Johnson's Russia List
#6236
11 May 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. New York Times: Strobe Talbott, Leading a Russia in Transition.
(DJ: Has anyone seen The Russia Hand?)
2. ITAR-TASS: Russia's education budget exceeds defence spending.
3. Lara Iglitzin (Jackson Foundation): re McFaul's op ed in Washington
Post/6234.
4. Arch Getty: Visa tit-for-tat.
5. Los Angeles Times: John Daniszewski, Bombing Ignites Anger in Russia.
Caucasus: Suspicions rest on separatists from Chechen republic as death
toll rises to 41.
6. BBC Monitoring: Chechen rebel spokesman condemns Kaspiysk blast.
7. The Guardian (UK): Ian Traynor, Putin tactics echo communist era.
Determined to maintain President Putin's booming popularity the Kremlin is
channelling criticism of policy away from him and on to his government.
8. Voice of America: Sonja Pace, Russian Farm Land Reform Still Delicate
Issue.
9. RFE/RL: Jeremy Bransten, Putin Seeking New Legislation To Combat
Extremism.
10. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Developments in the
Chechen Conflict. Statement of Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
11. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Developments in the
Chechen Conflict. Statement of Anatol Leiven, Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.]
******
#1
New York Times
May 11, 2002
Leading a Russia in Transition
By STROBE TALBOTT
NEW HAVEN
Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state in the Clinton administration, is
author of the forthcoming "The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential
Diplomacy."
One factor in Russia's transition from dictatorship to democracy has been
the capacity of its recent leaders to break with their own pasts. Once
Mikhail Gorbachev made it to the top of the Soviet system, he moved to
repudiate its reliance on lies and brute force, setting the stage for the
end of the empire and of the cold war. Boris Yeltsin, who rose to the
Politburo by carrying out its orders, spent his presidency doing battle
against the remnants of the Communist Party. Vladimir Putin, a former
K.G.B. officer who almost everyone believed would be hopelessly out of his
depth as Mr. Yeltsin's successor, has remained popular at home while
accelerating Russia's alignment with the West.
And then there are the also-rans. One of those, Aleksandr Lebed, died at
the age of 52 in a helicopter accident on April 28 in Siberia. He was a
paratroop general right out of a recruiting poster. Barrel-chested and
steely-eyed, with a basso profundo voice, he had achieved prominence
commanding a Russian division that stayed behind in the former Soviet
republic of Moldova after the collapse of the Soviet Union. That background
made him appealing to nationalists who hoped for a return to
authoritarianism at home and for Moscow's domination of neighboring states.
But Mr. Lebed surprised admirers and critics alike. By the time he ran in
the presidential elections of 1996, he had won over many liberals and posed
a credible alternative to Mr. Yeltsin, the incumbent; the Communist
candidate, Gennadi Zyuganov; and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, an ultranationalist.
An early critic of the war in Chechnya, Mr. Lebed presented himself to
voters as a tough, honest soldier with no tolerance for military bungling
and the waste of lives. He finished a strong third, behind Mr. Yeltsin and
Mr. Zyuganov, in the first round of voting. Mr. Yeltsin co-opted Mr.
Lebed's support to assure victory in the second round, making him head of
the Kremlin security council with a mandate to end the war in Chechnya. Mr.
Lebed negotiated a cease-fire with the Chechens that lasted for three
years. With no further use for the general-turned-peacemaker and fearing
that his popularity would grow, Mr. Yeltsin dumped him.
When I met with Aleksandr Lebed during his first trip to the United States,
in November 1996, he delivered a long and astute critique of his country's
economy: Russia was well endowed by nature but hindered in its chances of
ever becoming a modern state because it had a crazy, capricious tax policy
and rampant corruption. Democracy itself, he said, was in ill repute among
average Russians because it was identified with crime, chaos and poverty.
Russian democracy would have to be Russian-made — not, as he put it, an
import like Coke. Yet he professed to believe that America was "Russia's
most reliable long-term partner."
If he were in charge, he said, he would make Russia a genuine federation.
Decentralization, he said, was the best antidote to the breakup of Russia.
The iron hand of Moscow only encouraged secessionists; that, he believed,
was the lesson of Chechnya.
In those days, the single most contentious issue in American-Russian
relations was enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, due to
begin the following year. Yet Mr. Lebed didn't raise the subject, so toward
the end of our meeting I asked what he thought. Russians had "real
problems," he said. "They don't need phantom ones." It was a precursor of
the sensible view that Vladimir Putin has adopted and that will probably
guide him at his meeting with President Bush later this month, when Mr.
Bush is expected to confirm that NATO, at its meeting this fall, will bring
in additional Central European states, including former Baltic republics of
the Soviet Union.
In the late 90's, Mr. Lebed voluntarily packed himself off to Siberia — yet
another indication of how dramatically Russia had changed. In trying to
make a go of the governorship of the vast Krasnoyarsk region, he was
holding open the option of a return to political power in Moscow. Mr.
Putin, in his meteoric rise, eclipsed all other contenders for the
presidency in 2000 in part by adopting some of Mr. Lebed's imagery and
campaign techniques. It's a sign of Russia's continuing transformation that
Mr. Lebed's once prominent national role already seems part of an earlier
era.
*******
#2
Russia's education budget exceeds defence spending
ITAR-TASS
United Nations, 11 May: For the first time in decades, Russia's education
budget has exceeded the national defence spending this year, Deputy Prime
Minister Valentina Matviyenko said on Friday [10 May] as she addressed the
27th special session of the UN General Assembly on children.
President Vladimir Putin and the Russian government "are closely watching"
the interests of children. "The president issued a special decree declaring
the survival, upbringing and education of children a task of paramount
importance," Matviyenko said.
"We are close to finalizing the guidelines of state social policy to
improve the conditions of children. It specifies a programme of action for
the next ten years," she said, adding that the Cabinet of Ministers had
also endorsed a list of urgent measures in that field.
*******
#3
From: Lara Iglitzin [iglitzin@hmjackson.org]
Sent: Friday, May 10, 2002
Subject: McFaul's op ed in Washington Post/6234
Regarding Michael McFaul's piece on May 10, 2002, arguing for graduating
Russia from the annual review called for under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment,
I am in full agreement with his view that Jewish emigration from Russia no
longer remains a pressing human rights concern and that the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment has served its purpose - stunningly well -- in the U.S.-Russian
relationship. I also share his grave concern for the other human rights
violations that occur regularly in Russia, particularly in the area of
press and religious freedoms, that have not been given the attention they
deserve by either President Putin or any Western political leaders. While
Professor McFaul calls for the establishment of Congressional legislation
to fund a new foundation to address current human rights concerns in Russia
as a way of commemorating the original intent of the Jackson-Vanik
legislation, I would like to remind readers that the Henry M. Jackson
Foundation, established to further the legacy of Senator Henry M. "Scoop"
Jackson and established in 1983, has as one of its fundamental missions the
direct support of human rights activists and organizations in Moscow.
