Johnson's Russia List
#6239
13 May 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. AP: NATO Prepares to Reach Out to Russia.
2. The Guardian (UK): Ian Black, Cold war enemies warm to joint task.
Nato-Russian alliance fuelled by common threat, says alliance chief.
3. BBC Monitoring: Kaspiysk blast investigators have no real suspects -
local prosecutor.
4. Interfax: Russian Patriarch says meeting Pope possible but
proselytizing must stop.
5. Novaya Gazeta: Boris Kagarlitsky, WHAT DO VODKA AND ELECTIONS HAVE IN
COMMON? Both vodka and election results are often not what they seem to be.
(re Ingushetia election)
6. Novoye Vremya: Lyubov Tsukanova, GREAT TURMOIL. One has to live a long
time in Russia to see the results of reforms. (re bureaucracy)
7. Novoye Vremya: DRAGGING OURSELVES OUT OF THE SWAMP. An interview with
Mikhail Krasnov. (re administrative reform)
8. Peter Lavelle: Untimely Thoughts - Through the looking glass of memory
or marching without a beat. (re Impressions of May 9, 2002)
9. Maclean's (Canada): Matthew Fisher, My life in Russian film.
10. Jerry Hough: Stiglitz and Reform.
11. Barron's Online: FBI Probes Itera, Pricewaterhouse on Gazprom Deals.
12. Maclean's (Canada): Paul Webster, Ripped off in Russia. Canadian
companies are losing their investments.
13. Wall Street Journal editorial: Russia House. (re NATO)
14. New York Times: Michael Wines, A Bombing in Russia: A Massacre of
Children.]
*******
#1
NATO Prepares to Reach Out to Russia
May 13, 2002
By PAUL AMES
REYKJAVIK, Iceland (AP) - When Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov meets
his NATO counterparts to seal an accord that aims to take cooperation
between the former foes to a new level, the venue could hardly be more
symbolic.
Sixteen years ago, a summit in Iceland's capital between then-President
Reagan and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev degenerated into a
bad-tempered Cold War exchange over arms control.
If all goes according to plan, Tuesday's meeting here will show how far
relations have come by creating a new body where Russia sits alongside the
19 NATO allies to plot common policy against terrorism, the spread of
nuclear weapons and other security threats.
NATO Secretary-General George Robertson says the ``quantum leap'' forward
in cooperation was inspired by the perception that, since Sept. 11, Russia
and the western allies face a common menace from international terrorism,
as they once did against Nazi Germany.
``Sept. 11 proved an extraordinary catalyst. For the first time since 1945,
it focused attention here in Europe and in Moscow on what we have in
common,'' Lord Robertson said in a recent speech.
``It led, not to a temporary thaw, but to a real sea change in attitudes on
both sides.''
The first meeting of the new NATO-Russia Council is set for May 28 when
President Vladimir Putin joins NATO leaders for a summit meeting at an
Italian air base outside Rome.
The NATO decision to reach out to Russia is a recognition of Putin's help
since the attacks on New York on Washington, which has included political
and diplomatic support, shared intelligence and approving American use of
bases in former Soviet Central Asia.
Under the new arrangement, Russia will sit as an equal partner at NATO
meetings where the alliance discusses a range of issues, including
counterterrorism, arms proliferation, missile defense, peacekeeping,
management of regional crises and arms control.
``It's a qualitatively new level of cooperation,'' Ivanov said recently.
``If this works - and we want it to work - it could become an important
element in building a new European security architecture.''
Skeptics however will point to an earlier new dawn in NATO-Russia relations
five years ago when a beaming Boris Yelstin embraced then-President Clinton
in Paris and signed the NATO-Russia cooperation and security agreement.
That agreement set up a council where the two sides could consult on
matters of mutual interest, but by 1999 it was in tatters as Russia
curtailed contacts in protest over NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia.
After the Kosovo war, relations gradually improved, but Moscow has
continued to complain that it is simply informed of NATO decisions rather
than helping to formulate policies.
On paper, the new agreement changes that, but while it may create the
foundation for a new partnership, analysts stress good will is needed from
both sides to make it work in practice.
``Architecture is less important than action,'' says Robert Hunter, a
former U.S. ambassador to NATO. ``The Reykjavik decisions are really just
teeing up the changes.''
NATO officials stress the alliance's core mutual defense role will be
unaffected. They insist Russia will have no right of veto over allied
action since either side will be able to act alone where there is no
agreement.
That should give NATO guarantees that if the relationship sours Moscow
won't be able to disrupt alliance business.
``There is concern Russia will make it still harder for NATO to take a
decision,'' says Sir Timothy Garden, European defense expert at the Royal
Institute of International Affairs in London.
``I don't doubt Russia will play hardball to get more control over what
NATO does.''
By gaining greater say at NATO, analysts say Putin's hand is strengthened
against an old guard in the Russian political and defense establishment
that continues to view the western alliance with suspicion, especially as
it moves later this year to take on up to seven new members from the old
East bloc.
Experts also point to differences over Chechnya, Iraq or Russian arms sales
to the likes of Iran or Syria as showing how fragile the relationship remains.
``Reykjavik is not the end, it's a beginning ... of a new stage in
NATO-Russia relations that could take years'' to develop into a real
``alliance with the alliance'', said Sergey Rogov, director of Moscow's
Institute of USA and Canada Studies.
*******
#2
The Guardian (UK)
13 May 2002
Cold war enemies warm to joint task
Nato-Russian alliance fuelled by common threat, says alliance chief
Ian Black in Brussels
Nato stands on the brink of a "revolutionary" new relationship with Russia,
which will become an active partner with its former cold war enemy in a
world transformed by September 11, according to the Nato secretary general,
George Robertson.
As an era of unprecedented security cooperation between Moscow and the west
beckons, Lord Robertson told the Guardian: "This is not a sentimental
journey. It's based on cold, hard-nosed self-interest on both sides and
that is what will make it function."
Lord Robertson and the alliance's foreign ministers will meet in Reykjavik
tomorrow to finalise documents setting up the Nato-Russia Council (NRC), in
which Russia will sit as an equal partner with the alliance's 19 members.
The NRC will be formally inaugurated at a special summit in Rome later this
month, with George Bush, Vladimir Putin and Tony Blair, who pioneered the
idea last autumn.
The new body is being billed as a "quantum leap" beyond the Nato-Russia
Permanent Joint Council, which was launched to great fanfare in Paris five
years ago, but which failed to progress because Nato positions were always
pre-cooked in the 19-against-one forum.
And it was almost finished off by the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when Moscow
backed the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, against ethnic Albanian
"terrorists" while Nato bombed Belgrade in the first war in its 50-year
history.
"Even the table plan in Rome will represent a revolution," said Lord
Robertson. "The secretary general of Nato will chair a meeting of 20 nation
states with the Russian president sitting between the prime minister of
Portugal and the prime minister of Spain."
If the chemistry turns out to be as good as the maths, the hope is that the
NRC will build up confidence and break down taboos while Russia gets a
bigger say in a setting of consensual decision-making on issues such as
countering terrorism and monitoring weapons of mass destruction.
The "revolutionary" new relationship will also have a big impact on the
ground.
