May 23, 2002:    #6264    #6265    #6266

[Third Issue of the Day]

JRL #6266

Plain Text - Entire Issue

Center for Defense Information
www.cdi.org
PRESS CONFERENCE WITH NIKOLAI ZLOBIN AND IVAN SAFRANCHUK, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION OFFICIALS, ON USA-RF SUMMIT
[PRESS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, MAY 22, 2002]
Moscow
Transcript by Federal News Service

Moderator: Good afternoon dear colleagues. I am glad to welcome you at this Press Development Institute. The subject of our press conference today is the visit by US President George Bush to Russia -- a chance to build new relations between Russia and the United States. Our guest today is Nikolai Zlobin, director of Russian and Asian programs of the US Center for Defense Information in Washington. Zlobin is one of the leading US experts on US foreign policy and Russian-US relations and he directly participates in drafting different aspects of US policy vis-a-vis Russia and the former Soviet Union states. We also have Ivan Alexeyevich Safranchuk, director of the Russian office of the Center for Defense Information, a recognized authority on issues of US-Russian relations in the area of defense, security and arms control. Who will start? Nikolai, please.

Zlobin: Thank you.

Moderator: Is he to be referred to as Nikolai or Nikolai Vasilyevich? You have the floor.

Zlobin: Usually they tell me I have very good Russian.

Moderator: Yes, this is so.

Zlobin: Good. I will begin by characterizing how the US foreign policy strategy is drafted as a whole and how the visit inscribes in this strategy, and I will go over, very briefly, over the basic points of the greatest interest. And then Ivan Alexeyevich will talk more specifically about the treaty on cuts and the possible military cooperation between our two countries.

I must say that America today is trying to put together and formulate its new foreign policy values and it turns out to be not quite simple. You would remember that in 1992 during the presidential election when Cliton won and became President, the issue was economics. If elections were held in American today, the issue would be foreign policy. This is a big change for the United States -- namely that foreign policy enjoys such attention and limelight domestically. This happens extremely rarely.

That is why the interest in foreign policy has changed. Politicians are spending more time to analyze these problems. It is a serious test for President Bush.

Following the collapse of the USSR, America for a long time tried to formulate its foreign policy priorities -- what it understood to be its national interests and somehow nothing was coming out of it. This was sort of blurred. I think that following September 11 last year it became easier for President Bush's foreign policy team to formulate those priorities, to formulate what they understood to be national interests.

I will formulate five basic areas of the US foreign policy doctrine which will probably be drafted by mid-June or by summer this year. It is now being actively drafted and so one can already identify certain basic elements.

Firstly, the chief national interest of the United States today is the struggle with international terrorism in any form and in any quality.

The second area is the struggle and prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and preventing the weapons from getting into the hands of the so-called irresponsible states.

Thirdly and very importantly, the rapidly growing foreign policy thrust of the United States today is creating a stable and predictable energy carrier market in the world.

The fourth area -- and I will refer to it a little later -- is what the Bush team today describes as establishing a zone of peace in the world.

The fifth -- which is not very defined area today -- is the peaceful solution to possible problems arising with China. These are the five areas that will probably be incorporated in the new doctrine. Very many issues arise in this connection. I will simply quickly refer to some of them to show you how the US foreign policy elite is trying, so to say, to understand and become aware of these questions. It is not simply because for the foreign policy elite, the political elite of the United States, the current situation is on the whole quite unexpected. The so-called school for realism, which for a long time molded the US foreign policy priorities, has always proceeded from the assumption that if there is one super power, then another super power is bound to come on the scene or the rest of the countries will try to grow to the size of a super power and challenge -- in this case -- the United States in order to try to find a balance. So, it is a group of countries or one country.

Up until recently the Americans proceeded from what they have to expect, from the assumption that a group of countries or one country will try to balance off the colossal might today concentrated in the United States -- something like it was in the years of the Cold War. Today they are having to rethink all this. It is considered that in the near, foreseeable, historical future no single country in the world, no single region of the world and not a single group of countries will be able to challenge the US and put itself roughly on the same level of ability to exert a military, economic and political influence. The result is that instead of the balance, the concept of balance that existed throughout the second half of the 20th century, Americans today believe there is a tendency to ally with the United States: countries, one after another, on different conditions enter into a bloc with the United States, and this, overall, is the basic trend of international development and what is happening to Russia today, among others, fits in quite well with this trend.

Incidentally, if we take a look at these five areas of the foreign policy doctrine which I have now presented to you, they generally coincide roughly with how President Putin's administration is formulating the tasks of Russia's foreign policy, for there are very many coincidences in the sense. The situation is reminiscent of the one in the wake of the Second World War. Condoleezza Rice likes to compare these present years with 1945 and 1947, when the old system of international relations, institutions, ideas and concepts collapsed and there is the time and the need to formulate new relations, a new system and new institutions.

In these conditions each country in the world is trying to extract as much advantage as possible from what is now being created, and America of course in the first place. One must frankly admit that there is no big secret in this: the foreign policy of any country must be very egoistic, based on a its internal requirements. Not every country can permit itself this. Generally, today probably no one can permit oneself this, except the United States. States. That is why, so to say, they, the Bush Administration today are trying to extract maximum advantage from the current situation, with account for the strategic perspective, so that what exists today in international relations and within the international institutions would work for the United States and for the concept of foreign policy and of US National interests as they see them -- in the general strategic sense.

Of course, nobody expected that the Bush Administration would face this problem of formulating all this. Nobody expected that George Bush would have to shoulder this responsibility of reviewing in practical terms, so to say, the results of the Cold War in a serious way. Be that as it may, today they are having to rethink this in a very big way. You would remember that they went to elections and they won them generally over quite different issues and priorities and with a different balance of domestic and foreign priorities. That is why for them today this problem is very acute for them and ideologically and intellectually they are in many ways not prepared for this. I do not wish to say that they do not have the ability but until recently there were no such plans to rethink the philosophy of international relations.

But as a matter of fact, the main question is that of the fundamental principle of international relations. While in the concept of the 1940s, in post-war concepts, if you remember, that principle was formulated as containment in relations between the two blocs, the Eastern and the Western ones, on a mutual basis, and the US did that explicitly ... Everyone practiced containment. International relations were built on that, weapons were stockpiled for that purpose, and agreements were based on containment, mutual containment.

