Johnson's Russia List
#6243
14 May 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Reuters: Russia "blinked" on arms to save summit treaty- US.
2. pravda.ru: AMERICA GOT TREATY, AND RUSSIA NOTHING.
3. AP: NATO, Russia Reach Landmark Treaty.
4. Reuters: Russian firms world's most likely bribers-watchdog.
5. Interfax: Colonel who murdered Chechen girl was temporarily
insane - Medical experts.
6. AP: Prosecutor closes case on '99 bomb scare.
7. gazeta.ru: Russia's human rights envoy condemns abuses.
8. Reuters: Rights body accuses Russian troops over Chechnya.
9. Interfax: Russia's new debt totals $51 bln as of early 2002.
10. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Russia's space program: High ambitions,
low funds.
11. Mel Goodman: Re Jackson-Vanik.
12. Oleg Dschunian: In response to Fitzpatrick JRL #6242.
13. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: KUDRIN: RUSSIAN GROWTH REMAINS AMONG
THE WORLD'S HIGHEST.
14. Reuters: Russian govt - high growth "impossible" short-term.(Gref)
15. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Andrew Kuchings,
Summit with Substance: Creating Payoffs in an Unequal Partnership.]
********
#1
Russia "blinked" on arms to save summit treaty- US
By Jon Boyle
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia backed down over a key demand in nuclear arms
talks with Washington to ensure that a treaty slashing arsenals was ready
for a summit next week, a senior U.S. administration official said Tuesday.
He said Russia had focused on the core issue -- cutting deployed nuclear
warheads to 1,700-2,200 each -- and stripped the accord of sensitive
matters on which there was no agreement.
With the summit due next week, the deal had stumbled on Russia's opposition
to what it branded "virtual cuts" -- the Pentagon's insistence that U.S.
nuclear warheads could be stored rather than scrapped.
Moscow demanded the destruction of decommissioned warheads, while the
Pentagon said storing them would allow the United States to "reconstitute"
its arsenal should new threats emerge from "rogue states" like Iraq, Iran
and North Korea.
On Monday President Bush announced he would sign a four-page arms reduction
treaty with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a summit in Moscow and
St. Petersburg which gets under way on May 23.
"A lot of the credit is due really to the Russian side for concluding that
the road we were traveling was not necessarily going to get us to an
agreement by the summit," said the U.S. official, who asked not to be
identified.
"They decided analytically that it was only going to be possible to agree
on the kind of measures the two presidents had talked about, so a lot of
these other issues ... they decided were not central to the objectives of
their president.
"That enabled us to respond very quickly ... (and agree on the main issue
of) how many warheads are really available to the sides at any particular
point in time over this 10-year period."
Had both sides refused to compromise it would have been "entirely possible
we would not have reached agreement in time for the summit," he said.
COLD WAR RIVALRY
Bush and Putin first agreed to drastically reduce their nuclear warhead
stockpiles at a summit last November hailed as the final nail in the coffin
of the Cold War rivalry that had divided them for five decades.
The announcement followed Putin's stalwart support for the war on terrorism
launched by Bush after the Sept. 11 hijacked airliner attacks on the United
States that killed some 3,000 people.
But arms talks had stumbled on the storage issue, despite a flurry of
meetings between top arms control negotiators Georgy Mamedov of Russia and
John Bolton of the United States.
The two men met again Tuesday and put the finishing touches to the text of
the arms accord. They also worked on a separate political agreement on
their future strategic relationship, notably including joint work on
missile defense -- an issue that had previously also divided the two nations.
The senior U.S. administration official said the arms cuts breakthrough was
emblematic of changing U.S.-Russian relations.
Other problems remain, however, notably Moscow's cooperation on nuclear
power and missile technology with Iran and other states Washington says
form an "axis of evil." Moscow denies any breach of its international
undertakings, something that cuts little ice in Washington.
*******
#2
pravda.ru
May 14, 2002
AMERICA GOT TREATY, AND RUSSIA NOTHING
Yesterday presidents of Russia and the USA almost simultaneously made
reports on the same problem, nuclear arsenal reduction namely. In both
reports words “breakthrough in relations” and “a new era” were used. George
W.Bush said Washington was ready to sign a treaty with Russia on nuclear
arsenal reduction to 1,700 – 2,200 warheads. He said, the agreement would
be signed on May 23 in Russia. In Bush’s words, “This treaty will liquidate
the legacy of the Cold War.”
Until recently experts doubted the treaty would be ratified at all, as
contradictions between Russia and the USA were too great. Russia insisted
that all warheads were to be destroyed, at the same time when the USA
planned to put warheads for “deep storage” for later use. Problem of
warheads utilization control was not settled as well. Russian and American
expert groups have been working on the problems for months, but no results
were achieved. And suddenly the USA announces readiness to sign the treaty,
that attaches at the same time more importance to the document.
Russia’s response was soon. Although reluctantly, but the Kremlin consented
to partial stockpiling warheads. Earlier Russia had insisted warheads were
to be destroyed completely. Experts say, Russia decided to reconcile itself
to the fact that US’s nuclear strategy can not be changed, and the treaty
will save Vladimir Putin’s face. It is to be added here, settlement of the
problem that is really painful for Russia will let it hope for solution of
other important problems (NATO – Russia relations, incorporation into WTO,
soonest conferring of a market economy status to Russia, presence of NATO
troops in Central Asia and Caucasus region, Iraq problem, etc.)
The president’s optimism is not shared by others. Foreign Policy
Association’s vice-president Sergey Kortunov said, “We need a perfect
treaty. To my mind, it is better not to sign any agreement at all than to
sign a bad one.”
Russia’s Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov tried to smooth gaffes and clumsiness
of Russian diplomacy and announced, the treaty planned for signing by the
presidents was a provisional treaty, not a final one. “It will be further
finished off”, Russia’s foreign minister said.
Yesterday Russia’s Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said, development of the
treaty did not mean that Russia had dropped its objections to the idea of
stockpiling warheads. The problem was thoroughly discussed in the press as
the main obstacle for treaty signing, as Russia insisted that warheads were
to be completely destroyed and the USA offered to store them for later use.
A source related to the Russian delegation told the Vedomosti newspaper,
the problem of warheads utilization was not touched upon at the recent
talks because it is really impossible from a technical point of view to
control the utilization process.
George W.Bush needs the treaty to shut up the democrats who criticize him
for the ABM Treaty withdrawal. Indeed, elections are coming up, and
President Bush needs additional votes. And what is Russia’s profit from the
treaty? Russia gained nothing. Is not the situation the same as last year,
when Russia got nothing at all in exchange for the promise to close bases
in Cuba and Vietnam?
Dmitry Chirkin
PRAVDA.Ru
Translated by Maria Gousseva
*******
#3
NATO, Russia Reach Landmark Treaty
May 14, 2002
By COLLEEN BARRY
REYKJAVIK, Iceland (AP) - Heralding the Cold War's funeral, NATO and Russia
reached a historic agreement Tuesday to combat common security threats in
the post-Sept. 11 era.
