Johnson's Russia List
#6261
22 May 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Interfax: Russians spend at least $37 billion on bribes each year.
2. pravda.ru: RUSSIA'S SCIENTIFIC POTENTIAL MAY VANISH BY 2010.
3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Nataliya Art, How Many Russians Remain in the CIS?
Statistics cannot say.
4. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Mark Mackinnon, Sale of Russian farmland
first since 1917. Farmers fear they'll be forced off land if the collective
votes to sell.
5. RFE/RL: Michael Lelyveld, Moscow Seeks Role As Alternate Oil Supplier
To West.
6. RIA Novosti: PETERSBURG REGAINING CAPITAL-CITY STATUS.
7. Reuters: U.S. military may pave way for Georgia prosperity.
8. Business Wire: 'ADAM SMITH - PUTIN'S RUSSIA' to be Broadcast On CNBC;
Special is First Adam Smith Program for CNBC.
9. PRESS CONFERENCE WITH STATE DUMA COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE VICE CHAIRMAN
ALEXEI ARBATOV AND POLITIKA FUND PRESIDENT VYACHESLAV NIKONOV ON
RUSSIA-US-NATO
RELATIONS.
10. strana.ru: Sergei Markov: There are three individuals ready to make new
decisions - Putin, Bush and Bin Laden. Decision time, Russia builds new
relations with world leaders and organizations.
11. Trud: Georgy Boss, Poverty Is a Vice of the State. Economic policy is
not a bargain over the delta that has formed because of an oil price increase.
12. Asia Times: Ehsan Ahrari, The schizophrenic Russian-Iranian nexus.]
*******
#1
Russians spend at least $37 billion on bribes each year
MOSCOW. May 21 (Intrefax) - Russian citizens spend at least $37 billion on
bribes to various officials each year. This follows from information issued
by Georgy Satarov, president of the INDEM Center for Applied Political
Studies, who spoke at a news conference at the Interfax central office in
Moscow on Tuesday.
The level of corruption in Russia "has, at least, not been decreasing in
Russia over the past ten years," Satarov said. Such a conclusion can be made
based on the research conducted by the INDEM center over the past two years,
he said.
The turnover of "non-business corruption" is estimated at $2.8 billion,
Satarov said. "People spend the most money on admission to universities ($449
million), followed by bribes to traffic policemen ($368 million) and courts
($274 million). The total amount of bribes paid for various services relating
to medical care reach some $600 million," Satarov said.
Commenting on corruption in business, Satarov said that the amount of
bribes paid here annually reaches $33.5 billion, while Russian budget
revenues in 2000 were $40 billion.
Satarov said that these calculations are based on "the minimal figures."
"In reality, they could be three times as high," Satarov said.
*******
#2
pravda.ru
May 21, 2002
RUSSIA'S SCIENTIFIC POTENTIAL MAY VANISH BY 2010
The situation involving Russian science does not allow much optimism. Russia
is turning into a secondary country not only from a political and economic
points of view but in the scientific sphere as well. To be honest, the misery
of Russian scientists became known long ago. To overcome the crisis, several
ways out are suggested that provide for more financing of the scientific
sphere or radical structural reforms in scientific establishments. However,
no considerable changes have been made.
Meanwhile, as the Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper reports, Russia may soon
loose its scientific and technical potential for good. Almost 70% of Russian
students who study abroad will not return to Russia, as forecasted by the
Demography and Human Ecology Center at the National Economy Forecast
Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The center held an
investigation of the immigration potential and the "return home" potential
among Russian students who study abroad.
On the eve of the March session of the RF Security Council dedicated to
problems of the technical scientific complex of the country, trade unions
chairman of the Russian Academy of Sciences Valery Sobolev sent a letter to
deputy secretary of Russia's Security Council Vladislav Sherstyuk. He wrote,
"There is every reason to state that personnel problems in the scientific
sphere are to be immediately settled, otherwise all programs designed for
technical, scientific, and innovation development of the country will fail.
Indeed, there will be no sufficient staff to implement the programs. In case
no anti-crisis measures are taken, Russia's technical scientific complex will
vanish as an important professional sphere by the year of 2010."
The above-mentioned facts are no surprise at all. Where to and why should
students studying abroad return? Nowadays, the wages of Russian scientists
are very low. For example, a doctor of science, who is at the same time head
of a department or scientific subdivision, author of numerous monographs and
researches earns about 3,000 rubles per month (about $100). Personnel of
lower ranks receive less. Scientists in some institutes get some additional
payments and grants. However, the majority of scientists have to search for
more work on the side or to leave the institutes altogether.
Do you think we can expect much from Russian science under such conditions?
Is it possible for Russian scientists to perform super important tasks at a
time when the industry is experiencing its hardest times? The answer is
certainly no. Today, many institutes subsist on resources created during the
Soviet era. Practically no young specialists go into to science, as
contemporary Russian science has nothing at all to offer them in exchange for
their work. As a result, average age of the Russian scientist today is about
50-55 and sometimes 60 years. In fact, young scientists prefer to work abroad
for higher wages, if they have the choice. Indeed, if you have to constantly
think about money to support your family, it will be impossible to perform
scientific experiments successfully.
It is sad to admit that we have no reason to believe that the situation in
Russia's science will improve soon. The most talented scientists will still
leave the country for work abroad. Some will certainly stay because of
patriotic feelings, but, unfortunately, patriotism only is not enough for
scientific research nowadays. As long as Russian authorities focus little
attention on problems of the Russian technical scientific complex, we can not
expect that technological lagging of the country will be overcome. Not only
technical equipment but brain potential as well requires investment.
Vasily Bubnov
PRAVDA.Ru
******
#3
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
May 22, 2002
How Many Russians Remain in the CIS?
Statistics cannot say.
By Nataliya Art
In the last edition of "The Russian Project" we wrote about how "all-
knowing" statistics know little about how many Russians there are in
the world. The same picture is repeated in the CIS, only more
dramatically: the outflow of Russians from the former Soviet republics
in the last 15-17 years (even in the Soviet period Georgia was
the "leader" in this uncivil process, and actively encouraged the exit
of Russians from the 1970s) has led to irreparable consequences. Most
of all for the economy, industry, culture and education of all the CIS
countries, where the titular ethnic group took pains to drive out
the "occupiers". After this the long-awaited prosperity for some reason
did not take place anywhere. On the contrary: having irrationally and
intentionally destroyed the "Russian" buffer (that is, a population
that in principle is always loyal to any local authority), the leaders
of CIS countries, aside from various other problems, have been
confronted with such an easily predicted situation as exhausting war
with one another, bringing inestimable harm and suffering to the
very "titular" nationality (the civil wars in Georgia and Tadjikistan).
Another paradox is that those who drove out the Russians and
the "Russian-speakers" for some reason soon afterwards abandoned their
native land, so recently freed from imperial dominance, and themselves
turned up in the former center of the empire, thereby clearly
demonstrating one of the results of their own "struggle". How many
Russians remain in the CIS today? One must depend upon the very
conditional data provided by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the absolute exactness of which in objective circumstances can hardly
be guaranteed. As inadequate synonyms of the word "Russian" we again
must utilize such highly inaccurate combinations as "Russian-
speaking," "citizens of Russia [Rossiyane]," and "Russian language
population" and so forth. But this is what the statistics are today.
