Johnson's Russia List
#6265
23 May 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Moscow Times editorial: What We'd Like to See at Summit.
2. RIA Novosti: TOUR OF THE KREMLIN AND A TRIP DOWN THE NEVA IN ADDITION
TO THE OFFICIAL PART OF PUTIN-BUSH SUMMIT.
3. Boston Globe: David Filipov, Sticky issues abound for the Bush-Putin
summit. Army policy, alliances are seen to threaten ties both want to tout.
4. Interfax: Most Russian citizens doubt Chechen conflict will be settled
soon.
5. Vedomosti: WHAT BUSH IS BRINGING TO RUSSIA. Mostly what he himself
needs. Predictions and expectations about the visit of President Bush.
6. Gazeta: RUSSIA QUITS START II. Before the United States. Nuclear arms
cuts, missile defense, and treaties old and new.
7. Profil: Vladimir Rudakov, GOODWILL GAMES. Time to stop expecting
sensations from Russian-US summits.
8. Kennan Institute meeting summary: Ukraine: Progress for Democracy in
the Framework of East Central Europe. (Mykhailo Kirsenko)
9. Asia Times: Hooman Peimani, Armenia and Azerbaijan once again on the
brink.
10. Reuters: US Senate eyes normal trade relations with Russia.
11. Interfax: Thirty percent would vote for United Russia last Sunday.
12. New York Times: Michael Wines, As Bush Heads for Russia, Hopes for
an Investment Plan Fade.
13. New York Times: William Safire, Testing Putin on Iran.
14. USA Today: Louise Branson, Bush can give a hand up to Putin.
15. Vladivostok News: Anna Malpas, Vietnam War recalled from Soviet
perspective.
16. Boston Globe editorial: Summit pragmatism.
17. UPI: Kyrgyzstan government resigns amid crisis.
18. The White House: Remarks by the President in Roundtable Interview
with European Print Reporters. (Bush on Russia)]
******
#1
Moscow Times
May 23, 2002
Editorial
What We'd Like to See at Summit
Nine years ago, U.S. President George W. Bush's father and President
Vladimir Putin's predecessor held a summit in Moscow where they signed a
much heralded arms control treaty to slash the number of strategic nuclear
warheads on each side. The treaty was START II and, although it was never
implemented, it was seen as important for reducing residual Cold War
tensions and lowering the risk of nuclear war.
On Friday, Bush and Putin will sign a new treaty that slashes the number of
warheads even further. It also is being heralded as a landmark treaty,
although we all know it's not. It will, however, be implemented, because it
allows both countries to do what they wanted to do anyway. Russia will cut
its arsenal below 2,200 warheads because it cannot afford to keep any more
operational anyway; the United States will cut its arsenal too, but because
it will be allowed to keep its warheads in storage.
The treaty, which has been billed as the final nail in the coffin of the
Cold War, is a nice political gesture, but it would be a shame if it was
the best thing to come out of the summit.
On the strategic front, the more pressing issue is the dispute over
Russia's cooperation with Iran. Washington is convinced Moscow is helping
Tehran develop nuclear weapons. Frank and detailed discussions could go a
long way, as could discussions on ways to stop global proliferation of all
weapons of mass destruction.
We also would like to see Bush do more to challenge Putin's claims that he
is doing his bit in the fight against international terrorism by waging war
in Chechnya and tell him that Russia is only exacerbating the problem by
allowing human rights abuses there to continue unabated. We're not holding
our breath.
Our best hope for the summit is for Washington at last to grant Russia
market-economy status. This is within the power of the U.S. Commerce
Department, and the commerce secretary arrived in Russia ahead of Bush, so
it seems entirely likely.
Unlike the arms treaty, this would be big news. It would not only
strengthen economic ties with the United States but support Putin's efforts
to integrate the country into the world economy.
Repealing the antiquated Jackson-Vanik amendment also is long overdue. This
decision is in the hands of Congress, but Bush could push the process along.
Finally, we hope the summit gives Bush a deeper understanding of Russia and
the man he reportedly has nicknamed "Pootie-Poot."
******
#2
TOUR OF THE KREMLIN AND A TRIP DOWN THE NEVA IN ADDITION TO THE OFFICIAL
PART OF PUTIN-BUSH SUMMIT
MOSCOW, May 23, 2002. /From RIA Novosti correspondent Marianna
Shatikhina/--US President George W.Bush is coming to Moscow for an official
visit on the evening of Thursday, May 23.
According to Sergei Prikhodko, the deputy head of the Kremlin
administration, Bush's jet lands in Moscow at 8:00 p.m. Moscow time.
Russia's Vice Premier Viktor Khristenko will meet the president at the
airport and escort him to his residence at Moscow's Mariott Grand Hotel.
The next day begins with a wreath-laying ceremony at the Grave of the
Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin Wall. At 10:00 a.m., the presidents of
Russia and the USA meet in the Green Reception Room of the Grand Kremlin
Palace in the presence of Vladimir Rushailo, the Secretary of Russia's
Security Council, and Condoleezza Rice, Bush's National Security Adviser.
After a tete-a-tete talk, the presidents move on to the Catherine Hall of
the Grand Kremlin Palace to join their teams for yet another round of
talks. The Russian team consists of Premier Mikhail Kasyanov, Vladimir
Rushailo, Vice Premier and Agriculture Minister Alexei Gordeyev, Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, Economic Development
and Trade Minister German Gref, Energy Minister Igor Yusufov, Atomic Energy
Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, Rosaviakosmos chief Yury Koptev, and
officials from the presidential administration.
After the talks, the St. Andrew Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace will host
a document-signing ceremony. After that, both presidents will meet with
journalists.
At about the same time, the Kremlin will host a meeting between the
presidents and businessmen from Russia and the USA.
An official breakfast at the Russian president's is scheduled for about
2:00 p.m.. After that, Putin and Bush may take a little walk around the
Kremlin.
In the evening of the same day, Vladimir and Lyudmila Putin will host a
dinner in honour of George and Laura Bush. The dinner -- "personal affair,"
as Prikhodko put it -- is being arranged in response to the hospitality of
the Bush couple, who welcomed the Putins at their ranch in Crawford, Texas,
during the Russian president's trip to the USA.
On Saturday, May 25th, the two presidents will travel to St. Petersburg,
which is right now having its "White Nights" season, each on his own jet.
After a joint wreath-laying ceremony at the memorial to victims of the
city's 900-day-long blockade /of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945/ at
Piskarevo Cemetery, Putin and Bush will visit the Hermitage -- one of the
world's largest museums -- to have some breakfast and view the displays.
At about midday, the presidents will meet with students at St. Petersburg
University. In the evening, both presidential couples will visit the
Mariinsky Theatre to watch "The Nutcracker" ballet. After that, they may
take a night-time trip down the Neva.
On Sunday, May 26th, the Bush couple will attend a church service at the
Kazan Cathedral and pay a visit to a local synagogue. After that, Putin and
Bush will meet at the Russian Museum, which houses yet another large
collection of Russian works of art, to view the displays and have a small
tea party.
On the same day, the Bush couple will leave Russia for France.
******
#3
Boston Globe
May 23, 2002
Sticky issues abound for the Bush-Putin summit
Army policy, alliances are seen to threaten ties both want to tout
By David Filipov, Globe Staff
MOSCOW - President Bush arrives in Moscow tonight for talks with his
Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, hoping to chart a partnership built on
strategic cooperation rather than Cold War-style arms control. But their
four-day summit is clouded by lingering disputes and underlying differences
on how the two leaders see their evolving relationship.
