Johnson's Russia List
#6187
16 April 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: US nears decision whether Russia 'market economy'
2. Interfax: Russian economy will not grow at 8% per annum in present
conditions - expert. (Illarionov)
3. Vremya Novostei: Alexei Chernyak, ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION
IN RUSSIA.
4. AFP: Yeltsin a grandfather again as once powerful daughter gives birth.
5. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, Putin's Party Assembly Line.
6. RIA Novosti: START CONTROL PATTERNS NOT TO BE WORKED OUT BY RUSSIA-US
MOSCOW SUMMIT.
7. AP: NATO, Russia Closer to Better Ties.
8. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Mark Mackinnon, Soviet-era shadows may
cloud future for Latvia. Anti-Russian sentiment is so strong it could subvert
the country's desire to enter NATO.
9. TimeEurope.com: Yuri Zarakhovich, From Russia, with Hate. With skinheads
and neo-Nazis on the rise, the country is bracing for a wave of xenophobic
attacks.
10. Financial Times (UK): Andrew Jack, Self-censorship the way to stay on
air. Disputes over freedom of speech in the media often involve a mixture of
competing commercial and political interests.
11. Financial Times (UK): Robert Cottrell, Closer ties with the west
attracts
muted criticism: Although not many Russian politicians are publicly attacking
President Putin's pro-western stance, few are praising it.
12. Ralph Davis: Re: JRL #6186 - Ware/Warren.
13. New book: Luke March, The Communist Party in post-Soviet Russia.
14. www.fednews.ru: NTV, INTERVIEW WITH GLEB PAVLOVSKY, PRESIDENT OF
THE EFFECTIVE POLICY FUND, ON CPRF.(Communists)
15. Matthew Maly: debate on democratization.]
*******
#1
US nears decision whether Russia 'market economy'
By Doug Palmer
WASHINGTON, April 15 (Reuters) - After a decade of wrenching economic and
social change in Russia, the Bush administration is nearing a decision on
whether to officially reclassify the country as a market economy, a
Commerce Department spokeswoman said on Monday.
Such a finding, which some expect before President George W. Bush's visit
to Moscow in late May, would put a U.S. seal of approval on the reforms
Russia has made since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and provide
some momentum to Moscow's bid to join the World Trade Organization.
It would also be of real dollar-and-cents importance to Russia exporters
because of U.S. trade laws that make it easier for the Commerce Department
to impose steep anti-dumping and countervailing duties on "non-market
economies."
Russian Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref was expected to
ask about the issue in talks here on Monday and Tuesday with Bush
administration officials.
Julie Cram, a spokeswoman for the department's International Trade
Administration, said the administration was in the last stage of an
investigation that began last year.
"I can't give you a final date, but we expect to reach our decision in the
near future," she said.
Supporters of the change have been encouraged by the Commerce Department's
recent decision to reclassify Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic, as a
market economy.
The Commerce Department has done the same for Hungary, the Czech Republic,
the Slovak Republic, Poland and Latvia since the collapse of the former
Soviet Union and is currently weighing requests from Ukraine and Moldova as
well as Russia.
Blake Marshall, executive vice president of the U.S.-Russia Business
Council, said Russia compares well to other former centrally planned
economies that have been reclassified.
"Clearly the vast preponderance of evidence points strongly in the
direction of revoking Russia's non-market economy status. That's a view
supported by hundreds of American business we work with on a daily basis,"
Marshall said.
But U.S. steel and nitrogen producers have argued against the change,
saying the Russian government remains heavily involved in its domestic
economy.
Robert Liuzzi, president of CF Industries, a leading U.S. fertilizer
producer, told a congressional panel last week that granting Russia market
economy status would allow it "to dump nitrogen fertilizers into the United
States with impunity."
The Russian company that makes popular Stolichnaya vodka also wants
Washington to deny Moscow's request.
SPI International accuses the Russian government of trying to reverse the
privatization of the vodka industry that occurred in the early 1990s. In a
dispute over who owns the vodka trademark, the government has barred SPI
from exporting some 150,000 cases of Stolichnaya.
Richard Edlin, a lawyer for SPI, said those tactics show Russia is
regressing on economic issues. Giving Russia market economy status would be
rewarding bad behavior, he said.
*******
#2
Russian economy will not grow at 8% per annum in present conditions - expert
MOSCOW. April 15 (Interfax) - Russia needs economic growth so as not to be
weak, poor and backward, Russian presidential economic advisor Andrei
Illarionov said on a Sunday night current events show.
The stance of President Vladimir Putin has not changed from what it was in
previous months and years. "What came as a surprise was the scenario of
Russian economic development conditions that estimated economic growth at
half of what the president had said, what all documents of the government had
said. That is what was surprising," Illarionov said commenting on the
presidential criticism of the government's economic plans earlier during the
week.
An annual growth rate of 8% during a period of 15-20 years requires an
absolutely different economic policy system and economic structure, the aide
said. "Here one cannot help agreeing with those who do not believe that the
Russian economy can generate a steady annual growth rate of 8%," he said
adding that two different conclusions can be drawn from the fact. Firstly,
"one can agree that we are doomed to 3% [of annual growth] and be happy with
that," however a different conclusion is also possible: "if these conditions
are insufficient for an 8% growth, let's change these conditions," he said.
*******
#3
Vremya Novostei
No. 54
April 2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION IN RUSSIA
By Alexei CHERNYAK
The State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat) made public
demographic forecasts for the next 50 years at the end of March.
There is nothing new about them: the country's population will
be gradually decreasing and getting older. Under Goskomstat's
pessimistic scenario, in 50 years, the country's population
will halve, making up about 77 million. The best scenario also
provides for a decrease in the population, but only to 126
million. Under the optimal scenario, by 2050, the country's
population will decrease by a third, making up about 100
million.
Admittedly, a third of the population will not vanish all over
sudden. The decrease will be gradual: of the current 144
million, 131 million will remain by 2020 an only 111 million -
by 2040.
Other negative tendencies will also persist, believes
Goskomstat. Say, the sex disproportion will grow. As is known,
the mortality rate among men is higher than among women and
they live 13 years less than women in Russia now. There will be
even more women by 2050. According to the forecasts, by the
mid-21st century there will be 32% less men and only 27% less
women than now. Admittedly, life expectancy among men will grow
from the current 59 years to 66.3 years and among women - from
the current 72 years to 77 years, on the average.
However, the growth of life expectancy, which is,
incidentally, forecast for the whole planet, has also a reverse
side to it. On the whole, the population will be steadily
getting older and the able-bodied citizens will have to
shoulder the burden of care about the aged. If today the share
of the able-bodied population in Russia's demographic
structure is 60.1%, by 2050, already less than a half of
Russians will be able to work, while the share of the aged will
be steadily increasing.
This is the reason why Russian scientists-demographers and
physicians have long been sounding alarm. As distinct from
statisticians, impartial in their pessimistic forecasts,
demographers are still hoping to change the situation. In the
opinion of Zhanna Zaionchkovskaya, head of the migration
analysis and forecasting laboratory of the Institute of
National-Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, serious crisis can be avoided only by increasing the
inflow of migrants into our country. The matter is that the
growth and age structure of the population of any country are
determined by three components:
birth rate, mortality rate and migration. However, the state
can influence far from all these processes.