Well, consider them for yourself, and think about it yourself:
In Azerbaijan today there are 150,000 ethnic Russians.
In Armenia: 15,000 Russians.
In Belarus: 1,142,000 Russians.
In Georgia: around 200,000 Russians (?)
In Kazekhstan: of 14.98 million people 4.48 million of them are
Russian, that is more than 30% of the population.
In Kyrgyzia: 650,000 "Russian-speakers," that is about 15% of the total
population of the country (it is possible that these numbers are
exaggerated after the mass migration of Russians, Germans and others
from the republic).
In Latvia: of 2.4 million people approximately 30% of the population is
comprised of "Russian citizens".
In Lithuania: about 300,000 "Russian citizens".
In Moldova: according to data from the 1989 census about 562,000
Russians are enumerated, that is approximately 13% of the overall
population of the republic.
In Tajikistan: around 60,000 Russian citizens (this number is possibly
exaggerated after the mass migration of Russians in 1992-1993).
In Uzbekistan: of 23.2 million people 1.8 million are "Russian-
speakers".
In Estonia: of 1.45 million people about one third of them are Russian-
speakers (420,000 people).
(Trans. by Timothy Blauvelt)
******
#4
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
May 21, 2002
Sale of Russian farmland first since 1917
Farmers fear they'll be forced off land if the collective votes to sell
By MARK MACKINNON
SOSLOVO, RUSSIA -- Every time he steps outside to feed his scrawny chickens,
Valentin Simionov can see what he believes is the looming end of his family's
centuries-old farming legacy.
Just over the wooden fence that marks the end of his 1.5-hectare property, a
row of opulent, multistoreyed dachas -- the Russian equivalent of country
cottages -- sits where his neighbours' farms once stood. The dachas, status
symbols of the country's nouveaux riches, dwarf the small, red-brick
farmhouse where parts of three generations of Mr. Simionov's family still
live and work.
The new dacha dwellers have actually jumped the legal gun in buying their
properties. Last week, a new bill -- one that erases the last vestiges of the
Bolshevik Revolution -- passed the first of three readings in the State Duma.
It will make legal the buying and selling of farmland in Russia for the first
time since 1917.
In principle, Mr. Simionov sees nothing wrong with giving farmers the right
to do what they please with their land. But he worries the new law will give
the rich the legal means to force poor farmers off their lands without proper
compensation. "I'm afraid some rich guy will come and just tell me to get off
my land, the land my father died in the war to protect," he said, pointing to
a black-and-white portrait of his father hanging in the kitchen, alongside
other ancestors who farmed the same plot of land in this village just west of
Moscow.
"They'll just buy me, the village and the land and say, 'Get out of here.' "
Like many Russians, the 62-year-old farmer has been scarred by previous
privatization initiatives undertaken by successive governments since the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
When public utilities and other state enterprises were privatized in the
early 1990s, he, like almost everyone else, bought vouchers supposedly worth
10,000 rubles (about $25 U.S. at the time) that could be converted into
shares in the newly private companies. Like millions of others, Mr. Simionov
was left with nothing to show for his money when the scheme collapsed.
"Everyone was promised something and did not get it," said Alexander Galdin,
a member of the municipal council in the neighbouring town of Odinstovo. "For
the last decade, people have been deceived, and now the government is trying
to do it again."
Most farms are still collectively owned, as they were in Soviet days, and
many farmers worry that they could be forced off their land with little
compensation if the majority of the collective votes to sell.
The new government bill gives farmers and local authorities one month to buy
a plot before it is offered for open sale. The proposed land changes have
touched off a political firestorm in rural Russia, where living standards
have fallen over the past decade and nostalgia for the Soviet system is far
stronger than in the cities.
A fading Communist Party has tried, with some success, to capitalize on the
anger. Last week in the Duma, Communist Party Leader Gennady Zyuganov raised
the spectre of multinational agricultural firms sweeping in and buying up the
"motherland," and suggested some might even take up arms against to protect
their territory from foreigners.
"For us, it's not just about land, it's a question of war and peace," Mr.
Zyuganov warned, urging a national referendum on the issue. "The policy of
the current government only serves the interests of oligarchs [business
tycoons] and swindlers."
Heated protests, including calls for President Vladimir Putin to resign over
his support for the changes, have forced the government to consider
amendments to the bill, including ones that would allow foreigners to rent,
but not buy, farmland. Another proposal would see one price set for Russians,
a higher rate for foreigners.
The government has sworn to press ahead with some version of land reform
largely because the potential windfall from the privatization is too big to
ignore.
Russia, the largest country in the world, has about 1.7 billion hectares,
roughly a quarter of which are qualified as agricultural. According to
Agriculture Minister Alexei Gordeyev, the land could be worth between
$80-trillion and $100-trillion on the open market.
"Nobody doubts the necessity of land turnover," Alexander Chetveriakov, head
of the Duma's agriculture committee, said in an interview. "It is vital that
we have this law."
Although Russia's 1993 constitution allowed land sales, the Communists
controlled previous parliaments and were able to block the introduction of
the legislation necessary to enable such transactions. They lost control of
the Duma in the 1999 election.
******
#5
Russia: Moscow Seeks Role As Alternate Oil Supplier To West
By Michael Lelyveld
Russia has called a formal end to its oil-export restrictions in support of
the OPEC cartel. The move before this week's summit coincides with Moscow's
offer of energy cooperation with the United States, but the past six months
may have set a poor example for market transparency.
Boston, 21 May 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Russia has dropped the last vestige of its
cooperation with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, just
days before a summit meeting between presidents Vladimir Putin and George W.
Bush.
On Friday in Moscow, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov announced plans
to end Russia's export reductions, which were declared last December to help
OPEC support prices in a slumping market.
After meeting with Russian oil-industry executives, Kasyanov said, "We
decided that the time has come to gradually lift restrictions on oil
exports," Interfax reported. The resumption of previous export levels will
take place over the next two months, Kasyanov said.
The move, less than a week before the Moscow summit, which starts on 23 May,
may raise hopes for the energy cooperation that Russia has offered to the
United States. As the largest non-OPEC producer, Russia has cast itself in a
new role as an alternate supplier to the West.
Speaking earlier this month at a Group of Eight ministerial meeting in the
United States, Russian Energy Minister Igor Yusufov affirmed "Russia's
readiness to become the guarantor of stability in the world market of energy
resources."
Whether Russia's decision on OPEC is connected or not, the summit now seems
likely to have an energy component to accompany the headline issues of
security and arms control.
Late last month, U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow told a Moscow
press conference that energy cooperation would be part of an economic package
to be taken up at the summit, the Russian official news agency RIA-Novosti
reported. How far the cooperation will go is still unclear.
But Russia seems to have shifted the political focus of its energy policy,
even if no change in its exports has actually taken place.
