Johnson's Russia List #6162 29 March 2002 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Note from David Johnson: 1. Reuters: Ukraine's main parties claim victory ahead of poll. 2. Vremya MN: Sergei Markedonov, WHY HASN'T RUSSIA FALLEN APART? Ten years of the Russian Federation: trends and remedies. 3. The Russia Journal: Alexander Golts, Marking end of an era. (re US-Russia relations) 4. Peter Lavelle: A Reluctant Russophile - JRL Weekly Review (JRL #6150 - #6159) 5. Novaya Gazeta: Alexander Ilyin, WE ARE FRIENDS WITH AMERICA: AGAINST WHOM? OPEC, oil prices, and Russia's relationship with the United States. 6. Gazeta: RUSSIAN ECONOMY MAY BE RUINED IN A MATTER OF MONTHS. Economic growth is a matter of trust in the state.(interview with Vladimir Mau) 7. Reuters: Russia says clamping down on Chechen rights abuses. 8. The Guardian (UK): Ian Traynor, From Chechnya with love. Mutiny and military bungles are key features of the war in Chechnya - a far cry from the victorious scenes depicted by Russia's TV and film industry. 9. The Analyst: Ariel Cohen, RADIO LIBERTY LAUNCHES CONTROVERSIAL CHECHEN SERVICE. 10. The Russia Journal: Matt Taibbi, Pundit’s views shift with political winds.] ****** #1 Ukraine's main parties claim victory ahead of poll By Elizabeth Piper KIEV, March 29 (Reuters) - Ukraine's pro-president and opposition reformist parties said on Friday a weekend election was a foregone conclusion, both confident of winning after a bitterly contested campaign. The parliamentary poll, closely watched by the West for signs Ukraine has shed its Soviet past and is ready to implement reforms, has become a battle between the reformist ex-prime minister and the head of President Leonid Kuchma's conservative administration. The success of For United Ukraine, the main pro-president party, will also be key for the future of Kuchma, Ukraine's longest post-independence leader. Volodymyr Lytvyn, head of For United Ukraine, said his party was all but guaranteed a majority after 14 parties had signed up in support of his movement. "Of course a 100-percent guarantee can only be given by insurance companies only in the case of death. But objectively...our bloc will form the majority in the parliament," he told reporters. He said his party would cement the rule of law, implement pension reform and a law to give opposition parties rights when in power, adding that the country had to become stable. For United Ukraine has run third in opinion polls ahead of the election, while reformist leader Viktor Yushchenko and his party, Our Ukraine, was in top position. The Communists are second. FEARS OF FUDGED ELECTION Yushchenko, a former prime minister and the country's most trusted politician, said he would shrug off the challenge by pro-Kuchma forces, but warned the vote could be fudged. "We will defeat the Communists. Now the main battle is between the forces who support reforms and movement forward, and those who want to maintain the current situation," he told a rally of some 500 people on the last day of campaigning. "We will create a transparent market-oriented economy with clear rules and speed up reforms." Yushchenko, who headed the government from December 1999 until he was ousted in April 2001, pulled Ukraine's economy out of a decade-long recession by pushing through long-delayed reforms. He also paid off billions of hryvnias, the currency, in wage arrears. He has joined a chorus of criticism over media violations ahead of the poll. Western observers have said campaigning was marred by unfair media access and the growing influence of pro-president parties on local electoral commissions which count the ballot. Kuchma said on state television he was doing his utmost to make the poll equitable: "The authorities will do their best to ensure a fair, transparent and democratic election and ensure nothing will prevent Ukrainians from expressing their will freely." Mykhailo Ryabets, head of the Central Electoral Commission, also dismissed accusations of impending vote-rigging. "Today, the fate of the elections is in the hands of those who take part," he told reporters. "Who is going to falsify the election if parties and blocs form the electoral commission and count the votes?." (Additional reporting by Olena Horodetska) ****** #2 Vremya MN March 29, 2002 WHY HASN'T RUSSIA FALLEN APART? Ten years of the Russian Federation: trends and remedies Author: Sergei Markedonov, directorate of problems of ethnic relations at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] THE FEDERAL TREATY WAS SIGNED A DECADE AGO, MARCH 31, 1992, AND BORIS YELTSIN SAID HIS FAMOUS WORDS: "TAKE AS MUCH SOVEREIGNTY AS YOU CAN SWALLOW." WE NOW KNOW THAT PREVENTION OF DISINTEGRATIONIST PROCESSES AND TENDENCIES REQUIRES SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES FROM BELOW. