Johnson's Russia List
#6240
14 May 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review.
2. AFP: Bush brushes up his Dostoevski ahead of Russian summit: Moscow.
3. Reuters: US, Russia agree on treaty to cut nuclear warheads.
4. AP: Putin Hails Nuclear Deal With U.S.
5. RIA Novosti: RUSSIA-USA: START READY TO SIGN, RUSSIA CLINGS TO WARHEAD
STOCKPILING DIFFERENCES.
6. WHITE HOUSE BACKGROUND BRIEFING RE: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY.
7. BBC Monitoring: Russian foreign minister reviews pre-summit relations
with USA.]
*******
#1
ORT Review
www.ortv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu)
Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and
Policy at Boston University
HEADLINES,
Monday, May 13, 2002
- An extraordinary session of the Daghestani State Council was held
today.
Last Thursday's terrorist act in Kaspiysk was discussed. The mayor of
Kaspiysk submitted his resignation, which was not accepted.
- Daghestani special service representatives reported that they were
aware
that a terrorist act was being prepared, but expected it in Makhachkala,
the capital of the republic. Security was increased in Makhachkala,
which thwarted the original plans of the fighters.
- Daghestani authorities are planning to ask the Russian president to
cancel the moratorium on the death penalty so that proper punishment can
be dealt to the terrorists.
- Shipments of humanitarian aid to Kaspiysk continue.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh President Nursultan
Nazarbayev signed an agreement delimiting the basin of the northern part
of the Caspian Sea (50:50).
- The Russian-German youth forum took place in Moscow. More students --
over 3.5 million -- are learning German as a foreign language in Russia
than in any other country. About 180,000 German students are learning
Russian.
- The trial of 17 terrorists who seized power in Karabdino-Balkiria and
Karachaevo-Cherkessia, wanting to create an Islamic state in the
Northern
Caucasus, are on trial in Pyatigorsk. The trial is a closed one.
- President Putin met with Moldavian President Vladimir Voronin. The
parliaments of the two nations recently ratified the Agreement on
Friendship and Cooperation. Today, the presidents exchanged
ratification certificates.
- Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Mamedov met with US Undersecretary of
State John Bolton to discuss strategic security issues. After the
meeting
they announced that there has been significant progress in the positions
of the two nations on an agreement on the reduction of strategic
offensive weapons.
- Commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Colonel General
Gennady Troshev announced that new, irrefutable information is available
on the death of Chechen field commander Shamil Basaev.
- In the Oktyabrsk region of Grozny, at least two OMON policemen died
when the military vehicle they were traveling in hit a landmine. An
investigation has been initiated.
- The leaders of the Eurasian Economic Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) met in Moscow for a summit. Nineteen
questions concerning economic ties among the countries were on the
agenda.
- A military truck carrying twenty soldiers overturned on the
Volgograd-Syzyn' highway. Fifteen of the soldiers have been
hospitalized.
The driver of the vehicle is suspected to be at fault.
- Search-and-rescue efforts in Baikanur have been suspended due to
weather
conditions. The roof of an assembly-and-testing complex collapsed
yesterday, trapping up to eight people. Six bodies have been found so
far.
- Gubernatorial elections in Krasnoyarsk Krai will be held on September
8th.
- The Black Sea Fleet celebrates its 219th anniversary today. The
Russian Navy is 300 years old.
- Central Electoral Commission Chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov announced
that the next presidential elections will be held in March of 2004, and
the next State Duma elections will be held in December of 2003.
*******
#2
Bush brushes up his Dostoevski ahead of Russian summit: Moscow
AFP
May 14, 2002
US President George W. Bush is taking a crash course in the novels of
Fyodor Dostoevski, one of Russia's greatest writers, "to soak up the mood
of Saint Petersburg" before he heads to Russia for a summit with President
Vladimir Putin, a top Russian minister was quoted as saying.
Bush "is looking forward with impatience to coming to Russia" for the May
23-26 summit in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov said in an interview published in the daily Vremya Novostei.
"He told me that he was reading Dostoevski specially in order to soak up
the mood of Saint Petersburg," Ivanov said.
"This proves what enormous potential our culture has," Ivanov said, adding
that it was one of his ministry aims to promote Russia's rich cultural
heritage abroad.
In addition to discussing the works of Dostoevski with Putin, who is a
native of Saint Petersburg like the 19th-century writer himself, Bush is
due at the summit to sign a major disarmament accord slashing nuclear
arsenals.
*******
#3
US, Russia agree on treaty to cut nuclear warheads
By Randall Mikkelsen
WASHINGTON, May 13 (Reuters) - U.S. President George W. Bush said on Monday
he would sign a treaty with Russia to remove two-thirds of long-range nuclear
warheads from missiles, bombers and submarines and "liquidate the legacy of
the Cold War."
Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed the deal, to be signed next week in
Moscow. It gives Moscow a binding treaty politically important to Putin, and
gives Washington flexibility to hold weapons in storage rather than dismantle
them and withdraw from the pact on short notice.
"What you have here is a deal in which Russia got a treaty and we got
everything else," said Brookings Institution arms control analyst Ivo
Daalder. The treaty must be ratified by the U.S. Senate and Russian
parliament.
Bush announced the deal in a surprise statement at the White House and said
he would sign the treaty at a Moscow summit with Putin, set for May 24.
"This treaty will liquidate the legacy of the Cold War," Bush said. "It will
make the world more peaceful and put behind us the Cold War once and for all."
The two sides are separately addressing U.S. aims to deploy a missile defense
system, as part of an outline on a new strategic relationship being prepared
for the Moscow summit.
Under the new arms treaty -- unusually slim at three pages -- the world's
biggest nuclear powers are to cut their deployed strategic nuclear warheads
by the year 2012 to 1,700-2,200 from current levels of about 5,000 to 6,000.
The pact "moves beyond" the 1993 START 2 arms treaty that mandates ceilings
of 3,000 to 3,500 warheads, a senior U.S. official said.
Compliance would be based on verification terms of the 1991 START 1 arms
deal, requiring steps such as peering into submarine launchers and counting
warheads. A new commission would seek additional measures, he said.
PUTIN 'SATISFIED'
Either side could pull out of the treaty on three months' notice -- half the
length of earlier agreements.
"The treaty is strategically virtually meaningless ... given the fact that
this administration has shown no compunction about withdrawing from
treaties," Daalder said.
He cited Bush's notification last December of plans to quit the 1972 Anti
Ballistic Missile treaty with Russia by June to deploy a missile defense
system.
But the deal also demonstrates that Russian objections to a missile defense
system would not block arms control progress, analysts and administration
officials said.