Analysts have been nearly unanimous since December in doubting that Russia's
pledge of export reductions would give OPEC more than moral support. Russia's
promise was to lower its daily exports by 150,000 barrels. The 5 percent
decrease was supposed to be in proportion to the production cut of 1.5
million barrels per day from 10 members of the OPEC cartel.
But figures so far suggest that Russia has raised both its production and
exports. Russian crude exports outside the CIS rose 4 percent in the first
four months compared with the same period a year ago, Interfax reported. Oil
output through April was up 8.8 percent.
The government still insists that Russia honored its pledge because of a
narrow definition. After Russia's cuts were questioned, officials claimed
that they applied only to exports through state-controlled pipelines and only
in comparison to the third quarter of last year.
Those technicalities seemed to create a temporary glut of oil on Russia's
domestic market, while allowing most Russian producers to continue their
plans to boost production this year. Yukos, for example, pushed output up by
17 percent in the first quarter, not far from its forecast of a 24 percent
increase for 2002.
Markets reacted calmly to Russia's announcement on Friday, as crude prices
fell in London but rose in New York. Middle East tension, rather than concern
about Russia, has driven the market for most of the past month.
A commentary Friday by RIA-Novosti took comfort in the lack of volatility
after Kasyanov's announcement, saying, "Today's market complacency proves
that Russia was correct in its forecasts."
In London, the Associated Press quoted Leo Drollas, chief economist for the
Center for Global Energy Studies, as saying, "They didn't cut in the first
place." Drollas called Russia's decision "a nonannouncement of no great
consequence to man or beast."
But if Russia now plans to cooperate with the United States rather than OPEC,
it remains to be seen whether the relationship will have any more substance.
The decision by Russian oil companies to invest in production seems to suit
U.S. energy policy because it puts more oil on the world market, though
little Russian oil actually reaches U.S. shores.
If Russia's pledge to OPEC never really mattered, then perhaps its methods
over the past six months did. The Russian government seems to have shown a
heavy hand in calling Kremlin meetings of oil companies and announcing export
decisions, whether the companies supported them or not.
Despite its growing commitment to free markets, the government also used its
state-owned pipelines to pursue its policies. In addition, officials offered
little to the world market in the way of transparency.
Washington seems likely to welcome greater cooperation with Russia and
investment in its growth. But the world market may also welcome more
independence for its oil companies and a reduced government role.
*******
#6
PETERSBURG REGAINING CAPITAL-CITY STATUS
MOSCOW, May 21 /RIA Novosti Writer Anatoly Kovalev/ - On May 8 (old-style
calendar), 1712-that is, 290 years ago-Peter the Great (I) transferred the
capital of the Russian Empire from Moscow to St. Petersburg, the town he had
founded nine years earlier in northwestern Russia. The new capital then had a
single square, with nothing but buildings housing the Senate and the Customs
Office, a restaurant, and an imperial palace. On the nearby Vasilyevsky
Island, there were three windmills surrounded with a dense forest.
The Russian monarch fell in love with this spot at the delta of the Neva
River, calling it an earthly paradise. He launched an ambitious construction
project here, starting with the Peter-Paul Fortress, and would spare no cost
to materialize his ambition. Many of the people drafted in by the Czar as
forced labor lost their lives to physical strain and damp climate.
Peter tried to instill the spirit of freedom in his new capital, making steps
to eradicate slavery and despotism. Among other measures, he issued an edict
banning subjects from kneeling at the sight of his carriage or himself on
horseback, with offenders subject to lashing. But having his humble subjects
change their old ways proved no easy task, and he eventually had to abolish
the edict.
Peter commissioned Swiss architect Domenico Trezini to build a Russian
Amsterdam. Even the modern-day beholder will be impressed by the stupendous
scope of the construction launched here then, with work underway at several
sites simultaneously.
Moving the capital from Moscow, in the center of European Russia, to this
far-northern site, just recaptured from the Swedes, was a daring step on the
part of Peter. He was, in fact, advancing his capital as a forward base in
the as yet unfinished Russo-Swedish war. Hence the city's dynamic and
aggressive style.
The model based on two centers of gravity (Petersburg as the kernel of
Russia's secular power and Moscow, as its spiritual center) proved remarkably
sustainable.
Preparations for St. Pete's 300th anniversary celebrations are in full swing
now. Once again, the city has turned into a large-scale construction site. A
presidential palace is to open here in the anniversary year (2003). In an
effort to restore its equilibrium, the post-Soviet Russia seems to be
returning to the two-capital model.
*******
#7
ANALYSIS-U.S. military may pave way for Georgia prosperity
May 21, 2002
By Elizabeth Piper
TBILISI (Reuters) - For the Americans, it may simply be a new foreign front
in the global "war against terrorism."
But, now that U.S. military instructors are in place to train Georgia's
ragtag army, the tiny Transcaucasus state is quietly celebrating a political
coup.
The former Soviet republic, on Russia's southern rim, has become the latest
stop for the U.S. military in Washington's anti-terrorism drive.
U.S. instructors, who arrived Sunday, are bent on helping Georgian forces
eradicate potential threats from Muslim radicals believed to have links with
the al Qaeda network blamed for the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States.
Adding to the U.S. military presence elsewhere in the old Soviet Union and in
other parts of the world, Washington hopes its instructors can lick Georgian
forces into shape so they can fight rebels holed up in the lawless Pankisi
Gorge.
But for Georgia, which has been a hotbed of war and rebellion since
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the arrival of U.S. forces has a
much wider significance.
It is the climax of efforts by President Eduard Shevardnadze and his
impoverished country to win the attention of the West.
They see the U.S. military presence as a sign that the world's leading
economic power wants stability in Georgia, officials say.
More particularly, it should lead to economic stability in the volatile
region which straddles what is likely to be a key route for Caspian oil to
the West in the future.
"It is a unique and wonderful opportunity for us to gain experience from the
very high level experts from the United States," Deputy Defense Minister Gela
Bezhuashvili told Reuters.
"A capable army will give the region more stability. ... Then the United
States and the Western world will have a reliable partner in the Caucasus, in
our region."
PANKISI PROBLEM
Washington is spending some $64 million on the mission -- a small sum by U.S.
standards but almost four times the annual defense budget of Georgia, which
has struggled to rein in rebels in Pankisi and in the breakaway Abkhazia
region.
The U.S. instructors say they will teach about one in 10 army members
everything from how to shoot a rifle to how to feed fighting troops.
Georgian officials say the training means the army would be ready for action
if needed, but they are reluctant to launch a military operation in the
Pankisi Gorge, or in Abkhazia, soon, for fear of civilian casualties.
"I see the army role in the cleaning up of Pankisi Gorge as not very
significant at the moment. But if the situation gets worse and requires army
movement, we will be ready to go in," Bezhuashvili said.
"There are different groups of people in Pankisi ... They must be treated
differently. You cannot employ a military operation there without identifying
these groups because then you will have the same mess the Russians had in
Chechnya."
He said the Georgian population would suffer and could turn against Tbilisi
if Georgia launched a war against the region. This could turn into a
prolonged and bloody struggle to rival that waged by Russia against Chechnya.
Instead, Tbilisi would focus on using the newly-trained army to indicate that
the country was working on securing stability, he said.