Non-governmental organizations such as Memorial, Moscow Helsinki Group and
the Glasnost Defense Fund - in addition to many lesser-known groups - have
been receiving steady support from the Henry M. Jackson Foundation for
eight years for their critical work in support of core political rights,
such as free speech, freedom of the press, religious freedom, and the
encouragement of tolerance and democratic values within Russian society. I
strongly agree with Dr. McFaul that more resources should be made available
to the worthy activists who struggle for human rights on a daily basis in
Russia. We urge others to join us in supporting those who defend the civil
liberties and freedoms in Russia that Senator Jackson held so dear.
Lara Iglitzin is the Executive Director of the Henry M. Jackson Foundation,
Seattle, Washington see http://www.hmjackson.org, for information in
English and Russian on our Russian grants.
Lara Iglitzin
Executive Director
Henry M. Jackson Foundation
1001 4th Avenue, Suite 3317
Seattle, WA 98154
tel: (206) 682-8565
fax: (206) 682-8961
*******
#4
From: Arch Getty (getty@ucla.edu)
Sent: 5/10/02
Subject: Visa tit-for-tat
As of May 1, 2002, there is a supplemental form, Form #95, which is
required ONLY for all male US citizens of age 16-45 who are applying for
visas to travel to Russia.
This is clearly in response to recent US visa regulations changes
designed to prevent terrorists from entering the US (JRL #6029), and is
part of the longstanding and stupid visa tit-for-tat that goes back
decades to Soviet times.
Like its US counterpart, the Russian form asks questions like the
following:
"7. List all countries You have visited in the last ten years (give the
name of each visited city)
11. List all professional, social and charitable organizations to which
You belong (belonged) or contribute (contributed) or with which You work
(have worked)
12. Do You have any specialized skills or training, including firearms,
explosives, nuclear, biological or chemical experience?
Yes (please explain)
No"
How can one fathom the stupidity of both governments? Do they really
imagine that these forms will stop a terrorist or are anything but a
nuisance for normal citizens? Can one imagine a real terrorist filling
out this form and ("please") explaining his explosives training? Are all
terrorists males between 16 and 45 years of age?
The proof that this is not a serious anti-terrorist measure but rather
part of an infantile consular game is that fact that only US males have to
complete the Russian form.
*******
#5
Los Angeles Times
May 11, 2002
Bombing Ignites Anger in Russia
Caucasus: Suspicions rest on separatists from Chechen republic as death
toll rises to 41.
By JOHN DANISZEWSKI, TIMES STAFF WRITER
MOSCOW -- At a time when world attention has been riveted on events in the
Middle East and Afghanistan, the continuing drip, drip, drip of carnage on
Russia's southern rim rarely gets noticed.
But the bomb filled with nails, nuts and bolts that ripped apart
schoolchildren and Russian army musicians in the republic of Dagestan on
Thursday, fatally wounding 41 people during a moment of national
celebration, is not likely to be soon forgotten in Moscow.
President Vladimir V. Putin immediately blamed Islamic extremists who have
been waging war in neighboring Chechnya, and vowed that they would be
treated like the Nazis whom Russia and its Western allies eradicated in
World War II. The bombing occurred just as Putin was addressing a parade in
Moscow's Red Square to mark Victory Day, a commemoration of the triumph
over Nazi Germany that remains one of Russia's most meaningful and
emotional holidays.
Russia is used to being widely criticized in the West for human rights
abuses in Chechnya. However, it believes the U.S. should start to get
behind its campaign against extremists in the Caucasus. That is a message
Putin will be reinforcing to President Bush at a Moscow summit later this
month, several analysts said.
Bush's public comments of condolence to Russia are a sign that he is coming
around to Putin's viewpoint and is starting to see the Chechen conflict,
which has frequently spilled over into Dagestan and other neighboring
republics, as part of the wider war on terrorism, said political analyst
Liliya F. Shevtsova of the Carnegie Moscow Center think tank.
"One should not expect any U.S. pressure on Moscow to expedite a peaceful
end of the Chechen conflict any time soon," she concluded. On the contrary,
the bombing in the Caspian seaside town of Kaspiysk "will only cement the
existing rapport between Washington and Moscow" on terrorism.
The official death toll in the bombing rose Friday to 41, including 17
children. More than 90 people still were hospitalized, Dagestani officials
said.
Authorities reported that some suspects had been arrested for questioning
in connection with the bombing. The Federal Security Service was leading
the investigation, and local residents were reportedly coming forward with
tips on possible suspects.
An amateur videotape played on television showed children frolicking behind
a military brass band Thursday morning, followed by a sickening shudder and
a cloud of smoke. The children and musicians suddenly come into focus
again--this time as piles of bleeding bodies lying on the pavement as
survivors scream in pain.
Despite being inured to terrorist acts in the northern Caucasus region,
Russians were thrown into stark fury.
"The people who committed the crime should be brought here, put right in
the place where it happened, and then be cut into pieces, so that they
themselves would experience the same pain," one indignant woman in Kaspiysk
told the NTV television network.
"For many people, this act of terror is and will be the most painful
experience of their entire lives, an experience never to be forgotten,"
Kaspiysk Mayor Dzhamaludin Omarov, a former police colonel, said in a phone
interview.
"I personally can still hear the screams and see the dead bodies in my
mind's eye," he said. "The entire town is in mourning."
Suspicion immediately came to rest on the separatist movement in
neighboring Chechnya or its sympathizers in Dagestan. The separatists have
been waging a war against Russian police and soldiers since fall 1999. In
recent weeks, Russia claimed to be making headway, trumpeting the death of
an Arab commander, Khattab, who was reportedly killed with a poison-laden
letter.
Russian policy toward separatists is already harsh, including repeated
roundups and arrests in Chechnya. Human rights groups have reported
"disappearances" of young men from villages there. But if the bombers
thought the attack would bring them closer to their goals, just the
opposite may be true, said Shevtsova.
"Instead of peace, the terrorist act will spur the federal authorities to
intensify the campaign aimed at knocking out the remaining Chechen
warlords," she said. Such a brazen attack "makes a peace deal indefinitely
remote."
Dagestan's envoy in Moscow, Ramazan Magomedov, said he wants to see prison
sentences for terrorist acts extended beyond the current five to 10 years.
The masterminds behind Thursday's crime, he said, were most likely Islamic
extremists with ties to international terrorist organizations, and they may
already have escaped to Chechnya or elsewhere in Russia.
Alexander I. Zhilin, a Moscow-based military analyst, said he believed the
attackers may have been influenced by the tactics that some Palestinians
have adopted against Israel--trying to inflict maximum suffering on a more
militarily powerful foe.
"The terrorist act in Kaspiysk ... will only make the authorities more
determined to finish the rebels off as soon as possible," Zhilin said. "The
country has been waiting for this for way too long, and now it is high time."
However, he doubted that Russians would long remember the bombing. After a
few weeks, they will simply block it out, as they have many other bitter
experiences, he said.
"If Russians were to commemorate every single tragedy that occurs, then
most of the calendar would have been colored black a long time ago," he said.
