Johnson's Russia List
#6186
15 April 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Reuters: Russia sees grain harvest of at least 75 mln T.
2. Vek: Andrei Ryabov, CHANGEABLE CHANGES. A principal change in the
Russian political situation.
3. Novoye Vremya: THE LAST ONE. (political poll)
4. AP: Boris Yeltsin Feeling Fit, Jovial.
5. AP: Russian Makes CIA Drug Allegation.
6. Moscow Times: Matt Bivens, Answering to PepsiCo.
7. BBC: Challenge to PwC Russian audit.
8. Vremya MN: Stanislav Kondrashov, HISTORY AND RUSSIA'S FUTURE.
Russia needs a new global balance in order to deal with its own
problems.
9. BBC Monitoring: US presence prompts China to get closer to Russia,
expand into Central Asia. (Kazakh newspaper)
10. Harriman Institute conference on The New Review (Novyi Zhurnal).
11. The Guardian (UK): Nick Paton Walsh, 'I play to win': As a child in
Russia she dreamed of being a model. Now she's 18 and it is all coming true -
but only because Alexandra Kosteniuk has also become a chess grandmaster.
12. Robert Bruce Ware: Warren/Straus (JRL #6185).
13. Moscow Times: Marat Kenzhetayev and Lyuba Pronina, Rocketing Up The
Arms Sales Charts.]
*******
#1
Russia sees grain harvest of at least 75 mln T
By Aleksandras Budrys
MOSCOW, April 15 (Reuters) - Russian officials issued their first forecast
for 2002 grain output on Monday, predicting a drop to possibly 75 million
tonnes from last year's 85 million.
But analysts said the early estimate was highly tentative.
"The minimum harvest we need this year is 75 million tonnes by clean
weight," Deputy Agriculture Minister Vladimir Alginin told Reuters. "This
is an early forecast, which we may adjust some time in May."
Analysts said no accurate forecast could be made without further data.
"As a rule, such forecasts are based mainly on previous years' statistics,
which do not always work," said Andrei Chernyshov, head analyst at
inter-regional Trading System Zerno.
"Currently we can only speculate, no one is able to give an exact figure as
the spring sowing campaign has just started," said Nikolai Demyanov, a
deputy director of the research Institute for Agricultural Market Studies
(IKAR).
Russian harvests have experienced boom and bust cycles since the fall of
the Soviet Union in 1991, being dependent largely on the country's
unpredictable weather.
The crop hit a 40-year low of 47.9 million tonnes in 1998, followed by
another poor harvest of 54.7 million in 1999, forcing the country to ask
the United States and the European Union for food aid, which was granted.
Russia recorded its last impressive grain crop in 1997, when it harvested a
post-Soviet high of 88.6 million tonnes. It harvested 65.5 million tonnes
of grain in 2000.
Analysts estimate Russia's grain consumption this season at 73-76 million
tonnes.
Russia has sown over 16 million hectares of winter grain this season,
nearly two million more than last season, when winter grain accounted for
40 percent of the total crop.
"Winter grains harvest may be higher, as the sown area rose by two million
tonnes, while winter kill losses were at last year's level of 1.5 million
hectares," Chernyshov said.
But Demyanov said IKAR's preliminary estimates had shown winter kill losses
could be higher, but he declined to give exact figures.
The country intends to sow another 33.5 million hectares with spring
grains, down from last year's 35 million.
The average grain yield achieved last year was 1.93 tonnes per hectare.
Records were vague in the Soviet era, but officials put the highest
previously recorded grain yield at 1.85 tonnes per hectare in 1990.
Ministry officials have said that producers have sufficient seed and fuel
but that a shortage of machinery for this year's sowing and harvesting
campaign could cause problems.
*******
#2
Vek
No. 11
April 12, 2002
CHANGEABLE CHANGES
A principal change in the Russian political situation
Author: Andrei Ryabov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE RUMORS ABOUT A POSSIBLE DISMISSAL OF KASIANOV'S CABINET PROBABLY
COVER OTHER, SIMPLER REASONS THAN CHANGING THE AGENDA: PRESIDENT PUTIN
MAY BE FEELING INCREASED PRESSURE FROM THE OLD YELTSIN ELITE, AND HAS
DECIDED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF DIFFERENCES AMONG THEM
The current situation in the Russian politics is fundamentally
new, at least formally. A pro-reform majority has formed in the Duma,
which will enable the president and the government to carry out
further market reforms without obstacles and constant looking at the
Communist Party and its allies. At a first glance, in these terms,
President Putin stops being the president of all Russians and becomes
the president of the non-communist majority. However, in fact, the
unwillingness of the majority of Russians to vote for the communist
leader at the presidential elections does not automatically means that
all these people are ready to fully support the radical market
reforms. On the contrary, the majority wants the state regulating and
redistribution functions to strengthen. So, in these terms, President
Putin becomes the leader of the pro-reform minority. Apparently, in
order to successfully continue reforms, he will need a government that
will stop hesitations and popular promises and will courageously start
cardinal reforms - in this case it will have to burn in the fire of
people's discontent. Kasianov's Cabinet is most unlikely to be
suitable for such a role, as it all bases on compromises. Besides, it
is composed of politicians who already make great plans for the future
and are unwilling to take risks. Evidently, understanding of the
present situation in the top circles of the Russian power caused a
surge of rumor on soon dismissal of Kasianov's government, which
greatly increased after last Monday the president brashly criticized
the Cabinet for their failures in the social-economic politics. The
rumor is already discussing the names of Kasianov's possible
successors, present deputy prime minister and finance minister Aleksei
Kudrin is mentioned the most often.
However, external signs of changes in Russian politics do not
necessarily mean that there are to be real changes.
A favorably layout of forces in the parliament is not enough for
a market breakthrough. In addition, the political will of the
president is necessary, his firm belief that there is no other way.
However, judging by a number of sings, the president has not made
the final decision on further social-economic strategy as yet. It is
no accident he met with a group of famous economists, who are close to
the Communist Party, and the date of his annual address to the Federal
Assembly has been postponed. Boris Yeltsin could tell people: Trust
your President! when asking people to wait a little for things to
improve. However, over the past decade Russians have become much more
practical: now the people want to know exactly when and where the
improvement will take place. And no one will agree to put up with
deterioration of the economic situation without certain guarantees.
Moreover, the closer the parliamentary and presidential elections are
the less chance has the president to carry out the experiment.
So it is very likely that the rumor about a possible dismissal of
Kasianov's Cabinet actually covers up other, simpler reasons than
changing the agenda. It could be that President Putin is feeling
increased pressure from the old Yeltsin elite, and has decided to take
advantage of differences among them. Although Aleksei Kudrin is
considered to be a man of the presidential team, he is also very close
to Anatoly Chubais's team. Undoubtedly, opposing the present head of
the Finance Ministry against the incumbent head of the government is
to deteriorate the relations between the Family and Anatoly Chubais.