A key route for energy pipelines from the oil-rich Caspian to the West,
Georgia has already signed up to a Western-backed billion dollar pipeline
from the Caspian to Turkey's southern coast.
"A stable situation in Georgia means economic stability. It means that the
project for the Baku-Ceyhan (oil pipeline) and gas pipelines will go smoothly
without any problems," Bezhuashvili said.
"This is a window of opportunity for us. If we close this window by our own
actions, I should find another job."
*******
#8
'ADAM SMITH - PUTIN'S RUSSIA' to be Broadcast On CNBC; Special is First Adam
Smith Program for CNBC
FORT LEE, N.J.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--May 21, 2002--ADAM SMITH- PUTIN'S RUSSIA, an
hour-long look at the country's progress under President Vladimir Putin, will
be aired on CNBC during prime time on May 25,26 and during the day on
Memorial Day, May 27.
The special will be the first program produced by Adam Smith for the
financial cable network. ADAM SMITH - PUTIN'S RUSSIA will air May 25 and 26
at 9 pm and 12 midnight ET and May 27 (Memorial Day) at 2 pm and 6 pm ET.
ADAM SMITH-PUTIN'S RUSSIA will examine President Putin's motives and
capabilities. Adam Smith will outline key strategic changes in
Russian-American relations. Russia is a powerful oil exporter. Could it rival
Saudi Arabia, and help lessen American dependence on the Middle East? What is
Russia's role in the war on terrorism. Ambassador Jack Matlock, a Russian
specialist who is former envoy to Moscow, will share his insights.
The program will also provide a look at the coming Russian generation, scenes
unfamiliar to most Americans- Russian rap stars, Russian MTV, and students
from the leading Russian business school. The program also provides an
insider view of Russia's continuing, but often unregulated, changeover to
free markets. Adam Smith provides a unique background for understanding the
current mood and situation in Russia.
Adam Smith did the first major economic interview with Gorbachev in 1990. His
weekly program, "Adam Smith's Money World," was the first American public
affairs program regularly broadcast on Russian television, with a Russian
translation. Other past Adam Smith specials from Russia have been recognized
with gold medals at international film festivals, and the citation of the
Overseas Press Club. "Adam Smith's Money World," seen weekly on PBS, won more
Emmy nominations than any other program in its field, and was broadcast
regularly in over 60 countries.
ADAM SMITH - PUTIN'S RUSSIA also features the following: Dr JAMES BILLINGTON:
Librarian of Congress, MICHAEL McFAUL: Stanford University, ALAN ADREAS:
Chairman, ADM, ANATOLI CHUBAIS: Former Dep. Prime Minister of the Russian
Federation, GRIGORY YAVLINSKI: presidential candidate, Chairman, Yabloko
Party, STEWART PAPERIN: Senior VP. Open Society Institute, LINDA JENSEN:
President MTV Russia, PAVEL CHERKASHIN: Founder, ACTIS, ANDERS ASLUND
Carnegie Endowment, FRANK BAKER: Anderson Group, Moscow, RONALD FREEMAN: VP
(retd) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development . Additionally, the
program will include a round table session with Ambassador JACK MATLOCK,
former US envoy to Russia and Richard Ericson, Professor, Columbia University.
The name "Adam Smith" was first coined by New York Magazine for George J.W.
Goodman, who hosts and serves as managing editor of the Adam Smith programs.
The Adam Smith books, The Money Game and Supermoney were no.1 bestsellers,
and three other Adam Smith books were also bestsellers. They were translated
into 20 languages.
*******
#9
Excerpt
PRESS CONFERENCE WITH STATE DUMA COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE VICE CHAIRMAN ALEXEI
ARBATOV AND POLITIKA FUND PRESIDENT VYACHESLAV NIKONOV ON RUSSIA-US-NATO
RELATIONS [RIA NOVOSTI, MAY 21, 2002]
PRESS CONFERENCE WITH STATE DUMA COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE VICE CHAIRMAN ALEXEI
ARBATOV AND POLITIKA FUND PRESIDENT VYACHESLAV NIKONOV ON RUSSIA-US-NATO
RELATIONS [RIA NOVOSTI, MAY 21, 2002]
Copyright (c) 2002 by Federal News Service
Moderator: We are beginning our press conference. Russia, the US,
NATO. How will relations between these three global centers develop in the
light of the agreements and decisions, both adopted and to be adopted at the
upcoming meeting of the presidents of the US and Russia in Moscow? This is
what we are going to talk about today.
Let me introduce to you the main participants in our meeting. State
Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairman, Alexei Arbatov, and Politika Fund
President Vyacheslav Nikonov.
I am turning the floor over to Alexei Arbatov.
Arbatov: I will try to be brief because it will be more interesting
to have a dialogue. Before each summit, especially a series of summits,
bilateral and multilateral, the press and officials have an unsurmountable
inclination to build up expectations, thus emphasizing the importance of the
meeting. Often the results of the meeting turn out to be disappointing,
because one expects more from it than he gets.
I think the upcoming meeting in Moscow and the multilateral forums
to follow it shortly have one peculiarity that differs them from such
events. You might have noticed that the official press services of the
Kremlin and the government have kept a low profile in connection with the
upcoming meeting. They have not been whipping up expectations, they have not
held big press conferences, they are not preparing the public for some
epoch-making event.
On the other hand, the upcoming events will be much more important
than regular summits because they will kind of sum up the first results of
the period, a totally new one in relations between Russia and the US and
between Russia and the West, that began from the tragic events in September
of last year and started dramatically changing the views of politicians and
the public with regard to security problems.
From this point of view, this will be a milestone event. Even if
its results are modest, this will mean that the changes that have occurred
in relations between the great powers are quite modest compared to the drama
and the depth of events that happened on September 11 and that constantly
dominate international relations. This will mean that politicians have
failed to change their way of thinking and to adapt to the new realities.
This will mean that the way of thinking of politicians, the military,
parliamentarians and the public lags far behind the real and deep changes
that are taking place both in international relations and in the entire
field of international security.
I think I will stop here. I am sure you will have questions about
concrete agreements and concrete issues, and then we will be able to talk
more about this.
Nikonov: A few brief remarks. Not so long ago in one of the West
European countries, I unexpectedly got a number of reproaches from my
colleagues. It was something like this, look what the Americans are doing.
They have seceded from the ABM Treaty, they have proclaimed some axis of
evil, they are going to attack Iraq, they have not ratified the Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol called upon to fight global warming, they
kick everybody out of their markets, the steel and agricultural markets. Why
don't you Russians don't do anything about this?
And I ask them, why don't you? And they say, you know, we are
allies, after all, and then you can only get yourself hurt by fighting the
Americans while the result will be zero because they don't listen to us.
Over the last decade, and maybe even century, the world has so
gotten used to watching our country fighting the US that now everybody seems
to be surprised, worried and outraged when Russia doesn't do this. Europe
and many other countries behaved over these decades in a very pragmatic,
reasonable and, if you like, hypocritical way in order to be or remain
strong and avoid a confrontation with the US. For us, a confrontation with
the US remained the only meaning of our existence for a very long time, and
we continued it instinctively although our national interests had largely
changed. Russia-US relationship is losing the dramatic nature characteristic
of the 1970s and the 1980s and becoming a part of a larger agenda that is
topped by such issues as Russia's economic revival, its return to the club
of great powers, integration into the global economic system. It's high time
Russia learned acting in a pragmatic way.