Alexei V. Kuznetsov of The Times' Moscow Bureau contributed to this report.
*******
#6
BBC Monitoring
Chechen rebel spokesman condemns Kaspiysk blast
Source: Chechenpress web site, Tbilisi, in Russian 11 May 02
11 May, Chechenpress correspondent A. Amayev: Commenting on the explosion
in the Dagestani town of Kaspiysk in which innocent people died, [Akhmed]
Zakayev, special representative of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov,
condemned the organizers of the terrorist act. On behalf of the Chechen
government, he expressed condolences to the families of the victims.
Commenting on statements by some Dagestani leaders on a possible "Chechen
link" in this crime, Zakayev said that the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov, had
categorically prohibited his soldiers from conducting military operations
on territory of the brotherly Caucasus republics. The Chechen side does not
condone military actions in which civilians suffer, as our people
themselves are victims of military aggression by Russia, Zakayev underlined.
However, he said that Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov resolutely
condemned all methods and forms of terrorism, regardless of the reasons for
which they are committed.
*******
#7
The Guardian (UK)
10 May 2002
Putin tactics echo communist era
Determined to maintain President Putin's booming popularity the Kremlin is
channelling criticism of policy away from him and on to his government
By Ian Traynor
Following a summit of Caspian Sea littoral states in Turkmenistan a couple
of weeks ago, President Vladimir Putin took advantage of geography to pay a
flying visit to nearby Astrakhan, the Volga delta town that is the centre
of the Caspian caviar industry.
It was a humdrum presidential walkabout, for Mr Putin if not for the
locals, that generated little that was conventionally newsworthy, certainly
for the international media but also for Russian newspapers. But ORT, the
main state television channel, did not see it that way.
That evening's flagship news broadcast devoted the first 13 minutes of the
bulletin to Mr Putin's Astrakhan activities. And at the end of the
broadcast, the editors returned for a further five minutes of Putin sound
bites and footage - 18 minutes of the 35-minute bulletin, just over half
the entire programme, were dedicated to the president although there was no
news.
If such reverential coverage of the Kremlin recalls the bad old habits of
the Soviet era and the obligatory portrayal of politburo leaders at the top
of the news every evening, the past week of holidays in Russia has
reinforced the tendency.
The May Day holiday featured the usual small crowd of ageing communists on
the streets protesting over poverty, but more significantly, and for the
first time in the post-communist era, the Kremlin threw open Red Square to
an orchestrated demonstration of devotion to the leader.
Tens of thousands of carefully marshalled marchers turned out by the walls
of the Kremlin in honour of "our president", bearing aloft pictures of Mr
Putin like sacred icons.
Earlier this week, the rent-a-crowd returned to the centre of Moscow for
another worship session, this time to mark the second anniversary of Mr
Putin's first term as president. And then on Thursday, Mr Putin himself
turned up on the Red Square rostrum to take the victory parade as thousands
of young soldiers marched past to celebrate the defeat of the Nazis 57
years ago.
The Putin parades are becoming a fixture of Russian political life. The
evening news has turned into a deadening recitation of the leader's
activities that day.
Mr Putin's popularity ratings are sky high, yet to dip below the 70% mark
in his two years in office. The Kremlin spin doctors are naturally
determined to keep it that way, heading off the slightest prospect of
dissent or protest with rival and bigger demonstrations of support while
channelling criticism of policy away from the president and on to his
government.
Mr Putin himself has recently adopted this tactic, playing the role of
stern but well-meaning schoolmaster faced with a hand-picked cabinet cast
into the role of naughty schoolboys.
May Day was a case in point. To show that the president is hardworking
while his ministers are idle, the TV cameras were present for his little
pep-talk to a cabinet missing several key members.
The prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov was sunning himself in Sochi on the
Black Sea. The economics minister, German Gref and the finance minister,
Aleksei Kudrin, were also playing truant.
This is the troika charged with Russian economic policy. So in their
absence, Mr Putin was shown rebuking the government for failing to present
him with a new set of economic figures and being laggardly on economic
policy.
It was the same story last month when Mr Putin delivered his state of the
nation speech in the Kremlin, the set-piece event of Russia's domestic
political year. It was a speech long on banalities, short on sound bites,
in which Mr Putin complained that Russian bureaucrats are bureaucratic and
Russian monopolies are monopolistic.
There were no fresh ideas, nor major policy initiatives. Given the
seachange in international relations since September 11 and Mr Putin's
shift towards partnership with America and the west, it was the ideal
occasion to explain his u-turn. He barely mentioned it.
Instead, the thrust of his speech was criticism of his own hand-picked
government, as if its performance and policies had nothing to do with him.
Anywhere else, the Kremlin speech and the May Day reproaches would signal a
major cabinet reshuffle, at the very least, and perhaps Mr Putin is about
to change his team.
If not, the attacks can only demoralise members of the cabinet while
confirming that the main political contest in Russia occurs within and
between Kremlin cliques behind closed doors rather than between government
and opposition, rival parties, or on the floor of parliament.
Mr Putin complained about the lack of transparency in Russian political
life although he presides over a Kremlin that is the least transparent in
Russia since the early 80s of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko. Three days
before the big speech in the Kremlin, Mr Putin's press service was still
refusing to confirm when the speech would be made.
Mr Putin's appeal to Russians is based on his image as a strong man -
dynamic, diligent, and dutiful. But the fawning TV coverage, the
orchestrated mass rallies of supporters, and the deflection of
responsibility for policy from the president to the ministers charged with
implementing it suggest a weaker and less confident leader than he usually
appears.
*******
#8
Voice of America
11 May 2002
Russian Farm Land Reform Still Delicate Issue
By Sonja Pace
Kaluga District, Russia
In the 10 years since the collapse of communism much has changed in Russia.
There is a new religious freedom, people can travel and do many things
formerly forbidden to them. But one holdover from the communist past
remains: the prohibition on the private ownership of farmland. It is an
issue that stirs passion and controversy and one the Russia's lower house
of parliament, the Duma, is to take up in the weeks to come.
If it were not for the Russian flag flying atop the barn, the green
pastures dotted with fat beef cattle could pass for any ranch on the
American prairie. But this is Andrei Davidov's farm in the Kaluga region
200-kilometers southwest of Moscow. "I love my farm. I like the country. I
like to look to my pastures, to my animals. .... I have good luck every
day. I like it," he says.
Mr. Davidov beams with pride as he brags to visitors of the cattle raising
techniques he uses, techniques he adopted after a visit to farms in Canada
and the United States. "I use North American technology. It is a very good
system. Cows and calves go to pasture, eat all they want. I use really good
methods for my farming, good quality pastures, good quality air. It is very
clean. [I have] healthy animals," he says. "They are happy and I'm happy
with them. They can pass on to me the profits."