Today containment does not figure in the foreign policy doctrine, and some replacement has to be found. The US political elite today increasingly tends to agree that the word "containment" should be replaced with "involvement," "integration," engagement of other countries in the sphere of US national interests and foreign policy priorities. It is not forcible engagement, of course, but the projection of these priorities on to the largest possible number of countries. Here I am coming back to what I began with, this creation of a freedom zone, as US documents suggest today. Sometimes it is referred to as a freedom and democracy zone.

This is not the old notion of confrontation between West and East, the patterns are occasionally quite unexpected, with freedom zones emerging where there has never been any Western influence. But those countries which embrace the concept and foreign policy doctrine and subscribe to the terms formulated by Washington are included in that freedom zone. Their relationship with the US changes, and I think that this is what is happening to Russia today.

Hence questions regarding the need to rethink the concept of allies and alliances. Hence the question regarding the need to rethink the problems of challenges and threats in the world and reactions to them, and Ivan Alexeyevich and I are going to discuss that. Hence a new understanding of the problem of international security and, accordingly, the new military doctrine of the United States.

The military potential of the United States is awesome, it is absolutely incomprehensible. It is the world's only country capable of maintaining 100,000 troop contingents in Europe and the Far East and currently 50,000 groupings in Asia and the Middle East, and this is far from the limit. The Pentagon believes that militarily the US has no military match and is not likely to meet one in the foreseeable future. That is why the very concept of the military doctrine is being revised. At one time military experts on both sides, Soviet and US military experts, counted the number of warheads, targets, and needs for specific warheads and troops to hurt the main adversary. There is no such adversary today.

That is why this approach, this utilitarian accounting is not working today. As a result, the very nature of military confrontation is changing. The Americans today base their military doctrine on the need to vanquish any possible adversary, whereas the concept of possible adversary, as you understand, has no limits. So, since threats are limitless, not quite visible and hard to count, they get the idea that the best possible defenses should be built, that it is better to be overprotected than underprotected because the identity, size and scope of the possible adversary is not quite clear.

The doctrine will by all means include the concept of the so-called asymmetric response, implying that countries, groups, terrorist groupings or any other hostile organizations unable to compete with the US in conventional arms may try to use nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons -- any weapons of mass destruction -- to try to neutralize the colossal superiority of the United States. Defenses have to be mounted against that.

Washington believes that someone could respond asymmetrically and this is the beginning of the logic of this national anti-missile defense system. If you remember, 1972 Treaty banned the development of any defense systems. Now, the Americans believe, regardless of our potential, we need these defenses because there is no adversary that could be predicted and calculated for decades ahead. So, these defenses have to be built.

Another important aspect of this revision would be related to the fact that more and more emphasis would be placed on high-precision weapons and offensive weapons, including the anti-missile defenses. This triad is to replace the traditional nuclear triad, and nuclear weapons will get far less attention in this sense.

The last thing I would like to mention before going on to the subject matter of our meeting, the summit, concerns the important thing we need to know about America's current approach to the analysis of the international situation and the international relations -- this approach will probably include the so-called limited sovereignty concept. This concept implies that all countries are sovereign and all governments are lawful with the exception of three factors: they must not kill their own people within the country, they must not help proliferate nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and they must not help terrorists in any manner. If these three conditions are not honored, in the view of US strategists, the governments of such countries may lose sovereignty on their own territory. The international community has a duty to intervene in order to avert greater losses resulting from non-intervention. This is the limited sovereignty concept, partially represented in the US approach to Iraq, for example, and some other countries.

So, this ideological basis is most probably behind these attempts to formulate the ideas of national security and national interests that are being discussed in Washington, and these questions need to be resolved without delay in order to formulate military, foreign policy and political strategies.

In this context President Bush's visit to Russia, I think should be analyzed as a logical event. If we analyze the situation within the United States and the US Administration's foreign policy priorities, there was no binding need to travel to Russia, and the Administration, I think, would be happy to delay that visit, especially since all those treaties, as we know, had to be drafted in a hurry.

That unbelievable crisis in the Middle East broke out two months ago, and the US President is spending a lot of time daily to address this problem. The war against terrorism is going ahead at full speed, problems with Iraq need to be addressed, and various concepts regarding that are under discussion, which I will outline later. But he nevertheless sets aside three days to visit Russia. I think that three days in these circumstances mean a sign of great respect for Russia. He spends less for the whole of Europe. Just one day in Germany.

Three days for Russia means a great respect for it, a sign of great respect for President Putin and a desire to support Putin in the foreign policy turn which he accomplished and, perhaps, to give some substance to that turn.

The Americans think that -- well, not just the Americans, but many people in Russia think that that turn largely reflected the position of the Russian President himself. Generally speaking, the presidents of the two countries have managed, whatever one's political attitude to them may be, raise the relations between the two countries to a fundamentally new level. It should be said that the elites of the two countries have badly fallen behind in this sense. Especially the Russian political elite, although the US political elite is also generally behind the two presidents. And in this context there is a gap between desires and the possibilities that the presidents are creating and bringing to the summit level, the concrete possibilities that could be supported by the elite, experts and intellectual capabilities of the two societies, so to speak.

In this sense the agenda is disappointing, of course, because it focuses on missiles. At present the approach to these issues is being reexamined, of course. The two presidents and their teams have been saying more and more that, of course, missiles will be discussed and the treaty will be signed, but more attention will be paid to economic matters, and so on. But initially, if you remember, the agenda consisted primarily in the need to conclude this treaty, and it was the Russian agenda.

The Americans have long said that they would cut their missiles anyway, regardless of any treaty. So, it was the Russian agenda. I think that the fact that President Bush has agreed to visit Russia and sign that treaty is further evidence of America's desire to meet Russia more than half way in these questions.

It is their desire to remove mistrust and allay Russia's concerns. In these circumstances one can ask: what is going to replace military issues and what constitutes the basis of our relations?

