Johnson's Russia List
#6241
14 May 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Interfax: Star Wars: Episode II - Attack of the Clones to premiere
in 114 Russian cinemas.
2. Christian Science Monitor: Peter Grier and Fred Weir, Nuclear pact
offers US flexibility, Russia relief.
3. Interfax: Russia-U.S. negotiations on strategic offensive armaments are
difficult - Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov.
4. Financial Times (UK) editorial: A small step to arms reduction.
5. Financial Times (UK): Andrew Jack, Powell holds whip hand in arms talks
with Russia.
6. The Times (UK): Giles Whittell, Cold War dangers recede as Kremlin
shifts
its balance.
7. Donald Jensen: Chechnya Documentary at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
in Washington.
8. Moscow Times: Kevin O'Flynn, Getting a Visa Just Got Tougher for U.S.
Men.
9. Consul General James Warlick: Visa service at US Embassy in Moscow.
10. Yezhenedelny Zhurnal: Maksim Blant, LIBERTY IS NOT ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE
MARKET. Who is responsible for economic growth in Russia?
11. Novoye Vremya: A TRAP FOR THE BUREAUCRACY. An interview with Irina
Khakamada, deputy speaker of the Duma.
12. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, Hardly Painting Town Red.
13. Baltimore Sun editorial: Russia and the war.
14. Transitions Online: Our Take: How To Tread on Vipers. The first step
for
Russia is to recognize who they are. (re Chechnya)]
********
#1
Star Wars: Episode II - Attack of the Clones to premiere in 114 Russian
cinemas
MOSCOW. May 13 (Interfax) - Star Wars: Episode II- Attack of the Clones by
George Lucas will premiere in Russia and worldwide on May 16, the press
service of Gemini Film company, which has the rights to show the film in
Russia, told Interfax.
They said the film will premiere in 114 cinemas in some 40 Russian
cities early on May 16. "The film will premiere in the 30 best cinemas in
Moscow alone, and will be shown from six to ten times daily for two or
three weeks," the press service said.
The press service told Interfax that "we expect Episode II to make more
revenues at the box office in Russia and globally than Lord of the Rings
and Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone, and to come close to those
earned by Titanic."
Star Wars: Episode II is the second part of a trilogy telling about
events that took place prior to those described in the three Star Wars
films produced by Lucas from 1977 to 1983.
Episode II describes events in the decade after those described in Star
Wars: Episode I - the Phantom Menace, which premiered in 1999. Episode II's
plot focuses on a love story between young Anakin Skywalker, played by
19-year-old Canadian actor Hayden Christensen, and Queen Amidala, played by
Natalie Portman.
Star Wars was one of the most successful financial projects in
Hollywood, and Lucas's four films have earned more that $1 billion.
The film will premiere in Britain and the United States on the same day.
Officials from 20th Century Fox and the film's crew say this is no
coincidence, as it has long been an international phenomenon.
********
#2
Christian Science Monitor
May 14, 2002
Nuclear pact offers US flexibility, Russia relief
By Peter Grier and Fred Weir | Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor
WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW – By striking a landmark nuclear-arms deal, Russia
and the US have likely ensured they will both get what they want out of the
upcoming Moscow summit between Presidents Vladimir Putin and George Bush.
Mr. Putin will have the treaty itself. He will be able to present Russia as
a continuing force in the world – a power still able to wring an agreement
out of a reluctant United States. Mr. Bush, for his part, will enjoy a trip
to Russia steeped in peace and harmony. With the potential irritant of an
undone deal removed, the White House will be able to use the summit to
promote a new US-Russia relationship to voters back home.
"The new era will be a period of enhanced mutual security, economic
security, and improved relations," said Bush when announcing the deal
yesterday.
The arms pact itself codifies the deepest cuts in atomic arsenals of the
nuclear age – but it also represents a deal long foretold. Bush and Putin
agreed in principle last year to reduce their arsenals to 1,700 to 2,200
warheads from the 6,000 now allowed under the START I treaty.
The Bush administration had preferred that these reductions be made without
a guiding treaty. While recognizing that the new strategic relationship
between the US and Russia made deep cuts possible, Bush officials have also
long placed high importance on strategic flexibility.
In blunt terms, they wanted to leave the US room to rebuild its arsenal in
the future, if need be.
Putin, for his part, took a more traditional view of the process of warhead
reduction. Cash-strapped Russia wanted stability, not flexibility. Thus
Putin last year insisted that the cuts be codified in writing.
At first, Bush appeared piqued by this insistence. But as the months rolled
along, and Putin did not back down, it became apparent that the absence of
a pact might become a defining irritant in the US-Russian relationship.
The end result: an apparent full-blown treaty that both sides will submit
to their legislatures for ratification.
"This is significant, because Bush is saying the word 'treaty' over and
over again," says Philipp Bleek, a research analyst at the private Arms
Control Association in Washington.
Details, details
As always with arms control, details are very important. One sticking point
had been Russia's objections to US plans for storing some of its withdrawn
nuclear weapons, rather than destroying them.
A US official told reporters that under the new pact, some US weapons will
indeed be destroyed – but that an undisclosed number of others will be
retrained as operational spares.
The two sides "appear to be agreeing to disagree on some of the core
issues," says Mr. Bleek.
In Moscow, analysts said that the deal comes as a huge relief for a Kremlin
that has staked its reputation on strategic partnership with the US since
Sept. 11, but has so far had little to show for making that bold choice.
"Russia has insisted that the entire framework of cold-war arms control
could not be replaced with a few nice declarations, but until recently, the
Bush administration seemed not to be listening.... This is a big victory
for Putin, and could be a key turning point in the US-Russian
relationship," says Alexander Konovalov, director of the independent
Institute of Strategic Assessments in Moscow.
Moscow was dismayed last December when Bush announced a unilateral American
withdrawal from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which Russia regards
as the keystone of cold-war-era arms control.
"For some time, it looked like Russian-US arms control would just
collapse," with serious political fallout for the Kremlin, says Alexander
Pikayev, a security expert with the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow. "But this
new deal marks the end of the 'dead end' period in the relationship. Where
it leads is less certain."
Little military significance
Russian analysts say the accord has little military significance, since
both sides would have slashed their strategic arsenals in any case.
Russia cannot afford to replace aging intercontinental ballistic missiles,
and would have seen its long-range missile forces soon reduced to about
1,500 warheads with or without an agreement, say experts.
Moscow is still worried that the US has not agreed to permanently scrap all
the warheads removed from active service under the deal, and instead may
shelve some for later use. "This agreement leaves the US with full freedom
of action," says Mr. Pikayev.
A few Russian experts warn that the political victory for Putin is
overblown. "This agreement decides nothing. It's pure propaganda," says
Pavel Felgenhauer, a military expert. "Putin needs to justify his
pro-Western stance, and now he can claim that he convinced a reluctant
George Bush to sign this document."
