Johnson's Russia List
#6248
16 May 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org

[Contents:
  1. Washington Post: Liz Clarke, For Russia, a 'Breath of Fresh Air.'
(re soccer)
  2. Reuters: Russian Orthodox community in Florence works for peace.
  3. Interfax: Russia puts an estimate on the value of its farmlands.
  4. RIA Novosti: RUSSIA MAY HAVE TEN MILLION LESS POPULATION IN 2016.
  5. The Nation editorial: A Dangerous Treaty.
  6. The Economist (UK) editorial: Russia and the West. To Russia for love.
Vladimir Putin has plans for Russia that can also benefit the West.  
  7. Moscow Tribune: Stanislav Menshikov, MUCH ADO ABOUT NATO And new 
rearmament coming.
  8. RIA Novosti: MIKHAIL GORBACHEV GIVES VLADIMIR PUTIN A BACKING.
  9. Jamestown Foundation: THE OLIGARCHY'S DEAD, LONG LIVE THE OLIGARCHY. 
(re Slavneft)
  10. gazeta.ru: Ustinov holds back on anti-corruption campaign.
  11. Interfax: Russia's leftist alliance to propose motion of no-confidence 
in government.
  12. Jacob Kipp: On Envy, Elites, and Winter Olympics/6233.
  13. strana.ru: Flowing Through Time - Scientists Picture Volga a 
Generation Ahead.
  14. Vedomosti: Aram Yavrumyan, Trade Wars, Episode Two.
  15. The Jerusalem Post: Herb Keinon, Israel wants Iran nukes on agenda 
of Bush-Putin summit.]

*******

#1
Washington Post
May 16, 2002
For Russia, a 'Breath of Fresh Air' 
By Liz Clarke
Washington Post Staff Writer

When the Soviet Union was at its finest on soccer's international stage,
finishing fourth in the 1966 World Cup, its best players were from the
country's outlying republics.

But with the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, the pool of Russian
soccer talent was dramatically drained. And fans' expectations dipped
accordingly over the slow and humbling road that followed to reclaim their
country's place in the world's most popular game.

The Russian national team failed to qualify for World Cup 1998. Its
fortunes sank lower still when it missed the cut for Euro 2000.

Russia is back for World Cup 2002. And a new optimism about its prospects
is sweeping the country, inspired largely by a blond, baby-faced striker
named Vladimir Beschastnykh, 28, who has used the run-up to the tournament
as occasion for renewal on two fronts: that of his own foundering soccer
career, and that of his once-proud country.

Beschastnykh had been a star for Russia's top club team, Spartak Moscow,
but lost his luster after transferring to Spain, where he languished on the
bench for Racing Santander after feuding with its coach.

Last July, Beschastnykh came home to Spartak Moscow and Coach Oleg
Romantsev, who discovered Beschastnykh as a teenager. And his return
sparked not only a sixth consecutive title for his former club, but also an
electrifying World Cup qualifying effort by Russia's national squad.

Beschastnykh scored seven goals in Russia's 10-match qualifying campaign,
including three in the 4-0 shutout of Switzerland that secured his
country's return to the World Cup with an exclamation point.

"A breath of fresh air for our long-suffering Russian football!" exclaimed
Sport-Express, a Russian sports daily that hailed Beschastnykh's hat-trick
heroics for having "brought back the nation's trust in our team and our
football."

Apart from Beschastnykh, Russia's chief asset entering World Cup 2002 may
be its enviable draw. Group H is rounded out by Tunisia, Belgium and
co-host Japan. And coaches have done little to lower fans' soaring
expectations, vowing to resign if Russia doesn't advance to the second round.

Russia's new era of good feeling, however, hasn't been without controversy.

Most has centered on Romantsev, who wears two hats as coach of Russia's
national team and coach of Spartak Moscow, Russia's dominant club.
Specifically, several journalists and prominent former players have
criticized his omission of winger Rolan Gusev and goalkeeper Sergei
Ovchinnikov from the national team -- accusing him of excluding them
because they play for rival Russian clubs.

Ovchinnikov ceded just one goal in his first six games with Lokomotiv
Moscow this season. But he wasn't among the three goalkeepers tapped by
Romantsev. Rousian Nigmatullin, a reserve with Verona, will be Russia's
primary goalkeeper.

Said former Russia captain Igor Shalimov, in remarks to Russian television
NTV: "If you are the national team coach, a professional, you have to put
the team interests above anything else. It's nonsense when you have two of
Russia's best players omitted from the national team for whatever reason."

Romantsev has also tweaked his midfield, sliding Alexander Mostovoi (Celta
Vigo) to sweeper. Known as "The Tsar" by his fans in Spain, Mostovoi
remains a key part of the Russian attack. Taking over his role at central
midfield is Celta Vigo teammate Valery Karpin, a powerful, accurate passer.
Midfielder Yegor Titov, 25, is at once Russia's most gifted and
unpredictable scoring threat. A top performer for Spartak Moscow, he has
twice been voted Russian playmaker of the year.

Like so many countries, Russia has been hit hard by injury on the eve of
the tournament. CSKA Moscow striker Denis Popov, 23, will miss the World
Cup after tearing knee ligaments in Sunday's Russian Cup final. Popov
finished the match on painkillers, helping his team to a 2-0 victory, but
will undergo surgery May 16.

Romantsev plans to test his 27-man preliminary roster in a four-team
tournament in Moscow this weekend that includes Belarus, Ukraine and
Yugoslavia. His announcement of the final 23-man roster will be aired live
May 21 on Russian TV.

"We come into the World Cup highly ambitious," Romantsev told BBC Sport
this week. "Our team's spirit and fighting power will provide strong
support to our high ambitions. We are aiming to reach the knockout phase of
the finals -- that's our minimum objective."

*******

#2
FEATURE-Russian Orthodox community in Florence works for peace
By Svetlana Kovalyova

FLORENCE (Reuters) - Harsh exchanges may fly between the Moscow
Patriarchate and the Vatican but a small Orthodox Christian community in
Florence is trying to bridge a 1,000-year gap one day at a time.
 
"Over a thousand years we have drifted far apart, dogmatic and other
differences are strong now. But a dream of a unified church dwells in the
hearts of true believers," said Father Georgy Blatinsky, Florence's local
Orthodox priest.
 
The Eastern and Western Christian churches split in 1054 over theological
and political issues. Relations have been tense ever since.
 
"Some great effort, steps of historical scale are needed to change the
situation. Reunification, if ever, would take a very long time. But we live
on the same land, share common faith and believers crave for unity,"
Blatinsky said.
 
Pope John Paul II has made no secret of his desire to reunite the churches
but relations have deteriorated as Orthodox leaders accuse the Vatican of
trying to steal their flock.
 
Still Blatinsky, a 56-year-old soft-spoken former mathematician from
Russia's second city of St. Petersburg, has high hopes for Florence -- the
city where Roman Catholics and Orthodox Christians tried but failed to come
back together in 1439.
 
The feud raging at high clerical levels seems to be far from the daily life
of the small Orthodox parish in Florence, which unites Russians,
Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, Ethiopians and even some Italians.
 
When Blatinsky arrived in Florence five years ago, the parish was in
decline. Only some 25-30 people gathered for weekday services. Now some 60
attend weekday services and more than 100 attend Sunday services.
 
"Nobody says we are stealing converts here," said Blatinsky, dressed in
dark robes. "Our relations with the local Catholic authorities are very
warm, even cordial. They consider us custodians of ancient common
traditions." 	   
 