The upcoming summit has brought about a large number of
commentaries on who will win or lose the summit. Strange and old-fashioned.
I think a person who starts musing about who will lose or win a US-French or
British-German or Japanese-Ukrainian summit, this person should be advised
to go to see a psychiatrist. However, in this country it's still believed
that it's normal to put the question this way with regard to the Russia-US
relationship, which is not so of course.
As for the contents of our agreements on the reduction of strategic
weapons and our interaction with the North Atlantic Alliance, which is a
topic of our press conference, I'll tell you what. Of course, we can live
without a "START-3" treaty, I don't know what it will be called, we can live
without the format of twenty with NATO. But at the same time, an
alternative, namely, the existence of such a treaty and of partnership with
NATO, is more beneficial to Russia.
It's true that the Americans do not assume any obligation under the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to destroy the warheads that are subject to
cuts. However, we must forget that an alternative to this, which does not
quite satisfy us, would be not a treaty that does not fully satisfy us, but
no treaty whatsoever. The absence of a treaty would mean the absence of arms
control as such. By the way, the Americans did not object to this at all
because they can afford to have as many warheads as they want. But we, given
our budget constraints, would have had to go all the way down to the
ceilings that will be set by the Treaty or may be even lower.
So, an alternative would have been a unilateral fall below these
ceilings or joint cuts of warheads under a binding treaty. Obviously, the
latter has all the advantages.
Many people criticize the formula of our relations with the North
Atlantic Alliance, NATO-20, saying that it is no better than the previous
one. But so far no one has demonstrated that it is worse, just as no one has
proved that it is indeed better. So far it is just a clean slate, on which
any formula of the Russia-NATO relationship can be written.
But I would not exaggerate the importance of the Twenty,
primarily because today NATO as an organization does not have quite clear
functions. The functions of this organization are becoming less and less
understandable at a time when it does not have any substantial role to play
in the conduct of the anti-terrorist operation. It's role as a military
organization will be even less understandable after the enlargement planned
for November this year, when NATO as a military organization will grow
weaker.
Apart from that, we should remember that decisions on security
matters are taken not within the North Atlantic Alliance. Of course, it is
pleasant to seat at the same table with the 19 NATO member countries --
shortly there will be 26 of them. Of course, it is important to discuss
European security affairs at a round or square table together with Estonia,
Romania, Iceland and the US, but it should be clearly understood that
decisions will be taken not at that table. Decisions will be taken, firstly,
in Washington, DC, secondly, again in Washington, DC, and thirdly in the
capitals of some European powers, such as London, Paris and Berlin. From
this point of view bilateral relations, I think, are more important to
Russia than any relations within the framework of the Twenty.
In addition, we think that rather serious decisions can be expected
from the summit regarding economic relations between Russia and the US.
Clearly, the renunciation of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment will be timed to
coincide with the summit, one way or another. Anyway, it will be announced
that the Senate will do this pretty soon. Russia has every chance to receive
a market economy status vis-a-vis the US. However, I'm not sure we should
hurry with getting this status now, before we have joined WTO and acquired
the ability to protect ourselves institutionally through that organization.
Of course, I expect a great deal from possible accords on energy partnership
between Russia and the US, accords that could create a very serious economic
foundation and put flesh on the present skeleton of relations, which is not
very strong. If Russia becomes a major energy supplier for the US, of
course, the nature of our relationship would change dramatically.
Everything that is going to take place at the summit will
constitute steps toward a better world, and they should be welcomed, of
course. These will be not seven-mile steps of the kind which we used in our
thinking at the time of the CPSU, but these will be steps in the right
direction. Thank you.
*******
#10
strana.ru
May 21, 2002
Sergei Markov: There are three individuals ready to make new decisions -
Putin, Bush and Bin Laden
Decision time, Russia builds new relations with world leaders and
organizations
By Sergei Markov
The time has come. May and June of 2002 is the time when Russia's president
will be holding summits with the most prominent Western leaders and
organizations. After September 11th, it became clear to one and all that the
old world order could no longer exist without changes. However, a new world
order has not come into being, if one does not take into account America's
readiness to shoulder the burden of leadership on this planet.
The May-June series of summits can resolve one old problem that the current
leaders face as a result of the end of the Cold War, namely to end the
isolation of Russia; to return it to the ranks of the leading European
states; to give it the status and commitments of a member of the leading
political and economic organizations in the West.
However, the Russian elite simply cannot believe in this. And a considerable
part of the foreign political elite in the U.S. and European countries
continues to live in the past.
Russia and the U.S. equal presidents and bureaucracy.
Since their last meeting, the presidents of the U.S. and Russia, having
concentrated their attention on the new realities and new threats to the
world after September 11th, and have been able to ensure very serious
breakthroughs in Russian-American relations as well as in the relationships
between the presidents of the two countries. But in spite of this, a
dangerous situation has emerged and it may cause a rupture between the
presidents on the one hand, and between the foreign political elites and
bureaucracies on the other hand. This is because in many respects part of the
elites and bureaucracies was not prepared for the changes that are taking
place. This rupture between the presidents and bureaucracies must be
eliminated.
There are two main ways of eliminating this rupture: either the two
presidents will be compelled to step back from that model of trust and
cooperation that they were able to create during their previous talks, or the
elites and bureaucracies of the two countries will have to accept the
presidential pattern of interaction.
To a certain extent there will be movement in two directions, but which of
them will become predominant - whether it be the presidents who will compel
their governments and elites to advance faster, or the elites and
administrations who will compel the presidents to fall back - remains an open
question. This then is the question that will be decided at the summit. What
concrete accords will be hammered out and to what extent they are upgraded
can be seen as indications in which directions relations will shape out -
whether the bureaucracies move forward or the presidents fall back.
Challenge of the times: leadership needed.
Today Putin and Bush are acting as those world leaders whose behavior
corresponds to the greatest degree with the new realities. After September
11th, many international organizations and leaders of the most influential
countries were unable to adapt themselves to the new realities and work out a
new strategy of behavior - they took a wait-and-see approach.
The Europeans who have become accustomed to living under the U.S. nuclear
umbrella and who are also busy building a unified Europe, are shunning
responsibility; they are not ready to shoulder the burden of leadership; in
fact, they do not yet have single, influential political instruments within
the framework of a unified Europe. China, according to the logic of ancient
Chinese wisdom, prefers not to get involved in the fight and is sitting it
out on the bows of a tree, from where it can watch the two tigers fighting it
out down below.
A leadership vacuum has developed and this is very dangerous at this point in
time. Today there are only three individuals that demonstrate readiness to
make new decisions: Putin, Bush and bin Laden (the latter should be
understood as "structures of international terrorism'). Putin and Bush are
simply obliged to become leaders and to take the initiative upon themselves.