The mortality rate in the country is still alarmingly
high, admit the health ministry leaders. Say, last year, Russia
lost 2.25 million of its citizens, a quarter of whom were in
the able-bodied age. On the whole, the mortality rate is 70%
higher than the birth rate. The number of newborns has been
growing for the second year in a row, noted health minister
Yuri Shevchenko at the ministry's extended collegium. In 2001,
51,000 more babies were born in Russia than in 2000. However,
this is clearly inadequate for us to start talking about a
cardinal improvement of the situation, for the aggregate birth
rate is still the same (1.2) and has not even reached the
minimum required for a simple reproduction of the population
(2.15).
Demographers believe that influencing migration processes
is much simpler than mortality and birth rates. An important
point is that the policy of attracting migrants from other
countries yields results faster - the changes in the
population's age structure and strength become noticeable right
away, stressed Zhanna Zaionchkovskaya. Scientists usually cite
the example of the experience of West-European countries in the
1960s or the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf in the
1970-1990. The liberalization of entry legislation enabled them
to quickly bring about an increase in the able-bodied
population.
*******
#4
Yeltsin a grandfather again as once powerful daughter gives birth
AFP
April 15, 2002
Former Russian president Boris Yeltsin has become a grandfather again as his
youngest daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko -- herself a once powerful political
figure -- has given birth to a daughter in a London clinic.
Dyachenko's stay in the London clinic cost 5,000 dollars (5,700 euros) and a
single day there is worth 900 dollars, the Gazeta daily reported Monday,
which did not specify when the birth happened.
This compares with Russians' average monthly salary of 140 dollars (162
euros).
The baby girl, Masha, is Dyachenko's third child and Gazeta speculated that
the birth would put a definitive end to her political career.
Dyachenko was her father's public relations adviser when he was president and
last October married Valentin Yumashev, a former presidential administration
head who co-wrote a book with Yeltsin.
While she still has an office in the Kremlin, her father would like her to
abandon politics, Gazeta quoted Kremlin officials as saying.
Dyachenko and Yumashev used to be part of a powerful and secretive group of
advisers around Yeltsin which the Russians dubbed "the Family."
Yeltsin, 71, who already has five grandchildren, learnt about the birth while
he was resting with his wife Naina in Russia's North Caucasus.
*******
#5
Moscow Times
April 16, 2002
Putin's Party Assembly Line
By Boris Kagarlitsky
Every self-respecting Russian leader has to have his own political party. At
first there was just the one party of power -- Unity. Moscow Mayor Yury
Luzhkov's Fatherland party could only aspire to that role on his home turf.
In the West, the party that wins an election forms the government. But in
Russia the victorious administration forms its own party, leaving little
doubt as to who will emerge victorious in the next election. Fatherland was
groomed to become the party of power on the national level after Luzhkov took
up residence in the Kremlin. That never happened, of course. But Fatherland
and its partners in the All-Russia bloc became the party of power all the
same. To get there they had to merge with Unity, the party of the victors.
With equal measures of Unity and All-Russia, and a dash of Fatherland thrown
in, our political alchemists produced a new superparty, United Russia. The
decisive factor in all this was not ideology but presence in the Putin
administration. The new party is situated at the center of the political
spectrum -- in the sense that it will follow orders from Moscow, the "federal
center."
Unfortunately some bureaucrats, dissatisfied with their new roles in United
Russia, decided to form new parties. No sooner had Sergei Mironov become
speaker of the Federation Council than he announced that he would launch his
own centrist party. Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matviyenko is now billed
as a potential leader of the Social-Liberal Party. Kremlin bureaucrats have
advised the heads of several minor social democratic organizations to join
forces with this "left-of-center structure," even though it doesn't yet
exist. And they get the hint, needless to say.
Party-building in Russia has become an assembly-line operation. The work is
all directed from one place. The presidential administration graciously
receives anyone with aspirations to be a party boss and advises on what
direction his or her new party should take.
This begs the question of how the Kremlin should deal with existing parties.
In fact, all of the factions in the State Duma are linked to the Kremlin in
one way or another. The Union of Right Forces supports the president's
liberal economic policies, although it whines about human rights abuses.
Gennady Zyuganov's Communist Party whinges about the government's economic
priorities but cheers up when federal forces bomb yet another Chechen
village. Grigory Yavlinsky's Yabloko party keeps a low profile. Our
democratic opposition prefers to keep its head down.
Strange as it seems, the Kremlin still isn't satisfied. The Communists have
been stripped of their committees in the Duma. Highly placed officials speak
openly about their plans to split the Communist Party in two. One half they
intend to turn into "reliable social democrats." They're even hand-picking
the new party's future leader. At this point the Kremlin's favorite is
millionaire Gennady Semigin.
Anyone who doesn't play by the new rules will be declared "unreliable" and
prevented from winning a seat in parliament. The sole criterion for
determining "reliability" will, of course, be loyalty to the Kremlin. If the
government is unhappy with the opposition, it will simply disband it and
organize a new opposition more to its liking.
Russia loves the persecuted. Political observers are predicting that the
Communists' poll numbers will soar following their public execution in the
Duma. But once the Kremlin starts a project, it doesn't stop halfway.
Political parties' freedom of movement will be restricted even more. Kremlin
operatives will test their authoritarian methods on the Communists, and
short-sighted liberals will likely cheer them on.
In short, everything is under control. Russia has a pluralist political
system. Elections are held on schedule, and there's no need to fix them any
longer because the winners won't make a move without orders from the Kremlin.
This isn't the managed democracy we had under Boris Yeltsin. Voters are now
presented with several cardboard boxes, all with somewhat different labels,
and told to choose. Everyone, including the voters, knows that the boxes are
empty. They are filled later, after the voter has made his choice. In a way
this might be more honest than falsifying election results. The only real
victims are the innumerable political consultants who peddle their services
to candidates and parties. Because it's much simpler to request an audience
in the Kremlin than to pay ambitious young politicos to tell you what you
already know.
Boris Kagarlitsky is a Moscow-based sociologist.
*******
#6
START CONTROL PATTERNS NOT TO BE WORKED OUT BY RUSSIA-US MOSCOW SUMMIT
MOSCOW, April 15. /RIA Novosti - The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or
START, which is to be signed by Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and
George W.Bush of the United States at their summit meeting, due in Moscow in
May, will be a legally binding document, according to a top-ranking Russian
military.
He, however, did not rule out that arms reduction control patterns would not
be worked out by the summit. As of today, the two countries have come to
terms on the START problem in general, while the control patterns problem is
yet to be resolved, according to the source. Yet, "should the signatories
stick to the Treaty-stipulated principles, related patterns can be worked out
later," believes the military.
Yet, he voiced concern over the US' attempt to divide the "nuclear basket"
into operationally deployed, fixed-targeted, and non-operationally deployed
nuclear forces. That means some of the warheads can be transferred into
operationally deployed ones in a month, others in two years, said he.