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, analysts and politicians predicted that Russia was going to follow suit. These predictions were not entirely groundless: the all-but-independent Ichkeria appeared in the autumn of 1991, Tatarstan organized a referendum on sovereignty, and relations between the Chechens and Ingushes deteriorated... Numerous opinion polls and sociological surveys also bred the fears that the integral state would not hold together much longer. Russia became a "community of regions" but escaped the fate of the Soviet Union. Why? Centrifugal tendencies were assisted by liberalization accompanied in ethnic republics (and to a smaller extent in regions and territories) by ethnic mobilization and a search for self- identification. "Why shall we copy the Russian reforms? Cannot Tatarstan follow its own road to the reforms that answer the interests of its population? Or there is only one way in the world, the one suggested by Moscow?" Shaimiyev's state adviser Rafail Khakimov asked in 1995. Russia's transformation into a "community of regions" was also assisted by simultaneous processes like the dual power in the center (the president and the Supreme Council) in 1991 - 1993. Without a decision made first on the strategic way to be followed by the state formed in the August revolution, any attempt to begin to pacify the provinces would have been a height of political folly. That was probably what Yeltsin was thinking when he told the regions to take as much sovereignty as they could swallow. In other words, Yeltsin faced an alternative - to buy regional barons (at a costly price) or subdue them by force. The president opted for the former. Outward loyalty and the ability to handle the ethnic-communist opposition was what counted. regional leaders could be counted to accomplish that much (how successfully is irrelevant). Blaming Yeltsin for his policy of encouragement of regional sovereignty has been fashionable but who can honestly say that he knows the resources the first president of Russia could use to subdue the regions by force? The Russian pie sliced up, every regional leader got his share. Opposing the president in minor matters, they nevertheless never seriously contemplated another Byelovezhskaya Puscha. The road to milder positions of post-communist regional leaders and eventually to the policy of "power vertical fortification" became possible to a considerable extent due to the peace Yeltsin made with regional leaders in the early 1990's. In this light, it is possible to look for differences in Yeltsin's and Putin's regional policies. Putin's decrees on the institute of plenipotentiary representatives and reorganization of the Federation Council rest on Yeltsin's reliable foundation of checks and balances. But is the period of disintegration of the country finally over? Presidential decree on presidential envoys (May 13, 2000) created certain conditions. First and foremost, it destroyed the regional leaders' power monopoly.. Introduction of the institution of presidential envoys created (on a bureaucratic basis) competition on the regional political market. From this point of view, it is certainly not a return to the past but is actually an element of democratization. Businesspeople and ordinary citizens get an opportunity to defend their interests at the local level, without the necessity of appeals to the center. At the same time, presidential envoys are not a universal remedy. They themselves are restricted by red tape. The tendency of their bureaucratization is dangerous indeed. It is clear in the meantime that getting the regional elites in line merely promotes a solution to tactical tasks only. Prevention of disintegrationist processes and tendencies requires support of the presidential initiatives from below. Otherwise the "people's support" will be lacking and the Kremlin's ideas will fail to become a system. (Translated by A. Ignatkin) ******* #3 The Russia Journal March 29-April 4, 2002 Marking end of an era By ALEXANDER GOLTS Moscow and Washington look to be heading fast toward a new strategic arms limitation agreement. "Negotiations were very productive and we managed to resolve a number of serious differences," said U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Bolton after the talks he held with his Russian counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov. Mamedov, for his part, assessed prospects for an agreement to be signed during George Bush’s visit to Russia in May as "very optimistic." Only recently, the differences between the two sides seemed insurmountable. Above all, this concerned the issue of operationally deployed warheads. When the United States announced its plans to cut its nuclear arsenal to 1,700-2,200 warheads, it said that this would be done by a process of "unloading." Single warheads would replace multiple warheads on surface missiles, for example. Strategic missiles would be removed from four nuclear submarines and several dozen bombers would have their missiles removed. The nuclear submarines would be