Johnson's Russia List
#6253
18 May 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Interfax: Russian attitudes on U.S. improve - poll.
2. Interfax: Russian-U.S. trade up 1.1% in 2001.
3. ABC News: More than 13,000 Chechen rebels dead since Oct 1999: Russia.
4. BBC: Russia moves against corruption.
5. AP: US Wants Better Russia Nukes Count.
6. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace meeting report:
Contemporary Russia: Revolutionary Past and Post-Industrial Future.
(Vladimir Mau)
7. Interfax: Russian investment abroad still exceeds foreign investment
in Russia.
8. Trud: Vladimir Nikonov, WILL RUSSIA BENEFIT FROM NEW RUSSIAN-AMERICAN
ACCORDS?
9. The Russia Journal: Alexander Golts, Moving beyond the last nuclear
treaty.
10. Gazeta: PRIME MINISTER KASYANOV WANTS NO ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM.
(interview with Andrei Ryabov)
11. New York Times: Bill Keller, A Beautiful Friendship.
12. The Independent (UK): Mary Dejevsky, Russian weakness is disguised
by some new clothes.
13. US Ambassador Alexander Vershbow: A NEW AGENDA IN U.S.-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS.]
*******
#1
Russian attitudes on U.S. improve - poll
MOSCOW. May 18 (Interfax) - Russian attitudes on the U.S. have improved
over the past two months, a sociological poll shows.
Thirty-seven percent of the Russians surveyed said that current
relations between Moscow and Washington can be considered "normal" and
"calm", while in March only 29% said so. Twenty-eight percent of
respondents said they consider Russian-U.S. relations "lukewarm" (against
30% in March), 12% characterized the relations as "good" and "good
neighborly" (10% in March), 5% as "friendly" (3% in March), and 2% as
hostile (4% in March). Three percent were undecided (6% in March).
This information was provided to Interfax by the All-Russian Public
Opinion Research Foundation. It was obtained by polling some 1,600 people
in late April.
At the same time, in response to the question, "How do you generally
feel about the U.S.?", 59% said they felt "very good and basically good",
while in March only 48% said so. Thirty-four percent said they felt "mainly
bad" and very bad" about the U.S. (41% in March). Seven percent said they
were undecided (11% in March).
When asked how they think relations between Russia and the West will
develop in the future, 39% of the respondents said they "can be really
good," 51% said these relations "will always be based on mistrust," and 10%
were undecided.
******
#2
Russian-U.S. trade up 1.1% in 2001
MOSCOW. May 18 (Interfax) - Trade between Russia and the United States
edged up 1.1% from $7.3387 billion in 2001 to $7.3897 billion in 2001, the
Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade said ahead of President
George W. Bush's visit to Russia next week.
Russian exports to the USA fell 9.8% from $4.6442 billion to $4.1877
billion, and Russian imports increased by 18.8% from $2.6945 billion to
$3.202 billion.
Trade has yet to recover to its pre-crisis level - in 1998, the two
countries clocked up $9.5121 billion in mutual trade. Russia still has a
trade surplus with the USA - this was $985.7 million in 2001.
The United States is Russia's third biggest industrially-developed
trading partner after Germany and Italy, and accounts for 5.4% of Russia's
entire foreign trade.
Russia exports mostly primary commodities to the United States - raw
materials and semi-finished goods account for approximately 80% of the
exports. More specifically, Russian exports consist of precious metals and
gemstones (25% of the total), aluminum and its products (20%), ferrous
metals (13%), inorganic chemical products (10%) and oil and oil products
(3%). Machinery and equipment accounted for 5.7% of total Russian exports
in 2000.
The main Russian imports from the U.S. are machinery and equipment (52%)
and grains (14%).
******
#3
ABC News
May 18, 2002
More than 13,000 Chechen rebels dead since Oct 1999: Russia
The Russian army said on Saturday more than 13,000 rebels had been killed
in Chechnya since the start of a military operation against separatist
groups in the republic in October 1999.
Staff officers based at the army's Chechen headquarters in Khankala said 20
rebels had been killed by Russian forces in the last week alone .
They said one Russian soldier had been killed by a landmine during the same
period.
The figures are impossible to confirm independently.
Russian officials last published official figures at the start of 2002,
when they said that 3,500 rebels had been killed since October 1999.
At the time, non-governmental organisations estimated that rebel losses
were at least double the figure.
******
#4
BBC
17 May 2002
Russia moves against corruption
Russia's lower house of parliament overwhelmingly approved a Code of
Conduct for Civil Servants at its first reading on Friday.
The code is modelled on a blueprint for European governments suggested by
the Council of Europe as a legal framework for stamping out corruption.
It was proposed by a group of liberal members of the State Duma who argue
that corruption is suffocating the country.
But representatives of President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Government
have expressed reservations about the bill, which still has to go through
two other readings in the Duma.
The bill was passed in its first reading only days after the prosecutor
general railed against abuses by bureaucrats.
"Verifications show that individual civil servants have established
commercial organisations and receive profits from businesses not connected
with their official work," Vladimir Ustinov was quoted as saying.
The prosecutor general admitted that most of the 2,500 corruption cases
involving civil servants which came to court in 2001 involved petty
bribe-takers.
One of the legislators who proposed the bill, Vladimir Yuzhakov, said that
officials in Russia "abuse their position en masse to improve their own
living standards".
Only one deputy voted against the bill in the Duma on Friday which lays
down strict rules:
Civil servants should not hold positions outside the service, either
commercial or political, if that may lead to a "conflict of interest"
They "should neither request nor accept presents, services, invitations and
any other benefits"
They should not use their civil service status when looking for a job after
their stint in office is completed
When signing an employment contract with a government agency, future
applicants are required to take a pledge to abide by the Code and face
sanctions if they breach it
The BBC's Moscow correspondent, Nikolai Gorshkov, notes that no punishment
is envisaged for anyone who knowingly fails to blow the whistle on rogue
colleagues or improper practices within their departments.
The Communist system of denunciation is still fresh in people's memories,
our correspondent says.
Putin's own bill
Mr Putin's official envoy to the Duma, Alexander Kotenkov, predicted that
the Code adopted by the Duma would become obsolete by the time it reached
its third reading.
He said that a bill on state bodies proposed by the president himself was
near completion.
But he added that certain clauses in the Duma's bill could be incorporated
into the president's.
The government's representative in the Duma, Andrei Loginov, said
parliament should pass a Code of Conduct for its own members first in view
of frequent press allegations against MPs.
But a leading liberal MP, Boris Nemtsov, defended the Duma's bill, saying
it would hit hard at corruption.
"The Code will work against those who sit and quietly cut into the state
budget for their own ends," he said.
*******
#5
US Wants Better Russia Nukes Count
May 17, 2002
By TOM RAUM
WASHINGTON (AP) - President Bush may raise the issue of Russia's stockpile
of short-range nuclear weapons when he meets with Russian President
Vladimir Putin next week in Moscow.
The arms-reduction treaty the two presidents will sign sharply cuts each
nation's arsenal of long-range warheads over the next decade, but does not
address tactical, or battlefield, weapons.