*******
#7
NATO, Russia Closer to Better Ties
April 15, 2002
By PAUL AMES
BRUSSELS, Belgium (AP) - Russia and NATO have neared an agreement for closer
ties in which the former foes will work together to tackle terrorism and the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, the alliance's secretary-general said
Monday.
But Russia and the United States differed over Washington's plans to expand
the defensive alliance by bringing in new members from eastern Europe.
Russia will sit alongside 19 NATO nations in a council to formulate joint
policy on peacekeeping, missile defense arrangements, and efforts to stop the
spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, Lord Robertson said.
``The 20 countries will sit around the table as equals,'' Robertson said
after meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. ``We are very close
to agreement. The spirit of cooperation is alive and well ... We are all
hoping it will take a quantum leap forward.''
Ivanov said he and his NATO counterparts will likely wrap up the agreement at
a meeting May 14-15 in Reykjavik, Iceland. ``There is still much work to be
done,'' he cautioned.
Robertson said Russian President Vladimir Putin would then join NATO leaders
at a May 28 summit meeting in Rome to formalize the new NATO-Russia council.
The drive to strengthen ties recognizes Russia's cooperation with the West in
the fight against terrorism since Sept. 11. Officials from both sides have
been negotiating since December to work out details.
Allied officials have stressed Moscow will not have the right to veto NATO
actions, nor will the new ties affect NATO's core mutual defense role that
holds an attack on one member is considered an attack on all.
Ivanov said Moscow remained opposed to NATO's plans to take on new members
from central and eastern Europe.
Russia has expressed particular concern that its three Baltic neighbors -
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - will be among seven nations expected to
receive an invitation to join NATO at a summit in Prague in November.
The United States supports a ``robust'' expansion of NATO to bring in new
members from eastern Europe, Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman said
Monday.
Grossman said it was too early to say who will be invited to join, but
restated President Bush's position that the expansion should be aimed at
``securing freedom from the Baltic to the Black Sea.''
Besides the Baltic states, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania want to
join.
``The alliance should continue to expand to the new democracies in Europe,''
said Grossman, who traveled to NATO headquarters at the start of a
nine-nation European tour to consult with allies on the Prague summit.
Albania and Macedonia have also applied to join, but are not expected to get
the go-ahead in Prague.
*******
#8
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
April 15, 2002
Soviet-era shadows may cloud future for Latvia
Anti-Russian sentiment is so strong it could subvert the country's desire to
enter NATO
By MARK MACKINNON
RIGA -- They hang side by side on display in the Occupation Museum in the
cobblestoned heart of Old Riga -- bright red Soviet posters praising the
common worker, and grainy black-and-white photographs of Hitler.
The museum recognizes almost no separation between Latvia's three-year
occupation by Nazi Germany during the Second World War, and its five decades
as part of the Soviet Union.
Both empires are portrayed here in the same light, as hated outsiders that
occupied this tiny country on the Baltic Sea.
More than a decade after Latvia won its independence from the Soviet Union,
there's still little love for Russia, and less trust.
Along with neighbours Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia hopes to be one of the
first post-Soviet states admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
next fall, when the alliance expands eastward.
"I think we should be part of NATO, part of the West," said Inta Gedrovica,
pushing a stroller in front of Riga's Freedom Monument.
Such strong feelings are common, especially among ethnic Latvians.
If there is anything that could keep Latvia from winning membership in NATO,
and from its longer-term goal of joining the European Union, it might be the
Latvian government's overt hostility to just about anything Russian.
During a recent visit, NATO Secretary-General George Robertson told Latvian
legislators that their anti-Russian laws -- particularly one that bars all
those who don't speak Latvian well from running for public office -- might
keep it out of the club.
"The NATO nations will be watching very carefully what you do this year in
relation to the election laws, so that they conform to standards throughout
NATO countries and the wider international community," Lord Robertson said in
a speech to Latvia's parliament.
While NATO, which is in the process of trying to redefine itself, is
sensitive to the suggestion that it remains an alliance targeted at Russia,
many ethnic Latvians are quick to embrace it because that is how they see it.
Last month, several hundred people -- many of them former members of a
German-led Latvian SS unit -- gathered at the Freedom Monument to commemorate
those who died fighting alongside the Germans against Soviets in the Second
World War.
Many expressed anger that Russian "settlers," who make up almost 40 per cent
of the country's 2.4 million people, have been allowed to stay.
"We agree with joining the NATO and the European Union, [because] there are
still occupiers here. Latvia's deoccupation has not yet occurred," said a
veteran at the event.
The resentment stems from a Soviet Russification policy that saw hundreds of
thousands of Russian and Ukrainian workers brought to Latvia to work as part
of a plan to swamp Latvian culture and stamp out nationalist sentiment in the
uppity republic.
Since 1991 the Latvian government, now headed by former Montreal resident
Vaira Vike-Freiberga, has introduced strict language laws. Russian is banned
on all street signs and businesses -- although it dominates trade in Riga's
800-year-old central market, and is the only language used in some towns and
villages. Recently, the last Russian-language radio station was forced off
the air.
Latvia's ethnic Russians say they feel discriminated against in a country
they consider home. They complain of losing jobs to ethnic Latvians, and of
persecution by language police, who can levy fines of up to $250 if they find
someone speaking Russian in a public-service job.
"If you go up to someone and speak Russian, they will pretend they don't
understand you," said Ruslan Sakoviks, a 25-year-old ethnic Russian.
"It's like being black in America."
An official from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
suggested recently that Latvia should recognize a de facto situation and make
Russian the second official language -- touching off a furor.
Official bilingualism, Latvian Foreign Minister Indulis Berzins responded,
would mean "the destruction of everything we have done in the past 10 years."
*******
#9
TimeEurope.com
April 22, 2002
From Russia, with Hate
With skinheads and neo-Nazis on the rise, the country is bracing for a wave
of xenophobic attacks
BY YURI ZARAKHOVICH/MOSCOW
It's a spring afternoon in downtown Moscow. Pushkin Square, a major hub of
the Russian capital, is as vibrant as ever. Even those who hurry along on
urgent errands steal a second to stop and enjoy the sunshine after weeks of
rain and snow. But the atmosphere in one corner of the square is more
menacing. A crowd of about 80 teenagers is chanting "Kill the U.S.A.!" and
raising their arms in the Nazi salute. Zakhar, aged 15, with shaved head and
camouflage shirt, is reluctant to talk to a journalist, but makes an
exception to explain that the rally is "all about exterminating the Jews,
Americans and other scum."
Immediately after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Russians in their thousands
brought flowers, wreaths, lighted candles and icons to the U.S. embassy wall.
Something of a rapprochement between Russia and the West followed. But those
feel-good days are gone. In a poll by the Public Opinion Foundation last
month, 70% of those surveyed regarded the U.S. as a hostile country. And
earlier this month, the U.S. embassy in Moscow received an e-mail in broken
English that read: "We are to kill all the foreigners we see, marking the
birthday of Hitler [April 20]. Send your citizens back -- or else. Russia is
for Russians." It was signed: "Ivan, President, Skinhead Group of Russia."
The embassy took the threat seriously enough to alert all Americans in Russia
to the increased risk over the next several weeks.
