Johnson's Russia List #6234 10 May 2002 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Contents: 1. Washington Post: Michael McFaul, The Russian Graduate. (re Jackson-Vanik) 2. BBC Monitoring: Putin addresses Victory Day parade in Moscow. 3. Boston Globe: David Filipov, US push for storing nuclear warheads roils many Russians. 4. BBC Monitoring: Russian web site says more defence spending on space in 2003. 5. Wall Street Journal: Guy Chazan, 'Alternativniks' Challenge Russia's Conscript Army. 6. Toronto Star: Gigantic ferris wheel to overshadow Kremlin. Meals will be served, weddings held on 170m-diameter behemoth. 7. International Herald Tribune: Sean Kay, Heading nowhere? (re NATO) 8. Asia Times: Hooman Peimani, Threat of civil wars looms in Azerbaijan and Georgia. 9. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: FSB Counterintelligence Department Chief Interviewed. 10. BBC Monitoring: USA confident enough to ignore world opinion - Russian paper.] ******* #1 Washington Post May 10, 2002 The Russian Graduate By Michael McFaul The writer, a Hoover Fellow and professor of political science at Stanford University, is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Thirty years ago, Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson and Rep. Charles Vanik co-sponsored an amendment to the 1974 Trade Act that must rank as one of the most successful foreign policy ideas initiated by Congress during the Cold War. The Jackson-Vanik amendment was a moral act. It explicitly linked the Soviet Union's trading status to levels of Jewish emigration. Leonid Brezhnev and the rest of the Soviet Communist Party politburo publicly scorned this linkage as an infringement of their sovereignty. Quietly, however, they responded by increasing Jewish emigration quotas. The legislation produced tremendous results, helping to trigger the emigration of more than a half-million refugees -- including Jews, Catholics and evangelical Christians -- from the Soviet Union and its successor states. The human rights problems that Jackson and Vanik wanted to address in 1974 still exist today in Russia. Tragically, a decade after the Soviet Union disappeared, the new leaders in the Kremlin still abuse their power to suppress freedom of the press, harass political and social critics, and violate the basic human rights of their own citizens in Chechnya. Local levels of power still restrict the religious rights of some Jewish and Christian organizations. But Jackson-Vanik -- as currently constituted -- no longer addresses these new strains of democratic infringements. It is time for Congress to "graduate" Russia from Jackson-Vanik -- while at the same time initiating new legislation to deal with these new forms of abuse. The moment for action is the May summit between Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin. The Jackson-Vanik amendment is obsolete for several reasons. First, there is little evidence to suggest that the current Russian state restricts Jewish emigration. Thirty years ago, the Soviet state imposed all kinds of draconian rules and regulations to prevent Jewish emigration, and viciously punished those Jews who even applied to leave. Today Jews living in Russia must endure several new threats, but state-sponsored restriction on travel is not one of them. Second, the nature of trade between Russia and the United States has changed substantially since the Cold War. In Soviet times, the state controlled all foreign trade. Thus, linking the Soviet Union's trading status to other state policies regarding human rights made sense. Today, however, private Russian companies do the trading. It is illogical to punish these trading companies for policies the Russian government undertakes. Third, from the Russian perspective, the continued application of Jackson-Vanik to Russia undermines the claim made by President Bush that the Cold War is over. For the Russian elite, including President Putin, the Jackson-Vanik amendment is a relic of the Cold War. Bush's pledge to assist Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization does not sound credible to Russians when this legacy from a different era in U.S.-Russian relations is still in the books. Fourth, failure to graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik will make the U.S. Congress look petty and lacking in principle. Trade disputes between the United States and Russia will continue to flare for decades to come. Whether dealing with steel, bananas or chicken wings, presidential administrations and congressional leaders must always engage our European trading partners -- be they Russians, Germans or the British -- to seek fair trade for American consumers and producers. Such disputes, however, should not be linked to the noble cause that originally inspired the Jackson-Vanik amendment. For those of us still concerned with the original human rights agenda embodied in the Jackson-Vanik legislation, it is painful to give up one of the most effective weapons for promoting human rights from the Cold War. It seems especially wrong to reward Putin, whose record regarding human rights and democracy is troubling. As a partial remedy, President Bush and those in Congress still concerned with the status of human rights and religious freedoms in Russia should use the moment of Russia's graduation from Jackson-Vanik to highlight the current violations of human rights still occurring in Russia. While in Moscow this month, President Bush could celebrate the passing of Jackson-Vanik with a public event commemorating the legislation, but then also use the ceremony to highlight the importance of securing individual liberties, religious freedoms and democratic institutions in Russia if Russia desires to be a partner with the United States and a full member of the Western community of democratic states. Both Russian state officials, including Putin himself, and their harshest critics should be invited to such a ceremony. Congressional leaders could then follow up this event with legislation to create a Jackson-Vanik Foundation, dedicated to the support of human rights and religious freedoms in Russia. This new foundation could be charged with making direct grants to those activists and organizations in Russia still dedicated to the original principles outlined in the 1974 legislation. Such a foundation would offer a much more effective mechanism for supporting human rights and religious activists inside Russia than the outdated Jackson-Vanik amendment. Russia today bears little resemblance to the Soviet Union of 1974. To reinforce the positive changes there over the past 30 years, while still addressing lingering problems of human rights and democracy, Congress needs to modernize its tools of influence. ******* #2 BBC Monitoring Putin addresses Victory Day parade in Moscow Source: Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 0555 gmt 9 May 02 Russian President Vladimir Putin has compared the threat of terrorism facing the world now with that posed by Nazism in World War II, and warned against "international procrastination and unwarranted tolerance" in confronting it. He was addressing Russian troops drawn up on Red Square for a parade to mark the 57th aniversary of the victory in World War II. The event was broadcast live by the two main Russian state television channels, which showed Putin standing in front of the Lenin Mausoleum flanked by government and parliament officials, Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and military officers. After the five-minute address the march-past by units of troops began. No military hardware was present. The following is the text of Putin's address. Comrade soldiers, sailors and sergeants! Comrade officers, generals, admirals, esteemed veterans and citizens of Russia! I congratulate you on this festive day, on Victory Day. I welcome all of you who fought selflessly to achieve that victory, fought on the front line and on the home front, fought for our homeland, and for the freedom and independence of other nations. Fifty seven years separate us now from that victory and the end of the war. But we scored it at a terrible cost, at the cost of our fathers' and grandfathers' lives. They had to come through inhuman suffering, but they stopped the total extermination of people, saved our homeland, delivered the world from fear and gave it a future. The enemy failed to bring our people to its knees. In 1941 we stopped them in their tracks here, near Moscow. In 1943 we broke their spine near Stalingrad and Kursk, while in 1945 we finsihed them off in their own den. Our victorious soldiers tossed 200 banners of the destroyed Nazi armies against the Kremlin walls here in Red Square. The Russian armed forces have retained the spirit of victory. That spirit is a historic pillar of the Russian military, its spine and its moral bastion. The years that passed have changed the world, but it is still very vulnerable. The forces of evil and violence reappear on the planet again and again. Today they have different names, but the same old habits. Just as before, they bring death and destruction. We have no right to forget that at any time they can become just as dangerous as Nazism. The Victory Day is a lesson and a warning to us, a reminder that international procrastination and unwarranted tolerance only served to strengthen the fascists at