This will increase the space for maneuvering for the head of state and
will enable Putin to take the political initiative into his own hands.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova )
*******
#3
Novoye Vremya
No. 15
April, 2002
THE LAST ONE
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
Promises of the Communist Party to become a "tough opposition" to
the present government are based on continued mass public support. If
the Duma elections were held now, less than half of potential voters
would participate in them: 18% would not participate in the elections,
and other 18% would mark the "against all" box; 21% pf respondents are
unable to determine their political orientation and their attitude
toward the elections. A third of the politically active 43% of voters,
which is 36% would vote for the Unity and the Fatherland - All Russia
bloc, and slightly less than a third, 30% would vote for the Communist
Party. These are still the largest groups of voters, which involve two
thirds of all electorate.
Close behind are three parties that are to pass to the Duma:
Yabloko, which has 15% of votes, the Union of Right Forces, 9%; and
the Liberal Democratic Party, supported by approximately 8% of voters.
Thus, despite all changes in the Duma and the country, the layout of
forces has hardly changed: over a third of voters support the
president, slightly less than a third of voters support the
communists, and 24% of people support reformers or the right wing,
plus 8% of Zhirinovsky's supporters, whose political belonging is
rather vague.
There is a traditional opinion that the Communist Party is the
party of pensioners and older generation; however, 5% of younger
people, under 24 years also give their votes to the communists, 13% of
people from 25 to 34 years; 18% of 35-44 year old voters, and 29% of
45-59 year old people also support the communists.
However, if determine the attitude of people to different
activities and the program of the party, some people support only some
ideas of the Communist Party, say that it "partially presents and
partially does not present my interests". There are 19% of such people
among the youth under 24 years; 24% of people with higher education;
27% of specialists, and 30% of leaders.
*******
#4
Boris Yeltsin Feeling Fit, Jovial
April 14, 2002
MINERALNYE VODY, Russia (AP) - Looking fit and jovial during his vacation in
southern Russia, retired former president Boris Yeltsin said Sunday that he
has no ailments but wants to recapture his youth.
The 71-year-old Yeltsin, who underwent quintuple heart bypass surgery as
president and was debilitated by illness for long periods of his second term,
has been vacationing with his wife Naina near Mineralnye Vody, a region
dotted with mountain springs and spas.
Asked by state-run RTR television Sunday whether he was there to seek medical
treatment, Yeltsin said, ``I have nothing to cure. I'm fine, but it's for
prevention and getting younger. I need to start thinking about getting
younger.''
He then announced the birth of his sixth grandchild, Masha, born to his
younger daughter Tatyana Dyachenko and former Yeltsin chief of staff Valentin
Yumashev.
Yeltsin's speech was clear and quick - unlike the slow, slurred sentences of
many of his presidential appearances.
Yeltsin stepped down Dec. 31, 1999, and named his prime minister, Vladimir
Putin, acting president.
*******
#5
Russian Makes CIA Drug Allegation
April 14, 2002
MOSCOW (AP) - A Russian government defense employee at the center of the
latest spy scandal with the United States was drugged and recruited by the
CIA while seeking information about long-lost relatives, he said on state-run
television Sunday.
The employee, identified only as Viktor, told RTR television he was trying to
fulfill his dying father's wish to contact relatives who fled to the United
States decades earlier and wrote a letter back. That letter in the 1950s was
ignored at the KGB's request.
Viktor's face was blacked out during Sunday's broadcast.
Russia's Federal Security Service, the main successor to the KGB, said last
week it foiled an alleged U.S. espionage effort involving Viktor. The
accusations came after a string of spy scandals in recent years and amid
preparations for a U.S.-Russian presidential summit next month.
In the interview with RTR, Viktor said he decided against contacting the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow to fulfill his father's wish last year because he works for
a Russian Defense Ministry installation and thought such a visit would raise
suspicion.
Instead, he approached an embassy in another ex-Soviet republic. The FSB has
not named which country.
Embassy employees promised to help Viktor and arranged another meeting.
``I started to understand in the middle of the conversation that they were
trying to recruit me,'' Viktor told RTR. ``But I cannot describe how the
conversation ended or how I ended up at the Russian Embassy.''
Viktor later was found on a public bench suffering from shock and amnesia,
RTR said. The Russian Embassy sent him to Moscow, where the FSB concluded
that U.S. officers had slipped him psychotropic drugs in drinks and cookies
in an effort to extract information.
Under FSB control, Viktor then received instructions and secret packets from
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The Russian security service identified Viktor's
contact as Yunju Kensinger, a third secretary in the embassy's consular
department, and reported its discoveries to the U.S. Embassy.
The embassy did not respond, RTR said. Kensinger - who allegedly never met
with Viktor but instead used secret drop points and messages in invisible
ink, according to the security service's press office - left Moscow last
month.
CIA officials and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow have declined to comment on the
allegations, which were first reported last week.
*******
#6
Moscow Times
April 15, 2002
Answering to PepsiCo
By Matt Bivens
WASHINGTON -- Congress occasionally holds hearings about Russia, and at
such times it's often hard to tell we're discussing the only institution on
Earth with the potential to erase the United States as a nation.
You'd never guess there had been an economic and political decade of
revolution, a war in Kosovo, a war in Chechnya, a Sept. 11. Instead, there
is only the Washington game: hire a lawyer, hire a lobbyist, wheedle for
advantage.
So it was last week as Congress considered whether to repeal Jackson-Vanik,
a 28-year-old law that punished the Soviet Union for punishing its Jews. In
more modern times, Jews have been as free as anyone to come and go, so
logic, and the Bush administration, argues for a repeal.
Then again, it's an election year. And Congress has all sorts of interests
to consider, including its own. So there was the PepsiCo lawyer testifying
on behalf of "the maker of Stolichnaya vodka, the principal brand of
Russian vodka."
"I come before this committee," the lawyer intoned, "in order to bring to
your collective attention certain facts and conduct by the Russian
government which brings into serious question Russia's ability to act as a
reliable trade partner, to respect the rule of law, and to conduct itself
in accordance with the practices we associate with free-market economies."
Goodness!
"Utilizing many of the presumably discarded methods of Soviet-era
intimidation, disrespect for international legal principles and raw police
power, the government of Russia is attempting to nationalize again the
vodka industry. In effect, this will reverse Russia's progressive
privatization practices of the past and casts significant doubt on Russia's
ability to become a reliable member of the international economic community."
"That's private property. ... You're going to have to answer to the
Coca-Cola Company!"
-- Colonel Bat Guano, "Dr. Strangelove."
Next up was the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of Domestic Nitrogen
Producers, who griped that American farmers are buying Russian fertilizer
cause it's cheaper. "Not fair!" the chairman says, because most of the
price of nitrogen fertilizers is the price of natural gas, and in Russia,
natural gas prices are held low by fiat.
"These low, nonmarket prices mean that inefficient Russian nitrogen plants
continue to operate and to export. They also mean that Gazprom, which does
not make a profit on its domestic gas sales, often barters its gas for
fertilizer and then exports it for hard currency," he testified, adding
that Gazprom has bought into "a substantial portion of the Russian nitrogen
fertilizer industry."
Fertilizer was followed by the American Farm Bureau Federation, which
talked about chicken, of course, but also about soy oil, skim milk powder,
ice cream, wheat.