For members of extremist and neo-Nazi groups, Hitler's birthday has become an
occasion for venting their anger. And not just against the Americans. On
April 20 last year, Moscow skinheads launched attacks that left a young
Chechen killed and more than a dozen badly injured. Why do they do it?
"Because [Hitler] gave us the holy idea of National Socialism," says Zakhar.
Moscow police have promised to take "necessary measures" to prevent skinhead
violence on Hitler's birthday. But one policeman, who impassively observed
Zakhar and his friends hoist "Skins against Bush" posters near the McDonald's
in Pushkin Square, didn't seem too worried. When asked why no "measures" were
being taken against this group, he shrugged: "Where do you see any skinheads
here? It's a rally to support domestic chicken producers against American
imports."
Ten years ago skinheads numbered no more than a few dozen in Moscow. Now the
Interior Ministry estimates that there are 10,000 skinheads and other
neo-Nazis in the country. Independent analysts put the figure at closer to
50,000. No official data on skinhead violence exist, but an estimate by
journalists and foreign embassies suggests that skinhead assaults have left
more than a dozen foreigners dead and 100 hospitalized in Moscow since May
2000. Similar attacks have taken place in St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg and
Novgorod. Russian officials dismiss these incidents as simple hooliganism but
can't deny that they have become more common. "There is a sharp increase in
physical and verbal attacks against foreigners," says a senior U.S. embassy
official.
The situation has become so bad that last month 18 foreign students, mainly
from African and Asian countries, studying at Rostov Medical University chose
to leave Russia for good. They had been subjected to repeated beatings and
insults by local skinheads, while the police turned a blind eye. At a
conference held last week in Moscow to discuss dangers to foreign students,
representatives of Russian universities said that in the face of police
indifference they would have to hire private guards and form self-defense
teams to protect their 70,000 foreign students.
The skinheads also target non-Slav minorities from the Caucasus, whom
Russians disparagingly refer to as "blacks," and Jews. Last October, a crowd
of 300 skinheads smashed a market in south Moscow, beating the "black"
merchants, then moved on to the Sevastopol Hotel to attack Afghan refugees
staying there. Four people were killed and more than 20 badly injured.
Dressed in bomber or camouflage jackets and heavy steel-tipped boots,
skinheads prowl in packs of three to five "fighters" armed with clubs and
steel rods. These groups can merge quickly to form mobs of several hundred
for major assaults, which seem too well-organized to be spontaneous.
Many Russians hold politicians accountable for skinhead violence. "Why blame
the kids?" asks Sergei Antonov, an unemployed Moscow economist in his early
40s. "Blame the government, which has condemned Russians to poverty while the
blacks and foreigners are lording it over us." Today, most skinheads are
still in their teens, warns Antonov, but soon "they'll take dominant
positions as they become adults. You'll see their impact a decade later." In
fact, their impact is already clear in Pushkin Square.
*******
#10
Financial Times (UK)
15 April 2002
[DJ: Part of multipart series on Russia that can be found at:
http://surveys.ft.com/russia2002]
SURVEY - RUSSIA: Self-censorship the way to stay on air: MEDIA by Andrew
Jack: Disputes over freedom of speech in the media often involve a mixture of
competing commercial and political interests
By ANDREW JACK
Just as journalists from Russia's TV6 television network were celebrating
victory in a competition to win back a broadcasting licence last month, their
new patron dashed any hopes that they had an easy task ahead.
As Yevgeny Primakov, the former prime minister, said openly in an interview
shortly afterwards, he expected "internal censorship" from TV6 when
considering what would be broadcast. "Let's call it self-censorship," he
added explicitly.
Three months after TV6 was forced off the air after lengthy judicial
harassment, Yevgeny Kiselyov, the station's director, successfully bid for
its reinstatement - apparently with the backing of President Vladimir Putin.
But he did so at a price. The Kremlin recommended that the advisory board of
the network would be headed by two former KGB officers, Mr Primakov and
Arkady Volsky, head of the union of industrialists and entrepreneurs. A group
of politically influential business 'oligarchs' was recruited as shareholders.
The TV6 incident was the latest in a series of initiatives under Mr Putin,
which have raised questions over the threat to freedom of speech in Russia
and triggered international criticism of anti-democratic tendencies within
his administration.
But, like a series of other such episodes in the Russian media which have
taken place since 2000, the situation is more ambiguous than it is sometimes
made out to be. The disputes involve a mixture of competing commercial and
political factors.
Mr Putin himself has clearly stated that the grip of oligarchs with
particular agendas should be removed from the media and that the best
guarantee for media independence is economic self-sufficiency.
The lossmaking TV6, by contrast, had previously been controlled by Boris
Berezovksy, the former "grey cardinal" to the Kremlin now living in exile in
London, who made no secret that he wanted media to further his own political
agenda. He also controlled ORT, the nation's principal channel nominally
owned by the state, which he used explicitly during 1999 and early 2000 to
help Mr Putin's election by criticising his opponents.
Once Mr Berezovsky fell out with Mr Putin, his control over ORT was wrested
by behind-the-scenes pressure. Then Lukoil, Russia's largest oil company,
used its 15 per cent minority stake in TV6 to begin action to liquidate the
company. It argued it was fighting back after Mr Berezovsky attempted to
dilute its stake to zero.
The same mixture of political and commercial motives lay behind the campaign
against NTV and other parts of the Media Most group created by the now-exiled
media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky.
He built up a highly professional empire, but did so on the back of loans and
investments from state institutions. Mr Gusinsky also periodically used his
media outlets to further his own interests - including criticising Mr Putin's
administration when it suited.
Like so many other parts of the Russian media, which are dependent on
oligarchs or the state rather than self-financing, "independent" was not
always the correct word to use in describing their journalism.
But the result was at least lively, critical coverage. Even if the reason
motivating the recent Kremlin attacks against the media has been a personal
vendetta against certain oligarchs rather than a direct attempt to crush free
speech more generally, the consequence has been less diversity.
The leading television networks ORT and RTR are controlled directly by the
state; NTV is held by the state-backed gas company Gazprom; and TV6 is now
beholden to a complex web of conflicting but broadly pro-state interests.
Furthermore, while the conversion of media groups into profitable businesses
- providing scope for their independence - may be a necessary condition for a
free press in Russia, it is not a sufficient one.
The struggles over both NTV and TV6 appear to illustrate that, despite Mr
Putin's calls for a "dictatorship of the law" with impartial judicial
decisions, the courts are still being used to further certain political and
commercial biases.
Just as troubling, the moves have encouraged self-censorship by journalists,
and given carte blanche to some regional administrations in Russia to follow
or even to exceed the party line being laid down by Moscow.
Oleg Panfilov, head of the Centre for Journalism in Extreme Situations, a
media watchdog, highlights attacks on the regional media, as well as the
creation of pro-state organisations, such as the Sibur and Yuzhny Kanal
television broadcasts or the Rosbalt news agency in St Petersburg.
He has detected a sharp rise during the past year in the number of
quasi-censorship moves, including tough accreditation requirements, despite
their clear violation of the Russian constitution.