*******
#3
Russia-U.S. negotiations on strategic offensive armaments are difficult -
Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov
MOSCOW. May 13 (Interfax) - Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov
and U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who have started negotiations
in Moscow, "will discuss in detail all disarmament questions," and not
merely the text of the document that is being prepared for signing by the
presidents of Russia and the United States.
Mamedov made this statement before the negotiations.
The questions can be divided into three groups, he said.
The first group is made up of questions Moscow and Washington hope to
settle by the document that is being drafted for the summit. Russia hopes
that the document will have the status of a treaty.
The second group is made up of questions "related to strategic offensive
armaments, which will not be settled by the document, but mechanisms for
whose decisions will be made," Mamedov said.
The third group is made up of questions "that are not directly the
matter of strategic offensive armaments, but without which strategic
stability is impossible," he noted.
The deputy minister said he implied, "in the first turn, the questions of
missile defense." He said he hopes "to achieve mutually acceptable results"
on questions of the future document, and "to report on that to our
ministers, who will meet in Reykjavik soon."
The treaty or the agreement to be signed by the presidents "has, as with
any other international document of such significance, a clause that
reserves the right of a party to quit it in case of a threat to national
interests," Mamedov said.
He was asked about the general progress of Russia-America negotiations
on strategic offensive armaments. "It's difficult. Firstly, the topic is
very complicated; secondly, there was a long pause after the American party
decided against ratifying START-2; and thirdly, a new administration with
its own approaches has taken office," the diplomat said.
********
#4
Financial Times (UK)
14 May 2002
Editorial
A small step to arms reduction
The good news is that the US and Russian presidents have agreed to sign a
nuclear arms reduction pact at their summit in Moscow next week. They will
cut their vast respective nuclear arsenals by more than two-thirds, to
between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads apiece, from about 6,000-7,000 today. And
they will seal the deal in binding treaty form, not just as an oral
agreement.
The bad news is that they have not been much more ambitious. Both sides can
do what they want with their warheads. An unspecified number of US missiles
will simply be put into storage, rather than being destroyed. More
important, they could have agreed to more drastic cuts on both sides,
without any real change in the strategic balance.
The agreement has been well trailed, since both President George W. Bush
and Vladimir Putin, his Russian counterpart, agreed on the size of the cuts
last November. The main change has been Mr Bush's agreement to put it in
treaty form, overruling the strong opposition of Donald Rumsfeld, the US
defence secretary, and the Pentagon.
That is a considerable ideological volte-face for the US administration,
which came into office insisting that such arms control treaties were a
relic of the cold war. It also means that the US Senate could still block
the treaty, as it did with the previous Start-2 treaty, which had proposed
cuts to between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads. That treaty has never been
implemented, not having been ratified in either the Senate or the Russian
Duma.
Mr Bush welcomed the deal yesterday as a treaty that would "liquidate the
legacy of the cold war". Up to a point. The cold war itself has been over
for more than a decade. It is hard to see why either Washington or Moscow
needs to preserve arsenals of 2,000 nuclear warheads. A figure of 200 would
have given a much more positive signal.
The determination of the Pentagon to keep an unspecified number of weapons
in storage, and presumably to allow Russia to do the same, is baffling in
the light of the far greater danger of weapons proliferation. Surely it
would be better to destroy these arms once and for all? Leaving them in
existence is tempting fate.
There is no doubt that Russia would have gone along with more drastic
weapons cuts. Mr Putin had proposed a figure of 1,500 warheads. Moscow's
armaments are increasingly outmoded and may not be much use in the
not-too-distant future.
That is the reality of why the cold war is already over, regardless of new
documents to formalise it. It is game, set and match to America. This
treaty was Mr Bush's to call. He could and should have dared to be more
ambitious.
*******
#5
Financial Times (UK)
14 May 2002
Powell holds whip hand in arms talks with Russia
By Andrew Jack in Moscow and our International staff
Sixteen years after a summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in
Reykjavik heralded the ending of the cold war, another meeting in the
Icelandic capital is again the focus of the US-Russian relationship .
On the sidelines of a meeting of Nato foreign ministers, Colin Powell, US
secretary of state, and Igor Ivanov, his Russian counterpart, will hold
talks to discuss the fine print of Monday's announcement of a new US-Russia
nuclear weapons reduction agreement. But for Moscow, the content of the
agreement under discussion today marks a sharp contrast with how its
negotiating position with Washington has changed since the fall of Soviet
Communism.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the balance of power in
arms talks has shifted sharply in the favour of the US. And in the latest
negotiations, it seems that Washington has again gained far more than
Moscow in the latest round of negotiations. The very fact of an agreement
is something of a relief for Russia, which had been pushing hard for a
legal document to replace the Start I treaty - due to expire in 2009.
Agreed by President Gorbachev but signed after his fall by Boris Yeltsin in
1991, Start I was the fruit of the breakthrough achieved by presidents
Gorbachev and Reagan at the Reykjavik summit.
That was followed in 1993 by further agreed reductions under Start II,
which was further developed in 1997 by presidents Clinton and Yeltsin.
But while the Russian Duma ratified both Start II and its 1997 protocol,
the new Bush administration indicated last year that it wanted to push for
reductions outside the limits of the treaty.
At the same time, the US indicated that it intended to withdraw from the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty in order to develop its new "Star Wars"
anti-missile system, aimed, according to President George W. Bush, at a new
threat to the US from "rogue states".
Washington's withdrawal from the ABM treaty, which comes into force in
June, further complicated negotiations on the latest agreement. However,
Moscow has been muted its protests over Mr Bush's decision to withdraw from
the ABM treaty.
The new agreement, alongside others likely to be signed next week, will
provide at least modest compensation for a series of tough moves by the US
in Russia's traditional sphere of influence in the last few months, in
spite of Mr Putin's decision to support the US-led campaign against
international terrorism in the wake of the events of September 11.
Russia's options in the negotiations have ultimately been limited by
economic factors: with its far smaller economy and a military budget just a
fraction of Soviet-era levels, it can barely afford to maintain its current
ageing stockpile of nuclear weapons.
At the very least, the announcement made on Monday suggests that the US and
Russia can reach agreement on changes to existing wide-ranging strategic
military treaties on civilised terms, without fear of triggering a new arms
race.
But it is likely to offer little extra ammunition to Mr Putin to defend
himself from the more conservative anti-Western hawks within Russia who see
his accommodating attitude towards the US as a betrayal.
*******
#6
The Times (UK)
May 14, 2002
Cold War dangers recede as Kremlin shifts its balance
by Giles Whittell
The threat of nuclear winter is not behind us, but our correspondent
notices a thaw
A CATASTROPHIC error on the part of either nuclear superpower could still
trigger a nuclear strike and, conceivably, a counterstrike.
But yesterday’s agreement in Moscow to cut the world’s two largest nuclear
stockpiles by two thirds apiece was the most important of its kind in more
than a decade, and crucially different from its predecessors.
Sooner than many dared hope, Russia’s nuclear arsenal will be on a scale
that reflects a legitimate need for national security and a longstanding
desire for a seat at the high table of world politics — but not a wish to
threaten the rest of us with nuclear winter.
