
and is a constituent part of Russia itself. The Russians fear that is
Chechnya is allowed to succeed other parts of Russia will want to do the
same.
Washington, D.C.: Thanks much for your great service to the U.S. and for
participating in this session. I saw that former Secretary of State
Albright recently questioned some approaches by the Bush administration.
Any things that you are especially concerned about concerning the direction
of U.S. foreign policy today?
Strobe Talbott: I am concerned that some -- repeat, SOME -- in the Bush
administration are antagonizing important allies of the US in their
go-it-alone concept of American leadership.
Strobe Talbott: The Bush-Putin summit in Moscow and St. Petersburg
demonstrates a high degree of continuity with the policies and the
diplomacy that I recount in my book. President Bush came into office
critical of Clinton's Russia policy and indicating his own would be very
different. To his credit, he has brought his overall approach with Russia
into alignment with that of his immediate predecessor Bill Clinton - and
(probably easily for him to do) the President before that: his own father.
washingtonpost.com:
That wraps up today's show. Thanks to everyone who joined the discussion.
******
#8
Date: Thu, 23 May 2002
From: Matt Bivens
Subject: Nation article on Nunn-Lugar
www.thenation.com/failsafe
The Fail-Safe Point
Playing with Fire
America's highest national security priority should be to keep Russia
from becoming a terrorist's Home Depot
By Matt Bivens
May 23, 2002
Let's assume that after signing the treaty in Moscow
this week, Russian President Vladimir Putin opts to
destroy the resulting excess 3,500-odd nuclear weapons
that Russia still possesses. He will find his way
blocked--by the US government.
Under the Nunn-Lugar Act, we have long helped the
Russians implement disarmament agreements. We pay to
cut up their nukes, a good deal all around. But the
Pentagon just quietly unplugged its Nunn-Lugar work.
The result: Russia will store thousands of warheads it
would rather destroy.
Each year, the Pentagon must "certify" Russia to be
committed to nonproliferation, or else roughly
one-third of Nunn-Lugar activities controlled by the
US military shuts down. (Other Nunn-Lugar programs-for
example, to improve security around Russia's
weapons-grade uranium and plutonium stocks-are
unaffected.)
This spring the Pentagon told Russia not to expect
certification because it is withholding information
about its chemical and biological warfare
infrastructure. Partly for the same reason, the
Pentagon has blocked construction of a plant in the
Ural Mountains town of Shchuchye to destroy thousands
of tons of nerve agents like sarin, the gas released
in 1995 into the Tokyo subway. (Investigators say Aum
Shinrikyo's sarin was Soviet in origin.)
Jon Wolfsthal, a former Energy Department official now
at the Carnegie Endowment, agrees the Russians haven't
shared their full chemical and biological weapons
histories. But he questions the logic: "We're saying:
'Because we don't think you've declared everything
that you've got, we're not going to help you destroy
everything we know you have.' "
Shutting down Nunn-Lugar work-on the eve of a Moscow
summit, no less-is at odds with President George
Bush's public enthusiasm for the programs and for
Pootie-Poot, his nickname for Putin. Which perhaps
explains why the White House is now begging Congress
for a Nunn-Lugar "waiver"-so the President can
overrule his own Pentagon.
"It's the revenge of the hard-liners," says Joseph
Cirincione, director of the Carnegie Endowment's
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project. "There's a group in
the [National Security Council] and the Defense
Department who have long opposed the Nunn-Lugar
programs and have tried to kill them, to cut funding.
They lost that fight, and in fact the President has
now embraced these programs. But issues never die in
Washington, and the hard-liners are fighting a
rear-guard action."
It's odd that the same Pentagon wounded by American
Airlines Flight 77 could attack a program whose
guiding spirit is to keep weapons of mass destruction
out of terrorist hands. It's particularly ironic
because even as the Pentagon says the Russians aren't
serious about cooperating, the Russians have quietly
invited American experts to visit eight nuclear
weapons storehouses and to recommend security
improvements.
"Finally, we're at the point where we've got political
clearance-and they shut down the process!" says an
incredulous Kenneth Luongo of the Russian American
Nuclear Security Advisory Council, a private
organization that advises the two governments. "After
six, seven, eight years, finally it's coming to
fruition, and these guys pull the plug to make an
ideological point."
The consensus in Washington seems to be that this too
shall pass. "I'm an optimist," Senator Richard Lugar
told The Nation when asked about the future of the
program he and former Senator Sam Nunn authored. Nunn
and Lugar will also travel to Moscow this week to
fight for this issue. So it's likely the
Administration will make its point, Congress will give
President Bush his waiver, and Washington will
congratulate itself on a return to the Nunn-Lugar
status quo.