A senior administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity,
expressed concern about the size of the Russian stockpile.
The United States intends to ask Russia to account for these weapons and
explain what it intends to do about them, but is not interested in engaging
in formal negotiations, the official said.
Russia has not said how many of these weapons it has, but estimates have
ranged from 4,000 to 15,000. The U.S. stockpile is classified, but a
non-governmental expert assessment puts the figure at 1,600. Of those, 320
are deployed in Europe while the remainder are in storage, the assessment
said.
Putin and Bush are expected to discuss ways to further reduce the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials during their meetings.
At next week's summit, Putin and Bush will sign a treaty under which
long-range strategic warheads will be reduced to between 1,700 and 2,200 on
each side by the end of 2012, down from the approximately 6,000 each
country has now.
The official said the treaty - cutting the arsenals of globe-straddling
nuclear weapons to a tenth of their Cold War peak - is the last of its
kind. The Bush administration does not envision further negotiations or
arms control treaties with Russia, given the warming of relations between
Moscow and western nations, the official said.
Bush will visit Moscow and St. Petersburg while he is in Russia. He will
also visit France, Germany and Italy on the weeklong trip that begins
Wednesday.
U.S.-Russian relations have improved dramatically in the aftermath of the
Sept. 11 terror attacks. But sharp economic disputes remain over U.S.
duties on Russian steel and Russia's ban on imports of U.S. poultry.
The official suggested the poultry dispute is making it hard to grant
Russia's request that the United States lift the Jackson-Vanik amendment to
a 1974 trade law that ties Moscow's trade privileges to its policies on
Jewish emigration and other human rights.
The administration doesn't have any problem with Russia's recent record on
allowing emigration, but it does have concerns about its trade practices,
the official said.
*******
#6
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
www.ceip.org
meeting report
Contemporary Russia: Revolutionary Past and Post-Industrial Future
May 16, 2002
On Thursday, May 16, Carnegie Senior Associate Martha Brill Olcott chaired
a discussion with Dr. Vladimir Mau on "Contemporary Russia: Revolutionary
Past and Post-Industrial Future." Dr. Mau is a prolific writer, economist,
and commentator. He is the recent co-author of the highly received, The
Challenge of Revolution (Oxford University Press, 2001 with Irina
Starodubrovskaia).
Over the past ten years, Russia has been subject to four separate but
overlapping transitions. This is a historically unprecedented occurrence.
First, Russia had to deal with the structural challenges to its economy
associated with post-industrialization. What the West had to go through in
the 1970s, the USSR had to deal with in the 1980s. Structurally, these two
systems were not that far apart and the same high inflation and structural
dislocation that plagued the West in its transition from a traditional
industrial economy plagued the USSR a decade later. Second, Russia was
assailed by a full-scale macroeconomic crisis. Although uniquely Russian in
character, in principle this crisis was no different than those that have
occurred in Argentina and Mexico. Third, Russia was confronted by the
transition from Communism. This was a process that was, most certainly,
unique in history, but Russia did not go it alone. Rather, Russia went
through its post-Communist transition along with 25 other countries
formerly of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. Fourth, Russia had to face
the challenge of political revolution. This was the first full-scale
revolution in an industrialized country. In this instance, revolution is
defined as a systemic transformation carried out under a weak government
that can meet neither its obligations nor its needs. Economically, this
revolution was characterized by a budget crisis, default and the
redistribution of property for political purposes in order to increase
efficiency, restore fiscal order and provide for a modicum of stability. In
Dr. Mau's view, the most interesting feature of the early period of this
revolution is the rapidity with which the Russian government was able to
reconstitute state institutions after abolishing their Soviet predecessors.
The most important result of the past ten years is that three of the four
crises confronting Russia are now over. Russia's macro-economic crisis is
over, its transition from communism complete and its revolution has ended
(in as much as the nature of the regime in Russia is no longer a question
of political debate). The main challenge that remains is to deal with
post-industrialization. This challenge contains a double uncertainty: no
one truly knows what a post-industrial society and economy is, let alone
how to catch up to it, as Russia must. A few features of this new system
have become clear. Specifically, it has become obvious that industrial
policies are no longer necessary. There is no longer any need for a clear
set of industrial goals and priorities. It is, however, less clear what
sort of positive incentives can be created to induce successful adaptation
to this new system. This is reflected in the domestic debate in Russia on
accession to the WTO. In Dr. Mau's view, the point should not be to focus
on how to protect old industries, but rather how to promote new industries
and sectors of the economy through competition.
Currently, four separate approaches are being advanced on how to deal with
the challenges facing Russia. The first approach proposes to redistribute
the wealth earned from the exploitation of Russia's natural resources to
other sectors of the economy and society in order to further their
development. While not a bad idea in theory, this sort of system of
redistribution is not very sound in Russia where state institutions are of
a less than trustworthy character. A second approach looks to Russia's
emerging Integrated Business Groups (IBGs) to help overcome the high
transaction costs that currently cripple much of the economic activity in
the country. According to Dr. Mau, while these IBGs can help mitigate
transaction costs, they also have a tendency to privatize profits and
nationalize loses. Moreover, in order for these IBGs to remain a positive
influence, the Russian government will have to push for entrance into the
WTO in order to offset the monopolistic tendencies of these groups through
institutionalized free trade practices. A third approach addresses Russia's
external debt to GDP ratio, claiming that it is simply too high. In Dr.
Mau's view, Russia's debt to GDP ratio may very well be too high for an
industrializing country to bear, industrialized countries have had to
assume much higher ratios in order to offset the costs of the social
services, such as education, that are a hallmark of post-industrialization.
The fourth and most promising approach is to focus on Russia's
institutional setting. It is important for Russia to adopt an institutional
benchmark, like the EU, to use as a model and a goal for reforming its own
institutions. In this instance, Russia would aim to form a close
relationship with the EU, much as Norway has, while reserving the ability
to distance itself from those EU policies that would be detrimental to
Russia's development.
Looking into the not too distant future, Dr. Mau concluded by observing
that Russia's economic legislation has begun to exhibit diminishing
returns. For every new piece of legislation passed, there has been less of
a positive effect on Russia's economy. This is because Russia has begun to
pump up against the limits of what its outmoded judicial and administrative
systems will allow. In Dr. Mau's words, "It doesn't matter how rational the
laws are on paper if they aren't supported in practice." Thus it is slowly
becoming clear that in order for Russia to continue to grow as it has it
will have to tackle the nadir of administrative and bureaucratic reform
that it has thus far avoided. This reform will be Russia's next great
challenge.
Summary by Karlis Kirsis, Junior Fellow, Russian & Eurasian Program
*******
#7
Russian investment abroad still exceeds foreign investment in Russia
MOSCOW. May 18 (Interfax) - The amount of Russian investment abroad
continues to exceed the amount of foreign investment in Russia, the State
Statistics Committee told reporters on Saturday.
Statistics show that Russian investment abroad reached nearly $4.4
billion in the first quarter of 2002, a 40.7% increase from the first
quarter of 2001. Meanwhile, foreign investment in Russia in the first three
months reached only $3.8 million.
