Johnson's Russia List
#6246
16 May 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Reuters: Is America getting too gushy about the Kremlin?
2. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, A Worthless Scrap of Paper.
3. AP: Russia's Ivanov Defends US Arms Deal.
4. Moscow News: Irina Kobrinskaya, Drop Zone Kremlin. Putin, Russia in the
Run-up to Summit.
5. gazeta.ru: Acquittal looms for Colonel Budanov.
6. RIA Novosti: Vladimir Simonov, RUSSIANS APPRECIATE SINCERITY.
7. Washington Post: Jim Hoagland, Cold War Afterthought.
8. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Russia pushes for deeper post-Soviet
integration.
9. RFE/RL: Kathleen Knox, CIS Military-Alliance Upgrade Plan Faces
Numerous Obstacles.
10. Grigory Yavlinsky: The Door to Europe is in Washington.
11. pravda.ru: MIKHAIL BULGAKOV: I AM A SATIRIST.
12. Heritage Foundation: Ariel Cohen and Baker Spring, U.S.-Russia Summit
Priorities: The Strategic Framework, a Nuclear Arms Agreement, and Trade.]
********
#1
ANALYSIS-Is America getting too gushy about the Kremlin?
By Elaine Monaghan
WASHINGTON, May 15 (Reuters) - Experts on the U.S.-Russian relationship are
beginning to ask if America risks getting too gushy about the Kremlin.
Since Sept. 11, the United States has grown so proud of its flourishing
friendship with Russia that President George W. Bush said recently he should
be no more worried about Moscow's nuclear arms than about Britain's.
"Do I care how many nuclear weapons (British Prime Minister) Tony Blair has?
No. And why should I care what the Russians feel they need for their
security?" Bush told an Oval Office visitor, according to Secretary of State
Colin Powell.
Bush's effusiveness, recounted by Powell at a book launch event on May 3 for
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, was a rhetorical flourish before a
summit in Russia this month. Bush and Putin are expected to sign a pact
slashing their arsenals to about a third of current levels over 10 years.
But history shows there can be risks in discounting a Russian threat.
President Harry S. Truman in 1948 famously underplayed Soviet dictator
Joseph Stalin's role, saying: "I got very well acquainted with Joe Stalin,
and I like old Joe. He is a decent fellow. But Joe is a prisoner of the
Politburo."
No one is comparing President Vladimir Putin to Stalin, although Putin's past
as a KGB spy initially made America sweat and the jury is out on his
democratic credentials.
However, experts fear progress could blind the United States to the threat of
a slide to autocracy in Russia and of its nuclear materials getting into the
wrong hands.
Michael McFaul, a long-time analyst of Russia and professor at Stanford
University, said there was always an understandable risk of American leaders
seeing the country through the eyes of the people they dealt with in Moscow.
But he poured scorn on the notion that Russia's nuclear arms were as
innocuous as Britain's from the U.S. perspective.
"I grew up in Montana on the Canadian border and I have no idea if they have
troops on the border and I don't care," McFaul said. "The big difference with
Russia is it's not a consolidated democracy, it's not a fully-integrated
member of the community of democratic states and to presume that process is
over, is either naive or misleading to the Russians."
McFaul said there was a residual risk Russia would slide from what he calls a
quasi-democracy now to autocracy in the next decade: "Not 50 percent, but not
zero."
CHICKENS AND SUCCESSES
Powell has also grown fond of joking about how he and Ivanov spend as much
time talking about chickens -- a reference to a trade spat purportedly over
the safety of American poultry exports -- as they do about anything else.
But the poultry war is no paltry matter: two of the top U.S. pork producers
said on May 10 that meat shipments to Russia had still not returned to normal
levels nearly a month after Moscow lifted its ban on chicken and turkey. The
poultry ban had a spillover effect on other U.S. meat imports from the United
States.
U.S. concerns remain high about nuclear proliferation from Russia to Iran.
Bush has dubbed Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, part of an "axis of
evil," accusing them of seeking weapons of mass destruction and sponsoring
terrorism including in the Middle East.
The experts' caution also has its basis in the more recent past. Critics and
some supporters of the last U.S. administration believed Bill Clinton's
embrace of Boris Yeltsin was too enthusiastic.
Republicans sometimes accuse Clinton of recklessly approving the pouring of
billions of dollars into the Russian economy after the Cold War ended and
inadvertently contributing to the country's subsequent financial crisis.
They say Clinton risked sacrificing U.S. interests to the goal of ushering
Russia into the West.
"President Clinton probably let his friendliness with Yeltsin become a tool
that a critic could use against him," said Steven Sestanovich, special
advisor on new independent states to Powell's predecessor Madeleine Albright
and now a senior fellow at the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations.
"President Bush, I would say, is trying to make the good personal
relationship a support for problem solving. That has not yet got to the point
where people say we're mismanaging issues because we're overcommitted to
Putin," he said.
Sestanovich said the friendliness also reflected genuine successes: Russia
opened the doors for U.S. troops to be based in former Soviet territory to
fight the war in Afghanistan; Russia's squeals about U.S. plans for a missile
defense have come to nothing; Moscow has backed down on Baltic states joining
NATO.
But he added: "It's okay to be chummy as long as you are prepared to address
tough issues and the problem arises when the chumminess makes the tough
issues seem inappropriate or unseemly to raise. That's when you're in
trouble."
He said it was hard to say whether the Bush administration was running this
risk, since he did not know the tone of behind-the-scenes conversations on
such thorny issues as the war in Chechnya. The danger, he said, was that if
the United States appeared to let up on that issue, others would too.
"If we don't do it, nobody else will," he said.
*******
#2
Moscow Times
May 16, 2002
A Worthless Scrap of Paper
By Pavel Felgenhauer
Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin have agreed to sign a treaty
next week in Moscow to cut strategic nuclear weapons over 10 years from their
present level of 5,000 to 6,000 warheads each to 2,200 to 1,700.
The proposed treaty is only three pages long, in sharp contrast to previous
strategic arms control agreements like START I, signed in 1991, or START II,
signed in 1993, that ran to hundreds of pages with appendices describing in
detail verification of compliance procedures, timetables for decommissioning
of specific weapons systems, precise definitions of the methods for counting
warheads, etc.
A high-ranking Russian official who has access to the new draft treaty told
me this week that most of the text consists of a long preamble that includes
a declaration of good intent, assurances of friendship, speaks of peace on
Earth and so on. The treaty per se is only half a page long (double spaced).
It seems Bush this week read out the entire "treaty" to reporters virtually
verbatim: "Russia and the U.S. will by 2012 have 2,200 to 1,700 warheads."
This treaty does not have any timetable for decommissioning, no definitions
of what a warhead is or how to count them, no verification procedures -- no
nothing. Russian sources say that Washington has supplied Moscow with some
plans for future decommissioning of strategic weapons systems (e.g., 50 MX
Peacemaker missiles with 10 warheads each are earmarked by the Pentagon for
scrapping soon). But these decommissioning plans are not part of the new
treaty and are in fact unilateral, nonbinding promises.