Putin had denounced the missile defense plans as a "mistake," and critics had
said there could be no arms deal while Washington pursued missile defense.
"We are satisfied with our joint work," Putin told reporters in Moscow on
Monday.
Earlier, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called the pending deal not
"overly ambitious" but nonetheless important.
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said the treaty lets each side decide
how to cut their weapons, either by dismantling them, placing them in
storage, or keeping them as "spares or for test purposes."
"The treaty does not tell either side what they have to do with those
warheads," he said.
Russia, concerned that stored weapons could be redeployed, had wanted them
eliminated. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said the storage terms were
in line with earlier arms control deals and not a sign of U.S. interest in
future redeployments.
"These are real reductions," a U.S. official said.
Another U.S. official said the agreement allows Washington to deal with "an
uncertain security environment in the future," but one in which Russia is not
an enemy.
The agreement was reached on Monday morning by U.S. and Russian negotiators
in Moscow, U.S. National Security Council spokesman Sean McCormack said.
BIPARTISAN SUPPORT SEEN
U.S. Sen. Joseph Biden, a Delaware Democrat and chairman of the Senate
foreign relations committee, said in a written statement he hoped to begin
ratification hearings this summer. The panel would study compliance and
enforcement issues and also whether weapons could be brought back into use.
"Eliminating these weapons of mass destruction would make Americans more
secure and the world a safer place," Biden said. He welcomed the decision to
agree to a formal treaty, subject to a two-thirds Senate vote. "It is rare
that a treaty commitment, once made, is reversed," he said.
The Senate rejected the last arms treaty it considered, a comprehensive
nuclear test ban treaty that failed to win the needed two-thirds vote in 1999.
The senior administration official was optimistic the U.S. Senate would
ratify the deal. "I have not taken any soundings. But these are the kinds of
reductions that have generally been supported in the past on a bipartisan
basis," he said.
Shortly after Bush took office in January 2001 he said he would make arms
cuts unilaterally if necessary and made clear he would move beyond the ABM
treaty's limitations to deploy a missile defense system regardless of
Russia's position.
He nevertheless struck up a warm personal relationship with Putin, and the
two leaders continued talks on a new strategic relationship in Europe and at
Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas. Russia has muted its criticism of the
missile defense plans.
"I look forward to going to Moscow to sign this treaty. It will be the
culmination of a lot of months of hard work and a relationship built on
mutual trust that I have established with President Putin," Bush said.
Arms control expert Robert Einhorn of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies said the deal undercuts critics of missile defense, who
have said such a system could set off a new arms race with Russia.
The Union of Concerned Scientists on Monday released a letter signed by two
Nobel laureates and other scientists urging Bush to make even faster arms
cuts and to dismantle all undeployed warheads to render them unusable.
*******
#4
Putin Hails Nuclear Deal With U.S.
May 13, 2002
By ERIC ENGLEMAN
MOSCOW (AP) - President Vladimir Putin praised a deal announced Monday for
deep cuts in U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads, but independent observers
voiced skepticism the pact would produce meaningful arms control.
President Bush announced the long-sought agreement in Washington, and the two
leaders will sign it during their Russian summit next week.
``We are satisfied with the joint work,'' Putin said shortly after learning
the draft treaty was complete. ``Without the interested, active position of
the American administration and the attention of President Bush, it would
have been difficult to reach such agreements.''
Yet, retired Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin, a former top arms control
negotiator, said Washington's willingness to sign a treaty did not mean the
agreement would last.
``The United States has shown how it regards treaties,'' Dvorkin said,
referring to the Bush administration's decision to pull out of the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to pursue an anti-missile defense shield. That
move was harshly criticized by many in the Russian leadership.
To make certain the cuts would live beyond the terms of Putin and Bush,
Moscow had insisted on codifying the cuts, rather than accepting American
president's offer of a verbal agreement.
Announcing the deal after the latest round of negotiations between U.S.
Undersecretary of State John Bolton and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Georgy Mamedov in Moscow, Bush said it would ``liquidate the legacy of the
Cold War.''
The accord will require each country to cut its nuclear arsenal to 1,700 to
2,200 warheads from the 6,000 now allowed by the START-I treaty.
Bush and Putin agreed to those levels last fall, but Washington's initial
reluctance to sign a formal deal and Russia's objections to U.S. plans to
store nuclear warheads, rather than destroy them, had held up final agreement.
Meeting one of Putin's demands, the document to be signed during the May
23-26 summit will be a full-fledged treaty and require ratification by the
U.S. Senate and Russia's parliament.
Washington appeared to get its way on the issue of storing warheads taken out
of service.
A senior U.S. administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity,
said that under the accord each nation will have authority under the treaty
to decide how to reduce its arsenal.
The official said some U.S. weapons will be destroyed, some put in ``deep
storage'' and others will be stored but kept as ``operational spares.''
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told reporters that Russia had not dropped its
objections to the idea of stockpiling warheads, but did not elaborate.
One Russian nuclear arms specialist said the treaty left too much room for
interpretation.
``Both sides will do what they wanted to do, even without the agreement,''
said Pavel Podvig, a researcher at the Center for Arms Control in Moscow.
He said the new accord covers only loosely defined ``operationally deployed''
warheads.
``Without the definition of what kind of warheads they are talking about, it
will be meaningless,'' he said.
Earlier Monday, Russian negotiator Mamedov said the agreement includes a
clause allowing either party to pull out ``in case of a threat to national
interests.''
*******
#5
RUSSIA-USA: START READY TO SIGN, RUSSIA CLINGS TO WARHEAD STOCKPILING
DIFFERENCES
MOSCOW, May 13. /RIA Novosti/ - A draft Russo-US treaty to reduce strategic
offensive arsenals has been coordinated--but that does not mean that Russia
has buried its objections to discarded warhead stockpiling, Sergei Ivanov,
Defence Minister, said to a news conference which summed up a session of
Collective Security Treaty countries' Defence and Foreign ministers.
START talks finished at an expert level in Moscow today, and their
achievements were reported to President Vladimir Putin, added Igor Ivanov,
Foreign Minister.
A START draft is, on the whole, ready to be signed, he said.
As Igor Ivanov meets with Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, in Iceland's
Reykjavik tomorrow, they will analyse proceedings round other documents to
be offered to the Russian and US Presidents at an upcoming Moscow summit.
After the summiteers sign the documents, the Foreign and Defence ministers
will offer to the media detailed information about their content and impact
on Russia, US and global security, promised Igor Ivanov.