Russian diplomats - who usually have little contact with alliance staff -
will move to work in the Nato compound near Brussels airport.
The road leading to this historic crossroads has not been free of
obstacles. Pentagon hawks were initially suspicious of anything that might
weaken Nato, an almost instinctive reflex in Moscow, and firmly insisted
that Russia got no veto on alliance decisions.
Russia was also denied a say on the plans to take in up to seven former
communist countries - including the three Baltic states - at the Prague
summit in November.
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia are also likely to join, copying
the step taken by the former Warsaw pact members Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic in 1999.
Yet the new council should help take the sting out of alliance's
enlargement and allow Mr Putin - in a way that his predecessor, Boris
Yeltsin, found difficult - to show his generals and nationalists in the
Duma the benefits of closer engagement with the old foe.
Above all, said Lord Robert son, this is about seizing opportunities
created by Moscow's cooperative response to September 11 and the Afghan
war, which was the product of Russian concerns about Chechnya and the
dangers of Islamic fundamentalism on the country's southern flank.
He said: "After 60 years of estrangement between Russia and the west there
is an identifiable common enemy. There is unprecedented cooperation at the
very highest level. The Russians and Americans are exchanging intelligence
at unbelievable levels of sensitivity."
Clearly, all this activity is good for business, though Lord Robertson is
not complacent about how much Nato needs to change and modernise to meet
new challenges.
It is also the best answer to the question of whether Nato is still alive,
let alone well - a query raised when the loyal invocation of its mutual
defence clause was ignored by America after September 11.
"I am too busy to get worried by this accusation," he replied briskly.
"Nato was never likely to be the first port of call, especially when it was
the US that had been attacked. But within a week they had a shopping list
of things they wanted from the allies."
Encouragingly, however, the tone in the US has changed in recent months.
America now puts greater emphasis on Nato as a vehicle for US interests in
a wider Europe stretching to the Balkans, the Black Sea and beyond.
Nato's peace support operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia are still
serious preoccupations. Similarly, a great emphasis is still being placed
on getting European members to spend more on costly hi-tech kit such as
heavy transport planes, precision munitions and communications to narrow
the yawning "capabilities gap" with the US.
"Nobody's going to tell me the alliance is sidelined," Lord Robertson said
firmly.
"Even if the Americans were going to handle everything on their own and
Nato had not existed, Nato would have had to be created."
Nato foreign ministers in Reykjavik tomorrow will discuss the prospect of
seven new members joining the alliance, a move many analysts believe will
fundamentally change the organisation.
Bigger and better?
Seven central and eastern European countries are candidates for membership:
Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic states of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania.
None of them is certain of an invitation to join at a Nato summit in the
Czech capital, Prague, in November.
A senior Foreign Office source said: "Pooling resources and specialising is
the way ahead. How Nato is relevant to terrorism and new threats is the
biggest issue [facing the alliance]."
However, the International Institute for Strategic Studies warned last week
that an enlarged Nato faced an identity crisis. It raised the possibility
of Nato becoming less of an alliance with members acting jointly and more
of an organisation in which individual members, or groups of members, would
act in what British officials call "coalitions of the willing".
*******
#3
BBC Monitoring
Russia: Kaspiysk blast investigators have no real suspects - local prosecutor
Source: Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian 0600 gmt 13 May 02
[Presenter] Despite the fact that three people suspected of involvement in
the Kaspiysk blast have been arrested in St Petersburg, the investigation
team does not yet have any real suspects, the prosecutor for Dagestan's
Kaspiyskiy District said today.
[Correspondent Anton Chermenskiy] The three people detained - brothers
Artur and Zaur Mamayev and their namesake Shamil Mamayev - have been on the
wanted list since last year.
The Kommersant daily reports that the law-enforcement agencies are carrying
on their special operation in St Petersburg. The police say that the arrest
of the three suspects was only the beginning.
Last Saturday [11 May] the three suspects were arrested and taken to
Dagestan. However, later it turned out that all three of them have alibis.
The men deny any involvement in the act of terrorism. They say that before
gunmen's incursion into Dagestan [presumably, in August-September 1999]
they worked as shoemakers. However, later they moved to neighbouring
Chechnya where they found themselves in a rebel training camp.
[Presenter] The prosecutor of Dagestan's Kaspiyskiy District, Akhmed
Magoramov, has said that so far there are no real suspects or people
detained in connection with the Kaspiysk blast. There is only the photofit
of a man who is reported to have been standing near the road-side bushes in
Ulitsa Lenina [the street where the landmine went off] an hour and a half
before the explosion.
*******
#4
Russian Patriarch says meeting Pope possible but proselytizing must stop
Interfax
Moscow, 13 May: Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia Aleksiy II believes that
a meeting with Pope John Paul II is possible only after conflicts between
the churches are resolved.
"The Russian Orthodox Church has reiterated that it is fully ready for a
meeting with Pope John Paul II. However, this meeting may take place only
after the churches achieve a common position on key issues," Aleksiy II
said in an interview with Izvestiya newspaper, which was published today.
The Patriarch thinks "the sides should discuss proselytism in all its
forms, as well as ban the Uniate Church as a method for achieving unity,
and not violate the jurisdiction of this or that church. In other words,
the focus should be put on finding a final solution for the long-standing
conflict between the Greek Catholics and members of the Orthodox Church in
western Ukraine, where the Lviv, Ternopol and Ivano-Frankivsk Orthodox
dioceses were virtually destroyed. In addition to this, the Vatican should
abandon its practice of proselytism among the traditionally-Orthodox
population of Russia and CIS countries," the patriarch said.
Aleksiy II said that "the Russian Church is still convinced that this
meeting would prove fruitful only if it manages to heal the wounds of the
past, as well as help resolve painful bilateral problems. And we are
becoming convinced that a meeting between the two churches' leaders is a
goal in itself. But Pope John Paul II's visit to Ukraine has proved that a
meeting in this format not only fails to provide constructive solutions to
long-standing issues, but is increasingly fraught with a further
heightening of existing conflicts."
The patriarch said that "we have no reasons for concern about the sizeable
growth of Catholicism's influence in Russia. We only seek mutual respect
and constructive relations with the Catholic Church."
******
#5
Novaya Gazeta
No. 19
May 6-12, 2002
WHAT DO VODKA AND ELECTIONS HAVE IN COMMON?
Both vodka and election results are often not what they seem to be
Author: Boris Kagarlitsky
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
A NEW ELECTION TECHNIQUE HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN INGUSHETIA: IN
ORDER TO DEFEND THE VOTING RIGHTS OF "DEAD SOULS", IT WAS NECESSARY TO
PREVENT REAL VOTERS FROM VOTING. WHILE ELECTORAL FRAUD IS KNOWN TO BE
WIDESPREAD IN RUSSIA, THE RECENT ELECTIONS IN INGUSHETIA REALLY MARKED
A NEW LOW.
Fraud in the election process is a norm of Russian life; and,
amazingly enough, it's a guarantee of our relative freedom and
relative rights. Otherwise, no one would share power with us.