that time; that the world's indifference allowed them [the Nazis] to spread on the planet, allowed hatred and cruelty to throw aside all restraint. One can only counter these threats by pooling the efforts of the states and the will of the nations. The anti-Hitler coalition was a good proof of that. The allied countries finished off the enemy then, and today we shall once again come together, are coming together, against a common threat. Terrorism is its name. Dear comrades, today is the day of national pride and gratitude to our veterans. The dignity and solidarity of the generation of victors is the most precious legacy that we, their children and grandchildren, have inherited. Our fathers and grandfathers never waited for salvation to come from without. The greatness of the people and the country is the result of their personal exploit, their unity and their heroic labours. The time requires action from us too. We have to work honestly, respect ourselves and our fatherland. It united once to storm through the times of severe troubles, and in our life of peace today we need the same unity. This is the pledge of a worthy future for Russia, the pledge of freedom and prosperity of its citizens. I congratulate you on this great holiday, Victory Day. Glory to our fatherland, glory to the victors! Hurrah! ******* #3 Boston Globe May 10, 2002 US push for storing nuclear warheads roils many Russians By David Filipov, Globe Staff MOSCOW - Major General Pavel Kukushkin spent most of his 48-year military career defending the Soviet Union, and later Russia, against a possible attack from the United States. But he really loves Americans. Linking up with American troops outside Prague at the end of World War II was one of Kukushkin's greatest thrills. His Katyusha rocket batteries performed best against Nazi troops when mounted on American-made Studebaker trucks, he said. But when asked about President Bush's summit here with Russian President Vladimir Putin later this month, Kukushkin's tone changed. The general, like most Russians, supports a measure proposed by both leaders to slash nuclear weapons on both sides to 1,700-2,200 warheads over the next 10 years from the current total of more than 6,000. But he doesn't understand why the United States wants to put the weapons in storage rather than destroy them, as Russia has proposed. As far as Kukushkin can see, these warheads could someday be used against Russia. ''What does it mean to store them?'' Kukushkin said as he took a break from a Victory Day celebration - marking the 1945 defeat of Nazi Germany - yesterday in Moscow's Gorky Park. ''Another American leader will come and put them back and use them against us. Why don't the Americans trust us?'' Kukushkin's comments - similar to those of other Russian soldiers and officers - illustrated the suspicion and misgivings many in Russia feel toward the United States only two weeks before the May 23-26 visit and are another sign of the growing anti-American mood here since Putin began pursuing strongly pro-Western policies after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The nuclear weapons agreement has become such a central part of the summit that both Washington and Moscow have decided to ignore the major sticking point on how to disarm. Apparently determined to make the summit a success, officials in both countries have described the deal as a symbol of the end of Cold War-era tensions. ''We are hoping for a turning point in terms of consolidating Russia's new, more westward orientation in foreign policy and a real major step forward in cementing its integration in the West,'' a senior US diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, told reporters in Moscow Tuesday. Russia disagrees with the Pentagon's plans to store hundreds of the warheads when they are removed from missiles and bombs. Washington wants the warheads available in case of emergency. But for many in the Russian military, the proposed deal is symbolic of everything they feel is wrong with US-Russian relations, which they see as bullying and distrustful behavior by their former Cold War enemy, even as the two presidents talk about ''friendship'' and ''partnership.'' Some officers complain that Putin may be putting Russia at a disadvantage by allowing the Americans to store their warheads. ''Our leaders are always bending over backwards to the West,'' said retired Lieutenant General Venedikt Mariasov. ''This deal is the same as putting the bombs in a warehouse next to the planes. The Americans say we are not enemies. We want friendly relations, but this is a problem.'' Putin's popularity remains high, with approval ratings still above 70 percent. But anti-American sentiment is as high as it has been in Russia since Moscow backed former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. A recent survey of 1,600 Russians by the VTsIOM polling agency found that 52 percent see bad relations between the two countries despite Putin's support for Bush's war on terrorism and the once unthinkable presence of US forces in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Many Russian analysts and politicians increasingly are asking what rewards they have reaped from Putin's pro-American line. Russia has seen its efforts defeated when the White House last year said it would scrap the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Moscow had vowed to save. NATO is planning to continue its expansion to include Eastern European countries that were once Soviet satellites, which Moscow has vehemently opposed. Washington has failed to cancel the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanick amendment, which links trade policies with Russia's human rights performance, and it has continued to block Moscow's entry into the World Trade Organization by not declaring Russia a market economy. Continued US criticism of Russia's human rights record in Chechnya, Bush's recent imposition of steel import quotas, and a dispute over US chicken imports and Russia's continued nuclear cooperation with Iran have all added to the sour feelings. ''The majority, who didn't support the president's plans from the beginning, now are washing their hands of them, saying, `We warned you, you won't get anything from the Americans,''' said lawmaker Alexei Arbatov at a roundtable discussion of US-Russian relations last month. Arbatov, a retired colonel, was one of the more moderate speakers. Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, who until last year headed the Russian military's foreign relations department, went further, calling Putin's moves since Sept. 11 ''an attempt at geo-strategic suicide.'' US officials are well aware of this mood. Alexander Vershbow, the US ambassador to Moscow, attended a roundtable with Ivashov and came away with the impression that ''many in the Russian military have not gotten over the idea that everything the US does is a threat,'' as he put it in an interview last month. The idea of signing a treaty on nuclear arms reduction with Moscow was intended as a concession to Putin, Vershbow said. Aware that Russia's nuclear arsenal would shrink over the next decade because of a lack of financing and decay, Bush had stated the United States was willing to cut its stockpiles but was prepared to strike only an oral agreement with Russia. But in February, Washington signaled its readiness to sign a binding document, giving Putin a victory of sorts. ******* #4 BBC Monitoring Russian web site says more defence spending on space in 2003 Source: Strana.Ru web site, Moscow, in Russian 8 May 02 The new threats posed by the changing international situation are likely to lead to changes in defence spending in 2003, with a bit more money going to space projects, the Strana.ru web site has reported. The bulk of the defence budget will go on modernizing military hardware. Spending on strategic nuclear arms is expected to decline further. The following are excerpts from the report by the Russian Strana.Ru web site on 8 May. Subheadings have been inserted editorially: When discussing the draft budget for next year, the president and prime minister also discussed the 2003 state defence order. The head of state's attention to this question is understandable. Most world powers (first and foremost China and the United States) have increased defence expenditure this year and the trend will continue in 2003 as well. But Russia is spending relatively little on the development of arms and military hardware at the moment. How will the defence order change in 2003? Will Russia decide to increase its expenditure on the development and production of weapons? We will try to answer these questions. Given all the positive aspects of rapprochement with the United States and the prospects for signing a new agreement with it on strategic offensive arms, a number of military leaders and politicians believe that ensuring Russia's own security and countering the threats connected with the deployment of weapons in space remain relevant for Russia, along with the issue of the development of new missile technologies, the unending attacks by terrorists, the war in Chechnya, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and so forth. All this requires the introduction of modern types of military hardware and armaments into the army, but Russia's economic problems prevent this from