But is the status quo good enough?
A grapefruit-size chunk of highly enriched uranium, or
a soda can's worth of plutonium, is enough for a
nuclear bomb. Nunn-Lugar officials can list many
achievements-but there's still enough weapons-grade
uranium and plutonium, in more than 100 Russian
buildings Nunn-Lugar experts have never made security
upgrades to, to make thousands of nuclear weapons.
Some of those buildings are protected by nothing more
than wood doors and padlocks-no fences, surveillance
cameras, traffic barriers or professional security
staff.
Should they fall into terrorist hands, these materials
represent the potential to erase New York or Los
Angeles. We could be using our leverage with President
Putin to tie them down. Instead, we're painting the
Russians into a corner-forcing them to divert
attention and security toward storing weapons we could
instead dismantle. We're doing so even though
carpet-bombing and wilding in Chechnya has created a
mini-Afghanistan-one whose Al Qaeda-friendly
guerrillas are experts at gaming the corrupt side of
Russia.
This is such an obvious national security bungle that
the Bush Administration is finally on the defensive.
Unnamed US diplomats reassure the summit-hungry press
that a secret new $20 billion non-proliferation
program is in the works, to be announced next month at
a G-8 meeting in Canada. Sounds promising - until you
learn the plan is for the US to kick in $10 billion
over ten years, or $1 billion a year, which is less
than the $1.3 billion we spend annually under
Nunn-Lugar. Another caveat: we kick in that $10
billion only if the Europeans and Japanese also ante
up $10 billion each.
The Administration also thinks Europe should come up
with its share by pressuring its private banking
sector to write off Russia's Soviet-era debt. Having
reported many years from Russia, I can assert with
confidence: there is no better way to bring a project
to a screeching halt than to involve it in Russia's
torturous debt negotiations. "Details of the plan have
yet to be worked out," the unnamed diplomats told
Reuters this week. No kidding.
Perhaps the Bush Administration could not have stopped
9/11. But it has all the intelligence it needs to see
that America's highest national security priority is
to keep Russia from becoming a terrorist's Home Depot.
*******
#9
Izvestia
May 22, 2002
Yabloko Party Ready for New Elections
Russian Justice Ministry has registered a reformed Yabloko party.
By Mikhail Vinogradov
(therussianissues.com)
The Russian Justice Ministry will present a registration certificate to the
Yabloko party on Wednesday. The party has undergone a serious structural
reform. A strong power vertical has been built. Yabloko's Leader Grigory
Yavlinsky believes that the party is ready to fight for votes in the upcoming
parliamentary elections.
Sergei Mitrokhin, Yabloko's deputy chief for party development, said that a
six-member presidium will now run the party affairs with maximum efficiency.
Branches in Moscow and St. Petersburg used to form the backbone of Yabloko's
organization. More attention will now be paid to regions. Several regional
party bosses will be appointed to top party posts. Each regional party boss
and organization will implement specific tasks for which they will be
accountable to Yabloko's central bodies. The party apparatus has also
undergone significant changes. Half of its staff has been dismissed.
Mitrokhin told Izvestia that apparatus was already working as an election
headquarters. Yabloko has introduced a new principle of admission of new
members. Each candidate will now have to submit an application.
The period of financial hardships which Yabloko experienced after the
departure of exiled media tycoon Vladimir Gusinskiy is over. Yabloko has
gotten new sponsors. It plans to introduce symbolic membership dues so that
people could feel their association with the party.
Yabloko has managed to establish cooperation with the right-wing forces in
the State Duma. A common position has been worked out on several bills,
though neither Yabloko nor the rightist parties have announced joint
participation in regional elections.
Nevertheless, Yabloko stands a chances to get into the Duma at the next
parliamentary elections. Its popularity ratings, according to the Public
Opinion Foundation and the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research
(VTSIOM), vary between four and six percent. Educated middle-aged voters
don't change their political preferences.
*******
#10
Financial Times (UK)
24 May 2002
Friendship is not enough
Mikhail Khodorkovsky outlines his hopes for the Bush-Putin summit
The writer is chief executive officer of Yukos Oil Company of Russia
The summit starting on Friday between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin is
a unique opportunity to move beyond cautious co-operation to an alliance
based on substance. The cold war suspicions that had been lingering since
the collapse of the Soviet Union were at last buried in the rubble of the
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. The challenge now is to produce
in a tangible and visible way the security and economic benefits that US
and Russian citizens are waiting for.