If, God forbid, electoral fraud ever becomes technically
impossible, no elections would be held. If the free press could
somehow influence politics, it would have been shut down long ago. But
elections are held in Russia these days, and papers do publish
revealing articles, even about electoral fraud. The dogs are allowed
to bark, as long as the caravan moves on.
Anyway, even against the generally grotesque background of
Russian politics, the election farce in Ingushetia stands out. It is a
masterpiece, which can be completely appreciated only by real
connoisseurs of the genre.
How can the scale of electoral fraud be estimated, based on
official statistics? The method is simple and well-known; anyone can
use it. The point is that the authorities are obliged to report voter
turnout figures, which is a common practice all over the world. The
point is that voter turnout fluctuates in the course of the day: many
people come in the morning, by noon there is a lull, and then in the
final hour there's another "attendance rush": those who were unable to
vote earlier in the day come to vote in the evening.
However, the "second rush hour" is always less than the first, as
there is little time and a large number of people would be physically
unable to fit in the polling stations over such a short period of
time.
This is a common statistical pattern, whether it's Britain, Fiji,
Nizhny Novgorod, or Cape Town. However, there are certain
peculiarities.
Long before Russia started holding multi-party elections, Latin
American and African dictators discovered that during the "final hour
peak" it is possible to throw in lots of false ballot papers, or to
simply add the necessary figure to the number of people who have
already voted, and then simply falsify the returns. Observers also
discovered this. That is why voter turnout figures must be officially
announced every hour. If it's revealed that a vast number of people
voted over the last hour or two, it is clear that the results are
being forged.
Judging by reports, this is how elections are held in Russia.
Over most of the day, people drop by the polling stations at a very
leisurely rate; while in the last five minutes crowds of voters rush
to cast their votes - sometimes up to two-thirds of the official voter
turnout.
On Sunday afternoon, the day of the election, I used the Internet
to find out that approximately 20% of Ingushetian voters had already
voted. It was easy to predict that by the evening, 60% would have
voted, about a third of whom would be "dead souls". However, what
happened in reality exceeded all my expectations.
The citizens of Ingushetia really did turn out to vote - and,
what is worse, kept trying to drop their votes into the ballot-box
until the very last moment. The only way for the election commissions
to get rid of them was to close the polling stations. As a result,
judging by media reports, crowds of people gathered, vainly trying to
vote. Alas, they did not understand that the election had already
taken place, and the results were calculated long before the end of
Sunday.
In order to protect the rights of the "dead souls", the
authorities of Ingushetia had to prevent living people from entering
the polling stations - this seems to be a new election technique.
Overall, to the great delight of the Kremlin, all went well, and
the new methods applied in the Caucasus will be similarly successful
when used on a larger scale throughout Russia.
Especially if we take into consideration that even if state
officials and politicians are caught red-handed in the act of
electoral fraud, they invariably keep their jobs.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
*******
#6
Novoye Vremya
May 5, 2002
GREAT TURMOIL
One has to live a long time in Russia to see the results of reforms
Author: Lyubov Tsukanova
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
AN ENTIRE ARMY OF STATE OFFICIALS IS EATING UP TAXPAYERS' MONEY, AND
CREATING WORK FOR ITSELF, SEEKING TO PROVE IT IS NECESSARY. ALL THESE
OFFICIALS REALLY DO IS CREATE EXTRA DIFFICULTIES FOR THOSE WHO DO
USEFUL THINGS. THIS SITUATION RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT PUTIN'S TACTICS
AND STRATEGY.
President Vladimir Putin said in his annual address to
parliament: "The present functions of the state apparatus cannot
resolve strategic issues." This explained why, in his opinion, the
government is so modest and insufficiently ambitious in setting
economic growth targets. According to the president, "...It is finally
necessary to analyze the present state functions and to preserve only
the necessary ones." Why does Russia need the administrative reform?
The answer is obvious: to make administration more efficient, and the
state apparatus more compact and less corrupted. Under Boris Yeltsin
this objective was declared many times, however, it was never carried
out as a reform. The number of deputy prime ministers was changed,
ministries were reduced, consolidated, and renamed; reformers were
invited to the government, them banished from there. However, only
once a new prime minister - Sergey Kirienko - said that the
inefficiency of the executive power is not caused by names or ranks of
top officials, but by the governmental structure. Gigantic apparatus
with dozens of departments made senseless existence of ministries,
depriving them of real power, and simultaneously, led an exhausting
war with the "second government", the presidential administration. All
decisions were lost in the bowels of this monstrous machine, and year
after year it grew bigger - until 1993 the government took up only
half of the building on the Krasnopresnenskaya embankment. In fact, in
the beginning the presidential administration doubled economic and
social functions of the Cabinet, because it was impossible to squeeze
any reforming decision through the Cabinet staff. So being unable to
conciliate one bureaucratic structure, the state created another, with
parallel functions.
Today, President Vladimir Putin presents liberal ideas on
reduction of the state's functions. Paradoxically: over the past two
years the president has increased bureaucratic functions of the state,
established federal districts, sent federal officials to regions and
created intricate schemes of their mutual dependence and co-
subordination. According to regional leaders, today the number of
federal bodies representations in regions amounts to fifty in each
region of the Russian Federation, while the number of officials
exceeds 1,000. Besides, each of seven presidential envoys to federal
districts has rather large apparatus. Plus, local administration and
authorities, which do not mind growing either. This army of officials
eats up the money of taxpayers, and, besides, it seeks to create work
for itself, as it needs to prove it is needed: in fact, they create
extra-difficulties for those who plow, sow, teach, heal, build, and do
other useful things.
How can the goal the president posed in his address be combined
with this phantasmagoria? According to experts, it is impossible to
combine them: Putin the tactician usually wins out over Putin the
strategist; and from the tactical standpoint he does not need a simple
and easy to control executive branch of power, which is primarily
associated with the president. Currently, he controls all branches of
power, primarily the Cabinet, which he can hold responsible and blame
for any economic and social problems. Despite the weakness of the
presidential envoys as an institution, they can be scapegoats for all
failures in regional politics. It is not ruled out this institution is
to be reinforced, naturally at the expense of doubling a number of
functions of the government and the regional authorities. At the same
time, both the government and presidential envoys are completely
dependent: the presidential administration works out policy. So it is
a classical Soviet situation: one department makes the decision,
another implements it, and a third one is accountable for all.
The bulkiness of the system makes another objective marked in the
address impossible to resolve: turning the state power from a "black
box" into a transparent for the society structure. It is well-known
how to make it technically, there is even a special program called
"electronic government" that suggests broad informing the citizens on
all decisions on the authorities. Today, it is next to impossible to
find the necessary law or governmental resolution of the government,
mayor's officer, or a municipal administration on the Internet, just
like in the pre-computer era. So far, only separate enthusiasts do
this that there is no law that obliges departments to "hang" their
information for general use.