However, Russian investment abroad is normally short-term and
speculative. Russian capital does not stay abroad, but returns Russia after
a short period of time. For this reason, the amount of Russian capital
accumulated abroad reached only $3.6 billion as of late March 2002, which
is less that what was invested in the first quarter of this year. In the
meantime, Russian capital accumulated in Russia exceeds $34.4 billion.
Of Russian investments accumulated abroad, $2.4 billion accounts for
direct investment, $155 million for portfolio investment, and $1.03 billion
for other investment. Russia's largest accumulated investment is in Belarus
($577 million), Iran ($554 million), Cyprus ($452 million), the Netherlands
($434 million), Liberia ($227 million), Moldova ($170 million), Armenia
($127 million), the British Virgin Islands ($118 million), the U.S. ($94
million), and Germany ($70 million).
*******
#8
Trud
May 18, 2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
WILL RUSSIA BENEFIT FROM NEW RUSSIAN-AMERICAN ACCORDS?
By Vyacheslav NIKONOV, president of the Politika foundation
The forthcoming Russian-American summit to be held next
week has caused a flow of comments questioning who will win or
lose from the agreements which are being prepared for signing
and planned decisions. This is a strange and old-fashioned
habit. I think a commentator who asks himself who will win or
lose from yet another US-German (British-French,
Japanese-Italian, Ukrainian-Greek, etc.) summit, should consult
a psychiatrist. For some reason, it is still considered normal
when such an approach is applied to Russian-American relations.
During the summit, the sides will sign a treaty to reduce
their strategic nuclear arsenals from 6,000 warheads held now
by each side to 1,700-2,000 warheads. Critics of the treaty
immediately declared that this was a great defeat for Russia.
We failed to persuade the Americans to destroy redundant
warheads instead of storing them somewhere.
At the same time, these critics forget quite some simple
things. An alternative to this treaty, which does not fully
suit us, is not a treaty which would suit us to a T, but the
absence of any treaty. Since the previous START-2 Treaty has
not been ratified by the US Senate, we could find ourselves in
a world where there is no control over strategic armaments. The
Americans are not averse to this alternative: they are so
strong economically that can afford to have any number of
warheads. As for us, with our budget indicators and without any
treaty we could fall to a level below the permitted 1,700
warheads. What is better for us - to disarm unilaterally, or to
do this together with the Americans, within the framework of a
legally binding document?
True it would be better to destroy warheads - there's no
need to argue about this. However, for justice's sake, I should
note that Americans are going to destroy a considerable part of
nuclear warheads, while they haven't produced new ones, and are
not going to produce any, for nearly ten years now. By taking
4,000 warheads out of service, each side will proportionally
diminish the danger of an unsanctioned nuclear missile launch,
an accident in a launcher or on a submarine. The thing is that
it is mostly accidents, leaks and errors that present a direct
and serious threat, not the possibility of a full-scale nuclear
missile attack.
The new formula of our relations with the North-Atlantic
bloc - NATO-20 - is also criticised: it is being argued that it
is not much better than the previous (19 + 1) scheme, which was
far from perfect. This is true. But tell me please: what's
wrong about Russia's higher (albeit not too much higher) level
of dialogue with NATO?
We can live without a new START-3 treaty, as we have lived
without the START-2 treaty. We can live with the Jackson-Vanik
amendment which links the granting of the most favoured nation
status to Russia with the free Jewish emigration from the USSR
(the US Congress is planning to abolish it by the summit). We
can live without the status of a country with a market economy,
with all kinds of sanctions being applied against us in the
sphere of trade (the United States is now ready to recognise
our market status, outpacing the Europeans in this respect).
But it is better and more advantageous for Russia to have a
treaty, to conduct dialogue with NATO, to have the market
status, and forget about the Jackson-Vanik amendment.
These will be steps towards a more perfect world order,
towards an integration into the globalising world, which should
be welcomed despite its limitations.
*******
#9
The Russia Journal
May 17-23, 2002
Moving beyond the last nuclear treaty
By ALEXANDER GOLTS
As the Russian-U.S. summit draws nearer, Russian diplomats’ statements are
becoming more dramatic. Now they’re saying the two sides have managed to
overcome significant differences, and the two presidents will sign a
historic agreement.
What the foreign ministry people prefer not to mention is the part not to
Moscow’s liking, namely, that the American position has hardly changed. The
Pentagon is not talking about destroying strategic arms, but about removing
them from their delivery vehicles and storing them.
This goes against all principles of previous strategic arms-limitation
treaties. The number of warheads was important to these treaties, but
wasn’t the most significant aspect. The number finally settled upon was
essentially a common denominator that enabled Moscow and Washington to make
cuts to various types of arms: nuclear submarines, strategic bombers and
land-based ballistic missiles. Cutting back strategic arms meant destroying
their delivery systems. But now Washington intends to keep most of the
delivery systems, and will simply remove the warheads.
Right from the start, Moscow had no hope of getting its own way. A year
before George Bush entered the White House, President Vladimir Putin found
himself forced to cut the Russian nuclear arsenal to 1,500 warheads. The
Americans know full well that by the end of the decade, Russia will have to
take its heavy missiles off duty and destroy them due to age. And Russia
doesn’t have the money to build new missiles. In 1997, former Defense
Minister Igor Sergeyev said that design work alone would take eight years
and cost 12 trillion rubles (around 50 billion rubles today, or $1.6
billion dollars) annually.
This meant that negotiations amounted to a choice for the Kremlin: Let the
Americans make unilateral arms cuts, or make the whole thing look like the
result of some kind of bilateral agreement.
In reality, the new agreement is less about security than about the fact
that the United States still thinks it necessary to support Russia’s
superpower status. But what is important is that Washington is making it
very clear that this treaty (or agreement, since it’s still not clear
whether the U.S. administration will risk submitting it to the Senate) is
the last concerning nuclear weapons. The era when Moscow and Washington
based their relations exclusively on finding reasonable limits to mutual
deterrence is over.
Now that military rivalry no longer makes sense, the new mission is to find
areas of security where the countries benefit from cooperation. Even after
the Soviet Union collapsed, relations were still based on ensuring Russia
did not pose a threat to the United States. The most successful cooperation
program was the Nunn-Lugar Program, aimed at ensuring the safety of
Russia’s nuclear arsenals. At the same time, the Americans are doing all
they can to prevent Russia transferring military technology to Iran.
Instead of finding things with which to reproach each other, the two
countries should be looking at how they can cooperate. One area for
potential cooperation is Central Asia. The temporary U.S. bases in this
region send a large section of the Russian establishment into hysterics.
Retired General Leonid Ivashov said these American bases are encircling
Russia like the rings of an anaconda.
If Washington is serious about fighting terrorism in this region, however,
it will need Russia’s support. The impoverished Central Asian republics,
with their instability and harsh ruling regimes, are a breeding ground for
terrorism and extremism. To return stability and order to these countries,
the United States will have to help them rebuild their industrial
infrastructure. But even if it provides the money, the United States is
unlikely to send a large number of specialists to this troubled region.