DIFFICULT PAST OVERSHADOWS PRESENT
 
Still, the chasm is wide.
 
Many Orthodox blame Catholics for a litany of offenses, from the Great
Schism of 1054 to the Fourth Crusade, when the Byzantine capital
Constantinople was sacked in 1204.
 
To ease tensions, the Pope has visited several predominantly Orthodox
countries. In Greece last year he asked forgiveness for the wrongs done by
Roman Catholics to Orthodox Christians since the split.
 
His dream is to visit Moscow to make peace with the powerful Russian
Orthodox Church, which has so far opposed proposals for a trip, saying the
Catholics should stop "poaching souls" in Russia, Ukraine and other former
Soviet states.
 
Fresh accusations the Vatican was trying to steal converts emerged in
February when the Holy See formalized its presence in Russia by creating
four Catholic dioceses.
 
They flared again in March when the Pope paid a virtual visit to Moscow,
addressing his flock via a live satellite broadcast.
 
Relations between Moscow and the Vatican soured further in April when an
Italian priest was expelled from Russia and a Polish Catholic bishop
working in Siberia was barred from reentering  Russia.
 
The moves raised concerns in the West that Russia was persecuting its
Catholic minority -- charges dismissed by the Russian authorities. 	   
 
LIGHT AT THE END OF CATACOMBS
 
In Florence, Blatinsky's church of the Nativity of Christ and St. Nicolas
enjoys Italian support.
 
A perfect replica of a Russian Orthodox church, with a characteristic
onion-shaped dome, it was built in central Florence 100 years ago by the
then-wealthy Russian diaspora.
 
It needs restoration. Frescoes are flaking in both the upper and lower halls.
 
The parishioners are people of moderate means. Many are illegal immigrants
from the former Soviet Union who struggle to make ends meet.
 
The church could not have survived without the help of charitable Italian
organizations .
 
A local bank, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, donated $100,000 for the
restoration of the lower church and Blatinsky hopes the work will be
completed by summer of 2003.
 
"Italians are very open and they appreciate art and beauty. They help to
restore our church," Blatinsky said, proudly looking at the ancient icons
donated by their heirs of old Russian aristocratic families.
 
Blatinsky took part in the first joint service which Orthodox and Catholic
priests held in January in Rome, in the ancient catacombs of St. Priscilla.
 
"These are our common roots, our common treasures, the origin of our common
faith," he said, eyes beaming.
 
"If we were able to hold joint services there, in the catacombs, where the
liturgy was born when we were together before the schism, that means we
have taken important and real steps to unity."

*******

#3
Russia puts an estimate on the value of its farmlands 
Interfax

Moscow, 16 May: Russia's farmland is estimated at roughly 80,000bn to
100,000bn dollars, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Agriculture Minister
Aleksey Gordeyev announced.

While commenting on farmland sale bills submitted to the State Duma, he
said that "left-wing politicians would like to use the new law in order to
de-privatize and, in essence, to nationalize farmland."

"On the contrary, drafts proposed by right-wing forces say nothing about
the government's regulating role," he said.

"The government-proposed draft envisions rigorous government control over
the sale of farmland. The levers of such control will be handed over to
regional authorities," he said in response to questions posed by readers of
the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper, published today.

The government-proposed draft gives the regions the right to decide when
such a law should take effect, he said, adding that "the regions have been
given time to prepare themselves technically for the beginning of the
civilized sale of farmland, not to engage in politicking."

The government also proposes that the regions be given the right to decide
"how much farmland one person will be allowed to buy and whether farmland
should be sold to foreigners", Gordeyev said.

"Russia's regions have passed over 30 land regulations which will fit into
the federal law," he said.

Today, the State Duma plans to debate seven bills on the sale of farmland.

Russia's farmland covers an area of 406m hectares (nearly 24 per cent of
the total land area.)

Source: Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 0858 gmt 16 May 02

*******

#4
RUSSIA MAY HAVE TEN MILLION LESS POPULATION IN 2016 

MOSCOW, May 16. /From RIA Novosti's correspondent Maria Balynina/ -- In
2016 Russia's population may be 10.4 million less from early 2001 and
constitute slightly over 134 million. On Thursday these figures of the
Russian State Statistical Committee were cited by Olga Samarina, in charge
of the department for the socio-demographic policy at the Russian Labour
and Social Development Ministry. 

She took the floor at a recent round table at the Federation Council on the
demographic situation in the country. 

Samarina also reported that the share of Russians in the country's European
part is increasing, while they are simultaneously outflowing from the
Northern and Eastern territories. In 2001 the strength of the population in
the Extreme North may be reduced by 12 percent. 

Experts said at the round table that, starting from 2006, Russia will be
faced with an inevitable reduction of the number of the able-bodied
population. They predict that by that time Russia will have slightly over
80 million people of the able-bodied age, which is less than 60 percent of
its entire population. 

According to Olga Samarina, a critical situation has also shaped with the
life span. At the present moment, Russia holds the 100th place in the world
in the life expectancy of women and only 134th in the life expectancy of men. 

*******

#5
The Nation
June 3, 2002 (press date May 15, 2002)
Editorial
A Dangerous Treaty

The Nation has warned repeatedly that the Bush Administration was 
threatening to undermine perhaps the best chance in a generation for 
a cooperative relationship with Russia that would make the world 
safer. The US-Russian nuclear weapons reduction agreement, announced 
May 13 and scheduled to be signed when George W. Bush and Russian 
President Vladimir Putin meet in Moscow on May 24, confirms our worst 
fears-and indeed may even create new dangers.

An unprecedented kind of cooperation between the two former cold war 
rivals is essential because of the disintegration of Russia's 
Soviet-era nuclear infrastructures, a development that has made the 
dangers of nuclear proliferation and accidents even greater than they 
were during the cold war. The only solution is very deep, rapid and 
irreversible cuts in the number of nuclear weapons in both countries, 
along with taking those that remain off hairtrigger alert. This 
treaty, which was virtually dictated to an impoverished and 
militarily weak Russia by the Bush Administration, falls far short of 
that goal-it doesn't even mention de-alerting-and thus represents a 
potentially tragic lost opportunity.

The treaty calls for each side to reduce its strategic warheads from 
about 6,000 to between 2,200 and 1,700. On the surface, those cuts 
may seem to be "historic," as the White House is claiming. Leaving 
aside the fact that the lower numbers are still obscenely high, the 
reductions are not to be realized until 2012, and during that 
ten-year period neither side is obliged to make cuts on a specified 
schedule. Since the agreement also permits either side to withdraw 
from the treaty with three months' notice, the United States or 
Russia could legally carry out few or no reductions for almost a 
decade and then abrogate the treaty before it expires. (The 
withdrawal clause was also insisted upon by the habitually 
unilateralist Bush Administration; because the treaty was all but 
imposed on Putin, it's unlikely to have much strong or lasting 
support in Moscow in any case.) Worse, reductions made may turn out 
to be virtual because neither side, on White House insistence, is 
required to destroy its decommissioned warheads-it may store as many 
as it wishes, as Washington has made clear it intends to do. Moscow 
will almost certainly do the same, and, given the widely recognized 
lack of security at its storage facilities, will thus multiply the 
already considerable risk of Russia's nuclear devices falling into 
the wrong hands-that is, fueling the danger of proliferation that has 
been especially alarming since September 11.