President Putin is, by most analyses, the loser as he prepares for his
first Moscow summit with President Bush. He has conceded America the right
to store weapons rather than destroy them, yet still subtract them from its
“operational total”.
He has also quietly dropped his objections to Washington’s unilateral
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that, until recently, he,
and not just the Russian hawks, had insisted was the basis of all
subsequent arms treaties. Communists and nationalists alike will be enraged
by these concessions, at least on paper and in the Duma.
But, as one Moscow commentator put it yesterday: “So what?” Mr Putin’s
popularity among ordinary Russians remains nearly as high as Mr Bush’s in
America and his influence on the Duma is far more impressive than his
counterpart’s on Capitol Hill.
This treaty will become law. Silos and submarines from the Urals to the
Pacific that, however decrepit, have threatened the West since the worst
years of the Cold War, will finally be scrapped.
This does not mean that doves have taken over the Kremlin. General Anatoli
Kvashnin, Russia’s top military planner, is also the architect of the
Chechnya war that helped to bring Mr Putin to power but shows little sign
of ending in a clear victory for either side nearly three years later.
By encouraging the Russian President to give ground on nearly all that
matters to the United States, he is hastening the day when Russia boasts a
leaner, meaner, conventional army, and this may only embolden Moscow’s
adventurism in its own sphere, especially in the Caucasus as Mr Putin
approaches re-election in 2004.
The era of global nuclear showdown is, however, winding down and when the
full history of this long twilight comes to be written, the departure of
Igor Sergeyev from the job as Russia’s Defence Minister in March last year
may be seen as a turning point comparable to yesterday’s.
Marshal Sergeyev was a former head of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces and
a fervent believer in maintaining Cold-War levels of nuclear deterrence,
even at the cost of critically low morale and funding in the rest of the
country’s Armed Forces.
His successor, Sergei Ivanov, is of one mind with General Kvashnin and Mr
Putin.
They understand that with a defence budget one fortieth the size of
America’s, their days of sabre-rattling are over.
The most they can hope for now from Washington is a show of mutual respect
sufficient to preserve the pride that Russians mind about so much. They
have probably done enough to earn it.
Mr Bush can now trumpet an arms control breakthrough on a scale with the
one that his father negotiated with the last Soviet leader.
He can mollify his own Republican hawks by pointing out that he has not
promised to scrap a single weapon — merely to shelve hundreds of them.
Most importantly, he can redirect America’s existing nuclear arsenal to
counter threats, real and perceived, from the rogue states along his
so-called “Axis of Evil” and he can free up resources to proceed with
building the missile defence shield he so covets.
********
#7
From: Donald Jensen (JensenD@rferl.org)
Sent: Monday, May 13, 2002
Subject: Chechnya Documentary at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
JRL readers are cordially invited to a screening of "Chechen Lullaby: Once
Upon a Time there was a Chechnya (2000)," from from 9:30-11:00 AM on
Tuesday, May 14 at the 4th floor of RFE/RL headquarters, 1201 Connecticut
Avenue, Washington DC.
The documentary is based on in-depth interviews with five journalists who
worked in Grozny during both Chechnya conflicts. In their analyses, they
address why the war started, why it continues, and their own experiences
reporting it..
The documentary was produced by the French-German cultural TV-Channel ARTE
and P.R. Films. In March 2002 it was awarded an Adolf Grimme Award in
Gold, which is considered the "Oscar" of German Television.
The film's director, Ms. Nino Kirtadze, will be present at the showing of
the film and available for questions. Kirtadze was born in Tbilisi and
now works as an independent journalist and documentary filmmaker in Paris.
During the first war in Chechnya, she worked as a correspondent for AFP and
AP. In recent years she has been a correspondent for the RFE/RL Georgian
Service in Paris.
Please RSVP by email to jonesm@rferl.org or by telephone to Melody Jones at
202-457-6949.
********
#8
Moscow Times
May 14, 2002
Getting a Visa Just Got Tougher for U.S. Men
By Kevin O'Flynn
Staff Writer
Amerian men applying for Russian visas will be required as of
this week to fill out an additional form detailing which countries they have
visited in the past 10 years, whether they have ever served in an armed
conflict and the names and addresses of their previous two employers.
The tougher visa requirement, which was introduced in Russian embassies in
the United States and Britain on May 8 and will be in place in all embassies
worldwide from this week, appears to be a tit-for-tat response to a U.S.
decision in January to require Russian men to fill out similar visa forms.
The United States introduced supplemental form DS-157 in the wake of the
Sept. 11 attacks, and all foreign males between the ages of 16 and 45 who
apply for nonimmigrant visas are required to fill it out.
The Foreign Ministry's supplemental form 95 closely mirrors the U.S. form. In
addition to listing all the countries they have visited in the past 10 years
and any wartime experience, American men aged 16 to 45 must list all the
professional, social and charitable organizations to which they belong or
have belonged; whether they have any specialized skills or training in
firearms or explosives; and the names of the countries they have worked for.
As for their employment history, American applicants must also identify their
past positions and provide the names and telephone numbers for their former
bosses.
The Foreign Ministry refused to comment about the new requirement Monday.
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told a Stanford University audience just last
week that "it would not be right to have tit-for-tat measures" in Russia's
visa regime, NTV.ru reported.
The U.S. Embassy would not comment Monday other than to say that it was aware
of the change.
The American Chamber of Commerce, which has lobbied both the Russian and U.S.
governments to ease visa restrictions, expressed concern that the additional
paperwork may cause problems for businessmen applying for visas on short
notice.
However, the decision has to be seen within the context of Russia's support
for the United States since Sept. 11, said American Chamber of Commerce head
Andrew Somers.
"We have to accept what our Russian partners are doing," he said. "Since we
invented it, we can hardly be complaining about it."
At a time when Russia is trying to attract more tourists, the move is seen by
some as a blow to the industry.
"This diplomatic opposition is bad for tourism," said Irina Tyurina,
spokeswoman for the Russian Association of Tourist Agencies.
The requirement will make it "a lot more difficult" for tourists wanting to
come to Russia, she said.
Russia has a lot more to lose than the United States by imposing the new
regulation, she said.
Last year 92,000 American tourists visited the country, putting the United
States in fifth place in the number of foreign visitors to Russia, according
to the Russian Association of Tourist Agencies. The 2001 number was a 10
percent increase from the previous year.
By contrast, the United States is not even in the top 20 list of favorite
countries Russian tourists visited last year.
Tyurina said that the U.S. Embassy, which has often been criticized for its
strict visa policy toward Russians, has been actively seeking Russian
tourists since the arrival of its current consul general, Jim Warlick.
"He's trying to do something, but it doesn't all depend on him," she said.
********
#9
From: James Warlick/"Ram, Vangala S"
Subject: Visa service at US Embassy in Moscow
Date: Mon, 13 May 2002
As Consul General at the American Embassy in Moscow, I would like to take
this opportunity to respond to occasional comments in JRL about the quality
of service provided by our consular section to visa applicants and American
citizens needing our assistance. Since arriving in Moscow last August, I
have made it a priority to correct misperceptions shared by both Americans
and Russians especially about visas and am pleased to reach JRL readers.