It is absolutely unclear what is to be done with the bottom layer
of bureaucracy, which has also grown over the years of reforms and
remained just as unprincipled and self-interested. Here the number of
functions only grows. It is as hard to believe that some day the state
will minimize its relations with the citizenry as it is to believe
that the average monthly wage in Russia will ever reach the equivalent
of $2000. However, no one is promising that.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
*******
#7
Novoye Vremya
May 5, 2002
DRAGGING OURSELVES OUT OF THE SWAMP
An interview with Mikhail Krasnov
Author: Hairi Ovsepyan
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
MIKHAIL KRASNOV, FORMER AIDE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND AUTHOR OF THE
FIRST ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM PLAN IN RUSSIA, THINKS THE NEW EDITION OF
THE REFORM PLAN HAS LITTLE CHANCE OF BEING SUCCESSFUL IF IT'S
IMPLEMENTED BY THOSE WHOM THE PRESIDENT HAS PLACED IN CHARGE OF IT.
Question: How can it be explained that despite numerous changes
in Russia, the bureaucratic apparatus has preserved itself so well?
Mikhail Krasnov: Actually, the explanation is that since the very
beginning of perestroika no one has raised the issue of administrative
reform in Russia. At that time, political and economic reforms were
the priority. We rebuilt the nation from the very beginning, we needed
a new constitution, and so on and so forth. Even if we look at
presidential addresses of that time, all of them were devoted to the
basis of the state structure, "On strengthening of the state...", "On
reinforcement of the state...", etc. However, even having changed the
constitution, no one touched upon the state apparatus. Now they say:
why wasn't the system cleansed, why weren't those who were obviously
slavish devotees of the prior regime driven out? First, because of the
fear of great upheavals; second, because they hoped that the new
constitution would bring the apparatus into good order all by itself.
Nothing like this happened: the essentially Soviet apparatus adjusted
the new constitution to its own needs and understanding.
Question: What can be done now to become at least partially
closer to the modern administrative structure concept? Let us speak of
the most urgent issue: state officials.
Krasnov: Overall, reform of the state service is a key issue of
the administrative reform. The modern state service concept is called
the "merit system" all over the world. In other words, it is the
system of accomplishments and values. It is of little importance how
long you worked for this department and how many steps you have made
in your career - the record should not be the main factor to determine
your position. The Russian law on state service is actually only half
of a law. On the one hand, it takes into account these new realities.
In particular, we already have A class officials, constitutional
positions of president, ministers, deputies, and so on; B class
officials, the so-called political appointees; and C class officials,
in other words, career officials. On the other hand, officials of the
two first classes have no considerable guarantees when they resign,
although starting his state service, a person should understand that
he or she is doing this not only in order to lauder the biography, or
to steal some money, but to also carry out some operation. Such a
person starts serving to the society, and he or she should be rewarded
for this after the term of service ends.
Question: Were any other administrative reform plans seriously
discussed, besides yours?
Krasnov: There are no plans at all; there are concept papers: the
concept prepared by Gref and ours. However, Gref has rather a concept
of reforming the power as a whole, as he touches upon legislative
bodies, and the court system, and the civil society. But I believe,
currently some ideas of our concept have chances, in particular,
replacement of the table of ranks system by the merit system. Or our
suggestion of 1997: liquidation of the deputy prime minister
institution in its present form. The idea of accountable ministers is
also slowly making progress. I always give this example: look at
Downing Street, the office of the British prime minister - and then at
the building on Krasnopresnenskaya embankment. These are two examples
of the government. We have a huge state machine, its departments only
complicate the administrative system, blur out accountability, and
slow down the process of decision-making. In short, what five years
ago seemed to be a blasphemy, today is more or less obvious. In these
terms, we did not work in vain.
Question: Why did the president said about the necessity of this
reform in his latest address?
Krasnov: I hope, it is because he understood and understood
because the old bureaucracy has not been reformed over the past ten to
twelve years. Russia has never made a rush forward. There has been no
"Russian wonder". The Russian people is also mostly Soviet, but
somehow should grab his hair and pull him out of the swamp. I hope
this is what Putin thought. It is a different thing that he spoke
about administrative reform in his address, but he did not say what he
meant. And this raises some anticipations, as very often only a part
of the normal and healthy ideas he suggests are is used.
Question: Speaking of the reform, you mention only the top
officialdom, however, there are local administrations. Bureaucracy in
housing and communal departments, passport offices, and so on seems to
be a more complicated issue than the one you are speaking about.
Krasnov: I agree with this, but the matter is that we do not live
in the Soviet system of "democratic centralism", where each lower
layer of power is in fact an antenna of the Center in regions. I
believe that local administrations are an extremely important thing,
but from the very beginning it was approached formally. Its living
philosophy is different and it can spread only from the bottom. Of
course, the administrative reform is connected with the local
administration; however, it should be a different reform - a reform of
local administration. It is a different system by its functions,
conditions, and financial sources. Besides, we should not attack all
officials at once - then we would never solve this problem.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
*******
#8
From: "Peter Lavelle"
Subject: Untimely Thoughts
Date: Mon, 13 May 2002
Peter Lavelle: Untimely Thoughts - Through the looking glass of memory or
marching without a beat.
(re Impressions of May 9, 2002)
(Written May 9, 2002 PM).
Fifty-seven years ago the Great Patriotic War ended in favor of the then
Soviet Union. As has been the norm since, the television channels are
flooded with old films and images of the conflict. The president attended
and addressed a military parade on Red Square. Young troops marched under
banners full of symbolic and discursive ambiguity with veterans in
full-metal jackets watching starry-eyed from the sidelines. The Soviet past
and the Russian present have an uneasy co-existence. The traditional
"salut" is expected in a couple of hours. Everything is all very colorful
and solemn. What today's festivities have lacked is a clear message what
the occasion is about. Going through the motions of remembering that
conflict has become a gapping void for what it means to be Russian and the
definition of Russia in the new post-communist century.
In a legal sense, the Russian Federation is the successor state of the
Soviet Union. In every other respect, this linage is becoming being called
into question. Doubts as to the meaning of the 1945 victory have become
more prevalent. Evening call-in television shows broach the question head
on: was winning the war worth it? The question is not posed to raise
doubt about the worthiness of the cause, but rather as to the cost of that
victory in light of Russia's present. How can we account for this? Are
memories fading? Is the Soviet legitimization project finally losing its
grip? Or is a new Russia struggling to come into being?
My grandfather-in-law-elect has his doubts. He walked from Moscow to Berlin
and back. He claims he killed seven fascists. The only comment he had on
the war today is the hope that Putin would increase his (generous) $128 a
month pension. Memory of the past doesn't help him as a veteran to secure a
meaningful present and future for his granddaughter. On a smaller scale,
the hard salami roll he received from Moscow Mayor Luzhkov last year enraged
him. It is no wonder; at 91 he had no teeth. Though he sure did bang up
the celebration table that year. Instead of trying to eat the salami he
used it as a baton after a few shots of vodka. A few pieces of his
full-metal jacket have yet to be found. Presumingly his fighting spirit of
1941-1945 is still with him. No worries, everyone ended the occasion with a
smile.
The linage of the Russian Federation is ambiguous and disorientating.