They will sign a treaty tomorrow in the Kremlin to cut their countries'
offensive nuclear weapons by two-thirds, reducing their arsenals from some
6,000 warheads each to 1,700 to 2,200 apiece by 2012. But even as Putin
prepares to ink his approval, his negotiators are still protesting the
terms of the pact as unfair.
Bush's stated goal of relegating the Cold War to the ash-heap of history
isn't proving easy, analysts say, especially when Russia and the United
States have such conflicting aims. In the Bush administration's view,
Russia should help out with strategic problems when it can, as in
Afghanistan and Central Asia, but stay out of the way the rest of the time.
This role is hard for the Russian elite to accept.
''Russia is too great territorially and too proud historically to be a
junior partner,'' political analyst Stanislav Kondrashov commented this
week, ''but, alas, too weak now to be equal.''
For different reasons, both presidents need this summit to go smoothly.
Both hope to show they have moved to an agenda between partners. The
official program, highlighted by the signing of the nuclear arms treaty
tomorrow, is designed to strengthen the image of closer ties between the
two countries since Russia threw its support behind Bush's war on terrorism.
Neither Russia's apparent support for Iran's nuclear weapons program nor
its military crackdown in Chechnya will appear on the public agenda of the
summit. Bush will press Putin on these issues, US diplomats have said,
during the many opportunities for one-on-one talks.
Nor is Putin expected to publicly express Russian concerns over America's
plans to topple Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, NATO's proposal to expand its
alliance to include the Baltic republics formerly held by the Soviets, and
the growing US presence in the former Soviet republics south of Russia's
border.
''America needs a happy summit because Bush needs to show that he has
turned Russia into a useful partner,'' said Alexei Pushkov, the host of
''Postcriptum,'' a popular Russian television news commentary show. ''Putin
needs to show that he is still important.''
But behind this friendly picture, a question lurks in the minds of analysts
on both sides of the ocean: What kind of relationship do the United States
and Russia need? And do they want the same things from each other? The
White House does not appear especially eager to make any real concessions
in pursuit of stronger ties. The dynamic is similar to that between the
United States and Europe; the Bush team has treated Europe as a useful ally
in the war on terrorism, but has largely ignored it on matters of the
environment or trade.
''The US would like to make Russia friendly without really giving anything
to the Russians,'' said Fiona Hill, a Russia analyst at the Brookings
Institution in Washington. ''US officials have made it pretty clear that
the world has moved on and that Russia isn't going to be the number one
item anymore.''
Pushkov and other Russian commentators refer to the disproportionate nature
of US-Russian relations as the ''Potemkin partnership,'' a reference to the
adviser to Catherine the Great who, according to legend, built sham
villages to impress the czarina. Behind the facade of closer US-Russian
ties, these critics argue, hides a hegemonic America that intends to
dictate policies, and a weakened Russia that can do nothing about it.
Putin has come under criticism in Russia from military leaders and other
conservatives who believe he has given away too much and received nothing
in return for his support of US policies. But analyst Hill says Putin is
merely playing the weak hand he has been dealt, realizing that Russia's
revival requires close relations with the United States and the West.
Rather than trying to oppose US policies he knows he cannot stop, Putin has
adopted a strategy of accepting things he cannot change, she suggests. In
return, Putin earns a place at the table in NATO, in his dealings with the
United States, and eventually, he hopes, in the World Trade Organization.
''Putin has a feeling that if he is inside the Western structures he can
influence the character of the relations of the West, the US, and NATO with
Russia,'' Pushkov said. ''Is it possible? I think not very much, but
something needs to be done.''
Bush has his own reasons for wanting a conflict-free summit, said Celeste
Wallander of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington. He needs to show critics in Europe and at home that he did not
create a crisis with his decision in December to abandon the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and develop a national missile defense
system, despite furious Russian opposition to those steps.
''Moving forward from the old arms-control agenda to a new agenda of
economic issues is meant to comfort the European allies that the US is not
as unilateralist as they fear,'' Wallander said.
In addition to the nuclear weapons treaty, the sides are still negotiating
a second accord on shared political and security priorities, said a senior
Russian diplomat. This declaration will include sections on the fight
against terrorism, according to US and Russian diplomats. It will also
contain a section on missile defense, including early missile warning
systems, the Russian diplomat said.
Putin's own negotiators have argued that the nuclear treaty merely papers
over huge gaps in the way the two countries view arms control. General Yuri
Baluyevsky, the Russian military's deputy chief of staff, said Russia's
leadership could not accept a US notion under which stored warheads would
not be counted in total arsenals.
Washington says it needs to store, not destroy, the warheads so it can
respond to emerging threats from so-called ''axis of evil'' states like
Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Here, too, the United States and Russia fail to
see eye to eye.
''Russia is puzzled by the concept of `axis of evil,''' said Sergei Rogov,
director of the Institute of the USA and Canada. ''We don't think of these
countries as our adversaries.''
Anne E. Kornblut of the Globe Staff contributed to this report from Berlin.
******
#4
Most Russian citizens doubt Chechen conflict will be settled soon
MOSCOW. May 23 (Interfax) - Fifty-nine percent of Russian citizens think
that Russia will not be able to normalize the situation in Chechnya in the
near future.
Twenty-seven percent hope, however, that the situation will be settled
and 14% are undecided, the Public Opinion Fund has told Interfax following
a poll of 1,500 respondents on May 17.
Today, like three years ago, most Russian citizens look pessimistically
at prospects for settling the Chechen conflict. In May 1999, 52% of those
polled said the conflict will not be settled, 27% had the opposite
viewpoint and 21% were undecided.
The latest opinion poll revealed that 24% of Russian citizens think
"military operations must be carried out to normalize the situation in
Chechnya;" 20% said force must not be used and 12% said everything depends
on correct economic steps.
*******
#5
Vedomosti
May 23, 2002
WHAT BUSH IS BRINGING TO RUSSIA
Mostly what he himself needs
Predictions and expectations about the visit of President Bush
Author: Zoya Kaika, Alexander Bekker, Aleksei Nikolsky
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH IS COMING TO RUSSIA TODAY. PROGRESS AT HIS
TALKS WITH VLADIMIR PUTIN IS EXPECTED IN TWO FIELDS: OIL AND ARMS.
THIS PROGRESS WILL PRIMARILY BENEFIT THE UNITED STATES. THE AMERICANS
WILL UNLEASH AN EFFECTIVE PR EFFECT ON RUSSIA AND THE WORLD DURING THE
VISIT.
Russian state officials are confident that the world will be told
during George W. Bush's visit that the US Department of Trade is going
to officially recognize Russia as a country with a free-market economy
in the near future. This mostly symbolic gesture has been expected for
a long time now. No one expects from the summit any progress in other
matters of trade, including terms for Russia's membership of the World
Trade Organization.
The Americans will unleash an effective PR effect on Russia and
the world during the visit. According to our sources, Exxon is going
to announce today that a shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur will get a
$150 million contract for construction of an Orlan oil rig. In this
way, Washington will prove that the declaration on energy dialogue to
be signed by Putin and Bush is anything but an empty document.
"The declaration will mention that the United States sees Russia
as a reliable and stable guarantor of oil deliveries," says Aleksei
Turbin, an adviser to Energy Minister Igor Yusufov. This wording is a
slightly veiled threat to OPEC, traditional suppliers of oil to the
American market. Russia has a substantial potential in the market, UN
Undersecretary of State Alan Larson told the Vedomosti. "American
investments in the Russian energy sector will be discussed" to realize
this potential.