If they fail to do that then the leading political subject that will
determine the principles of the new world order will be international
terrorism (understandably, it will be built not as a single organization but
rather a web or network, which incidentally better corresponds with the most
up to date principles of building complicated organizational systems). If it
is not Putin and Bush then it will be bin Laden.
That is why it is precisely Putin and Bush that face a most important task -
to formulate the principles on the basis of which a new world order is to be
built, and to chart out the directions along which the role of the most
important international organizations will evolve. If they fail to do that
then today no one else is prepared to formulate the principles of a new world
order.
This then is the challenge that time has placed before Putin and Bush. Their
upcoming summit and subsequent meetings, along with the political decisions
they make will show whether they are capable of rising to meet this challenge.
It is the mission of Putin and Bush to return Russia to the ranks of the
European states. History has created the prerequisites also for solving
another task - to spearhead the return of Russia to the European community of
nations (which at the end of the 20th century, in view of the might of the
U.S., transformed into a Euro-Atlantic community) to which it organically
belonged for centuries, but from which it was alienated as a result of
Communist rule.
In large measure, Russia has already gone through the process of internal
transformation: it has a democratic political system (and from the point of
view of national minorities - it is the most democratic in Eastern Europe),
and it has a market economy. The time has come for Russia to hook up to the
main European and Euro-Atlantic unions. This could be the mission facing the
Putin-Bush tandem.
The task of returning Russia to Europe consists of two parts: internal and
external. In this tandem, Putin could be responsible for the speedy
westernization of internal Russian political, economic and other
institutions, and Bush could be responsible for integrating Russia into the
system of western associations and organizations.
Russia and NATO.
The Rome summit that will immediately follow the Putin-Bush summit will open
the first page in solving a most important issue - the formation of a new
system of security in Europe and adjacent areas. There are several factors
that make it possible to speak about an end to the Cold War.
1.NATO is at last ready to transform from a military defensive body whose
bureaucracy is intensively seeking work for itself in order to retain its
budgets, into an organization for actively maintaining collective security.
The new "20" format, after all is said and done, must become the main
political body responsible for collective security. In the future, other
countries could also join the "20."
2.There now is a chance to end the confrontation between the West and Russia
- a confrontation that continued for practically the entire 20th century. The
inclusion of Russia and NATO in the new organization and its efficient
functioning act as a guarantee for general security and a guarantee for
integrating Russia into the western political and economic structures.
3.Russia and the European Union. The Russia-EU summit will begins after the
summit in Rome. On the one hand we see increasingly obvious cooperation on
new grounds and the formation of a unified Europe, while on the other hand,
we see that the bureaucrats, both in Russia and the European Union, are not
ready to pursue a policy that is in line with the new realities.
Among the representatives expected to convene in Rome and Moscow will be
leaders and bureaucrats. The bureaucrats that came to the helm in their
countries by chance, thanks to the high degree of political stability in
Europe, and in this period of forming new institutions, fearing changes, will
try to retard development; whereas the political leaders that are ready to
rise to meet the challenge of the times will move forward and will make use
of the changes to alter the work of international organizations and fulfill
new tasks.
The discussions at the summit will show who is who, and whether Europe is
ready for renovation and whether real leaders stand at the helm.
********
#11
Trud
May 21, 2002
Poverty Is a Vice of the State
Economic policy is not a bargain over the delta that has formed because of an
oil price increase
By Georgy Boos
The president demands that the government should increase the economic growth
rate by 8 to 10 percent and not by 3 to 4 percent. The difference is big
enough - it suggests a different rhythm in the economy and in the social
sphere. And it is wrong to think that we cannot live in that rhythm. Vast
manpower resources are unused in this county today. Russia may have a high
growth rate if it uses its potential effectively. But a different economic
policy is needed for that.
Today we closely depend on the raw materials market. When oil prices are
going up, Russia's budget is growing as well, federal programs are funded,
the earnings of teachers and doctors are increasing, and officials report
successes. But when oil prices drop, everything goes wrong and the budget is
slashed. Strictly speaking, economic policy in this case is replaced by a
banal sharing out of the delta that has formed due to oil price increase - so
much is to go for debt repayment, so much to the reserve fund, and so much to
wage increases.
But one should not have illusions about all this - export alone will not save
Russia's economy. The market of resources is unstable and tends to shrink,
and in the coming 5 to 10 years we shall not be able to sell to the West
anything but raw materials and a very limited number of other goods. So, we
have is no other way than to expand the domestic consumer market and thus
stimulate national economic growth.
In my view, there are two key factors capable leading to overall improvement.
It is accumulating an investment capability of the national economy through a
correct taxation and monetary-and-crediting policy. And we are to stimulate
the growth of the real incomes of the population. Poverty is a vice for an
economy of a state, because without effective demand it has no incentive for
growth.
We are to bring the poor category of the population up to the middle class
level, so that they would become consumers of home-produced goods. Precisely
this category should become mass purchasers. And everything should be done to
make their earnings grow. Having got such an incentive, the national producer
will be able to offer goods, if he obtains required resources.
But the question is: where investments are to be obtained from? Quite a few
people still expect a flow of investments coming in from abroad. It is a
delusion. In the first place, foreign investors have better places to invest
their money. Second - and this is the main thing - Western capital is not
interested in investing in Russia, because our market is very narrow and it
is pressed by the lack of funds. We shall interest foreign businessmen when
they have an opportunity to produce their goods here in Russia and to sell
them here with a profit.
For those who have a business in Russia it would only be natural to invest in
development and construction. And they will start doing that when the
authorities pursue a correct tax and crediting policy. For instance, if it
provides conditions in which the banks crediting what we call the real sector
get guarantees from the government. Today all are interested in a growth of
the home market. Even businessmen living by profit gained from export.
We have no to develop our economy. There is no other way. Russia's population
is decreasing at a rate of 800,000 people a year mainly because of the
disastrous social and economic conditions of the greater part of the
population. Unless we make an economic breakthrough, the population decrease
will become irreversible.
*******
#12
Asia Times
May 21, 2002
The schizophrenic Russian-Iranian nexus
By Ehsan Ahrari
Ehsan Ahrari is a Norfolk, Virginia, US-based strategic analyst.
The Russian-Iranian nexus, though it has been around for more than 10 years,
has a schizophrenic character that makes one wonder whether it will stay
intact, and if so, for how long. The relationship's schizophrenic aspects
refer to two contradicting trends, one intending to keep it intact and the
other leading to its potential disintegration.
The unifying aspects include cooperative endeavors to maximize the strategic
objectives of Russia and Iran. The potentially disintegrating aspect is the
simmering conflict between Tehran and Moscow regarding the division of oil
reserves in the Caspian Sea. Those tensions notwithstanding, the nexus is
significant in the sense that it enables the two countries to pursue policies
that the United States watches with quite a bit of concern. And if it were to
remain strong, this nexus might result in increased competition between the
United States and Russia in and around Central Asia and West Asia in the
coming years.
The schizophrenic character of this nexus also reflects the fact that the
strategic objectives of Iran and Russia are becoming increasingly intricate.