The announcement, which followed a meeting between NATO foreign ministers
and their Russian counterpart, came a day after Russia and the United
States agreed to shrink their nuclear arsenals.
``It is impossible to overstate the importance of this recognition, that
NATO and Russia must stand side by side in defense of common values and
interests in the face of the challenges of the new century,'' NATO
Secretary-General George Robertson said in announcing the deal to establish
a joint council of the 19 NATO nations and Russia.
``This is the last rites, the funeral of the Cold War,'' said British
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. ``Fifteen years ago, Russia was the enemy,
now Russia becomes our friend and ally. There could be no bigger change.''
The new NATO-Russia Council will set joint policy on a fixed range of
issues including counterterrorism, controlling the spread of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons, missile defense, peacekeeping and
management of regional crises, civil defense, search-and-rescue at sea,
promoting military cooperation and arms control.
NATO officials say that the agreement will not affect the alliance's core
mutual defense role and that safeguards are built in to ensure Moscow will
not be able to veto NATO decisions if relations sour.
But Straw emphasized the cooperation will be more than symbolic: ``It could
make an enormous difference in the war on terrorism.''
Buoyed by prospects for a new U.S.-Russia weapons treaty, the ministers
uniformly described an atmosphere of good will and consensus on the first
day of meetings in the Icelandic capital.
Capping an ambitious reform agenda to prepare for a summit in Prague in
November, the ministers reviewed the alliance's plans to invite new members
from eastern Europe, agreed to modernize NATO's military capabilities to
respond to evolving threats and establish new relations with Ukraine and
other former Soviet republics.
NATO ``must change once more to deal with the threats of a new century,''
Robertson said. ``Threats that cannot be measured in fleets of tanks,
warships or combat aircraft. Threats no longer mounted by governments. And
threats that can come with little or no warning.''
NATO will inaugurate one of the most significant changes since the fall of
communism on May 28 when President Bush joins other NATO leaders and
Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first meeting of the new
Russian-NATO council outside of Rome.
``Countries that spent four decades glowering at each other across the wall
of hatred and fear now have the opportunity to transform the future of
Euro-Atlantic security for the better,'' Robertson said.
Ahead of the Rome meeting, Bush and Putin are to sign a new U.S.-Russian
nuclear arms treaty to cut their arsenals by two-thirds - a deal that Bush
said Monday will ``put behind us the Cold War once and for all.''
The pact arose from Putin's support for the West since the Sept. 11 terror
attacks.
Under pressure from Washington to narrow the ``capabilities gap,'' the NATO
allies also agreed to improve the alliance's ability to move troops into
conflict areas quickly, enhance strike capabilities as well as shared
communications and intelligence - all areas viewed as essential to combat
threats revealed by the attacks on New York and Washington.
``The United States, which has the largest defense budget of all, is
continuing to add more money to our budget,'' Secretary of State Colin
Powell told reporters. ``We think that all of our colleagues in NATO should
be doing likewise.''
Ministers had no quarrel with Washington's push for modernization, but
Straw said it would be difficult to secure broad public support for a big
increase in defense budgets.
While specific recommendations will be worked out by defense ministers next
month, the foreign ministers acknowledged that new threats mean NATO
missions could be executed out of alliance territory.
``NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they
are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their
objectives,'' the ministers said in a statement.
The ministers added Croatia to the list of nine candidates for expansion,
but did not indicate which were favored to receive invitations for
membership at the Prague summit.
********
#4
Russian firms world's most likely bribers-watchdog
May 14, 2002
By Rebecca Harrison
PARIS (Reuters) - Russian companies are the most likely to offer or pay
bribes for contracts in emerging market countries, followed by firms from
China and Taiwan, corruption watchdog Transparency International (TI) said
Tuesday.
Hot on their heels are firms from South Korea, Italy, Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Japan and the United States, the Berlin-based watchdog said in its Bribe
Payers Index 2002 survey.
The world's richest countries must spend less time lecturing poor countries
on corruption and do more to crack down on bribery by firms based at home,
TI Chairman Peter Eigen said.
"Politicians and public officials from the world's leading industrial
countries are ignoring the rot in their own backyards," Eigen told a news
conference.
He said the Index, based on a survey carried out in the 15 emerging market
countries that trade most with multinational firms, looked at "the hands
that give bribes rather than the hands that take them -- at the source of
corruption."
Firms from Russia and China were offering bribes for contracts on an
"exceptional and intolerable" scale, while U.S., Italian and French
companies are seen to have a "high propensity" to bribe public officials
for contracts, he said.
Alexei Zabotkine, an economist at Moscow's UFG brokerage, said he was not
surprised by the findings considering the extent of graft in business there.
"Since firms face the necessity of bribing on their local markets, they see
it as an acceptable mechanism when they expand to other markets," he told
Reuters.
"UNHOLY ALLIANCE"
Bribery was most rife in the construction sector, closely followed by the
arms and defense industry, and firms from rich countries often paid
governments in emerging markets to build grandiose buildings that did
little for their citizens.
"These countries have no health, no education, no social services. All the
resources are siphoned off into useless projects thanks to this unholy
alliance between northern suppliers and the southern elite," Eigen said.
Many rich nations were not abiding by an anti-bribery convention drawn up
by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
whose member countries meet Wednesday in the French capital for a
ministerial meeting.
"The convention doesn't seem to have changed much -- the only surprise is
that U.S. companies are perceived as even worse than before," Eigen said,
noting U.S. firms were seen as more corrupt than in the last Index in 1999.
TI Executive Director Jermyn Brooks said companies must be made more aware
of the Convention, and that the best way to stop multinationals using
bribes abroad was to punish them at home.
"Business people will start to take note when their colleagues end up in
jail," Brooks told the news conference.
The Index, which TI conducted between last December and March by polling
leading business executives, bankers, companies, auditors and chambers of
commerce, showed firms from Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and
Canada were seen as the least likely to offer or pay bribes.
Russia did not figure in TI's first Bribe Payers Index in 1999, which found
Chinese firms the most corrupt, followed by South Korean and Taiwanese
companies.
The Bribe Payers Index scores countries on a scale with a perfect score of
10 points. Australia scored 8.5 while Russia trailed the field at 3.2.
Britain ranked eighth among the 26 countries examined with a score of 6.9,
Germany was ninth at 6.3, France 12th at 5.5 and the U.S. shared 13th place
with Japan at 5.3. Canada finished fifth at 8.1 while Italy was 17th at 4.1.
(additional reporting by Julie Tolkacheva in Moscow)
********
#5
Colonel who murdered Chechen girl was temporarily insane - Medical experts
ROSTOV-ON-DON. May 14 (Interfax) - Colonel Yuri Budanov was not in control
of his actions when he murdered a Chechen girl, says a statement by medical
experts which was announced in the North Caucasus military court on Tuesday.
The court hearings will be resumed at 2:00 p.m. on Wednesday, an
Interfax correspondent reported.
Budanov, the ex-commander of the 160th tank regiment, is accused of the
premeditated murder of Elza Kungayeva, of kidnapping and of abuse of power
by using force, which entailed serious consequences.