Only Russia can help by sending the needed people. But for this, both sides
would have to abandon their prejudices. Moscow would have to stop seeing
the U.S. military presence as a threat, and Washington would have to stop
worrying that cooperation between Russia and the C.I.S. countries will lead
to a rebirth of the Soviet empire.
Another strategic area where the two countries could cooperate is Russian
oil supplies to the United States. Experts say this project would require a
lot of work by both sides. But at the same time, the United States needs an
alternative energy supply in the event of a drawn-out conflict in the
Middle East.
The United States sees China as one of its main rivals in the coming
century, and it has an interest in seeing Russia develop its Far East. But
again, it would take political will in Washington to help Russia in this.
Finally, Russia and the United States will have to do most of the work
needed to turn the new Council of 20 into an effective instrument for
cooperation between Moscow and NATO.
After the events of Sept. 11, it’s clear that both Moscow and Washington
stand to benefit from cooperation. No matter how you look at it, Russia is
the last, albeit relatively, stable and democratic zone close to the
countries that Washington includes in its "axis of evil." This makes
cooperation with Moscow vital for U.S. interests.
But Russia will have to adjust to playing a new role, that of junior
partner rather than equal to the United States. This will be painful for
Russian foreign policy elite, raised in an era of confrontation with the
United States. But this new cooperation is the only possible way forward.
*******
#10
Gazeta
No. 86
May 2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
PRIME MINISTER KASYANOV WANTS NO ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
Today, after two years in office, Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov often disagrees with the president on how the country
should be governed. However, all rumours about the government's
resignation invariably turn out groundless. Analyst Andrei
Ryabov of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, in an interview to Gazeta
correspondent Andrei Reut, said that Kasyanov has formed a
second centre of power in Russia and does not fear to get the
sack.
Question: Kasyanov has been prime minister for two years.
What has changed in the chairman of the government over this
time?
Answer: The most important change is that from a technical
prime minister, as Kasyanov was viewed at the very beginning,
he has turned into a real major politician heading a large, one
of the most important political institutions in the state.
Question: How did he manage to do that?
Answer: Kasyanov has learned to balance different
interests, manoeuvre between various centres of influence and
be adequate to various requirements - those of elite groups and
the public at large. He has learned this art and turned from a
highly placed bureaucrat into a major political figure.
Question: How has the government changed?
Answer: I don't think anything new has taken place in the
government's role in Russian politics, compared with the
experience of the 1990s.
All institutions of power in our political system are
irresponsible. The president makes decisions but bears no
responsibility for them. The same refers to the federal
parliament. But the government has power and is answerable to
everyone. If it is headed by a strong prime minister, it
inevitably becomes a second centre of power. Chernomyrdin,
despite all his minuses and peculiarities, was such a figure.
Primakov was such a figure and, to all appearances, Kasyanov is
such a figure. Therefore the last two years have shown that the
government is again becoming a real centre of decision-making.
Question: You mean Kasyanov has already become the second
centre of power?
Answer: Yes, and his speech at the State Duma last
Wednesday confirms this. Instead of a breakthrough, called for
by the president, he spoke of "painstaking work," instead of an
administrative reform he spoke of "fine tuning," and so on.
Question: Doesn't Kasyanov understand that this may have a
sad outcome for him?
Answer: Aparently, he thinks that some factors will help
him uphold his position and, moreover, show his
indispensability as prime minister.
Question: How can Kasyanov show his indispensability?
Answer: The first factor is that the president is very
cautious of replacing Cabinet members. Over the two years of
Putin's presidency, there has been no serious Cabinet
reshuffle, except for the replacement of law enforcement and
defence ministers. At the same time, whenever the president
goes vacationing, there appear rumours that something is going
to happen. But it never does.
Second. Kasyanov now really reminds one of Chernomyrdin in
his last years in office, as he has managed to take a position
in the focus of balances of various interests. When he speaks
with oil barons, he is one of them. When he speaks with
metallurgists about the lobbying of their interests, he is one
of them. He is one of common people when he speaks about the
need for the population's social protection against an
insatiable appetite of natural monopolies, with which he finds
common ground, too.
Possessing all these qualities, Kasyanov holds that there
are not very many people like him, who could get on well with
all influential groups of interests simultaneously.
Knowing that social and political stability is one of
Putin's main tasks and main achievements, in which he takes
pride, Kasyanov realises very well that it will be very
difficult to sack him, because it may break the fragile
consensus in the upper echelons and gradually destroy social
stability. These are three arguments which, I think, allow
Kasyanov not to fear to get the sack.
Question: Do you mean to say that Kasyanov will continue
consolidating his centre of power?
Answer: Of course. I do not rule out that decision-making
on more and more issues will gradually move from presidential
structures to the government.
Question: Things look different from the outside. Many say
that Kasyanov tries not to "stick out" and that he obediently
implements the Putin administration's will.
Answer: This may be true on some issues. But on Wednesday
Kasyanov showed at the State Duma that on key issues he does
not at all tries to be convenient for the president's
administration.
Question: On what issues?
Answer: The president's state-of-the-nation address to the
Federal Assembly was, apparently, prepared by the
administration, and Kasyanov's words obviously did not
correspond to its main points. Kasyanov may avoid conflicts on
various kinds of insignificant and concrete issues, but he
consistently continues his policy of slow, gradual,
evolutionary reforms, realising very well that such a policy
receives the greatest support in the upper echelons and
probably will in the lower classes in some time.
Question: But the president regularly criticises the
government. What does he expect from Kasyanov?
Answer: The president expects, at least, preservation of
the favourable atmosphere in society, which is largely a result
of the government's work.
Question: And what about breakthroughs in the economy?
Answer: I don't know if the president really expects
breakthroughs from this government. There is an objective
conflict between Putin's two tasks. There is a final goal -
going down in history as a man who has achieved a breakthrough
in the country's economic and political development. And there
is a task that must be fulfilled in the near future:
re-election.
Breakthroughs and re-election are incompatible things.
Question: So the president must choose between a
breakthrough and Kasyanov?
Answer: A breakthrough may have unpredictable consequences.
Its results cannot be expected tomorrow or the day after
tomorrow. Kasyanov and his government personify high popularity
and stability. And if you want a breakthrough - OK. But mind
you, breakthroughs lead to bad things.
Question: And the president will prefer stability on the
eve of the elections, right?
Answer: Apparently, yes.
Question: Kasyanov again spoke about the government's
"fine tuning." What does it mean?
Answer: It means that he does not want any administrative
reform. He said in April, a few days after the president's
address, that he would submit plans for an administrative
reform to the president by the autumn, which sounded somewhat
strange already then. The presidential address named an
administrative reform as task number one. And suddenly, the
prime minister postpones the main idea until September.
According to state machinery rules, he needed to present
something within days. But he spoke of September.
On Wednesday, at the State Duma, Kasyanov went even
further.
He not only spoke of September but said that the government
needs not an administrative reform but fine tuning. What is
fine tuning? If some new guys come, who do not fit into the
government's united team, they will be replaced. But if the
team works efficiently, why change anything?
Question: But this is an open conflict with the president.
Or is it not?