In years long past the situation was clear: we were members of different alliances and targeted our missiles on each other. The concept of our relations today is not quite understandable. Is it the economy? Perhaps, and I will discuss that later, but we should be realists: so far Russia does not exist as a serious economic partner for America. So, there are no missiles, and there are no economic interests so far. Accordingly, the US Administration says more and more often that they would like to build relations with Russia on the same lines as the relations they have with Eastern -- excuse me, with Western Europe. This means that it should be a sort of Euro-Atlantic partnership, but partnership with Russia that would be based not on treaties or on missile counts, but on a single system of values, a common understanding of foreign and domestic policy priorities, a common understanding of the world situation and common assessments of international processes. Then, so to speak, a basis will be laid for our being allies and partners not against something like terrorism or extremism, but in favor of a system of values shared by our states, governments and countries. This is the concept that the Americans are suggesting in the long term.

What then is expected from Russia, and how can Russia position itself in these circumstances? There is a colossal asymmetry between Russia and the US from the economic, political, military and social points of view. And it is very important to understand that there is an asymmetry between the two countries' needs for each other. The US needs Russia far less today than Russia needs the US in very many respects.

In this context, I think, Washington would like to see some proof of ways in which the US may need Russia, to understand what Russia could offer and what it wants. In this sense there was a rather long period of the Russian Foreign Ministry's inactivity. They took a long time to formulate -- and they have not yet done it comprehensively, I think -- the reasons for which Russia is following this course and the goals which it could set forth officially as a doctrine through consensus in society and within the elite, complete with objectives, programs, tasks, stages and so on -- there are no such things.

I will only suggest one option that is worth consideration. There is no parity, and there will never be world parity between Russia and the United States. The US will never have parity with anyone. One more point is that today the US does not need Russia tactically to address current problems. All these problems are being addressed and can be resolved without Russia. But if we turn to strategy and strategic relations, there are many issues in connection with which Russia may turn out to be necessary and even essential to the United States, an essential strategic ally.

That is why many members of the US political elite believe that Russia should be engaged even without any practical benefit for the US at this moment, that Russia should be an ally and get involved -- you remember that engagement concept -- so as to be able to address new challenges together with Russia. These problems, generally, are related to those areas in which Russia has political and economic influence, areas in which, as the Americans believe, Russia could tackle problems better than the Americans themselves. These include primarily Eurasia in the broadest sense of the word, the Caucasus, Central Asia and central aspects of relations with China, and also problems of security and economic stability in the Caspian region, and generally security problems in Eurasia.

The Americans energetically support stronger relations between Russia and NATO. Generally, in St. Petersburg President Bush plans to make a tough-worded statement to the effect that the Europeans should talk less but do more to involve Russia in European structure and integrate it into Europe. But it is not to the Americans' benefit if Russia slackens its attention to Asia. Indeed, if Russia shares the foreign policy values suggested by Washington today or if these values are agreed with Moscow, it will be a very good party in addressing problems that may arise in Central Asia.

What I mean is that there is no parity on the world scene, but regional parity is quite possible, for example, in Central Asia, in Afghanistan, in the Caucasus, in the Far East, and so on. We may even get a situation in which Russia would be the leading and principal partner, the driving force, whereas the US may act as a junior partner in some circumstances.

While on the world scene today Russia is a junior partner to the US -- and President Putin has admitted that, openly or tacitly -- in some regional circumstances Russia is quite likely to act as the principal partner and the United States as a junior one.

So, if Russia succeeds in helping stabilize the situation and increasing security in Eurasia, where it has considerable influence, if it helps bring these countries together and agree their interests... indeed, the concept is simple. From the point of view of the economy, the US and Europe are two economic giants, especially in conditions when Japan is going far below and probably in the near future, as is thought in America, will not come back for it is very rapidly losing its economic and political influence. The two economic giants are Europe and the United States.

Europe, the sooner it starts talking a single language, the better and as a result, instead of the J-7 summit there will be the J-8 or essentially a J-2 summit meaning the United States and Europe will be solving economic problems. And it would not be bad if someone at that summit represented Eurasia. I think that the desire for this will appear in many countries so that the summit be held within the J-3 framework -- Europe, Eurasia and the United States. In this case Russia has a good chance to try it. Although China and other countries may attempt to fill that position. That is why here we again have a clean slate. In general, Russia, I believe, has a very good basis for presenting itself as a reliable, serious, predictable partner in that region with all the ties that have to be created, as Americans believe, in Europe.

And if Russia does this, the Americans will probably use Russia with pleasure as an ally vis-a-vis the problems that arise in that region.

One has to understand a couple of things. The United States and President Bush, unlike Clinton, has deliberately and to a greater extent given up this desire to create some conditions -- domestic policy conditions for cooperation. The US has no levers to influence Russia's domestic situation and the US today has no great desire to create such levers. The US sees no such need.

That is why if something will be happening politically inside Russia, inside the Eurasian region -- not necessarily within the framework of the former USSR, and Eurasia may, so to say, assume a new geopolitical configuration -- the responsibility will generally rest with the Russian political elite to preserve the democratic line of the nation's development.

You know, in the long-term perspective, one can be a partner with the United States only if the country remains democratic. All friends and partners of the US are democratic countries. As is known, all US enemies are dictatorial regimes. It is a fact of life, as Americans say, and one cannot take issue with this.

So, the development of events in Russia itself will be a factor on which the long-term relations with the United States will depend -- and we can be partners. In the se during the years of the Second World War, the US and Russia were excellent partners, they cooperated very closely -- their intelligence services and the armies closely cooperated. But as soon as the enemy disappeared, as soon as the situation changed, the countries very abruptly parted company and threatened each other with nuclear missiles for fifty years. It is because there was no common system of values, no foundations for those relations except military confrontation. These are the foundations of these relations on the Russian side, namely, the extent to which that country will be democratic and free.

On this, the US President faces a very complex situation -- something that is referred to as Catch-22. It is because, on the one hand, America is interested in seeing Russia as a democratic country. On the other hand, it is important for the US that President Putin continue a clear-cut, consistent and predictable foreign policy oriented to the West.