being carried out fully. ... The development of new equipment costs billions of roubles, whereas the modernization of existing equipment costs millions of roubles. It is quite clear that the current defence minister prefers option two. And the defence minister definitely stands a far greater chance of defending his viewpoint than do his opponents. Generals lobby for strategic nuclear arms There is another set of contradictions connected with determining the defence order's parameters and they reflect the different approaches to assessing the role of strategic nuclear arms and the general purpose forces in ensuring the country's defence. These problems apply less to the heads of defence enterprises than to the generals. For example, when he was minister of defence, Igor Sergeyev, who is currently an adviser to the Russian Federation president, lobbied for the development of strategic nuclear arms, which took up 40 per cent of the defence order. This indicator now stands at 18 per cent. Although according to the state armaments programme through to 2010, strategic nuclear arms should account for around 16 per cent of the defence order. Nevertheless, a number of former military leaders (for example Maj-Gen Vladimir Dvorkin, who was responsible for strategic nuclear planning and who was in Marshal [Igor] Sergeyev's immediate entourage) continues to defend the idea of more active development of strategic nuclear forces. They openly criticize Armed Forces Chief of General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin for the fact that he intended to place only two Topol-M ICBMs on alert duty. The criticism was heeded and now it has been decided to place at least six Topol-M ICBMs on alert duty. But Dvorkin believes that even this figure is too low and that to support the technological chain and production-sharing links and to reduce the cost of production it is necessary to produce at least 10 missiles and place them on alert duty. But the debates cannot be regarded as over, especially since, according to the predictions of many experts connected with the possible signing of the START agreement, the proportion of expenditure on the development of strategic nuclear arms will continue to decline. Meanwhile, it is not ruled out that, when the state defence order is being drawn up, funding will be allocated to research into ways to counter tactical nuclear weapons (according to the Pentagon's new doctrine, it intends to use such weapons in localized wars) and into new types of anti-missile defence systems which the United States intends to produce in 2002-2003. Certain military leaders involved in the development of military hardware and armaments have been stating that this is necessary. It is also possible that funding will be planned for nuclear tests. They will be necessary because there is every indication that Russia, like the United States, is going to plan the storage of nuclear warheads. To ensure the safety of this work, nuclear tests are needed. Igor Valynkin, head of the Russian Defence Ministry's 12th Main Directorate, once said that such tests will not contravene the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (this department is responsible for the storage and operation of nuclear munitions). 2002 figures It is common knowledge that defence order figures are classified. However, certain figures which have been announced by the top military leadership can provide an approximate idea of its scale. For example, according to the figures given by Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov, in 2002, R68 million will be spent by the Russian Defence Ministry on scientific research, experimental design work, rearmament and the repair of arms and military hardware which, strictly speaking, form the main parameters of the defence order. This is around one fourth of the country's entire military budget and 63 per cent of the entire so-called general defence order in which other security ministries also take part (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Border Service, the Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defence, Emergency Situations and so forth; a total of 20 participants). As we can see, this is a substantial figure, although it is clearly not enough for the proper renewal of the army and other troops with new types of arms and military hardware. Around 40 per cent of the 2002 defence order will be spent on scientific research and experimental design work (compared with only 10-12 per cent in 1996-1998). Around 11-12 per cent will go on repair work and around 30-40 per cent on modernization of arms and military hardware. But only individual examples of new types of military hardware will be procured. Col-Gen Aleksey Moskovskiy, Russian Federation forces head of armaments and deputy defence minister, once talked about this in an exclusive interview with Strana.ru. Will these proportions be maintained in the defence order in 2003? As Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov has repeatedly stated, until 2006 the military budget's main funds will go on scientific research, experimental design work and the repair and modernization of arms and military hardware. And, as Aleksey Moskovskiy claims, the money will be spent in approximately the same proportions as this year. A bit more money for space projects However, in view of the change in the international situation and the forecast of the possible nature of the threats to our country, some changes may be made to the defence order. What changes are these? First, as the Russian Federation defence minister states, significant funds will be allocated to the development of military space [projects]. In 2002, 12 per cent of the defence order will be spent on this. The proportion of spending on the development of spacecraft in 2003 is planned to be slightly higher, according to Col-Gen Aleksey Moskovskiy's figures. Whereas this year the plan is to produce eight spacecraft and four missile delivery vehicles, in 2003 the plan is to produce 11 spacecraft and eight missile delivery vehicles. Second, the main funds will be spent on modernizing the general purpose forces' arms and military hardware. Sergey Ivanov and Anatoliy Kvashnin defend this position. In their opinion, modernization will require a smaller outlay and will have a commercial effect in the foreseeable future, because the modernized hardware of the general purpose forces can be sold abroad. And the Defence Ministry has now put a proposal to the government to transfer part of the funds from military-technical contracts with foreign countries to the military department's account. What does modernization mean first and foremost? According to Aleksey Moskovskiy, this will affect the ground forces helicopter fleet (Mi-8s and Mi-24s), the Air Force's Su-27s, Su-25s, Su-24s and MiG-29s and also strategic aviation aircraft (Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers). In addition, work will begin on the modernization of armoured vehicles (T-72 and T-80 tanks and BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles). New intelligence- gathering and communications systems will be produced and procured. It is not ruled out that the country's leadership will decide to increase next year's military budget as a proportion of GDP (currently it stands at 2.6 per cent of GDP). After all, higher social expenditure (on increasing the pay and allowances of servicemen) and the elimination of debts to enterprises in the military-industrial complex (around R8 billion) objectively means an additional outlay. ******* #5 Wall Street Journal May 10, 2002 'Alternativniks' Challenge Russia's Conscript Army By GUY CHAZAN Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL NIZHNY NOVGOROD, Russia -- Twenty orderlies working in a hospital in this Volga River city have become poster boys in a campaign to reform Russia's demoralized military. They mop floors, empty bed pans -- and threaten the way Russia has raised and run its army since it beat back Napoleon in 1812. For centuries, Russia has defended and expanded its borders with conscripts. Whether ruled by a czar, the Communist Party or President Vladimir Putin, Russia has made military service an obligation, not a profession. Now, to the fury of Russia's generals, the hospital orderlies in Nizhny Novgorod have launched a bold challenge, seizing what, in theory at least, is a constitutional right to avoid bearing arms and seek alternative civilian service instead. In doing so, they have triggered an unprecedented public debate on the future of the armed forces. "Killing is a sin," says Vladimir Korochkin, a 25-year-old who has refused a two-year stint in the army demanded of all Russian men and opted instead to work in Nizhny's First City Hospital, "I still want to serve my country. I do that by working here." A Seventh Day Adventist, he says his faith forbids him from taking up arms. Although small in scale, this revolt against conscription has attracted nationwide publicity, with television stations and newspapers reporting on the stand taken by Mr. Korochkin and others. All the attention has given new momentum to what, with Russia's economy and politics changed beyond recognition since the Soviet Union, is now the last important frontier of reform. Revered for liberating the Soviet Union from its Nazi invaders, the army was once the most visible outward symbol of Russia's claim to superpower status. But these days, its reputation is at an all-time low. With almost daily casualties in Chechnya, around one in 10 recruits dodges the draft. Reformers have long demanded a humane alternative, and Mr. Putin has himself embraced the rhetoric -- though not yet the reality -- of military reform. He has called for an end to conscription and the creation of an all-volunteer army. Resistance, though, is formidable. Mr. Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, also took up the cause of army reform, but left the Kremlin with little to show for a series of bold, but mostly stillborn, programs for change. Troop strength and defense spending were drastically cut back, but little was done to alter the way the army was constituted. Russia's generals say that ditching the conscript system won't work unless salaries are raised to levels high enough to attract volunteers, meaning a huge increase in the military budget. Critics dismiss these arguments as a ploy and say the army is scared of reform that would shrink its size, prestige -- and perks. Russia's top brass, for example, are notorious for using conscripts as free labor to build or repair their country cottages. Reform also threatens a lucrative system of corruption that allows officers to exempt would-be conscripts in return for bribes. All Russian men aged between 18 and 27 are required to do army service, and around 400,000 men are drafted each year. But many go to great lengths to evade the call-up. Would-be recruits fork out hundreds of dollars for fake documents to prove they are college students, homosexuals, psychiatric patients or fathers of young children -- all of whom are exempt from army service. Some bribe members of their local military enlistment office to declare them unfit to fight. "The generals don't want to do anything," says Boris Nemtsov, leader of the liberal SPS party. "But if we don't do something, we'll soon end up with no army at all." The SPS has come up with its own reform plan, and is organizing nationwide rallies, pickets and petitions to promote it. Mr. Nemtsov predicts a grass-roots protest movement to rival the mass anti-Communist demonstrations of the late 1980s. "Unless society starts putting pressure on the bureaucrats, we'll never get things moving," he says. Most flee service in the army not out of religious conviction but fear of widespread brutality. Mr. Nemtsov says 150,000 Russian soldiers have died of hazing since 1945. Cases of desertion and suicide are rife. Russia's 1993 constitution guarantees the right to alternative civilian service, and legislation to give it force is now passing through the Russian parliament. But the government-sponsored bill sets the length of service at four years -- twice what an army conscript serves. Liberals say it is an attempt by the military hierarchy to stifle the idea at birth. "A young man who works for four years as a hospital orderly can't study, start a family, or find work afterwards," says Mr. Nemtsov. "He'll be practically excluded from normal life. Four years will destroy the whole concept of alternative service." Despairing of any meaningful reform, the authorities in Nizhny Novgorod decided to go it alone. Last year, the city's mayor, Yuri Lebedev, adopted a plan that allowed conscientious objectors to opt out of the army -- if they could convince local enlisters their pacifism was genuine. It was a hard task. "The mood was very aggressive," says one of the "alternativniks," Vsevolod Kurepin. "The military accused us of being homosexuals, traitors and deserters." Of 34 applicants, only 20 were finally allowed to do social work. All of them have been working as orderlies in the First City Hospital since January. They have proved a big hit with the staff. "These people are not draft dodgers," says head doctor Valery Lipatov. "They're doing the toughest work in the hospital. It'd be hard without them." But the pilot plan has proven controversial. President Putin accused Mr. Lebedev of indulging in cheap populism. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said last month that such experiments are illegal until the law on alternative service is passed. The 20 alternativniks would all be drafted, he said. Many of the men have already received their call-up papers. But all vow to continue the fight. Mr. Korochkin says he has been resisting army service for five years, and isn't going to stop now. "We're not anarchists," he says. "We're law-abiding citizens. We just don't want to spill blood." ******* #6 Toronto Star May 9, 2002 Gigantic ferris wheel to overshadow Kremlin Meals will be served, weddings held on 170m-diameter behemoth MOSCOW (CP) — The world's largest ferris wheel, soon to be erected on a hill overlooking the Kremlin, will come to symbolize Moscow as much as the Statue of Liberty evokes New York or the CN Tower does Toronto, says a former Soviet arms maker turned amusement park mogul. "We wanted to construct something remarkable in Moscow, and this wheel will be an absolutely unique thing," says Vladimir Gnezdilov, director of the Pax company, which used to make super-secret equipment for the Soviet military. Pax has since reinvented itself as a builder of roller-coasters, ferris wheels, free-fall towers, giant centrifuges and other amusement park thrills. Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov quietly signed off on the $20-million rotating colossus at a February meeting of the city-building council. That prompted ripples of irritation among architects and urban planners who say Moscow is sinking into chaos while city hall plays with grand construction projects that end up as unlovable eyesores. But enthusiasts say the 170-metre diameter wheel, which will be visible from any point in the city, will stimulate tourism, provide an endless source of affordable fun-for-all and levitate Moscow's age-old reputation as a dour and wintry place. The towering wheel, to be named Rus-3000, will have 60 heated cabins of transparent Plexiglas, each comfortably seating 24 people on recliner chairs and sofas. A single revolution will last half an hour, time enough for a light meal — served airline style — or a few drinks from the onboard bar. One special VIP cabin will be permanently reserved for President Vladimir Putin, another for the project's godfather, Mayor Luzhkov. Others may be rented for weddings, birthdays and special occasions. The wheel will be operational within two years, Gnezdilov says. Year round, passengers will soar some 200 metres above the Sparrow Hills, an Olympian height from which the entire metropolis of Moscow and its surrounding farmlands will be spread out like a carpet beneath them. At night the wheel will be illuminated by strings of high-powered coloured lights, creating the effect of a fat, round Christmas tree hovering high above the city. "I believe this ride will become the new holiday symbol of Moscow, and will revolutionize entertainment in this city," Gnezdilov says. Up to 10 million people are expected to ride the Rus-3000 annually, he adds, five times more than the wheel's nearest competitor in size, the 135-metre London Eye, now the world's highest observation wheel. Built in 1999 by British Airways, the Eye has had difficulty turning a profit and has been blasted by critics who say its prominent location — across the Thames from Westminster Abbey — ruins central London's historic image. A smaller wheel, measuring 60 metres, was also set up at the Place De La Concorde in Paris to mark the new millennium, replacing an older wheel built in 1900. Pax intends to assemble, own and operate the new Russian attraction — though Moscow city hall will be given an undisclosed stake in exchange for the prized land atop Sparrow Hills — and the company believes it can recoup its investment within two years. Critics complain the monster wheel is the latest in a string of Luzhkov-sponsored monumental boondoggles, decided behind closed doors, which have wrecked Moscow's architectural harmony and diverted resources from the city's many urgent development priorities. Luzhkov has been praised for repairing Moscow's notoriously bad roads and building new ones. But the rest of the city's vital infrastructure, particularly its underground sewers, pipes and building foundations, are reportedly in a state of near collapse. At the same time city hall has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on a reconstruction of a huge cathedral blown up by the Communists, a luxury shopping mall adjacent to the Kremlin and a hulking, eight-storey-high statue of Peter the Great which opinion polls show to be the most unpopular monument in Russia. Critics sat the planned ferris wheel is just another entry on that growing list of wasteful, ugly and unwanted architectural excesses. "From 200 metres in the air, passengers on this ride will get a clear view of the mess post-Soviet Moscow has become," says Marine Tutcheva, director of Rozhdestvenka, a private architectural bureau. "They will see deserted industrial zones, roads snarled with traffic jams, dilapidated housing estates and depleted green zones," she says. "This wheel will further disfigure Moscow's skyline, and become yet another standing joke." ******** #7 The International Herald Tribune Heading nowhere? By Sean Kay The writer, an