This is vital, not least because there is still ample room for
misunderstanding and even suspicion between our two countries. As a case in
point, it is worth remembering how in the run-up to this week's meeting the
US and Russia each emphasised different aspects of their relationship,
reflecting their differing expectations for the summit. While US officials
see the summit as an occasion to mark the formal end of the historic
east-west antagonism and focus on traditional issues of strategic stability
and arms control, Russia looks to the future and pushes forward a broad
economic agenda, concentrating on its full integration into the world economy.
In spite of these differences, I sense a fundamental willingness on the
part of the US to engage with Russia. It is in the interests of both
countries for the US to be Russia's ally as it integrates into the world
community and world economic institutions such as the World Trade
Organisation. If such an alliance is established, policy challenges in
critical integrated areas such as energy, the Middle East, Iraq and Iran
grow less intractable. This can and should be the most important result of
the summit.
If the relationship is to bear long-term fruit, the first step needs to
yield results that are interpreted by the Russian public as
incontrovertible progress for their country. Of critical importance is a
continued commitment to work together to fight terrorism. Mr Putin was the
first foreign leader to contact Mr Bush after the September 11 attacks. His
support and that of the Russian people was quick and heartfelt because
Russia has experienced at first hand the life-threatening tactics of a
mutual enemy: dissident Islamic terrorism.
Russia has proved its commitment to supporting the US in the war on
terrorism. America, in turn, is in a position to be of help with the
critical situation with drugs flowing from Central Asia, instability in
Tajikistan and Afghanistan and dissident Islamic terrorism in other parts
of Eurasia.
On the economic front, the Russian government and its business sector have
made significant progress in reforming tax laws, privatising state
enterprises, adopting standards for corporate governance, committing to
transparency in both the private and the public sectors and protecting
shareholder rights. Encouraging foreign investment - and therefore jobs -
in Russia is a vital means of convincing our population of the benefits of
the international business community.
This gain would be negated, however, if Russian business, having seen its
domestic markets opened up, felt blocked by bodies such as the European
Union and the WTO from accessing markets elsewhere. Russia does not expect
or need new credits and it can pay for the technology it needs for
development. But it does need fair access to world markets for its
products, its highly skilled workforce and its resources.
The test case is clearly entrance into the WTO. Russian accession is a
two-way street in the development of open, honest competition both
internally and externally. It is encouraging that China, a country that has
not fully relinquished the command and control systems of communism, has
gained entrance to the WTO. Democratic Russia should now be given the
chance to join.
A further case in point is the energy sector. Russia would like better
access to world energy markets, whereas the US is interested in energy
security through diversification of supply sources. Both countries would
prefer oil price stability. This provides common ground for an alliance
between Russia and the US on both the political and the business front.
Russia's oil reserves are huge, probably three times larger than is
generally assumed in the west. However, the added cost of transport to
distant US markets means that the price of oil must be in the range of $25
a barrel for direct sales to the US to be profitable. To date Russia is
primarily a regional European oil market operator, owing to this
combination of transport costs and available pipeline infrastructure. But
the country wants to go beyond that within the next 10 years. To make its
oil more readily available on world markets, Russia must develop greater
pipeline and deep-water port capacity. There is certainly a role for US
companies and institutions in developing these resources and bringing more
Russian oil on line.
Fortunately, there are options that even in the short term would have an
impact on energy security. Through oil swap arrangements, the US could
encourage European countries to increase oil imports from Russia to replace
some of the Middle East oil, while the offset amount from friendly
suppliers in the Middle East and elsewhere would flow to the US. Such
challenges aside, today the Russian oil sector is in effect acting as a
back-up supply for the world oil market and is committed to performing a
stabilising role in the event of strong price volatility.
If our two presidents could just take the next few steps in cementing a
deep and lasting partnership, the opportunities would be almost limitless.
It is their responsibility to turn today's friendship into a formalised
alliance for tomorrow.
*******
#11
Newsday
May 23, 2002
Bush Must Not Block Putin's Vision for Russia
By James Klurfeld
Back when the first Bush administration was still saying it wasn't all that
sure that Soviet Party Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev was the real thing, British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made it clear that she thought he was.
"I believe we can do business with Mr. Gorbachev," Thatcher said.
President George W. Bush ought to come to a similar conclusion about Russian
President Vladimir Putin when he goes to Russia today. The United States
needs to act as if Putin is a leader who wants not only to work closely with
the West but whose entire policy orientation is to make Russia part of the
West. Until now, Bush has said glowing things about Putin, but his policy has
not reflected that rhetoric.