And here they get into a situation when they have, on the one hand, to say that they are concerned with Chechnya, freedom of the press, human rights a number of outstanding economic problems of Russia, and on the other they have to say things publicly because the US political elite is following -- it is not simply a private conversation, things must be said publicly.

But the tonality, the tone must be found for saying things so as not to weaken Putin's positions inside the country because if he is weakened then who knows? Maybe his foreign policy lines will begin to change. But on the other hand, neither can he be fully supported because this would mean ignoring problems, Russia's domestic problems, and the United States is known to have its own opinion on this score and the US must express its opinion.

That is why one gets the following situation. How can one find the golden mean in order to criticize Putin but without weakening him; how to support him but not to creating in him the impression that he has full freedom of action inside the country, you see. It is because the Europeans, the Americans know Russian history well. And those who know Russian history, do not need -- maybe this is not a happy analogy -- Peter the First who opened all windows to Europe and then came back to hang the "streltsy" (the conservative military guards--FNS). You see what I mean.

And amid the limited sovereignty this will not be agreed. That is why they are interested, very much interested in the domestic development of the situation in Russia. I will not now refer to individual issues because I see how fast time is running out -- covering Iraq, Iran and China. I think that if there are questions I will simply speak up on each. I would like to enable Ivan to say not less than I did.

Making such a conclusion, I can say that overall the visit will be successful. It is obvious, so to say, that the officials on both sides will do everything to make the visit successful so that the US President would leave Russia in a good mood and with good memories of the country -- this will have a long-term effect. He hopes that Russia will understand and the Russian political elite will understand that, allied with the US, Russia will be stronger than in a situation when it comes out against the United States.

In general, no single country in the world became stronger by opposing the United States. Not a single world leader became known in the world or a world authority by opposing the United States. And let us say it frankly that President Putin became one of the key leaders of the world precisely because he was associated with Bush and the direction toward the West. Actually there is not a single obstacle to the establishment of friendly relations between Russia and the USA, based on a single system of values. Today there is none. Russia needs international stability and the United States needs international stability. That is why I would take a slightly philosophical attitude to the summit. All these treaties will be signed and this amounts to saying that this can be perceived as success. But the main success or non-success of the summit we will probably take some time to see. It is because the main success or failure of the summit will be the extent, the time and the depth with which the presidents and their teams will be able to discuss the new philosophy of their relations, how deeply they will be able to formulate the common interests and start laying the basis -- ideological, political, economic, and strategic basis -- of our relations.

The question is not in concluding a treaty -- this one is probably the last treaty on missiles, the question is to enable these relations to begin acquiring the basis so that this could be formalized within the framework of institutions. And all this will not happen say on the 27th after on 26th President Bush has left Russia. This will continue manifesting itself during a certain time and we will see the extent to which these countries, our countries, the extent to which our elites have not only supported their president but are also prepared to move in this direction. Thank you, and then I will taken your questions.

Moderator: Thank you, Nikolai Vasilyevich. Ivan Alexeyevich, I hope you will be more brief.

Zlobin: Thank you. I speak so rarely here.

Moderator: That is why we are not interrupting you. We are very glad that you have spoken up and you spoke for 45 minutes so I am afraid that journalists might ...

Safranchuk: I do not have to artificially limit myself because I want and can speak up on the summit in quite a compact way. I have the impression that there are very many problems in the Russian-American relations which are being actively downplayed, actively shifted to the backburner in a situation when externally, psychologically everything is so good and there is a new atmosphere and it is so remarkable that although there are problems, they can be resolved in the future, within one month or two or in half a year.

As a result we come to a point when we are marking one year of the new Russian-US relations which were begun roughly in Ljubljana and almost nothing specific have been done during the year. As for what has been done, it is sort of negative, like the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

This situation is justifiable in many ways. The reason is that the US and Russia have had absolutely opposite approaches to ways of using a good Russian-US relationship.

While the Bush Administration -- I should better start with Russia. Russia. While the Russian Administration believed that it could find solutions to a number of questions to its benefit against the background of a good relationship -- for example, reach agreement on the ABM Treaty, a new disarmament treaty, remove the US concern over Russia's cooperation with Iran, etc. -- that is, while Russia thought that all difficulties could be settled with due regard for Russia's opinion -- the US Administration rather tended to think that unwelcome decisions should be taken precisely in the context of a good relationship because of lesser risks.

If you have bad relations, negative decisions can provoke a crisis. But if your relationship with a partner is good and you take decisions not to his liking, the probability of a softer reaction to such decision is greater, and that was precisely what happened. The situation with the ABM Treaty is proof of this logic.

I will go back to one point I already made briefly. There have been very few concrete achievements during the first year of a positive Russian-US relationship. I don't think that the summit will produce anything concrete either.

In addition to the nuclear arms reduction treaty, a series of statements and declarations will be signed, but most if not all of them, I think, will be precisely declarations, if we use positive connotation, if we use negative connotation, they will be mostly empty words, offering no solutions to any questions. One can hope that these new documents will put in place a framework for future solutions, but this is not a fact, and the great deal will have to be done for that.

I think that this circumstance is particularly unpleasant for the Russian side because, from my point of view, Russia has viewed good relations with the US as a means to an end rather than an end in itself.

I am not very fond of the idea that Russia should be a member of some Western community or embrace some system of values. I think that these discourses are very general. The world has never been and will never be united. There are very many serious contradictions and differences between the countries making up the so-called civilized community. For example, it is absolutely useless to try to compare the systems of values of the US and Japan or South Korea -- they are absolutely different. One can say that the US, Japan, South Korea and Italy are all democracies. But they are very different democracies with not quite similar systems of values.

This may sound unpopular, perhaps, but from my point of view democracy is not about a system of values. Democracy is about procedures, ideal procedures for settling conflicts in society. For the time being it is the best system of procedures enabling solutions to social conflicts.

This system of procedures is employed by countries with different systems of values, among them the US and South Korea, Japan, Norway, Italy and so on. Russia is one of them, incidentally.

That is why I do not think that there is any reason to talk about any considerable problems with systems of values.

So, Russia views the US as an instrument of its foreign policy. This is a means of access to US allies. One cannot build a full-fledged good relationship without US allies unless one has good relations with the US. Any close ally of the US, from Japan to Britain or Italy, would look back at the US as regards relations with Russia.