Andrei Davidov took up farming 10 years ago after a career in the military
and a stint as a publisher. He took the proceeds from the sale of his
publishing firm and began to buy land here in Kaluga from shareholders of
an old collective farm. He now has over 600-hectares of rolling pastureland
and some 150-head of cattle. He uses the Internet to order supplies, like
his electric fencing, which he gets from the United States. Several small
cottages surrounded by garden plots and apple trees are where Andrei, his
wife Marina and some of their farm workers live.
Andrei Davidov says he would like his farm to serve as a model for others
in Russia. I have a dream when all Russia will be like my farm. We will be
happy," he says.
Mr. Davidov is clearly proud of his farm and he says he is making a profit.
But there is a problem. Even though Mr. Davidov bought this land, he does
not technically own it. He can farm it, but he cannot use it as collateral
for a bank loan. And that, he says, is holding him back from expanding his
operation.
Private ownership of property went out with the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
All farms were state-owned collectives. Farm workers were paid by the state
and were told what to grow and how much. With the fall of communism, that
began to change. Collective farms were turned into "cooperatives" and
divided up among farm workers, who were given property shares.
The new Russian constitution of 1993 permits private ownership but does not
provide the mechanisms to implement it. Last year the Duma passed a law
allowing private ownership of commercial land. But when the debate moved to
agricultural land, fist-fights broke out among lawmakers, and the
parliamentary session ended with a number of legislators walking out vowing
they would rather die than allow the motherland to be sold off to the
highest bidder.
Viktor Pleskachevsky is chairman of the Duma Property Committee,
responsible for spearheading legislation on land reform. "Many people
perceive a square meter of land as a square meter of the motherland," he
says. "This affects the whole issue. ... In Russia for 80 years, for
several generations people were not used to property. Russia has a
different notion of property. ... Reform is to change the existing order."
Mr. Pleskachevsky says such land reform is vital to develop and modernize
Russia's agriculture and its economy. But opponents, including communist
lawmakers and others, say foreigners and wealthy business tycoons will buy
up farmland and squeeze out the average Russian. There are currently seven
legislative proposals on land reform before the Duma and the upcoming
debate is again likely to be heated.
Anatoly Suyarko learned his trade in a Soviet agricultural institute and
was well versed in running an old-style collective farm. He is now the
director of a farm cooperative in Kaluga, down the road from Andrei
Davidov's private farm. He says the changes of the past decade have been
difficult. "The state used to take care of farmers," he says. "Then, they
threw us out into deep water. We had to change first of all ourselves our
attitude to work. We had to realize there would be no help, that we had to
rely only on ourselves. There was something good about the old times. But
now we are given freedom. It is hard. We have not really stepped away from
the old system. We have not left socialism and we have not really entered
capitalism."
Anatoly Suyarko's cooperative farms 1,400 hectares. In contrast to the
prosperous look of the privately run Davidov farm, the cooperative looks
shabby with rundown barns, thin and frail-looking cattle. Mr. Suyarko and
his colleagues would like to modernize, but like Andrei Davidov, they are
having a hard time getting loans from the bank.
As things now stand, both so-called private farmers and cooperatives depend
on the support of local officials. Valery Krutikov is the head of
administration in this area of Kaluga district. He strongly supports land
reform because he says the welfare of the farmers cannot be left to any one
individual. "The situation cannot be tied to a good or bad governor, good
or bad president, general secretary or czar," he says. "The goal is to
create a legal base, rules of the game by which everybody will play from
the president down to the common worker in the village."
Russia has more than 400-million hectares of farmland, that is close to
24-percent of the country's total landmass. But for Russians, the issue of
land goes straight to the heart.
That, of course, is why the members of the Duma are finding it so difficult
to reform the land code. They must do it in a way that gives farmers an
incentive to make improvements on their land, but they must also find a way
to persuade other Russians that their motherland remains theirs.
*******
#9
Russia: Putin Seeking New Legislation To Combat Extremism
By Jeremy Bransten
Citing the need to combat nondemocratic, ultranationalist movements,
Russian President Vladimir Putin has introduced legislation that would
allow the banning of extremist groups. Such laws exist in many countries,
but experts express concern that Putin's bill could be misused to shut down
mainstream opposition parties.
Prague, 10 May 2002 (RFE/RL) -- In terms of rhetoric, Russia's President
Vladimir Putin has fully embraced the global war on terrorism, while
putting a unique domestic spin on the issue.
In recent weeks -- most notably in his state-of-the-nation address on 18
April -- Putin has drawn a direct connection between terrorism and
homegrown ultranationalist groups that have appeared on the fringes of
Russian society over the past decade.
Putin says the skinheads, neo-Nazis, and other extremists who parade
through Russia's cities and have caused occasional violence, pose a threat
to society. He says the answer to the threat is new anti-extremism
legislation that he has put forward for parliament's consideration.
The head of the State Duma's Legislative Committee, Pavel Krasheninnikov,
agrees. He said this week that Russia is in urgent need of a new law
restricting not just extremist individuals but organizations as well,
noting that almost all European countries have such statutes.
Analysts believe the bill, which is now being considered by the Duma's
Justice Committee, has a good chance of passing. Public sentiment is with
Putin on the issue.
But some politicians, especially the Communists, have expressed worries
that certain of the bill's provisions could be used to muzzle legitimate
expressions of opposition. The fact that the Communist Party stands in
opposition to a bill ostensibly aimed at shutting down neo-Nazi
organizations is an irony, but also understandable.
Stephan de Spiegeleire, a Russia analyst at the RAND Europe think tank,
said: "You could understand how they would be worried, because the
organization of mass disturbances for any reason of intolerance -- and that
could be defined very broadly -- could be seen as a cause for activating
this law. Under the current law, it's only physical persons that can be
tried for this and under this law it would also be organizations, so you
could see how the Communist Party would have felt threatened by it and
would still feel threatened by it."
In other words, if the bill is approved, calls by the Communists or any
other party for a nationwide strike or other civil disobedience could give
the government an excuse to ban the party.
Attempts several years ago by former President Boris Yeltsin to have a
similar bill passed were blocked by the Communists. But the Communists were
recently removed from key committee posts in the Duma, leaving little to
block Putin's initiative.
De Spiegeleire agrees with Putin that Russia does have what is perhaps too
liberal a regime concerning neo-Nazi sympathizers.
"It's obviously true that Russia has had an extraordinarily liberal regime
on these kinds of matters. As you know, if you walk around in any bookstore
on the street or in any flea market --- it's amazing the amount of things
you can buy in Russia that you wouldn't be able to buy probably anywhere
else in the Western world. [Adolph Hitler's book] "Mein Kampf" is for sale
everywhere; Nazi paraphernalia really can be bought at a lot of flea
markets in Moscow and other Russian cities. So it is true that Russia has
had an extraordinarily liberal climate on all of this," de Spiegeleire said.
The reason for this anomaly goes back to Soviet times. Whereas all
countries in Western Europe instituted restrictions on various forms of
extremism following the end of World War II, the Soviets did not devote
much attention to the issue.
"In the Soviet Union there was this feeling that Soviet society was immune
to these forms of extremism. There really wasn't this entire legislation
that you would have expected and that you saw emerge in Western Europe.