******
#6
WHITE HOUSE BACKGROUND BRIEFING RE: STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY
ATTRIBUTALBE TO A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE
BRIEFING ROOM, WASHINGTON, D.C. TIME: 10:44 A.M. EDT DATE: MONDAY, MAY 13,
2002
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright (c) 2002 by Federal News Service, Inc.
[for personal use only]
STAFF: Good morning, everybody. We have a senior administration
official here this morning to talk a little bit about the president's
announcement this morning with regard to strategic arms reductions and a
treaty with the Russians.
Without further ado, a senior administration official.
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Thanks, Sean (sp). As you know, during the
campaign the president made clear that he was interested in reducing the
strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both the United States and the
Russians. After a lot of work, last year, on November 13th, in the context
of the Washington-Crawford summit, the president announced his decision that
the United States would reduce our nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200
operationally deployed nuclear warheads. President Putin, at that time, made
comments which indicated that he supported this approach, and a month later,
President Putin announced that Russia would also make similar reductions.
As the president announced this morning, negotiating teams from the two
sides have agreed on the terms of a treaty which reduces strategic nuclear
arsenals on both sides to 1,700 to 2,200 weapons over the next 10 years.
The treaty requires that by the end of 2012, each side will have between
1,700 and 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons.
The president has said all along that he wanted a new agreement to
reflect our new relationship with Russia. Instead of a negotiation which
took multiple years and consumed multiple forests worth of paper, what we
have is a negotiation which lasted essentially five to six months, has
produced a treaty which, when fully prepared, will be about three pages
long.
Under this treaty, both sides can make reductions in their own way,
according to what serves their own best interests.
Each side will reduce according to its own plans and will determine
for itself the composition of its strategic forces. And this will result,
as we've pointed out, in a cut of about two-thirds in the U.S. and Russian
operationally deployed forces.
Under this treaty, the United States will retain the flexibility we
require for an uncertain security environment in the future, as set forth in
the Defense Department's Nuclear Posture Review. And we would point out
that the treaty also proves, as the president has said in the past, that we
can have effective missile defenses and also agree with the Russians on
further offensive nuclear reductions.
With that, I'd be happy to take your questions.
Q How many of these weapons will be decommissioned, and how
many will actually be dismantled?
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell you how many, because
the Defense Department will be -- is still working on that. But some of the
weapons will be dismantled. Some of the weapons will be placed in deep
storage. Some of them will be stored as operational spares.
Q What about this idea that Russia has said in the past -- that
decommissioning a weapon isn't destroying it, and it's not really reducing
your arsenal? Have you reached some sort of an agreement with that, or do
you still agree to disagree on that point?
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have agreed, as I said, that some
warheads will be dismantled and some warheads will be stored. Now if you go
back and look at the history of arms control agreements -- for example,
START II -- each side would've taken its reductions largely in the form of
what's called downloading or removal of warheads from operational missiles
and having those warheads placed in storage. So this is not a new
departure. It is not virtual arms control. If START II was the
breakthrough which is was announced to be -- and it was -- we're following
the same kinds of rules.
Q But has the United States offered Russia more access -- a
more transparent build-down process? I've read some (people saying ?) a
day-to-day availability to the Russians of information about U.S. nuclear
arsenal.
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Each side will be working to provide
the other with more transparency as a baseline -- as a baseline. The
rules -- the procedures that were created under START I, which require
on-site inspection, counting of warheads and actually going to operational
bases and looking in missile silos or submarine tubes will apply. And the
sides are going to continue discussions on looking at further ways to
enhance transparency.
Q Are any of those ways specified in the four corners of the --
or in the treaty itself?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No. No. No, they are not. But a
bilateral implementation commission will be created, and that commission
will pursue enhancing transparency and predictability.
Q Will the numbers 1,700 and 2,200 be in the three-page treaty?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes, they will.
Q They will be arranged --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes, they will; 1,700 to 2,200 will be in the
treaty.
Q So we could choose to go to 1,700 and the Russians could
choose to go to 2,200 and that would be legal under this?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That would be legal under the treaty.
Yes, sir?
Q Is there a side understanding on missile defense or that sort
of --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, there is no side understanding on missile
defense. This is --
Q And will those issues -- will missile defense issues continue
to be discussed, or how are they dealt with?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: All issues are discussed. One of the -- one
of the topics, which a colleague of mine could to talk to you about, if Sean
(sp) would arrange it, if it's necessary, is that in an additional agreement
that's being prepared for this summit, which is a broad statement of
principles, there is language which talks about enhanced cooperation in many
areas, to include enhanced cooperation in missile defense activities.
But this agreement, this agreement is solely restricted to reducing
strategic nuclear arsenals.
Yes, ma'am?
Q What are the numbers that both countries have at this point?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Today each side has about 5,000 to 6,000 operationally
deployed nuclear weapons.
Q I thought it was 7,000 for the U.S. That's not right?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Five thousand to 6,000.
Q On the bilateral implementation commission, how much time do
they have, and do we know who's going to be on this thing?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, it hasn't been set up yet.
Q All right. So, but do they have any timetable? They've got
10 years here, so when does -- how much time does the implementation
commission have --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I would presume that the implementation
commission would begin meeting as soon as the treaty enters into force.
Q And do you know how long the Defense Department will take to
review and make a decision about many of these weapons would be dismantled
or stored or --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No. I think it's going to be -- I think it's
going to be -- I mean, first, I would defer that question to the Department
of Defense. But I think what they will say to you is it is going to be a
rolling process as they evaluate the security requirements we have and the
health of the warheads that are in our stockpile. Because we don't build
any new warheads, the warheads that we take off serve as, first and
foremost, a set of operational spares. Through the Department of Energy and
Department of Defense's Stockpile Steward Program, we learn more things
every day about how the warheads are aging. So that will also condition
what they will decide as far as dismantling. The third --
Q On that one --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: If I might, just let me -- the third factor
is that dismantlement is something done by the Department of Energy, and
over the last 10 years the DOE facilities, the infrastructure, which do the
dismantlement work, degraded a fair amount because of budget cuts.
We are building that back up. But our ability to dismantle warheads
is not something which is particularly strong at this point.
Q But on that point, what happens in this process for this
implementation commission to resolve disputes that come up along the way
about storage versus dismantling of the weapons --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That's not -- again, this is not going to be
dispute. Each side will structure its forces in its own way. Each side
will take its reductions, as I said, through a combination of retirements,
of eliminations and of storage.
But that's not going to be the focus of the implementation
commission. The focus of the implementation commission will be to provide
transparency into which -- in what each side is doing, so that each side is
confident that the reductions in fact are occurring over time.