********
#6
Prosecutor closes case on '99 bomb scare
May 14, 2002
AP
MOSCOW - Closing a highly sensitive investigation, Russia's Prosecutor
General's office announced Tuesday that it had found no wrongdoing in a
murky 1999 bomb scare that liberals said was a thwarted attempt by the
country's security service to commit mass murder.
"We carefully checked everything for more than a year. There was nothing
unusual," said Leonid Troshin, spokesman for the prosecutor's office.
Liberal lawmakers called the conclusion meaningless, saying it was made
under pressure from the Federal Security Service, the main successor to the
Soviet-era KGB.
The incident in the city of Ryazan, south of Moscow, came after apartment
house bombings in three cities that killed 300 people and provoked fears of
a wave of Chechen terrorism in Russia. Those bombings were blamed on
Chechen rebels and rattled the entire nation. Soon afterward, Russian
troops re-entered Chechnya for a war that has continued for more than two
and a half years.
Vladimir Putin's tough handling of the war as then-prime minister helped
catapult him to the presidency, and the allegations are seen as a threat to
his image.
On Sept. 22, 1999, residents of a Ryazan apartment house noticed a car with
falsified license plates parked outside. They alerted local police, who
found large sacks in the basement that allegedly contained explosives.
However, the head of the Federal Security Service, Nikolai Patrushev, later
said the sacks held only sugar, and that they had been planted as part of
an anti-terrorism training drill by his agency.
Many Russians didn't believe Patrushev's account, pointing to contradictory
comments by local police and security officials. The episode led to
suspicions that the security service had staged the earlier bombings to
instill fear in the populace and justify the Chechnya war.
The government has vehemently denied any connection to the bombings.
After appeals from Ryazan residents and several lawmakers, the Prosecutor
General's office announced a probe into the Ryazan incident. But critics
have said prosecutors were under heavy pressure to pronounce the security
service innocent.
"It's not really an answer," Sergei Yushenkov, a leader of the Liberal
Russia party, said of the prosecutors' announcement Tuesday. "It's not
based on any documents. It's proof of incompetence and their readiness to
fulfill political orders."
Yushenkov is part of an independent commission of lawmakers and human
rights activists conducting its own investigation into the 1999 bombings.
Boris Berezovsky, an exiled business tycoon and a co-chairman of
Yushenkov's party, recently financed a documentary that implied government
complicity in the explosions. The documentary contains no hard evidence of
FSB culpability, but it raises the question of how much Putin, a former FSB
chief, knew about the incident. /The Associated Press/
*******
#7
Russia's human rights envoy condemns abuses
gazeta.ru
May 14, 2002
In his annual human rights report presented to journalists on Monday,
Russia’s human rights envoy Oleg Mironov said that millions of Russians
suffer from violent offences each year. Mironov blasted authorities for
insufficient preventive measures against terrorism and in the opinion of
the ombudsman, those particularly subject to abuses are children, women,
soldiers, victims of terror attacks and other violent crimes, as well as
disabled people.
According to the data provided by the ombudsman in the report, although
human rights are enshrined in the federal Constitution, in Russia they are
not duly observed, and authorities fail to respect the rights of citizens
or to provide efficient guarantees to ensure such respect.
The foremost issue, which Mironov dwelt on, is the situation regarding the
rights of victims of terror attacks and other kinds of violent crime.
According to Mironov’s office, 2001 saw a two-fold increase (some 300
cases) in the number of terrorist attacks compared to the previous year. In
the opinion of Mironov, this is the consequence of the authorities’ failure
to take sufficient preventive measures against terrorism, of which the May
9 bomb attack in the Dagestani port of Kaspiisk is an example.
''And what do the taxpayers pay for? Where are our special services?''
Mironov wondered, adding that the Interior Ministry employs more staff than
the Defence Ministry.
At the same time, victims of violent crimes are forced to wait many months
for compensation they are legally entitled to from the state, because such
payments are usually not paid until offenders are apprehended and brought
to trial. Victims of terrorist attacks remain unprotected against the
authorities' arbitrary actions, charged the ombudsman. His office, Mironov
said, had received complaints against the authorities' reluctance to
provide new housing in compensation for homes lost in terrorist attacks,
and against insufficient compensation for material damage. ''Most Russian
citizens who fall victim to terrorist attacks have material problems and
experience psychological discomfort,'' Mironov said.
In his numerous trips throughout the country the human rights commissioner
had detected numerous cases of abuses against children. Regardless of
President Putin’s recent pledge to combat juvenile crime and bring homeless
and neglected children off the streets, in Mironov’s opinion, thousands of
children are still left uncared-for and miserable.
For instance, according to official reports, in Russia there are currently
over 700,000 children left without parental care. Of this number, only 5
per cent of them are real orphans. The others have simply been abandoned by
their parents, and the number of such children grows by 100,000 every year,
Mironov stated bitterly.
An entire chapter in Mironov’s report deals with criminal offences
perpetrated against women. This problem is seldom raised due to the fact
that quite often female victims are not willing to report such cases to the
police, especially when it concerns rape or domestic violence. Therefore,
the actual incidence of such offences is many times higher than the number
of registered cases. According to official statistics in 2001, the number
of reported cases amounted to 2 million, whereas a more realistic figure
for women falling victim to violent offences could be put at 35 million.
Mironov also emphasised the situation in the armed forces, charging that
the Defence Ministry fails to pay soldiers who took part in combat
operations on time, and conceals the precise numbers of those lost in
action. ''This is not bad-mouthing the army but fighting for the rights of
military servicemen,'' Mironov said.
Citizens’ right to environmental protection is not respected either,
Mironov said, citing the example of the Baltic seabed littered with scrap
weapons. As well as failing to clean the seabed, he said that the
authorities do not take adequate measures to prevent forest fires or set
aside sufficient funds for extinguishing them.
Citizens’ right to free movement has also been undermined by recent price
hikes on fares, Mironov said before going on to the problems of Russia’s
prisons, which are overcrowded with the ''poor and needy'', whereas wealthy
offenders seldom end up behind bars. To alleviate overcrowding in Russia’s
cash-strapped, obsolete prisons, Mironvov suggests that alternative
punishment not involving incarceration be practiced more widely.
Mironov openly accused the chief of the Russian Health Ministry, Yuri
Shevchenko, of abusing human rights, after the minister proposed last year
to amend Article 41 of the Constitution which provides for every citizen’s
right to free medical care. In other words, said Mironov, the minister
proposed to ''legalise that which is unlawful''.
The report will be forwarded to all ruling bodies including the President,
the government, the Federal Assembly, the Constitutional and the Supreme
Courts, and to the Prosecutor General’s Office, the ombudsman said. It will
be for them to decide what measures need to be taken to solve the problems
raised in the report.
Mironov said that he intends to ask the government to introduce ombudsmen
in all of Russia’s regions. As of today, human rights commissioners work in
only 18 of the country’s 89 regions, therefore, many cases of abuses remain
unregistered.