It's really only in the Russian period that this issue became much more
salient -- also because of the appearance of all these extreme-right and
extreme-left organizations -- that people felt something had to be done
about it," de Spiegeleire said.
All of this would appear to back Putin's argument. But de Spiegeleire said
both the timing of Putin's bill and the current state of Russia's judiciary
should cause some concern.
"Extremism, as it is outlawed or made more difficult under this law,
certainly doesn't seem to play the same role anymore in Russia that it did
a couple of years ago. It's a long time since we've heard about guys like
Makashov and Barkashov and Sterligov -- all these extreme-right leaders who
had paramilitary organizations going for them. So it seems to me that the
timing, from that point of view, may be a little bit off. And then also, if
Russia had a normal legal system, I would feel more comfortable in saying
that this law is perfectly O.K. Unfortunately, the legal system in Russia
is far from perfect and also the politicization, the continued
politicization of the legal system makes for a situation where laws like
this could really be abused," De Spiegeleire said.
The Kremlin cites Europe's example as it pushes for an anti-extremism law.
What has the continent's experience been with such laws in the post-war era
and what lessons can this offer?
Giovanni Capoccia is a political scientist at Oxford University who has
studied the issue. He said that preserving the interests of free speech and
free association in the broadest possible measure, while safeguarding
democracy against extremists, is a delicate balancing act. Different
countries pursue different models.
"After World War II and the experience of fascism or occupation regimes,
there were quite a lot of reactions in terms of legislation in different
countries, so the level of precision with which extremism or extremist
actions are defined varies enormously across countries. And so it's very
difficult to find one single equilibrium point across Europe that says:
This is what an extremist party is, this is what an extremist ideology is,
and this is what an extremist action is," Capoccia said.
Capoccia said some European countries have chosen narrow definitions of
what constitutes an extremist party -- banning only Nazi groupings, for
example -- while others leave the matter more open.
"You have cases, for example, like Germany, where extremist parties or
groups or associations are defined quite narrowly, in the constitution and
in the jurisprudence of the constitutional accords. And you have cases like
France, where in the constitution for example, the definition of what
parties cannot do if they don't want to be unconstitutional is much more
vague. So, it's impossible to come up with one single European standard,"
Capoccia said.
While some countries focus on a party's or group's stated ideology in
assessing whether it is extremist, other countries, such as the United
States, focus on actions. As long as individuals or groups do not incite
violence, they may publicly advocate almost any position. Inevitably,
whatever the laws in force, it is the courts that become important arbiters
in determining whether a party has overstepped the bounds of constitutional
behavior.
"The standards in this respect in Europe are that there is always -- except
in exceptional circumstances where you have a state of emergency or
something like that -- there is always some form of judicial review,"
Capoccia said.
In the final analysis, laws are only as good as those who interpret them.
And as de Spiegeleire noted, Russia's judiciary is sometimes subject to
government pressure and the courts have not always demonstrated sufficient
independence.
*******
#10
Hearing: Developments in the Chechen Conflict
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
May 09, 2002
Washington DC
Steven Pifer
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Chairman Nighthorse Campbell, Co-Chairman Smith and CSCE commissioners,
thank you for the invitation to speak today on Chechnya. The Administration
welcomes this opportunity to discuss U.S. policy on Chechnya and the events
of the past several months.
As you all know, the current conflict in Chechnya in a few months will
begin its third year. Coming on the heels of the first conflict in Chechnya
from 1994-1996, this latest conflict has dragged on nearly twice as long
but with a similarly tragic price in human lives, people’s homes, and
Chechen society. The casualties mount every day -- for both sides, Chechen
and Russian alike -- and the pain and suffering of innocent civilians
resulting from the fighting see no end in sight. There are few places in
the world that have borne such devastation as Chechnya. Continuation of the
conflict not only constitutes a drain on Russian development and a living
nightmare for innocent Chechens, but it poses a threat to the entire
Caucasus region.
Sadly, this tragic situation shows no signs of ending soon. The fighting
goes on. Russian forces conduct sweeps, sealing towns and villages and
searching house to house for fighters. Often these sweeps are subsequently
followed by reports of the beatings and torture of civilians, of extortion,
or the disappearances of young men. Russian convoys are ambushed daily by
Chechen fighters using landmines, and Russian blockposts or administrative
buildings are often attacked in hit-and-run raids. Pro-Moscow Chechen
administrators are assassinated. The economy is in shambles. Housing and
infrastructure are destroyed, especially in Grozny where thousands still
live, struggling from day to day in the most difficult conditions.
The United States Government is committed to doing all that we can to bring
about an end to this conflict and to relieve the suffering of the civilian
population. Through our humanitarian assistance programs and our diplomatic
efforts, the United States remains engaged on Chechnya.
Our objectives for Chechnya today are the same as they have been in the
past. We seek a political settlement that will end the fighting, promote
reconciliation, and recognize the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation. We also seek accountability for human rights abuses committed
by all sides, and unimpeded access to the displaced by humanitarian
organizations. As we have always done, we are working toward these
objectives in our on-going discussions with the Russian Government, in
concert with our friends and allies, and in partnership with international
and non-governmental organizations.
A Political Settlement
On September 24, 2001 President Putin made a speech describing Russian
readiness to assist the United States in the war on terrorism in the
aftermath of September 11. But he went further on Chechnya, drawing a
distinction between the "historic roots" of the conflict in Chechnya and
the presence of foreign terrorists. We saw in this distinction the basis
for the possibility that talks could begin. We were thus pleased when on
September 25 Chechen leader Maskhadov welcomed President Putin's speech and
opened the door for a political dialogue.
After weeks of jockeying and phone contacts, a face-to-face meeting between
a Russian Government official and a Chechen representative took place in
late November. Unfortunately, there have been no meetings to follow up on
that, and we understand that contacts have been suspended. But as have said
repeatedly, a political settlement is the only way that this conflict can
be ended, peace and stability can be returned to Chechnya and the process
of rebuilding can be started. Russian Government officials have noted
progress in re-establishing government structures and say they are working
toward "normalizing" the situation. Without some settlement with those
forces engaged in the fighting, however, we do not believe this will be
enough to end the fighting.
Clearly, the causes and motivations of Chechens fighting the Russians
differ. There are those who see this as a struggle to protect their
homeland. And there are others in Chechnya who have been linked to
international terrorist circles.
We do not ask the Russian Government to try to reach accord with
terrorists. But we do believe that there are those with whom discussions
can be undertaken, such as Mr. Maskhadov -- a leader who has sufficient
credibility with the broader Chechen population to speak for them in a
political dialogue with Moscow. We intend to continue to make this point to
the Russian Government, as we have consistently in the past, and we
encourage our allies to do so as well. We hope that contacts will be
resumed in the near future. However, while we see some indications of
interest on the Russian side in launching a dialogue, we are not able to
offer a reliable prediction as to when Russian-Chechen political contacts
might be resumed.