The federation representative testified that the 10 percent Russian VAT
levied on imports and domestic goods -- but not on exports -- is unfair.
"Russia should agree to accept meats from all U.S. federally inspected
plants," he told Congress. "Russian restrictions on pests/weeds that are
not necessary for quarantine purposes and lack scientific merit should be
eliminated," he said. And, "We oppose mandatory [Russian] labeling
requirements for genetically modified foods or agricultural commodities."
Eat our meat and wheat, drink our Pepsi, keep your fertilizer, don't ask
questions, don't mess around with your vodka industry because we bought
some of it ... do all that, and maybe then we'll drop the battle for Soviet
Jewry?
Matt Bivens, a former editor of The Moscow Times, is a Washington-based
fellow of The Nation Institute [www.thenation.com].
*******
#7
BBC
15 April 2002
Challenge to PwC Russian audit
By James Schofield
in Moscow
A minority shareholder in Russia's state controlled gas behemoth Gazprom
has launched a series of legal actions against PricewaterhouseCoopers, the
energy giant's auditor, "to officially expose as false and misleading"
audit conclusions reached last year.
"By launching the lawsuits against PwC, we want to show auditors that there
are rules and laws in Russia, and those who choose to violate them will
face serious consequences," said William Browder, chief executive of
Hermitage Capital Management Fund, which is bringing the case.
Alexander Dobrovinsky, Mr Browder's lawyer, described the case as "a
black-and-white case of a false audit report."
"PwC presented audit reports that contradicted the facts they had available
to them," he said in a statement.
No comment
PricewaterhouseCoopers declined to comment in detail until their lawyers
have had time to analyse the lawsuit.
"We have not seen the lawsuit and therefore we cannot comment in detail on
whatever may be contained in it," said Richard Buski, managing partner of
PwC in Moscow.
"We stand behind all our audits of Gazprom and will continue to do so in
the future," he said.
Hermitage has also filed a separate appeal with Russian Ministry of Finance
to suspend PwC's auditing licence in Russia.
'Dodgy' dealings
To support the lawsuits, Hermitage points to a number of transactions that
it claims were of a non-commercial nature between Gazprom and Russian gas
company Itera.
The press release comments that despite evidence used in the compilation of
the PwC audit reports, the transactions were "not adequately or
objectively" represented in the auditors' conclusions.
Mr Browder argued that these transactions "led to billions of dollars of
losses for Gazprom and resulted in Gazprom shares being deeply depressed
over a long period of time."
*******
#8
Vremya MN
April 13, 2002
HISTORY AND RUSSIA'S FUTURE
Russia needs a new global balance in order to deal with its own problems
Author: Stanislav Kondrashov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
OVER A DECADE AGO, NATO WON A BLOODLESS VICTORY IN THE COLD WAR
WHICH HAD LASTED ALMOST HALF A CENTURY. NOW NATO HAS OUTLIVED ITS
PURPOSE, AND WILL FADE AWAY. RUSSIA NEEDS TO PARTICIPATE IN CREATING A
NEW GLOBAL BALANCE, TO AVERT THE DANGERS OF TOTAL US DOMINANCE.
At a summit in Prague a few months from now, all NATO member
states - great and small, long-standing and recent - will discuss the
issue of admitting fresh members into their ranks. First in line are
Slovenia and Slovakia, as well as the Baltic trio: Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia. Romania and Bulgaria cannot conceal their impatience.
Over a decade ago, NATO won a bloodless victory in the Cold War
which had lasted almost half a century; it has now had time to absorb
such tasty morsels of the self-disbanded Warsaw Pact as Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic; now it is poised to start swallowing
and digesting some former Soviet republics. The eastward expansion of
NATO is unstoppable. It was initiated by the feckless "new thinking"
of Gorbachev, and sanctioned by the thoughtlessness of Yeltsin. It was
already unstoppable by the time Primakov made his desperate, insistent
efforts to do so, when he took over at the Foreign Ministry in early
1996.
Russia was left with two options. One is encapsulated by that
cynical old expression: if you're being raped and there's nothing you
can do about it, you might as well relax and try to enjoy it. The
other option: not to consider NATO as an enemy. These options do not
differ in content, only in form. After all, the new NATO members are
sovereign states, and Russia has recognized them as such. They are
joining NATO of their own free will, looking to gain a wealthy, strong
patron. Their political elites view the USSR as the rapist,
retrospectively; and for them, contemporary Russia is by no means a
magnet of strength and wealth.
Is NATO our enemy? If the past outweighs the present in the
reply, then yes, undoubtedly so. If we focus solely on the present,
then no, it's not an enemy; since the basic element of ideological
confrontation has vanished from the global picture nowadays, along
with the military and strategic rivalry between the USSR and US for
control over Europe. NATO, headed by the US, isn't conquering
anything. NATO is merely settling into the geopolical space which
Russia vacated of its own accord when it played the role of leading
eliminator of the USSR.
NATO is the inertia of the past in material form, and it's still
being used to justify the military and political dominance of the US
in Europe. Discussion of the idea that NATO ought to move in step with
the times - by transforming itself from a military-political to a
political organization, en route to disbanding itself - is still
treated as "dissent in the ranks". But it's impossible to avoid the
truths of these new times. Neither is it possible to avoid the
fundamental fact that the European Union, not NATO, is becoming the
most important alliance operating in Europe. In these radically
changed circumstances, there is no longer any justification for a US
military presence, other than the inertia of the past.
The lengthy echo of a bygone era still takes the form of the
nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia, but the goal of "catching up
with and overtaking America" - which pursued us like a dream and a
nightmare for decades - really has been taken off the agenda.
While making clear our opposition to NATO expansion, and
simultaneously finding ways to cooperate with NATO, we should not
forget that in the new world this Cold War era organization is doomed;
it will fade away, since it is no longer needed. It's vital for us to
get along with the United States, to cooperate with it - but if we
crawl to it, or do the opposite and try to create the impression that
Russia is equal in strength, it would mean we are losing sight of the
main strategic goal.
That goal entails participating in setting up a new global
balance, to replace the exhausted model of two superpowers and
assorted Third World countries. The new balance ought to be a
guarantee against any slant toward US dominance - which, although it
may seem natural, given the power of the US, is still dangerous,
intolerable, and contrary to the nature of things in the 21st century
- if we want to see it become a century of reason and civilization.
What should Russia's contribution to the global balance be?
Firstly, Russia can contribute its responisbility as the second global
nuclear power, alongside the US; having the kind of agreements with
the US which would restrain the US from nuclear extremism like that
which left the stain of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on history.
A second point, perhaps even more important: Russia shouldn't
just create a window to Europe - it ought to fling its doors wide open
to cooperation with Europe. It is more suited to us - in its
historical roots, in the type of its civilization and culture, in the
social orientation of the historical processes behind European
unification.
Thirdly, of course, there are the views to the east and to the
south. The new global balance is unimaginable without elements like
constructive cooperation with China, India, Japan, and the Islamic
world - where American-style globalization is intensifying a dangerous
inferiority complex.