And unlike other agreements, where there used to be midpoints --
you know, the START agreements had midpoints to reach certain warhead levels
-- this agreement provides for an endpoint. So the sides will need to
provide each other with a fair amount of information, as that this submarine
is being retired; this submarine's going into overhaul, it's not going to
count; we're going to be taking these missiles out according to this
schedule.
Q But are the U.S. and Russia right now agreed upon a
definition for a reduction?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes.
Q And therefore, as long as that reduction is taking place,
each side can do what it pleases with regard to retirement of weapons?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That is exactly right.
Q When is the treaty expected to come into force? And what --
Q And ratification --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: As soon as it's ratified by the Senate and by
the Russian Duma. Q Sir, can you elaborate on what you described
earlier as the uncertain security atmosphere that necessitates this
flexibility? What are you talking about?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, the Defense Department in its Nuclear
Posture Review, as you're aware, said that the future is not particularly
certain and that there may be requirements for us to have nuclear
capabilities far into the future. That's all it said.
Now as far as the Russian Federation is concerned, what this
document shows and what the president said is that we have put behind us the
notion that Russia is our enemy and that we need to structure our forces
based on how the Russians structure theirs, or we in fact need to be
concerned that we shape Russian forces in a particular way. So other
contingencies has (sic) not a great deal to do with the Russians.
And again, let me say, the warheads that we have -- we are going to
1,700 to 2,200. As to the warheads which are removed, some will be
eliminated, some will be placed in deep storage, and some will be used as
operational reserves.
Q Are there provisions for recycling or reusing the plutonium?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Not in this treaty.
Q So none of the plutonium can be reused, or we can reuse it --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, you can reuse -- there is no -- there is
nothing which prohibits the plutonium from being reused. But again, we have
no capability today to build new warheads, and we're not going to be
building new warheads. So we're not going to be recycling these pits or
this plutonium to build new warheads.
Q But you could use it with safer fuel rods for power plants or
something --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: You could conceivably, if you didn't have
enough. I don't think that's -- that's not my strong point. But I don't
think we have a shortage.
Yes, ma'am?
Q Does the president want this process to begin even while the
Senate's considering the treaty, since he said he wanted to go ahead
unilaterally anyway?
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You mean the reductions process?
We are going to reduce. The president announced in November that we are
going to reduce and we are going to reduce -- we are on that track now. The
Defense Department is making plans now to retire the 50 Peacekeeper missiles
and to take four Trident submarines and convert them to non-nuclear uses --
non-strategic nuclear uses.
So yes. We are drawing down. Similarly, the Russian Federation is
drawing down its strategic forces below the START I levels. So these
reductions are taking place now and will continue.
Yes.
Q If I may --
Q Just to be precise on a couple of points: First of all, you
used the word "treaty" several times. This will be a formal treaty --
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This will be a formal treaty --
Q Two-thirds vote of the Senate.
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.
Q And as I understand what you've said, the treaty is totally
permissive on the question of decommissioning versus storage, so that,
technically speaking, neither side is forced to destroy a single warhead, if
it -- (inaudible)?
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.
Q That has the look of a trade-off. The Russians were very
strongly in favor of -- (inaudible) -- a treaty was formally binding an
agreement as possible. The United States' position on the question of
decommissioning seems to have been accepted on permissive --
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, when you negotiate a treaty, a
lot of things are in play, but I wouldn't draw that strict conclusion,
because if you go into the specifics, as I said - transparent -- we are
establishing more and more transparency. And one of the places where it's
hardest to find transparency is in the nuclear laboratories -- especially in
Russia -- and nuclear facilities in Russia. For the Russians to push hard
for a warhead-destruction regime which then would allow us into their
factories is a bit of a stretch.
So that was by no means a clear Russian position. That was more in
the press than it was in the Russian government position. And because they
also do continue to manufacture new warheads, because the warheads have
shorter shelf life than ours -- to get into a situation where you mandate
destruction on the one hand, but you're allowing new warheads to be built on
the other is a bit of an odd situation if you're calling for a treaty.
That's why we're focusing on operationally deployed weapons. We're focusing
on those weapons which are in the field and which are responsive to the
presidents - not warheads that are in stock piles.
Q Two quick questions: The range between -- 500 missiles -- 17
(hundred) to 2,200 represents a 30-percent variance, depending on which
number you choose. Why go for a range, as opposed to specific numbers? And
also, on the issue of security, Russia could have as many as 4,000 warheads
decommissioned and floating around out there. What are we doing to make sure
that they don't fall into the wrong hands?
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, to go to the second point
first: We have, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, or the
Nunn-Lugar program, provided a significant amount of assistance to the
Russians to enhance the security of their nuclear warhead facilities.
This is why the Nunn-Lugar program is in their interest, but it's
also in our interest.
This whole concept of ensuring that Russian warheads are under
tight control has been a principal pillar of U.S. policy with Russia over
the last 10 years.
With regard to the whole question of -- could you repeat the first
question again?
Q The range versus specific number.
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: A range allows planners on both sides to have
some flexibility as they work to the future, as they look to adjust force
structure. Remember, warheads just don't exist; they exist tied to bombers,
they exist tied to missiles, they exist tied to submarines. And so as you
adjust your force structures, you don't get them in packages of one or two,
sometimes you get them in larger or smaller packages. The range is the same
kind of a range which existed in the START II treaty, 3,000 to 3,500 in that
case; and it affords both sides some room to work their force structures.
Yes, sir?
Q I'd like to follow onto Ken's question. In big picture
terms, it looks like the U.S. position generally prevailed. I mean, the
Russians got a binding agreement that doesn't bind us to do anything other
than what President Bush was ready to do unilaterally. Is that wrong?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yeah, I think that's wrong. I think this is
a treaty that both sides went in, in which both sides are cutting their
nuclear forces by two-thirds, in which both sides will have confidence that
they're cutting their nuclear forces by two-thirds, and that we're doing it
in ways which two years ago, all of you would have said, "This is
significant arms control." It's the way we've always done arms control in
the past.
So it's not as if the Russians were forced to take a U.S. position.
As I say, the controversy about destroying warheads was more a controversy
in the press than it was between the two sides, because the Russians also
have requirements to maintain some sort of a stockpile in reserve, and they
also have the same problems in terms of the factories that dismantle and
refurbish warheads are the ones that help produce new warheads. So
dismantlement was more of a public issue than it was an issue between the
two sides.
Q It does like since we were going to reduce anyway -- the
president said he would reduce no matter what the Russians did -- the
Russians financially unable to maintain more than the agreed upon level of
nuclear warheads, since it does not matter how they are dealt with, either
stored or destroyed, what is the benefit of the agreement? What does it do?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think one thing that it does is that it
makes this legally binding. The statement that president made in November
was a statement of U.S. policy. And as some of our Russian interlocutors
said to us, "We believe you, and we believe President Bush is serious about
carrying this out, but what happens after President Bush leaves office? Can
another U.S. president reverse that policy?"