American finances will help the Angarsk - Nakhodka pipeline, a
Transneft project. It may be implemented by 2008. The oil Europe does
not need may take this route to the Far East ports and pumped into
tankers. Up to 50 million tons of oil every year may thus be sent to
the United States.
"Getting oil from Murmansk or Sakhalin is only a shade more
expensive than from the Persian Gulf," says a source from the
presidential administration. "From all points of view, deliveries to
the United States are quite possible and will benefit Russian
companies."
But when the American talk about investments, they do not mean
assistance to Russian oil companies in settling in the American
market. The want to discuss investments on the condition of end
products split. These investments are made by American companies, like
Exxon, within the framework of Sakhalin-1 project.
Specialists of the US Department of Trade say that energy
dialogue and proper legal work on production sharing agreements are
two most promising directions of cooperation with Russia in the near
future.
The Americans have serious complaints about taxation in Russia.
Investments are blocked by the article of the Tax Code on taxation for
production sharing agreements, which has never come into effect. The
Cabinet's bill has been collecting dust in the Duma since November.
Signing of the treaty on reducing nuclear arsenals will be one of
the central events of the summit. Experts do not say that the treaty
will trouble the Americans much, but during the visit we will hear of
the colossal sums Russia may get for implementation of the treaty.
Japanese government sources say that Bush approached his G-7
colleagues with the proposal that each of them allocate $10 billion
for Russia's nuclear disarmament on the condition that the United
States allocated the same sum. Specialists do not think that the
initiative will be proclaimed during the Russian-US summit. It will
probably be put forth during the G-7 meeting in Canada this June.
It remains to be seen how the funding will be offered: in the
form of writing off Soviet debts to the Paris Club of creditor
nations, or in cash, and so on. In any case, huge sums will probably
be restricted somewhat. According to Ivan Safranchuk, an expert with
the Washington Defense Information Center, "assistance will be
unlikely on this scale, and actually it will not even be needed if
Russia plans to retain its nuclear potential." Safranchuk says that
only 40% of the sums allocated to Russia by the Nunn-Lugar program in
the 1990s actually made it to Russia. The rest was spent by the
Americans themselves.
While offering Russia a carrot in the form of the promised
billions, Washington will demand suspension of cooperation with Iran
(including the almost completed nuclear power plant in Bushir).
*******
#6
Gazeta
May 23, 2002
RUSSIA QUITS START II
Before the United States
Nuclear arms cuts, missile defense, and treaties old and new
Author: Ivan Yegorov, Andrei Reut
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
RUSSIA WILL UNILATERALLY PULL OUT OF START II IN RESPONSE TO THE US
DECISION TO QUIT THE ABM TREATY. A STATEMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE
RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. IT SHOULD BE RELEASED ON JUNE 14, WHEN THE
ABM TREATY IS OFFICIALLY DISSOLVED.
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH IS NOT COMING TO RUSSIA SOLELY TO SIGN THE
NEW OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TREATY ONLY. HE IS ALSO BRINGING
PROPOSALS ON THE SUBJECT OF MISSILE DEFENSE. MEANWHILE, RUSSIA INTENDS
TO UNILATERALLY PULL OUT OF START II IN RESPONSE TO THE US DECISION TO
QUIT THE ABM TREATY. HERE IS THE STATEMENT PREPARED BY THE RUSSIAN
FOREIGN MINISTRY. IT SHOULD BE PUBLISHED ON JUNE 14, THE DAY THE
UNITED STATES OFFICIALLY WITHDRAWS FROM THE ABM TREATY.
The document prepared by the Foreign Ministry states: "The
Russian Federation ratified START II in May 2000 along with the New
York agreements of September 26, 1997, on the ABM treaty. There was
the mutual understanding with the American side that the United States
would follow suit. It would have permitted realization of the
important agreements concerning offensive and defensive nuclear
weapons. The United States refused to ratify START II and the New York
agreements. Moreover, the United States quit the ABM treaty on June
13, rendering ineffective the international document that played the
role of a cornerstone of strategic stability for three decades.
Bearing in mind the aforementioned actions of the United States and
acting on the basis of provision of the federal law on START II
ratification, the Russian side emphasizes the lack of conditions for
START II coming into effect and does not consider itself bound by the
necessity to avoid any actions depriving START II of its object and
purpose."
The statement is to be accompanied by commentaries already signed
by ministers Igor Ivanov and Sergei Ivanov. The ministers merely
repeat the statement word for word and add that "the treaty was
supposed to be ratified together with the New York agreements of
September 26, 1997, on the ABM treaty. The Clinton Administration
refused to do so, citing its position on the subject of missile
defense. The Bush Administration has made it completely impossible for
START II to take effect, due to its decision to quit the ABM treaty."
According to Ivan Safranchuk, head of the Moscow office of the
Center for Defense Information, START II is dead, it never came into
effect, it is not effective now, and it will not be needed anymore. There
can be no doubts that the treaty will be denounced in the course of right
in the wake of the summit. START I will be retained.
Robert Norick, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, agrees
with the Russian expert. "The United States and Russia have long since
abandoned negotiations over START II. The treaty was signed but never
came into effect. Even some declaration on Russia's part will merely
become a formal reiteration of what everyone also knows," he said.
As for the possibility of negotiations over missile defense,
Safranchuk says that a political discussion will be helpful because it
will demonstrate the existing level of trust between our countries.
At the same time, Safranchuk warns against undue optimism
displayed by some Russian and Western experts. Some American
scientists say, for example that certain elements of the missile
defense system may be built in Russia. Make a deal, pay, and Russia
will deliver, they say.
Safranchuk: In my view, it will be very strange for Russia to
participate in construction of the American national missile defense,
the one to which Moscow objected. Officially, Moscow does not welcome
construction of the national missile defense by the United States.
Russia considers it a mistake. It is a different matter altogether
that the United States can make its own mistakes without asking
anyone's permission. That is why it would be the height of stupidity
to assist America in making what we consider a mistake.
As for Russia's response to withdrawal of the United States from
the ABM treaty, Safranchuk says that specialists have been looking for
an adequate response for some years already. It is an entirely
different matter that there is no need to implement these measures
now.
Safranchuk: The American national missile defense will be built
years from now and no one can say with any degree of accuracy exactly
what the Americans will end up with. We do not need to make decisions
right here and now, on missiles with MIRVs or anything like that.
Under START I, Russia is entitled to 154 Satan or SS-18 missiles.
Quite sufficient for Russia to be comfortable under its nuclear
umbrella. It will be insufficient only 5-10 years from now when the
Americans have their national missile defense.
*******
#7
Profil
No. 19
May 2002
GOODWILL GAMES
Time to stop expecting sensations from Russian-US summits
Author: Vladimir Rudakov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE MAJOR OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT WILL PROBABLY HAVE NOTHING TO DO
WITH ANY SIGNED AGREEMENTS OR VERBAL ASSURANCES. CONTACTS BETWEEN OUR
PRESIDENTS ARE GRADUALLY BECOMING WORKING MEETINGS. THE PUBLIC WILL
LEARN NOT TO EXPECT SENSATIONS OR BREAKTHROUGHS FROM BILATERAL
SUMMITS.
As it usually happens on the eve of meetings at this level, the
Russian-US summit opening in Moscow this week has already generated
all kinds of hopes in Russian society. On the one hand, state
officials proclaim the upcoming triumph of Russian diplomacy which
will finally wrench concessions from the United States in the matter
of offensive nuclear weapons. They claim fairly optimistically that
the Kremlin succeeded in forcing on the United States a mutually
binding treaty, instead of the vague agreement on which Washington had
insisted during the previous summit. On the other hand, leftist
patriotic pessimists say that Russia has bowed to the will of another,
yet again, and that by signing the treaty with the US, Putin will
begin a new phase of "treason against Russia's national interests"
(this is how they put it). It seems, however, that this line of
reasoning has one obvious flaw. Its advocates clearly overestimate
Russia's influence on the nature of bilateral relations.