Answer: Of course, there is a conflict. But this is
Kasyanov's reply to those in the presidential team who want him
to go. This is, perhaps, part of a public dispute with the
president on possible options. It is a kind of response to the
president's address - you urge us to speed up social and
economic development, but we believe that gradual, painstaking
work is needed. Kasyanov's confident tone suggests that he
realises that today the president can hardly find an
alternative to his policy course.
Putin may replace the prime minister, but a new prime
minister will have to do the same, and he will hardly do it
better than Kasyanov. I think this is the logic of the
incumbent prime minister. He believes in the president's
rationality, that the president may criticise, grumble and say
something unflattering in public. But in doing so, the
president will understand that there is no real alternative.
*******
#11
New York Times
May 18, 2002
A Beautiful Friendship
By BILL KELLER
Thanks to some dogged diplomacy and a little skillful spin, two once
implacable foes this week achieved a surprising, if temporary, rapprochement.
No, not Russia and the United States, although it has been a pretty good
week for those former adversaries too, and we'll get to that in a moment. I
mean the Bush Pentagon and the Bush State Department. For followers of the
engrossing battle between the treaty-loathing, gloom-mongering
go-it-aloners who march with Donald Rumsfeld and the alliance-friendly,
deal-cutting pragmatists with Colin Powell, this was a week when creative
tension produced a constructive compromise. The agreement to cut Russian
and American nuclear arsenals, along with other warm-up exercises for Mr.
Bush's Moscow summit meeting next week, represents both the Pentagon view
that we can act like masters of the universe and the State Department view
that it's not always in our best interest to do so.
First let's dispose of some hype. The arms agreement completed this week
does not, as Mr. Bush claimed, "liquidate the legacy of the cold war."
(After all, what's Dick Cheney?) The three-page treaty merely codifies
cutbacks both sides wanted to make anyway, the Russians because they can't
afford the duct tape to keep their missiles in service, the Americans
because the strategic nuclear balance is no longer the issue that keeps us
up nights. As an arms treaty, it is more loophole than law. It doesn't
require that any warheads be destroyed; at the Pentagon's insistence, they
can all go into storage for the next crisis. There are some funny counting
rules that make the cuts seem deeper than they are. The treaty has a more
liberal cancellation clause than some apartment leases. In short, as a Bush
official told The Times's military expert Michael Gordon, "That's our kind
of treaty."
A hard-core cynic might even say that with this treaty Mr. Bush managed to
humiliate simultaneously both Vladimir Putin, the Russian leader, by
establishing America's power to dictate whatever terms we like to Russia,
and his own father, by undoing an important Bush Senior legacy, the ban on
multiple-warhead missiles. (Russia likes the big ten-pack missiles because
they are a cheap way to flood the zone.)
But that would be greatly overstating the emptiness of the agreement. The
fact is, this is a real treaty, not just a handshake and a wink. The
seemingly weightless three pages come with a hefty 500-page appendix — all
the enforcement and verification protocols of the 1991 Start 1 treaty have
been attached to this agreement. That means the Russians and Americans will
be in each other's faces more, inspecting and securing and locking down
warheads, which is a very good thing if you worry about nuclear weapons and
materials falling into the wrong hands.
And treaties usually create a kind of momentum. It is true neither side is
obliged to retire a single weapon until 2012, but in reality taking nuclear
weapons apart is a long, painstaking procedure that will have to follow a
timetable. Unlike his father's last big arms treaty, Start 2, which has
languished nine years without Senate ratification, Mr. Bush's deal, bearing
both Powell and Rumsfeld seals of approval, should pass without great
difficulty. The logic of this agreement should lead to renewal of the Start
1 treaty (it expires in 2009) and an extension of this one when it runs its
course, and — who knows? The arms control process may remain on life
support, but it is alive.
The new arms agreement is not being hailed by Russia's elites as a triumph
for Kremlin diplomacy. The newspaper Nyezavisimaya Gazyeta dismissed the
deal as "the most lightweight in the entire history of arms control." It
does, however, give Mr. Putin what he needs to keep the paranoids in his
military at bay, including recourse to those hydra-headed missiles.
Beyond its minor contribution to the safety of mankind, the agreement
represents a continuing maturity in President Bush's relationship with
Russia, which has lurched from indifferent to giddy and finally settled
into something rather promising.
For those who just tuned in to the world last September, here are a few
purely selfish reasons we want Russia on our side:
1. Russia sits astride a world crossroads of oil, weapons, drugs and terror.
2. Russia has close, sometimes problematic but potentially useful
relationships with all three of the countries Mr. Bush insists on calling
the "axis of evil" — Iraq, Iran and North Korea. We barely talk to any of
them.
3. Russia contains an unnervingly under-policed stockpile of atomic
warheads, 603 metric tons of nuclear material suitably enriched for
terrorist bomb-making, and mountains of lower-grade radioactive garbage.
4. Russia has enough petroleum to insulate us against a Middle East oil shock.
Mr. Bush campaigned for office on the sneering premise that Bill Clinton
and Al Gore had sentimentalized the Russia relationship, letting American
interests founder as they propped up Boris Yeltsin and his corrupt cohort.
That was unfair. Mr. Clinton helped Mr. Yeltsin move Russia a long way
toward the West, in the face of serious opposition from Russian
revanchists. It is true that Mr. Clinton's 18 meetings with Mr. Yeltsin set
a record for personal summitry, but if congeniality is an indictment
someone should point out that, with Presidents Bush and Putin about to hold
their fifth meeting in a year, they are well ahead of their predecessors'
pace.
Mr. Bush emerged from his first meeting with Mr. Putin, almost a year ago,
sounding so lovestruck that his foreign policy chaperone, Condoleezza Rice,
quickly assembled reporters to play down the infatuation. Since then,
though, the Bush-Putin relationship has been mercifully free of the wild
mood swings that marked the Clinton-Yeltsin friendship, partly because Mr.
Putin is healthy and sober, but mainly because they both treat it as business.
The two are an interesting pair. Both are abstemious men who succeeded
leaders with flamboyant, self-destructive appetites. Both have endured the
suspicion of their native intellectuals. Both took office with some
question surrounding their legitimacy. Both are known for seeming more
confident in a private encounter than on the public stage. Both regard the
press as an inconvenience. They even have comparable mixes of bonhomie and
cold calculation.
Like Mr. Yeltsin before him, Mr. Putin has clearly decided that Russia's
future lies with the West. Unlike Mr. Yeltsin, Mr. Putin does not feel
quite the same need to be constantly pleading with America to bail him out
of his domestic problems with an infusion of cash or a face-saving
concession. To integrate his country with the West, Mr. Putin is willing to
swallow a lot — American missile defense, the expansion of NATO right up to
his borders, American soldiers flying war missions from his backyard.
Mr. Bush — prodded by his hawks — has not let the relationship become all
about keeping Mr. Putin in power, but — prodded by Colin Powell — he has
accepted that you can't treat the leader of Russia as your love slave. We
want Mr. Putin to survive. We also want the relationship to survive Mr.
Putin. Signing a treaty serves both those ends.