Celebrating the victory of a failed system and state is challenging. It is
difficult to let go what is so very memorable while the present seems to be
for the benefit of the exclusive few. Isn't it strange how pain can become a
friend only because it is familiar and constant? The images of the war are
for the most part of self-sacrifice and courage. There is little if any
self-sacrifice and courage in today's Russia. If anything, such social and
personal attitudes are ridiculed and laughed at. I am willing to believe
there was a modicum of social solidarity during the War. These same
feelings have not transmigrated to Putin's Russia. The past is not binding
Russians together in the present. The recent Russian-Soviet past is an
empty vessel in desperate need of a new wine. The immediate past is an
ahistorical void.
The problem with remembering the War the way it is traditionally observed is
the fact that it does not serve as a guide to the future - radiant or
otherwise. Russia's May 9 celebration is a prism to justify a reality and
worldview that was consigned to the dustbin of history without saying
anything about the present. The Soviet Union indeed defeated Nazi Germany
at an unprecedented cost. But the defeat of the Nazis remains an ambiguity
in today's Russia. To what degree was victory achieved by what was Soviet
about Russia or by what was Russian of the Soviet Union? Stalin did confer
special thanks to the Russian people for the country's victory over the last
century's political abomination. Though it is not entirely clear if most
Russians remember that particular detail of history. Russia very much needs
an Ombudsman of Historical Detail.
Is Russia really the successor state of the Soviet Union? Do Soviet
practices help or hinder the development of a new Russian identity? These
questions are not seriously confronted at the moment. As such, the same
program is presented each year. The War apparently is some immutable
apparition of something that is so sacred that it has been forgotten. It is
a like a faith that not longer ministers to the faithful. It is like a
marching band marching while its musicians have long left the field.
Grandfather-in-law-elect still has the spirit - but toward what end? For
some reason, he refuses to leave the field. No one is asking him why
either.
Is there any sense to continue commemorating the War in the Soviet-honored
style? Soviet patriotism is fading - the Putin interregnum haltingly and
unconvincingly bridges the past patriotic practice with the new Russian
patriotism in the making. What is patently clear is the fact that May 9 is
a celebration and remembrance of the "great generation". They are worth
remembering, but it is not nearly enough to construct a new Russian
tradition. The veterans of that War are honored once a year, but they are
not the cohort to build a new historical tradition. Most are not very happy
with the post-Soviet present - with very good material and psychological
reasons.
Today's May 9 festivities only reflect that a mythic present of two
historical constructs have uncomfortably been forced to cohabitate. Not
much unlike introducing democratic institutions and developing a market
economy, traditions are invented and constructed. Russia is attempting to
establish pragmatic and legitimate practices to deal with the present, but
Putin's Russia is also in need of a usable past. Constructing that past
has only just begun - and it is not off to a strong start.
Grandfather-in-law-elect most certainly would agree. Unfortunately, we will
never know the opinion of the victims of the terror act of the same day.
Peter Lavelle is head of research at a Moscow-based brokerage.
*******
#9
Maclean's (Canada)
May 20, 2002
My life in Russian film
By MATTHEW FISHER
When not pursing his career as a thespian, Moscow-based journalist Matthew
Fisher has covered 14 wars, including Somalia, Rwanda, Eritrea and the
current conflict in South Asia.
The casting call came out of the blue to my Moscow flat one evening. A
friend rang to say that his wife had a friend who knew a television
director who desperately needed a middle-aged man who could manage an
American accent and pass for an American doctor.
Canadians who spend time overseas are used to being mistaken for Americans,
so that wasn't a stretch. To see if I could look the part of a Stanford
cardiologist and manage 13 lines of script, I was asked to show up at
Mosfilm, the sprawling studios near the Lenin Hills used for decades to
make everything from sinister Soviet propaganda to lowbrow comedies and
high culture. After walking through the catacombs of a complex nearly as
big as the Pentagon, I entered a room filled with intense people discussing
sets, costumes and makeup.
Authentic Americans are apparently so hard to come by that I didn't need a
real screen test: I got to be Dr. Steve Brown by swaggering a bit and
shouting a boisterous "Hi!" I wasn't the only fake American. A second was
an old friend, David Yeomans, a retired British trade unionist and
still-loyal Communist who settled in Moscow about 15 years ago. The other
doctor was Vadim Kurilov, a genial, 30-something Muscovite with a
spy-perfect American accent who works for a French perfume company. We had
small roles in A Force of One, a Russian-American detective series being
shot in Moscow and Los Angeles, which will premiere this fall on ORT,
Russia's most-watched TV network. If publicity blurbs are true, its 12
episodes should have an audience of 150 million people.
The female lead, whom we never met, is Sean Young, who, you may recall,
once played Harrison Ford's bionic love interest in the 1982 film Blade
Runner. The male lead, writer and director is Rodion Nakhapetov, a dashing
veteran of the Soviet screen who emigrated to America at the end of the
'80s. In the movie, the couple wed in Moscow and move to Los Angeles.
Nakhapetov's character, a detective in Russia, has trouble fitting in until
his intimate understanding of the Russian Mafia comes to the attention of
the LAPD.
For 4,500 rubles a day, or $225, we would-be cardiologists stood in damp
cold for hours outside a hospital, greeting sick kids, along with about 20
chilled soundmen, electricians, grips and gofers. Many of the crew had
worked on such celebrated epics as Nikita Mikhalkov's Burnt by the Sun and
The Barber of Siberia. But these days, Russian cineastes face challenges
that might prove daunting even to members of Canada's perennially
cash-starved film industry. Unlike the old days of the Soviet Union,
there's no government funding. Then, it was possible to produce films like
1968's six-and-a-half hour version of War and Peace -- which many critics
consider superior to the 1956 effort that starred Henry Fonda and Audrey
Hepburn. Today, tickets at local cinemas cost about 50 rubles, or $2.50 --
and even that's a stretch in a country where the average monthly wage
equals about $300. Sure, a few new cinemas are a match for those in the
West, but at 200 rubles, or four times the average ticket price, their
audience is almost entirely made up of foreigners. And Russian films battle
for audience against some of the world's most active video pirates:
Spider-Man was available on video in Moscow within days of its release for
the equivalent of $8.
The result, I learned first-hand, is that uncomfortable conditions are a
fact of filmmaking life in Russia. We spent a day bouncing around town in
an ambulance with Nakhapetov and his cinematographer, Andrei Beilkannov. As
cramped as it was, Beilkannov cheerily informed us that he found it much
more difficult to film in Russian train toilets. Joining us was
Nakhapetov's wife and the film's producer and on-camera interpreter,
Natasha Shliapnikoff, a White Russian whose family odyssey from China to
Chile and California after the Bolshevik Revolution would make a great film
in its own right.
I hadn't heard of Nakhapetov, but Russian friends considered it a big deal
to work with him. He had just finished directing and starring in Russia's
top-ranked TV series this past winter, in which he played yet another
emigre cop taking on an apparently inexhaustible supply of Russian
gangsters in sunny California. For years, Americans played the heavies in
propagandistic Soviet books and films. Now, they're often shown as friends
(or, like other foreigners, as bumbling fools) -- and the favourite
villains are the Russian Mafia.
At the same time, Moscow is no Hollywood: Nakhapetov, despite his star
status, stood in the cold with the rest of us and tucked into the same
hunks of cheese and ham on unbuttered bread. Between takes, his wife
Natasha regaled us with stories about how much more difficult it is to work
with perk-obsessed Russian actors in the U.S. than with American stars.