And obviously, the answer is yes, another U.S. president could
reverse that policy. The same applies to statements by President Putin.
What you have here is an agreement which legally requires both
sides to move in the direction that we said we wanted to go. And there's
nothing wrong with that. I mean, we said we wanted to go in a certain
direction, the Russians said they wanted to go in a certain direction, that
they wanted some guarantees, and we thought that this was a good thing to
do. What we didn't want to do was to hold up the -- was to hold up the
reductions for another eight years of negotiations in Geneva. We were not
prepared to do that, nor were we prepared to get into the old business of
saying, we're really going to retire these missiles, but we're going to keep
them around even though they're overage and not supportable, as a bargaining
chip to use in this non-zero-sum game of arms control that we've all
experienced for the past three decades.
So what we did was to say this is a win-win situation, we're both
going in this direction, and we're going to write it down and we're going to
do it in a clear, easy, comprehensible way, and we're going to do it
quickly.
Q What are the withdrawal provisions? And is there a
notification provision?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There is a "supreme national interest"
clause, as with other agreements.
Q How much time?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I believe it's three months.
Q Sir, we've talked about what happens to the warheads, the
decommissioning and --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Right.
Q What happens to the delivery system, the missiles, bombers?
Is there any requirement for decommissioning or destruction?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: There's no requirement for that, but I think
in practical fact, most of those that are retired will likely be destroyed.
Now, some -- let me be clear. First of all, you should go to the Defense
Department and get the status of that. There are some elements of the
Peacekeeper missile which I know have long been planned to be used as
space-launch boosters, but not -- clearly not in their role as military
intercontinental range ballistic missiles.
Q Would there be any MIRVed warheads left when this treaty is
--
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Absolutely. The Russians -- I mean, there
would be MIRVed warheads on the U.S. side because our Trident submarine will
continue to carry multiple warheads. What the Russians do, the Russians
will do. But that is -- as I said, how they structure their forces is up to
them. We have not tried to channel them in a certain direction, as we did
during the Cold War. And that reflects an important change. The
president's been saying they're not our enemies, we're not their enemies.
This agreement does not reflect the kind of Cold War focus on forcing our
view or their view of strategic stability on the other, because we're not
that concerned about their forces anymore.
Yes, sir?
Q Why today? Did they reach an accord over the weekend, or why
was it announced today?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The announcement was this morning because in
fact the negotiators -- who have been meeting, say, every three to four
weeks, intensively, certainly, since December, January, and somewhat
preliminarily before that, since August, really -- actually reached their
agreements, the last agreements, this morning in Moscow.
Q What was the last agreement --
Q Sir, to the best of your knowledge, does any side -- the U.S.
or the Russian side -- have any plans of resuming nuclear tests, at this
point, any time soon?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: You'd have to ask the Russian Federation as
to whether it has plans to resume nuclear tests. The United --
Q What about --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm getting there. I'm getting there. The
president has made clear that we intend to continue to abide by a nuclear
testing moratorium. We have no plans to do any nuclear tests.
Q Also, since you mentioned that we are no longer enemies, are
there any ways of increasing transparency of the nuclear planning policies?
You've been referring several times to Nuclear Defense Review, and we both
know that both sides are still targeting each other. So is there a way --
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Could you -- neither side targets the other
at this point. As you know, since the mid-1990s, no missiles on the U.S.
side are targeted, and that is the same case on the Russian side.
Q I know. Correction taken. But we remember the press reports
that Russia is still on the list of countries potentially to be targeted by
the United States. Is there any way of increasing confidence in that sphere
at this point?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, the answer is yes. There have been,
again, since the late summer, a series of Defense Department-to- Ministry of
Defense consultations. Those will continue. Those are generally -- they
are held at the undersecretary level -- Undersecretary of Defense Feith and
Deputy Chief of the General Staff Baluyevsky -- sometimes at a lower level,
and sometimes between Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Minister of Defense
Sergey Ivanov. So those discussions will continue. Transparency is one of
the main topics which is on the agenda for those talks.
We seek a better relationship across the board with the Russian
Ministry of Defense, and indeed as we continue our cooperation in the war
against terrorism, that kind of transparency and increased cooperation is
going to be absolutely vital. So that is clearly part of it. Yes, ma'am?
Q So as a matter of practical purpose, if the Senate does not
ratify this, what difference will it make? I mean, you said you were going
to go ahead with the reductions, so what happens if the Senate doesn't
ratify it?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I guess you could ask that question. We will
continue to reduce. But to some degree, an element of predictability in the
long-term U.S.-Russian relationship will have been removed.
Q Do you have any sense of what level of support there is in
the Senate?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I believe that the -- do I have any support?
No, I have not taken any soundings. I have not taken any soundings. But
this is the kind of -- these are the kinds of reductions which have
generally been supported in the past on a bipartisan basis.
Q Sir, just to be clear, the president in November said that we
needed no formal treaty whatsoever; he was making a unilateral decision. He
was going to disarm at the level he wanted to disarm. Now we're signing a
treaty. Has the president shifted to believe that a treaty is in the U.S.
interests, or is this only a concession to the Russians?
SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The president, as you may recall -- I think
it was in Crawford; it may have been in Washington -- said that President
Putin had asked him to write this down, and that he would look at that, he
would consider that.
The president's always been open as to form. What the president
wanted to avoid, as I said from the beginning, was one, holding the
reductions in abeyance while we went into a long, classic arms-control
process. As long as this could be accomplished quickly and as long as this
did not impede our ability to move forward, and as long as it was
reciprocal, and as long as the Russian side also found that it was in
Russia's national interest, the president was prepared to sign the treaty.
And that's where we ended up.
Q But he does believe that a treaty is also in the U.S.
interest?
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely. The president believes
this treaty is in our interest for the reasons that I gave you -- that it
helps further codify and establish predictability in the long-term
U.S.-Russian relations in a way which will go beyond him and President Putin
-- beyond their terms in office.
Q One last question: Is this -- (inaudible) -- of the START II
--
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This gentleman back there has the
next one.
Q Can you tell me, how many warheads are there presently in
storage, as opposed to being --
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no idea. I have no idea.
There are thousands of warheads in storage on both sides.
Q Does this supersede the SALT II or the --
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry?
Q Does this supersede all the provisions of START II and START
I, if it's ratified?