Is Putin perfect? Is he a liberal democrat in the sense of Britain's Tony
Blair? No, of course not. There is good reason to be critical of Russia's
brutal policies in Chechnya, for instance, although this nation is certainly
more understanding of the realities of fighting terrorism these days. Putin
is propping up some decidedly undemocratic characters in his own backyard, as
in Belarus, in order to increase Russian influence in areas of its former
empire. And Putin's moves to eliminate media opposition inside Russia are
certainly disturbing.
Some conclude that Putin is nothing but a former KGB brute making tactical
concessions to the West because Russia is weak. I'm convinced that is a
fundamentally wrongheaded view. Putin is proving himself to be a reformer
with a vision even more bold than Gorbachev's. As Columbia University's
Robert Legvold points out, Gorbachev started out as a moderate reformer and
only became a radical reformer when he had to deal with the unintended
consequences of his reforms. Putin starts with a radical vision: that
Russia's future lies with the West - as part of the West - and he is not
going to allow anything to get in the way of it.
Dmitri Trenin, a former high-ranking Russian army officer and now deputy
director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, says that Putin's vision is
significantly out front of even elite opinion in Russia. He is willing to
ignore the United States' expansion of NATO right up to Russia's borders,
accept an arms-control treaty far less specific than many of his advisers
believed desirable, and cooperate with the United States even as U.S. forces
spread their influence into what used to be Russia's backyard in central
Asia.
To Putin, these geo-political considerations are passé. What counts is
Russia's ability to integrate itself into the West's economic and political
system. The first priority is the economic link. But Putin is too savvy to
believe that political reform will not ultimately have to follow the
economic.
The last time Bush and Putin met, in November, I believed it was critical
that Bush meet Putin at least halfway or a golden opportunity for a new
relationship between Russia and the West would be lost. It's still the case
that Washington ought to be doing whatever it can to help Putin reorient
Russia toward the West. For instance, as the administration moves ahead with
NATO expansion, it also ought to be working to bring Russia into NATO as
well. To a certain extent that is happening, but the more integrated Russia
becomes, the better.
And economic integration needs to be done more rapidly. For example, it's
ridiculous that Congress could not repeal the Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik
provision, which hampers Russian-U.S. trade before the summit because chicken
farmers in Delaware object to new, open trade provisions. Ultimately, Russia
needs to be brought into the World Trade Organization as it reforms its own
legal system.
But Putin is not going to let any of this get in the way of his vision. He
continues to move ahead even if Bush and Congress drag their feet. He's
obviously doing this not because he is a "good guy" who wants to help the
West. He's doing it because he knows it is good for Russia - indeed,
essential for Russia. Unlike so many of the public officials we see today who
do everything by polls, Putin appears to be that rare individual who is
willing to get out ahead of his constituents because he can see where his
country should be going. It's called leadership.
******
#12
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 2, No. 17, 22 May 2002
KREMLIN & THE WHITE HOUSE
GEORGIA ON THEIR MINDS. Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S.
President George W. Bush will meet in Moscow this week for their
third tete-a-tete in a year. Preceding Bush to that part of the world
was a new group of U.S. military instructors, who arrived in Tbilisi
on 19 May. Upon his arrival at Tbilisi's airport, Lieutenant Colonel
Robert Waltemayer told reporters that there will be more than 150
American military personnel in Georgia at any one time, according to
polit.ru. A first group arrived last month to launch training
programs for Georgian army, border, and security services personnel
(see "RFE/RL Newsline," 30 April 2002). While the subject of the U.S.
military presence in Georgia and Central Asia will likely not be at
the forefront of discussion between the two leaders, the presence of
U.S. troops in what was traditionally considered Russia's sphere of
interests highlights how much has changed in the international
context since the first meeting between Putin and Bush and from U.S.-
Russia summits of previous presidents.
At a pre-summit briefing at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace on 20 May, Stanford Professor Michael McFaul
ventured that this summit may be the last of its kind because all of
the outstanding big issues between the U.S. and Russia have
essentially been resolved. In the future, the main issues in the
U.S.-Russia relationship will be disputes like that over imported
chicken parts and visas. However, his colleagues disagreed. The
Carnegie Endowment's Rose Gottemoeller said that U.S. presidents find
summits too valuable for their high visibility to give them up.
Likewise, Martha Brill Olcott, also of the Carnegie Endowment,
suggested that summits "are one of the payoffs we can give to an
empire in decline."