A sober, constructive foreign policy is very important for Russia
- but still, it's secondary. It's a means, not an end in itself. A new
global balance and the associated stability are required in order for
us to meet Russia's domestic challenges; in order to implement a
strategy - which we still lack, unfortunately - to create a political,
economic, and social system which is enduring, acceptable, and broadly
advantageous for most of the people. The only kind of democracy which
will do is the kind that frees the nation from the humiliation of
poverty and strife, making it wealthy and united, worth of respect
from its own citizens and the rest of the world.
(Translated by Elena Leonova)
*******
#9
US presence prompts China to get closer to Russia, expand into Central Asia
BBC Monitoring Service - Apr 14, 2002
As a counterweight to the US military presence in Central Asia, China will
now try to get closer to Russia and expand its presence in Central Asia,
the Kazakh newspaper Ekspress K said on 11 April. Russia and China are
responding to the US presence by building up their military potential, and
the possibility of a Beijing-Moscow-Delhi geopolitical axis is emerging.
China is starting to develop Xinjiang to reduce the separatist threat.
China's aggressive economic expansion and Russia's retreat from
confrontation with China over such issues as transborder rivers will have
important repercussions for the Central Asian countries. The following is
the text of the report by Viktor Serov entitled "The Great Wall of China
gets ever higher". Subheads have been inserted editorially.
Two events have taken place over the past two months which are barely
noticeable against the background of those global changes that we have
witnessed, but still it is we who should have looked at them closer. Our
eastern neighbour [China] has been in the centre of these events. Earlier
this year information emerged in the Russian media that Beijing had placed
an order with a Russian defence plant for two brand-new destroyers. Later
Kazakh sources reported that China was starting to develop a copper deposit
in the Xinjiang [Uighur Autonomous Region, XUAR], of course, to the
detriment of Kazakh copper exports. One trend pretty closely connects these
two events, unconnected though they may seem: Beijing's desire to
comprehensively strengthen its political, economic and military positions.
China vulnerable to US long-range aircraft
It seemed that there was nothing new about this since China's power has
been increasing year by year for three decades now. But from now on the
trend of this growth will be somewhat different both globally and
regionally. Not only Moscow is concerned over the deployment of the US
military forces in Central Asia, with Washington trying at the same time
under the noble pretext of the fight against terrorism to further its
influence "on all fronts"; however, even Moscow is less concerned over this
than is China. From the military point of view, the latest geopolitical
changes may pose big potential threats to China rather than to Russia. Now
virtually the whole territory of China is becoming vulnerable to US
long-range aircraft, given the US air force bases in Japan, South Korea, in
the Indian Ocean and in CIS Central Asian states [Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan]. It is true that the US bases in the latter do not have
long-range aircraft but will it take a long time for them to turn up there?
The threat posed [to China] by tactical aircraft is already pretty serious.
There is also Taiwan, which is Washington's ally and is hostile to Beijing,
and there is also the de facto return of the US military to the
Philippines. Now it is only to the north of China, Russia, that there is no
US presence. And a little northwestern section of China's border with
Kazakhstan. But the numerous press articles chewing over the possibility of
making the aerodromes in [eastern Kazakh town of] Semipalatinsk and
[southern Kazakh town of] Taldykorgan available to the Americans and the
British does not pass unnoticed in China.
China seeks new methods to handle new situation
The events that have taken place over the past two months have radically
changed the state of affairs in China's strategic security issues and not
in its favour. Whereas Beijing could concentrate on economic issues until
the end of last year, fairly describing the problems with Taiwan and the
XUAR as important but not so acute as to pose a threat to its security,
however, now it is different. China needs to seek ways of reacting to the
new situation.
China and Russia - new rapprochement
One of them could be a new rapprochement between China and Russia. They
simply have no choice but to strengthen their geopolitical alliance. One
cannot rule out that India will gradually be "inclined" towards this as
well - it is hard to predict the political situation inside Pakistan, which
is India's major opponent, which gives the USA huge opportunities to
influence this region of Asia, whereas this threatens Delhi with isolation
there.
But for the Central Asian countries this is not that topical. More
important is what impact the Russian-Chinese rapprochement will have on
them. One of the likeliest results, but of course this is not the strongest
nor the last one, is that Moscow is guaranteed to withdraw, on its own
initiative, from participation in solving the problems of the transborder
rivers. Russia will not quarrel with China over the River Irtysh whereas
Kazakhstan, evidently, will not be able to defend its interests on its own.
The rapprochement between Russia and China may develop towards ironing out
their claims against one another and in future towards common political
initiatives. For the time being, the obvious result of the US presence in
Central Asia in the Russian-Chinese relations will be the building up of
their military and technical potential. The destroyers that China has
ordered in Saint Petersburg are not the first ones nor, of course, the
last. What Yevgeniy Primakov unsuccessfully tried to do two years ago
during his brief premiership when he put forward the idea of a Beijing -
Moscow - Delhi geopolitical alliance just at the time when the USA was
bombing Serbia, is now effectively being carried out by the USA itself.
Xinjiang province is China's painful "spot"
The second direction in which China will act in trying to counterbalance
the USA is that it will strengthen its positions in Central Asia and
actively develop the XUAR. This province is known to be still China's most
painful "spot" in terms of the threat from disorders arising on ethnic
grounds.
There is also Tibet, but it is more a political symbol for Beijing's
opponents rather than a real threat since the potential for resistance is
too weak in this sparsely-populated province.
As for the XUAR, it really does pose a potential threat because of its
varied ethnic mix and large population.
Separatism can be fought both by using forceful methods and by improving
the living standards in the region. By the way, at one time Beijing calmed
Tibet down using a combination of these two methods.
Increasing the number of jobs, raising living standards and improving the
social infrastructure - all these things cannot completely wipe out
separatist sentiments but they can substantially narrow their base.
Therefore Beijing will inevitably start developing the XUAR now that the
hope has emerged in potential separatists that "the West will help" them.
This is why China intends to start developing its copper deposits in the
XUAR. Maybe it is economically inexpedient since it is more profitable to
buy cheap Kazakh copper, but the political gains matter more. Kazakh copper
producers can now only "thank" that [country] due to whose fault their
market has become narrower.
China and Central Asia
China will probably step up its presence in the Central Asian countries as
well. There are lots of methods for doing so: laying transport roads and
railway routes from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to China and
introducing its financial organizations in the region.
What is most important is to ensure its imports increase even further.
However, in terms of the economy and trade, the dependence of Central Asian
countries [on China] is already so great that, in terms of geopolitics,
this will outweigh the impact of the presence of the US military bases. And
this dependence will not diminish.
It is no secret that many in countries of the [Central Asian] region,
especially in Kazakhstan, have suspected China in recent years of a
tendency to expansionism. We will not judge now whether this was right or
wrong but if there was a grain of truth in this, then one cannot fail to
notice that before the USA's coming to the region, it could have taken a
long time, several decades, for these plans "to mature", whereas now all
the geopolitical processes in the region have radically speeded up.