As does the agreement this week marrying Russia to NATO, which surpasses
anything the Clinton administration was willing to give Mr. Yeltsin. If Mr.
Clinton had proposed giving Russia such a loud voice in NATO, he'd have
been hammered mercilessly by the Republicans. (Our cynic might say that Mr.
Bush doesn't mind giving away the NATO store because he doesn't intend to
let NATO slow him down anyway.) Letting Russia sit at NATO's table gives
Mr. Putin bragging rights at home. It also plugs his country into one of
Europe's civilizing institutions.
By consummating these deals beforehand, the two presidents have dislodged
arms control from its dominant place at the summit and left themselves free
to deal with the real, dangerous legacies of the cold war, such as Russia's
continuing nuclear business with Iran, such as what to do about Iraq, such
as the aforementioned atomic detritus.
Mr. Bush, who came into office a foreign-policy naïf, has in this case
shown that he is capable of listening to his rival advisers and fusing a
foreign policy that draws from both. He has settled into a Russia policy
somewhere between the romantic notion that if we bend far enough we can
save Russia from its darker instincts and the fatalistic idea that we
should write it off as a hopeless cause.
As for the Pentagon and the State Department, that is still a Casablanca
affair — not Rick and Ilsa, but Rick and Captain Renault. We'll see how
this beautiful friendship weathers the issues that boil blood, like the
Middle East. But it is worth recording that this week the administration
flapped hard with both wings, and got something important off the ground.
*******
#12
The Independent (UK)
17 May 2002
Mary Dejevsky: Russian weakness is disguised by some new clothes
This has been a strange week indeed for Russia's relations with what we
used to call "the West", and the next couple of weeks promise to be even
stranger.
This week, Russia and the United States suddenly agreed some of the most
swingeing nuclear arms cuts ever and the world yawned. The very next day,
Russia and Nato signed up to a new joint council to regularise relations
between the Cold War military alliance and its erstwhile enemy, and the
world (in the shape of 20 foreign ministers) hailed the "last rites of the
Cold War" (Jack Straw), "a deal to put behind us the Cold War once and for
all" (George Bush).
Next week, Mr Bush and Vladimir Putin meet in Russia for what we used to
call a "superpower summit" where, just as in the old Soviet days, the one
visible achievement will be two signatures on an arms treaty. A week later,
the two leaders will both be in Rome to inaugurate the Nato-Russia Council,
where the main item on the agenda is lunch. By then, though, we will all
have succumbed so completely to nostalgia for old-fashioned global security
that we will fail to notice what is really going on.
For what we are seeing here are the classic symptoms of Transition. The old
East-West relationship is giving way to something quite different, but no
one wants to abandon it completely, lest something far worse and less
predictable fills the empty shell. In keeping up appearances so
assiduously, however, the US and its Nato partners are deceiving themselves
mightily.
We were right to yawn at the weapons cuts. The speed with which the latest
agreement was reached, like its bare three pages in length, betrays its
utter irrelevance. If the US and Russia are going to treat each other as
civilised countries, as they insist, they do not need paper commitments to
new cuts in nuclear weapons. These are hypothetical reductions, to be
accomplished almost 10 years down the line, with no verification procedures.
Even in the heyday of arms agreements, there were always two ways of
looking at them: one the literal one took the actual count of missiles
and warheads as the measure of improved security; the other saw the numbers
as largely fiction except as a gauge of existing trust.
The sole reason for this agreement is as quid pro quo or, more
realistically, political cover for Washington's unilateral renunciation
of a treaty which did mean something, which is why it had to go. The real
news from next week's Moscow summit will be that Russia has accepted that
it can do nothing to stop Washington abandoning the 1973 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, and going full steam ahead with its missile defence plan.
This is potentially the biggest shift in Russia-US relations since Moscow
acquired its nuclear capability.
The Nato-Russia Council deserved its "historic accolade", but not because
it lays the Cold War to rest, nor yet because it places Nato-Russia
relations on a new footing. It does neither. The Cold War ended with the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. And the so-called Joint Partnership
Council is only tenuously different from the five-year-old Nato-Russia
Council that succeeds it. What makes the agreement significant is the
acknowledgement by Nato that a new relationship with Russia is needed, and
that it has not yet been found.
By trying to find some institutional way of harnessing Russia, however,
Nato has sown doubt in the minds of Nato's new and would-be members from
the former Eastern bloc, who saw the alliance primarily as their shield
against the perceived threat from the east. From Hungary to the Baltic
States, these countries now view Nato less as a cast-iron guarantor of
their security than as a staging post on their longer journey into the
European Union.
The creation of the Nato-Russia Council is one symptom among many of the
full-blown identity crisis in Nato. Washington's newly unilateralist
approach to military action has not helped Nato's credibility as a
transatlantic military alliance, nor has the post-Cold War absence of a
common enemy. Concepts such as "weapons of mass destruction" or "terrorism"
are no substitute.
Washington is too squeamish to say outright that the real target of its
missile defence project (beyond Russia) is not to be found among the
changing ranks of "rogue states", but China.
Those former Eastern bloc states now joining Nato may well be less burdened
with historical loyalties and clearer-headed about Nato's prospects than
its long-standing members.
They hoped for a military alliance and find themselves joining a social
club. They are still in the market for defence, and see the growing
cohesion and economic clout of the European Union as the likely answer.
This may be wishful thinking on their part, but time may well prove them
right.
In fact, the only people not deluding themselves about what is happening in
the vast post-Cold War, post 11 September transition, may be perversely
the Russians. Mr Putin's political opponents have described the pact with
Nato as a sham and the arms control agreement as a "sell-out".
Yet they also appreciate, as does Mr Putin, that Russia's present weakness
must be camouflaged as decently and as elegantly as possible. And they are
justifiably confident that Russia will not be weak for much longer.
*******
#13
US Department of State
17 May 2002
U.S.-Russian Agenda to Focus More on Economics, Civil Society
(May 17: remarks by U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow)
(3230)
Now that a new relationship -- "even an Alliance" -- is taking shape
between the United States and Russia, the agenda between the two
countries is likely to shift from security issues to economics and
civil society issues, U.S. envoy Alexander Vershbow told a conference
in Moscow May 17.
Vershbow, the U.S. ambassador to Russia, was addressing the Inaugural
Conference of the Institute for Applied International Research on "A
New Agenda in U.S.-Russian Relations."
President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin have
"fundamentally redefined" the U.S.-Russian relationship over the past
year, Vershbow said. "They share a common vision in which our mutual
security is strengthened by strategic cooperation and Russia's
political and economic integration into the Western family of
democratic nations."
Agreeing with those who see the United States and Russia as
"increasingly becoming allies in the full sense of the term," Vershbow
maintained that the new relationship encompasses far more than the
common struggle against international terrorism and predates the
September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
He said the United States has been "impressed by the vision of
President Putin's economic team" and by the many historic pieces of
economic reform legislation enacted by the Russian Duma over the past
two years.
"To be sure," he said, "enormous difficulties remain -- unreformed
banking and agricultural sectors, corruption, an aging infrastructure,
and a business environment that is still difficult for small and
medium enterprises -- but the trend is clearly positive."