associate professor of politics and government at Ohio Wesleyan University and a nonresident fellow at the Eisenhower Institute in Washington, is author of "NATO and the Future of European Security." He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune. DELAWARE, Ohio--NATO foreign ministers gather in Iceland next week and will proclaim NATO to be as important as ever. They risk appearing to be in denial over the health of the trans-Atlantic alliance. NATO declared the Sept. 11 terrorist strikes at the United States an attack on all its members, but the organization has been sidelined since. Questions about its relevance grow daily. The problems confronting NATO begin in Europe. Many European allies spend well below 2 percent of GNP on defense. It is understandable that the United States avoided being burdened by inefficient and poorly equipped allies in Afghanistan. But NATO's troubles also lie in Washington, where it is increasingly seen by the Bush administration as another multilateral institution constraining American power. Increasingly, Europe and Washington disagree on both the nature of the threat they face and the means to confront it. The alliance faces three priority agenda items as it sets the stage for its Prague summit in November: increasing capabilities, enlargement to include new democracies to the east, and building a new relationship with Russia. Can NATO make effective decisions with declining capabilities, 26 members, and a new NATO-Russia council? It is difficult to reconcile NATO's primary goal of increasing capabilities with its enlargement plans. During the Cold War, Europeans were hard pressed to spend money on defense, preferring to invest in social programs. It is even more improbable that they will today. With the likely addition of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria into NATO, the number of militarily free riders on the American security commitment to Europe doubles. While justifiable as a political act, current enlargement plans make no sense in terms of enhancing NATO's military capabilities. The new NATO-Russia relationship, to be inaugurated late this month, significantly elevates Russia's role within NATO. It cannot veto NATO's internal decisions, but the agenda items placed within the NATO-Russia purview include primary things that NATO does such as peacekeeping and regional crisis management. NATO is drifting into the sort of toothless political institution that Russia hoped for. No wonder Moscow has lifted its objections to enlargement. If enlargement contributes to a hollow NATO and Moscow's voice is enhanced as a result, then Russia's interests are well served. Debate over who contributes what capabilities, who gets invited and what roll for Russia distracts from the fundamental question: Can NATO remain an effective institution? Two specific steps can help it to meet this challenge. • NATO leaders should support a proposal floated by some American defense planners that, rather than get all members to increase overall military capabilities, NATO should distribute areas of specialization. Each country could assume a particular contribution for modern, multilateral force planning. Such planning should go beyond military concepts and create direct links with the European Union to include multinational police operations and counterterrorism. • NATO should require membership candidates to generate force structures to fit with this new, specialized and highly capable multilateral force design and to counterterrorism in particular. In November, NATO should invite all politically eligible candidates to negotiate membership. Their actual accession time should begin with a two-year review of their military contributions to NATO's new force structure and their counterterrorist capabilities. If in that two-year period such criteria are not met, the probationary period would be extended for another two years and then reviewed again. No new invitee would be submitted to NATO Parliaments for membership ratification until all established criteria are fulfilled. Eventually, NATO must also revise its procedures so that as it becomes larger and more political, the members can make effective decisions. NATO leaders should review the existing consensus process and consider alternatives such as adopting a "consensus minus one" framework for noncollective defense missions. The stakes could not be higher for NATO. Failure to adapt its priorities quickly to the radically changed international environment would lead to further diminution of its relevance. It would be a failure of American leadership at a time when it is most needed. ******* #8 Asia Times May 9, 2002 Threat of civil wars looms in Azerbaijan and Georgia By Hooman Peimani Dr Hooman Peimani works as an independent consultant with international organizations in Geneva and does research in international relations. As a land-link between Asia and Europe, the Caucasus has been unstable for more than a decade. The three Caucasian states of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia gained independence when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991. They have since experienced instability in one form or another, including civil wars in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Ceasefire agreements ended those conflicts in 1993 and 1994, respectively, but left their root causes intact. In the absence of peace agreements, the persistence of unsettled issues has frustrated both their governments and their populations. They have suffered not only from the civil wars themselves, but also from the existing no-war-no-peace state of affairs, an unpredictable situation discouraging economic activity and preventing normal life. Against this background, certain factors have created an environment conducive to the resumption of civil war in both countries in the near future. They include the worsening economic situation, the expansion of social discontent with the status quo, the growing opposition to the governments and the growing inter-elite conflict. A new round of civil war will not only engulf Azerbaijan and Georgia in instability, but could potentially develop into bloody regional and international conflicts. Instability in the form of civil war began in the Caucasus in the last years of the Soviet Union. In 1988, Azerbaijan's Armenian-dominated enclave of Nagorno Karabakh sought unification with neighboring Armenia. This development provoked a civil war between the Azeris and the Karabakhi Armenians and dragged Armenia into the hostility in support of its ethnic kin. The civil war outlived the Soviet Union and continued when Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia emerged as independent states. In the post-Soviet era, the removal of communism as the dominant ideology encouraged the eruption of Armenian and Azeri nationalism, which added fuel to the conflict. After six years of devastating war, a ceasefire agreement ended the conflict in 1994 when the Karabakhi Armenians extended their control over the entire enclave, the Lachin Passage (a land linking the enclave to Armenia) and large parts of western Azerbaijan. The ceasefire stopped the civil war, but did not address the belligerents' demands. The following no-war no-peace situation has been dissatisfactory for both sides. Azerbaijan has since lost about 20 percent of its territory to Karabakhi control. About a million Azeri inhabitants of the occupied territory have become refugees inside Azerbaijan. Unsurprisingly, they have become firm supporters of a military solution to regain the lost territory, a solution backed by most of the Azeris feeling humiliated by the Armenians. The defeated Azeri government has not accepted the status quo. Nor have the Karabakhis. They have run their territory as an independent state, but its independence has not been recognized by any state. To avoid the internationalization of the conflict and the resumption of civil war, the Armenian government and its Karabakhi counterpart have not sought unification, even though they are connected to each other through various economic, political and military ties. The uncertain status of the enclave has prevented its economic growth despite impressive efforts in that regard. The unsatisfactory and fragile status quo has created grounds for the resumption of civil war. In the case of Georgia, civil war began right after its independence. Its two large ethnic minorities, the Abkhaz and the Ossetians, also declared independence for their respective regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Those declarations triggered a civil war for which the Georgian government was totally unprepared. It lasted until 1993 when a ceasefire ended the conflict, but it did not lead to the conclusion of a peace treaty to settle the dispute once and for all. The exhausted Georgian government had to accept the ceasefire when the separatist forces secured their total control over their breakaway regions. The latter have since run their regions as independent states, although no state has accepted their independence. The civil war forced 300,000 Georgians to flee from the rebellious regions to other parts of Georgia where they have since lived as refugees. As in the case of Azerbaijan, these refugees have become outspoken proponents of war to end separatism in their favor. The