In fact, the "negotiating resources" of Russian diplomacy depends
almost entirely on our American partners' readiness to conduct this
dialogue with Russia. Russian and American economic, political, and
even military potential are incomparable to such an extent that a
"dialogue of equals" is absolutely impossible. Now that the "contest
of two systems" is history and the use of nuclear weapons history is
out of the question, Russia's status of a nuclear power does not give
Russia any additional trump cards in its relations with the United
States.
It is clear that awareness of this alarming but actually all too
objective situation helped the president of Russia find the correct
tone in dealings with the Americans. Vladimir Putin understands all
too well that it is useless for Russia to be arrogant now that it
lacks the resources to implement even a part of its former ambitions.
It follows that Russia will gave to go on making concessions to the
West and first and foremost the United States, the accepted global
leader that promotes its own interests and hardly anyone else's. It
must have dawned on Moscow that it is better to succumb to America
retaining warm relations and the illusion of partnership than succumb
to its will all the same in the conditions of its dictatorship and
hostility.
This line of conduct does not promise Russia immediate dividends.
Still, official Moscow is not after any. Unlike Mikhail Gorbachev and
Boris Yeltsin who needed from the West firstly loans and secondly
support of their foreign policy, Putin emphasizes his self-
sufficiency. Aiming at modernization of the country and making use of
the favorable situation in the world markets, the president of Russia
relies on investments and not loans.
With the rating considerably higher than Gorbachev's or
Yeltsin's, Putin does not need the West's support of his moves in the
domestic policy. One the contrary, his first year in office (use of
force to finally solve the problem of Chechnya, decision to close NTV
and TV-6 channels, war on "certain oligarchs", and some other
"antidemocratic" moves) convinced Putin that the West's position with
regard to Russia was different now. For several years after the fall
of the totalitarian regime the United States and its partners viewed
the subject of democracy in Russia as instrumental. Everything is
different now, the terrorist acts in New York last year moving to the
forefront other problems, the ones not related to the situation in
Russia.
It should be noted here that contrary to what our patriots might
be and actually are saying on the subject, the West revised its policy
of applying pressure to Russia for every minute thing, given half a
chance. Life shows that the Western recipes enforced on Russia and
other "smaller partners" by the United States do not always work. In
fact, they backfire all too often. Besides, progress of the reforms
under Putin breeds the hope that Russia is actually interested in
making its own life better.
It is also important that the United States, the country that may
actually ignore and neglect Russia without any serious consequences
for itself, chooses to build a positive image of bilateral relations.
According to an American political scientist, the position of the
United States rests on three ideas. Firstly, "it is better to be
friends than to quarrel" when there is actually nothing to quarrel
about. Secondly, "Russia may be useful in some situations" in future,
for all its current weakness. Thirdly, Putin is a "predictable and
coherent partner, capable of maintaining a high level of contacts
between Russia and the West."
That is why the major outcome of the summit will probably have
nothing to do with any signed agreements or verbal assurances. More
importantly, the era of mutual surplus ambitions is drawing to a
close, regardless of the actual outcome of the summit. Contacts
between our presidents are gradually becoming working meetings. The
more this continues, the better the public will be taught not to
expect sensations or breakthroughs from bilateral summits. As Putin
said six months ago, "all disappointment is a result of excessive
expectations."
******
#8
Kennan Institute meeting summary
Ukraine: Progress for Democracy in the Framework of East Central Europe
May 13, 2002
Summary of a Kennan Institute meeting at the Woodrow Wilson Center with
Mykhailo Kirsenko, professor, Department of History, University of
Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and regional exchange scholar, Kennan Institute
In a recent meeting at the Kennan Institute, Mykhailo Kirsenko, regional
exchange scholar at the Kennan Institute, discussed Ukraine’s role in East
Central Europe (CEE). While traditionally considered a “sister nation” to
Russia, Kirsenko stated, Ukraine’s historical and contemporary linkages
with the other countries of the region illustrate Ukraine’s connections
with the liberal traditions of the West. He noted that while Ukraine is
not ready to join NATO or the EU, Ukrainian leaders could learn valuable
lessons from the collective experience of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic.
Kirsenko stated that despite its shared background with Russia, Ukraine’s
traditions of property and political rights are more closely related to
those of its European neighbors to the west. For example, he noted that
while Russian rural society was based on collective ownership, periodic
partitions, and collective responsibility, norms in western Ukraine
emphasized private property and individual responsibility. Ukraine’s steps
toward democracy can also be traced back to the 18th century when
provisions regarding the separation of powers appeared in early Ukrainian
constitutional drafts.
Kirsenko also offered several examples of Ukraine’s connections to other
CEE countries in the modern era. He mentioned that Ukraine’s declaration
of sovereignty during World War I closely paralleled the Polish, Czech, and
Hungarian declarations for independent statehood. He stated that while the
relationship between Poland and Ukraine is well documented, it is important
not to underestimate Ukraine’s strong ties with the Czech Republic and
Slovakia. He noted that Slovak and Ukrainian diasporas exist along the
border between the two countries, and that Czech settlements in Volhynia
and Kyiv continue to influence various aspects of Ukrainian culture and
society.
According to Kirsenko, Ukraine should use its historical heritage to
strengthen its contemporary relationship with its Western neighbors.
Kirsenko contended that Ukrainian history should be placed in the proper
European context, with special attention given to sociological factors such
as language and culture. He argued that the era of Soviet-rule in Ukraine
should only be viewed as a period in the national history. Kirsenko stated
that Ukrainian leaders should also openly address negative or controversial
periods of Ukraine’s past, including the atrocities committed during WWII.
Kirsenko concluded by discussing how Ukrainian leaders could learn from the
collective experience of other CEE countries. He contended that Ukrainian
leaders should use mass media to help shape public opinion toward the
advantages and responsibilities of integrating into Euro-Atlantic
structures, including eventual NATO membership. Finally, Kirshenko noted,
Ukraine and other CEE countries could have a vital role in forming closer
relations between Russia and the West.
Blair Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute, (202) 691-4100
******
#9
Asia Times
May 22, 2002
Armenia and Azerbaijan once again on the brink
By Hooman Peimani
The shadow of war is hovering over Armenia and Azerbaijan, two neighbors on
hostile terms with each other for more than a decade. The bitter memories and
the consequences of a devastating six-year war between the two over
Azerbaijan's Armenian-dominated enclave of Nagorno Karabakh have practically
made their peaceful ties and normal relations out of the question, at least
for the moment. Tens of thousands of Azeris and Armenians were killed during
the war, while millions of them became refugees.
Since the belligerents' acceptance of a ceasefire in 1994, all efforts to
settle their disputes and to end their hostility have failed. This has
contributed to a fragile situation that could burst into war at any time. In
particular, the growing sense of frustration with the status quo among the
Azeri people and leaders alike has become increasingly apparent. During the
past few weeks, it has been reflected in the categorical rejection of many
Azeri politicians of an autonomous Nagorno Karabkh within Azerbaijan as a
proposed compromise for settling the conflict with Armenia. Armenians have
also become increasingly dissatisfied with the current situation, which makes
the status of the enclave uncertain. The recent statements of Armenian
officials on Armenia's eventual unification with the enclave have
demonstrated this dissatisfaction.