Vershbow also portrayed "overall trends" in terms of democratization
as favorable.
"Democratic structures and democratic culture are growing stronger in
Russia every day," he said, singling out media freedom as the area
that causes greatest concern.
The relationship between the two countries, however, is primarily a
matter for the private sector and non-governmental organizations to
develop, he believes
"It is a relationship that calls for expanding cooperation between our
two countries, working together to enhance our national security,
supporting further development of Russia's market economy and
expanding trade, and strengthening democracy, civil society and human
rights," the U.S. ambassador to Russia concluded.
Following is the text of his speech as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
Inaugural Conference of the Institute for Applied International
Research Metropol Hotel
Moscow
May 17, 2002
A NEW AGENDA IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
Remarks by Alexander Vershbow
U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation
It's a great pleasure to be here today at this inaugural conference of
the Institute for Applied International Research (IAIR), which is
taking place at a propitious time - just one week before President
Bush will be arriving here in Moscow for his summit meeting with
President Putin. I can think of no better time for the discussions you
will be holding today and tomorrow on the new agenda in U.S.-Russian
relations.
I notice that this afternoon one of your panels will be discussing
whether we are marking a new beginning in U.S.-Russian relations or
whether we are experiencing - in the famous words of Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan - "irrational exuberance," so I promise you
that I will be sober and rational in my comments and restrain any
undue exuberance. But perhaps I should remind you that when Mr.
Greenspan referred to the "irrational exuberance" of Wall Street in
1996, the Dow Jones Industrial Average stood at 6,000. Today it's at
10,000.
In fact, I would suggest to you that - judging by much of the media
commentary in Russia - irrational exuberance is not the danger, but a
knee-jerk pessimism about the nature of U.S.-Russian relations. Some
of the observations that I've seen suggest at times a certain
journalistic regression to the days of the Cold War. Now I know that
conflict and controversy are the lifeblood of journalists and even
some politicians, but I'm confident that conferences like this will be
able to take a wider and wiser view of the prospects before us.
And those prospects are more positive than at any time in the recent
past. Presidents Bush and Putin during the past year have taken the
lead in overcoming past suspicions and prejudices - the legacy of Cold
War thinking - and they have fundamentally redefined the relationship
between our two countries. They share a common vision in which our
mutual security is strengthened by strategic cooperation and Russia's
political and economic integration into the Western family of
democratic nations. This redefinition began before the September 11
terrorist attacks, and certainly encompasses far more than just our
common struggle against international terrorism. I agree with those
who say that the United States and Russia are increasingly becoming
allies in the full sense of the term.
Today I would like to talk to you about how I perceive the new dynamic
of U.S.-Russian relations and some of the goals that we are pursuing
in the context of next week's visit by President Bush to Moscow and
St. Petersburg. In particular, I would like to emphasize that - in
addition to critical security issues such as arms control and the
fight against terrorism - we are going to see greater priority given
to economic relations between our two countries and cooperation on the
continued development of democratic institutions in Russia, especially
independent media and non-governmental organizations.
Although the security issues to be discussed next week understandably
have received the most attention, I believe that if we are successful
in dealing with them, the upcoming Summit may go down in history as
the point of transition to a very different agenda - an agenda in
which non-security issues become more and more the focal point of our
relations with Russia, just as they are with our other allies and
partners.
So, rather than upstaging the distinguished experts taking part in
your panel discussions later today and tomorrow on strategic and
security matters and Russia-NATO cooperation, I'd like to focus my
remarks on economic questions and the importance of civil society in
Russia.
It is important to stress the American view that movement forward on
the economic front and the development of civil-society organizations
that constitute a working democracy need to proceed together. We
should view economic and democratic reform as mutually reinforcing,
and I can cite no better example of this than the initiative
undertaken by Yukos Oil in founding the Open Russia Foundation. Its
work and sponsorship of this conference today demonstrate the critical
role that private businesses can play in promoting civil society and
the robust debate that is essential to any democracy.
Our two Presidents have focused at their previous meetings on
developing the economic dimension of our relationship, and we hope to
see important progress in this area at next week's Summit. The basis
for improvement in trade and economic relations is, first and
foremost, the progress made by Russia on economic reform since the
1998 crash. We have been impressed by the vision of President Putin's
economic team and the many historic pieces of economic reform
legislation enacted by the Russian Duma over the past two years. These
include sweeping income and corporate profits tax reforms, a new labor
code, pension reform, a law on private land ownership, and a number of
measures to reduce bureaucratic regulation that impede the growth of
business. In addition, Russia has managed to balance its budget and
even pay off some of its debts ahead of schedule. All these steps have
created the prerequisites for a sustained economic recovery - growth
in GDP and foreign investment has been impressive over the past two
years.
To be sure, enormous difficulties remain - unreformed banking and
agricultural sectors, corruption, an aging infrastructure, and a
business environment that is still difficult for small and medium
enterprises - but the trend is clearly positive. The Russian
leadership clearly understands what is needed to address these
economic challenges and is determined to create a much more favorable
business climate.
Recent disputes over trade issues such as U.S. poultry exports to
Russia or Russian steel exports to the United States have been
challenging, but I am confident they will eventually be seen as no
more than bumps on the road to a larger, mutually beneficial trade
relationship between our nations. Indeed, such disputes are a sign of
the strengthening of the bilateral trade relationship; we never had
such problems with the Soviet Union, but they do occur occasionally in
our relations with our closest allies.
The key to a much deeper mutually beneficial trade and economic
relationship between the United States and Russia is cooperation
between the private sectors of both our countries, particularly in
identifying remaining barriers to trade and investment in Russia. That
was the reasoning behind the decision by Presidents Bush and Putin to
establish a Russian-American Business Dialogue last summer. The
Business Dialogue is a way to shift the center of gravity from
government-to-government-contacts to the private sector. The leaders
of this dialogue - the American Chamber of Commerce, the U.S.-Russia
Business Council, the Russian-American Business Council, and the Union
of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in Russia - will formally present
their recommendations and an action agenda to Presidents Bush and
Putin at the Summit next week.
We have barely tapped the potential for trade and investment between
Russia and the United States. Our trade with Russia represents less
than 1 per cent of total U.S. trade worldwide and is roughly at the
level of our trade with Costa Rica - which indicates tremendous room
for improvement. The potential for growth underlines the importance of
dealing with impediments to trade and investment, such as excessive
bureaucratic regulation and corruption. Especially important in this
regard is strengthening the role of the courts in serving as guarantor
of the rights of private investors, rather than being the object of
political manipulation. Some judicial reforms have been enacted, but
getting them implemented at the local and regional level remains a
challenge.
Progress on Russia's integration into the rules-based global trading
system of the WTO is another essential ingredient in building
confidence and improving the climate for trade and investment. We are
working with the Russian government to accelerate Russia's WTO
accession, and we have been clear and consistent with regard to the
conditions for accession: Russia will be asked to meet standards that
are no less, and no more, than those asked of other countries. The
Russian government needs to continue to make progress in deregulation
and increasing transparency; the Duma still needs to pass legislation
to bring Russia's trade regime into line with WTO principles; and
action needs to be taken to implement these changes, for example in
protecting intellectual property rights. WTO accession will help
improve the competitiveness of the Russian economy, and should
stimulate economic growth.