Chechnya remains a telling test-case, with the government proving effective
in its efforts to control access, and even banning interviews in the Russian
media with Aslan Maskhadov, the elected president turned rebel leader.
"It is possible that a new era of neototalitarian ideology awaits Russia, an
ideology no longer based on communist beliefs, but on nationalist and
patriotic principles," Mr Panfilov wrote prophetically two years ago, warning
that "innovative ways" would be used to thwart independent journalism.
Still more blunt instruments have also been used. The Glasnost Defence
Foundation, another media watchdog, estimates that at least 17 journalists in
Russia died last year in circumstances linked to their professional work.
Many more have been beaten up.
There are some more positive tales, including the growth in some profitable
regional media groups, and the purchase of stakes by Modern Times Group of
Sweden in Darial and STS, two small non-political TV networks. If it takes
place soon - despite recurrent delays - the sale of NTV by Gazprom will be
one to watch closely.
However, the principal sign being scrutinised by analysts today is whether,
with parliamentary elections looming next year and television now much more
firmly under state control, pressure will increasingly be applied to the
printed word.
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a daily paper owned and clearly used by Mr Berezovsky,
has recently come under threat of a criminal action. Novaya Gazeta, an
investigative weekly, has been the subject of two crippling libel actions.
There are always excuses which can explain or justify each individual case.
But the cumulative result is currently leading in an unpalatable direction.
*******
#11
Financial Times (UK)
16 April 2002
Closer ties with the west attracts muted criticism: Although not many Russian
politicians are publicly attacking President Putin's pro-western stance,
few are praising it
By ROBERT COTTRELL
The most striking thing about President Vladimir Putin's new pro-western
foreign policy, save for the policy itself, is the muted response it has
provoked from the Russian political and military elite. No political
heavyweight is attacking Mr Putin's policy publicly. But precious few are
praising it, either.
Privately, says one Kremlin adviser, "there is criticism (of the new foreign
policy), and there are people opposing it. But the risk is a reasonable one
for a statesman who is making a historic choice."
The historic choice made by Mr Putin is to push Russia closer to the west -
beginning with his pledge to help the US-led fight against international
terrorism after the attacks of September 11. The consequences of this may
quickly have outstripped Mr Putin's expectations.
He was obliged almost at once to accept the arrival of US troops in some
central Asian countries, for the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan forced his hand by signalling their desire to
assist US forces, whatever Russia said.
Mr Putin was later also obliged to accept the prospect of US forces in
Georgia, another immediate neighbour of Russia, when the US said it wanted to
train and equip Georgian troops in suppressing banditry and terrorism
spilling over into Georgia from neighbouring Chechnya.
Even as Russia adjusted to these moves deep within the former Soviet bloc,
its own supposed "sphere of influence", it was bound by the logic of his
policy to make other concessions to the US - and some compromises.
In December, it accepted, without serious protest, a US plan to withdraw from
the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty and move ahead with national missile
defence. Previously, Russia had opposed missile defence, describing the ABM
treaty as a cornerstone of international security arrangements and
threatening unspecified counter-action if the US withdrew.
Changed relations with the west also obliged Russia to change its line on
Nato's eastward enlargement, which it used to attack as a prime threat to its
own national security. Since September 11, it has stopped talking in those
terms; instead, it has focused on trying to get a voice and even a vote for
itself in Nato business.
The dominance of international security issues in the "new" foreign policy
means Russia has returned to treating the US as its primary western
interlocutor, rather than Europe, which was Mr Putin's initial preference.
The new foreign policy also complicates relations with many countries that
Russia favoured under its "old", Soviet-tinged foreign policy. The old
policy, closely associated with the still-influential former prime minister,
Yevgeny Primakov, emphasised differences with the west. It favoured close
economic and diplomatic relations with undemocratic or anti-western
countries, such as China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya.
It is a measure of Mr Putin's policy shift that, only a month before
September 11, he was entertaining as an honoured guest in Moscow the North
Korean dictator, Kim Jong-Il. Only a month before that, he was signing a
treaty of "friendship and co-operation" with China, portrayed by both sides
as a big new long-term commitment towards much deeper economic and security
relations.
Relations with China remain outwardly correct. But there is no sign of the
new warmth and trust the treaty was supposed to bring about. China "must be
very deeply concerned" about Russia's new direction, and, in particular,
about its tolerance of US troops in central Asia, on China's western flank,
says one Asian diplomat in Moscow.
As for Iraq, the prospect of a US intervention to force out Saddam Hussein
may cause Russia fewer qualms than is commonly assumed, says Mikhail
Margelov, chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the upper house of
parliament, the Federation Council.
Russia has no strong interest in preserving the regime of Saddam Hussein, he
says. Its interest is "to have its debts paid and to have its economic
interests protected", he adds - referring to Iraq's Dollars 8bn sovereign
debt to Russia, and to the contracts held by Russian companies for developing
oilfields in Iraq once United Nations sanctions are ended.
And the US is apparently thinking in the same terms. "There is something here
that can be discussed," says a US diplomat. "We have to look for ways in
which (Russian) commercial equity could be preserved in a post-Saddam Iraq."
Iran may be a trickier problem, if the US continues to treat it as a full
member of the "axis of evil". Russia views Iran as a vital if sometimes
awkward partner in regional affairs, particularly relating to the Caspian
Sea, and also as a legitimate market for Russian nuclear reactors and
conventional weapons. But the biggest obstacle to Mr Putin's new foreign
policy, may be his own generals, politicians and civil servants. Having
disrupted Russia's traditional foreign policy ties, Mr Putin needs to show
gains from the new links with the west if he is to inspire this conservative
mainstream into actively supporting him.
Some argue gains are already visible. "The Americans are doing our job in
Afghanistan," says Mr Margelov. "Their military involvement can lead to
economic involvement, creating jobs and assisting development in central
Asia."
But that will hardly comfort critics of Mr Putin, who are imbued with old
Soviet-style geopolitical thinking, and who see only a series of US advances
and Russian retreats. What Mr Putin needs is gains that even these doubters
cannot dispute. But so far gains of that kind have been elusive.
Given that Mr Putin supported the old-style foreign policy happily enough
before September 11, it would not be surprising if even he himself still
harboured a few doubts about where the new foreign policy is leading. "He has
not yet completely burnt his bridges," says Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of
Yabloko, the centre-right party.
"Putin wants Russia to be close to the west, that's obvious," says Boris
Nemtsov, leader of the Union of Right Forces, another centre-right party.
"But he also wants to build Byzantine Russia inside here at the same time.
That's tricky. And if he fails, what's his choice? He will have to change his
policy."
*******
#12
From: "Ralph Davis"
Subject: Re: JRL #6186 - Ware/Warren
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2002
A couple of corrections need to be mentioned regarding Russian-US
collaboration viz the threat of Islamic insurrection in Eurasia:
1. There was collaboration between the US and Russia which was formalized in
2000,albeit without the media fanfare and public disclosure to deflect public
criticism.