We are one of the largest and busiest consular sections in the world. In
Russia, we received over 120,000 nonimmigrant visa applications last year at
our Embassy and consulates in St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, and
Vladivostok. More Americans adopted children in Russia than in any country,
over 5000 adoptions last year, and we issued more than 12,000 immigrant
visas to Russians who will make the United States their permanent home.
Most importantly, especially after the tragedy of September 11, we are here
to aid American citizens and provide critical services to those living and
traveling outside our country.
An important goal of the American Embassy is to facilitate travel to the
United States for tourists, businessmen, students, and others in Russia. We
issue visas to three out of every four Russians who apply. These
people-to-people contacts are important for both our countries and are a key
element of the growing partnership between the United States and Russia.
We have made it easier and more convenient for Russians to apply for visas.
Instead of long lines at the Embassy and sometimes repeated trips to Moscow,
applicants may now apply for nonimmigrant visas at many offices of the
domestic courier service Elf-91, an affiliate of Federal Express. Many
frequent travelers will receive their passpports and visas returned directly
to their homes, usually in 5-7 days. A businessman in Nizhny Novgorod, for
example, can now apply without ever coming to Moscow. Those who require an
interview at the Embassy are offered a specific date and time, and only need
to come to the Embassy once. This program is expanding to cities around the
country.
We introduced a travel agent program earlier this year. Working with twelve
of the largest travel agencies in Russia and the Russian Association of
Travel Agencies, our program makes it possible for many travelers to submit
their visa applications to us through the same companies where they purchase
tickets and make other travel arrangements.
A frequent misperception is that it's difficult for students and young
people to receive visas to travel to the U.S. Last year, we issued some
10,500 visas to Russians for study and professional exchange travel to the
United States. These young people represent Russia's future. We are
pleased they have the opportunity to see the United States for themselves,
study at our schools and universities, and engage in professional exchanges.
We have an obligation to protect America's borders and ensure that those
who intend to violate our laws do not enter the country. Since September
11, we have become more vigilant than ever in protecting national security.
It is an unfortunate reality that there are Russian citizens involved in
organized crime and other illegal activities. Some attempt to obtain visas
through illegal means; others apply for visas with the intent of living and
working illegally in the United States. The threat of international
terrorism is foremost in the minds of all of us. Applicants for
nonimmigrant visas need to show that their visit to the United States is
temporary and that they plan to return to Russia. Under U.S. law, the
burden of proof rests with the applicant to demonstrate that they are not
intending immigrants.
We are committed to providing the best service we can to all visa
applicants. We are making the process convenient and responsive. Through
our public outreach, we want our consular services to be transparent and
minimize misunderstandings. But we will not compromise U.S. security. Our
interview process and review of every visa application is an integral part
in protecting America's borders.
If you have questions about visas or any aspect of our consular work in
Russia, please contact us by email at consulmo@state.gov. We respond to
every inquiry, often within 48 hours. Callers from the United States can
dial toll free, 1-866-487-8472, to our telephone center with specific
questions about visa cases.
Sincerely,
James B. Warlick
Consul General
*******
#10
Yezhenedelny Zhurnal
No. 17
May 17, 2002
LIBERTY IS NOT ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE MARKET
Who is responsible for economic growth in Russia?
Author: Maksim Blant
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA IS CHARACTERIZED BY A
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WHAT MOST PEOPLE HOPED FOR FROM PUTIN IN 2000, THE
HOPES THAT WON HIM THE ELECTION - AND THE ECONOMIC STRATEGY THAT IS
NOW BEING CARRIED OUT BY AN APPOINTED GOVERNMENT. REFORMS ARE TOO
DEPENDENT ON PUTIN'S POPULARITY.
When Vladimir Putin's first came to power, consistency in
economic policy was discussed in the most general terms. The abrupt
rise in the popularity of Putin, a previously little-known leader from
the Federal Security Service (FSB), was propelled by the campaign in
Chechnya, the resolve to "kill them off in the toilets", and the hopes
of the majority of Russian citizens that the former FSB colonel would
be young and energetic enough to "put the country in order".
No one expected liberal reforms from Putin, since the rhetoric of
"putting in order", combined with his KGB past, gave no grounds for
this. That is why it was completely unexpected when Putin ordered
market economy specialists to develop an economic program. In late
1999, a private think-tank, the Center for Strategic Development was
established: headed by Herman Gref, Putin's old acquaintance from the
St. Petersburg administration.
At first, Putin hardly intervened in the process at all, limiting
his participation in development of the economic strategy to setting
the objectives: "It is necessary to stop lagging behind economically
developed nations, and to find our own path, which would enable Russia
to take a proper and honorable place among the most developed and
advanced states of the 21st century." Then, Putin was most unlikely to
face a choice between state administration and a free market. However,
it was very difficult to compete with the US liberal economy, not only
for countries with planned economic development, but also the
capitalist but state regulated countries of Europe and Japan.
According to Yevgeny Yasin, one of the developers of the governmental
program and scientific supervisor of the Supreme Economics School, the
modern post-industrial and information economy mostly progresses due
to creative forces, inventions, and enterprise of individuals. That is
why nations which offer more freedom and opportunities for individuals
are the most successful.
Supposedly, the program of the Center for Strategic Developments
was to be ready by the presidential elections; however, things were
delayed. Meanwhile, from the very beginning Putin actively started
distancing tycoons from the Kremlin, conciliating regional governors
and the Duma and forming the power hierarchy in the country, which won
all "statesmen" over to his side, as they still had nostalgia for the
times of the a super-power that besides, took care of them. The
methods the president used were far from liberal.
The personal membership of the government and Andrei Illarionov,
who took the position of the presidential aid for economic issues in
the presidential administration substituted for absence of the
economic program for supporters of liberal economics. Still, when a
long-term program for the next decade was published at the end of May
2000, the ring wing of the Russian society was pleasantly surprised
with its liberal orientation, unlike chair of the government Mikhail
Kasianov. Prime Minister Kasianov, appointed by Putin, did not support
the program not because he was against market reforms in the economy.
The matter was that the document also stipulated a rather radical
reform of state administrative system, reduction of the number of
bureaucrats, including the governmental ones. After the cabinet of
ministers "polished" the program, the "liberal shining" of the
strategy lost some of its luster. The document passed in the end of
June considerably differed from initial suggestions, which saved
Kasianov from significant reconstruction of the cabinet of ministers.
In other respects, recommendations of the center were reflected in the
long-term program, in accordance with which the country started its
life in the first decade of the new century.