Washington has also vowed great openness and says it will allow the Russians
full access to verify future cuts. But again the verification procedures are
not stipulated in the treaty and depend only on future goodwill.
Legally speaking, in military arms control terms, the new treaty is nothing
more than a worthless scrap of paper. Without any agreed procedure on how to
count nuclear warheads, an entire nuclear submarine with 20 ballistic
missiles and the capability of carrying 400 nuclear devices may be counted as
one "warhead" if most of its payload is temporarily stored on land.
The new treaty essentially allows Russia and the United States to cut or not
as they please, to deploy new attack systems or to keep old ones. This is not
arms control, but the end of arms control as it has been known for 30 years.
Of course, the new treaty will be condemned as a national sellout by many in
the Russian elite. Last Sunday, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, anticipating a
wave of criticism, announced that the new treaty is only a brief outline and
that some follow-ups may be negotiated. However, the possibility that
Washington will continue traditional arms control negotiations is minute.
The new treaty is seen as a major victory for Washington and a defeat for the
Kremlin, which wanted some substantial guarantees that planned U.S. missile
defenses will not threaten Russia and that offensive nuclear cuts will be
"irreversible" but got a worthless piece of paper. However, the treaty is
assured of ratification in the State Duma, where Putin has a comfortable
majority.
In fact some of Russia's military chiefs also support the accord. From 1997
to 2001, when Igor Sergeyev was defense minister, almost all procurement
money was spent on strategic nuclear weapons. Since Sergeyev's ouster there
has been a backlash against strategic nuclear weapons led by Deputy Defense
Minister Anatoly Kvashnin. The General Staff is planning to use the treaty to
cut strategic missiles and spend its money on other projects. Strategic
nuclear weapons are increasingly seen as senseless and unusable by many
Russian generals. In 1999, despite strong objections from Russia, NATO bombed
Yugoslavia and nuclear deterrence could not prevent it. The outcome would
have been the same whether Russia had 1,500 warheads or 5,500.
The new treaty may actually turn out to be a "win" for both Moscow and
Washington inasmuch as its signing signals that Russia has abandoned the
cherished principle of nuclear parity with the United States -- the last
vestige of former Soviet superpower status.
Now it is time the Kremlin stopped acting as a lame superpower in other
fields by downsizing not only its nuclear arsenal by two-thirds but its
entire military machine and reforming what's left into something more
professional, so that Russia can begin to develop as a normal, civil state.
Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.
********
#3
Russia's Ivanov Defends US Arms Deal
May 15, 2002
By ANGELA CHARLTON
MOSCOW (AP) - Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov dismissed accusations
Wednesday that Russia had compromised its national interests in agreeing to
an arms control pact with the United States that slashes arsenals by
two-thirds.
The agreement, announced Monday after nearly six months of negotiations, is
to be signed next week by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin
during a summit in Russia.
``Neither side, neither Russia nor the United States, surrendered any
national interests while drafting this agreement,'' Ivanov said at a Moscow
meeting of defense ministers from China and four ex-Soviet republics in
Central Asia. ``This agreement is the result of a compromise, like any other
international agreement.''
The document is ``pragmatic and realistic and fully reflects the present-day
situation,'' he said.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said that the international
community's positive reaction to the new agreement was further testimony to
its importance.
``All reactions emphasize the treaty's importance for strategic stability,''
he said in a statement that highlighted the Chinese government's positive
response to the pact. In recent years, Russia has made a considerable effort
to improve its relations with China.
Meanwhile, Russian lawmakers continued Wednesday to give mixed reactions to
the agreement, which foresees cuts in each country's arsenals to 1,700-2,200
warheads from the approximately 6,000 that each is now allowed. The treaty
will include a provision for possible further cuts, a high-ranking Russian
Foreign Ministry official said on condition of anonymity Wednesday.
Russia's liberal Yabloko party welcomed the pact as consistent with the ``new
spirit of cooperation between Russia and the United States following the
tragic events of Sept. 11,'' Alexei Arbatov, deputy party leader, told
Interfax news agency.
Gennady Zyuganov, leader of Russia's Communist Party, blasted it as an
``unprecedented surrender,'' saying it eliminated Russia's nuclear shield.
Some Russian media dubbed the accord a failure for Russia because the
document does not spell out what would be done with the warheads after
they're taken out of service. Washington wants to store some of the
decommissioned weapons, while Russia wanted all of them destroyed.
Besides the arms treaty, Bush and Putin are to sign a political declaration
on their nations' shared strategic priorities. The Foreign Ministry official
said the document would call for expanding cooperation in strategic missile
defense, and that a consultative commission on the issue, headed by the two
countries' defense and foreign ministers, would be created.
The issue of increasing U.S. aid to Russia in dismantling and securing the
former Soviet Union's weapons of mass destruction will also be on the summit
agenda, the official said.
The arms control deal came a day before Secretary of State Colin Powell and
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov announced a landmark agreement on a new
relationship between NATO and Russia. Despite the NATO deal, a new poll
showed most Russians still see the alliance as a threat.
********
#4
Moscow News
May 15-21, 2002
Drop Zone Kremlin
Putin, Russia in the Run-up to Summit
By Irina Kobrinskaya
Head of the European Security Department at the Russian Academy of Sciences
Institute of Europe
Ahead of the Russian-U.S. summit Putins foreign policy has been taking a
lot of flak. For the umpteenth time political analysts have pointed to a
dangerous gap between the presidents remarkably strong support at home and
rejection of his pro-Western course. This is a purely Russian paradox.
Support for the president is so strong that the elite is forced to adapt to
Putin while inwardly opposing his pro-Western line. At the same time the
elite is increasingly lagging behind, losing its leadership ambitions. The
gap is growing: This is a problem of Putins political regime, its internal
stability.
Furthermore, the Kremlin has to contend with distrust on the part of the
West itself, which Putin is hard put to overcome.
So, the West does not trust Putin, knowing the anti-Western mood within the
Russian elite, while the president is unable to break down the elites
resistance in the absence of a stable partnership relationship with the
West to vindicate his pro-Western choice. This is a vicious circle.
Why does the West mistrust Russia? I believe that the main reason lies in
the conviction that Russia still exists in a different dimension, embracing
a different set of values, that the country is deeply undemocratic, and
that it is imperialistic both covertly and overtly. And here it is blamed
for everything that goes wrong - TV6, Chechnya, the demoralized military,
skinheads, the Krasnodar governor, harassment of Catholic priests by the
Russian Orthodox Church and the Interior Ministry, and so forth.