Part of this agreement included joint training of Central Asian states
[Uzbekistan,
Kyrgystan, and Kazakhstan] under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for Peace
program. Furthermore, the US created the Central Asian Border Security
Initiative that provided military aid to the three Central Asian states in
improve their counterinsurgency capabilities.
In early 2001, non-lethal military aid was extended to Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan, with the implicit consent of Russia . . .
2. In 2000, Russia and the US created a joint working group on
counterterrorism that
provided a forum through which to collaborate in dealing with the threat
emanating from Islamic insurrection, including the threats posed by Chechens
[the mating of Chechen nationalism with Islamic radicalism is a potent mix
that bodes ill for regional stability], the Taleban-Al Qaeda, and the IMU.
According to Gen Tommy Franks, its significance signaled a revolution in
US-Russian relations: US-Russian interests in Central Asia no longer
conflicted but intersected in the region.
3. Regarding the supposed threat of air strikes against the Taleban in 2000,
there is
nothing to suggest that this plan of action was seriously considered. What
instead transpired was much media hype regarding the confluence of US-Russian
interests in battling Islamic insurrection that foresaw "conspiracy-oriented"
speculation to take
a life of its own . . . with Russian military officers adding fuel to the
gristmill.
4. Putin, faced with the realization that Russian military power was impotent
in battling the scourge of Islamic insurrection [which Mr Warren correctly
identified],
took the only course of action that was available: he conceded to US military
assistance . . . he had to swallow Russian pride, a prospect that left a
bitter taste.
5. The point that both Ira and Rob were trying to convey is that the
confluence of
US-Russian interests in battling Islamic insurrection was NOT accepted by a
host of Russian-bashers - RUSSOPHOBES - a point that Mr Warren did not
address but which was the central argument of Ira's post ... and Rob's reply.
6. What to make of this? US policy will be guided by what is considered US
national
interests and not by the whims of Media editorialists, drum-beating Human
Rights
activists, or from hysterical academics. Whether it is popularly accepted in
US public discourse or not, US policy has initiated a tectonic shift in
US-Russian interests, which, it is hoped, will foresee a more
European-oriented
Russia, one that will only enhance US interests in the region.
What is wrong with this?
Best,
Ralph Davis
Moderator: Eurasian Geopolitics
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/eurasia-geopolitics/
*******
#13
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2002
Subject: New book on Communists
From: Luke March
Given the recent coverage to the shenanigans with the communist portfolios
in the Duma, it seems an apt time to give readers notice of my new book, The
Communist Party in post-Soviet Russia, just published by Manchester
University Press. This seeks to evaluate CPRF activity as a whole in the
last ten years. I wonder if you might put this on Johnson's Russia List.
Details follow.
The Communist Party in post-Soviet Russia
Luke March, University of Edinburgh
Banned and repeatedly consigned to history in 1991, the Communist Party of
the Russian Federation (CPRF) is now Russia's largest and most influential
party, and the largest non-ruling communist party in the world today. The
focus of this book is the origin and development of this extraordinary
political party.
Drawing on extensive original and primary research, March details the
ideology, organisation and activity of a political phenomenon which has as
yet received little in-depth analysis and over which there is currently
little scholarly consensus. He analyses the CPRF's evolution in the context
of post-Soviet political developments, and makes comparisons with other
Eastern European countries where left-wing parties have made strong
comebacks, to provide a detailed and stimulating examination of a party
whose role in Russian politics is far more complex and contradictory than is
generally understood. The party has helped stabilise the Russian political
system, and common perceptions of it as anti-democratic are vastly
oversimplified. But like many other Russian political blocs, the CPRF's
future development in a barely-formed democracy faces huge obstacles.
CONTENTS:
* 1. The CPRF's emergence as the dominant successor party
* 2. A broad church: the CPRF's ideological currents
* 3. Programmatic evolution
* 4. Evaluating the CPRF's ideology: backwards to socialism?
* 5. Organisational development and membership
* 6. Electoral ascent 1993-96
* 7. Electoral decline 1996-2001?
* 8. The CPRF and the political system
Conclusion
Publication date: April 2002
Hardback c. £45.00 ISBN 0-7190-6043-5, Paperback c. £16.99 ISBN
0-7190-6044-3. 288 Pages
From Manchester University Press
www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/
Through University of British Columbia Press
http://www.ubcpress.ca
and Palgrave USA
www.palgrave-usa.com
Dr Luke March
Lecturer in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics
Department of Politics
University of Edinburgh
Room 301
Adam Ferguson Building
George Square
Edinburgh EH8 9LL
SCOTLAND, UK
TEL: 44 (0)131 650 4241
FAX: 44 (0)131 650 6546
*******
#14
TITLE: INTERVIEW WITH GLEB PAVLOVSKY, PRESIDENT OF THE EFFECTIVE
POLICY FUND, ON CPRF
[HERO OF THE DAY NTV PROGRAM, 22:30, APRIL 11, 2002]
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/)
Anchor: Good evening and this is Hero of the Day program on
NTV channel. I am Savik Shuster. The Duma crisis appears to have
blown over and perhaps the communist crisis has started. The
Communist Party has lost its power and influence in the State Duma
and it lost one of its leaders, Gennady Seleznyov. His decision to
stay on as chairman of the State Duma is seen by many as carrying
the seeds of discord and perhaps even a split in the Communist
Party. Our guest is prominent political scientist and President of
the Effective Policy Fund Gleb Pavlovsky. Good evening. First, how
probable is a split in the Communist Party?
Pavlovsky: I think it is already taking place. It has yet to
express itself in organization terms, but the actual split is
evidenced by the fact that the party leaders failed to solve what
was after all a fairly simple question. They couldn't come up with
a decision over the situation with Seleznyov that would suit both
Seleznyov and the party.
Q: Was such a decision possible?
A: Well, I don't want to do the communists' work for them, but
honestly it is not all over yet, things are only starting. As I
always say the main problem of the CPRF is its leaders who do not
see the losses of the party.
Q: But the Seleznyov affair is probably over. This is his
final and firm decision and it is not to be revised.
A: Yes, I think Seleznyov himself will mull over what
happened, theoretically he can contemplate some actions. He is the
leader of a certain movement and elections are approaching and some
options may be open.
Q: But you say that there was an acceptable solution for them,
a solution acceptable to all sides. What could it have been?
A: It is obvious to me that they failed to capitalize on the
situation in which they came under pressure. They came under
pressure from the majority of the Duma parties, the Duma factions,
their rivals. A party if it feels support and it is real support it
can always fall back on the support of the social groups that back
it and they can exert a certain influence on the situation as a
whole. This is normal political process.
Q: You mean people taking to the streets?
A: Well, people taking to the streets is not the only form of
democracy that exists in the world. And it is not easy in any
democracy to make inroads on a big political party in parliament.
Q: That is true. But in continental Europe the opposition
often has recourse to this, it mobilizes the masses to indicate
that it has support.
A: If the party has the 30-40 percent support which Zyuganov
always talks about then in that case the party creates a situation
in the country, including for other parties, that forces an early
election, for example. That is, if the party really believes in the
30-40 percent support. But does Mr. Zyuganov really believe he has
30-40 percent support? I have strong doubts about it.
Q: You definitely don't believe it?