Georgian troops and the separatist forces have both violated ceasefires on numerous occasions to test each other's resolve and preparedness and/or to extract concessions from each other. The unsettled ethnic conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan have frustrated both their governments and their separatist forces. The failure of all efforts by various mediators - namely the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Russia and the United States - to find peaceful settlements to those conflicts has exhausted all the interested parties. It has also discredited peaceful means toward those ends. No wonder, then, that there have been voices of discontent demanding a military solution to change the status quo. As the humiliated parties to the conflicts, the Azeri and Georgian governments have threatened to use force to regain control over their breakaway regions, although there is no realistic ground for their success in any future military confrontation. However, popular pressure to change the status quo and, in particular, to enable the refugees to return home could force their unstable and unpopular governments to resort to war, if only to appease their dissatisfied people. Since last year, the growing number of bloody skirmishes between pro-government and separatist forces along the ceasefire line in Georgia has increased the possibility of this scenario. In the absence of peaceful settlements to the prolonged conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan, the resumption of civil war will be a predictable end to the deadlocked situation. In such a case, the hostility will not be confined to the two countries only. Armenia, Iran, Russia, Turkey and the United States have ties with and commitments to the governments and/or separatist forces, apart from their economic and political stakes in the Caucasus. Those realities will make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to remain indifferent to the outbreak of civil war in the Caucasus. As neighboring countries, Armenia, Iran, Russia and Turkey would also be concerned about the spillover of the civil wars into their countries, which are linked to the Caucasus through a variety of ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical, and religious ties. Thus, economic interests, geographical realities, political considerations, security imperatives and natural ties could drag the five mentioned regional and non-regional countries into the Georgian and Azeri civil wars. Hopefully, the predictably dire consequences of such a scenario for the Caucasus, its neighboring regions and world peace as a whole should create an additional incentive for all the interested parties to find peaceful settlements to the prolonged ethnic conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan. ****** #9 Russian FSB Counterintelligence Department Chief Interviewed Rossiyskaya Gazeta 7 May 2002 [translation for personal use only] Interview with Colonel General Oleg Syromolotov, deputy director of the Russian Federal Security Service, by Timofey Borisov on 6 May; place not given: "Counterintelligence Service Changes Along With Spies" -- first paragraph is introduction Yesterday [6 May] was the 80th anniversary of the establishment of counterintelligence agencies. Our special correspondent met with Colonel General Oleg Syromolotov, deputy director of the Russian FSB [Federal Security Service]. [Borisov] First of all let us congratulate you and all FSB counterintelligence officers on your anniversary. Why is this date marked in May, surely the intelligence officers' traditional holiday falls on 20 December? [Syromolotov] Thank you for your good wishes. Taking advantage of the opportunity, allow me too from the bottom of my heart to wish serving and veteran counterintelligence officers a happy anniversary from the pages of Rossiyskaya Gazeta. Eighty years ago, on 6 May, a special subunit to counter foreign espionage -- the GPU [State Political Directorate] Counterintelligence Department and its apparatus in the provinces -- was set up within the structure of the central apparatus of the country's security agencies. [Borisov] In the chief counterintelligence officer's opinion, what place does your service now occupy in the Russian FSB structure and how is it organized? [Syromolotov] I must clarify that the country's main counterintelligence officer is Russian FSB Director Nikolay Patrushev, whereas I am in charge of the Counterintelligence Department, which has now become a central element of the FSB counterintelligence structure. Besides combating espionage, the Counterintelligence Department's activity is carried out in the sphere of ensuring the security of Russian institutions and citizens abroad, regulations and procedures concerning foreign citizens' entry and exit and visits to the Russian Federation, combating illegal migration, operational protection of the state border, and operational investigation. In addition, the department carries out, jointly with interested FSB subunits, measures aimed at ensuring the security of foreign states' missions on Russian Federation territory. [Borisov] That is, you carry out the same work as in Soviet times? [Syromolotov] It is not fundamentally important to us what the central element of counterintelligence is called -- the KGB Second Main Directorate or the FSB Department. What is important is that counterintelligence will always exist and will not depend on any political conditions at all. Or, at any rate, until people stop playing "spy games." [Borisov] Nevertheless, have any changes occurred since the time of the USSR KGB? [Syromolotov] Twenty years ago, when we were talking about our main enemy we were primarily referring to the United States, NATO countries, and China. The world's entire intelligence community has now undergone great changes. The range of special services operating on our territory has become substantially wider. Furthermore, the actual substance of their intelligence activity has changed. [Borisov] Have the methods of your reaction also changed? [Syromolotov] We endeavor not to make a fuss over detained foreign intelligence officers. Generally we try to ensure that their activity does not go beyond the framework of what is permitted. Official terms such as "counteraction" and "constraint" have come into use by counterintelligence officers. The concept of the "main enemy" is a thing of the past. That does not mean that the Russian counterintelligence service must adopt a passive, defensive position. We act offensively, in the light of the constantly changing political and operational situation. Lately confidential contacts between special services, including Russian and foreign ones, have been noticeably expanded and their level of trust has increased in connection with the pooling of many countries' efforts in the fight against international terrorism. [Borisov] Yet I think that we can talk about trust among special services only with a certain degree of relativity. What is the counterintelligence service's most pressing task at the moment? [Syromolotov] Countering foreign special services' intelligence activity traditionally remains the most important task. The world's leading counterintelligence services have considerably reinforced the personnel of the stations operating under cover of embassies and other official missions in Moscow, other Russian cities, and the near abroad. The number of "deep-cover" intelligence officers has increased. [Borisov] Can this be regarded as a new spiral of "spy mania?" [Syromolotov] In this context we are not inclined to go to extremes and to regard this factor as an intensification of a particular state's "hostility." But materials obtained now make it possible to say with complete certainty that Russia is a priority target for most foreign states' special services. The hallmark of their activity is acquiring on the one hand a more aggressive, and on the other a more secretive and sophisticated, nature. [Borisov] Probably it has become easier for them to operate since the USSR's disintegration? [Syromolotov] In the past two years, as a result of long-term and carefully planned operations 14 foreign citizens, 10 of whom were career special services officers, were caught red-handed while carrying out intelligence acts. A total of around 260 career foreign special services officers were detected and investigated, and in addition espionage and other subversive activity by over 40 of them was thwarted. In total it was possible to thwart the unlawful activity of around 100 agents of foreign states' special services, including six Russian citizens. In particular, the special services of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and certain other states were deprived of their valuable informants. Here are just a few examples. Last August former Russian Foreign Ministry senior official Moiseyev was again convicted of high treason and sentenced to four and a half years' imprisonment in a strict-regime colony. Foreign intelligence agencies' career officers were arrested and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment (one to 20 years, another to 10 years) and later pardoned by the Russian Federation president and expelled from our country. Russian counterintelligence discovered and terminated the unlawful activity of the manager of a firm