Speaking later on Radio Ekho Moskvy, Mironov denounced the State Council's
decision to ask President Vladimir Putin to lift the moratorium on capital
punishment in the wake of the Victory Day terrorist act in Kaspiisk.
''Terrorist acts, horrendous as they are, cannot provide an argument for
lifting the moratorium on the death penalty in Russia. We can understand
the feelings of people after this terrible tragedy, but Russia must fulfill
its obligations to the Council of Europe regarding the abolition of the
death penalty,'' Mironov said.
********
#8
Rights body accuses Russian troops over Chechnya
By Clara Ferreira-Marques
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Human rights group Memorial said Tuesday Russian troops
in separatist Chechnya regularly flout Kremlin orders demanding restraint
and continue looting houses and killing civilians in "sweep operations."
Under a military decree published in March by the commander of Russian
forces in Chechnya, servicemen were ordered to identify themselves and to
take local elders with them during raids to curb the possibility of abuses.
But the decree has been ignored, said Oleg Orlov, an official of Memorial,
a human rights group set up under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's
perestroika reforms to expose the excesses of the Stalin era.
"This order didn't really change things, but it was the bare minimum,"
Orlov told a news conference. "We even welcomed it when it was announced,
but they cannot even stand by this."
"Why bother? Just to tell the world that the government is heeding civic
society? This is not good enough for us," he said.
The office of Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the Kremlin's main spokesman on
Chechnya, declined to comment on the charge.
Russia denies its troops carry out systematic abuses and says incidents of
excessive force are investigated and punished.
In footage filmed by Memorial in the village of Alkhan-Kala near the
Chechen capital Grozny this month, weeping women, young children and
elderly men trawled through the rubble of a grain silo, blown up after two
successive "sweep operations."
They pointed to charred and mangled body parts and bloodied rags belonging
to four civilians inside the building when it was blown up. One man held
out bullet casings to the camera.
"Often in Chechnya, when they have to get rid of a body they blow it up
with a grenade. In addition to this, they blew up the building," Orlov
said, adding the men might have been beaten.
"These men were arrested, and then they disappeared. Only in one man's case
were the remains large enough to allow his family to identify him."
SWEEP OPERATIONS
A group of women standing by the ruined silo spoke hysterically of the two
sweep operations.
"They took out the women, they beat the old men," one woman screamed. "What
do you want from us? Go to hell! Find out if they are guilty first -- don't
kill them straight away!"
Another woman said soldiers had looted her house.
"'Why are you taking my television?' I asked them. 'We have an order from
(Russian President Vladimir) Putin,' they said."
Russian tactics in Chechnya, in particular its sweep operations, have been
sharply criticized by human rights organizations and periodically by
Western governments.
The U.S. State Department said in its annual human rights report in March
that Russian forces in Chechnya showed "little respect for basic human
rights."
Rights groups have lobbied the White House to use the summit between Putin
and President Bush in Moscow this month to seek promises of better conduct
from the Kremlin.
Western criticism of Russian actions, already muted for some time, was
further softened after last September's airliner attacks. Putin backed the
U.S. war on terror, saying Moscow faced the same terrorist threat from
Chechen guerrillas.
Russia says abuses are monitored, but culprits are rarely found and
punished. According to the Kremlin's Chechnya office, fewer than 40
servicemen have been convicted since the present campaign, the second in
post-Soviet times, began in 1999.
Medical experts at the trial Tuesday of Col. Yuri Budanov, the first senior
officer to go on trial for serious crimes in Chechnya, said he was insane
when he raped and killed a Chechen woman. RIA news agency said the court in
the southern city of Rostov-on-Don would hand down a ruling Wednesday.
Russian forces poured back into Chechnya in 1999 to return it to Moscow's
rule after a first war in 1994-96 awarded the region de facto independence.
********
#9
Russia's new debt totals $51 bln as of early 2002
MOSCOW. May 14 (Interfax)- As of January 1, 2002 Russia's new debt is
estimated at $51 billion, an analytical review of Russia's balance of
payment and foreign debt in 2001 published in the Central Bank Bulletin on
Tuesday said.
Foreign currency-denominated securities worth $27 billion (53% of the
debt) and loans granted by international financial organizations amounting
to $14.4 billion (28%) account for the largest part of the country's new
debt. Debts on intergovernmental loans total $6.4 billion (13%) and on
GKO-OFZ ruble-denominated obligations to non-residents stand at $0.6
billion (1%).
The Central Bank said in its review that residents' foreign debt
decreased by $10.5 billion in 2001 from $161.4 billion to $150.9 billion.
Debts of the state-owned sector of $113.8 billion (75%) continue to
dominate Russia's foreign debt, including the Russian government's debts of
$112.8 billion and those of the country's regions totaling $1 billion.
As of January 1, 2002, Russia's Soviet-era debt stands at 55% of the
country's entire debt.
Aggregate foreign debts of Russian residents amounted to 49% of the
country's GDP in early 2002, with the state-owned sector's debts standing
at 37% of GDP.
*******
#10
Asia Times
May 14, 2002
Russia's space program: High ambitions, low funds
By Sergei Blagov
MOSCOW - When the hangar at the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan collapsed
on Sunday, many hopes for Russia's space program came down with it.
The collapse of the 65-meter high hangar, killing eight construction
workers, is seen as symptomatic of the state of the Russian space program -
ambitious but under-funded.
Russian space officials sought to play down the loss. The accident will not
damage Russia's space programs, Sergei Gorbunov, spokesman for
Rosaviakosmos, the Russian space agency, told RTR state television on Monday.
Gorbunov said that the accident could have been caused by a fuel tank blast
inside the hangar. Or, he said, it could have been caused by strong wind.
But there are indications of neglect.
The roof of the hangar, built in the late 1960s for the Soviet moon
program, had never been repaired. The hangar was used to build a Buran
space shuttle in 1988. Plans for another Buran shuttle in 1993 were
dropped. A Buran shuttle and a rocket launching system were in the hangar
at the time of the accident.
The hangar, known as the 112th MIK, was being prepared to accommodate the
Rus commercial rocket launching system to replace the aging Soyuz system.
Baikonur is Russia's main commercial rocket launching site. In recent years
there have been numerous disputes between Russia and Kazakhstan over the
Baikonur lease, which costs Russia more than US$100 million a year.
The collapse of the hangar could renew disputes over safety. Of the eight
workers who died, seven were Kazakhs and one was a Belarus national.
The hangar is unlikely to be repaired. It has been cordoned off due to
fears that the walls could also collapse. The damage runs into millions of
dollars.
Russia's space program has become a liability following the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991. The Buran and the Mir projects are among many that
were abandoned. Mir, which means both "peace" and "world" in Russian, was
the country's showcase. The former Soviet Union spent an estimated $4
billion on it. In the end Russia could not find about US$200 million needed
to keep Mir in orbit. The 130-ton space station came down in the Pacific in
March last year.
Lack of money has hit most of the remaining projects. Workers at once elite
space plants earn about 1,000 roubles ($30) a month, though some space
executives earn a thousand times that much. As a result, thousands of
qualified workers have left the space sector. Spacecraft manufacturers find
it increasingly difficult to make quality products.