Implicit in Olcott's and other presentations was the assumption
that the U.S. must offer some concrete "deliverables" or rewards to
Russia for its cooperation in areas of U.S. concern. But before the
question what rewards are merited, the first question that might be
asked is what costs has the U.S. military presence in Russia's
traditional sphere of influence imposed. "RFE/RL Russian Political
Weekly" asked a number of experts to enumerate the domestic political
consequences for the Putin administration of the U.S. military
presence in Central Asia and Georgia. (Julie A. Corwin)
Pavel Baev, International Peace Research Institute (Oslo):
What is observable in Moscow is some curiosity, a little irritation
and grumbling -- but these could hardly qualify as "impacts." The
issue of the U.S. military presence near Russia's borders will
certainly be raised at the Bush-Putin summit, but it will probably be
reduced to a footnote to the broader strategic discussions.
Afterwards, the Kremlin will only fine-tune its "this-is-not-a-
tragedy" rhetoric -- essentially because it cannot find an answer to
the larger question: What does it want to make out of the U.S.
military presence?
The easiest thing would be to create a loud scandal, along the
lines of the earlier hysterics over NATO enlargement. This would
accompany nicely China's bitter criticism of the U.S.'s
"imperialistic penetration" and would be applauded by Iran and,
maybe, India as well. The motley crowd of 'patriotic Eurasianists' in
Moscow would love to partake in such a show, but it would serve no
practical purpose. And, therefore, it would be wrong to expect it.
The second easiest thing to do would be to make real trouble
for the United States. Multiple small-scale deployments are
stretching the U.S. military dangerously thin. The recent film,
"Black Hawk Down," about a failed U.S. military mission in Somalia --
leaving aside its patriotic drumbeating -- is a timely reminder of
how wrong things can go really fast. Russia's special services have
enough "assets" in Georgia and Tajikistan to guide a few terrorist
attacks at the exposed "enemy" -- and many in Moscow would gloat over
U.S. casualties. If, however, Russia's "competent organs" would pause
to make a basic risk assessment of the U.S.'s likely unrestrained and
disproportional response, they would shelve this option forever.
A more difficult option would be to establish practical
cooperation with the U.S. aimed at stabilizing the turbulent area
along Russia's southern borders. That would require overcoming all of
Russia's paranoid geopolitical fears of "encirclement" and U.S.
domination of the oil-rich Caspian area. Indeed, how could the U.S.
ever be able to dominate Kazakhstan, if it has so embarrassingly
failed to get rid of President [Hugo] Chavez in Venezuela? Russia has
a pretty decent record of cooperation with NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo,
there is no good reason why such cooperation would be less possible
in the Ferghana Valley or Pankisi Gorge. Putin is measuring carefully
every step in this direction. This is smart tactics but poor
strategy.
Russia's interests in stabilizing Central Asia and the Caucasus
go much deeper than the U.S. interests related to the war against
terrorism and oil. Washington, at least for now, is quite satisfied
with securing support from the ruling regimes and accepts their
consolidation as sufficient stabilization. Moscow should know better.
It should recognize that [Georgian President Eduard] Shevardnadze is
much more of a problem for Georgia's stability than a solution. But
Moscow fails to formulate an engagement strategy for this region --
not only due to a lack of "big thinking." This failure is also part
of Putin's larger dilemma: how to combine the rapprochement with the
West with strengthening his "executive vertical?" The goals of moving
towards Europe and building an Oriental despotic state are
fundamentally incompatible, and Putin cannot avoid a choice for very
long.
Celeste Wallander, Center for Strategic and International
Studies (Washington, D.C.): I have two points. The first one is
that Putin hasn't suffered dramatically in that it looks like the
U.S. has done something that is counter to Russia's interests. There
is a plausible argument that the U.S. presence in Central Asia and
the decision to train Georgian soldiers to deal with problems in
Pankisi [Gorge] is in Russia's security interests. That is what the
Russian government has been arguing for for some time. I don't think
[the U.S. military presence] is a negative [for Putin] right now. But
I don't think it is a big positive either. He can't really claim to
be in partnership with the United States on this. He can't claim that
this was part of his security strategy. But I don't think there's any
particular damage at this point.
The second point I would make is that there now has to be more
attention within Russian military and security circles to what the
United States is doing in Central Asia and Georgia. There are some
elements in the military -- the loudest elements of which are those
who are retired but I think the retired folks are speaking for some
people who are still in active service and are not free to express
their opinions -- as well as some conservative members of the State
Duma, who argue for a more assertive definition of the Russian
national interest, who are saying we are not in partnership with the
United States. The United States may have another agenda. The U.S. is
squeezing us out. Because of those voices, I wonder if there isn't a
kind of reinforcement of the Russian intelligence presence and
attention to these regions as a way of assessing what the United
States in the region is doing in the region and who we are talking
to. It might have the effect of not reinforcing certain skeptics of
the military and security services. After all, Putin needs to
demonstrate that he is willing to keep an eye on what the United
States is up to in these regions.