from a Near East country, who was collecting and illegally taking out of Russia our scientific and technical documents, models, and materials, which had been produced using advanced Russian dual-purpose technologies. [Borisov] Is espionage activity itself changing in the new conditions? [Syromolotov] Our work has increased in respect of so-called voluntary espionage, whereby people themselves make contact with foreign intelligence services. It is mainly citizens dissatisfied with their financial or social position who pass secret information to foreign special services on their own initiative. Currently "volunteers" are trying to establish criminal contacts with members of the special services of such countries as the United States, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, the DPRK, the PRC, and Israel more often than in previous years. It is noteworthy that officials of bodies of state power and administration and of security departments have started to be found among them more often. In the past two years the FSB has discovered 11 such "volunteers." [Borisov] What new things have appeared in this sphere in the most recent years? [Syromolotov] Today foreign special services try to make maximum use of the latest scientific and technical achievements for their own purposes. As is known, telecommunications systems and global information networks, primarily the Internet, which are being widely introduced in Russia, have become an additional channel for the receipt of information. Moreover, Russian FSB analysts believe that in the near future there will be an increased threat of the launching of a so-called information war and of the use of information weapons by special services and foreign states' organizations against information, information and telecommunications, and electronic control systems and against databases and data banks of strategic importance on Russian territory. [Borisov] Is it to be expected that the problem of ensuring the country's information security will become one of your main priorities in the future? [Syromolotov] Yes. In 2001 an increase in the number of offenses in the sphere of computer information and of damaging communications lines and facilities was noted. The problem of the proliferation of computer viruses which pose a threat to state and regional information resources has become particularly acute. Over the past year FSB bodies have instituted over 40 criminal cases in respect of crimes in the sphere of computer information. In 2001 offenses were detected and prevented during the processing of secret information by computer technology and during the hacking into open telecommunications systems in Russian Federation components' bodies of state authority. [Borisov] Is the FSB counterintelligence service taking part in the counterterrorist operation in Chechnya? [Syromolotov] Of course it is. We have discovered facts indicating that separatist and extremist organizations in the Russian Federation, including in Chechnya, have links with and are being supported by the special services of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, and Pakistan. It is also known that detachments of gunmen are to a considerable extent made up of foreign mercenaries. A certain proportion of this contingent has missions which have been set by the special services of states interested in destabilizing the situation in Russia. The activity of the British special services in the North Caucasus, which was carried out under cover of the Halo Trust international organization, was compromised by counterintelligence officers and antiterrorist subunits. Using humanitarian activity as a cover, it organized explosives training for Chechen separatists. Joint efforts resulted in the termination of the activity of the Saudi Arabian al-Haramein organization, which was funding gunmen and organizing arms supplies to and the recruitment of foreign mercenaries to fight in Chechnya on the pretext of giving charitable aid. [Borisov] How do you picture the counterintelligence service of the future? [Syromolotov] That is a difficult question and it requires a separate conversation. The strength of any special service undoubtedly lies above all in its personnel. As before, devotion to the Fatherland, dedication to duty, professionalism, human decency, and discipline are still especially highly valued. ******* #10 BBC Monitoring USA confident enough to ignore world opinion - Russian paper Source: Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, in Russian 7 May 02 According to the Russian newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow's influence has diminished since the USSR collapsed, while Washington is becoming increasingly confident in the international arena. The USA does not think it necessary to obtain Russia's backing on major issues, the newspaper says. It argues that to make its opinion count, Russia will have to regain its former strength. The following is an excerpt from the report, published on 7 May. Subheadings have been inserted editorially: "Hostilities" on this front, it is asserted, began virtually immediately after the end of the Cold War, the aim of which was, as we know, the destruction of the USSR and of the socialist camp. With the attainment of that goal, the world, whose peaceful state had hitherto had been maintained on the basis of a balance of forces, ended up without a deterrent factor and out of kilter. Under modern conditions it cannot remain so for long. A struggle has begun for a new world order, which, in the opinion of some people, above all Washington, must be a unipolar one, headed by the United States. And with the United States having the right to decide the fate of the world. That kind of world order does not suit other people, above all Russia, China, and India, which are advocating the building of a multipolar international order which would give each state - in West and East, North and South - the opportunity to develop independently under conditions of peace, stability and national security. Moscow becoming less influential One of the manifestations of this war is the struggle for the legacy of the Soviet Union. Russia, as its successor, has been more occupied in this period with domestic political intrigues and in fact has kept itself aloof from the development of links with many countries, the former allies and partners of the USSR. Others rushed into the enormous post-Soviet area. This applies particularly to the countries of "young democracy," states in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa, not to mention the former Soviet republics. As a result, Moscow lost its influence in many regions of the world and has essentially been left on its own, without allies, and US and NATO military bases have ended up right on its borders. With the disappearance of the socialist camp, that very buffer which separated the first world and the Third World also vanished too. As a result the "golden billion" - the prosperous countries - are vying with those who are reluctant to reconcile themselves to globalization and cultural-civilizational expansion. Incidentally, ultimatums on this score were heard from the Third World just a few days prior to terrorist acts in the United States. At the UN conference on racism in Durban they [presumably Third World countries] put forward a demand for the payment of reparations by the Western countries running into many billions [currency unspecified] for the slave trade. Even earlier, this happened after the G8 summit in Genoa when the Third World saw for itself that one should expect from the First World neither the cancellation of debts, nor a relaxation of the rules for export of goods from the poorly developed states, nor any substantial assistance in surmounting backwardness and poverty. And this is at a time when it is those states that are, in their quest for a way out of their indigent situation, becoming "hornets nests" of terrorism, drug trafficking and other modern misfortunes of mankind. Washington pursuing its own agenda From time to time the war on the political front has, as it were, been waged behind the scenes. However, with the coming to power of a Republican administration in the United States, and especially after the tragic events of 11 September, it has assumed an overt nature. Taking advantage of the fact that the world has virtually unreservedly acknowledged America's primacy in the fight against international terrorism (and it could not have been any different because it was a question of joint counteraction of this awesome challenge to mankind), Washington has decided to consolidate its success. It now wants to determine off its own bat who ought to be categorized as terrorists and who as their accomplices. And it is deciding how they are to be punished. Across the ocean no secret is made of the fact that they do not intend particularly to stand on ceremony with those countries that are going to get in America's way. This is cogently borne out by the so-called leak of information about the Pentagon's possible nuclear targets. At the same time the United States is embarking on the upgrading of its own war machine that is unprecedented in terms of the scale of expenditure, and this has to enable it to hold sway in a unipolar world. At the same time America does not intend to take account of the opinion not