At the same time, we have called on Mr. Maskhadov and other moderate
Chechens to disassociate themselves with terrorists. Contrary to some media
reporting, we have not seen evidence of extensive ties between Chechens and
Al-Qaida in Chechnya, but we have seen evidence of individuals or certain
factions linked to terrorist elements. A clear demonstration by Mr.
Maskhadov that he does not maintain such ties is appropriate as a gesture
to show he is a credible interlocutor for the Russians. And we intend to
continue to make that point to the Chechens as well.
We have taken action on this point. Some Chechen forces with links to
international terrorists are supported through groups operating in the
Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, which borders Chechnya. Last fall, Russian
aircraft conducted several air strikes against the Pankisi Gorge. While we
agree that the Russians have a legitimate concern, we have urged them not
to take action themselves. Instead, we are working with President
Shevardnadze and the Georgian Government to train and equip Georgian
military units, so that Georgia will have the capacity to deal with this
problem itself.
Despite the death of field commander Khattab, an Arab linked to terrorists
and commander of the foreign mujahidin in Chechnya, and the rumored death
of field commander Shamil Basayev, another of those linked to terrorists,
the conflict is likely to continue at its present level. We believe that
more than one thousand Chechen fighters remain. The Chechens' ability to
recruit new fighters is aided in part by the animosity created by the harsh
tactics of Russian security forces. As we have said repeatedly and continue
to believe, there is no military solution to this conflict.
The Humanitarian Situation
An estimated 300,000 Chechens have been displaced by the fighting. More
than half of the displaced -- 160,000 -- remain in Chechnya. The displaced
account for more a third of Chechnya's estimated population of 440,000. Of
the rest, the largest concentration is in Ingushetiya, with others in
Dagestan and other areas of Russia, or in Georgia, Azerbaijan or
Kazakhstan. The United Nations estimates that 140,000 Chechens are in
Ingushetiya now, and 65 percent of them are living in private homes, with
relatives or others who would take them in. The rest live in camps or
spontaneous settlements. These people are largely dependent on aid provided
by the international community.
The United States has been the largest single provider of humanitarian aid
to the North Caucasus. Since 1999 we have contributed more than 30 million
dollars, an amount that is roughly a quarter of all aid given under the
United Nation's consolidated humanitarian appeals. In FY2001, the United
States contributed a total of 22.1 million dollars to the United Nations
and its agencies, to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
non-governmental organizations. Included in that sum is 9.6 million dollars
of monies earmarked by Congress for American non-governmental organizations
to carry out projects in the region.
Much of contribution has been in the form of food aid, such as wheat, flour
and cooking oil. In FY2001, our funds helped feed 335,000 people. Our
contributions also have funded much needed emergency health care, water and
sanitation projects, education and shelter, as well as mine awareness
programs. All of our contributions, except earmarked funds, are provided
directly to the UN and the Red Cross for distribution through their
agencies and implementing partners.
Beyond our contributions, we have assigned a refugee coordinator to our
Embassy in Moscow who works with the international community and Russian
officials in the delivery of our humanitarian assistance and reporting on
further needs. The coordinator is a liaison with international and
non-governmental organizations working in the field and federal and local
governments. The coordinator also serves to monitor the situation on the
ground, to observe the plight of the displaced and to identify where U.S.
assistance programs should best be targeted.
In the North Caucasus, the security situation makes access to the region
difficult. As you may know, there is a ban on U.S. Government personnel
traveling to the region without the specific permission of the U.S.
Ambassador to Russia. But the priority we place on the humanitarian
situation has required that we send our refugee coordinator to the region
on several trips.
Our policy has emphasized that humanitarian organizations be given the
necessary, unimpeded access to the region to reach the displaced. The
Russian Government has generally provided this access for the delivery of
relief, but there have been occasional problems with changing
administrative requirements and lack of coordination by Russian federal
authorities and the local Chechen administration. The security situation in
Chechnya makes delivery of humanitarian assistance particularly difficult,
however.
We have also stressed in our discussions with the Russian Government that
the return of the displaced to Chechnya be voluntary. Russian authorities
have assured us that is the case, but the local pro-Moscow Chechen
administration has undertaken a campaign to convince the displaced to
return. As long as the security situation shows no improvement, however,
most will not. In addition, Moscow has cut payments to the government of
Ingushetiya that had been used to support benefits to displaced Chechens.
The cuts in food and other programs in Ingushetiya create pressure on
Chechens to return despite the risky security situation. Finally, the
Russian government has suspended registration of new displaced persons in
Ingushetiya since February 2001, making new arrivals ineligible for social
benefits – food, housing, even education for their children.
Human Rights
The danger to civilians in Chechnya remains our greatest concern. The human
rights situation is poor, with a history of abuses by all sides and little
or no accountability by either. As we discuss in detail in our most recent
human rights report, and as both Russian and international human rights
NGOs have reported, civilians in Grozny and other towns and villages in
areas where there is rebel activity are subject to security sweeps, or
zachistki, by Russian forces.
These sweeps may be planned or occur spontaneously if Russian troops in the
area are attacked. The result is that the village is sealed off and troops
conduct house to house searches, checking identity documents. Usually,
these sweeps are swiftly followed by new reports of serious human rights
abuses, such as summary execution, arbitrary detention, torture, beatings,
or extortion. Frequently, some of those taken into detention disappear, and
sometimes their bodies are found days later. There are reports of rape.
According to the Russian human rights group Memorial, at least 600 people
have disappeared since the conflict began, although Russian official
statistics put the total reports of disappearances between 1,200 and 2,000.
Russian officials have acknowledged that Russian soldiers have committed
crimes against civilians, but investigations and prosecutions have not kept
pace with the scope of the human rights violations that have been reported.
Russian commanders in Chechnya have issued orders intended to prevent these
abuses. Under these orders, sweeps may only be conducted with the
permission of the Russian commander in Chechnya, General Moltenskoi.
Vehicles are to be clearly marked, and troops are to identify themselves
before entering homes. Masks are not to be worn. Lists of detainees are to
be circulated to local civilian administrators. But it appears that these
orders have not been effectively implemented. Much more needs to be done to
instill discipline in Russian security forces, to prevent abuses, and to
prosecute those who commit them.
Publicly and privately, we have made this point to the Russian Government
at all levels. As the Secretary said in his recent testimony before House
and Senate, "We have not forgotten about Russian abuses of human rights. We
raise Chechnya at every opportunity." The conduct of Russian forces in
Chechnya must be improved. That is why we again supported the resolution on
Chechnya before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights this year.
The rights of the civilian population must be respected. In his recent
State of the Federation speech, President Putin said that "Everyone
resident in Chechnya or originally from there must feel they are full
citizens of the Russian Federation."
The Chechen fighters are not without blame. There have been repeated
attacks on local officials who work for the pro-Moscow Chechen
Administration. The landmines and other explosives fighters have used
against convoys have also wounded, maimed or killed innocent civilians.
There are other reports of kidnapping and execution of Russian prisoners
held hostage. Chechen fighters must also be held to account.