Nor will a treaty that does not provide for irreversible nuclear 
weapons cuts diminish Moscow's sense of insecurity, already 
exacerbated by the Bush Administration's unilateral withdrawal from 
the ABM treaty, its determination to build a missile defense system 
and its steady military encirclement of Russia. (By 2003 there will 
be a US or NATO presence in at least nine of the fifteen former 
Soviet republics.) This is hardly offset by Russia's new 
quasi-deliberative role in NATO on select issues and will make Moscow 
even more reluctant to destroy its nuclear weapons unless Washington 
does.

Yet another danger may lurk beneath the misleading facade of the Bush 
Administration's "historic" treaty. The agreement does not even 
mention the thousands of small, tactical nuclear weapons on both 
sides. The omission is ominous in two respects. Such weapons are more 
vulnerable to theft and other kinds of proliferation. And, as we 
learned when the Administration's new nuclear doctrine was leaked in 
March, the Pentagon is devising scenarios for the early use of such 
weapons and thus for building new ones. That would require a 
resumption of nuclear testing, and Moscow would probably follow suit. 
The result would be a new and more dangerous nuclear arms race: The 
first one built nuclear weapons not for use but as deterrents; the 
new race would build nuclear weapons with the intention of using them.

In announcing the agreement, Bush claimed that it "will liquidate the 
legacy of the cold war" and "begin the new era of US-Russian 
relationships." In fact, this treaty is more likely to perpetuate and 
even increase some of the worst aspects of the cold war. And the 
"era" it marks may well be more dangerous than the one we have only 
barely survived. The struggle for a truly new era of US-Russian 
relations and nuclear security must therefore be redoubled before 
there are no last opportunities.

*******

#6
The Economist (UK)
May 18-24, 2002
Editorial
Russia and the West 
To Russia for love
Vladimir Putin has plans for Russia that can also benefit the West
 
HISTORY is offering Russia a second chance. Next week President Vladimir
Putin will welcome George Bush for a summit that will have as a centrepiece
the first Russia-America arms-control treaty in a decade. Then Russia and
the leaders of the transatlantic alliance will inaugurate a new NATO-Russia
Council. A year ago, all of this would have seemed the pinnacle of possible
achievement in an awkward relationship between Russia and the West. Yet
these events may be no more than diplomatic footnotes in a much bigger
history-shaping process that had begun before the September 11th terrorist
assault on America, but has accelerated sharply since. After 70 years of
blind-alley communism, and ten more of drift, Mr Putin is making a
determined bid for Russia to end its self-estrangement and join the concert
of developed, democratic countries alongside America and Europe.

The shift is already measurable in encouraging ways. Fears that America's
withdrawal next month from the two countries' 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) treaty would produce another eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation have
faded. Not many months ago, the deployment of large numbers of American
troops to bases in Central Asia, and the despatch of military advisers to
Georgia, would have been seen in Moscow as an intolerable incursion into
Russia's jealously guarded geopolitical space. Instead Mr Putin is now
sharing useful intelligence with America that has helped the war on
terrorism, in Afghanistan and beyond. And while Russia's relations with
NATO have often been openly hostile—to the alliance's plans to take in more
recruits from Eastern Europe, and to its military intervention to end the
bloodletting in the Balkans—by month's end the discussion will instead be
of common problems, from counter-terrorism to peacekeeping, and efforts to
tackle them together. 

Winning Russia for democracy was supposed to have been the great prize at
the end of the cold war. But hopes foundered on familiar rivalries and
suspicions. Will that happen again? Plenty of Russian generals and
diplomats of the cold-war school still see the “qualitatively new”
relationship with America and Europe that Mr Putin is after as a sell-out
at worst, and at best an indicator of Russia's own weakness and decline.
There are westerners, too, who fret that Russia could once again all too
easily turn from would-be friend to foe.

The measure of Russia

The sceptics are right in one respect: Russia is a lot weaker than it used
to be. Mr Putin is in some ways trying to make the best of a bad job. He
needs the arms-control deal announced this week more than Mr Bush because
Russia cannot afford to maintain the arsenal it has (see article). He has
piped down over NATO enlargement and the ABM treaty in part because he sees
little point in picking fights he cannot hope to win. And he was probably
all the happier to see America squashing the Taliban in Afghanistan,
because Russia's cash-strapped army wasn't up to the job, and because
America's arrival in Central Asia represents something of a counterweight
to growing Chinese influence there.
 
Yet unlike his predecessors, Mr Putin is not satisfied merely with managing
Russia's decline. He knows that the 21st-century measure of its influence
will be economic growth, not its missile tally. His strategic goal is to
get Russia into the World Trade Organisation, not to keep tossing spanners
into western works. He may still be more of a Russian liberaliser than a
western-minded one, but he knows that Russia's economic future needs to be
built on the difficult reforms needed to qualify for the world's premier
trading club, not on the fickle price of its oil exports (see article).
That is why America and Europe should resist the temptation to bend WTO
rules to shoe-horn Russia in.

Yet if Russia is to reform and eventually prosper, it will need two other
things: a secure and stable neighbourhood, and new investment. This casts
Mr Putin's recent policy shifts in a different light. Since the threats to
Russia now come, not from America or NATO in the west, but from the south
and the east, it makes sense to work with America and Europe to counter the
problems of terrorism and weapons proliferation. America and Europe,
moreover, are home to the firms and stockmarkets Russia needs to help
finance its economic revival.

Helping himself

In other words, Mr Putin's is a pro-Russia policy, not a pro-western one,
but there can be plenty of beneficial overlap. And from these shifts others
can flow. It makes sense for Russia to keep on good terms with neighbouring
China, but that country's hopes for a rejectionist front against America's
missile-defence plans have fallen through—leading it, perhaps, to seek
better relations with the Bush administration too. Russia itself is once
more co-operating in the UN Security Council (after assurances that its
commercial interests will not be overlooked) to get weapons inspectors back
into Iraq.
 
Things will not always run this smoothly. Agreement to disagree more
politely—as America and Russia are now doing over missile defences—though
welcome, only goes so far. Part of the difficult new agenda at next week's
summit will be Russia's determination to press ahead with nuclear
assistance to Iran, despite concerns at that country's bomb-making
ambitions. And while terrorist atrocities in Russia, such as last week's
bomb in Dagestan, rightly invite western condemnation, so still should
Russia's bloody campaign against separatists in Chechnya whenever human
rights are trampled on.

Other differences are bound to emerge along the way. The popularity Mr
Putin enjoys, and which he is relying on to continue what some Russians
still see as his maverick foreign policy, may not endure once the painful
changes needed for WTO entry start to bite. Grumblers ask: What's in it for
Russia?

The answer is the sort of future Mr Putin is sketching out: an economically
capable Russia; not the superpower it once was, but a power among others,
respected for the contribution it can make, not feared and quarantined for
the damage it can do. Such is Russia's opportunity. Will it grasp it? 

*******

#7
Moscow Tribune
May 17, 2002
MUCH ADO ABOUT NATO And new rearmament coming 
By Stanislav Menshikov 

Two developments earlier this week have been called historical: an agreement 
to create a joint Russia-NATO council, and a Treaty to reduce strategic 
nuclear armaments prepared for signature by presidents George W. Bush and 
Vladimir Putin when they meet in Moscow on May 24. A closer look at both 
documents raises serious questions about their historic value. 