De-bureaucratization of the economy is considered to be a most
important direction of the reforms: it can sharply improve business
climate in the country and thus, become an important factor in
economic growth. However, so far the efforts of reformers here have
not been a great success. There is every reason to believe that the
main result of attempts to strengthen the Russian state in its present
form has been an increase in the already huge army of officials, which
is not at all the same as making the machinery of state more
efficient. Eventually, these changes turned out to be incompatible
with the liberal economic reforms. In particular, a leader of the
Center for Strategic Developments and rector of the Supreme Economics
School Yaroslav Kuzminov wrote is his report entitled "Russian
economy: conditions for surviving, prerequisites for development",
"Trying to compensate for inefficiency of officials with their number,
the state has inflated its apparatus to the size that exceeds the
Soviet and party bureaucracy of the USSR altogether. This,
automatically, enlarged the sphere of interference of state officials
to economic and social processes, for every element of the state
apparatus claims for a particular area of activities." The report was
prepared in 1999, however, since then the situation has not changed in
the least. Meanwhile, the authors of the report warned, "chronic lack
of funding of state bodies forces ministries, departments, and their
subdivisions to search for additional financial sources. This, in
turn, leads them to fighting against other ministries and departments
for the revenue sources: license fees, distribution of budgetary
means, and rendering additional chargeable services. The mans can be
attracted openly, like in the Customs, the Interior Ministry, and the
Federal Tax Police Service. However, more often departments are unable
to do it openly, and they have to established affiliated state or even
private enterprises that provide the necessary services."
So it is no wonder all attempts of the government to de-
bureaucratize the society meet such a tough resistance from officials:
simplification of bureaucratic procedures will deprive "state
officials" of their income sources. At the same time, even the salary
of a minister is not enough to buy an apartment, an automobile, or to
dine out in a restaurant at least once a week. On the other hand, it
is necessary to decrease state spending in order to increase
competitiveness of the Russian economy. That is why it is good and
necessary to economize on wages of the state apparatus only by means
of its radical reduction, as officials must not be underpaid. Authors
of the report not only highlightened the issues, they also made
suggestions for resolving them, "It is necessary to consolidate and
simplify the state apparatus, centralize departments, eliminate the
spheres of double and triple responsibility. For instance, in the
sphere of economic regulating there should be only two ministries:
finance ministry and economy ministry.... It is also necessary to
liquidate the apparatus of the presidential administration, including
the institution of presidential representatives in regions. Our
country is not rich and it is unable to feed two branches of executive
power."
Currently, these measures seem to be extra-radical, however,
their realization could aid the government to resolve the issue of
reducing state spending and to make fighting against corruption more
grounded economically, as well as to simultaneously increase the
efficiency of the state apparatus.
So far, according to experts from the Center for Researching
institutional reforms of the Maryland State University, who also
presented their report at the second economic forum at the Supreme
Economics School, excessive strengthening of the power hierarchy is
disastrous for the economy. In their opinion, "the executive branch is
losing its monolithic nature, for its centers and functional
subdivisions become channels for political influence, and various
ministries and departments become involved in debates concerning
various reforms, including plans for reforming natural monopolies,
pension, banking reforms, instead of parliamentary factions." In other
words, industrial lobbyers are doing their best to object to reforms.
For instance, head of the State Pension Foundation, Mikhail Zurabov
managed to push his private competitors aside from "long-term money"
in the process of "development" of the pension reform - consequently,
in the near future there is to be no competition in administration
pensioners' money. Private pension foundations that the developers of
the reform supported so ardently, do not have equal conditions with
the state ones, and hardly have chances for surviving.
Thus, "conciliation" of the legislative power did not resolve the
issues. Now, instead of bargaining with the Duma, as Russians used to
watch over several past years of Yeltsin's presidency, today officials
waste the majority of their time and energy on multiple coordination
of the document in various departments.
The issue is that Vladimir Putin cannot entirely trust any of the
teams and give it carte blanche for carrying out an economic policy
which is clearly formulated and consistently presented to the public.
However, the president demands results. In his address to the
Federal Assembly he spoke of the insufficiently high growth rate and
the lack of ambitions in the government. It is hard to say if this
reproach is fair. For instance, Andrei Illarionov thinks the
activities of the Cabinet directed toward reduction of the real ruble
rate could also contribute to increasing the competitiveness of the
Russian economy, and consequently, to providing for its growth. The
advantages the Russian government had a result of the ruble
devaluation has already exhausted and, according to his logic, the
government is to bear the responsibility for slowing down of the
growth rate and for its inefficiency.
On the contrary, Yevgeny Yasin referred in his report on the
March 2001 conference in the Supreme Economics School to author of the
German "economic miracle" Ludwig Erhard and said, "The state should
create all conditions to enable free and responsible individual to
develop their capacities, but to make no guarantees that create
dependence." According to Yasin, the clear conclusion of this is that
the government cannot and must not be responsible for economic growth
- it is the matter of private companies. The role of the state should
be limited to support for private initiatives.
Admitting that strengthening of the state carries a certain risk
of returning to the authoritarian system, Yevgeny Yasin believes we
should not exaggerate the danger of deviating from democratic
principles and market reforms.
However, there is a danger in this that is becoming more and more
probable: leaning of the power on bureaucracy is likely to lead to
transition to "modernization from the top", when businesses, like
trade unions and other insinuations of the civil society, will be
turned into driving belts. Political power and bureaucracy must not be
equated, although the power tends to surrender to the influence of the
latter, while business is able to balance this influence. "In Russian
history, the bourgeoisie has several times been unsound because of its
crawling in front of the authorities and the fear to take the
responsibility for the game on itself. The result was 1917 October
socialist revolution. Hopefully, this will not happen again."
The present political situation in Russia is characterized by a
discrepancy between the hopes of the majority of the population
connected with Putin in 2000, which gave him a convincing victory at
the presidential elections, and the economic strategy that is being
carried out by an appointed government. This makes liberal reforms
greatly dependent on such an unreliable factor as the presidential
popularity rating; and, consequently, limits the possibility of
carrying out reforms which are unpopular but extremely effective and
necessary for further development.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
*******
#11
Novoye Vremya
May 5, 2002,
A TRAP FOR THE BUREAUCRACY
An interview with Irina Khakamada, deputy speaker of the Duma
Author: Lyubov Tsukanova
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
INTEGRATION INTO GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC STRUCTURES WILL FORCE
RUSSIA TO BECOME MORE TRANSPARENT AND EFFICIENT. PRESIDENT PUTIN WILL
BE ABLE TO COPE WITH ALL PRESENT DIFFICULTIES ONLY IF HE FORMS A TEAM
OF PEOPLE WHO ARE LOYAL NOT ONLY TO HIM PERSONALLY, BUT TO A SPECIFIC
IDEOLOGY.
Question: You have just returned from a London economic forum.
Has the attitude of European business leaders towards Russia changed?
Irina Khakamada: The attitude has changed. Two or three years ago
the forum discussed how much Russia meets the primary corporate
behavior standards, the standards of contact culture, and whether a
tax reform is possible. Now, they discuss more serious issues: within
what time Russia, that eventually restored from 1998 crisis, can
become a member of the World Trade Organization; to make its
legislation meet European standards; and become a civilized partner of
the European Community. The main topics were joining the World Trade
Organization, the tax reform, and bureaucratic barriers that still
exist in Russia. The latter issue has not been resolved at all. Forum
is economic, but many politicians raise serious political issues.