This reality is its Achilles heel, and makes it potentially enticing for the
US to lure one of the partners away, thereby bringing about its
disintegration. The chances of America's success in doing so regarding Iran
remain virtually nonexistent, however, especially in the aftermath of
President George W Bush's axis of evil speech of last January, grouping Iran
with Iraq and North Korea as countries that were developing weapons of mass
destruction.
In the last years of the late Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini's life, Iran toned
down the stridency of its verbal attacks on the former Soviet Union.
References to it as the "little Satan" (as opposed to regular references to
the United States as the "great Satan") became scarce in public statements.
Iran needed Soviet weapons to continue to fight the Iran-Iraq war, and Moscow
was willing to sell. As Iran emerged from that nine-year long bloody war in
1988, its revolutionary perspectives lost their idealistic edge and became
hardened.
Iran was not about to forget that the international community offered it
little support, even though Iraq was the aggressor in that war. All Arab
countries, save Libya and Syria, sided with Iraq. Western sources of weapons
were not available to Iran, largely as a result of the systematic American
endeavors to close those avenues, leaving Russia, China, and North Korea as
the main sources of weapons purchase. Even though weapons from those
countries did not have the quality of Western weapons, they were available to
Iran with few or no political strings attached, as long as it was able to pay
in hard currency. Thus, an Islamic republic became dependent on weapons from
communist countries, initially to be able to continue fighting a war with a
fellow Muslim Iraq, and, after the end of that war, to enhance its security
within a turbulent region.
One bitter "lesson learned" was that Iran adopted a fiercely self-reliant
policy in defense affairs. The disaggregation of that policy meant that it
was to sign contracts with the former Soviet Union, China and North Korea to
initially only assemble, but later on manufacture, those weapons
domestically. The indigenous know-how thus developed was to enable that
country to eventually become a self-reliant conventional arms producer of
significant proportion.
When the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, its successor state Russia not only
understood the significance of honoring its defense agreements with Iran, but
also institutionalized those commitments, thereby creating a nexus with the
Islamic republic. Russia was motivated to become Iran's major weapons
supplier for two reasons. First, it was in dire need of hard currency to
bankroll not only the research and development part of its defense sector,
but also to be able to pay for such basic essentials as salaries of its
military personnel and the upkeep of its intricate operating weapons systems.
Second, since it was then attempting to find its own permanent international
status in the world arena, having Iran as a state dependent on its weapon
supplies became a source of prestige for Moscow. After all, Iran, despite its
diminished status as a military power stemming from the turbulent
revolutionary change, had retained its significance as a major Persian Gulf
nation, and a foremost opponent of America's dominance in its neighborhood.
As Russia calculated, it could always use the "Iran card" in its intricate
ties with the United States.
For Iran, Russia was an important country because its perspectives on the
sale of weapons coincided with those of Iran. Besides, as its contacts
related to the purchase of Russian weapons became more frequent, Iran became
quite certain that it could persuade Russia to sell increasingly
sophisticated weapons, and even allow its highly skilled scientists - who
found themselves without jobs with the implosion of Soviet Union - to help
Iran acquire indigenous technological knowledge in developing sophisticated
weapons systems, and even facilitate the development of Iranian nuclear
know-how.
The Gulf War of 1991 significantly diminished the threat potential of Iraq to
Iran. But Saddam Hussein was still in power, and Iran was convinced that
Iraq's desires to emerge as a nuclear power remained unaltered. Consequently,
Iran decided to maintain an active program of nuclear development under the
rubric of "peaceful nuclear use". In addition, it opted to develop highly
ambitious programs of acquiring indigenous skills to develop ballistic and
cruise missiles.
Russia, as the chief successor state of the Soviet Union, though no longer a
superpower, became a permanent "wannabe superpower". As such, it resented the
unipolar system that emerged at the cessation of the Cold War. The United
States became the dominant global power in both economic and military
affairs. However, Russia favored a "multipolar" global system, that is, a
system where a number of great powers would collectively, or by forming ad
hoc groupings, resolve heady global issues. In other words, no single power
in a multipolar system could veto the actions and strategic preferences of
another great power with impunity. Thus, the phrase multipolar system became
a euphemism for bringing about an end to US hegemony, a preference that
Russia and China, as well as Iran, strongly share. But these countries also
knew that any collective endeavors for the creation of a multipolar system
had to be benign in nature, for the dominant power, in the final analysis,
may decide to resort to military power to sustain its dominance.
In the years between the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks on the
US on September 11, Russia was largely focused on creating global conditions
for the evolution of a multipolar world. A number of major issues of US
foreign policy - the development of the national missile defense (NMD) and
the theater missile defense (TMD) systems, nuclear proliferation, and
ballistic and cruise missile proliferation - were to be exploited by Russia,
China and Iran for the evolution of a multipolar system. In the process, they
were to enhance their respective bargaining positions vis-a-vis the United
States. Especially for Iran, every one of those issues was at the very core
of its security concerns, since the prospects of imminent US-Iran
rapprochement was well nigh nonexistent.
The US was onto the Russian-Iranian preferences for a multipolar global
order, and was especially concerned about active missile and nuclear programs
in Iran that Russia, China and North Korea were supporting. But persuading
Russia or China to cooperate, by ceasing their trade and assistance to Iran
in these realms, was highly intricate, and involved offering the types of
concessions to those countries that Washington was not willing to make. For
instance, China would have wanted the United States to abandon its support of
Taiwan so that it could tackle head-on the issue of reunification with that
island territory. Similarly, both Russia and China wanted the US to forgo
developing the NMD and TMD systems, and not abandon the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) treaty of 1972. All those issues became entirely significant
sources of friction and dispute among the US, Russia and China when George W
Bush was elected president.
The conventional patterns of international diplomacy were given a severe jolt
when the terrorists struck the US on September 11. Those enormously tragic
events initiated a militant phase of American foreign policy. The Bush
administration declared war on global terrorism. All nations - mighty and
weak - were put on notice when Bush issued a seemingly clear admonition:
"Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists." Russia did not have
to think twice before it jumped on the American bandwagon. There ensued a
period of cooperation that the American media - in an almost wishful way -
interpreted not only as a period of entente cordiale but even the making of
an alliance between Washington and Moscow. What remained unstated in that
collective exercise of wishful thinking was that Russia was to remain a
junior partner of such a perceived relationship.
President Vladimir Putin of Russia was not interested in reading tea leaves a
la the US media about the long-term prospects of alliance-building with the
US. He clearly wanted his country to go along with the United States, but to
use that new bumper sticker slogan "war against global terrorism" to pacify
the Chechens, who are bent on breaking away from the Russian federation. It
became clear only in early 2002 that Russia had its eyes fixed all along on
the goal of "wannabe superpower". And the Russian-Iranian nexus was still
going to play an important role in it. Thus, Moscow never agreed with the
Bush administration's pleas for stopping the sale of advanced weapons
systems, but especially the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran's
"peaceful" nuclear programs.