So, if US-Russian relations are not very good, US allies will only use the Russian card in their tactical games with America, but will never build full-fledged relations with Russia. So, the first thing is a means of access to US allies.

Second, from my point of view, this is the only means of carrying on economic reform. Unless positive relations with the US are built and unless an economic component is brought into these relations, the success of Russia's economic reform is not at all assured, to say the least. These are my general comments regarding this summit.

Now some specific issues. The first one is the new nuclear arms reduction treaty. In brief, I believe that this is the last treaty of the Cold War Age, and it has come very late because the Cold War, regardless of the way you look at it, was over in 1989, or in 1991 at the latest. Nevertheless, by its logic this treaty is a Cold War treaty, if we are honest.

If we want to be more correct politically, we can say that this is a treaty of the period of transition from the Cold War to some new relations between Russia and the US. This is how the US Administration interprets it.

As an expert I can be not as politically correct as they and will say that, from my point of view, this is the last treaty of the Cold War. There will be no such treaties in the future, and I don't expect to see any new treaty on nuclear disarmament between Russia and the US in the next 4-5 years.

Other matters to be discussed at this summit provoke very many questions. One of them is economic cooperation. The so-called common energy policy is in the focus of debate today. At the conceptual level I am a great supporter of this idea, the idea of a joint Russian-US energy policy in the world.

However, over the 4-5 months of energetic discussions on the subject at the official level, between Cheney and Kasyanov, for example, or at the lower level, between Gref and his US colleagues, or at the unofficial level between experts, no concrete achievements have been gained to flesh out this joint Russian-US energy policy.

It makes no sense to hope that the US will directly buy oil from Russia in any foreseeable future because there is no infrastructure to transport oil to the US. Moreover, if something absolutely unimaginable does not happen in Saudi Arabia, there will be no cheaper source of oil because, as you know, Saudi Arabia sells oil to the US at discounted world prices.

So, there are very few concrete things. The only avenue of cooperation that is being pursued in practice today is the indirect regulation of world oil prices with Russia's help. In a sense this is an aspect of joint energy policy, but this is clearly not enough. It is not sufficient to use the Russian potential for increasing oil production only in order to be able to regulate world price of oil.

I think that this would be inadequate cooperation in the energy field. To make it adequate, one needs to invest many billion in the infrastructure, which the US business is not so far prepared to do. Here very many problems remain and I regret very much that, in my opinion, very little attention is still given to these economic issues in the Russian-US dialogue.

And the last point I would like to refer to. It seems to me that at the summit there will be one very unpleasant topic which most likely will not be discussed publicly -- it is the topic of Russian-Iranian cooperation. Over the past half year or so, the impression was created that the US administration has finally "swallowed" the Bushera contract and calmly weathered Russia's withdrawal from the so-called Gore-Chernomyrdin agreements.

I will remind you that the withdrawal was announced by the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in November 2000. And it seemed that everything went on quite calm. But I take it that already at this summit and in the near future the United States will actively develop the topic of the Russian-Iranian cooperation. This may become a very serious irritant in the Russian-US relations because Russia is probably prepared to make concessions on some general philosophical issues but when it comes to questions involving hundreds of millions of dollars which practically cannot be compensated from a lending system or through pardoning the Russian debts, so, when at issue is roughly a billion dollars in the Russian-Iranian cooperation, I think very many problems will arise.

And in my opinion the questions of non-proliferation in which the Iranian topic will be clothed, these questions will be discussed between Russia and the United States with extreme difficulty. And it seems to me that the general conversations that with us everything should be new -- the new agenda, new philosophy, new ideology do not have anything specific behind them. This is true of the Iranian topic, and the non-proliferation topic, the disarmament topic and the topic of economic cooperation.

In the process, there is a very big area of practical cooperation which is little known by the public -- it is cooperation on certain local issues. It is for instance the exchange of intelligence information. There are special military groups of Russians and Americans who are carrying out a certain exchange of data. There are very many such local discussions of issues related to Central Asia.

It is true that on Georgia there occurred no discussion between Russia and the US at the level of military experts. But still there are some local topics: Afghanistan and Central Asia. Overall, this practically is all the agenda on which there is more or less some specific cooperation. All the rest so far is general words and these general words continue already for a year. It seems to me that it is too much for one year. And I believe that it is time to give up general words and pass over to more specific things. Most likely it will not be possible to draft a general philosophy of Russian-US relations because there is a huge number of areas of disagreement.

The only way out is to cooperate where they can cooperate. As to the other topics, it is to pursue consultations and exchanges, not to be after some general schemes and spend four or five years drafting such general schemes and then the administrations will change in both countries and it will not be clear who would implement such general scheme.

I think that to some extent Putin was right, according to the press, in Crawford he told Bush many times that something should be done that would endure after us. And I think that Putin was thinking about the example of Gorbachev when the general philosophical phantom built did not survive because there was practically nothing specific behind it. And Putin does wish to leave something that will endure.

For this something must be done. And not very much time is left in the historical perspective because if one considers that Putin may be re-elected for another five years in Russia and who knows maybe it will be four or six years on the American side.

Moderator: I thank Ivan Alexeyevich. Questions please.

Q: RIA-Novosti. The question is to Mr. Zlobin who spoke about the concept of limited sovereignty. Who did you refer to? Who assesses it and who decides?

Zlobin: I said that literally now this very concept is being discussed with the administration and the National Security Council. The discussion is attended by the leading US politicians, including Condoleezza Rice and the Pentagon leaders and members of the National Security Council and US experts.

They favor the idea that the world must be capable of defending itself if there is a government or a political group which violates the overt and covert rules existing in the world. And as Bush often stated, in such conditions time always works against us; when we wait, they get stronger.

That is why there may be the need, the possibility and the necessity to stop them, to stop those countries even if this involves violating their sovereignty.

Q: Does this mean that this is a part of foreign policy concept?

Zlobin: Yes.

Moderator: More questions?