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No. The treaty makes very clear
that START I remains in effect by its own terms and its own way. I think
that we could say that we have moved beyond START II. START II was one of
the first treaties -- actually was the first treaty that featured dramatic
reductions in nuclear warheads. But it still had a bit of a Cold War
orientation. This treaty moves beyond START II because it goes to lower
levels and it recognizes the new relationship, the new era in
U.S.-Russian relations, in that we are no longer concerned about the way the
Russians configure their forces -- nor are they concerned about the way in
which we configure ours.
STAFF: Okay, thanks very much.
Q Can I get just a quick follow-up on testing?
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah.
Q Several members of Congress received a briefing -- an
analysis last week that suggested that the Russians may be getting set to
resume testing at Novaya Zemlya. I'm wondering what you know about that
analysis and --
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I know and what I'll tell you --
we -- this administration opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because
we have always said it is not verifiable. And we have always been concerned
that if any country wanted to test in a deceptive manner, that we might not
be able to pick that up. That's why we haven't signed the Test Ban Treaty.
Verifying a test ban is very difficult.
We are not going to test. The Russians have signed up to a nuclear
test ban moratorium, as well, and we expect that they will -- expect the
Russian government to carry out its pledge to refrain from nuclear testing.
STAFF: Thank you very much.
SR. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.
*********
#7
BBC Monitoring
Russian foreign minister reviews pre-summit relations with USA
Source: Russian Public TV (ORT), Moscow, in Russian 1830 gmt 12 May 02
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has reiterated his country's views on
a strategic partnership with the USA and what it entails as far as the
fight against international terrorism and arms control agreements are
concerned. The remarks were made in the context of the upcoming Russian-US
summit in Moscow on 23-26 May. Ivanov also talked about the recent
terrorist act in Dagestan, which coincided with Victory Day celebrations
throughout Russia, and the new relationship that is developing with NATO.
The following is an excerpt from a wide-ranging report in the "Vremena"
programme broadcast on Russian Public TV (ORT) on 12 May. Subheadings have
been inserted editorially.
[Presenter Vladimir Pozner] The Russian foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, on 5
May completed his four-day visit to Washington. The aim of his visit was to
put in train the final preparations ahead of a summit meeting between
President Bush and President Putin. It will take place both in Moscow and
St Petersburg on 23-26 May.
Russia-USA summit expectations
It is expected that two documents will be signed. The first is a
declaration on new strategic relations between Russia and the United States
of America. The second is an agreement on strategic offensive arms cuts.
Given the importance of the future meeting for both countries, and not only
for them but for the whole of world politics, we have decided to devote
today's programme to the issue of Russian-American relations.
Let me introduce our guest. He is Russian Foreign Minister Igor Sergeyevich
Ivanov...
Terrorist act in Dagestan
We shall begin our programme with the tragic event of Victory Day, 9 May,
in Kaspiysk [Dagestan]...
In your view, Igor Sergeyevich, what were the aims of the organizers of
this terrorist act?
[Igor Ivanov] I think that the organizers of all terrorist crimes - and
they are crimes - aim first of all to destabilize the situation, to instil
in public opinion fear, terror and disbelief in its own strength, and in
those murky waters to resolve their problems.
The fact is that all crimes are interconnected. Take terrorists,
extremists, religious extremists, the drugs trade, organized crime - they
are all in close collaboration. It is something we have spoken about time
and time again, that they are the new threats and challenges with which all
countries are faced today, to a greater or lesser degree. And in order to
oppose them, we, the international community, must join forces...
Future treaties, agreements with USA
[Vladimir Pozner] Igor Sergeyevich, the document that will be signed [at
the Russia-USA summit], from the point of view of Russia, what will it be -
a treaty or an agreement? Because these are different things.
[Igor Ivanov] At this stage this issue is still being discussed but the
Russian side thinks that it should be a treaty. But the main thing is that,
be it a treaty or an agreement, it will be a legally binding document which
requires ratification both in the United States and in the Russian Federation.
[Vladimir Pozner] Even an agreement?
[Igor Ivanov] Absolutely correct. An agreement as well. The only difference
is that, to ratify a treaty, a two-thirds majority is required by US
procedures whereas a simple majority is required for an agreement, which
indicates the significance of these documents. Therefore, we think that due
to the importance of the issue covered by that document, it should be a
treaty. But I would like to say once again that this matter has not yet
been decided...
[Vladimir Pozner] Igor Sergeyevich, the question is as follows: will there,
all the same, be some kind of linkup between the treaty on strategic
offensive weapons [START] and the development of a national antimissile
defence system in America? Will these things be linked?
Russian-US partnership
[Igor Ivanov] If you permit me, I would like to return to certain previous
questions and comments that were made here.
[Vladimir Pozner] Please do, of course.
[Igor Ivanov] Statements were made that the United States needs some kind
of document to create some kind of outward appearance. That is, from the
very beginning, the new American administration stated "we do not regard
each other as enemies, as opponents. We wish to build relations based on
partnership, and treaties and agreements are not required between partners.
Why do we need treaties at all?"
And this question was there during the highest-level talks too.
Nonetheless, taking into account the importance of the problem of strategic
offensive weapons, we said all the same that "of course we are ready to
build relations based on partnership, but, as one Russian saying mastered
by one of the previous presidents [Ronald Reagan] goes - `trust, but check'
[Russian: doveryay no proveryay] - let's all the same trust and for the
time being simultaneously check, and when we reach a level of such trust
where there is no need to check, then we won't check."
Therefore, this was not an insistent request from the American side, but we
put the question - that there was a need for a treaty - because what
obtains? - START - START-1 came to an end last year, although it will be in
effect until 2009. START-2 is not working in connection with the fact that
the United States has not ratified it - (? it leaves) the treaty on
antimissile defence and a vacuum is formed, a very important and crucial
point in the area of armaments control, including nuclear arms.
Therefore, we considered that it was very important to begin these talks
and to reach certain understandings, certain principles, criteria. This is
not a full stop, but a continuation of the process, and the talks will be
continued, but at this stage we must register the accords that we can reach
today, and then continue.
You ask if there will be a link between offensive and defensive [weapons].
It has already been stressed that such a linkup between offensive and
defensive - and antimissile defence is directly related to defensive
weapons - this link was registered at the meeting of our presidents [George
Bush and Vladimir Putin] in Genoa, and this idea will be reflected in both
the political declaration that you were talking about and in the document
on cutting back on strategic offensive weapons...
Fight against international terrorism
[Vladimir Pozner] Mr Ivanov, what is your attitude to the statement on
raising somewhat the number of axes of evil and these three countries being
added?
[Igor Ivanov] Today our countries, both the USA, Russia and the
overwhelming majority of countries in the world, come across common threats
and challenges.