This is a comparison I may get to make myself: Nakhapetov asked if I would
be willing to reprise my role as Dr. Steve Brown on the West Coast next
month. If so, I hope Californians won't catch me out on my fake American
accent.
*******
#10
From: "Jerry F. Hough"
Subject: Stiglitz and Reform
Date: Mon, 13 May 2002
Anyone interested in the Russian economic reform, but especially
those in Russia in charge of economic reform, should absolutely read
Joseph Stiglitz' "Argentina Shortchanged: Why the Nation That Followed
the Rules Fell to Pieces" in the May 12 Washington Post, Outlook Section,
p. 1.
Stiglitz was the chief economist of the World Bank who led the
unsuccessful battle against the IMF policy in Russia and called it crazy.
He now teaches at Columbia University and was awarded the Nobel Prize in
Economics in 2001 as a statement by the Nobel committee that they think he
was right.
Stiglitz in his article lays out in detail why Argentina is now an
unmitigated disaster. As his title states, it closely followed the
advice of the IMF, which, as he states, virtually no other economist
outside the IMF believes. The IMF considered Argentina "an A+ student" as
late as 1998. It even followed the advice to cut the deficit as it
entered an
economic downturn, precisely the opposite that the conservative George Bush
advocates when the US has a downturn. Stiglitz argues that because of
the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s and the mishandling of the
financial crisis of 1997-1998 all of Latin America had one-half of the
economic growth of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.
Anyone familiar with Russia reads the article with a sense of
familiarity. Argentina was given the same advice as Russia and then Russia,
like Argentina, was a victim that was blamed for following the advice.
The article should be translated and given to President Putin.
Argentina also shows how a presidential system can work with bad
economic performance.
*******
#11
Barron's Online
May 13 2002
FBI Probes Itera, Pricewaterhouse on Gazprom Deals
By VITO J. RACANELLI
American accountants aren't under fire just in the U.S. Shareholders are
complaining of questionable bookkeeping as far away as Russia. In one case
involving PricewaterhouseCoopers, Itera, a gas-trading company, and OAO
Gazprom, the Russian energy giant, Barron's was told that the FBI is
investigating the situation in connection with alleged fraud and asset
stripping of Gazprom, whose American depositary receipts also trade in New
York.
An FBI spokesman says the agency doesn't confirm or deny the existence of
investigations, but two people tell Barron's that during the past few weeks
they have been approached by FBI agents seeking information on the issue.
The agency can investigate an overseas matter if it involves a U.S. company
or citizen.
Richard Buski, PWC senior partner for Russia, said he hasn't been contacted
by the FBI, and he isn't aware of any FBI investigation. A PWC company
spokesman in the U.S. says the same thing. In an e-mail, a U.S.-based Itera
spokeswoman replied that Itera hasn't been contacted by the FBI and isn't
aware of any probe.
However, James Fenkner, an analyst at investment bank Troika Dialog
Research, says the FBI has contacted him on at least five different
occasions in recent weeks concerning Itera's relationship with Gazprom and
about a shareholder lawsuit against PWC. The FBI didn't reveal who the
target of the probe was, Fenkner says.
Another person who has been contacted by FBI agents and Justice Department
attorneys over the same issues says the federal officials were interested
in the Itera-Gazprom dealings and a PWC audit of that relationship that was
presented to Gazprom shareholders.
On May 20 the Gazprom board is expected to examine whether to keep PWC as
its auditor.
Fenkner recently wrote a report criticizing the U.S. Trade and Development
Agency for approving a grant to help develop the giant Achimneftegaz field,
which has 13 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Itera owns 49% and
Gazprom 51% of the field. In his report, Fenkner alleges Itera obtained its
stake, as well as other assets, from Gazprom in the late 1990s at prices
far below market level thanks to what he termed an incestuous relationship
between Itera and Gazprom's former management.
In June 2001, Gazprom Chief Executive Rem Vyakhirev and other managers were
removed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The former Gazprom managers
are thought to have an interest in Itera, but it isn't clear who owns the
beneficial trusts that nominally control Itera. The U.S. agency's grant
subsequently was suspended.
The FBI probe follows increasing protests by Gazprom shareholders over the
alleged asset stripping by Itera. PWC's Russian affiliate recently was hit
with a lawsuit in a Russian court by Hermitage Capital Management. The
minority Gazprom shareholder contends the affiliate conducted "false and
misleading audits" that covered up sales of Gazprom gas-field assets to
Itera at sweetheart prices. Pricewaterhouse has said the suit is unfounded.
Gazprom is 38% owned by the Russian government.
Friday was a holiday in Russia, and a spokesman for Gazprom wasn't
reachable by press time.
*******
#12
Maclean's (Canada)
May 20, 2002
Ripped off in Russia
Canadian companies are losing their investments
PAUL WEBSTER in Moscow
Alex Rotzang expected to make a fortune developing the Siberian oil field.
But one day last June, as the hard-driving businessman arrived at his
office in Moscow, the phone rang. It was his firm's director general,
Lyudmila Kondrashina, calling. She had just fled the company's operations
office and she sounded terrified. A score of heavily armed men dressed in
army fatigues had seized the building and four gunmen barred her way when
she attempted to return. "The company has a new director," their leader
shouted, waving a document under the muzzle of his AK-47. It was a hostile
takeover -- Russian style.
Rotzang, the chairman of Norex Petroleum Ltd., is now at his head office in
Calgary, and fighting to get justice for his firm. "We worked hard for 10
years, paid our taxes and built a model company," he says. On Feb. 27,
Rotzang launched a $2.4-billion lawsuit against Tyumen Oil Co., the
powerful Russian firm that was Norex's partner in the project -- and the
company, Rotzang says, that sent in the gunmen. Rotzang is not the only
Canadian businessman battling his way through Russia's capricious court
system in an attempt to hang on to Russian assets. In a country where new
laws regulating foreign corporations are written almost daily, and where
local laws often conflict with federal legislation, a disturbing trend has
emerged: after the Canadian firms spend millions of dollars getting the
projects off the ground, their Russian partners exploit legal
technicalities in court to break the contracts and take control.
Just ask Kinross Gold Corp. of Toronto. The company invested $68 million
developing a gold mine in Siberia. Its lawyers are now in court in Magadan,
a former Soviet prison town on Russia's remote north Pacific coast, trying
to fend off a dispute over shares that could result in Kinbross losing
control. Facing off against the company: its Russian partner, Geometall
Plus. Unlike Rotzang's employees, Kinross executives were not threatened
with AK-47s. Instead, the court has been asked to rule on a complicated
legal question surrounding the validity of Kinross's shares in the project.
Even though Kinross now controls the majority of shares, it faces an uphill
struggle in court. "A judge in Magadan is going to be thinking about a
crowbar on his head if he favours a foreigner," says Peter Sahlas, a
Canadian lawyer who has worked on Russian legal reform programs. Kinross
vice-president John Ivany understands the reality. He says he is optimistic
that he will win in court, but Russian judges, he adds diplomatically, "are
known for hometown decisions." And while Russian President Vladimir Putin
has instituted changes to the legal system -- among them dramatically
boosting funding for the courts and attempting to blunt the arbitrary power
of judges by moving toward a jury-based system -- analysts say the country
still has a long way to go before foreign companies can expect impartiality.