But not all projects have fallen out of orbit. Three years ago Russia
launched the biggest space exploration project ever when it sent the first
component of the $40 billion International Space Station into orbit. The
Zarya (Dawn) module has been orbiting Earth smoothly.
Russian space officials have tried recently to fund projects through space
tourism. A week's trip to the International Space Station is being sold at
$20 million.
Space tourist Mark Shuttleworth returned to Earth on May 5 after 10 days at
the International Space Station. Shuttleworth, a 28-year-old South African
Internet millionaire, is waiting to blast off again. Russia will need many
more Shuttleworths.
(Inter Press Service)
********
#11
From: "Mel Goodman"
Subject: Re Jackson-Vanik
Date: Tue, 14 May 2002
Michael McFaul was wrong to cite Jackson-Vanik as an accomplishment in
Russian-American relations and the comment from the Jackson Foundation was
equally misinformed. In fact, Kissinger and Dobrynin were doing a decent
job of getting increases in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union (along
with Armenians and Baltic Germans). Jackson-Vanik, in fact, brought
emigration of Jews to a halt for most of the mid-70s. There was a trickle
of emigration in the late 70s and early 80s, but the real change was
brought about by Eduard Shevardnadze in the mid-80s. Jackson-Vanik was an
example of congressional interference in foreign policy that pandered to
the American Jewish community and had negative consequences for actual
emigration.
******
#12
Date: Tue, 14 May 2002
From: oleg@btinternet.com (Oleg Dschunian)
Subject: In response to Fitzpatrick JRL #6242
Catherine Fitzpatrick did a good job explaining what the visa problem looks
like from the other side of the remains of the Iron Curtain (JRL #6242). I
sympathise with the difficulties Catherine has experienced in her travel to
Russia. However, I’d like to make a few important points of distinction:
1)Making the travel restrictions imposed on Russian citizen by western
countries look less painful by comparing these to those which used to be
imposed by the bad old OVIRs in the USSR is unfair. Two wrongs don’t make a
right.
2)Perception is reality, and the natural assumption of one’s right to free
travel comes not from studying the Helsinki accord but from observation.
Most of my European and American friends are blissfully unaware of what is
the passport for, and how to get a visa. They take their right to travel
for granted, both within the Western community and to most tourist
destinations. Russians fail to explain it to themselves how a Russian
passport makes them less of a “human” and their right less “right” when
compared to a citizen of a rich country, or to the Poles, Hungarians,
Czechs etc.
3)Propiska is not a unique Russian invention. For example, as a foreigner
in the UK, arguably the most liberal European country in terms of the
immigration law, I must register with the local police office within 7 days
of changing my address (or any other change in status). I must be able to
produce a special registration certificate “if required to do so by any
Police Officer”, or else. A friend who has just relocated to Germany was
issued with a document which he must carry with him at all times (he’s not
a criminal, but a senior manager of an major international car company).
How eagerly this is enforced is another question.
4)A single visa refusal does affect one’s future chances with other
countries. Most visa forms ask you whether you have been refused a visa. If
you cannot explain the refusal to yourself, it’s all the harder to explain
it to a visa officer at the next consulate. But if you say you have not
been refused, you can then be accused of “trying to obtain the visa by
deception.”
As somebody who’s studied and then worked abroad for the last 6 years, 3 of
them in the US, I am fully aware of crime and other problems that a
minority of ex-Soviet citizens present to the societies in the West, and I
regret this. These are not the people I’d like to be compared to.
Unfortunately, this is exactly what happens in the hysteria whipped up by
the press. The visa topic is an emotional one. But that is understandable
if you spend the whole day queuing up to the French consulate and being
brutally pushed around by the guards, or after returning for the third time
to the American Embassy with the photos of your dog and your garage as the
“burden of proof”, or after trying to prove to a British visa officer that
you are not a prostitute. This is hardly comparable to the trouble of
getting a hotel stamp. All we are asking for is a little dignity, and not
being reduced to the lowest common denominator of thugs and beggars.
*******
#13
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
May 14, 2002
KUDRIN: RUSSIAN GROWTH REMAINS AMONG THE WORLD'S HIGHEST.
In response to President Vladimir Putin's repeated complaints that the
government's economic growth forecasts for the next four to five years are
insufficiently ambitious, the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development
has apparently raised its projected gross domestic product numbers. The
business newspaper Vedomosti reported yesterday that the ministry, headed
by German Gref, is now projecting 2.4-4.4 percent growth for 2003, given
oil prices of US$21.5-22 dollars per barrel, 4.2-5.1 percent growth for
2004 at the same prices, and 4.7-5.6 percent growth for 2005 at US$23 per
barrel. In March the government was predicting 3.2-4 percent growth for
2003 and 3.5-4 percent growth in the ensuing years given an US$18.5 per
barrel oil price, or a 4-4.5 percent growth if oil costs reach $23 per barrel.
Putin upbraided the government for the growth projections during a cabinet
meeting in early April. A short time later he gave a rather gloomy annual
State of the Nation address, charging that the inefficiency and corruption
of the state apparatus was hindering the country's economic development.
Both Putin and his economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov, have noted that it
would take Russia's economy years to reach the size of Portugal's even if
it consistently posted an 8-percent-plus annual growth rate, as it did in
2000. Last week the Russian president showed he was still annoyed about the
situation, saying he had been waiting for a month to see revised growth
forecasts (see the Monitor, May 7). Vedomosti, citing an unnamed source in
the Kremlin administration, reported yesterday that Gref had asked Putin
not to put the government in a difficult situation by criticizing it
publicly. But while the cabinet has apparently decided to try and appease
the president by correcting its forecasts upward, it is not clear whether
this will satisfy him.
Meanwhile, Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, who also holds the rank of
deputy prime minister, told journalists yesterday that the government would
forecast only realistic economic growth figures, emphasizing that Russia's
growth rate remained one of the world's highest. He said it was important
to discuss not so much the specific growth indicators, but rather the means
to achieve growth (Polit.ru, May 13). One of Kudrin's allies outside the
government also accentuated the positive. Yevgeny Yasin, former economics
minister and now director of the Expert Institute (a Moscow-based
thinktank), noted yesterday that Russia's economy had demonstrated "vital
growth" over the last three years, and that its growth rate for last year,
5.1 percent, was one of the world's best. According to Yasin, Russia's hard
currency reserves grew from US$11 billion in 1998 to US$36.5 billion last
year. The share of barter operations in overall domestic trade went from 60
percent in 1998 to 13 percent last year and the country's total state debt
during the same period went from US$158 billion (some 60 percent of GDP) to
US$137.8 billion. Meanwhile, foreign investment reached US$9.7 billion in
the third quarter of 2001, US$2 billion of which was direct foreign
investment, up from less than US$2 billion in 1998. Yasin predicted that
Russia's GDP would grow anywhere from 2 percent to 4 percent this year, and
that inflation this year would be 16 percent (Regions.ru, May 13).