These are, first of all, terrorism, which causes suffering to all of us,
and other threats related to the danger posed by the spreading and the
proliferation [Russian: raspolzaniye] of weapons of mass destruction.
We can imagine what would happen if these weapons of mass destruction ended
up in the hands of extremists or terrorists, what the scale of the tragedy
would then be. We therefore support the unifying of efforts of the
international community.
We took a historic step after 11 September. Since the end of World War II,
there has never been such a unity in the international community, in a
single coalition fighting against a common enemy. It was the Nazi regime
during World War II and now it is terrorism.
Not accidentally did the Russian president compare terrorists to Nazis.
Terrorism is a threat of the same scale and facing this threat now we have
to unite our efforts. We believe, however, that specific religions, nations
or countries should not be identified with terrorism. It is necessary to
have very precise information on this matter in order to have a clear
vision of our goals and the means chosen to achieve these goals and tasks.
Therefore, as US State Secretary Colin Powell stressed, these topics are
being constantly discussed between us and we believe that the UN should be
the main, the central venue for discussions on these issues and it should
be given a leading role in this process...
Tackling disagreements with USA
[Vladimir Pozner] Igor Sergeyevich, do you agree with such a position?
[Igor Ivanov] First of all I would like to say that we do have and can have
disagreements. This is natural. There are disagreements between allies and
there are different points of view. The question is how to overcome these
disagreements.
If the United States has a concern that there could be a leak from Russia
of some technologies that could be used to create weapons of mass
destruction, there are many channels through which we could exchange
information in order to find out how true this information is and how well
founded these concerns are. If they are well founded, we will take
decisions together in order to close possible channels of illegal
proliferation of information. If they are not, these concerns should be put
to rest.
What one should not allow, we think, is unfounded accusations, simply
unsubstantiated accusations like the ones made during years gone by. If
there is anything, let us meet, discuss and see to what extent they are
founded or unfounded. This is the form of work the US secretary of state
and I are trying to conduct...
[Vladimir Pozner] But the question is still about bringing down the
threshold, about creating small nuclear devices. Igor Sergeyevich, do you
not see a danger in this, because as soon as the level is brought down, in
the sense of being able to strike more precisely or of the device being
cleaner, doesn't the temptation to use it arise?
[Igor Ivanov] First of all, I would like - if you will permit me - to
return to your previous question about missile defence. In negotiations
with our US partners, the US side stresses that the missile defence system
they are planning to create - we are still at the stage of studying it, so
it is early to say what the precise format will be - will be of a limited
nature.
It is very important that stress is laid on the fact that this will not
pose a threat to Russia's strategic forces and to the global strategic
balance. This is of fundamental importance. I hope that in the course of
the negotiations we shall be able to state those principles in the
declaration we are going to adopt during President Bush's visit to Russia,
and those principles - if they are stated - will be put into practice.
As for your second question, of course I see such a threat to be a real
one. The further we go along the path of creating mini nuclear weapons the
greater the probability that such mini nuclear weapons may fall - even if
they are not used, as the US secretary of state was just saying - but they
may fall into the hands of forces which could be tempted to use or threaten
the use of such weapons to attain their ends. And we are well aware of the
kind of world we live in. And so our view is not to go down the road of
creating mini-mini nuclear bombs, but rather to work together on
strengthening the regime of nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and the rest...
Relations with NATO
[Vladimir Pozner] Igor Sergeyevich, still, Russia-NATO, how do you
understand this?
[Igor Ivanov] My understanding is very close to what the secretary of state
just said, because we have been discussing this for a long time and
constantly. In two days' time we will have a meeting of foreign ministers
of Russia and NATO [Reykjavik], where we hope to conclude the preparation
of a document which will then be submitted to the heads of state of Russia
and NATO for signing in Rome on 28 May.
The essence of the agreements which we are drafting is to set up a now
body. This is a council of Russia and NATO, in which the NATO member
states, as individual countries, and Russia, on the basis of equal say -
therefore the format is not called 19-plus-one but 20 - discuss, on the
basis of equal say, the issues they designate for discussion - for example,
the fight against terrorism, or matters related to dealing with
emergencies, and so on, altogether about 10 subjects - where we discuss on
the basis of equal say, take decision and work jointly to implement them.
This is the special nature of the new body that is being created. It is not
a consultative body but an executive one, if you will.
Here we somehow open a new script, open a new field for cooperation. Yes,
all our countries, both those in NATO and not in NATO, face the same
threat. Let us use the resources of NATO and the resources of Russia and
try to resolve these issues together. This is the aim and role of the new
body that is being set up...
[Vladimir Pozner] Talking of the USA, in your view which wing is likely to
come out on top?
[Igor Ivanov] You know - and I'm not saying this because the secretary of
state made this point, and with me being a minister we are counterparts -
but I want to back what he was saying in the following way: Of course there
are differing points of view, and of course there are arguments. And I make
no secret of the fact that we too have arguments.
But it is the president who takes the final decision. So I would say that I
fully concur with the secretary of state, because I myself have had the
opportunity to meet the president. He proceeds from the premise of building
relations of strategic partnership with Russia on a long-term basis. And
indeed the document we are going to sign - the declaration on a new
framework for strategic relations - is intended precisely to lay down the
principles on which we are going to build our political, economic,
military-strategic and humanitarian relations. So it is a document of
fundamental importance.
[Vladimir Pozner] Today - yes today - I read an article in the New York
Times with the headline: It is being said in the USA that Russia is
preparing nuclear tests. The article talks about closed hearings in the
Senate and the House of Representatives at which administration
representatives briefed congressmen about alarming intelligence data
showing that test preparations are under way at the Novaya Zemlya nuclear
test site. Can you comment on this?
[Igor Ivanov] Unfortunately statements of this kind surface periodically
and without foundation in various committees of the US Congress. We express
our bewilderment about such matters to the administration through various
channels, asking what basis such and such a figure has for making such
irresponsible statements, if we really are striving to build a new
strategic relationship based on mutual trust and mutual respect.
So this is another such report which will once again require us to make
that kind of response. But you know, this doesn't surprise me. After all,
it is not as though somebody took a decision and from that day on
everything changed and all the bad guys suddenly became good. As though a
command had been given in 1991 to end the Cold War and everyone immediately
forgot the Cold War and began living according to new principles.
Of course there are people who still live according to the categories of
the Cold War; of course there are people who see our country as an opponent
and not a partner; of course there are people who want to crank up the
machine of the military-industrial complex, investing billions and billions
in it. All of this is true. There is good and evil -
[Vladimir Pozner, interrupting, to applause and laughter] It sounds as
though you are quoting Marx...