It is another matter that the values held so dear by the West (democracy,
freedom of expression) have been called into question while their relative
character is becoming increasingly obvious. Shaken by the September 11
terrorist attacks, the United States was ready to enforce undemocratic
procedures to ensure the security of its citizens. Political correctness
has taken a crippling blow: Only non-whites and non-Americans have to
suffer the indignity of being frisked down at Washington and New York
airports. Jim Saxton, the Republican from New Jersey who chairs the House
Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, has come to Russia to study the
"Chechen experience." The West has almost stopped holding Chechnya against
Moscow. But has the war become more "democratic"?
What democratic values are they talking about if Pakistan and Uzbekistan
have become the United States main allies in the war against the Taliban,
and if new coalitions are built not on commitment to democracy, but on the
cost-effectiveness principle?
Meanwhile, traditional European democracies feel unwanted; they are tired
of U.S. dictate and at the same time afraid of being dumped, deeply
affected by the Freudian love/hate complex with regard to the United States.
The results of the first-round presidential election in democratic France
and, prior to that, Haiders strong showing in Austria appear to show that
democratic values are but relative.
True, there is no cause to worry about the United States or other Western
democracies. Centuries-old traditions and institutions of civil society
will protect these countries against dictatorship and authoritarianism.
Russia, however, did not receive its democracy vaccination shot until
recently, and its organism is still exposed to dangerous infections.
But what is to be done if otherwise Russia cannot build up as a proper
democracy? Put up with the fact that distrust of Russia will not go away?
Obviously, this prospect does not suit President Putin in the least. He is
prepared for the time being to shut his eyes to the still virtual-reality
NMD program and NATO enlargement, and make concessions on issues of
strategic offensive weapons (realizing that Russia will still have plenty
left for nuclear deterrence while the United States will not attack
Russia), Georgia, and Central Asia - in exchange for real partnership in
the economic sphere.
He understands only too well that democratic values have slim chances of
striking root in an economically weak country, even if there is freedom of
expression and information.
Still, there is some hard evidence we can present to the West to show that
Russia has embarked on the path of democracy and will not turn off it. One
bit of such evidence is the recognition of human life - moreover, a life
worthy of man - as the supreme value of state policy. This basic democratic
value has been absent from Russias centuries-old tradition.
If something novel has emerged in post-Soviet Russia, it is the fact that
its citizens have come to appreciate the value of their own self, aspiring
to make their life better, more dignified and comfortable. If the life,
well-being and security of every individual is indeed recognized by the
ruling authority as the basic value, this state policy will without a doubt
be understood and supported by society.
*******
#5
gazeta.ru
May 15, 2002
Acquittal looms for Colonel Budanov
The trial of Colonel Yuri Budanov, who stands accused of cold-bloodedly
murdering a young Chechen girl, has resumed in the North-Caucasian military
court in Rostov-on-Don. Budanov faces charges of abducting and murdering
Tangi-Chu resident Elsa Kungayeva. The officer went on trial in February
2001, being the first ever serviceman to face charges of human rights
abuses since the war in Chechnya began.
In March 2000, the then-commander of the 160th tank regiment Colonel Yuri
Budanov together with three other officers drove into the Chechen
settlement of Tangi-Chu in an armoured personnel carrier and forcibly took
local resident Elsa Kungayeva to a military base, where the Colonel
interrogated her for an hour.
After the ''questioning'' was over, he ordered his subordinates to bury the
girl’s lifeless body in the woods nearby. Several days later, the Colonel
was arrested after severely beating up the commander of his division’s
reconnaissance unit, Lieutenant-Colonel Bagreyev, who had refused to obey
his orders and open fire at the Tangi-Chu settlement. Tangi-Chu residents
then filed the complaint against Budanov concerning Kungayeva.
During the pre-trail investigation, Yuri Budanov testified that he had seen
a photo of Elsa Kungayeva pictured with a rifle in her hands and concluded
that the girl was a rebel sniper who had killed several soldiers from his
regiment. Filled with a desire to avenge his brothers-in-arms, Budanov
wanted to make her confess to those murders.
According to the Colonel, during the interrogation at the military base,
Kungayeva attacked him and shouted that she had always killed and would
continue killing Russians and one day she would even kill his daughter.
According to the defendant, that idea occurred to her after she saw a photo
of Budanov’s small child in his office. In court, Budanov admitted he had
strangled Kungayeva, but claimed that it was not a premeditated murder; he
had simply lost his temper, outraged by her insolence.
Budanov went on trial at the end of February 2001. Initially, the Colonel
was charged with premeditated murder, abduction, and abuse of office. The
prominent Russian lawyer and Chechen national Abdulla Khamzayev agreed to
represent the victim’s family in court.
Khamzayev is convinced that Budanov made up the story about Elsa’s photo,
because investigators never found it, and in actual fact the girl was raped
and then strangled. Throughout the proceedings Khamzayev continuously filed
requests in court demanding additional forensic examinations of the
victim’s body, asking to grant the Kungayevs additional time to study the
case file, and to move the trial from Rostov-on-Don to either Chechnya or
Ingushetia, where it would be closer to the place of the crime.
In July, the trial was again postponed for a lengthy period of time after
the court ordered Budanov to undergo additional psychological and
psychiatric tests in Moscow’s renowned Serbsky Institute. The experts’ task
was to determine first of all, whether or not the colonel was compos mentis
at the moment of the murder, and secondly, whether Budanov was mentally fit
to serve in the army in the first place. If the experts answered yes to
both, the abuse of office would be dropped and the murder charge would be
diminished to manslaughter.
On Tuesday, May 14, the Serbsky Institute experts presented the
long-awaited test results when the North-Caucasian military court in
Rostov-on-Don resumed Budanov’s case. They have determined that at the
moment the Russian Colonel strangled Elsa Kungayeva, he was suffering a fit
of rage and therefore was not capable of appreciating the illegality of his
conduct or to keep his actions within the law.
A member of the expert commission, psychologist Galina Burnyashova,
explained to reporters that if the court agrees with the conclusions of the
Serbsky Institute experts, the murder charge brought against the officer
may be dropped.
If Budanov is convicted of murder during a moment of temporary insanity,
then under Russian criminal law he will face a 3-year prison term, but
could be freed in the courtroom under the amnesty act, passed by the State
Duma in May 2000.
In the course of the tests, the commission determined that beginning in
November 1999, Budanov had developed a serious mental disorder brought
about by the numerous cases of shell-shock he had suffered in action and
stress caused by the loss of his subordinates. Burnyashova explained that
the Colonel is only partially fit for military service and therefore should
be dismissed from the army.
On Tuesday, the court spent several hours listening to the psychiatrists’
report. It is worth noting that both the father of the murdered girl Visa
Kungayev and his lawyer Khamzayev failed to show up for the hearings for
the third time, claiming ill health. The court, however, ruled that the
hearings could continue in the absence of the aggrieved party.
Colonel Budanov for the first time during Tuesday’s court proceedings
confessed to the murder of the Chechen girl. At the previous court session
on April 2, the court rejected Budanov’s defence request to discharge him
from custody on bail due to the deteriorating health of the defendant. The
court session was later adjourned until 1400 Wednesday.