Zlobin: While you are thinking about questions, I will add one thing concerning what Ivan Alexeyevich said. You know, Russia is not a priority for the US foreign policy. It is hardly worthwhile to wait for the United States to come and suggest something specific. If each country, waiting in a line to get to the White House, to come and get friendly with Bush, expects something specific from him, it is hope forlorn. It is necessary to propose a program: what Russia needs from America, what are its priorities and what does it wish to get? This is what Bush would wish to hear at the coming summit.

There are issues of economic cooperation. The Americans are prepared to propose and discuss at the most serious level the problem of saving the Russian Far East and investing there a political and economic capital. They have apprehensions concerning the region.

The Americans are prepared to discuss and talk specifics on the subject of restoration, rescuing, creating, if you wish, a system of social security, health and education in Russia. Problems may be discussed related say to the need of agreements on sending 50 thousand Russian students to US universities with the money to be paid by the US government over a period of 5-10 years, I don't know.

There are projects and discussions of a very serious nature at the level of experts and politicians on the Caspian region; there are first plans concerning military cooperation; and in general it is getting increasingly active and Bush is prepared to discuss Russia's problems as a source of oil and gas not only for the United States but also for Western Europe.

But here indeed there is a whole range of problems which are regarded by the Americans to be so important that neither the elite nor the American politicians today are prepared to accept the concept of Russia as a country which can be relied upon in this sense. This is to say that there are blocks of specific problems.

I think that Bush will speak up in public or not publicly with a number of initiatives on easing the visa regime to approximate it to that practiced by the East European countries for Russian citizens. There are economic and, possibly, political problems related to the Caucasus, and they will be discussed intensively. I think that Russia has very strong positions in this respect.

A very interesting situation is taking shape in Central Asia following the deployment of US troops there. The Americans are trying to foresee strategic developments there, and they realize that they need Russia in that area. I will tell you about their vision of the situation if you have questions on this score. So, certain other things, although not on the agenda, will be discussed at the summit.

I think that the signing of all these treaties, agreements and declarations will take very little time, although there will be a lot of PR for the public. Meanwhile, the presidents will devote most of their time to the problems I mentioned.

Q: Could you give us more detail regarding the saving of the Far East? What are the concrete proposals?

Zlobin: Well, there are several main points that are being discussed in Washington today. It is believed that economically the Middle East is one of the most -- sorry, the Far East, as for the Middle East --

Moderator: Stands to reason.

Zlobin: The Far East is one of the most economically depressed regions in Russia. So, first and foremost, something needs to be done about that. Second, the Middle East is geographically very close to America, and if something is to be established, such as joint ventures or free trade zones...

Moderator: Do you mean the Far East?

Zlobin: The Far East, of course. The Middle East is such a focus of discussion that ... So, America has an interest in that region. Third, at a time when Japan's economic and political influence is shrinking and when the Japanese are hardly likely to offer a large investment package, plus the lingering problem of the Northern territories -- and fourth, the Americans are afraid, of course, that Russia will lose real sovereignty over the Far East, which will increasingly drift into China's hands.

Both sides view China as a potentially unfriendly nation. That is why the Americans have a general interest in Moscow having a stronghold on the Far East with Washington's help.

Q: Czech television. Mr. Zlobin, you said that Bush faces a dilemma: on the one hand, he wants to support Putin, while on the other the US has to criticize breaches of democracy or something else, and Chechnya was mentioned, so he is looking for the middle road. Could you tell us what kind of road could that be?

Zlobin: Hard to say. I think much will depend on President Bush's ability to direct the discussion in the right way. He is working on different scenarios for the discussion, together with his team. Generally speaking, Bush is a good communicator and negotiator. Perhaps, this is his background of a businessman. He is a great master of compromises. Even as governor of Texas, he was famous for his ability to make compromises and to pursue policies that would meet the interests of not only his party. Take a look at his team -- it is very disparate, with very different people rallied around him. He should be given credit in this respect.

As for the US political position, in this case they need certain proof of the fact that Chechnya is part of the world terrorist ring. So far, as far as I know, no Chechens have been apprehended in Afghanistan and presented to the US and the world community, so the Americans do not yet accept Chechnya as part of the terrorist conspiracy in their political doctrine or assessments.

Second, they draw a clear divide between terrorism, on the one hand, and refugees and independence fighters, on the other. This difference is very important to them because of their mentality, political priorities and ideas of political and democratic messianism.

That is why, I think, Bush will say that Russia should also practice such differentiation and understand what actually Russia is fighting. This applies not only to Chechnya, but also to the mass media, I think. The Americans are very much concerned about the current situation in Russia in this respect not so much from the point of view of freedom to criticize the government as from the point of view of possibilities to obtain information, get information from government authorities, or certain agencies and structures, military and political information -- what is implied by free speech. This is not just criticism, but ready access to information.

This is a matter of concern, human rights are a matter of concern. And I think that this is a serious question, namely, how to discuss this matter with Putin in a way that, on the other hand, would not give his domestic critics a chance to shatter his foreign policy positions. I think that much will depend on President Bush's ability to direct the discussion in a correct way.

Q: I have two questions. The prevalent opinion in Russia is that the treaties and declarations to be concluded are sort of Potyomkin villages. What do you think? And second, does the US need anything from Russia in the context of the US plans for Iraq?

Zlobin: Let me start with Iraq, or we will be diverted again. Iraq is, perhaps, one of the two problems, alongside Iran, that is a very acute issue between our countries. The United States is in no two minds about the Iraqi regime and believes that Saddam Hussein should be ousted. The whole discussion centers on how, when and by what methods the situation in Iraq could be changed. Three courses of actions are being discussed today. One boils down to handling Iraq in the same way as East Europe and the Soviet Union were handled, that is, through propaganda, radio broadcasts, etc. in a bid to subvert the prevalent ideology. This could take as much as five years, but the option is being discussed.

The second is to try to provoke a civil war in Iraq based on the opposition in the North and in the South, or perhaps, with the use of the Iraqi opposition scattered all over the world, but mostly the Iraqi National Congress in London. This is the idea of the US arch-conservatives, but the White House and the Pentagon are highly skeptical about the possibility of change of regime as a result of such war. So, this option is not taken seriously, but still...