*******
#10
Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2002
From: Alexander Domrin
Subject: Conference
On April 19th, Harriman Institute will hold a one-day symposium
dedicated
to the 60th anniversary of The New Review (Novyi Zhurnal).
The goal of the symposium is the assessment of the Journal's long-term
work as a promoter of the best traditions of classical culture and
independent
Russian thought in the context of American culture.
The New Review is the oldest magazine of the Russian emigration.
At present it has subscribers on five continents in 32 countries.
Contact numbers:
at Harriman Institute - 212-854-4623.
at The New Review - 212-353-1478.
E-mail: newreview@msn.com
*******
#11
The Guardian (UK)
15 April 2002
'I play to win': As a child in Russia she dreamed of being a model. Now
she's 18 and it is all coming true - but only because Alexandra Kosteniuk
has also become a chess grandmaster
BY NICK PATON WALSH
In chess, you can tell a game is not going your way when your opponent has
captured nearly as many of your pieces as you have made moves. This is the
situation I am in after about half an hour with Alexandra Kosteniuk, the
Russian grandmaster, known as the Anna Kournikova of chess. Were we playing
alone, I would not feel so useless in conceding a game to the "world
vice-champion" after about 20 moves. But I am one of 17 people Kosteniuk is
playing simultaneously in a stuffy meeting hall in Moscow. And the prodigy,
who effortlessly knocked off my queen and used her knight to trap my king
before accepting my surrender with a robust handshake and contented grin,
is only 18.
"I cannot say that chess is fun for me," she tells me sternly after the
matches have finished. "If I do something then I do it properly and it is a
serious business. I have played since I was five years old; this is my
profession. I play to win."
Kosteniuk has always been forthright about her career as a chess genius.
She is number two in the world for girls, and number 15 among women. She
was a grandmaster - an official accolade in chess which basically means
that you beat lots of good players at big tournaments regularly - at 14.
Her grandiose title, world vice-champion, means, less grandiosely, that she
narrowly lost last year to the Chinese genius, Zhu Chen, 25. Chen went on
to beat the male world champion. And as if this was not enough, Kosteniuk
recently attempted a bolder, more unlikely feat: she has tried to make
chess sexy.
Last year, Fide, the Swiss-based Federation International Des Echecs,
invited Kosteniuk to be its new poster girl, modelling a new range of its
"chesswear". Her dark eyes, youthful lines and confident grin conjured a
new vision of chess - previously the reserve of tweed jackets, old men in
parks and confused American geniuses hiding in Prague - as something fresh,
zesty and attractive. "Chess is not that spectacular a sport for the
television," she admits, "but it deserves more attention and investment. It
can be made to be as exciting as tennis or football. Things are changing. I
am clever so I can play chess, and I am not so ugly so I can model."
Clearly, mixing chess with life before the lens feels natural to her. "When
I was a child, my sister and I would play at her being a photographer, and
me being a model. I sent letters to competitions to be a model, but never
heard back. I was not able to be a model without chess."
Kosteniuk was a rarity - a beautiful young Russian who had to become a
chess master to pursue her dream of modelling - and is now engaged in talks
with sports promoters for further deals.
Tonight's matches are more a promotional event than a real competition, as
a few journalists and 13 delegates from Moscow's embassies crowd into the
cultural centre for the diplomatic corps, providing prey for her talents.
She pauses briefly to plug her new book, the immodestly titled How I Became
a Grandmaster at Age 14 - her life story coupled with a guide to her
favourite killer moves - and begins her attack. We sit in a circle, so
Kosteniuk can walk between each game in turn. During the "simul" - or
simultaneous game - she is a consummate and ruthless professional.
In the corner is Ivan Iudin, a rising star of the local chess circuit. Ivan
has developed the best poker face at the event, all the more impressive a
feat considering that he is only seven. At first he puts up a worthy fight
against Kosteniuk, but soon has to join the rest of us in defeat, when she
begins seizing his pieces. Iudin takes this gracefully at first, but is
later to be found sobbing in his father's arms, dangling his legs stroppily
off the edge of his chair, and being consoled with the advice that he
rushed into some moves and will learn from the experience.
Being a child chess prodigy is tough in Russia, where your success can lift
the whole family out of the quotidian grimness of Russian life. When
Kosteniuk has to admit defeat tonight to one delegate from the Indonesian
embassy, she feels angry at her 95% victory rate. "When I lose a game all
these thoughts run through my head about what I did wrong," she confides in
good English, once all the TV crews have headed for the buffet. "It is
normal to lose one at events like this but I shouldn't have. I had a better
position than him, but I pushed to win."
She learned this aggressive edge at an early age. Her father, Konstantin,
left his army job when she was young and decided to devote his time to
training her. "I can remember when my father introduced me to exercises. He
wrote on little cards the squares of the chessboard, like E4, GBP1 - or
even false ones like E9 to test me. Then he would show me cards, one
quickly after the other, and I'd have to say whether the square was white
or black on the board."
Konstantin taught his daughter to win a chess game blindfolded in three
moves, in a bid to "exercise [her] brain", she says. "At the moment I am
studying five to six times a week for six hours each time. If I don't study
for a while then my chess gets worse."
She quickly rose through the ranks to become European champion for under-10
girls in 1994 and then, a month later, she came joint first at the world
championship in the same category. But at 11, as she graduated to the
under-12s, the competition intensified and she began losing. "I had a very
hard year when I first played at under-12 level. But my family supported
me. They said I could be better, that I can be the best, and that I must
study."
At the time, her father worked full-time as her trainer, so she was also
the family's sole source of income. Konstantin struggled to find sponsors,
and sometimes she played men for money or, as she puts it, they paid to
play against her. Prize money is a rarity in children's tournaments, and
life was tough for her parents, younger sister and cat in their three-room
flat in east Moscow.
The next year all the hard work paid off and she won "everything. The
Russian under-12s, European under-12s, and world under-12s, and the Russian
rapid chess tournament [games last 25 minutes] for women."
It was now that the better times began and Kosteniuk launched herself at
the world, even publishing on the internet the poems she wrote in English
in her spare time. As Nick Hawkins, marketing director for the British
Chess Federation, puts it, "she is a very attractive figurehead for the
world of chess. She removes the stereotype that chess is for men, and that
women have to be masculine to beat men. She plays chess quickly and
aggressively, and puts everything on the line."
To Hawkins, she represents the future, where young people are enticed by a
fast, aggressive form of chess; where games take minutes rather than days.
He thinks she will almost certainly become women's champion soon, and may
go on to do the unthinkable - rock the male world of chess by beating the
top men players too. Kosteniuk has ambition enough to achieve this. But
when you learn about how chess has become both her career and a family
enterprise, the steeliness and focus behind her rise seems less about
ambition, and more about keeping afloat, and toeing her father's line.
In person, Kosteniuk is not the precocious monster she seems in print or
over the chess board. She is still a teenager, albeit one whose
extraordinary life has cushioned her from many everyday teenage problems.
She giggles and fiddles with the bouquet of artificial flowers she has been
given. Her father keeps popping in and out of the room, causing her to get
edgy. She will talk openly about her conquests and talent, but becomes
quieter when asked about how it makes her feel.