*******
#14
Russian govt - high growth "impossible" short-term
By Darya Korsunskaya
MOSCOW, May 14 (Reuters) - Russia's government, scolded by President
Vladimir Putin for being too slow to spur the economy's recovery, on
Tuesday said faster growth was impossible in the short-term.
Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref said the government
would try to do better, and that Putin's demand for faster growth gave the
cabinet a free-hand to pursue deeper reforms.
"I would very much like to revise these forecasts to eight to 10 percent
(GDP growth) a year, but we must not set unrealistic goals," Gref told
reporters.
"It is unrealistic during economic restructuring to obtain very high growth
rates. In the short- and medium- term it is impossible. May God allow us to
achieve what we have currently got planned," he said.
The government says that if things go well there could be slightly higher
gross domestic product growth of 4.4 percent next year, 5.4 percent in
2004, and 5.6 percent in 2005.
However, that is well below the levels demanded by Putin's economic
advisor, and would need oil prices, on which the economy depends, to
average $21.5 per barrel in 2003, $22 in 2004 and $22.5 in 2005.
If oil prices fall to around $18.5 over the period, growth would be 3.4
percent in 2003, 4.0 percent in 2004 and 4.3 percent in 2005.
The figures compare to the previous forecasts of 3.5-4.5 percent over the
three years.
"We think this plan is hard to meet as it is, and there is no way to
seriously speed up growth rates," Gref said.
On Monday, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development said that
growth would slow down this year to 3.5 percent -- compared to 5.0 percent
in 2001 -- held back by rising wages and energy costs and the rouble's
appreciation against the dollar.
In a state of the nation address last month, Putin accused his government
of not being ambitious enough to close the gap between Russia and developed
states.
His economic aide, Andrei Illarionov, has said that Russia's economy had to
expand eight percent a year to catch up with Portugal, one of the European
Union's poorer states.
Russian GDP grew a record nine percent in 2000 but that was from a low base
and followed the country's economic crisis two years earlier from which it
is still struggling to recover.
Gref has in the past warned that attempts to push the economy too fast
could trigger another crisis.
Economic analysts say that until deeper reforms are in place, high growth
would be impossible to sustain.
Gref, who stuck to the government's forecast for this year of 3.6 percent,
said he based the higher forecasts on improvements in the global economy
and speedier reforms inside the country.
"The president has set correct goals and it is leading to more energetic
reforms. The part of the government which carries out reforms needs such
support from the president," he said.
"We now have carte blanche. We must push forward with reforms."
*******
#15
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
www.ceip.org
Summit with Substance: Creating Payoffs in an Unequal Partnership
By Andrew C. Kuchins (akuchins@ceip.org)
Director, Russian and Eurasian Program, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
U.S. president George W. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin have an
important opportunity at their upcoming meeting to reach key agreements,
remove major irritants in U.S.–Russian relations, and initiate a genuine
partnership less burdened by Cold War legacies. In Europe last smmer and in
the United States last November, the two leaders established personal
chemistry and trust, but the meetings lacked substance. Although Putin’s
leadership position will not be made or broken on his foreign policies,
this time it will be important for his pro-Western orientation to produce a
concrete payoff for Russia. As for President Bush, if the summit fails to
produce results, then his vaunted Russia policy will be seen to be
drifting. Thus both men require real outcomes such as a signed, legally
binding nuclear arms reduction agreement and a new institutional
relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Perhaps
just as important, however, Putin and Bush each must explain to his own
country why this partnership is important and what are its key elements.
It is easy to lose sight of how much better U.S.–Russian relations are
today, with the news in recent months full of the U.S. withdrawal from the
Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty, trade disputes over steel and chicken,
controversy over the U.S. nuclear posture review, and even Russian anger at
the Winter Olympics. The very fact, however, that the most contentious
issue this spring has been a trade war—not a possible nuclear or even cold
war—underlines what a qualitatively different relationship this is.
The United States and Russia are far from being allies. There is still a
deep lack of trust, and this will require time and effort to overcome. The
two countries can best be described as partners—albeit very unequal
ones—that share considerable interests and can help advance each other’s
national interests. Partners, even allies, do not agree on everything, but
the foundation for a genuine partnership is far stronger today than when
the Soviet Union collapsed. Early efforts to promote a premature "strategic
partnership" resulted in mutual disappointment. But now both sides have
more realistic expectations about their opportunities and limits.
September 11 and Fundamental Change in U.S.–Russian Relations
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, led to Putin’s key strategic
choice to unconditionally support the United States and the international
coalition in Afghanistan. Russian intelligence sharing, arms supplies to
the Northern Alliance, and acquiescence to the U.S. use of military bases
in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have contributed significantly to
the success of military operations in Afghanistan. The Russians have also
accepted that U.S. military trainers will work to strengthen the capacity
of the Georgian armed forces to restore order in the Pankisi Gorge on the
Russian border.
Before 9/11, the United States could not have imagined that Russia would
accept such a U.S. military presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus,
regions the Russians have jealously regarded as within their sphere of
influence. The new environment after 9/11 has also contributed to greater
understanding on highly contentious issues of the 1990s like NATO expansion
and missile defense. The Russian government may not agree with the U.S.
decision to abandon the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty or expand NATO, but
Putin has acknowledged that these developments do not directly threaten
Russian security. Russian energies are now more constructively focused on
reaching an arms reduction agreement with the United States and developing
a new institutional framework for NATO–Russia cooperation.
Collectively, these developments suggest a profound change in Russian
policy that has deep structural roots predating 9/11. More than ten years
after the end of the Cold War, Russians view the West—both Europe and the
United States—not only as less of a threat but increasingly as an essential
partner in addressing both economic modernization needs and security
issues. Russians may not be comfortable with the deep power asymmetry of
the U.S.–Russian relationship, but Putin and many Russians have reconciled
themselves to Russia’s position in the world and no longer harbor
superpower illusions. Putin’s outlook for Russia can be likened to that of
Deng Xiaoping, who more than 20 years ago concluded that long-term economic
recovery was essential for restoring Chinese international influence as
well as bringing prosperity to the Chinese people.
Russian critics of their country’s post-9/11 foreign policies assert that
Putin has made major concessions to the United States and received little
in return. His pro-Western foreign policy has been compared with that of
former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, who was similarly criticized for
giving a lot and getting little back. What the Russians have so far
"received" in the war in Afghanistan is the overthrow of the Taliban
government, destruction of al Qaeda bases, and at least a temporary
stabilization of the country. U.S. and Russian interests are closely
aligned in Afghanistan. Because Putin’s primary goal is economic
modernization, he is willing to make other concessions that one retired
Russian general described as "geopolitical suicide." What Putin needs to
receive are acceptance of Russia as an important member of the West and
more support for his economic goals. That is why, for example, U.S. support
for Russia’s rapid accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a
new relationship between Russia and NATO are so important. Unlike Boris
Yeltsin, who could be satisfied with symbolic gestures such as Russia’s
inclusion in some Group of Eight discussions, Putin’s more businesslike
approach calls for far more substantive ties between Russia and the West
that advance Russian interests, not just Western ones.