Martha Brill Olcott, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace (Washington, D.C.): It is very difficult to say what the
domestic costs have been for Putin because his popularity is still so
high. I think that the people [in Russia] who are most concerned
[about the U.S. military presence] are probably the ones who would be
the least supportive of him to begin with. They probably come from
that 30 percent [that doesn't support him.] The disenchanted
intellectuals have really been disenchanted with him all along. They
voted for him in the second round because there was no one else to
vote for. But they basically don't approve of him. I'm thinking of
people like [Russia Foreign Policy Association Vice President Sergei]
Kortunov and [Politika Foundation head Vyacheslav] Nikonov. Putin
kind of offends the basic intellectual because of his background and
because he doesn't need them. He is a security person made good. That
is not someone who will appeal to intellectuals at all.
Putin is making a series of tactical moves [in Central Asia],
but there is no overall strategy that Putin could pursue. That is the
vacuousness of both the left and liberal [intellectuals'] critique --
there is no strategy that Russia could realistically pursue. Putin
talks a lot about the continued vitality of Russian policy in the
Central Asia region, but signs of this are really more virtual than
real. Russia doesn't have any choice but to cooperate with the U.S.
in Central Asia. Russia was really being pushed out of Central Asia
before the U.S. arrived. Russia doesn't have the tools to give the
Central Asians what they need. In a sense, this was a fait accompli
of what was already a trend. Russia had already rolled up the carpet.
And with the arrival of the U.S. military, Putin was able to get
chips for what Russia had already lost. I think the issue of how long
the U.S. will remain in Central Asia will be explicitly raised at the
summit. And the Russians will get the same answers that they got
before: "We don't plan to stay indefinitely, but we have created the
structures to stay indefinitely."
But the situation in the Caucasus is really different. There,
you could argue that Russia stayed and fought. It's hard to talk
about these two things in the same breath. The Central Asian case is
different than the Georgian. The U.S. presence in Georgia is a
lightning rod for other kinds of emotions, because of the history [of
the region] and war in Chechnya. Georgia was part of the empire
longer than Central Asia and is much more closely integrated.
Margot Light, London School of Economics: Although reportedly
there was strong military opposition to President Putin's decision to
ally himself with the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, it has
had little domestic political impact. He claimed that the Central
Asian presidents had sought Russian support before offering the use
of their airfields to launch the attack on Afghanistan. In fact, the
evidence suggests that he merely acquiesced to a decision he could
not prevent, but the Russian public chose to believe his version of
events. A number of politicians have warned intermittently of the
danger to Russian interests of a permanent U.S. presence in Central
Asia, but their apprehension has not aroused public alarm. Nor is
there much public awareness of the fact that an earlier attempt by
President Putin to create an antiterrorist coalition in Central Asia
remained a paper exercise, while President Bush got instant
cooperation after 11 September.
It seemed inconceivable that the U.S. offer to send military
advisors to Georgia to equip and train local battalions for security
operations in the Pankisi Gorge would similarly evoke little Russian
protest. But again, there were early muted objections, for example,
by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, but no public protest. Even the Duma
resolution on the subject simply warned that the U.S. presence might
"complicate the already difficult situation in the region." The mild
language stands in stark contrast to earlier Duma foreign policy
resolutions on issues in which the Duma objected to Western policy.
The absence of a strong response should not be interpreted to
mean that the Russian government and public approve of the U.S.
presence -- here as in other aspects of foreign policy, President
Putin has simply learnt that when he cannot prevent an action
occurring, empty bluster shows up Russia's weakness and detracts from
its international stature. For the moment, he has public support for,
and Duma acquiescence to, his foreign policy. The danger will come
when and if he loses support more generally -- when the fact that he
presided over Russia's loss of influence in Central Asia and the
Caucasus will be added to the grievances against him.
*******
#13
From: L.Dobrokhotov [dobrokhotov1947@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002
Subject: Russian Communist Party Statement on Bush's visit
Dear David,
I just got the English translation of Zyuganov's Statement on President
Bush visit that just started in Moscow, and would be like to share it with
JRL readers. The best, Leonid.
May 16, 2002
About a new stage of national treachery
Statement of Gennady Zyuganov
Chairman of the National Patriotic Union of Russia,
Chairman of the Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Russian Federation
The Kremlin is preparing a large-scale national treachery. The president of
the Russian Federation Mr.Putin during the US president Mr.Bush's visit to
Russia is going to sign a treaty on reduction of strategic nuclear
potentials to 1700 - 2200 warheads. In fact Mr.Putin is going to destroy
strategic forces created by two generations of our compatriots.