Many observers and human rights activists reacted angrily to the results of
Budanov’s psychiatric examination, charging that the Serbsky experts could
have been coerced into drawing conclusions in favour of the Colonel. Others
said they believed in the professionalism and impartiality of the
scientists, yet wondered how a person suffering such serious health and
mental disorders could command a whole regiment, and demanded that those
responsible for allowing such a person into the front-line forces be made
to account for their decision.
********
#6
C O M M E N T A R Y RUSSIANS APPRECIATE SINCERITY
MOSCOW, May 15, 2002. /From RIA Novosti political analyst Vladimir Simonov/.
- President George W. Bush must be jubilant. No sooner had he started
speaking of a global partnership programme a few months ago than it began to
be translated into reality as if by Harry Porter's magic wand.
Next week George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin are meeting in Moscow to sign an
agreed treaty on cuts in strategic offensive weapons. On Tuesday, in
Reykjavik, NATO and Russia set up a political 20-member council, a new and
seemingly equal mechanism for jointly countering global threats.
This is good news.
The less good news is that most of thinking Russians refuse to rend their
garments for joy over another termination of the Cold War, a revolution in
Moscow-NATO relations and similar high-sounding epithets showered on the
world by western analysts. On the contrary, an intelligent voice called in at
a popular television programme and asked the deputy chairman of the Duma's
defence committee why the West treats Russia as if it were Andorra.
The Russians have nothing against new treaties and international mechanisms.
But they do not like it when new good beginnings are not backed with the
West's new and sincere relations with them.
All the current euphoria about the new Russia-NATO Council bears a striking
resemblance to 1977, when the first permanent council of this sort was in the
making. The forerunner body also presupposed joint discussions and decisions
with a reasonable Russian representative who would be on an equal footing
with his NATO counterparts.
Nothing of the sort, as we know, came of that. Nineteen members of the North
Atlantic alliance would collude behind scenes, work out a common position,
and let it descend with hammer-like force on the Russian partner's head.
NATO's war in Yugoslavia led to Moscow temporarily quitting the Permanent
Council.
It looks as if nobody can guarantee that history will not repeat itself.
Documents initialed by NATO and Russian foreign ministers in Iceland abound
in references to "consensus", "new level of relations" and "equitable
footing". But so far there are no signs that even within the 20-member body
the West is willing to reckon with the wishes of its equal Russian
counterpart.
Analysts are wondering: what will happen if NATO fails to agree with Russia?
Will the alliance act on its own?
Meanwhile, a situation of this kind is already real. Moscow may grow hoarse
in arguing the fallacy of NATO enlargement. But the alliance, which has
entered a new era of relations with Russia, has never thought of making any
corrections to the agenda of its November meeting in Prague. The skies may
come down, but it will admit three new members. It does not matter whether
they be the Baltic states or former Soviet allies in Eastern Europe. The
important point is that in any case NATO will come within spitting distance
of Russia.
Is it worthwhile now, with a 20-member council within easy reach, to pretend
that this will not make Russia go hot or cold?
Equal doubts assail today Russian skeptics who flip over a three-page draft
of the treaty on cuts in strategic offensive arms, prepared for signing at a
Russian-American summit in Moscow.
To be sure, everyone here realises that Russia needed START-3 more badly than
the US did, if it needed it at all. But Washington must have felt some
compunction about quitting the ABM Treaty. Russia also helped more than all
NATO members with the Afghan operation. In reward Moscow got a full-format
treaty which Republican George W. Bush will have to sweat hard to push
through the democratic Senate.
Hurrah, America has made a concession. The Russian side, too, has agreed to a
compromise -- which, incidentally, was achieved without mutual threats,
pressure and resentment. As a result, the future of warheads to be reduced
and their counting rules are a sub-rosa clause in the treaty. The timeframe
-- who will do what and when -- is vague. There is no thread linking
strategic offensive weapons and an American national missile defence.
Verification measures are veiled with a reference to the much-worn START-1.
Even so Moscow and Washington have brought forth what one leading Russian
military expert described as a "strapping little treaty". But to say that it
abolishes the Cold War legacy is to stretch the truth. It makes sense to
ponder the words by minister Igor Ivanov that apart from an agreed draft
treaty Moscow's objections to putting warheads in storage remain.
As indeed against NATO expansion.
In the ultimate analysis the West and Russia are just hammering together a
trestle to build a world on, in which the geopolitical confrontation of the
former rivals would gradually fade. The United States and NATO would do well
to show greater understanding for Moscow's legitimate interests.
The Russians appreciate sincerity.
*******
#7
Washington Post
May 15, 2002
Cold War Afterthought
By Jim Hoagland
George W. Bush's deadpan expression and inflectionless voice did not match
the short burst of rhetoric his aides had prepared. He was announcing from
the White House lawn that he and Vladimir Putin would sign an arms-control
treaty that would "liquidate the legacy of the Cold War" when they meet in
Moscow next week. But even casual television viewers could see that Bush had
his enthusiasm under control.
"It will begin the new era of U.S.-Russian relationships," the president
said, quickly adding, "and that's important," as if his low-key presentation
on Monday might have misled his national audience.
Bush's critics -- slowly reemerging into the sunlight from post-Sept. 11
political bomb shelters -- will portray his mood as chagrin over having to
renege on campaign denunciations of the very notion of arms-control treaties:
They were unreliable instruments that he would toss onto history's ash heap.
Or the critics will spotlight the hard fact that Bush has accepted Putin's
insistence that substantial cuts in nuclear arsenals are too big a deal to be
settled by a Texas handshake, as Bush proposed.
But Bush's phlegmatic demeanor was more appropriate than the grandiloquent
script he had memorized. Instinctively, he was communicating that this moment
was about embers rather than flames, about what America's role in the world
has been rather more than what it will be. This would have been a glory
moment in the pre-Sept. 11 world in which he campaigned and governed. But
that is a world Bush, Putin and the rest of us no longer inhabit, and I
suspect Bush could not shake that realization.
Bush does not have to apologize or feel humble about giving in to Putin on
form. He lost nothing on substance. The 3 1/2-page document they will sign
will have two provisions. The first is that each side will reduce its nuclear
warheads to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012. The other recites
already-tested verification procedures. "This is a minimalist treaty," says
an approving Richard Perle, the most articulate and determined opponent of
previous arms-control accords of any flavor. "Agreements between friends
should be short. This one is mercifully lacking in details."
Condoleezza Rice, Bush's national security adviser and the most trusted voice
he hears on Russian affairs, described the new treaty in similar terms. It
was the result of the close trust the two leaders had established on other
issues, and especially on the war on terrorism in Central Asia, she said.
Bush 43 sees arms control as byproduct, not a driving force in or regulator
of Russian-American relations. This treaty was retrofitted from the high
level of U.S.-Russian intelligence-sharing in the war on terrorism.