It was into this murky, sometimes violent world of frontier capitalism that
Prime Minister Jean Chretien led more than 300 Canadian businessmen on a
trade mission in February. The Russians hoped to sign $1 billion in
contracts, but given the controversies surrounding Norex and Kinross, in
the end Team Canada inked just $148 million in new deals. Still, the
mission culminated in a giant party at the Moscow arena where Canada
defeated Russia in the 1972 hockey showdown. Putin attended, shaking hands
and chatting, but Sergei Kovalev, a respected member of the Russian
parliament, told Maclean's he doubts if the Canadian firms will ever make
much money. Some, he said, will be lucky not to lose their shirts: "Go
ahead and invest -- but don't trust the legal system in Russia."
Rotzang certainly won't be investing in Russia again. He faces arrest if he
returns -- there's an ongoing criminal case against him for alleged
misappropriation of funds. And he is so fed up and frightened by his
experiences that he turned down Chretien's invitation to buy a spot on the
trade mission for $8,000. "Given the level of personal intimidation I've
had from police and even judges, I don't feel safe in Russia," he says. "I
think Chretien made a huge mistake picking Russia for the Team Canada
visit, because what happened to me could happen to any Canadian who invests
in Russia."
The list of Canadian companies claiming their projects have been stolen out
from under them by their Russian partners is already long -- and growing.
Archangel Diamond Corp., which is listed on Calgary's TSX Venture Exchange,
is among the losers. In 1996, the company discovered a massive diamond
deposit in northwestern Russia, estimated to be worth $8 billion. But the
project was stalled when its partner went to court in an attempt to
overturn a deal under which the two firms had agreed to co-own the mine.
"There's no way we can get a fair hearing in Russian courts," says
Archangel chief executive officer Timothy Haddon, who also fears for his
life if he returns to Russia. Appealing to Ottawa hasn't helped either.
"Chretien," says Haddon, "has decided he wants to be pals with Putin no
matter what happens to us."
In late 1999, Vancouver-based Pan American Silver ran up against the Kaskol
Group, a giant Moscow-based conglomerate that has major holdings in
aerospace, shipbuilding and mining, and enjoys close government connections
(its offices are located across a narrow lane from the powerful Ministry of
Natural Resources). Kaskol also controls Polymetall, Pan American's partner
in the development. After investing $60 million in a massive Russian silver
mine located in Magadan, Pan American was forced to write off its
investment through a dubious legal process that challenged the
technicalities surrounding its government-issued licence -- a legal
manoeuvre that the mine's former general manager Jim Wade describes as
"very clever" but "very unhappy."
Another of the unhappy ones is Ivanhoe Energy of Vancouver, which invested
$68 million in a very promising Siberian oil venture. But Ivanhoe's
partner, which controlled the licences to produce the oil, reneged on a
deal to share the revenues. Ivanhoe walked away in 2000 with a settlement
of $46 million, well short of its original investment. And Toronto-based
Bitech Petroleum had a similar experience two years ago, when its Russian
partner went to court claiming Bitech did not have legal title to its
licence to develop an oil field in the Komi region of Siberia and should be
forced to quit the project. The company spent nearly $8 million defending
its licence and buying out its partner before finally deciding it had had
enough of the Russian justice system and left the country.
During a speech at the Team Canada party in Moscow, Chretien acknowledged
that "the negative experience of some Canadian investors has tarnished the
Russian market in the eyes of many." But he noted that, recently, the
Russian economy has grown rapidly, while Putin is implementing legal
reforms that should level the playing field for Canadian firms. Pierre
Pettigrew, the Canadian international trade minister, agrees. He told
Maclean's the Russian market is simply too big to ignore. "We have to be
here," he said. "We are impressed by Putin and his efforts to implement
reforms."
The Canadian International Development Agency has also suffered in its
dealings in Russia. Since 1993, it has spent $130 million to, among other
goals, germinate Canadian business in Russia -- but has virtually nothing
to show for it. "There are huge barriers here," concedes Eric Yendall,
CIDA's representative in Russia. "Our efforts to support direct contacts
between Canadian and Russian businesses mostly didn't work out."
Even some CIDA projects designed to improve the legal framework backfired.
In 1995 the agency gave a $1-million grant to help the prestigious
Toronto-based Gowlings, now Canada's second-largest law firm, to rewrite
Russia's bankruptcy laws. By forcing companies that had been ignoring their
creditors to finally pay their debts, the new legislation spurred a big
increase in bankruptcies, which rose to 11,000 in 1999 from 4,300 in 1997.
With weak, money-losing companies out of the market, analysts hoped the
Russian economy would become more competitive. Instead, powerful
politicians and businessmen often had their cronies named as
court-appointed managers of troubled companies, allowing them to take over
some of the firms and strip them of any prize assets.
Last February, CIDA also put $4.8 million into a project in the Magadan
region, which is aimed in part at helping small Russian businesses develop
in the area where Pan American Silver and Kinross Gold have struggled. But
Rotzang thinks CIDA will be wasting its money. "The Canadian government may
think Russia is being reformed," says Rotzang. "But from what I've seen
after dozens of trips there, the courts still allow Russians to steal from
us at will."
*******
#13
Wall Street Journal
May 13, 2002
Editorial
Russia House
The rhetorical spin isn't hard to predict for when the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and Russia sign tomorrow their new accord on closer
cooperation in Reykjavik, Iceland. "History being made," "a new dawn," "a
quantum leap forward in relations," and the like. Much will also be made
out of the historical coincidence that, just 16 years ago on the same
Arctic island, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev sparred over arms control.
But the pomp and circumstance is a substitute for substance. In reality,
this deal is but a repackaging of past efforts to get Moscow to work
closely with -- rather than against -- NATO.
Little will be said either that Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who'll sign
on behalf of the Russians, spent the latter part of the 1990s obstructing
NATO from the Baltics to Balkans. Mr. Ivanov's "nyet" can still be heard at
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) when that
Vienna-based body wants to pressure the dictatorship in Belarus or build-up
democratic institutions in Kosovo.
None of these uncomfortable questions about Russian policy and past
behavior will be raised at the festivities in Iceland. Everyone wants a
fresh start. Russia's President Vladimir Putin later this month will be in
Rome for the inaugural session of the Russia-NATO Council created by the
deal. This body, a "NATO at 20", is going to meet monthly to discuss and
take joint decisions on issues of common concern. Among them, diplomats
say, will be peacekeeping in the Balkans, missile proliferation, and
counter-terrorism.
The new council does, indeed, present an opportunity for Russia to join the
community of Western democracies by working with them on security. A new
beginning needs foremost a new attitude from Russia itself. The alliance
will be counting on Mr. Putin to provide the good will to get his generals
and ministers to play along with his commitment to improve relations with
the West. Mr. Ivanov, a hawkish holdover from the era of former President
Boris Yeltsin, was cut out of the loop during the talks with the alliance,
according to NATO officials. All in all, they say, NATO's deal is really
with Mr. Putin, not Russia .