Chechnya and U.S.-Russian Relations
Russia is cooperating with us in the war on terrorism, and we are embarked
on building a new, more cooperative bilateral relationship. President Putin
has made clear that he sees a partnership with the United States and the
West as the best course for Russia. President Bush has made clear that
partnership with Russia is in our interest.
In just two weeks, Presidents Bush and Putin will meet in Moscow to discuss
how to further strengthen relations between our two countries. We hope that
they will be able to record concrete progress on a number of parts of the
bilateral agenda, including security issues, economic relations and
people-to-people exchanges.
As part of this new relationship, however, there remain issues on which we
disagree. Chechnya is one of those issues, and it is an issue that we have
raised regularly and candidly with the Russians. President Bush discussed
it with President Putin in November, as did Secretary Powell with President
Putin in Moscow in December. In the last two weeks, Chechnya has figured
prominently on the agenda during Deputy Secretary Armitage's discussions in
Moscow with Deputy Foreign Minister Trubnikov and during the meeting last
Friday between Secretary Powell and Foreign Minister Ivanov. As we embrace
this opportunity we now have to build a stronger relationship with Russia,
we do so without compromising our principles and commitments to promote
peace and the strengthening of human rights in Chechnya.
********
#11
Hearing: Developments in the Chechen Conflict
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
May 09, 2002
Washington DC
Anatol Leiven
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Chechnya After September 11th
The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, and the consequent US “war
against terrorism”, have led to considerable changes in US approaches to
the war in Chechnya, and indeed to general US policy towards Russia. The
strong support given by Russian President Vladimir Putin to the US
campaign, his acceptance of US military deployments on the territory of the
former Soviet Union, and very useful Russian help in Afghanistan and in
intelligence sharing have all created a new belief in the US that a
co-operative relationship with Russia is possible and desirable. Both
Russia and the US have a very strong interest in co-operating against Sunni
islamist extremism and terrorism, and in preventing the kind of regional
instability and upheaval in Central Asia and the Caucasus which tend to
breed and harbour such pathologies.
However, considerable problems still remain, of which the Chechen War is
one. The US administration has a new sympathy for the extremist threats
that Russia has faced in this region. The presence of international
islamist militant forces in Chechnya and Georgia is now fully recognized,
whereas previously this was downplayed or even ignored altogether by wide
sections of US officialdom, the media and public opinion. This was despite
abundant evidence – notably from the militants’ own English-language
propaganda – both of the presence of these forces and of their links to
international extremist networks, including Al Qaida.
The group of international Muslim radicals (so-called “Wahabis”, though
this term is highly inexact) in Chechnya were headed by the late Habib
Abdurrahman Khattab, a Saudi Arab who like many of his men had fought
against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The international Mujahedin were drawn
to Chechnya by the war of resistance against the Russian infidel, as they
had previously been drawn to Afghanistan, Bosnia and elsewhere. The
declared intention of this force and its Chechen allies was to drive Russia
out of the rest of the north Caucasus and unite other regions with Chechnya
in a new islamic republic. It was in the name of this program that the
international militants and their local allies invaded the Russian republic
of Daghestan in August 1999.
This force has received support from Al Qaida and other radical networks in
the Middle East. This was confirmed by one of Osama’s aides, Abu Daud, by
the English-language website of the Chechen Mujahedin, Qoqaz.net, and by
the Egyptian security forces, who in July 2001 carried out a major
operation against Egyptian islamist radicals who were raising funds and
recruits from Chechnya. Khattab and his allies also received support from
the Taleban in Afghanistan, the only state to have recognised Chechnya’s
independence. Knowledge of the connections of parts of the Chechen
separatist forces to terrorist groups in the wider Muslim world was
therefore anything but a secret. It was known both to Western officials and
to many Western journalists working both in the former Soviet Union and
Afghanistan, but for a variety of reasons it was not widely publicized in
the West.
The prevention or elimination of lawless areas and quasi-states in the
Muslim world – of which Chechnya between 1996 and 1999 was one – is now
recognized as a vital US national interest, since such areas can all too
easily become safe havens for Al Qaida or allied groups. If Chechnya had
remained a quasi-independent state, as it was in those years, there is
little doubt that today we would be speaking of this region, like Somalia,
as an extremely likely place of refuge for Al Qaida elements fleeing
Afghanistan. This recognition has created a new awareness of the importance
of maintaining Russian sovereignty over the North Caucasus. Finally, the
experience of war in Afghanistan, and other episodes like the recent
fighting in Jenin, have reminded us that anti-partisan warfare is an ugly
business in which some civilian casualties are inevitable.
That said, however, it must also be clearly stated that – as in Kashmir or
Palestine - while extremists and terrorists have established a strong
presence in Chechnya, they have been able to do so because of the
legitimate grievances and the great suffering of the Chechen people. The
initial appearance of these forces – as in Afghanistan – was due to the
brutal Russian military intervention of 1994-96; and the way in which they
were able to carve out a powerful position for themselves in 1996-99 owed
an enormous amount to the destruction, brutalization, and radicalization
left behind by that war.
Whatever Russian propaganda may argue, the war in Chechnya is therefore
certainly by no means simply a war against “terrorists”. Mass Chechen
national resentment and aspirations play a critical role. Moreover, a line
must be drawn between the Chechen and international radicals on the one
hand and the much more moderate followers of General Aslan Maskhadov on the
other, if only because these two elements have clashed bitterly in the
past. Whatever his past faults and failures, Maskhadov was elected
President of Chechnya in February 1997 with 65 per cent of the popular
vote, in elections accepted by the then Russian government and recognized
by Western observers as free and fair. It is difficult to imagine any
stable peace settlement for Chechnya that does not involve his
participation – whereas with the militants no compromise is possible.
Moreover, US and Western public opinion remains rightly repelled by certain
aspects of the Russian campaign, and especially by the overwhelming
evidence of very widespread abuses against Chechen civilians by Russian
soldiers. These include kidnap for ransom under the guise of “arrest”;
torture and beating – both to extract information and out of sheer sadism;
numerous extra-judicial executions and “disappearances”; very extensive
looting; and rape. Many of these abuses are the work of the soldiery
themselves rather than of the Russian state; but there is also ample
evidence that senior Russian officers have at the very least turned a blind
eye to such behavior, which has claimed thousands of Chechen victims. In
recent months, there appear to have been moves by the Russian government
and high command to limit such atrocities, which are especially common
during “sweeps” by Russian troops searching for militants in Chechen
villages, and at Russian checkpoints. An order by the Russian commander,
General Moltenskoy, attempting to control military actions on these
occasions has led to familiar complaints from officers in the field that
their “hands are being tied” and successful operations prevented. In fact,
however, so great is the demoralization and indiscipline of the Russian
forces fighting in the region that it seems very likely that many orders to
this effect will simply go on being ignored, and that severe abuses will
continue. These abuses are not only deeply evil in themselves, but also
fatally damaging to Russia’s own goals in Chechnya – as Russia’s own
Chechen allies have repeatedly and publicly argued. The leader of the
pro-Russian administration, Ahmad Kadyrov, and his followers have denounced
them in public and called for Russian tactics in the war to be changed.