Question: The two most emotional issues are joining the World
Trade Organization and reform of the executive branch of power. Do you
think Russia will be able to overcome the resistance of monopolists on
the one hand and bureaucrats on the other?
Khakamada: I believe we will become a member of the World Trade
Organization in the next two or three years. The WTO is a sort of
instrument, with the help of which new transparent Russian companies
will be able to get access to European and world markets. It is very
important for us, as the raw material export component in its present
form cannot satisfy anyone. Secondly, there is a more ambitious plan
behind joining WTO and membership there. Perhaps that is why President
Putin insisted so much on this in his address. The plan is to develop
Russia in accordance with the market capitalization pattern.
If imagine Russia of the past decade of reforms as a large
corporation Russia, the main component in administration this
corporation has been that the government, key ministers, the
presidential administration, and tycoons have been fighting for
personal control of financial currents of this corporation,
distributing them so that they could benefit by it. Some did this to
collect money for elections - I mean the political elite, - others to
build a capital and transfer it by additional offshore channels to
solid foreign banks.
It is clear that on the one hand, it seems to be market, while on
the other hand, it is some Columbian market with no future. Today, a
part of the elite has consolidated - I mean the liberal part of the
government and those, who prepare and make decisions: Alexei Kudrin,
Herman Gref; the liberal part of the presidential administration,
Illarionov and others; the president and a part of the parliament,
right wing factions and the party of power - and concentrated on the
same goal: to make administration Russia transparent in all areas, and
thus increase the cost of shares of Russia corporation on the world
markets. It is a very ambitious project. And it is a serious
breakthrough to decide on such things after a whole decade of half-
reforms.
In my opinion, the main thing is that Russia was not mixed up
with China, which joined the World Trade Organization on special
terms. We should join this organization on the usual terms, including
transition periods that many countries have. It is a longer and more
difficult path, but from a strategic viewpoint, it is more
professional, since Russia is joining the World Trade Organization not
only to be able to enter new markets, but to also completely transform
the state management system, when business will finally separate from
the state and bureaucracy will be compact and will take its natural
niche. I think the administrative reform will be faster only if we
base it on the idea that Russia is becoming a part of the European
world and it will have to work by other standards. Then, bureaucracy
will have to give up.
I have the impression that within Russia the potential for
fighting against bureaucracy is gradually being exhausted, and we are
becoming a country ruled by a bureaucratic class. The middle class in
Russia is only developing, civil society is not developed at all, the
authorities put pressure on the media, while civil society is not
strong enough to influence the government into making the correct
decisions. The situation in Russia is paradoxical: the Kremlin is
putting pressure on democratic liberties within the country, but at
the same time it is willing to join the European community with an
efficient economy. It seems to me that in this paradoxical intrigue,
it is very important to support the authorities. There is a trap here:
if we want to enter the European community and meet European
standards, we are to remove the grounds for all stagnant and to create
a field where the middle class will grow not like grass through
concrete, but develop under normal conditions with a natural
atmosphere. Then, the elites will change.
When I was listening to the presidential address, on the one hand
I was delighted, as I have said for a long time: administrative reform
is a priority and the economic reform will not end until the
administrative reform is finished. There is a limit, which allows
economic reforms until a certain point, but then resistance starts
inside the bureaucracy itself for it distances from resources and
ceases being the ruling class in the society. I even suggested a more
radical idea to remove the government as an instrument and to
establish direct administration: then the president takes the
responsibility, appoints deputy prime ministers, who are a compact
bureaucratic apparatus and fulfill only the functions characteristic
of the state. These functions are stated in the address: public
services and protection of rights and interests. Then, the state will
finally leave the market. At present it is impossible to reach this
point with our government, with tremendous numbers of ministers, who
run huge financial currents, and have got in there so deep that they
are no longer independent agents.
On the other hand, I was alert when speaking of this priority
President Putin again turned to Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov asking
him to make suggestions. It seems to me it is time for the president
to make suggestions. He has energy, he has intention to move forward,
he is above all fights, and he must suggest. The civil society is
unable to make any suggestions - it is forming right now and it is
pressured by Putin's surrounding. If the president has such ambitious
plans, he should form a group of experts and to prepare a plan of
reforms. And it is historically na?ve to expect the government to self
reform, to voluntarily decrease, and to liquidate its own enormous
ministries with their huge personnel, to reject the tremendous
financial currents they control.
Perhaps the address is purely rhetorical and the main thing is to
make a signal. I hope that after all this, the president is to start
seriously working with a group of corresponding experts in order to
form a different administrative structure.
Question: What can the Duma do and what are the abilities of the
right wing factions?
Khakamada: We can amend the law on state service. However,
reduction of ministries and the governmental apparatus is not our
prerogative. We are unable to remove the excessive state functions.
The major issue of the administrative reform is inside the executive
branch of power.
Question: There is a standpoint, according to which the executive
branch of power is inefficient because there are so many power centers
and the responsibility is diffuse....
Khakamada: I argued with Boris Berezovsky at the forum. He said
that in Russia the power is concentrated in the hands of one person. I
disagree with him: if the power concentrated in one hand, we would
have someone to get an account from. While currently, there are many
complaints that Putin makes one decision and the government transforms
it into an entirely opposite thing. It is well known that there are
disagreements between the economic department of the presidential
administration, in particular, presidential aid for economic issues
Andrei Illarionov and the government. Here is an example of double
influence. The fact that Mikhail Kasianov is not a public politician
and makes no claims means nothing, for as the government controls huge
financial currents makes it a power by definition. Naturally, as the
head of the state is very busy, he is physically unable to control all
the paper that move between various layers of the power.
Besides, there is a layer of regional governors, who have
financial means of their own, their own sabotage or support measures,
and it is very noticeably even in the argument for distribution the
authorities between the federal center and regions. Putin does not
concentrate the power in his hands, that is why now and then he has to
make concessions: first he was against three gubernatorial terms, then
he had to accept this. First, the Kremlin intended to rapidly pass the
law in accordance with which regional legislative bodies were to be
elected by proportional system. However, governors objected to this,
and now another compromise is to take place.... Putin has to take
regional governors into consideration, he is afraid of their
opposition because they have sufficient resources and besides, so far
the Kremlin usually lose at regional elections.
Now about security ministries: they are involved in property
redistribution and at present they have concentrated a conservative
layer of their own, which influences politics through property and
funds. By the way, this layer is opposed to drawing closer to the
United States and joining NATO; it does not support the military
reforms. I can understand the position of the president, who is
waiting for the military to support the reform - however, he is
waiting in vain. While, if everything concentrated in president's
hands, I think we would hear in his address about the terms of army
reduction, the next recruitment, and what ministries are to preserve.
However, he was unable to say all this, as there are different sources
of power that influence the terms and content of his decisions.
It is a very hard issue how to realize all the conditions when
there are so many discrepancies inside the political elite.