NATO says it is a win-win for the alliance. Russia will be expected to name
a new ambassador to NATO and set up a mission at the Brussels headquarters.
Other former Soviet satellites have had their diplomats in place for years,
working in tandem with NATO on military reforms and other issues.
The new Russia council, as a matter of fact, replaces the NATO-Russia
Permanent Joint Council, which was set up in 1997 and, just like the new
one, was supposed to discuss common concerns and take joint decisions. The
council never lived up to those early hopes; Russia even walked out for a
few months to protest NATO's war in Kosovo.
If that happens again, then NATO won't be any worse off for the effort to
engage Moscow. It might be better off. If Russia becomes a true partner for
NATO, and behaves better in Chechnya and Moldova and Georgia, then fine.
But the political motivations behind the initiative raise uncomfortable
questions about the deal itself. The U.S. saw the promise of an "equal
voice" for Moscow at NATO on certain issues as a way to reward Mr. Putin.
In Washington's view, the Kremlin boss took big risks by letting the U.S.
tear up the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty without a fuss and parachute
American forces into the old Russian stomping grounds in the Caucasus and
Central Asia. The U.S. wants the three Baltic countries inside NATO when
the alliance enlarges in November. The agreement is "small consolation for
Putin," a senior NATO official tells us.
Washington initially seemed too ready to bargain away what's still the
world's most successful military alliance to meet political priorities of
the day. The U.S. scaled back the ambition and scope of the council. But
other unanswered questions remain. What are "common interests"? Will NATO
and Russia carve up spheres of influence? Will NATO truly decide to act on
its own when it can't in concert with Russia , or to what extent can Russia
water down what the allies wants to do? The alliance has trouble enough
taking decisions at 19 without inviting Russia to the party.
NATO responds the alliance will tread carefully in the first few months and
won't put any "big ticket" items on the agenda. This council or NATO must
not be allowed to resemble the OSCE, which Moscow long argued ought to be a
model for a future NATO.
The alliance and Russia are no longer enemies, and can be friends. The
world has changed. Yet the good will must come mostly from Russia ; NATO
has for years shown it can get along with most of the former Soviet empire.
Most importantly, it bears reminding, Russia isn't a member of NATO, nor
will it be soon. In drawing up new structures for the alliance this year in
the wake of September 11, the U.S. says two principles are sacrosanct: the
integrity of NATO must not be diluted and Russia will not have a veto over
alliance decisions. To keep the alliance strong even as it is given a new
look this year, the 19 current members of NATO must be faithful to the
spirit as well as the letter of that policy.
*******
#14
New York Times
May 13, 2002
A Bombing in Russia: A Massacre of Children
By MICHAEL WINES
KASPISK, Russia, May 11 — Laura Gidayatova was at her stall in the outdoor
market of this Caspian seaside town on Thursday, hawking the flowers that
countless folks were laying on the graves of World War II veterans, when
the distant rumble of an explosion washed over the vendors.
She paid it little mind. This was Victory Day, the anniversary of Russia's
defeat of Nazi Germany 57 years ago, and noisy celebration was to be
expected. She learned the truth only when a neighbor arrived bearing the
clothes of her own 5-year-old daughter, Zuriat.
"They were soaked in blood," Ms. Gidayatova said today, two days after the
event. "I said, 'Where is she?' and she said, 'She's in the hospital.' "
Zuriat had wandered onto Lenin Street to watch the annual parade when a
bomb packed with plastic explosive and metal bits detonated just yards
away, spraying her face and chest with shrapnel. She was in Kaspisk's
dilapidated city hospital today, swathed in bandages.
Anwar Gasanov, 14, had been standing with about 10 teenage friends, waiting
to join the procession. Today he lay just down the hall from Zuriat, his
left arm and right shoulder tightly wrapped after surgery to extract
shrapnel.
One of his friends died on the spot. A second lost a leg and died hours later.
"The person who did this," said Anwar's mother, Kistaman Gasanova, "could
not have been born of a mother."
The special horror of the bomb here in the Russian republic of Dagestan is
not the total number of those killed but the number of children who died.
Of at least 41 deaths recorded so far, 17 were children. Thirty more
children were wounded.
The authorities said today that the bomb appeared to be an antipersonnel
mine, detonated by remote control. The question on virtually everyone's
lips in this city of 70,000 was what kind of person could destroy so many
young lives.
For the answer, Russian government investigators look to the slow-burning
guerrilla war that has consumed the next-door republic, Chechnya, since 1999.
Prosecutors arrested three men in St. Petersburg on Friday, saying there
were "very strong arguments" that they and others, inside and outside
Russia, were linked to the blast.
Nikolai Patrushev, the director of the Federal Security Service, Russia's
domestic intelligence agency, said the bombers were "linked first of all to
Wahhabism," the sect of Islam that has played a growing role in the war in
Chechnya. But he and prosecutors declined to make public their evidence,
saying the case was still being built.
Three weeks ago, the security service announced with some fanfare that it
had liquidated an Arab guerrilla known as Khattab, the leader of Islamic
militants who are waging at least part of the Chechen war.
One possibility discussed this week was that the Kaspisk blast had been set
off in retaliation for Khattab's death or to demonstrate the rebels'
resolve to continue the battle.
In addition to the toll among the young, at least 18 servicemen, many of
them in a marching band, and at least 6 civilians were killed.
There were indications that a principal target may have been about 10
senior military officers who were marching behind the band and in front of
a column of flower-bearing children. At least three lieutenant colonels and
a major from that group were killed, officials said today.
Dagestan's deputy health minister, Paizula Magomedov, said in an interview
today that about 160 people had been wounded.
Mr. Magomedov said Kaspisk's hospital, clean but falling apart after a
decade of deferred repairs and puny budgets, had been overwhelmed by the
flood of wounded. "We have enough medicine," he said. "But what we are
lacking is equipment — for anesthesia, respiratory equipment, monitors for
pulse and blood pressure," he said, equipment that is "very important for
getting people out of critical condition."
This town has been bombed before. An explosion in November 1996, still
unsolved, collapsed a military apartment house, killing 68. But the tragedy
of Thursday has left residents here reeling, because it struck down
children from all over town.
Virtually every class in every school was assigned a role for Victory Day.
School No. 1 absorbed the greatest blow: seven deaths, mostly
eighth-graders who were carrying wreaths to the cemetery. The city
Gymnasium, a public preparatory school of 900 students, lost two students.
School No. 6 lost three; the city Mechanical-Technical School lost one.
The explosion threw its worst shrapnel in a low arc through the band and
across the street. Anwar Gasanov, who was standing, escaped with minor
wounds. A schoolmate sitting on the curb died instantly.
Today, a 30-by-30-foot square of Lenin Street was roped off with red
plastic tape and surrounded by hundreds of mourners. The square was filled
with hundreds of flowers.
"For us, after our great Soviet Union has fallen apart, this is the only
day we hold dear," Murtuz Murtazliyev, the Gymnasium vice principal, said
as he at the bomb scene on Friday evening. "Every class is schooled in
this. And every class prepared wreaths and flowers.
"Those wreaths and flowers were meant for soldiers' graves," he said. "Now
they are here."
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