In the NATO case, Russia will be now sitting on a new council of twenty 
together with 19 members of that alliance to discuss issues of fighting 
terrorism, peacekeeping operations, non-proliferation of armaments and a few 
others. But it will have no voice on NATO membership or on core military 
decisions. 

The agreement has been dubbed "the funeral of the Cold War". Russia is no 
longer called NATO's principal enemy. But if so, then what is the purpose of 
the alliance's enormous military machine? There is no need to maintain it 
for the sake of fighting international terrorism or running peacekeeping 
operations. Because we are no longer enemies, it could easily be reduced, as 
Russia's was in the past decade. But there is no sign of that. On the 
contrary, plans are for more, not less military spending to upgrade, as the 
US sees it, "Europe's comparatively outdated forces". If the machine is not 
to be used against Russia then why not include military decisions on the new 
council's agenda? 

Also, the question is why continue with NATO's expansion to the East if 
there is no enemy in sight there? It seems that including Russia into that 
joint council is just a ploy to buy - at a very low price - its tacit 
agreement with bringing the Baltics into the alliance, something to which it 
always objected. 

The new Treaty on strategic arms reduction is another strange creature. It 
compels Russia and the US to reduce their operationally deployed warheads to 
1,700 - 2,200 on each side in the next ten years. There is no set schedule 
or structural limitation. Both parties can choose their own timetable and 
strategic force composition. How would one side know that the other is 
indeed reducing? Procedures for monitoring and verification are to be worked 
out in further negotiations as well as rules for counting warheads. There is 
no obligation to destroy warheads, missiles or bombers. There is no 
limitation on deploying MIRVed warheads. In fact, there are no binding 
provisions at all, except to somehow achieve the final figures. What happens 
if in 2012,  warhead levels turn out to be higher than anticipated? No 
answer, except that each party has the right to drop out at a three month's 
notice. 

The history of disarmament talks knows no precedent equal to the new Treaty 
in utter lack of substance. Over the preceding decades both countries were 
very much interested in arms reduction on the other side. Russia is still 
interested. In the five months of negotiations, it continuously insisted on 
real, non-reversible, not virtual reductions. It was prepared to reduce and 
destroy its own warheads and missiles, but not unilaterally. Why? For the 
same reason that the US wants to keep its warheads in storage - in view of 
uncertainties in the global situation. On all vital points negotiators 
disagreed. Then they decided to throw out the meat but keep the skeleton so 
that their presidents could boast of another historical achievement. In the 
past, leaders of both countries had the decency to admit disagreement when 
it was a fact. The treaties they signed were real. Not any longer. 

The winners on both sides are the military establishments. The Pentagon is 
free to pursue its plans of building a new US strategic triad that is more 
powerful than anytime during the Cold War. There will be no limitations on 
the US anti-missile defence system. Nor on modern high-power and 
high-precision conventional weapons. Nor on mini-nuclear bombs. Nor on any 
other kind of military equipment that the US military may want to develop. 

Russia is also free to choose its own path. Putin can proceed with one-side 
disarmament in the hope that the US does the same. But chances are that, 
watching the US, he is more likely to counter with his own rearmament. He is 
now free to produce as many new intercontinental missiles as he needs and 
equip them with MIRVed warheads. He can stall on former plans to 
decommission Russia's old "Satans". He can modernise his space forces to 
make them adequate in the emerging race to control outer space. He can go 
ahead with re-equipping his supersonic heavy bombers with high-precision 
targeting equipment. All that can be easily done to fit the new "binding" 
Treaty. The idea that Russia does not have enough money is a legend. Half of 
one percent of the country's GDP would suffice for those purposes. 

The gate is thus wide open for a new and dangerous armaments race - wider 
than at any time in the last 40 years. Other countries are sure to join. If 
going backwards in disarmament and global stability is also history, than 
this is indeed a historical moment, 

*******

#8
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV GIVES VLADIMIR PUTIN A BACKING 

MOSCOW, May 16. /From RIA Novosti's correspondent Alexander Chebanu/ --
Mikhail Gorbachev, the first president of the USSR, gives a backing to
Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Gorbachev Fund press service reports
that Gorbachev has revealed his vision of Russia's present and future
before students and professors of the Johans Guttenberg University in Mainz
in Germany. On invitation from the University, Gorbachev this week
delivered a lecture, Russia and Europe on the Road to a New World Order. 

Gorbachev said that as the Russian president "Putin has done much more
positive things than expected". He has reached "a greater stability in the
country and is steering the right course", said Gorbachev. 

"I was a president and know it is a tough job. I give a positive assessment
of Putin's activities. As an individual and the president of the Fund I try
to back him as much as I can", said the former president of the USSR. 

Gorbachev also believes that Russia should seek for new ways of cooperation
with the European Union and, by way of example, suggested associated
membership in the EU. 

As regards relations between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, Gorbachev said "we should be realists: NATO exists and acts".
"It makes sense with the involvement of NATO countries to expand security
cooperation and give Russia the right to participate not only in the
discussion of a certain range of questions of general security of the
countries of NATO and Russia but also participate in decision-making", said
Gorbachev. Russia "should also have the right of veto on a certain range of
questions", he is sure. 

*******

#9
Jamestown Foundation 
Russia's Week
16 May 2002

THE OLIGARCHY'S DEAD, LONG LIVE THE OLIGARCHY....
The past week saw more intrigue involving Slavneft, one of the last 
majority state-owned Russian oil companies. This latest round began May 8, 
when word leaked that the Interior Ministry's economic crimes department 
had opened a criminal investigation into alleged "abuse of power" by two 
Slavneft vice presidents, including Yury Sukhanov, a reputed ally of Prime 
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and Roman Abramovich, the Chukotka governor and 
the power behind the Sibneft oil company. Sukhanov, a former Sibneft 
executive, was seeking to replace Slavneft's ousted president, Mikhail 
Gutseriev (whose brother, Khamzat Gutseriev, was disqualified from 
Ingushetia's presidential race last month). He was also challenged for the 
post by Anatoly Baranovsky, first vice president of Rosneft, another 
state-owned oil company. During an extraordinary shareholders meeting held 
earlier this week, Sukhanov defeated Baranovsky and became Slavneft's 
president.

According to various Russian observers, the battle for Slavneft's 
presidency was in anticipation of the auctioning later this year of a 
19.68-percent stake in the company. The rival presidential candidates were 
backed by two powerful rival oligarchic coalitions. Politkom.ru, the 
website of the authoritative Center for Political Technologies, named these 
clans as: (1) Bolshaya MADAM, or Big MADAM, the second word being an 
acronym derived from the initials of five leading oligarchs--Urals Mining 
and Metals Company chief Iskander Makhmudov, Roman Abramovich, Siberian 
Aluminum chief Oleg Deripaska, EvrazHolding chief and steel baron Aleksandr 
Abramov and MDM Bank board chairman Andrei Melnychenko; (2) BMP, standing 
for Rosneft president Sergei Bogdanchikov, Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller and 
Mezhprombank founder and Federation Council member Sergei Pugachev. The 
first group overlaps with the group of Yeltsin-era oligarchs sometimes 
referred to as the "Family." The second overlaps with the St. Petersburg 
special service veterans known as the "Chekists."

In any case, Sukhanov's election as Slavneft's president marked a victory 
for the Family/Bolshaya MADAM group generally and for Prime Minister 
Kasyanov specifically. Many observers, however, believe that it was only a 
temporary win and that the BMP/Chekist faction is preparing its revenge. 
Indeed, Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov's attack this week on the State 
Customs Committee (GTK) for alleged involvement in shady foreign trade 
operations, among other things, was widely seen as an indirect attack on 
the prime minister, given that the GTK's head, Mikhail Vanin, is a 
long-time Kasyanov ally.