We can recall how reforms were carried out in post-war Japan, in
France under de Gaulle, and Roosevelt's reforms. In each case, they
were effective only because the government as a whole accepted a
certain model and a clear ideology of how to achieve the goal. We do
not have this.
For instance, the institution of presidential envoys. What can be
done with it? Obviously, it was an attempt to concentrate power in
Putin's hands, to understand what is going on in regions and to
control at least federal financial currents. However, to my mind, so
far the idea is failing, due to absence of constitutional authorities
for presidential envoys, unlike regional governors; moreover they have
no authorities that are fixed by a federal law.
The main result presidential envoys were expected from is precise
and rigorous implementation of federal law in regions. Of course, at
present regional legislation has been brought in conformity with the
federal one. However, I believe governors did this because they are
afraid of Putin not of his envoys. As for the rest.... The
arbitrariness is regions is the same: there are the same
administrative barriers, same misappropriation and stealth of regional
and federal properties; same selling out land resources. It seems
every governor is at helm for the rest of his life. In fact, every
separate region resembles a small emirate: businesses have to conclude
agreements with the sheikh, who can break it at any moment. At the
same time, the federal contract culture does not exist here at all:
agreements, both oral and written, are often broken. In Russia this
culture has been forfeited long ago and only law, standards, and their
precise fulfillment can save us.
Question: Do you think Putin will be able to cope with all this?
Khakamada: I think he will only if he really wants to form a team
of people, who are loyal and faithful not only to him personally, but
to some way, values, ideology, and who are professionally adopted to
pass this way. If he dares and forms such a team, it will not matter
where it will be; I believe it is not even necessary to make such
people officials, for as soon as they become officials they start
following corporate culture. That is what Margaret Thatcher, Ronald
Reagan and others did - they leaned on such a team, made decisions,
evaluated all possible consequences, and after that lobbied laws in
the parliament and forced the executive branch of power, reduced and
reformed, to precisely observe these laws.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
********
#12
Moscow Times
May 14, 2002
Hardly Painting Town Red
By Boris Kagarlitsky
Marching through streets and squares as part of the ritual May demonstrations
was a return to business as usual for the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation. The party lost the lobbying muscle needed to raise money when it
lost control of numerous State Duma committees. After all, no one in Russia
gives money to politicians for merely political reasons; specific requests
are always involved. Party functionaries are obviously concerned about their
financial future. But after the recent changing of the guard in the Duma, the
party faces a much more serious problem.
The party leadership has announced that it will now adopt a policy of
uncompromising opposition. But the Communists have been in opposition since
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov
understands full well that he has to do something to express the party's
outrage and to show the Kremlin that it's ready to fight; but fight with
whom, and for what?
In the run-up to the May holidays the Communist leadership came up with what
they considered a brilliant strategy. They would call for the government to
step down.
Where was the brilliance in this decision? Everyone in the corridors of power
knows that President Vladimir Putin has fallen out with Prime Minister
Mikhail Kasyanov. It was clear from the start that Putin appointed Kasyanov
with the intention of replacing him with a member of the St. Petersburg team
at the first opportunity. But here's the problem: In two years the "Northern
Alliance" hasn't managed to find a single politician in its ranks who could
be entrusted with the job. The president will only tolerate a total nonentity
as his sidekick because that's the only way he can stand out. There is no one
among the government's faceless functionaries who can be trusted with any
measure of independence without running the risk that the government would
immediately fall apart. And so Putin lives with Kasyanov.
The prime minister, for his part, has made himself at home in the White
House, much like Viktor Chernomyrdin, another "temporary" figure who ended up
serving for more than six years.
In this context it's possible to appreciate the refinement of Zyuganov's
maneuver. He wants to express his displeasure to the president. But when it
comes to action, he offers the president his services in the Kremlin's
intrigues against the prime minister. This sort of "opposition" is really no
less than firm loyalty.
At the same time, Zyuganov, out of old bureaucratic habit, has gotten a
little ahead of events. His offer will be appreciated, of course, but not
likely accepted. Rumors of Kasyanov's ouster have dogged his government from
the day it was formed, and this could continue for a long while yet. Before
he gets rid of the prime minister, Putin will at least have to come up with a
replacement and an excuse to sack him. At this point he has neither. And for
that reason Zyuganov can't really do anything to help.
The Kremlin will probably take Zyuganov's ploy as a sign of weakness and put
the screws on the Communist Party. It has two ways of doing so: cozying up to
the governors and falsifying election results. It has been made clear to the
"red" governors that the Kremlin will overlook their ideological coloring if
they can prove that they will put the president above party affiliation. And
regional Communist leaders will simply not be allowed to prevail at the polls.
The main resource left to the Communist Party after its drubbing in the Duma
is its ability to win regional elections and then divvy up jobs and finances
in the "red" regions. If the party is deprived of this possibility it will
lose the support of many owners of mid-sized provincial businesses and lose
its appeal for budding careerists. And Zyuganov relies on these very people
above all.
The main groups that make up the Communist Party are not the best of friends
to begin with. You have the anti-Semites from the St. Petersburg
organization; Alexander Kuvayev, the radical leader of Moscow's Communists;
the wary social democrat Yury Maslyukov; and Gennady Seleznyov, the grandee
who serves as speaker of the Duma. With every passing day they have less
reason to remain within a single party.
If it becomes obvious that the Communist Party is doomed, its various
constituencies will simply go their own way. But if Kremlin leaders believe
that such a dissolution would spell the end of the Communist movement in this
country, they are mistaken. The lion's share of current Communist Party
voters will continue to consider themselves Communists, with or without
Zyuganov.
Boris Kagarlitsky is a Moscow-based sociologist.
********
#13
Baltimore Sun
May 13, 2002
Editorial
Russia and the war
STUDDED WITH screws and ball bearings, the Victory Day bomb that obliterated
a marine band in the southern Russian republic of Dagestan was noteworthy for
the level of anguish it caused but not for the anguish itself. Anguish isn't
news in that part of the world. Thursday's explosion was just another
wrenching moment in the bitter story of the Caucasus.
The remote-controlled bomb killed 41 in all, at least 13 of them children who
had turned out to watch a parade celebrating a long-ago triumph of Russian
arms, the vanquishing of Nazi Germany. For the Russians, World War II lasted
just a month shy of four years; the consecutive Chechen wars have already
been going on for more than seven, with no end in sight.
Throughout the Caucasus, trouble and sorrow reign. Chechens, in fact, may not
have been involved in the Dagestan atrocity. Authorities said they believe a
local Islamic extremist was behind it. But Dagestan borders on Chechnya, and
there's a free flow of murder and havoc in the region. Last month, a bomb
went off at an outdoor market in the city of Vladikavkaz, in nearby North
Ossetia; eight died there.