Tragically, however, Chechnya is trapped in a familiar vicious circle
whereby as long as attacks by Chechen militants on Russian forces continue,
those forces will continue searches and reprisals – and vice versa. It is
therefore very important that US condemnation of Russian military
atrocities should continue. This condemnation, together with criticism from
pro-Russian Chechens, and the objective evidence of the Russian military’s
failure to pacify and stabilize Chechnya, does seem to have had a real
effect in pushing the Russian government and high command to try – at least
to some extent – to diminish abuses. But clearly very much more needs to be
done in this regard, and it needs to be done not only for the sake of the
Chechen people, for peace in Chechnya, and for the wider struggle against
islamist terrorism and extremism. For getting a grip on military abuses is
also an essential part of bringing discipline, reform and modernization to
the Russian armed forces. It is closely tied to the need to crack down on
corruption in the armed forces, which among other things ensures an
indirect supply of Russian weapons and ammunition to the Chechen rebels
themselves! Such changes are therefore extremely important to Russia’s own
vital state interests, and this is a point which the US and other Western
states should be making very forcibly to the Russian government. However,
in formulating its criticisms of Russian behavior in Chechnya, the US needs
to pay close attention to two related questions: the spirit in which this
criticism is offered, and US goals and interests in this region. For it
should be obvious that US approaches to human rights abuses and military
atrocities by the forces of other states inevitably differ very greatly
depending on whether these states are seen as enemies of the US or – like
Turkey and to an increasing extent India – allies and partners. In the
latter cases, US concerns are raised in a spirit of what might be called
constructive criticism, and are accompanied by credible assurances that the
US unconditionally supports the territorial integrity of these states and
is committed to the protection of their vital interests. If the US wishes
Russia to develop into a truly reliable partner in the struggle against
terrorism, it obviously cannot afford to give the impression that it is
indifferent to vital Russian concerns and interests in this region.
This must also involve a recognition that it is emphatically not in the
interests of the USA, the West, or the Caucasus that the Russians should
simply withdraw and Chechnya return to its condition of 1996-99. The
banditry which flourished in those years was a threat to the region and to
western visitors to it. The establishment of a new base for international
Muslim radicalism (and perhaps terrorism) posed a threat not just to the
region, but to Western interests across the world, and to US allies in the
Middle East. This is a point which was fully recognized by the Israeli
government long before September 11th, but which for a long time was not
fully understood by the US foreign policy elite – to the genuine
bewilderment and frustration of Russian officials. Before September 11th at
least, few in the USA stopped to think what the US reaction would be to the
establishment of a powerful group of heavily armed international Muslim
radicals on America’s borders – and yet the answer is not difficult to find.
This leads to the question of the prospects for peace in Chechnya, and what
if anything the US can do to help in this regard. These prospects have
increased in recent weeks with the death of the chief international radical
leader in Chechnya, Khattab. Russian sources are also claiming that the
most famous leader of the Chechen radicals, Shamil Basayev, has also died
of his wounds, but this is unconfirmed. Supplies of international radical
men and money to the Chechen struggle appear to have been badly affected by
the US struggle against Al Qaida and its allies, and more immediately by
the new willingness of neighboring Georgia (backed by US military aid and a
military training mission) to crack down on international supply routes to
Chechnya. These are positive developments, since it is impossible even to
imagine a peace settlement between Russia and the radical forces in
Chechnya. At the same time, the fighting in Chechnya continues, and
continues to claim numerous Russian and Chechen lives. And while Russia may
be able to reduce and even to some extent contain this violence, it is also
impossible to imagine any stable peace in Chechnya which depends in the end
only on Russian military control. Indeed, the end of the large-scale
guerrilla struggle in Chechnya might only encourage a shift towards
terrorism, with terrible consequences. It is therefore extremely desirable
that Russia should seek real negotiations with President Aslan Maskhadov.
While the dreadful experience of Chechnya in 1996-99 means that full
independence for Chechnya must now be excluded for the foreseeable future,
these talks should have as their goal the creation of a democratically
elected, legitimate Chechen administration and the restoration of full and
genuine Chechen autonomy within the Russian Federation (something which
Moscow has always offered in principle). But as so often in these cases
(Israel-Palestine being a classic example), a key problem in this regard is
mutual lack of trust; and as so often, this lack of trust is entirely
understandable and even justified. Leaving aside the question of formal
independence, from the point of view both of Maskhadov and of most ordinary
Chechens, they cannot feel secure while Russian soldiers remain heavily
present in Chechnya and retain the right and ability to undertake raids and
reprisals. Given the present condition of the Russian armed forces, such
operations are bound to lead to abuses against the Chechen civilian
population. From their point of view, therefore, even an interim settlement
therefore has to involve Russian military withdrawal and Chechen
responsibility for security in the republic. From a Russian point of view,
however, the experience of Chechnya under Maskhadov’s presidency after the
Russian military withdrawal of 1996 makes this unacceptable. His utter
failure to control the criminals and radicals during these years (a failure
which included the kidnap and murder of senior Russian officials who were
under Maskhadov’s personal protection at the time) has desperately
compromised him in Russian eyes – although Maskahdov’s followers may well
reply that Moscow never gave him sufficient help in this regard. Moscow is
absolutely determined not to go back to a situation in which Chechen kidnap
gangs can raid neighboring Russian regions at will (a situation which
between 1996 and 1999 produced something in the order of 1,600 kidnaps,
including numerous Westerners); and in which Chechen and international
radicals can use it as a base to spread islamic revolution. For the Russian
government, the only guarantee against this is a continued and large-scale
Russian military presence.
It is indeed true that as the years 1996-99 demonstrate, before it can
become a stable independent state, Chechnya needs to develop the social,
cultural and political foundations for such a state, including an organised
political nationalist movement capable of mobilising the population behind
a state-building programme. These foundations proved mainly lacking in
1991-94, and wholly lacking in 1996-99, with disastrous consequences. Even
in optimal circumstances, they will take years to develop. To do so, they
will also require great help from Russia – because for all its fine words,
it is very unlikely that the West would ever give serious help in this
regard, even if it were permitted to do so by Russia. As seen from 1996-99,
the only other international financial help for Chechnya is likely to come
from radical islamist groups, with terrible results. The US should
therefore do its best to help facilitate talks between Maskhadov’s
representatives and the Russian government. One possible starting-point are
the tentative contacts between different Chechen and Russian figures being
sponsored by Lord Judd and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, which the US might well consider informally supporting. US goals
should be the destruction or exclusion of the radicals followed by a sharp
reduction of the Russian military presence, free elections for a Chechen
administration, and the restoration of autonomy. However, before it can
embark on any such path the US needs to think very seriously about the
correct balance between sympathy for Chechen suffering, respect for Russian
security and sovereignty, and America’s own vital interests in this region,
in the context of the wider war against terrorism.
*******
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