In the Cold War, arms-control agreements sought to contain the danger that
Washington and Moscow would annihilate each other in atomic clouds of dust if
their rivalry in Europe had spun out of control. Superpower conventional war
in Europe is no longer a danger, Rice and Bush believe. So there is no
trigger for a global nuclear exchange.
The unspoken corollary is that Europe is no longer America's biggest security
concern. Against his own expectations, Bush will make his reputation in war
and peace in the Middle East and in Asia, where he must manage the emergence
of India and China as big powers.
That does not mean Russia will not present new challenges when opportunity
arises (see Iraq) or that Europe can now be ignored. The Europeans, led by
Britain's Tony Blair and NATO Secretary General George Robertson, have taken
the lead in fashioning a new consultative security relationship with Russia
that will make the alliance more responsive to the challenges of the future.
And Europeans will not be spared the reach of global terror, as a suicide car
bomber who killed 11 French nationals in Karachi, Pakistan, last week
demonstrated.
"This is a hard awakening for all of Europe," the Paris daily Le Monde
editorialized as French investigators pursued leads pointing to Osama bin
Laden's al Qaeda network. Europeans had begun to slip back into a pre-Sept.
11 "quietude" in which they pretended that "the hardest was over and the
Americans were exaggerating" in "their war on terrorism," Le Monde's
editorialist wrote. That pretense was shattered in Karachi.
For Bush, the treaty-signing in Moscow will come as an afterthought of
history -- a last shovelful of earth on the grave of the Cold War. In that
struggle, each side could at least assume the other was rational enough not
to commit suicide. In today's conflicts, the American president does not have
the luxury of that assumption.
*******
#8
Asia Times
May 15, 2002
Russia pushes for deeper post-Soviet integration
By Sergei Blagov
MOSCOW - A number of high-profile gatherings in the Russian capital seemingly
indicate that the Kremlin is seeking to boost its influence among at least
some selected former Soviet states.
In an attempt to develop post-Soviet Union military and security ties, the
foreign and defense ministers of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) met in
Moscow on Monday, before a summit of CST leaders was held in the Russian
capital on Tuesday. The heads of state of Russia, Belarus, Armenia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan discussed their multilateral Collective
Security Forces, as well as plans to create a sort of joint chief of staff of
the CST.
The summit marked the group's 10th anniversary since the CST was formed on
May 15, 1992. On Tuesday, the presidents decided to transform the CST into a
new international body, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO.
By July 1, a joint working group is to be created, tasked with drafting the
CSTO's blueprints by November 1.
Russian President Vladimir Putin assumed the CSTO chairmanship and the summit
also decided to keep Russian General Valery Nikolayenko as the head of the
CST. The CSTO leaders agreed to trade weapons among member states at
internal, low prices.
At their Monday meeting, the CST foreign and defense ministers urged their
presidents to create a joint military body on the basis of Russia's General
Staff and to be commanded by Russian Chief of General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin.
Clearly, this plan implied something reminiscent of the former Warsaw Pact
joint military command. However, the CST leaders subsequently failed to agree
on a joint military command under Russian control. Instead, they decided to
create "a group of coordinators-representatives of chiefs of general staff of
the CSTO", something falling short of the former Warsaw Pact-style joint
military command.
Despite this setback, the CST leaders tried to sound upbeat. The CST should
cooperate with both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Putin declared on Tuesday.The CST is
not supposed to defend the energy interests of its member states, as the
organization has a broader task of safeguarding regional security, Putin was
quoted as saying by the Russian Information Agency (RIA). Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbayev described the CST as a sort of "insurance policy"
against outside threats. Moreover, Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko
urged the creation of a stronger organization. The CSTO should become a
"strong center of power" among post-Soviet states, strong enough that NATO
would take it into account, Lukashenko stated.
Last year, the CST agreed to set up joint rapid-reaction forces for Central
Asia and has already held a series of military exercises. The most recent
maneuvers were held on Sunday through Tuesday in Gorokhovets in Russia's
Nizhny Novgorod region, under the command of Russian General Alexey
Merkuriyev, commander of the 22nd Army. Some 1,000 military personnel,
including a tank battalion, artillery and air defense units, 20 helicopters
and six fighter jets took part. The next exercises are to be held in
Kyrgyzstan in June.
The six post-Soviet nations make up the CST (also known under its Russian
acronym DKB) within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The
presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Belarus and Armenia
met in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek in October 2000 to sign an agreement on a
status of the Collective Security military forces - to be assembled in case
of need by member states. The forces are to be used to combat outside
aggression, to carry out "anti-terrorist" operations or to be involved in
military maneuvers.
Moreover, on Wednesday, defense ministers from the SCO, which includes
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China and Russia, gathered in
Moscow to discuss the next SCO summit, which is to be held on June 7 in St
Petersburg. According to RIA, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian is due to
discuss an upcoming visit to China by his Russian counterpart Sergei Ivanov.
And apart from the security gathering, a meeting of the Eurasian Economic
Commonwealth (EEC) was convened in Moscow on Monday. The EEC leaders agreed
to refrain from punitive tariffs in multilateral trade and to coordinate
their respective bids for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. So far,
only one EEC member state, Kyrgyzstan, has joined the WTO. The summit also
approved Moldova's and Ukraine's observer status within the EEC. Although at
the summit Putin was supposed to assume the EEC chairmanship, the Russian
leader suggested that Kazakh President Nazarbayev keep it.
Within the CIS, the EEC comprises Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Russia, which leads the group. "We would not have created the EEC if we
had not believed in its future," Putin said on Monday.
At a summit meeting of the CIS held in the Belarussian capital Minsk last
May, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan decided to turn
their customs union into the EEC, aiming at liberalizing mutual trade.
However, the group's efforts to forge closer economic ties still largely lack
substance, producing mainly paperwork. Subsequently, the EEC's plans of
economic integration sound somewhat reminiscent of the former COMECON
(Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation), which oversaw trade among the
communist countries of the Eastern and Central Europe.
Because of its economic might, Russia has more to say in the Eurasian
Commonwealth. Russia has a 40 percent vote in the EEC, Belarus and Kazakhstan
20 percent each, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 10 percent each. However, Russia
is responsible for some 85 percent of the EEC's economic potential.
Therefore, it is understood that Russia has moved to push for more
post-Soviet security and economic cooperation as Moscow still considers
itself to be a leading regional power. However, the path from the Kremlin's
plans on paper to reality seemingly proved fraught with potholes as the
proposed joint military command failed to materialize.
*******
#9
Russia: CIS Military-Alliance Upgrade Plan Faces Numerous Obstacles
By Kathleen Knox
Yesterday, the six members of the CIS Collective-Security Treaty agreed to
turn their 10-year-old alliance into a formal organization but postponed
talks on a joint military command under Russian control. The decision was
made at a summit in Moscow, where Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted the
leaders of Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. What
prompted the upgrade, and what are the organization's prospects, given the
alliance's lackluster first decade?