The Russians argue that this is one front in the war on terrorism, and
however dispiriting that thought may be, of course they're right. A bomb at a
holiday parade is a pure act of terror. But there's a larger point as well,
which is that the war on terrorism is not a unified assault by the
right-thinking nations of the world against the forces of evil, arrayed in a
worldwide alliance. It's a diverse and difficult war, sometimes ugly,
sometimes stupid, generally brutal. It's global and local at the same time,
and it didn't begin on Sept. 11. It's mired, more often than not, in cruel
and vengeful history -- in the Middle East, in Kashmir, and in the Caucasus.
President Vladimir Putin rose to power in Russia when the Chechen war
re-ignited in 1999. A group of half-renegades from Chechnya tried to launch a
rebellion in Dagestan, and Moscow's response was to put Chechnya in a vise
and start cranking it shut. Russian forces destroyed most of what they found,
stole the rest, killed tens of thousands. Mr. Putin's popularity soared among
Russians, who longed for security and despised the Caucasian criminals and
troublemakers who defied them.
The war served Mr. Putin's purpose, but now the war won't let him go. Russia
can't afford to lose it, but in a strange way can't afford to win it, either.
Complete victory would require military resources that simply aren't there,
and a level of devastation that would probably be beyond even Russian
imagining. Complete victory at this point would mean killing every enemy
Russia has created. A negotiated settlement would raise cries of betrayal
from the armed forces -- and who would negotiate with terrorists?
There's the catch. The Chechens didn't use to be terrorists. They were
fighting for the freedom of their republic. But a combination of Russian
tactics and Islamic revival and bad leadership among the Chechens changed the
character of the war. The Chechens reached out and found al-Qaida waiting for
them. Today it is a war where ideas of freedom and jihad, murder and paradise
are inextricably entwined.
And if Russia can't win it or lose it, what's to be expected? Death without
end. War made permanent. It would be a cautionary lesson to others, if it
weren't so connected to the rest of the world.
This is one face of the global struggle. On one level it is a clash between
deadly Islamic extremism and a pitiless Russian state, and on another it's a
street corner in Dagestan, where the brass instruments of a band lie strewn
across the street, among the bodies of children who thought to cheer a
parade.
*******
#14
Transitions Online
www.tol.cz
Our Take: How To Tread on Vipers
The first step for Russia is to recognize who they are.
Two weeks after flower sellers were killed in the southern Russian city
of Vladikavkaz , 42 Red Army veterans, children, and marching band
members have been killed and 130 others injured in Dagestan. Was this a
show of strength by Islamists following the killing of Chechnya's most
ruthless and fearsome warlord ? Was it revenge for the arrest of a more
minor Dagestani warmonger, as the Dagestani police believe? Could it
conceivably be the work of someone in the Russian establishment, as a
former KGB higher-up has suggested ? Could it have been carried out by
someone disaffected by the gaping chasm between Dagestan's rich and
poor, or frustrated by what had seemed to be the increasingly strong
position of the republic's leaders? Typically, to outsiders these seem
mad reasons for such indiscriminate mayhem, but plausible to insiders.
As usual, Chechen links are suspected. On this occasion, the argument
seems plausible to an outsider. What better day than Victory Day for
radical Islamist Chechen fighters to show that they remain undefeated,
despite the death of warlord Khattab? And, despite the deaths of
children, the principal target of the attack--a military band--suggests
a military message on Russia's most important day of military symbolism.
In any case, many Chechen civilians and foreign hostages could testify
to the extremists' disregard for civilian lives.
But no Chechen group has claimed responsibility. If Khattab's followers
wanted to send a message, there seems little reason for them not to have
put their signatures on it. Perhaps, then, the intent was simply terror:
faceless men with no name or known creed intent on sowing confusion and
fear.
The first task of the authorities must surely be to provide some
clarification. They must prove, for a change, that the alacrity of the
Dagestani police in seizing suspects was more than the usual sudden and
unconvincing roundup of the usual suspects.
The second task is to fashion a coherent policy toward terrorism and
Chechnya, but the early signs are not convincing. Perhaps President
Vladimir Putin's speechwriters were simply reaching for the most
convenient simile on Victory Day, but surely they could have done better
than to tell the people of the Caucasus that terrorists would be treated
as Nazis. Too many people in the region know what that meant in World
War II: the shunting of whole peoples--Chechens included--to the steppes
for alleged collaboration with the Germans. Whatever the reasoning, this
was unfortunately in keeping with Putin's usual verbal extremism in all
matters relating to the Chechens.
Perhaps strong actions will follow the strong words. As Putin promised:
"During [World War II], there was a slogan, 'Tread on the viper.' And it
was destroyed. Difficult as the tasks facing us today are, they will be
carried out." That may be good rhetoric to Russian ears, but the
insensitive application of force and the creation of an ever more
authoritarian regime would surely make for bad politics in Dagestan,
known as a "mountain of languages" and the most complex mosaic of
peoples in the northern Caucasus.
And if Chechens are deemed to be the "vipers," rather than keeping to
Russia's current strong-arm approach--which has frequently meant rape,
torture, and death for Chechens--Putin should be a strong politician and
follow the example of the late General Aleksandr Lebed by pursuing
peace in Chechnya.
Pursuing peace now, after a terrorist attack, might seem to be craven
weakness. But there is no good time, and delay merely promises further
destabilization of the region. Secondly, given that progress in this war
comes in geological time, the chances of an initiative coming soon after
this attack are remote. Thirdly, no one can argue that Russia has been
weak in its response to alleged Chechen terrorism. And, most important,
peace should of course be pursued with those that want peace. Doing so
would address Putin's fundamental problem regarding Chechnya--his
failure to distinguish between the Chechens' national cause and the
cause of extreme Islamist fighters and users of terror among them.
The first step should surely be to recognize Aslan Maskhadov for what he
is: the president of Chechnya, elected in a 1997 vote accepted by Russia
and rated by international observers as free and fair. Of course,
Maskhadov's peacetime rule between 1996 and 1999 was not stable or
peaceful. But to demand peace and stability before negotiations can
start or expect it afterwards would be unrealistic given the
brutalization, destruction, and radicalization of Chechen society in the
two Chechen wars and--before that--the communists' failure to create any
kind of Chechen nomenklatura that would have been capable of exerting
greater control after 1991.
Coming to terms with a moderate rebel leader such as Maskhodov seems to
be Russia's best option. The Chechens are unlikely ever to unite behind
the pro-Moscow Chechen administration. The Russian military appears
unable to win this war (and profiteers are merely feeding the Chechen
war effort). And, given the ties between extremists in Chechnya and
extreme Islamist movements, if things stay as they are, the chances for
an Afghan scenario will grow, with war and chronic instability
encouraging radical Islamic fundamentalism. With some kind of peace,
Russians and moderate Chechens could struggle against at least one
common enemy--militant Islam.
The shame is that Putin appears to view the more moderate Chechen
leaders as if they cannot be negotiated with, as if they were Hitler (or
at least Hitler after 1939). The preconditions for talks finally
presented to Maskhadov in November 2001 equated to total surrender.
Putin needs to purge his thinking--and not just his language--of World
War II rhetoric and imagery. This is not a war where total surrender is
the only option.
******
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