re-equipped to perform other, non-strategic tasks, while the bombers would be taken out of service. As for the warheads, they would be stockpiled. In the Russian interpretation, however, this is called not reduction, but maintaining return potential. Washington hasn’t abandoned these plans and says it will keep the warheads and their delivery vehicles so as to respond in the event of unexpected change in the international situation. None of this was to Moscow’s liking. Indeed, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that these plans amounted to no more than a virtual arms reduction. But talk of "return potential" has suddenly died down. U.S. ambassador to Moscow Alexander Vershbow and then Mamedov said that the future agreement could take the form of a three-to-four-page additional protocol to the START I Treaty, the last strategic arms-limitation treaty officially in force. That both sides should refer to the START I Treaty suggests that the Americans have found some loophole in this treaty enabling them to avoid liquidating the warheads up for the cut. It’s not just chance that in November, when he announced that Russia had fulfilled its obligations under START I, Yury Baluyevsky, first deputy head of the General Staff, said he wasn’t happy with the way the Americans had counted warheads. This was followed by a statement from Ivanov during his visit to the United States that if such a loophole exists, Russia could also begin stockpiling warheads. This, it seems, became the foundation for a new Russian-American agreement. If this is so, then Moscow has simply made concessions to Washington. The fact is that delivery vehicles were always the most important component of all strategic arms limitation agreements. This was why the number of warheads that could be deployed on a particular delivery vehicle was always set very strictly. The idea was always to reduce the number of missiles rather than the number of warheads. The Americans know full well that by the beginning of the next decade, Russia will be forced to take all its heavy missiles off duty. The Topol-M missile-production program is practically at a standstill. Rumors that President Vladimir Putin has given the program the green light in order to maintain parity with the United States seem doubtful. Even when former Chief of the Missile Forces Igor Sergeyev was Defense Minister, no more than 10 new missiles a year came on duty. In this situation, it doesn’t matter how many warheads Russia stockpiles, it still won’t have the delivery vehicles on which to deploy them. To put things frankly, Russian and American diplomats are now working on an agreement that will give legal form to unilateral U.S. strategic-arms reduction. Russia’s participation isn’t so much out of military necessity as out of U.S. President George Bush’s desire to do something nice for Putin and keep the illusion of a bilateral agreement. Moscow, meanwhile, has virtually nothing to bargain with. What’s important to remember is that this strategic-arms agreement will probably be the last signed by Russia and the United States. When the Los Angeles Times published excerpts of a Pentagon report on U.S. nuclear-arms policy, hysteria broke out in Russia over the idea that U.S. military officials still conceive of nuclear war against Russia. But few pointed out that such a turn of events could be envisaged only if Russia returned to a totalitarian regime. Hysterical commentators also neglected to say that the report makes it clear the United States does not see any direct military threat from Russia and that this is the foundation for the Americans’ new nuclear strategy. Washington has decided that Russia is no longer dangerous. This would be worth celebrating if it weren’t for the fact it does away with what has long been the foundation of Russian-American relations. Our two countries’ relations have been based on a system of treaties reducing strategic arms – and reducing a mutual threat. But now that Washington has decided this threat is highly minimal, it no longer pays as much attention to Moscow. The era of nuclear confrontation is over. Even possessing the world’s second-largest nuclear arsenal doesn’t automatically make Russia a great power, but Russian diplomats have placed too much hope on this status for too long. The Sept. 11 events and Moscow’s active participation in the anti-terrorist operations have given Russia the chance to show that it is still an important player for the United States. But this is a temporary factor and it’s no good counting on a repeat of such circumstances in the future. So instead of concentrating on doomed-to-fail disputes about operationally deployed warheads and return potential, Moscow should turn its efforts to establishing a new agenda for Russian-American relations not based on mutual deterrence. ******* #4 From: "Peter Lavelle" Subject: A Reluctant Russophile - JRL Weekly Review (JRL #6150 - # 