Prague, 15 May 2002 (RFE/RL) -- The six members of the CIS
Collective-Security Treaty gathered in Moscow yesterday to breathe new life
into their decade-old alliance. Leaders from Russia, Belarus, Armenia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan agreed to turn the largely symbolic
alliance into a formal organization.
Russian President Vladimir Putin told his counterparts the treaty needs to
change to meet new threats such as terrorism.
"Today, when the geopolitical situation is changing rapidly, the task in
front of us is to further strengthen the [CIS Collective-Security] Treaty and
to adapt its mechanisms to tackle the new, nontraditional challenges and
threats that all of our countries are facing," Putin said.
Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka hailed the upgrade, saying the
collective-security organization will be a powerful military grouping
comparable to NATO.
The alliance was originally set up to foster security cooperation between
Russia and some of the newly independent states following the breakup of the
Soviet Union. Signatories pledged to hold consultations in the event of a
threat emerging to one or several member states, and promised mutual aid in
the event of an attack. But critics say it failed to deliver much in the way
of security and several of the original signatories -- Uzbekistan, Georgia,
and Azerbaijan -- pulled out in 1999.
Michael Sheehan, director of the Scottish Centre for International Security,
said the states share some common interests, such as maintaining border
security and containing Islamic fundamentalism. But there's no reason to
think that this will translate into effective action in the future.
"A lot of these common interests have existed for 10 years, but it hasn't
been enough to energize the treaty system," Sheehan said.
So why the upgrade? Analysts say Moscow clearly wants to reassert its
influence in selected states once part of the Soviet Union, particularly in
Central Asia. They say Putin also wants to soothe conservatives at home,
upset at the closer ties Russia is forging with NATO and at the U.S.-led
troops now stationed in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Sergei Blagov, a Moscow-based analyst of CIS affairs, notes another motive:
to strengthen Russia's bargaining position ahead of its summits with the U.S.
and NATO later this month.
"Right now, the Russian negotiating position with the U.S. on strategic
security, on strategic-arms reduction agreements, is quite weak. And it's not
impossible that by holding two summits in two days -- the Eurasian Economic
Cooperation on 13 May and the Collective-Security Treaty on 14 May -- Moscow
was trying to give a little bit of a boost to its negotiating position versus
the West," Blagov said.
Still, yesterday's meeting fell short in one key respect, suggesting some of
Russia's partners in the treaty feel uneasy about any efforts to reassert its
influence. Members failed to agree on a joint military command under Russian
control, deciding to put off talks until later this year.
There are other obstacles to making the organization a success. Alex Vatanka
is editor of "Jane's Sentinel: Russia and the CIS." He said Russia's
co-signatories to the treaty are the weakest CIS countries that, in the past,
have looked to Russia for security for lack of more powerful friends
elsewhere. But with Central Asia playing an increasingly important role in
U.S. foreign policy, those Central Asian countries don't want to risk being
reabsorbed under Russian influence.
"If you look at it from the point of view of Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan -- weak
states [dependent] on Russia -- sure. But are they going to gamble [and]
throw away the potential benefits available to them by sticking with the
U.S.?," Vatanka said.
Vatanka cast more doubt on the success of the project by noting that Russia's
campaign against separatists in Chechnya is still simmering, despite Moscow's
claims that the war is over.
"The Russians can't even successfully complete their mission in Chechnya.
What chance do they have to go into the mountainous regions of southern
Uzbekistan and western Kyrgyzstan and northern Tajikistan and pretend as if
they can solve the issue of radical Islamists in that region? They can't even
fix it in Chechnya," Vatanka said.
Nevertheless, the plan poses some key questions for NATO, says Vladimir
Socor, an analyst at the U.S.-based Jamestown Foundation. He argues that it
should have been addressed while NATO was still discussing how to give Russia
a bigger say in its affairs. But that deal is now as good as inked, after
NATO foreign ministers agreed yesterday to set up a NATO-Russia Council where
all 20 members will sit as equal partners in a number of areas.
Socor said: "The question for NATO is just who will be sitting at the table
of NATO at 20 in the seat reserved for Russia? Will it be Russia as a normal
country, a normal partner, or will it be Russia as the leader of a newly
created political-military bloc based on the Soviet past?"
He said this is not what NATO bargained for and should be addressed before
the new agreement is signed at a summit in Rome on 28 May.
*******
#10
From: "Eugeniya Dillendorf"
Subject: summary of Grigory Yavlinsky's article
Date: Wed, 15 May 2002
In the attachment you can read a summary of Mr. Yavlinsky's article on the
relationships between Russia and the West. The article will be published in
"Obschaya gazeta" 16/05/02. You will have an opportunity to read the
complete text in English on our web-site (www.eng.yabloko.ru) very soon. If
you have any questions, please, don't hesitate, write or call me - (095)
960-50-29.
Your's
Eugenia Dillendorf
"The Door to Europe is in Washington"
by Grigory Yavlinsky
(SUMMARY in ENGLISH)
(Unofficial translation)
Neither new arrangements with NATO nor arms reductions treaty but
military and political agreements will be of crucial importance at the
forthcoming meeting of Presidents of Russia and United States. This is what
Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of Russian Democratic Party "Yabloko", writes in
his article published by "Obshaya Gazeta" on May 16, 2002.
"To "accept Russia" means for the West to agree at least with two
thesis. First, the West must acknowledge that security of her present
borders, separating her from the most unstable, unpredictable and
precarious regions of the world, is a priority of vital importance for
Russia. Second, basic understanding and complete readiness is necessary to
accept the fact that in 15 to 20 years Russia will join all economic,
political and military European institutions as full member", - elaborates
Grigory Yavlinsky.
According to him, the first step in that direction "might become the
signing of a document on military and political alliance between Russia and
USA during President Bush's visit to Moscow".
"As to the format of that document it may be either Agreement or
Memorandum or Treaty. The main point is that it should be something
conceptually different from polite cooperation within NATO frameworks and
from agreement dealing with arms reductions problems only. The
understanding is that it should be a joint declaration on mutual concept of
freedom, democracy, human rights as fundamental principles of global
structure in XXI century, on common priorities and menaces, on mutual
security guarantees in case of terror or military aggressions", - runs the
article.
"Yabloko" leader is convinced that "Without Russia - America agreement
on strategic partnership, without creating a stable and clear-cut scheme of
relations with USA, Russia's integration into Europe is impossible".
"However, - Grigory Yavlinsky goes on, - genuine mutual understanding
and partnership are feasible only if domestic and foreign policies are
based on a similar system of values and priorities. Common system of values
is necessary for effective partnership as much as common for everybody
multiplication table and method of time calculation are indispensable".
The author also maintains that "policy of disarmament as a foreign
policy conception is totally senseless under existing conditions. (...)