just of the world community (Bush Jnr, for instance, stated honestly that the United Nations is like a grandmother in a big family - they listen to her out of respect but at the same time it is not at all mandatory to do as she says), but also of its own allies. And in general, Washington is letting everyone understand that in principle when tackling its most important tasks it can even do without them. In particular, this applies to relations with our country the new scheme for which was presented to the US Senate at the end of April by Secretary of State Colin Powell. According to him, cooperation between Washington and Moscow would henceforth be built according to the formula "we agree to disagree". In practice this means that mutual agreement in key issues of bilateral relations is no longer required. America does not intend any longer to wait for Russia to accept any given proposal and so America is prepared to act unilaterally. In confirmation of his idea, the secretary of state cited the example of the United States' abandonment of the ABM treaty. Despite the persistence of fundamental Russian-American differences on this issue, Colin Powell declared, "the world has not come crashing down, the arms race has not resumed, a crisis in Russian-American relations has not occurred. Our relations are developing very well." Moscow even "helped us to get into Central Asia". And all this under conditions where the United States has ceased to try to reach agreement with Russia on every specific issue. Henceforth such a scheme that has already proved its fruitfulness will gradually be migrated to other spheres of Russian American relations too. But the main thing is that relations with Russia should be of tangible benefit to America... Competition developing on the military front For all the resoluteness of the actions on the political and economic fronts, the participants in a new world war will avoid transferring these actions to an overt field of battle, realizing that such a battlefield could become the last in mankind's destiny. Nevertheless, this does not mean that "engagements" are not being conducted on the military front. They find expression in different forms - shows of strength, regional conflicts, and limited wars (the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia and the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan), but above all there is the increase in military spending and the creation of new arms. And again, it is the United States that sets the tone. We have already talked about its military spending. As for new arms, among these figure, above all, the National Missile Defence System and the theatre ballistic missile defence systems which the United States intends to create. The Pentagon's plans for the creation of warheads capable of destroying targets with which conventional charges, even extremely accurate and powerful, are unable to cope, recently became public knowledge. An example of such targets is provided by underground bunkers and other installations. In an attempt to calm public opinion, the developers of these warheads are asserting that the future warheads will be highly accurate and that means they can be of a relatively small yield and will incur virtually no collateral damage. Experts call these assertions into question, however. One cannot agree with the opinion of Colin Powell that the abandonment of the ABM Treaty has not led to an arms race. Indeed, no-one today intends to compete with the United States in this sphere. You are unlikely to find another country that would venture to create such big aircraft-carrier force groupings, strategic military transport aircraft, such a substantial satellite grouping, and such intelligence gathering and transmission systems as those that America has at its disposal. However, the fact that the world has reacted to the US challenge appropriately is also obvious. This is noticeable even from its NATO European allies. Of late they have stepped up their actions in the creation of their own European armed forces which would be independent of the United States. Literally the other day there was a decision on disbanding the multinational division that forms part of the NATO allied armed forces and the transfer of its units to the Eurocorps for the purpose of reinforcing the defence potential of Europe itself. The following year the Europeans intend to take the same line with NATO mobile forces. Or take China. This year it went in for the highest increase in military spending in its entire history. A big part of that expenditure, observers are noting, will, in accordance with the new strategy, be channelled into the development of space rocketry and satellite hardware. This strategy, it is pointed out, has been devised taking into account China's more efficient use of its limited means and on the basis of the theory of asymmetry in waging a war. Its successful realization will enable Beijing to have, despite the existing lag in the field of both conventional and strategic arms, a definite high-tech potential with the aid of which it is possible to put out of action the enemy's key facilities such as information centres and communications systems. For these purposes, Beijing is planning in the next five years to launch about 30 satellites into orbit. And China's efforts in the defence sphere are not going unnoticed. Analysing them, the well-known Rand Corporation research centre (Santa Monica, California) is making the forecast that in 20 years China will have considerably reduced or even reduced to a minimum the amount by which it lags technically behind the United States in the military sphere. Russia has to regain former strength In his annual Message to the Federal Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed, that "the norm in the contemporary world is tough competition for markets, for investments and for political and economic influence... and that competition has assumed a truly global character. In a period of weakness, our weakness, we have had to give up many niches in the world market. And they have been immediately seized by others. No one wants to give them back just like that, and they won't... " This utterance not only establishes the situation in which Russia has found itself in the battle for a new world order, but also contains an indication as to where we should look for a way to get out of that situation. The main path, and this is perfectly obvious, is that Russia must once again become a strong and flourishing country. It has everything needed for this: rich mineral resources, an enormous intellectual potential, and many other factors. The task is to bring all these factors together and channel them towards attaining this objective. The country's foreign policy must also serve this end. The principle of cynical, if you like, pragmatism must be made the basis of our foreign policy. That is, where it is advantageous to Russia, including from the viewpoint of long-term prospects, we must embark on the closest cooperation with other countries. Like, let us say, it was with giving the United States support in its actions to destroy the Taleban regime in Afghanistan. And where it runs counter to Russia's interests, the approach has got to be different. In no case must the line beyond which confrontation lies be crossed. Foreign policy must be directed towards seeking out and acquiring allies. Unfortunately, for the first time in its history, Russia has found itself without allies. But in the present battle for a place in the sun, and for world markets, one is a good as none. In the immediate future it looks as if we will have to endure several unpleasant features. Thus, at the moment it is unclear whether an agreement on strategic arms will be signed during the Russian-American summit. And although at a recent working meeting in Sheremetyevo the defence ministers of the two countries stated that there had been a degree of progress in the preparation of such an agreement, they both specially stipulated that it will be the presidents of Russia and of the United States who would decide whether or not it would be signed. And taking account of the Secretary of State's scheme cited above, you have to be prepared for anything from the United States. But on the other hand there is clarity about something else: the United States and NATO - despite the special relations with our country, and the readiness to cooperate with us in the "Twelve" - do not intend to abandon the eastward expansion of the alliance and a decision about this will be made this year. And this means that the war machine of that most powerful organization will move still closer to Russia's borders. Under these conditions the country's defence capability has to be reinforced. And it must be said that today a lot is being done by its leadership in military organizational development and in the creation of modern armed forces that are small in terms of numerical strength but are nevertheless well equipped and mobile. It is their might that has to become the guarantee of the country's creative development. ******** Web page for CDI Russia Weekly: http://www.cdi.org/russia Archive for Johnson's Russia List: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation A project of the Center for Defense Information (CDI) 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036