6159) Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2002 Peter Lavelle: A Reluctant Russophile - JRL Weekly Review (JRL #6150 - # 6159) [Note: With David's permission, I have volunteered to write a short weekly review of the JRL on a trial basis. My aim is two fold. First, I believe a critical overview of some of the postings can be helpful for those who have a strong interest in things Russian, though due to time constraints cannot fully digest David's heroic efforts. Second, I hope to generate more discussion on the List. We all are presented with a huge corpus of material to think about, I hope I can help focus our "imagined community" to better understand the subject so many of us are obsessed with and to promote more interaction among subscribers. At the outset I would like to make clear what I intend to comment on. Almost all news service reports will not be reviewed, unless there is something unique or compelling in the report. I am most interested in analysis, especially from those who post original material on the JRL. This posting will be made, if it is eventually deemed helpful after a number of weeks, every Friday (COB - Moscow time). Additionally, this will not be a forum agitating my occasional "Untimely Thoughts"; others review my thoughts much to my satisfaction without me blowing my own horn. "Untimely Thoughts" will continue uninterrupted. Lastly, I represent myself and not the JRL or David. I am very appreciative that David has created a forum for me to express my opinion how others write and think about Russia.] JRL #6150 UPI: Martin Sieff, Analysis: Experts fear for Russia's future: Sieff's piece is exactly the kind of analysis that is not analysis. Unfortunately, this kind of "Russia-watching" is what many politicians and the international business community is exposed to. Anyone paying attention read Lilia Shevtsova's excellent Carnegie presentation and Vogel's longer, through more general analysis, should come away with a very different interpretation. After reading both, the word "fear" did not come to my mind. If any single word is be used to describe what both scholars stressed it is "challenge". Putin's reform-restructuring project has a long way to go. But Putin's Russia has a way to go before the word fear should be invoked. I know titles are part of the journalistic trade and in this case Sieff should have used the title "Experts see complex and challenging decisions ahead for Putin". Not too sexy, though closer to what the experts actually said. Richard J. Thomas' response to Peter Gallo's "Hermitage's Browder Say Being An Activist Investor Pays in Russia" is spot on when thinking about Russia's equity markets - pre-1998 and after. For those of us who have observed the markets on a daily basis since the August meltdown, it is fair to say that investing in Russia has only slightly improved . I also agree with Thomas about rolling-up the sleeves and getting directly involved - these are the folks who make the real super-profits. Thomas is also right about investors having short memories. I have always preferred the phrase "greed is stronger than fear". Thomas' experience and insights are as good as it gets. However, I do very much appreciate Browder's hard work. He helps the greedy and those with memory loss to remember what it really means to invest in Russia today. Are Duma deputies worth listening to? Most of the time the answer is an unequivocal no. However, Vladimir Ryzhkov's "No Modernization Without Representation" is an example of a parliamentarian who reflects seriously about Russia's battle to become more democratic. He is not very optimistic. Comparing Russia's experiment with democracy of 1906 - 1917 to 1989 to the present has its limitations. He suggests that France's Fifth Republic experiment might be the best model for Russia. Many in France have reservations about the Fifth Republic; I cannot see how Russians would be happy by emulating the French. But then again, most Russians I know could give a hoot about democracy. A good car, dacha, and foreign vacation on a hot beach are much higher in the wish list. Ridding Moscow of the "blacks" is high on the list too. JRL #6152 I will be shamelessly short and to the point. Stratfor.com's "Crisis Looming Between US, Russia" should be re-titled and re-analyzed. Stratfor.com's analysis of Russia is in crisis. Go back to the drawing board guys, in our 9/11 world your doomsday scenarios are dwarfed by the "superior intelligence" of CNN's Wolf Blitzer. Bill Bennett's title "The Death of Outrage" should be appropriated to Starfor.com's level of analysis. I am relieved that I am not alone in thinking this way. Please see (#JRL 6154) Mikhail Tsypkin's comments on the Strarfor piece. JRL # 6153 Golts in "The Battle of Pskov" of the RJ provides an update on one of Putin' s biggest headaches - military reform. Rumor has it that military reform will be high on Putin's list when he discusses Russia's