A: Yes, I definitely don't believe it. This is the average
support in the lower house. This is not a measure of real support,
it is an opinion poll that asks people to indicate what they as
voters would like to tell the parties that they trust. They know
that they are not going to the polls just yet. But they send their
signals from time to time. For example, if they don't like the way,
for example, United Russia behaves they may give it black marks in
a survey, but when polling day comes they will still vote for it.
This is a normal situation in such opinion polls.
You know, sometimes popularity ratings continue to grow even
with regard to political corpses, like beards and nails grow. For
example, General Lebed continued high in popularity ratings for a
year after he had reached the peak of his fame.
Q: But the Communist Party traditionally has support in
Russian society.
A: Used to have support.
Q: But the number of disadvantaged people is not shrinking.
A: This brings us to the most interesting thing. Something is
happening to the party which emboldens its enemies. The problem is
very simple. When we ask people about social problems -- you see,
we have two policies, there is the Moscow policy and there is the
politics of millions of people who face a lot of difficulties and
a lot of interesting situations. For example, a down-at-heel person
who lives in an apartment built for him by the Soviet government.
That person has a lot of social problems. A teacher, a doctor, an
engineer. When he speaks about his problems he never mentions the
communists.
Q: That is, the communists are not the people he looks to for
protection.
A: Some of them do vote for the communists. But when it comes
to his every day problems the communists do not come into the
picture. 0.02 percent in all the focus groups mentioned communists
during the year in connection with the social problems.
Q: But in the questions addressed to you via the Internet
there are many recurring questions. Look at the action in Voronezh,
and I think you are underestimating the number of people in Moscow
who vote for communists and sympathize with them.
A: Yes, people believe in communists as a certain ideological
symbol. Now, who are the social base of the communists? And what is
their main problem? These are people whose capital was created
under the Soviet government: education, a trade and an apartment.
But this is capital and he wants to make a use of this capital if
he is an active person. And there the communists have nothing to
tell him. They have nothing to give him. They do not solve his
problems. These problems are tackled by Putin. Rightly or wrongly,
they expect Putin to solve these problems for them.
Well, at the level of grassroots democracy in Russia Putin has
already gained the upper hand over the communists. And what he
needs now is a party that would claim that victory. So, at present
the strength of the communists lies only in this, that the center
right parties have not challenged them at the grassroots level.
Q: In order to wrest the final victory from them. Yes?
A: Yes. But a victory not where it is easy, like in Moscow,
but in the streets.
Q: Which brings me to the next question. Don't you feel that
the latest political events will force the communists to bring
people out into the streets?
A: I hope that the latest developments will first of all force
the rivals of the communists to stop being complacent and engage in
intrigues in the capital and hide themselves behind Putin's back.
Q: You are inviting them to come out in open competition?
A: The field of competition is not the city streets, it is the
real problems of real teachers, doctors, engineers and students.
Opinion polls reveal a stable 20 percent of those who believe in
the success of the majority.
Q: What you seem to be saying is that the center, the alliance
of four parties, should emerge as a social-democratic party and win
that ground from the communists.
A: Well, some might become social democrats, but some might
not. Why should they all become social democrats? One should just
address the social problems of the people. And I must say that
conservatives are sometimes also good at working with the masses.
We have a conservative-patriotic groundswell in our society. This
is a reality. Theoretically, the communists should have benefited
from that, but they missed that opportunity.
Q: They missed it.
A: And today, whoever the communists may bring out into the
streets, they have lost their grip on the problems of these people.
They may bring out a large number of old folks into the streets.
But they have lost their grip on the problems of the active part of
the population.
Q: Let us hear a call from our viewer who looks at the same
problems as the ones you were talking about but from a different
angle. "Do you think it is a crisis? I for one don't think it is.
The democrats have displayed their beastly nature. I have never
been a communist myself, but now I am totally on their side."
A: Well, there are different democrats.
Q: But it is assessed as a victory of democrats over the
communists.
A: I hope it will evolve into a victory of the democrats over
the communists. But for that to happen things should move forward.
It is not yet a crisis. The crisis still lies ahead.
Q: This is the most interesting thing. You say that the
communists who have turned to their electorate, provoke an early
election by using political instruments. But from what we have
seen, do you think the leaders themselves could have behaved in a
different way? For example, Zyuganov might have allowed Seleznyov
to head up the parliamentary Communist Party. Seleznyov might have
done something else.
A: No, of course not. We know these people, we have seen them
in action many times. Even in 1998 they failed to do anything. And
not because they were afraid. It was a situation of a crisis that
affected tens of millions of people. And what they were doing was
they engaged in intrigues waiting for power to drop into their laps
owing to some Kremlin intrigues. But this did not happen. And they
are not capable of anything else. They just drive around in their
Mercedes limousines.
Q: So, they will not be in a hurry to grab the center-left
position.
A: It is late in the day. They missed the boat. But let me
tell you that this does not guarantee success for their rivals. If
the rivals do nothing, you know the concept of the "seller's
market."
Q: Let us hear another call. "Don't you think that it gives a
chance to the CPRF to win the next election?"
A: I think it is an honest situation of competition. I repeat,
if they work hard now and above all they have to renew their
leadership cadre, and if their competitors are passive, they may
improve their position. But I repeat, it would require something
that I consider to be incredible. They won't be able to recruit
such people as Seleznyov, Tuleyev and so on. They too big to fill
that niche.
Q: They are people who have already had taste of power.
A: But power is not just Mercedes limousines, but a say in
decision-making. It's about deciding and not waiting for others to
make a mistake.
Q: Here is an interesting question addressed to you: Why have
you personally engineered a split within the CPRF? Today Russia has
one communist party and tomorrow there may be two. Do you love
them?"
A: To begin with, there are more than one communist parties
and more than two, I think. I don't like them. I don't like them,
among other things, because those whom they cite have brought about
the collapse of the state which theoretically they should have
protected. But they have it in them to bring about the collapse of
another state. So, I wouldn't entrust them with leading the state.
Anchor: Thank you. And the guest of Hero of the Day was
prominent political scientist and president of Effective Policy
Fund Gleb Pavlovsky.
*******
#15
From: "Matthew Maly"
Subject: debate on democratization
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2002
Matthew Maly
tel. in Kyiv, Ukraine 380-44-472-2851
http://www.matthew-maly.ru/index-eng.html#DEF
I have been following the debate on democratization of Russia with great
interest and would like to offer a personal perspective. I think that JRL
readers may find it useful.
I emigrated to the US from Russia at the age of 21, graduated from Columbia
and earned an M.A. at Yale. In 1990, I proposed a scheme of voucher
privatization (quite different from the one that was eventually implemented)
and in 1992 came back to Russia to become an Expert with the Russian
Ministry of Economics. Since I was hired by the Russians and not by the HIID
or USAID, my salary was $26 per month. I served one and a half years.