Nearly one third of the USSR national income was annually invested into
their creation. The people sacrificed consciously as they were sure of the
need to guarantee the country's safety. The people wanted to be sure that
June, 1941 would never repeat. However Mr.Putin is moving now towards
liquidation of the foundation of Russian defense capability.
The reduction of the Army to 850 thousand men is being prepared. It was its
number at the beginning of last century, when our country was defeated by
Japan. The army has not received new armaments for 10 years. The fleet is
being destroyed. The pride by ours space research - the orbital station
"Mir" - was drowned. In Baikonur the largest testing complex for space
engineering in the world was destroyed. Today military pilots have no fuel
for training, and the Navy - for naval exercises. For the first time in the
history of Russia the officers' privileges earned for protecting Motherland
with their lives, have been taken away.
The allies of Russia were sold out. Russian bases in Vietnam and Cuba vital
for our country's security were closed. American soldiers appeared in
Central Asia and in Georgia. Tomorrow US aircraft will land at the
airfields of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia speedily admitted into NATO. The
strategic encirclement of Russia is being completed with full consent of
Mr.Putin and his team.
The show with negotiations and treaties cannot deceive anybody. 1,500
warheads, which Russia will be allowed to have is exactly the number that
the US Anti-Ballistic Missile system will be able to intercept. The Kremlin
is making sure that this system reliably protects America from retaliatory
strike.
Promised reductions of the US nuclear forces is a large-scale deceit. The
USA will only move warheads from missiles to warehouses, whence it will be
possible quickly to return them back. At the same time Putin and his team
will actively destroy our nuclear potential under pretext of fulfilling
Russia's international obligations.
The liquidation of our strategic forces is a part of the program of
Russia's destruction and enslavement. The aims, which Hitler failed to
achieve by means of war, are now being achieve by other means. What is the
need to occupy territories, if under the minister Gref's draft law tomorrow
foreigners will be able to buy up all Russian lands? What is the need to
hit launching sites of our missiles, if they will be destroyed under the
instruction from the Kremlin while the program of production of new
"Topol-M" missile is being financially strangled by minister Klebanov?
What is the need to occupy power stations, if Mr.Chubais can disconnect
from electricity maternity houses, hospitals, schools and even strategic
installations by turning a switch? What is the need to create colonial
administration, if Prime Minister Kasyanov ensures advance payment of debts
to his patrons and holds hungry the entire country, while the head of
Presidential Administration Voloshin and his deputy Surkov have transformed
parliament into a rubber seal, which stamps the most antinational laws? Why
should US government "Freedom" radio station show a lot of zeal if
Mr.Svanidze through State TV injects the poison of Anti-Russian hatred into
each apartment?
The feeling becomes stronger that Mr.Putin has lost control even over his
own government and now is floating in the direction pointed out by the
oligarchs.
The treaty which will lead to destruction of Russia's nuclear potential was
approved in Reykjavik. Open treachery by Gorbachev of the Soviet Union's
interests began there. The Gorbachev - Yeltsin criminal tradition of making
vital decisions secretly from the people is inherited by the Kremlin's
present masters. There is no need to sign the treaty on strategic arms.
What we are facing is a clear repetition of Gorbachev's desire to please
Western "friends - masters", despite hard consequences for Russia, and for
safety of the world. And Mr.Ivanov - the head of Russia's Foreign Ministry
is obviously dreaming of laurels of Shevardnadze who destroyed the USSR.
We support demands put forward millions of people at the meetings on May 1
and May 9 on resignation of present antinational government and creation of
a government of national interests.
The National Patriotic Union of Russia and the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation strongly condemn plans of new large-scale treachery of
Russia's national interests and demand to call off signing of the treaty
contradicting those interests. In accordance with the Law on ratification
of START-2 Treaty we insist that the President of Russian Federation
immediately calls consultations with the Federal Assembly of Russian
Federation on the issues of strategic security.
These issues concern destiny of Russia and destiny of each citizen, each
Russian family.
********
#14
Wall Street Journal
May 23, 2002
Editorial
The Moscow Summit
When a U.S. President leaves behind throngs of anti-American demonstrators in
Berlin for a red-carpet reception in St. Petersburg and Moscow, you know it's
a new ballgame.
The German demonstrators were echoing their government's warnings about the
destabilizing impact of a second Gulf War. Of course, Russia has even bigger
doubts about deposing Saddam Hussein; and, unlike the generally pro-American
Germans, more than half of Russians still think of America as an enemy. But
expect to hear little of this during the Bush-Putin summit.