A closer U.S.–Russian relationship would not rest on Putin alone. Outside
Russia, many believe that he has crawled out on a shaky limb in taking such
a pro–United States stance. Though he may be far in front of the foreign
and security policy establishment, his policies find strong support among
the Russian people. Much of the Russian foreign policy elite struggles to
shed the vestiges of loss of the Cold War and superpower status, and this
contributes to their more negative views of the United States. Survey
research during the past ten years, however, has consistently indicated
that a majority of Russians has a different view (see figure). Polling from
last fall done by the Foundation for Public Opinion indicates that a full
69 percent of Russians support closer ties with the United States, and that
65 percent support the United States and Russia becoming allies. We should
take note, however, that in March 2002, Russian positive attitudes toward
the United States dipped to their lowest level since the Kosovo war in
spring of 1999.
On the U.S. side, the basis for a new U.S.–Russian partnership rests on a
reconfiguration of U.S. foreign and security policy goals, which include
(1) successfully conducting the war on international terrorism, (2) a new
urgency to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery, (3) peacefully managing the rise of China as a
great power, and (4) achieving a stable global energy supply. This is
obviously not an exhaustive list, but no one would seriously question the
weight of these items or that they can be pursued effectively only with
Russian cooperation. In fact, no country except Russia could possibly bring
as much to the table on these four goals. Russia—uniquely endowed with
geography and natural resources—can potentially be extraordinarily
important in helping the United States realize these key goals.
Pillars of the New Partnership
Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Nuclear security remains vitally important in U.S.–Russian relations.
Though the danger of U.S.–Russian nuclear conflict has virtually
disappeared, the new Bush doctrine highlighting the dangers of terrorists
armed with weapons of mass destruction accentuates the importance of
U.S.–Russian cooperation.
It is heartening that the Bush administration now recognizes the importance
of signing a treaty to reduce strategic arsenals by about two-thirds over
ten years. Signing this treaty will be the centerpiece of the May summit,
and failure to do so would be a significant setback. Understandably,
because Russian strategists seek a predictable nuclear arms relationship,
the Bush administration’s initial approach of unilateral reductions secured
only by a handshake did not sit well.
The agreement on nuclear weapons reductions should be accompanied by a
statement of principles on the role of defenses in the bilateral nuclear
relationship. This statement should clarify that any system the United
States develops will not threaten the Russian deterrent (something
Washington has asserted all along), and the United States should provide
adequate transparency measures for the Russians on this. More broadly on
cooperation, Washington should push hard to implement the shared early
warning agreement reached with Moscow in June 2000. That agreement could
sharply reduce the danger of an inadvertent Russian strike and provides a
foundation for broader nuclear cooperation. Cooperation on missile
defenses, especially theater defenses, should be encouraged not only for
its value in confidence building, but also to employ the Russian
military-industrial complex in producing components and technologies. Such
cooperation would provide incentives for some of the strongest critics of
Putin’s accommodating policies toward the United States to mute their
opposition.
Above all, particularly in light of 9/11, the United States should
substantially increase support for cooperative efforts to secure the vast
Russian arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and fissile materials. The
bipartisan Baker-Cutler report released in January 2001 recommended a more
than threefold increase in annual funding for these threat-reduction
programs to $3 billion. The former Russian biological weapons program
should also receive greater attention, both to prevent leakage of dangerous
material and to encourage cooperation on developing vaccines in areas where
Russian research is more advanced. Developing debt swaps for the
approximately $3 billion of Soviet-era Russian debt to the United States
could help to finance new programs, including controlling the acute
proliferation and environmental threats presented by decommissioned Russian
nuclear submarines.
The War on Terrorism
Many U.S. efforts to combat terrorism will be in states where Russia has
considerable legitimate interests, including those directly on its borders.
The United States should be as open as possible with Russia about its
plans. Because Washington now attaches a higher urgency to terrorism and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it should out of
self-interest be ready to offer greater incentives to enlist Moscow’s
support on issues of sharp disagreement such as Iran and Iraq.
First, however, the United States needs to work closely with Russia in
Afghanistan to successfully conclude military operations and to transform
the fragile political situation into the basis for a stable state. If
cooperation with Russia falters, Afghanistan is almost certain to collapse
back into a bloody failed state with warring factions variously supported
by the United States, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and others. Failure to
maintain a common understanding on the future of Afghanistan will set a
poor precedent for future theaters of action.
Similarly, the U.S.–Russian partnership will fail if both are not able to
agree on how to deal with Iraq and Iran. Although Moscow wants its economic
interests in existing Iraqi debt and future oil development to be addressed
in the event of a regime change, it understands that the Bush
administration is deadly serious about Iraq. This has contributed to
Russian support for a new "smart sanctions" regime in U.N. Security Council
discussions in early 2002. Moscow would also likely support robust
inspections in lieu of a military attack.
There is no love lost between Saddam Hussein and Russia, but there is
little incentive for Moscow to support intensive inspections or military
action if the United States acts unilaterally in disregard of the United
Nations and without at least the moral support of its European allies.
Saddam, however, has been effectively buying Russian support with future
oil contracts and lucrative Food for Oil contracts. It is very much in the
U.S. interest that Russia deliver to Saddam a clear message that Moscow
will no longer support Iraqi interests at the United Nations, but
Washington must raise their incentives to do so.
Reaching an understanding with Moscow on policy toward Iran may prove more
complicated. Russia is inclined to agree with the United States that Iraq
is a rogue state, but that is not the case with Iran. For Moscow, Iran has
been an important geopolitical partner in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and
the Caucasus. U.S. concern over the Russian–Iranian relationship in recent
years has been concentrated on the transfer of nuclear and ballistic
missile technologies and more recently on conventional arms sales. The
Russians deny that they are transferring missile technology and assert that
civilian nuclear cooperation in the construction of the Bushehr reactor is
in accord with all of the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
regime.
The United States needs to prioritize what is most objectionable in the
Russian–Iranian relationship and to provide greater incentives for Moscow
to curtail the activities it deems most objectionable. Missile cooperation,
especially on long-range cruise missiles, does present a potential threat
to Israel and the United States, but Washington should not object to
conventional arms transfers that do not threaten its naval presence in the
Persian Gulf.
On Iran’s nuclear program and other programs for weapons of mass
destruction, it would be helpful if the United States enlisted the support
of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to share intelligence with
Russia and speak to Moscow with one voice. Russian arms exporters and the
Ministry of Atomic Energy—entities that would lose desperately needed
income with the curtailed sales to Iran of missile and nuclear
technologies—could be partially compensated by business elsewhere, such as
components for missile defense and next-generation, proliferation-resistant
nuclear reactors.
It would be an exaggeration to call the begrudging Russian acquiescence to
the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and now Georgia an indication of
real partnership, but it can offer creative opportunities for cooperation.