Unless the two counties agree on a peaceful settlement of their prolonged
territorial/ethnic dispute, the growing sense of frustration and impatience
among their populations will likely push them into a war. This will be a
disastrous scenario for the Armenians and the Azeris who have suffered a lot
from war in their economically devastated countries.
Armenian-Azeri relations have not been hostile historically. The
disintegration of the Russian Empire in 1917 created grounds for short-lived
independence for the Caucasians who created three independent states that
lasted until 1920, when the Bolshevik regime re-established Moscow's rule
over their region. During the years of independence, the Armenians and the
Azeris had peaceful and friendly relations. The Soviet regime planted the
seeds of their hostility when it put the Armenian-dominated Nagorno Karabakh
under Azerbaijan's administrative control. That decision created resentment
among the Armenians, who lost part of their land and population. In 1988, the
Armenian Karabakhis' demand for reunification with Armenia pushed the two
then-Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan into a bloody war over the
fate of Nagorno Karabakh. The war ended in 1994 as both sides agreed on a
ceasefire, but what they did not agree on was the fate of about 20 percent of
Azeri land, including the enclave, now under the Armenian-backed Karabakhis.
The occupied territory's unsettled fate has ensured hostile and unpredictable
relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. There is little, if any, hope for
its peaceful settlement in the near future as it requires a degree of mutual
flexibility and willingness to compromise, luxuries that neither the
Armenians nor the Azeris can afford for many reasons.
As the victorious side, the Armenians have no incentive to return the
territory whose land and population they view as necessities for their
survival. Their control over the territory has turned it into a national
source of honor and pride. In particular, its return to Azerbaijan could be
interpreted as a sign of weakness and a bow to the Azeri demand under
pressure. Being the defeated side, the Azeris cannot accept anything short of
return of the entire occupied territory. Accepting Armenian control on any
part of it would be taken as caving in to the Armenians and the selling out
of Azeri interests. The existence of millions of Azeris and Armenians living
in their respective countries as war refugees makes any compromise over
territory practically impossible. A firm stance on the occupied territory has
become a defining element for Azeri and Armenian nationalism.
Their different political and economic directions have further widened the
gap between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Since its independence, Armenia has established extensive political and
economic ties with two regional powers: Iran and Russia. Many bilateral
agreements have strengthened those ties and ensured the Armenians friendly
and stable relations with those states. Their ties with Russia also include
military and security dimensions. Russia is their main arms supplier and
their partner in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and its
collective security agreement.
Azerbaijan's vast oil resources have made it close to the United States,
whose oil companies dominate the republic's oil industry. Energy development
has become the main determinant in their relations since Azerbaijan's
independence. In late March, the United States' lifting of a ban on selling
arms to Armenia and Azerbaijan paved the way for adding a military/security
dimension to those relations. The conclusion of a few military agreements
between the United States and Azerbaijan has since hinted at that objective.
Azerbaijan will likely be the main military partner of the Americans given
Armenia's warm relations with Iran and Russia. As a close US ally and a
neighboring regional power, Turkey has also become close to Azerbaijan. In
addition to limited military cooperation, their relations have mainly focused
on political and economic dimensions.
Ties with two different groups of countries with reasons for concern about
each other's objectives have further complicated the Azeri-Armenian conflict.
The United States and Turkey have sought to establish their political,
economic and military presence in the Caucasus at the expense of Iran and
Russia. As Azerbaijan's neighbors, Iran and Russia have tried to ensure that
the Caucasus will not turn into a hostile territory. Thus, they have sought
to limit Turkish and US influences there. These four counties are not the
reason for the outbreak of the Azeri-Armenian conflict and its continuity.
However, their concern about an unfavorable settlement of the conflict at the
expense of their friend or ally or about any settlement, which could lead to
their vulnerability to the other rival group, has discouraged them from using
their full political capital in the conflict-resolution process. As an
external factor, this reality has reduced the possibility of a negotiated
settlement to the conflict.
Evidence indicates that the current state of Azeri-Armenian relations cannot
last very long. The existing no-war-no-peace situation has frustrated both
the Armenians and the Azeris who have reasons for dissatisfaction with the
status quo. In absence of a realistic chance for a sudden breakthrough in the
bungled conflict-resolution process, resorting to war to end the current
uncertainty will gradually become the only available option for them. If it
happens, a new round of war will delay for an unpredictable period of time
the fair and peaceful resolution of their conflict, apart from its threat for
regional stability.
Dr Hooman Peimani works as an independent consultant with international
organizations in Geneva and does research in international relations.
*******
#10
US Senate eyes normal trade relations with Russia
WASHINGTON, May 22 (Reuters) - On the eve of President George W. Bush's visit
to Moscow, the U.S. Senate signaled its willingness to waive a Cold War-era
restriction on trade with Russia -- but not just yet.
The Senate adopted a nonbinding resolution calling for the United States to
establish permanent normal trade relations with Russia "in an appropriate and
timely fashion."
The measure was adopted on voice vote during debate on a bill to expand
Bush's ability to negotiate new trade pacts.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden, a Delaware
Democrat, said he could not support waiving three-decade-old "Jackson-Vanik"
trade restrictions until Russia fully lifts an ban on U.S. poultry imports.
"I can either be Russia's best friend or worst enemy," said Biden, whose
state is a major poultry producer. "They keep fooling around like this,
they're going to have me as their worst enemy."
Biden complained that Russian import licensing requirements have had the
effect of maintaining the import ban even though Russian officials say it has
been lifted.
Russia, which imported $640 million worth of U.S. poultry products last year,
banned imports from March 10 to April 15, citing health concerns about
antibiotics in feed and salmonella. The move came shortly after the United
States slapped tariffs on foreign steel, including Russian shipments.
The resolution approved by the Senate was a watered-down version of
legislation offered by Sen. Sam Brownback, a Kansas Republican.
His original amendment would have allowed Bush to permanently waive the
Jackson-Vanik provisions, which require Moscow to demonstrate it allows free
emigration to qualify for normal trade relations.
Congress passed Jackson-Vanik in 1974 to hold U.S.-Soviet trade hostage to
progress by Moscow in allowing Russian Jews and other religious minorities to
emigrate freely.
Bush had urged Congress to graduate Moscow from the Jackson-Vanik provision
before his summit this week with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The issue is to some degree symbolic, since Moscow has been in compliance
with Jackson-Vanik since 1994.
The poultry issue blocked action on Jackson-Vanik in the U.S. House of
Representatives, where key lawmakers had expressed sympathy for removing the
measure.
However, Senate Finance Committee Max Baucus, a Montana Democrat, may be an
even bigger obstacle to congressional action on the issue.
Baucus, whose committee has jurisdiction over trade issues, has balked at
removing Jackson-Vanik until Russia has reached agreement with the United
States on the terms of its entry into the World Trade Organization.
He indicated on Wednesday that would remain the case even if U.S.-Russia
poultry trade fully resumes.
*******
#11
Thirty percent would vote for United Russia last Sunday
MOSCOW. May 22 (Interfax) - As many as 30% of the electorate would have
voted for United Russia if parliamentary elections had been held last
Sunday. This is one of the results of a poll held by the Public Opinion
Fund on May 18 and 19.
The Communist Party would have trailed with 22%, followed by the Liberal
Democratic Party and Yabloko with 4% each, and the Union of Right Forces
and the Agrarian Party with 3% each. Every 10th eligible voter would not
have gone to the polling station and 7% would have voted against all the
parties.
The poll sample included 1,500 people in 100 towns and villages in 44
Russian regions.
In the preceding poll held on May 11 and 12, 25% would vote for the
Communist Party and 27% for United Russia.