This is a pressing problem but only a technical one, and incomparable, as
to its significance, to the logic of political values. That is why if 23-26
May negotiations result only in disarmament agreement, in NATO arrangement,
in "Jakson - Vennik" and in general declarations it will signify that the
potential of opportunities that has opened up after September 11 will be
wasted. It will mean that everything comes full circle to the
understandings similar to those of the seventies".
Grigory Yavlinsky is convinced that the realization of the now
existing opportunity rests with the leaders of all interested countries.
However the major part of that responsibility lies upon Vladimir Putin
because "in Russia's case it is not only her security but also the very
existence of the country which is at stake".
"Specifics of Russian authorities domestic policy clearly indicate
the direction of retreat in case alliance with the West does not
materialize. It is obvious that Russia has no perspective along that
direction. But there will be no other choice for a president who will be
willing to remain in power if the alliance fails. In what situation
President and his administration will find themselves as the result of such
a retreat and will not another Foros happen is a very actual question", -
concludes his article Grigory Yavlinsky.
*******
#11
pravda.ru
May 15, 2002
MIKHAIL BULGAKOV: I AM A SATIRIST
One of Russia’s most mystic writers, Mikhail Bulgakov, was born May 15,
1891. This writer came to the Russian culture in the 20s of the previous
century, a very contradictory period. It was a period of a new economic
policy, when renovation destroyed the habitual. Literature was experiencing
changes as well. Private publishing houses appeared, new books and
magazines were issued, cultural societies were revived, and people
organized disputes on cultural problems. Great poets such as Alexander
Blok, Sergei Yesenin, Nikolay Gumilev, Anna Akhmatova were still published
at that time. Publication of pre-revolution magazines was resumed. A new
magazine, Novaya Rossia (New Russia) appeared, the first edition without
any party afilliation; it proclaimed desire of Russian cultural
intellectuals was to cooperate with the Soviet power.
The life of Mikhail Bulgakov began in Kiev among his loving and friendly
family and his mother, whom he called “a fair queen." He studied at the
medical faculty, then had a medical practice in a small remote village. It
was an uneasy and awful period in the life of Russia. Then there was Kiev
again. And then was Vladikavkaz, where Bulgakov suffered from typhus and
gave up a trip to Constantinople. This was the very place where the career
of Mikhail Bulgakov as a doctor finished, and his career as a writer
started. Bulgakov wrote many of his most popular plays at beginning of the
20s.
Bulgakov himself wrote about that period: “Remember the autumn of 1919,
when at night, being in a rickety train, I wrote my first short story by
the light of a candle fixed into a kerosene bottle. When the train took me
to a town, I brought the story to the editors of a local newspaper. It was
published. Then followed several satirical articles. At beginning of 1920,
I gave up my medical practice and started writing. At the end of 1921, I
came to Moscow having no money and luggage at all; I came to Moscow to stay
there forever. I had a really difficult period in Moscow; I had to work as
a reporter and a topical satirist to keep body and soul together. I started
hating jobs are devoid of any distinctions. At that very time, my hatred of
editors arose; I hate them now and think I will until end of my life.”
Bulgakov’s occupations were really different at that period: office work
and work in commercial newspapers. Bilgakov’s works were published in
different editions; at the same time he took up commerce and worked at the
scientific technical committee and in the private newspaper Commercial
industrial bulletin. As he says himself, “he tried fantastic jobs at that
time; he even was a compere in a small theatre.”
Mikhail Bulgakov seriously started journalism in 1922–1926, when he
co-operated with such Soviet editions as Rupor, Krasnaya gazeta and others.
Those editions made for the establishment of Mikhail Bulgakov and other
authors as outstanding writers. It is to be mentioned here that Bulgakov
did not shrink from any job at that time.
The daily newspaper Rabochy (Worker) of the Communist Party was founded on
March 1, 1922. Evidently Bulgakov started working for the newspaper at that
very period under an assumed name, Mikhail Bul. Mikhail Bulgakov was
practically following the fate of another famous Russian writer, Anton
Chekhov, as they were alike in their prolificacy, easy manner of writing,
and a of bit delayed confidence in their talent.
Bulgakov worked with newspapers for about seven years altogether. That
period made him a professional journalist, as he could write satirical
stories very quickly, but journalism was not his calling. It was a source
of income for him and was kind of a literary journey-work. Really important
work was still ahead. Ideas and plots were forming in his head.
Researchers of Bulgakov’s work say that his works are closely interrelated.
The author himself said that manuscripts do not burn and and all of them
are important for the author, as they make up his experience and
demonstrate the scope of work done.
Bulgakov’s short satirical stories about Moscow life, which was familiar
for the writer himself perfectly well, were filled with an astonishing
sense of humor, irony turning to sarcasm, and rich imagination. He said,
“The turn of my mind is satirical. And I write stories that may be
disagreeable for the Communist regime. But I always write just exactly what
I see, honestly! The negative in the Soviet country draws my close
attention, as it provides good food for my work of a satirist.”
In his letter to Joseph Stalin Bulgakov, wrote: “Black and mystical colors
(I say, I am a mystical writer) used for depicting the ugliness of our
everyday life, my scepticism toward the revolutionary process, and
contrasting it with the evolution is the way I depict awful traits of my
people, the traits that had been painful for my teacher Mikhail
Saltykov-Schedrin long before the revolution.”
Bulgakov’s satire arose from humorous reconsideration of important events
from real life. Bulgakov did not adjust himself to the norms and rules of
that time; his attitude to satire and contemporary life could not be
changed. His fate was to be really very hard, as he became a satirist
“right at the time when no realistic satire could be possible in the Soviet
Union.”
A close friend to Mikhail Bulgakov, Yermolinsky, said, “The necessity to
ruthlessly and satirically depict life was not only a game of his sarcastic
mind but also his civil attitude. He was not a frondeur!”
Mikhail Bulgakov wrote in his diary: “I believe that the voice that
troubles me now is prophetic. It is. I do not see any other job for myself;
I can be a writer only.”
Olga Pavlova
PRAVDA.Ru
Translated by Maria Gousseva
*******
#12
Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder
U.S.-Russia Summit Priorities:
The Strategic Framework, a Nuclear Arms Agreement, and Trade
by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., and Baker Spring
No. 1549
May 14, 2002
[full version at:
http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1549.html]
When President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet for
summits in Russia and Rome later this month, they will have an opportunity
to define a new framework for U.S.-Russia strategic relations that extends
beyond the war on terrorism. Such a framework could lay the foundation for
a new 21st century security architecture while facilitating Russia's
integration into the European-North Atlantic security and economic
environment.