The third is outright military operation. So, if a direct military operation is launched, according to the latest estimates, this could happen in early 2003, although many US journalists and politicians say that Bush could stage an "October surprise" on the eve of the congressional elections and launch military action so as to divert public attention. From the point of view of technical capability, by early fall all the stocks of high-precision weapons in the US will be brought to the levels similar to those at the beginning of the action in Afghanistan. The stocks will be rebuilt and the Americans will be ready.

In that case Russia's position will be extremely important because the Americans proceed from the assumption that Russia is the only strong political and moral protector, so to speak, for Iraq on the international scene. Russia's position in the Security Council, its position in the United Nations, its new position in NATO and new relations with the United States and European countries will be very important. Naturally, no one says that Russia could send troops to defend Iraq. But what the Americans would like to have is Russia's positive indifference, if not support.

And generally, the Americans now assume that positive indifference will be displayed by most of the countries, including Arab countries. Now many Arab countries are already considering the options and trying to enter into some semi-secret or secret talks with the United States over how the US visualizes the regime in Iraq after Saddam Hussein and what role is assigned to other countries.

Saddam Hussein does not have friends but he is needed by many who wish, for instance, to see Iraq remaining comparatively weak in the economic sense. For instance Egypt. They do not need Iraq as a competitor for leadership in the Arab world. While Saddam Hussein is set on America and America -- on Saddam they are spending their energy on each other and the rest of the Arab world lives in this situation. Some are cashing in handsomely on these very "smart" sanctions, for instance, Egypt. And certain Arab countries do not need to have in Iraq a regime supported and created by the United States. This is to say that everyone is guided by his own interest, and so there is no united front that would rally around Saddam Hussein.

Hussein. And the US is very much reluctant to see Russia acting, if not as the creator of this front, then at least as a moral support for this kind of action. That is why Russia's position will be of extreme importance, and this question will be raised at the summit.

Also, as Ivan Alexeyevich justly put it: for the first time the question with regard to Iran will be raised in a serious way. As you know, during the meeting between Bush and Putin in Texas, Bush decided not to raise the issue of Iran. In general, I will say this: whatever the attitude that has been taken by America in regard to Iran, up until quite recently this was not a priority for the Bush administration in relations with Russia.

Today it is becoming a very serious problem in relations with Russia. The problem is even formulated in this way. The US problems in relations with Russia are problems of Russia's relations with other countries. It is not a problem with Russia, it is a problem of Russia's relations with other countries.

We are talking about the following: one of the sets of possible economic cooperation related to technological cooperation, military, space, atomic and energy cooperation involves two restraining factors. The first is that Russia does not guarantee that technologies obtained through that cooperation and their results will not find themselves in Iran. And the second is that Russia does not have a sufficient legislative base for protection of copyrights, the rights to inventions and all the other things that go with it.

And I forgot what the first question was?

Moderator: The first was about Potyomkin villages.

Zlobin: Actually this expression resurfaced three weeks ago and I heard it in America for the first time and then I came down here and suddenly it turned out that someone had already picked up those Potyomkin relations. I don't think these are Potyomkin relations. And indeed the relations in the style of Potyomkin villages are better than no relations at all.

I take it that the Potyomkin relations are an admission that very much today goes into the PR activities. Both presidents need a small PR victory, especially President Putin, and Bush as well, and indeed, it would not be bad to score a small PR victory in a situation when he has very big problems in the Middle East and a whole set of issues to attend to within the framework of struggle with terrorism. But he needs a successful and good visit to Russia where the two presidents will spend three days together well and so on. In this sense there will be a lot of PR and in this sense it is Potyomkin relations. Firstly, the Potyomkin relations mean the lack of hostility and secondly, the Potyomkin relations may mean that there is a desire to have them, but for the moment the content is lacking. That is why we are beginning by constructing these goals. That is why I think there is nothing bad in this term and it is in part justified.

Moderator: Any more questions?

Q: You said that they will also touch on the Transcaucasian problems at the summit. Did you also mean Georgia?

Zlobin: I think that the Transcaucasia will almost not be raised at the summit. There will be a discussion of course. But how can one do without discussing that problem? Of course, it will be discussed. Maybe this discussion will not be public. Most likely it will be discussed in private. Russia needs to clarify the conditions. Russia and America need to clarify the conditions for their cooperation in that area. I think that it may be discussion in the sense of concluding some agreements over the reciprocal policy there, safeguarding security in that area.

You know, the United States has a special attitude to the regime existing in Georgia especially in view of the fact a) the Georgian President Shevardnadze enjoys colossal respect in the United States by virtue of being one of the creators of the new system. And I think that the Americans have a sensitive attitude to what is happening there. I think that Americans see a great danger in the situation around Abkhazia. And each time (if say we did not tell Bush or Putin about Iran), so each time when the Russians and the Americans meet, diplomats and politicians, each time it is pointed out to Russia that the Americans do not like its policy vis-a-vis Abkhazia. Here the Americans have a very clear position.

I think that at issue can be signing some agreements containing general positions and a certain verification of reality must occur. It is because the region is quite important, related to energy and stability to a much great extent than simply Transcaucasia or Abkhazia separately. Incidentally, the attitude is partly the same to Nagorno-Karabakh. The Americans have not forgotten about this. So these questions are bound to be discussed. I believe that potentially we may get to some agreement, if not a treaty to the effect of these countries, with Georgia's participation, among others, these countries will guarantee the stability, security and predictability, including in the area of energy, in the region.

Q: I wonder what you meant saying there will be and there will not be ...

Safranchuk: Firstly, I believe that these questions have not been practically processed at the level of experts so as to take them to the level of the two presidents. Secondly, I believe that very much has yet to be formulated inside Russia and inside the United States. In Russia there is no clear understanding of how to treat the US policy in Georgia. This policy is largely a new policy of roughly the past 3-4 months. In American there is slightly more clarity as to how to treat the Russian policy in Abkhazia and how to treat the Russian policy in Georgia.

But they are also prepared to think this over. So, these are questions that have not been processed in practical terms. Maybe the two presidents will be able to briefly -- within ten minutes -- exchange opinions on these issues. But I don't think we can say that they will process some treaty and discuss something in detail and get to something, I personally think they will not get to anything because they will devote to the topic 10 minutes at most.