Igor Sergeyevich, if we pursue that line of argument, can it then be said
that you are in favour of signing a bad agreement?
[Igor Ivanov] First of all, I would like to say that I fully share Pavel
Leonardovich's [previous speaker] point of view that a bad agreement should
not be signed.
Importance of agreements with the USA
[Vladimir Pozner] Everybody, I think, agrees with that. The question is:
what constitutes a bad agreement?
[Igor Ivanov] Quite so. Second, nobody is going to put forward a bad
agreement to be signed. Third, of course we can take the path some people
propose - let us have no documents at all. This is also a solution.
Everyone will live according to their rules. But, for instance, I think
that this path will lead to even more chaos in weapons control. Therefore,
today we might not be able to adopt a comprehensive document which will
meet all those criteria enumerated in your chart, with which we are very
well familiar.
But if we can agree on certain things which do not infringe the interests
of either of the parties - does an agreement that the number of nuclear
warheads shall be between 2,200 and 1,700 in 10 years infringe the
interests of Russia or the USA? We state our goal. Yes, we have
disagreements over what to include and so on. But we state our goal - we
are moving towards reduction rather than an increase.
And, of course, there will be additional negotiations as that process
progresses. And then we are not stopping that process. After all, what is
the danger here? It can be argued that START-2 is good or bad. I disagree
that that treaty was the main irritant in our relations. I disagree with
that. Well, it did not come to pass. By the way, we had our own opponents
to START-2. However, together we managed to persuade them that that treaty
was needed. We ratified it. And I think we did the right thing.
Politically, we only gained from it.
As for START-3, we have prepared it. I cannot say that we have engaged in
protracted negotiations. It was, rather, precisely the desire to maintain
the process of negotiations and the process of reduction in strategic
offensive arms. However, all that is now history.
We have START-1, which will be in force until 2009, and then there will be
a pause, a vacuum or whatever you call it. Therefore, today we are about to
sign - I would not call it an overly ambitious document - but a vital
document -
[Vladimir Pozner] A real one at that -
[Igor Ivanov] - and a real one from the point of view of continuing the
process of control over weapons and stating those goals and tasks we are
aiming at. From this viewpoint, I think that it is a vital document...
Foreign policy
[Vladimir Pozner] The Russian Federation's foreign policy blueprint, which
was endorsed by President Putin in July 2000 if I'm not mistaken, in summer
2000, says the following: The international situation at the turn of the
21st century made it necessary to review the general situation around the
Russian Federation, the priorities of Russian foreign policy and the
possibilities for resourcing that policy. Alongside a certain strengthening
of the Russian Federation's international position, negative tendencies
have also appeared, and certain assumptions about the formation of new
mutually beneficial relations of partnership based on equality of rights
have proved to be unfounded. That was in the year 2000. So tell us, please,
Igor Sergeyevich, is that still true today?
[Igor Ivanov] I should like to say first and foremost that that blueprint,
the analysis made in the preamble - and I believe it fully reflected the
real picture that existed in the world - related to the 1990s, that is, the
period following the Soviet Union, and the transformations that had taken
place in the world situation and around Russia. And just as a doctor needs
to make a correct diagnosis before prescribing the medicine, so our purpose
in drawing up that blueprint was to set out a correct diagnosis: where we
stood, what kind of world we found ourselves in, what resources we
realistically had at our disposal, and how to tackle the priority tasks
confronting us. So, on the basis of that analysis a scale of foreign policy
values and priorities was drawn up. Naturally the primary one was
safeguarding national security. The second was to create favourable
conditions for the continuation of political and economic reforms in the
country. The third was to defend the interests of our citizens and
compatriots abroad. The fourth was to assist our business, our economy in
integrating into the world market. So the conclusions we drew and the tasks
we set ourselves flowed from that analysis, and I would say that that
assessment retains its relevance today...
[Vladimir Pozner] Igor Sergeyevich, is it true that, if one's stance is
always like this - always ready to oblige - then practice shows that you
are left out of the team, as is well-known. Is it not fair to say that,
they say, we are always ready to please? There is that feeling.
[Igor Ivanov] Statements such as always ready to appease or to salute and
do it are, perhaps, a good sound bite and are effective journalistically.
As a professional, however, I usually only operate on the basis of facts.
Perhaps, scholars should do the same [reference to a previous speaker].
So when these loud statements are made, what is usually cited in those
materials? First, that we made some concessions or did something like it.
For example, the USA abandoned the 1972 ABM Treaty, and Russia made
concessions or acquiesced. What concessions or in what way did it
acquiesce? Article 15 of the ABM Treaty provides for the right to withdraw
from the treaty. It is that right that the USA made use of. In every way we
tried to prevent it. What is more, on three occasions the UN General
Assembly voted in support of the ABM Treaty. Eighty countries were in
favour; the USA, Israel and Micronesia were against. Washington, thus, took
that attitude not in relation to Russia, but in relation to the
international community. In what way was it a concession?
Second, they say that we have withdrawn our naval base from Cam Ranh and
thus met the USA halfway. What has the USA got to do with it? I led the
negotiations. They were our bilateral negotiations with Vietnam. In 10
years, not a single naval ship has called in at that base. Why should we
maintain that base? Vietnam said they would close it and would use it for
peaceful ends. We reached agreement and closed it. They now say it was a
concession to the USA.
In Lourdes, in Cuba, a station had been in existence for 40 years. In the
opinion of the military experts, it was no longer performing the functions
for which it had been created. So we reached agreement and closed it down.
It is now presented as a gift to Washington. What gift?
[Vladimir Pozner] So are you dismissing these charges?
[Igor Ivanov] I think that it not only does not correspond to reality, but
that it is at times simply more in the realm of political [changes thought]
- how can I put it mildly, I can only think of a word that does not belong
in the diplomatic lexicon...
Coming Bush-Putin summit
[Vladimir Pozner] What does the summit of President Bush and President
Putin mean for Russia mostly - is it the strengthening of partnership
relations or the assertion of its special geopolitical role?
[Sergey Ivanov] I think that you have highlighted absolutely correctly two
central aspects. [First], Russian-American relations, which are important
not just for our two countries. No matter what is said, to a great extent
Russian-American relations define the world political climate, both in
terms of strategic stability and in terms of the ensuing processes of the
formation of a new world order.
Second, it is of course the assertion of Russia's independent role and its
unique face in the new world. I believe there are fewer critics now,
including in Russia, who doubt that Russia should have such a unique face,
taking into consideration its own history, considering its geopolitical
interests, considering its religion, if you like, culture, and considering
its interests today...
*******
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