What was important about the Slavneft imbroglio, however, was less its 
murky and tortuous twists and turns than the degree to which it resembled 
an episode straight out of the Yeltsin era. Indeed, it may be no surprise 
that Vladimir Putin's promises to crush the oligarchs have been replaced by 
his denunciations of terrorists at home and abroad. He may have concluded 
that he has more hope of winning a war against the latter.

*******

#10
gazeta.ru
May 16, 2002
Ustinov holds back on anti-corruption campaign
By Artyom Vernidoub  

A large-scale anti-corruption campaign in Russia could lead the country
into anarchy, Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov believes. In the opinion
of Russia’s chief prosecutor, combating corruption on a large scale with
zero tolerance could leave the country without any rulers, because 80 per
cent of state officials would end up behind bars or having to resign in the
event of such a purge. 

On Wednesday, Russia’s chief prosecutor presented the annual report of his
agency’s activities in 2001 to the Federation Council (the upper house of
the Russian parliament). Given the wide range of high-profile criminal
cases initiated by the Prosecutor General’s Office last year against top
state officials and powerful businessmen, Ustinov’s report revealed little
that was not already known. The prosecutor mentioned several high-profile
cases currently being investigated by his office, accused foreign
counterparts for their failure to cooperate and turnover criminals hiding
abroad, blasted corrupt state and police officials and blamed the
increasing crime rate on alcohol abuse. 

Russian law demands that the prosecutor general report annually on the
results of his agency’s work to the upper house. A 33-page report
concerning the general situation with law and order in the country was
submitted to the Federation Council at the end of April. 

Thus, not only the senators, but also some journalists had a chance to
familiarize themselves with the report before it was presented by Ustinov
in the upper house on Wednesday. Prior to his appearance in the Federation
Council, some media outlets alleged, referring to leaks from the upper
house and sources in the Prosecutor’s Office, that Ustinov was gong to make
a series of sensational revelations concerning allegedly corrupt officials
in all the top Russian governmental agencies. The Ministries of the
Interior and Defence, the Railways Ministry, as well as the Ministries for
Property Relations, Transport, Natural Resources, and state-owned arms
concern Rosvooruzheniye along with gas monopoly Gazprom were all considered
potential targets. 

Not one of them, however, was mentioned by Ustinov as he addressed the
senators on Wednesday. Ustinov, instead, directed his criticism at the
customs services. He openly accused the State Customs Committee of
corruption: ''Anyone who has spent any time in the field of customs
transactions, cannot but feel that the conduct of many of these customs
operators fully confirms all the stories of excesses, and of attempts by
them to turn customs areas into their own fiefdoms,'' Ustinov said. 

Ustinov’s report was noteworthy in that it mostly concerned economic
crimes. In particular, he brought the fact that bankruptcy procedures have
recently become a profitable business to the attention of the senators. He
expressed concern that only a very small number of companies have succeeded
in staving off the threat of bankruptcy. 

''There were more than 11,000 rulings on bankruptcy, and only in 60 cases,
that is 0.05 per cent, did companies succeed in re-establishing their
solvency before the declaration of bankruptcy. As members of the Federation
Council, you know better than anyone that bankruptcy is, essentially, doing
away with viable enterprises, which are socially and economically
significant, having at their disposal valuable property and unique
products,'' Ustinov said. 

The head prosecutor dedicated part of his report to his office’s
achievements in the political sphere. The chief accomplishment of his
agency was its significant contribution to President Putin’s policy for the
creation of a strong ''power vertical''. In the framework of that campaign
launched by Putin on his advent to power in March 2000, all regions, which
were largely uncontrollable fiefs, were ordered to bring their regional
laws in line with federal legislation. Ustinov proudly noticed that last
year the PGO detected 4,264 violations of federal legislation by regional
authorities. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan still refuse to obey the Kremlin’s
orders and stubbornly refuse to conform to federal law. 

Ustinov also reminded the upper house about Vladimir Gusinsky, Russia’s
once powerful media tycoon charged with large-scale misappropriation in
2001 and who was forced to leave the country after his Media-Most empire
was seized from him by state-controlled Gazprom over debt repayments. The
Spanish authorities still refuse to extradite Gusinsky, saying the case
against him was politically motivated. 

As a result of this, the Prosecutor General blasted his foreign
counterparts who fail to render sufficient legal assistance to Russia.
''Our Spanish colleagues have found some political issues in an absolutely
criminal case and are refusing to extradite Gusinskiy,'' Ustinov said.
Noting that Russia is ready and willing to cooperate with foreign
colleagues, Ustinov said that the extradition of criminals is ''a two-way
process, though in reality everything looks somewhat different''. 

Ustinov did not fail to mention some other well-known personalities
involved in high-profile cases. Last year alone, more than 25,000 officials
were investigated for crimes involving corruption, he said. Commenting on
the case of the former Railways Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko, he said the
investigation was still in progress. Ustinov also refreshed the senators’
memories on the so-called Aeroflot case, which has been sent to court,
while Boris Berezovsky and his associate Badri Patarkatsishvili have been
put on the wanted list. 

When asked by the upper house member Vyacheslav Novikov, if he was not
being just a little ridiculous speaking of Berezovsky’s name being placed
on the wanted list, when in actual fact the ''fugitive'' regularly shows up
on television, and does not make any secret of his whereabouts (the tycoon
is currently in self-imposed exile in London), Ustinov answered stolidly:
''Modern means of communication are so effective that not only Berezovsky,
but bin Laden, wanted worldwide, grants interviews.'' 

Ustinov spoke little of his office’s non-political work aimed at the
eradication of crime. He did admit some serious drawbacks in the work of
his agency. 884,000 crimes were left unsolved last year, he said and many
dangerous crimes were committed in which the police were somehow involved.
Many crimes also remain unregistered by police authorities unwilling to
initiate so-called hopeless cases, which hardly ever get solved. That is
why official crime statistics do not reflect the true state of affairs. 

Speaking of the terror threat, Ustinov said he was confident that the
investigation into the Victory Day attack in Kaspiisk would yield results
and those responsible for the horrific crime would be brought to justice.
(The blast in the Dagestani port of Kaspiisk claimed over 40 lives). 

Before his appearance in the Federation Council on Wednesday, the
prosecutor told the press he was not going to impress the public with any
scandalous revelations. A day earlier, he had met the Italian national
anti-Mafia prosecutor, Pier Luigi Vigna and upon signing a memorandum of
cooperation with Mr.Vigna, Ustinov emerged before the press and made a very
peculiar statement. Asked whether a large-scale operation similar to
Italy's ''Clean Hands'' in the 80s could be conducted in Russia, Ustinov
answered, to the great surprise of all those present, that Russia could not
endure such a large-scale campaign of combating corruption. He expressed
apprehension about the possible outcome of such an operation because ''in
Italy, over 80 per cent of politicians either resigned or were brought to
trial''. 

Ustinov went on to praise the Italian media for the important role they
played in the anti-corruption campaign in Italy by impartially reporting on
the work. In Russia, he claimed, certain biased media outlets hinder the
operations of the law-enforcement agencies. ''Unfortunately, some articles
aimed against the Prosecutor-General's Office are sponsored by criminal
groups,'' he said.  