Just look at the protocol of the meetings of the two presidents. Where will they will discuss this? At Peskaryovskoye cemetery or during a stroll in the Kremlin? They will talk about it but little time has been allocated for all the talks. And there is a big agenda which is so joyfully discussed by experts cannot be discussed because there is almost no time for it. That is why I said that everything will boil down to a very narrow scope of issues. And among the specific topics that will be raised, besides signing the documents which are in the main prepared, although I think that some last minute amendments may be made in the declaration, out of the specific topics they will be able to raise only Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran, a little of the non-proliferation issue and a little of the economic issues.

Zlobin: I will only set the record strait. I do not say that within the framework of this meeting some treaty or agreement will be signed. But they can begin working on it. I think that President Bush has no possibility to come to Russia for three days to enjoy himself. They will be working, believe me, they will work very rigidly and very much. It is because the two president of two such countries cannot in this situation permit themselves the pleasure of ...

Moderator: Tourism.

Zlobin: Yes, tourism. Bush certainly has no time for tourism.

Safranchuk: But don't forget that during the meeting there will be one topic we practically said nothing about. It is the topic of the new Russia-NATO Council. And in general, President bush's visit -- and he is not going to Russia alone -- he is already in Europe and he sort of starts from Europe -- from Germany and ends in Italy.

That is to say he will fly from Germany to Russia and then from Russia he flies ... where to?

Zlobin: To France.

Safranchuk: To France. From France to Normandy. From Normandy to Italy. All this visit inscribes precisely into the NATO and European affairs. And they will also have to discuss this or that concerning NATO. And literally after a short time in Rome they will have to deal with this subject area together so I think this topic will take catastrophically much time.

If one looks at the agenda to be discussed by Bush in Germany, in France and Italy, the NATO subject area is prevalent -- NATO and terrorism, NATO and Russia.

This will also take time at their talks here in Moscow. So, I think that very little time will be devoted to those issues, except the ones I have already mentioned.

Moderator: Now Voice of America, please.

Q: What are the prospects today for the US attitude to China and Russia after the summit?

Moderator: Who the question is to?

Safranchuk: I think that the triangle relationship almost does not any more exist. The geo-political triangle pattern that existed during 1990s did not proposed that Russia could simultaneously pursue a pro-Western policy and at the same time have a positive dynamic in relations with China. It was a mutually exclusive scheme. It was like a game with a zero amount or communicating vessels: if relations got better with the West, the relations with China would get worse; if relations with China improved, something was wrong with the West. It is this scheme that was offered by that geopolitical triangle.

In a situation when in spring and summer last year Putin made a sharp pro-Western turn in his foreign policy, that triangle pattern ceased to work because he simultaneously pursued a pro-Western policy and signed a big treaty with China. In this way he simply broke that geo-political scheme. So, now these are two parallel lines of Russia's foreign policy. One can say that more is being done in one direction and so less in the other.

But this, to use geometrical terms, this triangle seems to have been transformed into a flat surface. That is to say a figure like a triangle simply does not exist. Now it simply two parallel lines of relationships.

Zlobin: I will add only a couple of words. The Americans are perfectly aware that Russia and China are obligated to have good relations, they simply have to have good relations. If they don't have good relations, there will be many problems in the world including for the United States.

I think that today nobody puts the question in Washington in way to imply that Russia must be a bastion of the West in regard to China. And they would not wish to have a situation in which Russia acts as China's advanced post in Europe. That is why Russia must find some golden mean here. But I think that the Americans would be pleased to put some of them burden of resolving the problems with China on Moscow on condition that Moscow becomes a reliable and predictable US partner and would help the Americans to solve the problems which, according to the Americans are bound to arise with China during the coming 20-25 years and related to global problems and economic issues, and formation technologies and related to China's broader presence on the international scene, as well as problems related to Chinese emigration and Chinese extremist organizations. On all these, I think, the Americans would like to have Russia as a reliable ally on these issues.

Q: ... (inaudible)..

Moderator: No, we did not discuss this.

Q: I have in mind assistance in improving Russia's relations ...

Moderator: With North Korea.

Q: America and North Korea and domestic relations ... (inaudible)...

Safranchuk: Yes, indeed, the North Korean Foreign Minister's visit was practically unnoticed although yesterday the Interfax released two big stories devoted to this topic.

I think that the North Korean card will not play in the Russian foreign policy as it did last year, when President Putin came to the G-8 summit in Okinawa after his visit to North Korea and offered some political guarantees that North Korea would not implement its nuclear and missile programs. There will no longer be a possibility to play such a North Korean card this time. Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, Russia may cooperate with the United States in regard to North Korea. The fact is that Bush has to some extent driven himself into a corner. He pursued the US policy in regard to North Korea in 2001 so toughly that he still cannot get out of it.

It would seem, I take it, that Washington has taken a political decision to resume a dialogue with North Korea, but it is extremely difficult for Bush to do this, among other things because he will face quite stiff criticism from his own supporters in the United States.

In general, Russia may to some extent be helpful in solving issues still outstanding in the area of non-proliferation in regard to the Korean nuclear and missile programs. But I think that this topic which last year was quite "alive and fresh", now it is a topic of secondary importance in the Russian-US dialogue.

Zlobin: I think that after last year's confusion, the US administration doubts Russia's ability to act as a third country in improving the relations between Korea and the United States. The Americans are increasingly inclined to assume that nobody can impact on what is going on inside North Korea, that that country generally behaves largely the way it pleases to.

It is very difficult to draft a joint policy in this connection. I think that today the Americans would wish to get back to talks, that they would wish to begin a dialogue with North Korea. It is not clear on what conditions this could be done because there is no concept and because the two sides are stuck and cannot find a compromise. The US today has not concept to speak of.

I think however that the very idea of talks is on the agenda and that any issues arising between the two countries can be resolved, according to Washington, only through negotiations.

Moderator: Thank you very much. That would be the end of the press conference. Those wishing to know the opinion of the Carnegie Foundation please stay over because at two o'clock we will have the Foundation President and his deputy Trenin as guests. Thank you.

 
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