She won't talk about her boyfriend (but lets slip that he is older than she
is, doesn't play chess, and they have been together for two years). And she
talks wistfully of the life she might have had if chess had not come along.
"I thought I would be a doctor once, or something that helps people. I do
not regret playing chess, but I do regret that life is so short. I want to
do two or three things seriously.
"Sometimes I dream about chess, sometimes about children and a family. I
have a dream to play a part in a movie," she confides, giggling. "That is
my dream. But I will not make plans for it. I will just play chess and try
to do what I can."
She continues, her mask of confidence slipping slightly. "But when I win
one tournament then I am expected to win the other. It is difficult," she
says, her English slipping as she fidgets furiously with her flowers and
hair. "Everybody expects you to win. But sometimes I prefer to play without
thinking about the result."
She looks up to see her father come into the hall. "But, of course,
pressure makes me play better," she adds quickly. Her father comes up
behind her and rests his hands on the chair. He doesn't speak English, yet
his presence seems to remind Alexandra the girl what Kosteniuk the champion
is all about.
But what makes her feel best in life? "Winning, of course. That makes me
happy, because then I understand that I have done everything right."
*******
#12
From: "Robert Bruce Ware" <...@brick.net>
Subject: Warren/Straus (JRL #6185)
Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2002
In his reply to Ira Straus (JRL #6185) Marcus Warren manages to overlook
more than one point. In response to Mr. Warren's opening query, Russian
officials publicly declared their consideration of air strikes against
Afghanistan in order to cut support for international terrorism. In
response to Mr. Warren's postscript, those declarations occurred after Mr.
Yeltsin's departure from office, and prior to September 11, 2001. Had those
airstrikes occurred they might well have had some effect, as Mr. Warren
should know from his own accounts of the devastation of Grozny.
Unfortunately, the possibility of Russian airstrikes against Taliban and Al
Qaeda positions in Afghanistan received little notice and less support form
Western editors, academics, analysts and policy makers.
One of Ira's narrower points is that Western nations should have been
working with Russia at least as early as 2000 to dismantle the foundations
of global terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere. There would have been a
number of good reasons to mount such a cooperative effort, including the
fact that it might have saved thousands of American lives.
Iras broader point is that one reason why this cooperation did not occur
was that Russaphobia has become a cornerstone of Western culture. So many
analysts, editors, academics, and journalists have been busy building their
careers upon the threats of 1953 that they have rendered themselves utterly
incapable of recognizing new and vastly more important threats. In some
cases, they committed this error because they lacked insight, and all too
often, a simple first-hand, up-to-date familiarity with the region.
Unfortunately, in many other cases these people placed the private
interests of their careers ahead of the public interest with which they
were charged.
Consider that until Sept. 11, the only institute in Washington that
specifically focuses upon Central Asia and the Caucasus was calling upon
Western policy makers to support the Taliban in order to diminish Russian
influence in the region. Indeed, the institute's web page promoting support
for the Taliban on these grounds was taken down only after the terrorist
attacks. Remember the endless rewrites of the same stories about the
devastation of Gozny and the deprivations of Chechen refugee camps that
appeared and reappeared in 1999 and 2000 in every major Western media
outlet and at many "scholarly" conferences? Important news, of course, but
prior to the autumn of 2001, how many stories do you recall that
investigated Taliban and Al Qaeda connections to Chechen militants? Prior
to September 11, how many editorials were written on the subject? How many
scholars tried to investigate it? How many grants and fellowships were
offered for the study of the topic? How many proposals were written to fund
such studies? Among the thousands of papers and panels at the September
2001 meeting of the American Political Science Association, just a few days
before the terrorist attacks, there were no more than a handful (in fact,
I'm aware of only one) that dealt with anything related to Russia's claims
about the real terrorist threat. Ira's point is that Russian officials have
been making these claims for years, and few people paid any attention
because they were blinded by a culture that rewards Russaphobia, because of
their personal interests in retaining those rewards, and because of their
fears of deviating from the well-worn path.
Those few who attempted to call attention to Al Qaeda's connections to
Chechen militants were subject to a barrage of personal attacks (in these
pages and elsewhere) by all of those others who failed, for various
reasons, to grasp that what was happening in Chechnya in 1999 was not the
same as what happened in Eastern Europe in 1989, or even the same as what
happened in Chechnya in 1994.
The point is that Western academic and media circles are full of plump
little careerists and blind old men who got it very seriously wrong. The
failure of September 11 was theirs, and some of the responsibility for
September 11 is theirs too. How many have accepted any smalll part of that
responsibility? Quite to the contrary, most have them have continued just
as before, complacently positioning all of us for the further
miscalculation of American policy, and for the next major catastrophe.
*******
#13
Moscow Times
April 15, 2002
Rocketing Up The Arms Sales Charts
By Marat Kenzhetayev and Lyuba Pronina
With arms exports booming, Russia is looking to tap new markets to keep the
ball rolling. We take a look at who is buying what and who may be in line.
Arms export officials are not known for being the biggest publicity-seekers
around. But during the past couple of years, the nation has been piling
weapon sales success upon success, and those officials have been getting
louder.
Speaking on the sidelines of the Moscow Air Show in August last year,
Andrei Belyaninov, chief of the state-owned arms sales agency
Rosoboronexport, said that in 2000 Russia delivered $3.68 billion worth of
weapons, generating $2.84 billion in revenues.
Rosoboronexport, which accounts for about 90 percent of all arms sales
abroad, was itself responsible for $3.1 billion worth. Belyaninov, whose
company's portfolio was over $13 billion, went on to promise that 2001
would show even better results.
In December, President Vladimir Putin put the final figure of arms exports
revenues at $4.4 billion. In Russia's last bumper year, 1996, revenue stood
at $3.6 billion.
Although the figure on deliveries of arms for the past year has yet to be
made public, Russian media have reported that deliveries were on a par with
2000 and reached some $3.7 billion.
The whopping $700 million difference between deliveries and revenues data
in 2001 and some $840 million in 2000 is due to the fact that payments on
2000 deliveries came through in 2001.
Then in December 2000, Russia made large deliveries to China, including 10
Su-30MKK and eight Su-27UBK fighter jets, and one Project 965 destroyer.
During the same period, Greece took delivery of a Zubr military hovercraft.
It looks increasingly likely that this year will also yield impressive
results. Alexander Denisov, first deputy head of the Committee for Military
and Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries, said in December that in
addition to orders clinched by Rosoboronexport, arms producers with the
right to sell independently of the state arms giant had over $2 billion
worth of orders.
Among them, the Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG last year boosted its
contracts almost tenfold to $1 billion.
Bronze Medal Contention
In 2000, market leader the United States exported $14.2 billion, while at
No. 2, Britain exported $5.1 billion.
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia's arms exports have
generally remained within the $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion range, dropping
to $1.7 billion in 1994 and hitting $3.6 billion in 1996. But given the
past two successful years in arms sales, Russia may well be at last rising
from its traditional position as the world's No. 4 arms exporter, leaping
over France into third place after the United States and Britain.