Deepening bilateral cooperation in the energy sector is another
important aspect of our relationship. We welcome the re-emergence of
the Russian Federation as a major world energy provider, which should
enhance world energy security and stabilize global supply. The role of
the private sectors of both nations will be crucial. It is clear that
there are great possibilities for joint U.S. and Russian commercial
work in the exploration, production, transportation, refining and
marketing of energy.
There are many complex ways that economic and democratic issues
intersect, and the process of democratization in Russia is a major
factor in our relationship. Americans like to be allied with countries
that share our values and demonstrate a sustained commitment to those
values. Problems on this front, by the same token, can set back
progress in the economic and political fields.
Let me make clear that, in my view and that of many other Western
observers, the overall trends in Russia are favorable. Democratic
structures and democratic culture are growing stronger in Russia every
day. A robust civil society is beginning to take shape from the bottom
up after centuries of rule from the top down. Non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and grassroots activists are gaining confidence
and experience in defending the values of democracy and establishing
the right balance of power between the leaders and the led. A lively
political debate takes place every day in the parliament and in the
press. There are also examples of strong public-private partnerships
throughout the regions. Businesses, local governments,
non-governmental organizations, and citizens are working together to
solve problems and to make life easier for countless people.
It has been estimated that 65,000 non-government organizations are
providing services to 20 million people. The NGO sector accounts for
15 billion rubles in economic activity and supports one million jobs
nationwide. A major goal of U.S. assistance to Russia is to strengthen
the role of the vast network of NGOs and other associations that we
believe are the bedrock of vital democratic nations. These include
labor unions, community organizations, political parties, independent
media, business and professional associations, think-tanks and groups
that defend human rights, the environment and the free market.
We encourage the corporate sector to play an active part in promoting
civil society in Russia. I congratulate Mikhail Khodorkovsky, chairman
and CEO of Yukos Oil, for his initiative and foresight in establishing
Open Russia, which is forging new links with the West through its
educational, cultural and leadership-development programs. Yukos has
led the way for other Russian companies in its role as a responsible
and far-sighted corporate citizen of the world. Its major
philanthropic initiatives include a $1 million gift to the U.S.
Library of Congress to fund academic fellowships for Russian students
and scholars doing research at the Library. The gift will also expand
judicial exchange projects as part of the Rule of Law Program at the
Library's Center for Russian Leadership Development.
Corporate philanthropy has a long and proud tradition, not only in
America, but in Russia as well. Some of the greatest charitable and
research foundations in the world bear the names of America's most
famous industrialists and business leaders of the past: Carnegie,
Rockefeller, and Ford, for instance, and lesser-known ones such as
Robert Brookings, whose legacy is best known through the institution
that bears his name. Today the leaders of America's technology,
financial and information sectors, such as Bill Gates, George Soros
and Ted Turner, are continuing that tradition through their own
foundations and charitable gifts that have furthered world peace,
economic progress and educational development.
Although their activities may not be as well known, Russian bankers
and entrepreneurs 100 years ago took the lead in supporting
charitable, medical and educational establishments in Moscow, St.
Petersburg and Nizhniy Novgorod, among other cities. In fact, Spaso
House, where I live, was built by one of Moscow's most important
corporate philanthropists - the textile magnate Nikolay Vtorov, who
financed scientific and educational institutions, establishing special
foundations and endowments before he was tragically killed in 1918.
Today through the Open Russia Foundation and thousands of other
business, community, social service, labor, religious, environmental
and other initiatives, Russia has begun to weave the complex and
intricate web of a civil society that must thrive in any country that
wishes to call itself a democracy.
Alexis de Tocqueville, the French writer who visited the United States
170 years ago, best articulated the role of civil society in his book
Democracy in America, where he noted that if government is the only
active player in a society, it becomes a tyranny. Private companies
must exist to ensure economic prosperity and "associations of a
thousand other kinds" must be created to preserve the intellectual,
moral and creative vigor of a nation, according to Tocqueville.
The sheer volume and variety of associations in a thriving civil
society also help to ensure that a high value is placed on the virtue
of tolerance - for the very survival of diverse associations in a
democracy requires a healthy respect for the opinions and views of
those who differ from us, whether those differences be religious,
racial, ethnic, or ideological.
Tolerance toward others is a challenge for all societies. Strong
democratic institutions clearly make it easier to protect human
rights, whether we are speaking of the rights of the civilian
population in Chechnya or those of religious and ethnic minorities
elsewhere in the country. Promoting tolerance and defending human
rights will be prominent on the list of priorities as the United
States and Russia develop our new partnership.
One area of civil society that causes great concern is the independent
media in Russia. While there continues to be a wide diversity of
opinions expressed in Russian media - amazingly wide, for those of us
who were familiar with the old Soviet press - media freedom is in
danger. The saga of Russia's TV-6 is a reminder of how economic and
political interests can affect free speech and pose a challenge to the
rule of law at a time when the foundations of democracy and civil
society remain fragile. The same can be said of the similar struggles
being waged by independent media in Russia's regions, where there have
been some shocking murders of journalists who have courageously
exposed corruption.
A voice that is always independent of government - and sometimes
critical of it - is a good tonic for democracy, hard as that may be
for some public figures here to accept. As we strengthen the
institutions of civil society in Russia, we must remember that truly
independent newspapers, magazines, TV networks and radio stations that
defend the public interest are an integral and indispensable part of a
thriving democratic system.
One way that we have tried to address these questions of media
independence is through the Media Entrepreneurship Dialogue launched
by our two Presidents last November. Its first recommendations will be
presented to Presidents Bush and Putin next week. The premise behind
the Dialogue is simple: to bring together media professionals from
both countries to discuss common problems and to learn from one
another. They will also identify ways to put the Russian media on a
more solid business foundation and thereby make them less vulnerable
to political pressure. Responsible, independent newspapers, magazines,
TV networks and radio stations are key players in the development of
civil society in Russia. They are the institutions that must hold
public officials accountable and safeguard the public interest, which
is a critical in any democracy.
I believe that many Russians have learned in recent years that
economic progress and the development of democratic institutions must
go hand-in-hand. An active, dynamic civil society working on behalf of
Russia's citizens and fostering an understanding of their rights and
responsibilities in a democracy is absolutely essential to this
country's political and economic transformation. Strong NGOs and
think-tanks can contribute explicitly to the development of sound
economic policy. This has been seen in the groundbreaking work of
several Russian NGOs in laying the groundwork for tax reform, communal
services reform, and deregulation.
When Presidents Bush and Putin meet next week, they will discuss how
to further this political and economic transformation. And I do not
believe that we are being either irrational or exuberant when we state
that a new relationship between our two countries - even an Alliance -
is taking shape. It is a relationship that calls for expanding
cooperation between our two countries, working together to enhance our
national security, supporting further development of Russia's market
economy and expanding trade, and strengthening democracy, civil
society and human rights.
********
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