******

#11
Russia's leftist alliance to propose motion of no-confidence in government 
Interfax

Moscow, 16 May: The united left opposition will officially raise the
question of no confidence in the government in the State Duma before the
end of May, leader of the Communist Party and the People's Patriotic Union
of Russia Gennadiy Zyuganov said at a press conference on Thursday [16 May].

The demand was made at rallies on 1 May and 9 May and by regional
organizations of the People's Patriotic Union, Zyuganov said.

The future signing of the Russian-American treaty on the reduction of
strategic nuclear armaments and the promotion of a law on private property
in land run counter to Russia's national interests and propel the country
into disintegration, he said. Zyuganov referred to Western press reports,
which say that the new Russian-American agreements imply Russia's "full
capitulation" to the US.

"Any imbalance of forces on the planet, any playing into the hands of the
party of war that has taken office in the US, will contribute to the
American globalism policy," Zyuganov said.

His press release entitled "On the New Phase of National Treason" says that
"the agreement to give in on Russia's nuclear potential was reached in
Reykjavik, the place where Mikhail Gorbachev betrayed the interests of the
Soviet Union".

"The left opposition demands immediate consultations between President
Vladimir Putin and the Federal Assembly on strategic security in compliance
with national legislation," Zyuganov said.

******

#12
From: "Jacob Kipp" 
Subject: On Envy, Elites, and Winter Olympics/6233
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 

On Envy, Elites, and Winter Olympics

I intended no disrespect to Vladimir Shlapentokh, sociology, or your
readers. Nor did I intend to "oust the issue of envy from the world." I like
"Othello," "Mozart i Salieri" [a la Pushkin, Shaffer, and Foreman] and
Olesha's "Zavist''." But I am still not sure exactly what they have to do
with Russian popular and elite behavior in the context of the Winter
Olympics.

What I suggested is that the passions expressed at the heights of the Winter
Olympics skandaly are a special and particular case.  I accept Vladimir's
introduction of white and black envy as useful categories but disagree with
its application to sport.  Core evidence of national "black envy" would have
been the conduct of Russian sports men and women.   From all I read and saw
they were fine national representatives. There was not a single Tanya
Harding and accomplice among them. If there is evidence to the contrary I am
willing to hear it. The anti-American response came from the fans at home.
They saw the events on their televisions, and the elites responded to their
sentiments.  The fans do matter here.  That was my point about the Red Sox.
If readers doubt that point, they might want to investigate the response of
South Korean popular and elite opinion to their speed-skating skandal.

I have been following anti-American sentiment in Russian for quite a while
and must say that it hit a low immediately after 9-11 when there was great
sympathy for the American people and government. I draw a distinction
between anti-American sentiment and anti-Americanism. The first is a
hostility towards the American people or government policies on a particular
issue and the second is a universal hostility and has ideological core. The
first is a function of particular context and situation.  "Yanks are
over-sexed, over-paid, and over here" can be taken to be an anti-American
sentiment with some "white envy" when spoken by British Tommies who were
under-paid, not here [in England], and longing for their sweethearts. This
had little or no impact on the Grand Alliance that defeated Hitler and
Japan.  Anti-Americanism implies an ideology.  In this case I would define
the sports skandaly as white envy for most Russians, who expressed
anti-American sentiments in the passion of the movement. Sports create a
special, unique climate.

I agree with Vladimir that there was a peak of anti-American senitment in
early March in the immediate aftermath of the Winter Games, according to
polling data.  I am not sure we should draw too much from that spike and lay
too much upon envy as an explanation of that sentiment. Vladimir, however,
makes the jump to a much larger context: "But the humiliation of one's
pride, which generates hatred, is an exact synonym of envy. Most Russians
regard the U.S. as the single power responsible for Russia's humiliation."
The sport skandaly are thus the proof of deep negative feeling [black envy]
toward the United States and Americans.  My Red Sox analog has been judged
anti-scientific. But I have trouble here. Both Vladimir and Matthew Maly
seem to want to redefine envy. Maly declares:   ". . . envy is the key to
understanding Russia." He goes on to add a dimension over which we
fundamentally disagree, asserting that envy should be defined as "choosing
to make the other suffer more than oneself as a means of achieving a desired
outcome." Now that is not my definition of envy. Merriam-Webster says envy
means: "painful or resentful awareness of an advantage enjoyed by another
with a desire to possess the same advantage." The Russian definition is not
particularly different: See: S. I. Ozhegov, Slovar' russkogo Iazyka,
"Zavist': Chuvstvo dosady, vyzvannoe blagopoluchiem, uspekhom drugogo." What
Maly calls envy and Vladimir would more precisely define as "black envy," a
la Nietzsche, comes much closer to malice [Merriam-Webster,: "a desire to
cause pain, injury, or distress to another," Ozhegov: "Zloba: Chuvstvo
gnevnogo razdrazheniia, nedobrozhelatel'stva protiv kogo-n"].

There is a small problem with Nietzsche's "black envy." That envy is the
petty and banal sentiment of  Untermenschen in the presence of the
Uebermensch who operates beyond good and evil and the restraints of
Christian/Kantian ethics. The envy of Untermenschen is the threat to the
Uebermensch's creativity. This slope, as we have seen in the 20th century,
is a slippery one. As an American I do not need to be an Uebermensch,
however much pride I feel in my country and my nation. I certainly do not
feel that Russians are Untermenschen. In an increasing complex and
interdependent world ideologies based on such assumptions are a throwback to
a dark past.

The skandaly associated with the Winter Games were marked by passionate
anti-American sentiments and some were manipulated, as I suggested, by those
with an ideological anti-Americanism. The issue is: can we generalize from
those passions to the victory of that anti-American ideology?  I still have
my doubts.  "Vsia Rossiia, vsia Moskva preziraet TsKSA!" [All Russia, all
Moscow despise CCSA. ] The Central Club of the Soviet Army hockey team has
heard that chant at their games against Dynamo for years. There is passion
here but it is not ideological. It is a matter of the moment of the
particular in the context of sports competition. Such passion can become
explosive. We have had soccer wars in the past - the one between Honduras
and El Salvador in 1969 comes to mind -  but none broke out as a result of
Salt Lake City.
We did, however, have a wonderful satiric piece by Ilya Milshteyn in Grani
[26 February 2002] on Russian retaliatory strikes against the North America
[the Canadians apparently also got hit for their sins]. The author did offer
a tongue-in-cheek observation on this fanciful event. ". . . sociologists
cite a sharply higher approval rating for the president and increased
confidence by the electorate in the RF Armed Forces."

We have had European football hooliganism since the late 1960s, which has
been attributed to working class resentment, racism, media encouragement,
and excessive consumption of alcohol.  But to my knowledge, we had no
Russian hooliganism in Salt Lake City or in Russia, although a few private
shops said they would not sell to Americans during the skandaly.

I would not draw too deep conclusions about national envy from the recent
manifestations of wounded pride during the Winter Games.  Sports may appear
at times to be politics continued by other means.  But they are not.  Sports
are, by definition, a zero-sum game. And the Olympic coverage does seem to
be about national pride and not international sportsmanship. But in sports
the victor and vanquished have a chance to play again. Russian resentment
focused on the United States for several reasons: First, the US had the
double role of both competing and hosting the games, thereby putting it at
the center of the skandaly about judging and drug testing. Second, the
success of American athletes gave to the US a preeminence in the media's
infamous calculation of national success by medal count and so defined a
symbolic relationship between Russia and the United States. Third, world
media coverage came to Russia through American feeds and so tended to
present an American spin on events to which Russian media responded.