Washington broadly shares concern with Moscow about terrorism, religious
extremism, and drug trafficking that could sharply destabilize the fragile
states in the region. In Central Asia, the United States should work
together with the Russian 201st division stationed in Tajikistan, along
with local forces, in efforts to counter the drug trade as well as to train
local forces in counterterrorist activities. If the booming heroin trade in
Afghanistan and Central Asia is not sharply curtailed, it will continue to
fund terrorists and warlords, who in turn will undermine these states.
Russia appreciates that state failure in Central Asia is not in its
interests, but it also worries that the United States seeks a permanent
military presence and will use it to increase its influence over the
region’s energy resources. Washington will need to reassure Moscow that its
commercial interests will be recognized despite increased U.S. influence in
the region. Washington also needs to remember that notwithstanding the
power asymmetry, Russia maintains considerable influence in this part of
the world that can be used for good or ill. Pretending that U.S. and
Russian interests fully coincide or acting as though Russia is too weak to
matter would be costly mistakes.
Russian Integration into Western Institutions
Encouraging Russia’s deeper integration with three key Western security and
economic organizations—NATO, the WTO, and the European Union (EU)—is an
essential component of a durable U.S.–Russian partnership. Russia’s
pro-Western orientation will only become sustainable through much more
intensive interactions with these multilateral institutions. In turn,
deeper integration will require that Russia continue to reform the domestic
institutions that underpin a market democracy.
Russia’s demand for a new institutional relationship with NATO is a very
positive development. Since last fall, the Putin government has quieted its
opposition to expansion and focused on replacing NATO’s Permanent Joint
Council with a new NATO–Russia council that has been loosely termed "NATO
at 20." Naturally enough, Moscow wants to be involved in discussions on
many, but not necessarily all, aspects of NATO policy before rather than
after decisions are made by full members of the alliance. It makes sense,
for example, to include Russia on such issues as nonproliferation,
terrorism, and peacekeeping where its constructive involvement would be
essential for success. Fears about such an arrangement amounting to a
virtual Russian veto power over NATO’s actions are overblown.
But it will be essential for NATO to work rapidly with Russia to develop a
plan so that a new institutional relationship does not become an empty
shell like the Permanent Joint Council. NATO should take the initiative to
work with Russian military officers to promote Russian military reform.
NATO should also be more open to purchases of Russian arms, especially for
new member states whose militaries are equipped with aging Soviet hardware.
A long-standing Russian objection to NATO expansion has been the loss of
arms markets in former Warsaw Pact countries.
Russia’s accession to the WTO will be both a symbolic and substantive step
in developing a market economy integrated into the global trading system.
WTO membership will give Russia international recourse if other member
states raise tariffs or erect other restrictions on Russian exports, but it
will not be a panacea for Russia’s most serious economic deficiencies in
fighting corruption, strengthening the rule of law, and creating a real
banking system. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative should continue
to work closely with the Putin government to facilitate Russian entry.
In the long term, the EU will be the most important Western institution for
Russia, but obviously the one least directly influenced by U.S. policy.
Europe is and will continue to be Russia’s largest trading partner, and its
dependence on Russian energy will also grow in the coming years. The EU’s
further expansion will bring Russia even closer geographically to Europe,
which will further increase Europe’s interest in Russia’s stability and
reform progress. Europe is a powerful magnet for Russia, and Brussels can
apply steady pressure on Moscow to strive for European norms of democracy,
the rule of law, human rights, and the like.
Closer Russian–European ties are in U.S. interests precisely because
Brussels may hold more leverage than Washington over Russia’s domestic
economic and political development. Although Washington may increasingly
see Russian and European positions aligned against the United States on a
variety of international security, economic, and political issues—from
missile defense to U.S. steel tariffs to the Kyoto Protocol—Putin is no
longer following a Sovietlike strategy of using closer relations with
Europe to destabilize the transatlantic alliance. The transatlantic
relationship could only be serious weakened by a series of U.S. foreign
policy blunders perceived by Europe as egregious unilateralism—certainly
not by Moscow’s troublemaking.
Society-to-Society Engagement
Unlike during the Cold War, when state-to-state relations defined
U.S.–Russian relations, in the new era society-to-society ties have a
growing importance. Economic ties between U.S. and Russian enterprises are
expanding, and this will accelerate as Russia makes progress in developing
its legal and financial infrastructure. Perhaps the most significant news
around last November’s summit was not a state decision at all but Exxon
Mobil Corporation’s decision to increase its investment in Sakhalin energy
development by $4 billion, the largest commitment of foreign direct
investment in Russia to date.
Commercial partnerships in the energy field will become more significant in
U.S.–Russian relations. But the market, rather than government
intervention, should lead this process. However, the U.S. government should
allocate more funding for collaborative research with Russian scientists on
alternative energies. Two U.S. actions that would help smooth economic ties
would be for Congress to finally repeal the deeply anachronistic
Jackson-Vanik Amendment and for the U.S. Commerce Department to declare
that Russia is a market economy.
Hundreds of U.S. nongovernmental organizations have worked with their
Russian counterparts in a wide variety of fields from nuclear safety to
environmental protection to human rights. Because Russian civil society has
felt increasingly vulnerable since Putin came to power, Bush should
strongly and publicly state during the summit that economic modernization
is not the only ticket for Russia’s deep integration with the West.
Economic progress must be accompanied by the continuing development of an
open, democratic civil society; otherwise, Russia will never be the West’s
full partner. Washington cannot convey the message that it is willing to
tolerate a Faustian bargain trading off Moscow’s support for the war on
terrorism and on security issues in exchange for its turning a blind eye to
Russia’s creeping authoritarianism and human rights violations in Chechnya.
To confirm for the Russian people that the United States really cares about
the future of Russia and not simply a temporary and instrumental
partnership, Bush could bring four initiatives to the May summit that would
help address Russia’s pressing challenges. The first should focus on the
needs of one of Russia’s most socially and economically depressed regions,
the Russian Far East. Because of a shared border with Alaska, increased aid
there would serve U.S. interests, and it would resonate with Russians
because of their thinly veiled concern about the growing power of China.
Second, the United States should undertake a major initiative on health
care, given the true crisis in health in Russia and its grim implications
for the future. Third, Washington should institute a generous program to
allow thousands of Russian college students to enroll in U.S. institutions.
These will be investments not only in higher learning but also in
relationships between new generations of Russians and Americans. Fourth,
Washington should adapt a more friendly visa regime that will allow
Russians to travel more easily to the United States.
Conclusion
A markedly improved relationship with Russia may be one of the most
significant benefits for the United States resulting from the shock to the
international system of 9/11. Today, when the potential for terrorists to
acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities is the number one U.S.
security priority, deep cooperation with Moscow is essential for success.
In the long term, a robust U.S.–Russian partnership will be essential for
Russia’s economic development and its integration into the West. The events
of 9/11 created unique circumstances to make possible rapid progress on
these goals, and the Bush administration should meet the challenge of
strengthening the U.S. partnership with Russia that is so clearly in the
U.S. interest and so close to its grasp.
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Web page for CDI Russia Weekly:
http://www.cdi.org/russia
Archive for Johnson's Russia List:
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson
With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and
the MacArthur Foundation
A project of the Center for Defense Information (CDI)
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