Russia also continued transferring the missile know-how to Iran, despite the
US-Israeli charges that Iran could easily integrate its missile and chemical
technologies to build chemical armed missiles in the short run, and would
eventually be able to transform its peaceful nuclear technology to develop
nuclear weapons, very much like Israel itself did in the 1960s and India in
1998. Moscow was persistent in dismissing American interpretations of Iranian
intentions related to its aspirations to develop weapons of mass destruction.
The Russian-Iranian nexus was also consistent in its support of the Northern
Alliance in its intractable military conflict with the Taliban rulers of
Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. But, despite the flow of military and
materiel support to the Northern Alliance, the latter could not make any
significant territorial gains against the Taliban. It was only after the US's
military campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda - Operation Enduring
Freedom - in the aftermath of September 11 that the balance of power
significantly shifted in favor of the Northern Alliance and resulted in the
dismantlement of the Taliban regime from Afghanistan.
Russia and Iran drew a considerable amount of satisfaction from that
development, since both of them had suffered from the jihadist tendencies of
the Taliban - which were acutely anti-Shi'ite, and were also incredibly
supportive of the on-going military conflict between Russia and the Chechen
breakaway movement. However, Moscow and Tehran remained wary of the presence
of the US forces in their neighborhood, and its implications for their own
priorities of influencing the modalities of governance and the shape of
politics in Afghanistan.
As Russia and the US cooperated during the course of Operation Enduring
Freedom, Iran also offered its own moral support. Both those countries were
present at the Bonn meeting of past November-December, which brought about
the creation of the interim government under the chairmanship of Hamid
Karzai. Russia and Iran pledged financial assistance for that government. But
after the uprooting of the Taliban, the United States and Iran frequently
clashed over the nature of activities of the latter in relation to the
support of Ismail Khan, a warlord of the Herat province of Afghanistan. The
Bush administration never understood, or did not want to recognize, that Iran
has legitimate interests in ensuring the stability of Afghanistan, at least
as much as, if not more than, the United States. Afghanistan is Iran's
immediate neighbor, thus both countries are destined to share each other's
fate, for better or for worse. The US's perspectives are rather simplistic -
that any Iranian activities in the Afghan areas contiguous to its territories
are nothing but evil and destabilizing in nature.
Russia and Iran continue to see eye-to-eye on the need for having a large say
about what happens in Afghanistan, without necessarily adopting the roles of
"kingmakers" for that country. As long as the end result of US activities in
Afghanistan is the emergence of a government that is not hostile to Russia
and Iran, these countries are willing to limit the scope of their own
activities and wait for the outcome of the loya jirga of June in Afghanistan
to select a more permanent government.
So much for the integrated aspects of the Russian-Iranian nexus. Its
schizophrenic part becomes clear when one examines the dynamics of the
involvement of Moscow and Tehran in the Caspian Sea.
The Caspian Sea is a region where oil specialists have over the years issued
a variety of figures on the size of oil reserves. While reading those
estimates, one has to distinguish between possible, probable and recoverable
numbers. For instance, in 1994 it was reported that the Caspian Sea held 200
billion barrels of oil. Later, that figure was trimmed to 115 billion
barrels, or even less. In both instances, the numbers reflected possible and
probable estimates only. In a recent report, the US Department of Energy
issued an estimate of 233 billion barrels of possible reserves. But the
Italian oil company ENI might have been closer to reality when its chairman,
Gros Pietro, stated that the Caspian Sea contains only 7.8 billion barrels of
oil. This figure reflected recoverable oil reserves.
Five littoral countries - Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan - are claimants to the Caspian Sea oil reserves. The issue of
growing contention is the formula of dividing the sea floor among those
states. Russia has "authored a formula of dividing only the sea floor into
national sectors", leaving the waters open to its dominant navy. Iran, on the
other hand, "has sought common control of the entire Caspian Sea or a 20
percent share, while the Russian plan would give it perhaps 12 percent". Iran
bases its claims on the "equal partnership treaties" that it signed with the
Soviet Union in 1921 and in 1940.
Despite numerous meetings among the littoral states for the past 10 years, a
mutually acceptable formula has not been negotiated. Putin, after yet another
failed summit meeting on the issue in April, stated that he would pursue
bilateral and trilateral arrangements. That was unmistakably a not-so-subtle
threat to leave Iran out of the negotiating process. However, he set off
alarm bells in Tehran by flying from that summit meeting to the Russian naval
base at Astrakhan, where he ordered a naval exercise that will be held this
summer.
And Putin was good to his word. Last week he signed a bilateral agreement in
Moscow with President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to divide the
natural resources of the Caspian seabed.
With regard to the naval exercises, Moscow later attempted to calm Iranian
concerns by stating that they were aimed at combating terrorism and drug- and
caviar-smuggling, Iran got the message behind the sudden surge of militarism
in Russia related to the heady issue of distribution of oil reserves. The
speaker of the Iranian parliament, Mehdi Karroubi, was the ranking official
who bluntly gave Iran's reaction to Russia in a public statement. "Iran and
Russia have good and close ties," he said, "but the Islamic Republic of Iran
is obliged to defend its territorial integrity and national interests of the
country. We are neither an aggressor nor [do we] tolerate aggression. We hope
all countries, including Iran, will achieve their fair share in the Caspian
Sea."
There is little doubt that neither Iran nor Russia would want to further
ratchet up their differences in their quest for an acceptable formula for the
allocation of Caspian Sea oil, for at least two significant reasons. First,
given the currently somewhat depressed nature of global oil prices, it
behooves both of them not to rapidly develop the Caspian Sea oil reserves. In
fact, a case can be made that Iran and Russia as oil producers would want to
postpone bringing their respective shares of Caspian Sea oil to the global
market by at least by 10 years. Second, both countries are only too aware
that they must maintain their nexus at a time when the US is enhancing its
own presence in their neighborhood in the name of fighting global terrorism.
The US military presence is indeed escalating in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan,
while Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have agreed to open their air space for the
US to supply humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. That reality, in all
likelihood, would lead to further military cooperation among them. Both
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have shown a high degree of interest in expanding
the scope of security ties with the US, a development that both Moscow and
Tehran are watching warily. Washington has also started training the security
forces in Georgia, traditionally a country of significant interest to Russia.
The durability of the Russian-Iranian nexus became apparent once again when
Russian officials reiterated their position, prior to the impending
Bush-Putin Summit later this month, that their country was not providing
missile or nuclear weapons technology to Iran. Even after the establishment
of the Russia-NATO Council on May 14, Russia does not seem to have lessened
the significance of its long-standing ties with Iran. On the Caspian
Sea-related issues, even though Iran appears to be in a not too strong a
negotiating position, neither is Russia, given its own concerns related to
the growing American presence in Central Asia.
Thus, Moscow and Tehran are likely to find a formula for sharing the Caspian
Sea oil that is reasonably acceptable to the latter. By doing so, they would
avoid the emergence of any deleterious tensions within their nexus. In the
final analysis, doing their fair share for the emergence of a multipolar
international system remains an objective of high politics to both Iran and
Russia. This type of system, in their collective judgment, will be eminently
more promising to their strategic interests than the extant unipolar system
of America's dominance, which in some instances ignores their interests, or,
in others, assigns them lesser significance than they deserve.
*******
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