As to the more general picture of US-Russian relations, I would agree that
the honeymoon after 9-11 is over. What follows the honeymoon depends very
much on the two parties. How they manage their relations are the crux of the
matter. And here the expectations of the parties matter. Vladimir argues
that the Russian elite resents the United States for imposing humiliations
upon Russia.  Has the United States humiliated Russia?  Have the American
people humiliated Russians?  Some Russians, as I suggested, would answer
that with a ringing "Yes!"  Others would speak of particular and specific
issues of conflict and cooperation. And those I would suggest are not guilty
of "black envy." These Russians have concerns shared by many
long-term foreign friends of the United States. We would be wise to listen
and engage in dialogue. I would call attention to the account of roundtable
that Ambassador Alexander Vershbow conducted recently [Nezavisimaya Gazeta
(8 April 2002)].. I think the range of opinions presented by the Russian
participants showed the diversity of views on US-Russian relations at this
time. The participants included a wide spectrum of Russian elite opinion:
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy Chair Sergey Karaganov, Council on
Foreign and Defense Policy Political Program Director Andrey Fedorov,
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, Russian Public Television station Odnako
show head Mikhail Leontyev, and manager of the Ezhenedel'nyy Zhurnal
political section Aleksandr Golts.

Now the argument offered by Shlapentokh and Maly is that this envy and
anti-Americanism are to be associated with leaders.  Maly mentions that
American students of Russia have been "loonies" looking for win-win,
Kumbayah , love fests in the US relationship to Russian monsters.  I cannot
speak for all scholars, but I plead not guilty. 

I do have problems with conspiracy theories that propose linear explanations
to complex, nonlinear phenomenon. Vladimir asserts: "It was the envious
elites who fomented the scandal using the Games as a pretext for launching a
new wave of anti-Americanism in the country." The issue is whether this is a
linear or non-linear wave. In a linear case we can isolate the single
variable, the elites' intentions, and portray change over time. The event
will follow their game plan. But the truth is that instantaneous, global
media brought the skandaly directly to the public without time for elite
filters to shape perception. The response of the Russian elites was populist
and adaptive.  I freely admit that there were those who sought to use the
events to their advantage.  Vladimir does suggest a gradation of opinions
among the elite but he does not deal with wave amplitude over time. My
impression is that the wave quickly lost amplitude after the close of the
games. I am not happy with the concept "envious elites" because it paints
with a broad brush. I identified in my comment those who, I would say,
engaged in anti-Americanism.  I agree that Putin's comments did not fall
into that category. We are dealing with a complex system that did not go
into chaos over this issue for a set of reasons. 

As to Maly's comments, I am at a loss to reply.  Envy and the murder of John
Lennon linked to Stalin's purges, a cult of death, and "the victory of  the
Horrible Evil over the Very Personification of Death for the greater good of
all of us" mystify me. I disagree with Maly's assumption that Americans and
the United States government was the source of Russia's protracted crisis.
He is dead wrong when he asserts: "we caused this long-suffering country to
go through an economic catastrophe comparable in scale to that of the Nazi
invasion." The causes of Russia's crisis are many and complex. US policy may
on some issues have contributed to the depths of the crisis, but the roots
are much deeper in Soviet and Russian history and society. I simply cannot
accept the characterization that the role of the United States in Russia's
"transition" over the last decade have been the equivalent of the Nazi
invasion in terms of damage and human suffering

I do not believe and cannot accept the assumption that Russian elites and
population are guided by a national trait of self-destruction in order to
destroy others.  Elites can generate elements like that and they can come to
power in times of extraordinary crises, but in complex societies there are
likely to be competing elites with different interests and perspectives.
Even in the Soviet period we did not face elites committed to collective
suicide. We should not lose sight of the reality that for much of the Cold
War both nations possessed arsenals sufficient to destroy the world.  If
unlimited malice had been their intent, the Soviet elite could have ended
the Cold War with a bang. They did not.

US-Russian relations have had their rocky moments since the collapse of the
Soviet Union.  I was in Moscow for two of them in September 1995 and May
1999. I did not see the same wave magnitude or amplitude in March-February
2002.   Soon we will sign a treaty with the Russian government further
reducing those arsenals. Today Russia is an ally in the war against
terrorism.  Putin's Russia is finding its own way through a difficult
transition. It will not lead to American democracy, but it can lead to
better and more humane Russia - true to the best of its past and a
contributing member of the world community. And there will be sufficient
reason to take pride in a nation and society that will be more open,
prosperous, and democratic.

********

#13
strana.ru
May 16, 2002
Flowing Through Time - Scientists Picture Volga a Generation Ahead
Study seeks stable future for Russia's greatest river
By Michael Stedman

A unique project to study the 2,300 kilometers of Russia's principal
waterway has been unveiled to delegates at an international scientific and
industrial forum examining the lives of the world's great rivers.

The study is a futurist assessment of how the Volga river could look in 30
years' time, protected from an environmental viewpoint while used to its
full potential as an economic power source, life sustainer and recreational
resource for the people of its banks and basin.

Teams of scientists will be tasked over the next 18 months to deliver a
blueprint in a major initiative just announced by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO.)

It was launched in the Volga city of Nizhny Novgorod by UNESCO's envoy to
the Russian Federation, Wolfgang Reuther, as a multi-disciplinary mission,
sharing the view, he said, that the study's methodologies and results "will
then become a model for other major world river systems."

The vision "puts the stress on human prosperity and interaction between man
and Nature," outlining differences between the life of the river today "and
the stable future we want to see," the official told delegates gathered at
this year's Great Rivers forum.

Experts from Russia and abroad will now launch into a science-based look at
ways in which physical, chemical, biological, social and economic processes
can improve management of the basin's life systems and generate
sustainable, responsible and realistic development.

They will be focused on stretches of water winding from the Baltic and
White Seas in northern Russia to where the river gushes up to 30,000 cubic
meters of water a second into the landlocked southern Caspian Sea. The
first stage of the project will cover just the river, further stages moving
into the Caspian itself.

Researchers will examine what UNESCO's Reuther called a "ramified
ecological system." This runs through lands housing more than 60 percent of
Russia's economic potential, home to many cultural traditions and a rich
history based on the river's resources.

Since, over time, the waterway's course has been "engineered" away from its
original character, the study seeks to address conflicts of interest among
the river's inhabitants - "how could we avoid conflicting results because
of the activities of groups of lobbyists," said Reuther.

Those behind the project say it should become a reference point for putting
policy in place, suggesting specific answers, including action at federal
level, to the basin's problems. The principals guiding it will be presented
to a world summit on stable development planned for Johannesburg in August.
Other world rivers scientific forums next year would be landmark events in
the drafting of the Volga concept, the UNESCO official said.

The Volga-Caspian basin has been chosen for study largely because of its
key interest to scientists as a landlocked waterway. It is also going
ahead, said Reuther, because of confidence on the international side that
Russian participants "have a high degree of scientific prowess and
professionalism and because we have an interest in supporting
inter-disciplinary scientific co-operation in this country."

Though confined initially to Russian territory and waters, Caspian Sea
states Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will be invited to
take part in later stages of the project, UNESCO says.