In January, France's Defense Ministry published a report on the results for
arms production and exports. According to the report, France exported 2.7
billion euros ($2.38 billion) worth of arms in 2000, well behind official
Russian figures for the same year.
Although there is still room for France to improve its performance, with
its export deliveries fluctuating, it appears likely this outcome will be
repeated in the 2001 figures. In recent years, France's average deliveries
have hovered between $4 billion and $6 billion, with some exceptions. In
1997 to 1998, arms exports reached $7 billion, while in 1994 and 2000, they
dropped below $3 billion.
French Defense Ministry officials described the 2000 results as the lowest
in a decade, but the scope of contracts signed in 2000 point to the
downturn being a temporary one. According to the ministry's defense
procurement agency, Delegation Generale pour l'Armement, France signed some
6.86 billion euros ($6.04 billion) of arms contracts, which means Russia
will have to seriously boost its number of contracts if it wants to hold
onto third place.
While Russian officials generally shy away from attributing Russia any
ranking, Ilya Klebanov, the former deputy prime minister in charge of the
defense industry and arms trade, has said Russia could make it to No. 2.
Some in the West have, however, awarded Russia second place on the world
arms market, albeit in the category of conventional arms sales to
developing nations.
Richard Grimmet, a national defense specialist with the Congressional
Research Service, an arm of the Library of Congress, wrote in his report,
Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations -- 1993-2000, published
last August, that Russia ranked third in deliveries with $3.5 billion,
behind the United States' $14.2 billion and Britain's $5.1 billion.
But Grimmet, whose figures often spark controversy among experts, puts
Russia at No. 2 for the volume of contracts concluded. Grimmet reported
that Russia had $7.7 billion worth of contracts in 2000, second only to the
United States, which accounted for $18.6 billion out of the world total of
$36.9 billion.
He placed France third with just $4.1 billion, trailed by Germany with $1.1
billion, and Britain with $600 million.
According to French statistics, however, France actually signed deals worth
in excess of $6 billion.
As for Russia, Grimmet's figures outstrip the official ones by $2 billion
to $2.35 billion. The $800 million contract with India on 310 T-90C battle
tanks, which Grimmet included in his report, was not actually signed until
early 2001. Also in the report are a $1 billion contract to deliver four
A-50E airborne early warning planes and a $650 million contract to
retro-fit the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. Both contracts are yet to
be signed, although the Times of India newspaper Friday quoted Defense
Secretary Yogendra Narain as saying he expected the Gorshkov negotiations
to be concluded in June.
Indeed, Klebanov's February visit to New Delhi failed to reach a
breakthrough on the Admiral Gorshkov deal, which combined with a batch of
MiG-29 fighters to be supplied as part of an overall package is expected to
garner Russia $1.5 billion.
The actual value of contracts in 2000 is subsequently estimated at $5.5
billion to $5.7 billion.
The Leader ...
Rosoboronexport holds the leading position among Russia's six arms
exporting companies.
Rosoboronexport exported $3.3 billion worth of weapons in 2001, a five-year
record for the state arms colossus, according to Vedomosti. The results are
up from $3.09 billion in 2000, of which $2.97 billion came from
Rosvooruzheniye and $120 million from Promexport, the two agencies that
were fused into Rosoboronexport in November 2000.
Among Rosoboronexport's largest deliveries was a 30-strong batch of
multirole Su-30MKK Flanker jets to China, which were produced by the
Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Production Association. It was the fruit of a
1999 contract for the delivery of 40 Su-30MKKs at $1.5 billion, the first
10 of which had already been delivered in December 2000.
Last year, China also received 10 Su-27UBKs, made by the Irkutsk Aviation
Production Association, as part of a 1999 contract to deliver 28 such
fighters to help pay off Russia's state debt. The first eight jets were
delivered in 2000, with the rest expected to follow this year.
Rosvooruzheniye, and then Rosoboronexport , which absorbed it, signed
separate contracts in August 1999 and February 2001, respectively, to
deliver nine Ka-31 helicopters to India. As part of the first contract,
worth $92 million, the Kumertau aviation production association began work
on four helicopters, delivery of which began in late 2001. The remaining
five helicopters worth a total of $108 million are planned for delivery
this year.
Also in 2001, India received 40 T-90C tanks made by Uralvagonzavod in
Nizhny Tagil out of the 310 units contracted in February 2001. Under the
terms of the contract, 124 tanks will be delivered and 186 more will be
assembled under license in India.
Other transactions last year included a second Zubr hovercraft and an Mi-26
helicopter to Greece, while Algeria took delivery of 12 Su-24MKs as part of
a $120 million contract for 22 of the aircraft.
Iran, meanwhile, got the 16 Mi-171 helicopters outstanding from a contract
for 22, Nigeria received two Mi-34 helicopters last year and deliveries
began to Angola of Su-24 MKs under the 1999 contract for 20 such jets.
And the Satellites
For the past three years, Concern Antei has been rated Russia's No.2
exporter. Last year, according to an unnamed source quoted in Vedomosti, it
exported arms for $138 million, a significant drop from its 2000 figure of
$393 million.
Last year, Antei exported six mobile missile launchers and two Ranjir
command vehicles of Tor-M1 anti-aircraft surface-to-air missile systems of
10 contracted to Greece. Since 1999, Antei has delivered 27 of the missile
systems to Greece. Antei's export volumes this year are likely to plummet
from 2000's peak as the deliveries on Tor-M1 are completed, as there have
been no new contracts signed yet with Greece any further Tor-M1s
Close behind, Tula-based Priborostroyeniye Design Bureau, or KBP, exported
$107 million in 2001. KBP is currently working on a $720 million contract
to deliver a Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile system. KBP may also have
completed delivery of anti-tank missile complexes for the United Arab
Emirates as part of the contract from 1992 to 1994 for 600BMP-3 armored
personnel vehicles.
Likewise, it may have also begun delivery of Vikhr-M anti-tank missile
systems for the 40 Mi-17-1V combat helicopters delivered to India by the
Kazan helicopter plant in 2000-01, but KBP is notoriously tight-lipped
about its activities.
During Klebanov's recent visit to India, a contract was signed for the
delivery of Krasnopol-M precision-guided munitions.
KBP's exports this year could be worth $120 million to $150 million,
jumping to $240 million to $280 million over the next two years.
MiG, meanwhile, reportedly exported $97 million worth, with deliveries of
Mig-29 fighter jets to Bangladesh, Yemen and Eritrea. After several lean
years when annual sales failed to rise above $100 million, 2001 was
something of a watershed, with MiG concluding contracts totaling a record
$1 billion. Last December, MiG general director Nikolai Nikitin said that
five contracts were signed for 36 fighter jets.
In June, MiG signed a contract with Myanmar for 10 MiG-29s at $130 million
to $150 million. This was followed by a contract worth more than $400
million with Yemen for 14 MiG-29s. Contracts were also signed with Sudan
and Nigeria. Spares were also delivered to India, Syria, Iran and Malaysia
and several European countries.