In 1994, I got a short-term USAID contract to write an orientation brochure
for arriving western consultants. I wrote the brochure, and it was put on
the shelf. But then there was an article stating that the USAID’s Chief of
Mission had overspent on the remodeling of his apartment. As the US Senate’s
fact-finding mission was about to arrive, my brochure, called Understanding
Russia, was published in forty eight hours, and spread on tables, still wet
with paint, for the inspectors to see. So, that was how Russia was
understood: very fast. And since Russia was now understood (a total cost of
my contract was $7K), several million dollars of questionable expenditures
were immediately forgiven.
Some may call USAID’s practices wasteful and self-serving, but it was
exactly these practices that launched my career as a published writer. I am
proud to have covered USAID’s behind with my work and, by the way, am ready
to do so again: I have just finished another book.
After the Senators left, USAID decided to read the book it had just
published. There, it found a discussion of cultural differences between the
Russians and Americans as well as the use of the word “corruption” in
relation to the Yeltsin’s government. USAID then bought up the book in
stores and shred it, giving me back the copyright. I applaud this courageous
action: indeed, how can USAID be promoting democracy and diversity of
opinion unless it knows what it feels like to shred a book?
I reprinted Understanding Russia without a USAID logo, and it was favorably
reviewed by several newspapers. The Globe and Mail called it “perhaps the
best guide to [Russia’s] psychology” and a major Danish newspaper,
Berlingske Tidende, wrote that the book was “an outstanding insight” that
“enjoys a cult status in the Moscow English speaking community.”
Several employees of the US Embassy in Moscow invited me to their homes to
tell me they had learned my book virtually by heart. But they talked to me
in whispers, shook my hand furtively, and never came out in my support when
I found myself in a life-threatening emergency. This I also applaud: how can
you promote democracy unless you are full of fear and operate under an
ideological press? As a naturalized American citizen who bought the America
thing lock, stock, and barrel, I did not know Americans could whisper. Now I
know they can.
From June 1996 to August 1999, I worked for the Defense Enterprise Fund
(“DEF”).
DEF was established and funded by the U.S. Congress with a mission to create
profitable joint ventures with the former Soviet producers of weapons of
mass destruction. DEF’s stated goal was to convert these producers in order
to prevent rogue states and terrorist organizations from getting their hands
on the advanced Russian military technology. In his last State of the Union
Address, President Bush referred to DEF’s mission eight times; apparently,
it is important.
In July 1999, after my repeated attempts to convince DEF’s top management to
improve the way the Fund was being run were all rebuffed, I wrote a
confidential letter of concern to Ambassador Taylor, Coordinator of U.S.
Assistance to the N.I.S. (All documents I mention are available on my
website http://www.matthew-maly.ru/index-eng.html#DEF). I alleged that about
$20M of DEF’s money were grossly mismanaged.
Ambassador Taylor ordered an investigation of my allegations to be conducted
by a partner of a lawyer that represented DEF Board. The “investigation”
lasted four months and found absolutely nothing.
In August 2000, Department of Defense published its Audit of DEF. In it,
DEF’s management and oversight were seen as “poor” and several million
dollars of very questionable losses were described. However, this Audit
failed to investigate or even mention my allegations.
In April 2001, the Moscow Times, published a 10,000 page Special Report
about DEF, Investing, Pentagon-Style. This Report went through my
allegations and essentially confirmed them.
In December 31, 2001, the second Department of Defense Audit of DEF was
published. Again, it made no mention of my allegations. It said that DEF had
invested about $30M, and the present value of this investment portfolio was
estimated at $11M. DEF had just $4M in cash remaining in the $67M program.
DEF spent $35M on itself, or 53% of its money, whereas, as the Audit noted,
usually venture capital firms spend just “one to two percent” on
administration. The Audit also found $2.2M of “unallowable” expenses, such
as golf club memberships.
After my letter of concern, the company that managed DEF at the time was
fired by DEF Board and another company was found to manage DEF. The new
contract calls for $2M yearly management fee and is to run for five years.
As present value of DEF investment portfolio was estimated at $11M, a
contract to manage this portfolio for a fee totaling $10M seems generous.
The new DEF management company rehired only three people from the former
management company, my former employer:
1. a person who, I alleged, deserves most of the blame for DEF’s demise.
Even though my letter of concern put most of the blame on him, this person
was promoted to serve as DEF President (the former DEF President resigned
immediately following my letter of concern);
2. a person who, I alleged, was passing bribes to the former Russian Vice
Prime Minister;
3. a person who, immediately after my letter of concern was received by DEF
Board, called a staff meeting to describe my letter as “slanderous”.
The Audit noted that the new DEF management company was “destroying
documents”: it certainly has on its staff the three people best able to do
that. As DEF’s new management contract leaves no money at all for
conversion, I would call it “clean” as it cleans everything up rather neatly
and takes to the cleaner’s both the Russian scientists and the American
taxpayers.
So far, there has been four newspaper articles (two in the Moscow Times and
two in Defense Week) and four investigations of DEF (an internal
investigation, two Department of Defense audits, and an investigation by the
Defense Criminal Investigative Service that is still continuing). Almost
three years later, DEF (or whatever remains of it) is still managed by the
same person.
I live in Russia and Ukraine and want to find a position having to do with
U.S. assistance to the N.I.S. Since I wrote the letter of concern almost
three years ago I have not been able to find such a position even though I
have filed more than 200 applications. My wife is Ukrainian, and I cannot go
back to the States because this would mean a long separation: we have two
small children. As a result, my family was financially ruined: we lost our
apartment and at times were having trouble feeding our children.
But I was not idle during these three years:
· I pressed the US Government to investigate DEF, even though it was
extremely reluctant to do so.
· I claimed that blacklisting a whistleblower whose confidential allegations
proved to be correct is wrong and counterproductive.
· I wrote a book called How to Make Russia a Normal Country. This is a
democracy primer and an interactive internet project. I published it in 2000
and gave away the entire printing run of 800 copies to Russian democratic
politicians. My website, dedicated to the discussion of this book has had
5000 visits, even though for almost a year I had no money to maintain it. It
goes without saying that I failed to get a single cent of funding for this
project from any source.
· I translated How to Make Russia a Normal Country into English, and adapted
the text to Western readership. It will probably be called Russia: Where
Lose/Lose Wins Out.
· I wrote several televised speeches for Russia and Ukrainian politicians,
where I promoted the idea of Win/Win as being better than a Lose/Lose. Those
who know the NIS countries will understand that in this part of the world
this idea amounts to a psychological and technological leap.
· I wrote letters to USAID, and they clamed to have lost my e-mails.
· I wrote to the US Embassy in Moscow complaining that my family was
literally starving because of my inability to get a job – and they offered
me a pauper’s ticket out, and offer that I did not take.
Here is my conclusion. I am an American citizen, and I have a lifelong
commitment to democratization of Russia. This commitment does not depend on
USAID funding. I want to participate in turning Russia into a peaceful,
democratic, and prosperous state, a true friend and ally of the United
States. In a war between Lose/Lose and Win/Win, I want Russia to be on the
side of the Win/Win. My experiences over the last ten years have taught me
that this was not a clear cut, Us vs. Them, kind of process. Some of the
people involved in this process from the American side have not been the
highest caliber. But this is natural. I am certain that JRL readers believe
in true American values (as I still do, to my amazement) and are committed
to bringing Russia and America closer together.
******
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