*******
#12
New York Times
May 23, 2002
As Bush Heads for Russia, Hopes for an Investment Plan Fade
By MICHAEL WINES
MOSCOW, May 22 — With President Bush barely a day away from Moscow, it
began to appear today that he would not be bringing with him economic
proposals to transform his first Kremlin meeting with President Vladimir V.
Putin into anything more than a funeral service for the cold war.
In Moscow, that was a clear disappointment for those who have held out hope
that Mr. Bush might use such proposals to signal that talk of a new
Russian-American alliance will yield tangible riches soon.
The Russian government said today that negotiators for both sides had put
the final flourishes on the centerpiece of the meeting, an agreement to
reduce each side's nuclear stockpiles by two-thirds or more.
The two presidents are also to sign a nonbinding agreement setting out a
new framework for bilateral relations.
And the Kremlin indicated that it would sign three other agreements dealing
with cooperation against terrorism, stabilizing world energy supplies and
expanding cultural and governmental contacts.
But none of the announcements mentioned what some Russians were seeking as
much as any arms-control accord: an increase in investments, economic
incentives or other policy changes that would help stimulate the Russian
economy.
A spokesman for Commerce Secretary Donald L. Evans, who is in Moscow for
the three-day meeting, said he knew of no plans to sign any such economic
agreements.
More galling to some officials — though expected — was the word that Mr.
Bush would not bring promises of action on the two economic issues of
greatest concern to them: the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and
American certification of Russia as a market economy.
The Jackson-Vanik amendment, aimed squarely at cold war restrictions on the
movement of Soviet Jews, bars the president from giving favorable tariff
treatment to nations that restrict free emigration. Congress has routinely
waived the ban for Russia during the last decade, but Russian officials see
its permanent abolition as a symbol that the United States recognizes
Russia's transition toward democracy.
Mr. Bush supports lifting the ban, but legislation to do so sits today in a
committee of the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, with no
clear date for further action in sight.
One Congressional official said that the amendment was snarled in an
unrelated legislative dispute over American textiles.
"There were some missteps on the administration's part," the official said.
"They just couldn't get it through the House, and they thought they had a
tough road in the Senate."
The United States has also held out hope of Russia's gaining the legal
status of a free-market economy, which would entitle it to an array of
benefits in trade with the United States.
But a Commerce Department officer said today that the quasijudicial process
leading to that decision was only now completing the period of public
debate, with the United States Import Administration still to conduct
deliberations of unknown length.
Russia must meet six standards to win market-economy status, and on some —
like the degree to which the government controls the allocation of natural
resources — the country's compliance may be an open question.
Officially, the Russian government has played down the delays in both
procedures, saying that the White House's commitment is a clear signal of
American trust even if real benefits have not yet materialized.
And, stymied economic hopes aside, there are the week's negotiated
accomplishments, of which the so-called framework agreement for bilateral
relations is the most important. It makes what the Kremlin called a
"politically binding" declaration that the two nations will not aim
military actions at each other and will seek to cooperate on foreign policy
and economic issues.
A senior American official said tonight that the agreement would also take
the first steps toward American-Russian cooperation on a limited defense
against ballistic missiles.
The United States announced in December that it was withdrawing from the
1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the foundation of most arms-control
accords, so that it could begin developing such a defense. Russia continues
to argue that the withdrawal is a serious mistake.
The senior official said the framework agreement would commit both sides to
set up a long-discussed center to exchange data on missile launchings and
tests.
******
#13
New York Times
May 23, 2002
Testing Putin on Iran
By WILLIAM SAFIRE
WASHINGTON — Thirteen days after Sept. 11 Russia's president, Vladimir
Putin, met with 21 leaders from the Duma and the Presidium of the State
Council to determine Russia's response to America's war on terror.
"One of the participants advocated support for the Taliban," reports
Grigory Yavlinsky, head of the democratic reform party, who was present,
"while 18 participants proposed that Russia remain neutral in the fight
between America and the terrorists. Only two said that Russia should
participate in the antiterrorist coalition."
Putin sided with the two, which instantly became the majority. (For
Yavlinsky's idealistic vision of how this could grow into a Russian-U.S.
alliance, try www.eng.yabloko.ru/) Putin then seized the opportunity to
abandon long-held strategic positions without humiliation and to gain a
superpower ally in Russia's inexorable rivalry with China.
Remember last year's hand-wringing by France's Jacques Chirac and Germany's
Gerhard Schröder about that cowboy Bush's insistence on a missile defense?
Recall their panicky prediction that his withdrawal from the ABM treaty
would surely start a new arms race? Then Bush abrogated, the Chinese
hyperventilated, and Putin all but genuflected.
Remember the horror of our accommodationists at the East-West "collision
course" sure to be caused by expansion of the NATO alliance to include
nations flush against Russia's borders? Strange as it seems, many members
of the old Soviet Warsaw Pact have already joined, and soon the three
Baltic nations will be welcomed. Putin has been pacified with regular NATO
consultation.
Remember the elite derision at how (yecch!) unilateralist it sounded when
Bush said he would reduce the nuclear missiles we have deployed by
two-thirds no matter what the Russians did? In Moscow this weekend, Putin
will blandly go along with that cut, and in return for codifying both in a
three-page treaty will not object to our keeping undeployed nukes in our
attic.
Ordinarily, these happy developments would cause a paroxysm of gloating by
hard-liners, but we are denied our deserved nyah-nyahing by the same device
Putin used on his score of Russian naysayers: Sept. 11 reshuffled the deck.
Diplomatic circumstances changed, and so mistaken predictions cannot be
held against the muddled multilateralists.
No longer does Putin fear humiliation if he gives way on armaments he
cannot afford. Russian pride was salved by the injury inflicted on the U.S.
and our need for intelligence help in the terror war, as well as public
buttering-up by an avidly trusting Bush. Putin's "turn to the West" — more
to the U.S. than Europe — does not seriously undermine his popularity at home.
After welcoming Bush to Russia tomorrow and following the usual signing,
embracing and cold-war-is-over effusion, the Russian will get to the point:
His nation needs capital investment as well as entry into the World Trade
Organization.
We know his population is down to half the U.S. size and his economy is
half as big as that of Portugal, the poorest country in Europe. But Putin
will remind us he is sitting on the world's largest oil and gas reserves,
which could break the OPEC cartel.
Bush, one hopes, will stress the need for sanctity of contracts and the end
of wholesale bribery to attract investors. He should tell Putin his
stranglehold on the mass media makes a mockery of political freedom, and
point out that a war on terror is not a free pass to continue to brutalize
Chechen civilians.
Then to the big one. For a whopping fee, Russia is helping Iran construct a
1,000-megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr (a name George W. can easily
remember) with a uranium conversion facility able to produce fissile
material for nuclear weapons.
At the same time, hundreds of Russian technicians are helping Iran develop
the Shahab-4 missile, range over 1,250 miles, to carry a nuclear or germ
warhead anywhere in the Middle East and into Europe.
Iran's terrorist arm is Hezbollah. If its agents are armed with a weapon of
mass destruction, and if that weapon is used against the U.S. (and our
defeatist F.B.I. director tells us to get used to it), then we would have
to retaliate against the terrorists' sponsors and suppliers. Thus for
Russia to help Iran empower Hezbollah is hugely detrimental to Russia's
interests.
Bush should make clear it would be the end of a beautiful friendship.
*******
#14
USA Today
May 23, 2002
Bush can give a hand up to Putin
By Louise Branson
Louise Branson, co-author of Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin, is a former
Moscow correspondent for London's Sunday Times.