Given Russia's proximity to Western Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia,
and the Far East, and in light of Putin's decision to line up with the
United States in the war on terrorism, 1 establishing closer cooperation
with Russia will have significant benefits for U.S. national security and
regional and economic interests. Closer cooperation with Moscow is vital,
for example, for isolating such terrorism-supporting states as Iran, Iraq,
Syria, Libya, and North Korea and for slowing the transfer of Russian
military technology to China. 2
On the Summit Agenda
At the summit meetings in St. Petersburg and Moscow on May 23-26 and at the
NATO-Russia summit in Rome on May 28, President Bush and President Putin
will focus on matters of security and economic policies. In Moscow, they
will sign a formal treaty that calls for deep cuts in nuclear arsenals on
both sides over the next 10 years. Both leaders are committed to ending the
legacy of the Cold War by reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of their
countries to around 1,700 to 2,200 deliverable warheads each. Such a
commitment will also be required in cooperative efforts to reduce the
threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to
increase security in regions of common interest, and to increase trade to
strengthen economies.
The treaty to reduce U.S. and Russian offensive nuclear arsenals is
compatible with currently projected U.S. security requirements. These
requirements, however, could change with little warning. As a result,
reductions should proceed cautiously and the process should permit
flexibility. The treaty allows flexibility by limiting its duration to 10
years, by pacing the reductions within the 10-year period, and by allowing
either party to withdraw from the treaty with three months' notice. Another
welcome sign of this flexibility is the agreement not to require the
destruction of the warheads or to impose limitations on missile defenses.
Specifically, during his summit meetings with President Putin, President
Bush should:
Ask for Russia's support for removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from
power. For Russia, the issues in Iraq are primarily the Soviet-era debt of
$11 billion to $13 billion for arms sales during the Iran-Iraq war and how
the oil deals secured by Russian companies in Iraq (worth $30 billion in
cash flow for the life of the projects) would be grandfathered in under a
new regime. In addition, Russia is concerned about the territorial
integrity of Iraq. President Bush could secure Russia's active diplomatic
and military participation in an operation against Baghdad by guaranteeing
that such concerns would be addressed in the post-Saddam Iraq in a manner
that is satisfactory to Russia. 3
Encourage Moscow to terminate Russian sales of conventional weapons to Iran
and technological cooperation to produce WMD. In 2001, Russia and Iran
signed a $300 million a year, multi-year arms export agreement, making Iran
the third largest customer for Russian weapons after India and China.
Moscow is also building two nuclear reactors at Bushehr, from which the
precursors to nuclear bomb fissile material could be obtained, and is
selling sophisticated anti-ship missiles and other destabilizing weapons to
Iran. 4
On May 6, Under Secretary of State John Bolton called for the United States
and Russia to sign a political declaration on the New Strategic Framework
that would cover not just strategic offense and defense systems, but also
nonproliferation and counterproliferation. 5 Such a framework should
promote cooperation to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state armed
with ballistic missiles. The Administration should be ready to offer an
economic quid pro quo for Russia's actions, such as participation in
building the components of ballistic missile defense systems and expansion
of civilian space launch quotas.
Reject any limitations on strategic defenses. Although the treaty to reduce
strategic nuclear arms does not include a provision limiting missile
defense programs, the Russians may seek such limitations through other
declarations to be issued during the summit. President Bush, as he has in
the past, should continue to resist Russian pressure to limit missile
defenses. According to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), strategic
defenses--which include missile defenses--are a necessary leg of the new
strategic triad that includes offensive strategic forces and responsive
forces. Now that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the
former Soviet Union is scheduled to lapse in mid-June, nothing should
reimpose its limitations on missile defense.
Move forward with NATO-Russia cooperation. On May 28, NATO and Russia will
sign an agreement to establish the NATO-Russia Council. This agreement
should allow for joint development of policy and the planning of mutual
activities in such areas as the war on terrorism; operations against
terrorist organizations and their financial supporters; nonproliferation
and WMD security; special forces interoperability; educational exchanges
between officers on all levels; peacekeeping operations; and comprehensive
military reform, 6 which President Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov
would welcome.
In the past, the forum provided by the 1997 Permanent Joint Council often
turned into a venue for Moscow to air its frustrations with NATO actions,
such as the Balkans operations. 7 Today, the joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping
activities in that region demonstrate how these two sides can cooperate.
Top U.S. generals, such as Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Joseph
Ralston 8 and Commander in Chief of Central Command (CENTCOM) General Tommy
Franks, routinely praise Russia's cooperation with the United States and
NATO. 9 The NATO-Russia Council should be seen as a first step on the road
to greater security integration between Russia and the North Atlantic
alliance. The President also should invite President Putin to address the
NATO summit in Prague in November.
Encourage Russia to expand its energy sales in the global market. Russia
could increase energy sales significantly by enhancing corporate governance
transparency and shareholder rights for Western investors. In addition,
production could be increased by including 100 new oil and gas fields in
the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) legislation, which allows Western
oil companies to be compensated by drawing oil for sale from the jointly
developed fields. U.S. companies need assurances that their investments in
Russian fields and infrastructure are secure. President Bush should ask
Putin to support guarantees for Western companies through expanded PSA
legislation and to ensure its passage in the Duma.
Russia exports over 1.8 billion barrels of oil and 6.7 billion cubic feet
of natural gas per year. It is the world's largest exporter of natural gas
and second largest exporter of oil. 10 Together with the countries of
Eurasia, it could catch up with Saudi Arabia as a leading oil exporter by
2010. 11 U.S. export development agencies, such as the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Export-Import Bank, and the
international financial institutions, could assist foreign investors by
insisting that the rule of law be honored and contracts upheld. A boost in
Russia's energy exports also would provide its European and Far Eastern
customers with additional energy security in the event that OPEC continues
its policy of high prices and production cuts.
Express support for the lifting of U.S. barriers to trade with Russia. The
Administration supports Russia's economic integration with the West,
including its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). President
Putin has declared that Russia will not require any special deals from the
WTO, so standard WTO criteria for membership should apply. President Bush
should declare U.S. support for Russia's accession in 2004, provided the
negotiations in all sectors are completed successfully.
The U.S. statute known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which denies Russia
most favored nation status, is a relic of the Cold War. It was passed in
1974 when the Soviet Union severely limited emigration. Congress suspended
application of the amendment after the Soviet Union collapsed. At the
Russia summit, President Bush should express his support for a permanent
lifting of the Jackson-Vanik restrictions, which Congress could accomplish
by attaching an amendment to trade legislation.
Conclusion
The forthcoming U.S.-Russia summits offer both countries a unique
opportunity to launch a strategic partnership that would assure greater
security in the 21st century. At the summit meetings, both President Bush
and President Putin should focus on casting off the baggage that has
hampered U.S.-Russia relations in the past, such as Moscow's ties with Iran
and Iraq and other states that sponsor terrorism.
The two leaders will put to rest the legacy of the Cold War by signing a
strategic treaty to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Most important, they
should expand joint actions in the war on terrorism, as well as establish
goals for NATO-Russian cooperation and support policies that further
integrate Russia into the global market.
-- Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. is Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies,
and Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security
Policy, in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
*******
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http://www.cdi.org/russia
Archive for Johnson's Russia List:
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson
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the MacArthur Foundation
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