*******

#14
Vedomosti
May 16, 2002
Trade Wars, Episode Two
By Aram Yavrumyan 
(therussianissues.com)

The uncompromising protectionists from all countries of the world, the
numerous agrarian opponents of free trade have received yet another
valuable gift from President George Bush. Some of them, the particularly
alert ones (in Russia as well), have already managed to use it, renewing
their demand for grown agrarian subsidies. In actual fact, however, the
worsening free trade situation that now encompasses farm output is no less
damaging for this country than the slide in steel trade. In principle,
Russia has every chance to regain the positions of a major food exporter it
lost early in the 20th century.

The magnanimous Bush, in spite of the growing budget deficit, has signed a
bill into law, which promises Americans engaged in the hard farm work a
large-scale surge in subsidies. This officially closes down the free market
experiment in the problem-ridden U.S. agrarian sector. Mr. Bush commented
on his decision rather cynically and, reporters observed, with a nervous
giggle: "It's an imperfect law, I know it. But, you know, every law is
imperfect."

Rejecting admonitions of prominent Republicans (who had spent six years
trying to make farmers do without huge subsidies), the president promised
the agrarians $190 billion over 10 years (80 percent more than the present
level). Two-thirds of the subsidies are to go to 10% of farmers, the
biggest outfits. U.S. politicians say Bush has given much help to his
supporters, Senators due to face soon-to-come elections in the agrarian
states. He has helped himself too, for now Iowa, South Dakota and Missouri
will be grateful to him as long as he lives. The opponents of the step are
speaking about the president's "political suicide," but if what they say is
true, it is already death after death: first there was steel. West
Virginia, Ohio and Pennsylvania are as infinitely grateful to him for
having introduced steel duties and subsidies to companies. But there are
another 44 states and this cannot but cause concern.

Like after the U.S. introduction of steel barriers, the EU has promised to
appeal against the step to the WTO. But in their heart of hearts, the
European politicians (along with the Japanese) are applauding Bush. The EU
hope is for the weakening of pressure brought to bear by the Cairns Group
(it includes agricultural exporting countries, which advocate full
renunciation of support for the countryside in the form of duties and
subsidies; it is in Russia's interests to join them).

In real fact, it is the Cairns Group countries, not the EU, that will
appeal against the U.S. decision: Australian and Brazilian officials have
already expressed their disappointment. But they are unlikely to have any
backing from Russia. Based in the Agricultural Ministry and the Federation
Council, the domestic protectors of the agricultural industry insist on
raising the allowed level of subsidies in Russia as well. Russia's real
interests, however, lie elsewhere: already now the growth of consumer
demand for agricultural products lags behind production growth, this being
an indication that the country needs an outlet to foreign markets. But if
the WTO negotiations on the opening of agrarian markets end in failure, it
will have no chance at all. It is for this reason that Russia ought to join
the Cairns Group as soon as possible, thus strengthening its positions.

Opened in Qatar in November 2001, the present round of WTO negotiations is
visibly losing chances of success. Properly speaking, it was launched only
thanks to the fact that Europe and Japan (caving in under pressure coming
from U.S.-supported developing countries) gave their preliminary consent to
lower non-market agrarian barriers. For the majority of developing
countries, the aim of these negotiations is to help their export of metals,
agricultural produce and textiles to the developed countries. Now, with the
U.S. Administration waiving the free trade principles, the first two groups
of commodities can be struck off the list.

But the fight will go on. The developing countries will continue insisting
on full renunciation of subsidies or at least their phased reduction.
Subsidies tend to create inequality of terms of trade: the developing
countries (where the per capita annual earnings are anywhere between $400
and $2,000), as well as Russia, simply have no money for subsidizing
farmers the way it is done in the EU and the U.S. According to OECD
statistics, prior to the latest Bush present, each U.S. farmer received
from the government $20,800 a year on average, and his European counterpart
$16,000. EU farm subsidies make up approximately 40% of the cost of farm
output, the U.S. figure being between 20 and 25%.

Mr. Bush has shed the last of what remained of his image of free trade
supporter. When the strongest player, the U.S., plays to rules of its own
that do not benefit the majority and renounces support for free trade, the
others are left only to spread their hands. The world trade is being
wrapped up (or rather does not grow), and one can consider an epoch of
ubiquitous trade wars as open. Chucking the idea for the sake of local
electoral successes is a bad example to politicians the world over. The
cost of this betrayal of principles may prove an unpleasant surprise for
America itself: all countries will gradually realize that the States has
given them an indulgence for unrestrained protectionism. So long as the
matter concerns commodity trade alone, America is in the saddle, for her
protectionist capabilities are superior to those available to others. But
the world economy is already a unified affair and the next step to follow
the commodity trade restriction is certain to be a damper on capital movement.

*******

#15
The Jerusalem Post 
May 16, 2002
Israel wants Iran nukes on agenda of Bush-Putin summit
By Herb Keinon 

The government is lobbying Washington to place Iranian nuclear
proliferation high on the agenda of next week's critical summit between US
President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which is
expected to go a long way toward codifying a new world order. 

The topic of the transfer of nuclear and missile technology from Russia to
Iran was discussed at high-level US-Israeli talks in Washington over the
last two weeks. 

According to senior diplomatic officials, the topic was discussed Monday
during the Israeli-US strategic dialogue between Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage and his staffers, and National Security Council head Uzi
Dayan, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's foreign affairs adviser Danny Ayalon,
Foreign Ministry Director-General Avi Gil, and Defense Ministry deputy
director-general Koti Mor. 

A week before, a high-ranking delegation went to Washington to specifically
talk with the administration about the nuclear and missile technology
"leakage" issue. This delegation met with Undersecretary of State John
Bolton. 

One diplomatic official said it is both presumptuous and unrealistic for
Israel to ask the US to hold up an agreement with the Russians to cut
nuclear stockpiles by two-thirds, or not to form a new Russian-NATO
committee to coordinate policy on a number of issues unless they put an end
to nuclear and missile leakage to Iran. The idea, he said, is to "weave"
the Iranian proliferation issue "into the fabric" of the overall US-Russian
dialogue. 

Bush and Putin are slated to hold a three-day summit beginning May 23. 

"The whole US-Russia relationship is changing," the official said. "You
have the cuts of the nuclear arsenal, NATO's expansion, its cooperation
with Russia, Russia's involvement in the war on terror, and even Russian
involvement in the Middle East as part of the quartet [together with the
US, European Union, and UN]." 

He said Israel does not want this new world order to fall into place with
the phenomenon of nuclear and missile transfers from Russia to Iran an
accepted part of it. 

The US has been intimately involved in the efforts to curb leakage since
the mid-1990s. Leakage is the transfer of nuclear technology and materials
to Iran, often with a wink and a nod from the Russian government, as well
as transfer of missile technology and some missile parts, often by
disgruntled individuals and non-governmental bodies, such as academic
institutions. 

He said Russia's interest in this transfer is both financial and
geopolitical. The financial interests are obvious, he said, while one of
its geopolitical interests is having Iran as a buffer to mute criticism
from the Moslem world over Russia's handling of the situation in Chechnya,
as was the case at a recent conference of Islamic nations. 

But, the official said, "Putin is a serious leader. We hope he will see
that it is not in his interest to have a nuclear Iran, with missiles with a
1,300-km range, on his border." 

Judging by talks with US officials, however, Jerusalem is not banking
solely on Putin's good judgment, but also wants the US to help him realize
that a nuclear Iran is in nobody's best interest.

*******

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