Remember those lines from Joni Mitchell's 1970s song, Blue Motel Room: "You
and me, we're like America and Russia, we're always keeping score, we're
always balancing the power, and that can get to be a cold, cold war"?
The lyrics definitely need updating. As President Bush heads today for a
summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, he should take the lead in
shaping them. Not that the leaders need to "hold ourselves a peace talk in
some neutral cafe." They're already comfortable on each other's territory.
Putin visited Bush's Texas ranch in November. He will now show Bush around
Moscow and his native St. Petersburg.
A core problem, though, remains. The Soviet Union collapsed more than a
decade ago, but the ghosts and mind-set of the Cold War linger. Russia's
establishment, in particular, has found it hard to accept its diminished
status.
Bush and Putin have quietly formed a pragmatic partnership. Bush once said
America and Russia shouldn't be dependent on the relationship between the
two leaders, as he felt it was under Bill Clinton. He should revise that
assessment. His relationship with Putin is fast becoming an engine for
potentially dramatic changes.
The first, most visible evidence will come at the summit. The two will sign
an agreement deeply cutting nuclear weapons — from some 6,000 warheads to
between 1,700 and 2,200 each. This, Bush announced, would "liquidate the
legacy of the Cold War."
In fact, Bush had not wanted a formal agreement, preferring a gentleman's
handshake on a verbal accord. But he did Putin this face-saving favor (even
though the agreement, only three pages long, is seen by many experts as
laughably lacking in detail). The reason: Putin is on a risky course. He
has begun taking Russia in a new direction on the world stage: staking
Russia's success and security on Western integration — economic, military
and political. But he is doing so with a comparatively small circle of
enlightened advisers, plus going against the country's instinctual Cold War
grain.
Bush needs to help and nudge Putin, and Russia, further on this track. Bush
can already take much credit for this new direction — beginning with early
in his presidency, when he refused to be intimidated by Putin, a shrewd
former KGB officer. That includes Putin's moves to form an alliance with
China and to create international momentum against the American pullout
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Putin's new pragmatism emerged with force only after Sept. 11, as he took
the decision to give strategic, intelligence and other aid to the United
States in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. In part, this was because of
the stark choice the United States gave the world: You are with us or
against us.
The nuclear-weapons agreement is an important moment. But two other issues
could prove more significant: NATO and oil.
First, NATO. A few days after the Bush-Putin summit, both will attend the
new session of the first NATO-Russia council, being referred to as the
"19+1" arrangement. It will give Russia a real say in NATO decisions, a
first move toward possibly joining the alliance.
That is a breathtaking step, having Moscow in this new arrangement with
NATO, which was formed to combat Moscow's growing menace. But in addition,
the three formerly Soviet Baltic states, as well as Slovenia and Slovakia,
could be invited to join NATO in November, along with Romania, Bulgaria,
Croatia and others. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are already in.
A senior NATO official said this meant the Cold War was now "kaput." But
that assessment is premature. In fact, it's only a beginning. The real work
is ahead.
NATO's effectiveness has been diluted with so many new members. It needs to
firmly define its new raison d'etre as fighting terrorism and create
standards and procedures that make it the kind of civilizing "club" the
European Union has proved to be. Bush should take the lead in giving NATO
new meaning and bringing Russia properly into its fold.
Oil, the other long-term issue, is perhaps the most important question mark
now looming over the Russia-America relationship. It has become more urgent
in recent weeks because of the Middle East crisis, which has underscored
America's reliance on OPEC and particularly Saudi Arabia. A possible oil
partnership could quite literally transform U.S.-Russia relations into a
solid partnership lashed with business ties.
The bottom line: Russia has huge reserves of oil, and the USA would like to
tap into them. It is far from a perfect match. Among the many potential
pitfalls: transportation difficulties, Russia's continuing economic mess
and the bad experiences of American businesses that invested in Russia in
the 1990s.
Still, the idea is far more probable today. If Russia's economy were
eventually stabilized and underpinned by wealth from properly managed oil
sales, Russia could in time join other clubs such as the World Trade
Organization, as China has just done. Perhaps even, in the distant future,
it could join the European Union, an economic organization many Russians
view as more of a threat than NATO.
Bush's goal should be clear: to create a stable and allied Russia within
the Western fold. That would be the real happy ending to an updated Blue
Motel Room.
For now, though, the lyrics will have to focus on the search for that happy
ending — and the hopeful signs that one may be in sight.
******
#15
Vladivostok News
May 21, 2002
Vietnam War recalled from Soviet perspective
By Anna Malpas
A nostalgic celebration at the end of the Vietnam War was held at the
Vietnamese Cultural Centre in Vladivostok on May 7, at the opening of an
exhibition entitled 'The Vietnam War: looking back through the years', to
run throughout May.
Among the guests at the exhibition, to mark the 27th anniversary of the
fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975, were the Vietnamese Consul General,
students at the Marine State University, and local Vietnamese residents.
The Soviet Union played a crucial role in the Vietnam War, assisting Ho Chi
Minh's forces with supplies, arms and 22,000 military advisers. Soviet aid
was loaded onto ships in Vladivostok, and local sailors were among the
war-dead.
"We love the USSR very much and remember," said Nguyen Tien Zung, the
chairman of Vladivostok's Vietnamese association. His compatriots quietly
sang along to a wartime song, "We're going to free the South," performed by
a Vietnamese language teacher.
The director of the Vietnamese Centre, based at the Far East State
University, Professor Alexander Sokolovsky recalled the important role of
the Bridge of Friendship, a Soviet organization supporting Ho Chi Minh.
"It was established in 1971, and everyone joined. The Russian people wanted
to help the friendly Vietnamese people," he recalled.
"They demonstrated, gave money, and the state loaded big ships with rice,
food and medicine."
"The main sense of our exhibition is that we have no right to forget the
war. We don't want it to be repeated," he concluded.
Soviet military aid to Vietnam was officially acknowledged in 1999 at a
conference of the Institute of Military History in Moscow. Its findings
were published in a rare book, on display at the exhibition, called 'The
Vietnam War: looking back through the years'. Other exhibits include a red
sash given by Vietnamese school children visiting Vladivostok in 1968 and a
marble statue of Ho Chi Minh presented by the Consul General.
The Vietnamese Consul General Nguyen Ngoc Binh told the gathering that,
"Our people are close both spiritually and historically."
"We strengthened our friendship with our blood, sweat and tears."
However, he assured journalists that, "We now have normal diplomatic and
economic relations with the USA, and relationships are developing in other
spheres."
Vladivostok retains close links with Vietnam, and the Vietnamese Cultural
Centre at the Far East State University was partly funded by the local
Vietnamese population, which numbers around 1,0000, mainly businessmen and
market traders.
******
#16
Boston Globe
May 23, 2002
Editorial
Summit pragmatism
THE THREE-DAY summit between President Bush and Russia's President Vladimir
Putin beginning today in Moscow will be successful if it illustrates the
virtues of normal dialogue between two countries working out the terms for
increasing cooperation.
The treaty that the two men will be signing to reduce strategic nuclear
weapons from 5,000 or 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200 is receiving
headlines, but the reductions are less than the Russians want and less than
Americans can easily afford to make. In acceding to this US-imposed version
of arms control, Putin is doing what he has done with other potential
causes of conflict with Washington: making a virtue of necessity.
This is the crux of Putin's pragmatism. He is not a leader who allows
himself to misjudge the cards he has to play. Since budgetary constraints
and the sorry state of the Russian Army mean that Putin can do very little
to alter Bush's plans for missile defense or NATO expansion, Putin cuts the
best deal Moscow's weakness permits him and then seeks to change the
subject to areas of crucial interest for contemporary Russia.