The three-day meeting will be big on symbolism and ceremony, both of which
are especially important for Mr. Putin's efforts to show Russian voters that
Russia is moving up in the world. The two presidents will conclude a treaty
to reduce their nuclear arsenals, emphasize the new NATO-Russia agreement and
perhaps conclude an agreement on strategic priorities.
Nobody would dispute that the Cold War has ended, but does this amount to a
dramatically new relationship? Not yet, which is why this summit is worth
watching closely. All of the above are small gifts in fancy wrapping, signs
of an improving mutual trust, but not real professions of lasting friendship.
Chumminess in diplomacy has its uses of course. Eyes rolled when President
Bush remarked, upon first meeting his Russian counterpart in Ljubliana, that
he looked into Mr. Putin's eyes and saw his soul. President Bush likes to
recall that Mr. Putin was the first to call him on September 11, volunteering
aid. Russia didn't seriously protest when the U.S. pulled out of the defunct
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It waved hello when American forces
deployed to former Soviet republics that Russia still considers its sphere of
influence. We're inclined to say that President Putin was smart enough to
pursue Russia's own best interests, but who's to say that personal chemistry
-- real or forced -- hasn't yielded diplomatic benefits?
But if the test of a true partnership is whether thorny issues can be
addressed, then the Bush-Putin summit ought to be judged on how often the
words Iran, Iraq, Chechnya, rule of law, press freedom, corruption and free
trade are uttered.
President Bush ought to kick off with a serious discussion of proliferation.
Last October Russia and Iran signed a multi-year arms export agreement worth
$438 million annually, which makes Iran the third largest recipient of
Russian weapons after India and China. Russia is also helping to build two
nuclear reactors at Bushehr, which intelligence analysts believe can
eventually be used for Iran's nuclear weapons program. The Bush
administration said little at the time, but a CIA report questioning Russia's
ability and willingness to stem sales of dangerous military technologies was
furiously criticized in Moscow. The real test of Vladimir Putin's support for
the war on terror is not a September 11 phone call, but his cooperation in
ridding the world of dangers posed by the "axis of evil."
As for Iraq, Russian concerns mostly boil down to the desire to claim some
$11 billion of Iraqi debt owed Russia from the Soviet era and see through $44
billion in oil deals with Russian companies. Russia also fears that a breakup
of Iraq might cause instability on Russia's borders. Assurances that it would
not lose financially from a campaign to depose Saddam Hussein and that it
would have a voice in determining the post-Saddam political landscape would
probably go a long way toward reassuring Mr. Putin. Supporting Russian hopes
of joining the World Trade Organization would be another way of encouraging
Moscow to recognize that Russia's new friends have much more to offer than
the old Soviet ones.
Some in Washington argue that Russia is too weak now to matter greatly to
American or Western interests. But Russia is a Eurasian power of 144 million
people with nuclear weapons and a tenth of the world's oil production.
Writing it off would be folly.
America's short-term interests in Russia are fairly prosaic. They come down
to two main imperatives: stemming the proliferation of weapons and
encouraging Russia to become a stable energy source. But these goals depend
on promoting Russian democracy over the long term. For all Russia's laudable
economic growth, its progress toward economic reform and the pragmatic
cooperation of Mr. Putin since September 11, there is much to remind us that
democracy and stability in Russia are far from assured.
There is expanding state control over national television and the harassment
of newspapers and journalists critical of the Kremlin. There is the lagging
state of corporate governance and a judiciary which, despite some reform,
remains politicized. There is the horrific record of Russian forces in
Chechnya, where indiscriminate killings, torture and kidnappings are daily
occurrences. There is the rapidly expanding power in every level of
government and commercial life of the Federal Security Services, the
successor organization to the KGB, where Mr. Putin spent his entire career.
And there is the continued hegemony of an oligarchy of the rich and powerful
able to sequester and control resources without any real accountability.
Banishing these blights is a job only the Russians themselves can accomplish.
Still, as Mr. Putin has made clear, Russia cares deeply how it is perceived
in the world. Indeed, America's greatest advantage in pressing liberalizing
changes in Russia remains its moral authority, which the Bush administration
should guard more jealously than it has with recent protectionist and farm
subsidy legislation.
American presidents have often misjudged Russia . The best measure of
Russia's value as an ally isn't fancy treaties or mutual admiration; but
whether Russia will display a firmer commitment to the values that America
and its allies cherish. We hope for some clues to that at this Moscow summit.
*******
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