The last time MiG enjoyed a similar level of success was in 1994 when it
signed three contracts for delivering a total of 36 MiG-29s, with 10 to
India for $240 million, eight to Slovakia for $150 million, and 18 to
Malaysia for $560 million.
The Malaysian government, which last week signed a contract with
Rosoboronexport for a $48 million missile defense system, is now
contemplating the purchase of more aircraft, choosing between the Su-30MK
and the Boeing F-18 Super Hornets. The two types are battling in a tender
for the Malaysian Royal Air Force.
And on the subcontinent, MiG is aiming to sell India 22 to 50 MiG-29K/KUB
naval jets under the yet-to-be concluded Admiral Gorshkov carrier deal.
Of the remaining exporters, Kolomna Machinebuilding Design Bureau, or KBM,
reported $32 million arms deliveries last year, and Reutov Scientific
Production Association, or NPO, claimed $31 million, Vedomosti reported.
KBM signed its first independent contract with India in December 2000 for
several hundred shoulder-carried Igla air-defense systems, deliveries on
which were completed last year.
NPO Mashinostroyeniya is also working with India, in this case in a joint
venture, BrahMos, that manufactures PJ-10 missiles based Russian Yakhont
anti-ship missiles. BrahMos' work has been described by Indian Defense
Minister Fernandes as a watershed in Indian-Russian military cooperation.
Until recently, these five companies alone enjoyed the right to sell
weapons independently of Rosoboronexport. But a decree in December by
President Putin partially extended this right to a larger number of
producers, but only for spare parts, support services and repairs on
hardware already delivered.
The full list of firms is yet to be drawn up, but Committee on Military and
Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries deputy head Denisov said only
companies in which the state has a controlling stake will qualify.
Putin's decree also calls for greater efficiency in the delivery of spare
parts, an area that has drawn criticism in the past from buyers of Russian
military equipment who have often been left in the lurch by slow deliveries.
Tapping Other Markets
Having subsisted in the past few years on orders from prime clients China
and India, Russia is eager to broaden its clientele.
Klebanov said last year that Latin America is an essential target for
Russian arms exporters. Africa, he added, could also make a good client.
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov visited Brazil and Venezuela last December
to promote Russian-built weapons. Venezuela -- which bought 18 Mi-17
helicopters in 1996 and 1997 -- showed interest in buying more Russian
helicopters.
In Brazil, Russia is participating in the $700 million tender for 24
fighters with its Sukhoi and MiG jets. An announcement on the tender was
originally slated for March but has been delayed.
In 1994, Brazil signed up for 118 Igla shoulder-carried anti-aircraft
missile complexes, and in 1996, snapped up 10 Mi-34 light helicopters.
During the visit by Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in
January, an agreement was signed between Sukhoi and Brazil's Avibras
Industria Aeroespacial for the supply of components for the Su-35 jet.
The agreement is the first step toward possible co-production of the Su-35
in Brazil, if it wins the tender.
There have been setbacks, however. The Su-35 was knocked out of the tender
for a $4 billion South Korean project last Tuesday, prompting
Rosoboronexport to protest that the process was political and biased
towards U.S giant Boeing Co.
Soviet-era customers Cuba and Peru remain on the Russian arms traders'
sales agenda. Peru, for example, bought three MiG-29s in 1998, in addition
to dozens of Su-22s, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters and hundreds of T-54/55 tanks.
Mexico has also been a regular customer, buying up helicopters for both its
navy and its air force, while in Africa, it is estimated that some 70
percent of arms are Russia-supplied. Russia obviously stands a good chance
of continuing success in this market, arms officials say.
But the most obvious market to tap, after long-time partners China and
India, is Iran, a potential third big client that could be worth up to $400
million per year for Russia.
Moscow and Tehran signed an agreement on military and technical cooperation
last October during a visit by Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani.
Iran -- described earlier this year as part of an "axis of evil" by U.S.
President George W. Bush -- has a wide-ranging shopping list and is looking
to buy fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, armored troop vehicles, patrol
boats and air defense systems as part of a 25-year rearmament program
adopted in 2000.
An Unclear Future
With Klebanov, the government's point man in the defense industry and arms
trade, demoted from deputy prime minister in February, speculation has been
rife as to who will oversee the lucrative export sector.
When he was appointed deputy prime minister back in June 1999, Klebanov
took up the challenge of reforming the mammoth industry Russia inherited
after the break-up of the Soviet Union. According to Klebanov, who retained
the position of industry, science and technology minister, only one third
of the approximately 1,700 existing defense enterprises will ultimately
survive the reforms, and they will be amalgamated into integrated holding
structures.
But the future remains unclear for the five agencies -- the Russian
Aviation and Space Agency, the Russian Conventional Arms Agency, the
Russian Control Systems Agency, the Russian Shipbuilding Agency and Russian
Munitions Agency -- set up at Klebanov's instigation to oversee Russia's
defense and aerospace industries. They were previously supervised by just
two government bodies, the Economic Development and Trade Ministry and the
Russian Space Agency.
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, on whose recommendation Klebanov was
demoted Feb. 18, has since been in charge of the military and technical
cooperation.
Kasyanov has so far reviewed a number of Klebanov's decisions, including
recently re-awarding a $1.4 billion deal to build two destroyers for China;
it had been held by St. Petersburg shipbuilder Baltiisky Zavod, and was
given to rival firm Severnaya Verf, also in St. Petersburg.
The prime minister also switched the prime contractor on a $1.5 billion
Chinese-Russian contract for Su-30MKK multipurpose fighters from
Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Production Plant to Sukhoi Firm.
There is also a plan to change the main contractor on a $400 million
contract to deliver S-300PMU surface-to-air systems to China, switching
from Almaz Scientific Production Association to Concern PVO.
Such sharp changes inside the military-industrial complex could negatively
affect future relations with Russia's clients.
Emerging from a Cabinet meeting March 19 devoted to the military-industrial
complex, Kasyanov was quoted by Prime-Tass as saying serious shortcomings
were found in the work of the agencies and ordered a full inventory of
documents relating to the agencies' activities in the sphere of arms
exports, particularly in the way the agencies identify contractors on arms
sales. Kasyanov emphasized the necessity for transparency in the selection
criteria.
With Kasyanov ruling the arms exports in the interim, speculation has
surfaced that the system of overlooking the military and technical
cooperation with foreign countries may be brought back under full
presidential control, as was the case from 1994-97 when Alexander Kotyolkin
was head of Rosvooruzheniye.
The entire arms sales hierarchy was then headed by President Boris Yeltsin,
represented by his aide, Boris Kuzyk, who now heads New Programs and
Concepts, a holding that controls Severnaya Verf.
It is thought in some circles that the next such adviser might be Putin
associate and former Promexport head Sergei Chemezov, the first deputy
general director of Rosoboronexport. Chemezov was previously slated to
become head of Rosvooruzheniye
But when his agency was fused with Rosvooruzheniye in November 2000, he
became first deputy of the new company, Rosoboronexport, and his deputy
Andrei Belyaninov became his boss.
Marat Kenzhetayev is an analyst at the Center for Arms Control in Moscow.
Lyuba Pronina is a Staff Writer.
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