Bush will need to calibrate carefully his use of American leverage. The
trick is to exercise that leverage on issues that really matter, such as
Russian sales of nuclear power plants and missile technology to the
theocratic hardliners who rule Iran, but to be as cooperative as possible
on agenda items such as the Kremlin's ambition to join the World Trade
Organization.
To qualify for the WTO, Russia must make many substantive reforms - in its
banking system, its implementation of commercial contract law, and its
practice of giving energy subsidies to inefficient industries. Since it
will be several years before these changes are in place, Bush's overt
backing for Russian admission into the WTO costs America nothing for now,
while it demonstrates to Russians that the path of Putin's pragmatism need
not be a one-way street.
More immediate is Russia's pronounced wish to receive Western private
investment. There is only so much Bush can say on this issue. He cannot
oblige US or European firms to make risky business decisions. The Russian
economic recovery that is underway has to be reinforced with more reliable
guarantees against arbitrary bureaucratic actions, erratic taxation, and
mafia extortion. But Bush can assure Russians that Americans understand the
difficulties of their transition and will do their utmost to help them
become a prosperous people living in a stable nation.
Bush need not approve of Putin's penchant for using his security services
to silence opposition, but Bush does need to show Russians that Putin's
pragmatism will benefit them.
*******
#17
Kyrgyzstan government resigns amid crisis
BISHKEK, Kyrgyzstan, May 22 (UPI) -- The entire government of the Central
Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan resigned Wednesday as demonstrations
continued, deepening the country's political crisis.
The protests centered on the death of five demonstrators in clashes with
police in March, and increased public opposition to a controversial
agreement transferring to China disputed territory on the
Chinese-Kyrgyzstan border.
Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akayev accepted Prime Minister Kurmanbek
Bakiev's resignation hoping to defuse the tense situation. But opposition
leaders said the step-down changed nothing.
Thousands of demonstrators continued to block a strategic road between the
north and the south of the country, linking the southern provincial center
of Osh with the capital, Bishkek.
Street protests have been going on since March when five demonstrators were
killed and more than 60 injured in violent clashes with police in southern
Jalalabad region.
At the time, the protests were over the arrest and detention of Azimbek
Beknazarov, a former prosecutor who had spoken out against Akayev.
Beknazarov was promptly detained and charged with abusing power. He was
released by the authorities following the demonstrations, but still faces
trial.
The more recent demonstrations have called a for a formal inquiry into the
March riots and the alleged police use of firearms against the unarmed
crowd. They also want charges against Beknazarov dropped.
A state commission has been set up to investigate the March events, but
government officials say they have not been able to pinpoint the officer
who gave orders to open fire.
President Akayev was quoted Wednesday as saying, "Kyrgyz society is right
to refuse to forgive the authorities and law enforcement agencies for
violations of human rights and infringements of democratic freedoms."
However, Russian press reports confirmed that Beknazarov would still be
tried.
Akayev also blamed the opposition for creating a crisis atmosphere,
fomenting hysteria and inciting unlawful acts.
Observers said that Akayev was trying to find a scapegoat in the current
crisis, transferring the blame to the government in an attempt to stay
above the fray.
On Thursday, police clashed with demonstrators outside the parliament
building in the capital, resulting in at least 70 arrests, and many now
face long jail sentences.
A group of parliamentarians traveled to the Bishkek-Osh and spoke to the
demonstrators, who say they will stay put until all charges against
Beknazarov are dropped. They have also threatened to march on the capital
if their demands are not met.
The opposition has also been angered by moves in parliament last week to
ratify an agreement handing over a large portion of disputed border areas
on the Kyrgyzstan-China border to China. The opposition, including
Beknazarov, claim the government had ceded China too much land.
Until March, Kyrgyzstan had been one of the most stable republics in
Central Asia. Akayev has accused certain forces of trying to destabilize
the country, which is hosting 1,900 international troops taking part in
operations in Afghanistan, including a significant U.S. military contingent.
(Marina Koslova in Tashkent contributed to this story.)
*******
#18
Excerpt
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
May 22, 2002
Remarks by the President in Roundtable Interview with European Print
Reporters
Q How do you, Mr. President, see Russia in the near future?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, it's the same issue that relates to the
European Union and America, as well as Russia and America. We want healthy
competition. We want our friends to be strong and competitive. We want the
economies to grow. I think it's essential for American policy makers to
recognize that a healthy Europe and a healthy Russia is in our nation's
interests. It makes it easier -- for example, a healthy economy makes it
more likely that a friendship will develop in a more significant way.
And so my message to the Russian people, as well as to here at home, is
that it is important that Russia be viewed as a friend, not as an enemy. I
said that right off the bat; that was my stated goal as a President, is to
work with Russia as a friend not as an enemy. I was able in Slovenia to
realize that was possible when I visited with President Putin. And this
head of his bureau there, or whatever you want to call the guy, asked me
the question, first question: Do you trust Putin?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I answered that several months ago when -- what's the
boy's name, Fournier is his name -- please, please, scratch that from the
-- (laughter) -- scratch that from the notes.
They said, how do you know? I said, I looked into his eyes and was able to
glimpse into his soul. See, and I've been proven right. I do trust him
because I believe he cares deeply about moving forward. There's so much
that can be done in the spirit of friendship, together. And that's how I
view -- that's -- and we've got a lot of problems.
We've got AIDS ravishing an entire continent. Well, imagine, here we are,
we're all representative of relatively wealthy nations -- hopefully,
Russia's wealth will increase -- and, yet, we're confronted with a society
that's being wiped out. And so one of the fundamental questions is how --
what do we do? We've got nations, responsible nations, how do we respond to
that?
And I've got some ideas. As you know, we put a -- anyway, my point to you
is that we want Russia to succeed. We want Russia to be healthy. We want
Russia, our partner now in fighting terrorism, to have the means to
continue the fight. And I hope this trip will help, you know, assuage the
doubts of some in Russia who -- and in America -- who like the old way of
resentment and bitterness and hatred. Vladimir Putin and I are putting that
behind us, for the good of both peoples....
Q Mr. President, can you please describe your relationship -- I'm excited,
therefore I'm reading. (Laughter.) Can you please describe your
relationship with President Vladimir Putin?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
Q How do you call each other during the informal session? What are the
subjects of your conversation after official state session?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would call my relationship warm. I enjoy his
company. He has got a good sense of humor, and I appreciate that. And he
has kindly invited me to his house, and I'm looking forward to going.
Our conversations will be about -- here's a man who loves Russia, and he
loves the Russian people. And he's deeply concerned about problems facing
Russia. And a lot of times, even in the most informal gathering, he shares
with me his deep concerns.
He is a -- he also is a man who worries about the threats that Russia
faces. We share a common interest in this war on terror, because Russia,
herself, has been attacked; innocent people have lost life. And he's
passionate on the subject, about protecting his homeland. And we share
information about how best to do that. I mean, we ask questions, as friends
would ask questions: "How are you doing this? Where are you doing that?"
Q How do you call him? Vladimir?
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I call him Vladimir, yes.
Q Vladimir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And he calls me George.
MR. FLEISCHER: Jorzh.
THE PRESIDENT: But he's a -- one of the interesting things we're going to
do is go to St. Petersburg together, and go on the barges and see the White
Nights.
Q Do you know a couple of words in Russian?
THE PRESIDENT: No.
Q No?
THE PRESIDENT: Nyet. (Laughter.) One. But I've got a Russian speaker with
me. Senorita Arroz. "Arroz" means rice.
*******
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