priorities during his annual address next month. Golts looks at the barriers the military establishment creates to slow reform and block the introduction of a volunteer army. Golts' assumption that the General Staff has already decided that the experiment with the 76th Division will fail is well reasoned. However, I would go even further. Considering how Putin has ruled to date, if the experiment with the 76th Division is deemed a failure, more than just a few heads will roll in the General Staff. Putin will not accept failure, someone else will be found to accept failure for him. JRL # 6154 US News and World Report: "Moscow's Vlad and Gorby show": When will western commentators get over their fascination with Gorbachev? Putin does not mind that the man who inherited a superpower and then left behind a country in complete decay travels to foreign capitals. Just listen to his interviews - and don't blame what he says on poor translation. He has little meaningful to say. If Yelstin was a big disappointment for most Russians, Gorbachev remains a disgrace. His influence in Russia is even dwarfed by the midget size of Zhrinovsky. I had lunch with him a few months ago (ok, with about 100 other people too). The local feeling was to be respectful, but "Gorby' s" time is long over. (I am the first to agree that the American lecture circuit is lucrative). Panarin asks the reader to compare Pax Americana's liberalism with Social Darwinism in his "On Totalitarian Utopianism and Liberal Realism". His words and ideas reflect well what much of "Russia's thinking society" is talking about at present. "We ... see that regress in civilized conduct in modern international relations, which have been simplified in favor of the naked dictate of power. The body of contemporary liberal analysis, describing the nature of US actions, finds in them one simple but all encompassing explanation and justification. It is because they are stronger." Maybe these words are sour grapes from the weak. Nonetheless, foreign policy commentary should be allowed a margin for sober expression, beyond the almost hysterical sound bites coming out the Pentagon. JRL # 6155 A quick comment on John Lloyd's: "The ever-so-popular Mr. Putin". First the main part of the title almost has nothing to do with what is presented. Second, Lilia Shevtsova's Carnegie presentation is misinterpreted (again) or simply not understood. Much of what Lloyd tells us what Russia must do to become a real and reliable ally of the west will not be (according to Shevtsova) accomplished for a very long time. Shevtsova claims that Putin is working with a new set of assumptions about Russia's place in the world. She does not claim that those have become a reality. Novaya Gazeta's "TO BE EQUAL FRIENDS. Interview with Alexei Arbatov of the Yabloko party" is matter of fact interview about the personal and personnel politics of military reform. For those interested in a smart and well-reasoned presentation on Russia's concerns related to arms control and the present state of the US-Russia, Arbatov's interview is a worthwhile read. Marina Shakina's "PUTIN, TWO YEARS ON" presents how one writer sees Putin's political evolution since being elected president. For her the President's evolution is positive though incomplete. She suggests the Soviet bureaucratic legacy will be with Russia society for the foreseeable future. Political discourse has changed and new political agendas advanced but institutions lag beyond. Sitting here in a Moscow office, her words ring very clear. JRL # 6157 Svetlana Babayeva and Georgy Bovt in "PRESIDENT'S MIDDAY" give a different spin on the President's first two years. The authors are less enamored by achievements as they are by the change in perception under Putin. Putin is the right man to lead Russia; he just lacks the right kind of people around him. They also argue that if Putin does not attempt some kind of breakthrough in the economic sphere, his reform drive will stall. Forget the last half of the article - it is only street gossip that clouds rationality. JRL # 6159 Russia Business List #288 - Tom Adshead on political events. This List needs to hear more from Tom Adshead of the brokerage house Troika Dialog - my most worthy competitor. My experience is that he usually applies a convincing balance between rumors and analysis. I like the comment that Putin is probably really on vacation! No deep-seated political intrigue should be garnered from the fact that the President is relaxing and thinking about his address to the nation. He also has a reasoned spin on the Seleznov saga. He also has some thoughts on the Borodin case that should be given consideration. ******* #5 Novaya Gazeta No. 21 March 2002 WE ARE FRIENDS WITH AMERICA: AGAINST WHOM? OPEC, oil prices, and Russia's relationship with the United States Author: Alexander Ilyin [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] NO MATTER HOW SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH POULTRY MEAT AND FREE SPEECH ARE IN RUSSIA, OIL TAKES PRECEDENCE AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED. RUSSIA ISN'T SAYING SAY ANYTHING SPECIFIC, ITS OFFICIALS ONLY REPEATING THAT THEY DO NOT KNOW WHETHER OIL EXPORTS WILL BE CUT, LEFT AS THEY ARE, OR INCREASED. An OPEC conference took place in Vienna on March 15. The cartel resolved not to change production in the second quarter of 2002, and oil prices in London leaped to $25 a barrel soon afterwards. Moscow did not say anything specific about its planned oil exports between April and July. Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko had previously promised on behalf of the government that exports in the second quarter of 2002 would not go up. At the same time, representatives of the oil sector and journalists known for their closeness to the Kremlin constantly claim that boosting exports is inevitable. Why this ambiguity? Let us try to reason it out. The situation on the oil market is currently as follows. OPEC, Russia, Angola, Mexico, Oman, and Norway cut production by almost 2 million barrels per day after January 1, 2002. OPEC continues to insist on more and more cuts to prevent a price slump. Russia isn't saying say anything specific, its officials only repeating that they do not know whether oil exports will be cut, left as they are, or increased. OPEC leaders Rodriguez and Lookman in their turn approached stock exchanges with the attempts to persuade traders that Russia would probably leave its export unchanged in the second quarter of the year and that the market "will be particularly weak in the second quarter." Russia denounces all these statements. General mood in Moscow official circles is pointedly optimistic: the state of affairs in the major user countries (Europe and the United States) has improved, why restrict oil export then? Price rise in January did result in a level favorable for Russia and the West - above $20 but below $25 a barrel. The latter figure would have suited a lot of OPEC states, with 70% or even 90% of their economies dependent on oil revenues. Despite the current growth, prices will probably fall again after the failure of the cartel's attempts to persuade Russia not to increase exports against the first quarter of the year. How far they will fall is another question. Prices went on growing - probably by inertia - after Rodriguez and Lookman visited Moscow on March 3-5. Moreover, the economic situation in the West, particularly in the United States, has improved somewhat. Aware of alll this, Moscow feels confident. Saudi Arabia, the major oil exporter to the United States, cannot afford risks. For it, even a poor peace with Russia will be better than a price war. The United States has its own oil deposits, and oil produced there costs America no less than $18 a barrel. Support of national producers and stocking become pointless otherwise. It means that $20-22 should be the best acceptable price for the United States. Besides, America is already pursuing its policy of influence with the Mideast - the operation in Afghanistan, threats to Iraq, etc. In a situation like that, Saudi Arabia feels jeopardized. Upping prices will be like opposing powerful Americans in the midst of the counter-terrorism operation. The $20-22 bracket suits Russia as well. The logic is clear: as far as the West is concerned, Russia is becoming an important leverage against OPEC. This assumption explains the statements of Andrew Sommers ("... Russia may become at least the second major strategic supplier of oil to the United States") and Abraham ("A new energy order has been established" - following the September 11 tragedy). As for the Russian government, cooperation with the United States will benefit it. On the one hand, this is a chance to sell oil at a profit with an emphasis made on the bulk and not on price or quality as Presidential Adviser Andrei Illarionov openly said. On the other, Russia may seriously undermine the cartel's positions and solidify its clout with the Mideast. Dmitry Glinsky, an expert with the Institute of Global Economy and International Relations, commented when discussing relations between Russia, the United States, and the Arab world that Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov's refusal to meet with Yassir Arafat was not a coincidence at all. Rather than a personal initiative, it was probably another attempt to formulate a new line of behavior in the Mideast. It is a different matter altogether that the Kremlin - as always - put tactic above strategy. Actually, Russia's behavior in the oil market doesn't depend on agreements with the United States alone. It also depends on the position of oil companies and situation on the domestic market. The situation in question is rather problematic. The market is saturated, storage facilities full, petrol prices down. Companies mostly focused on the domestic market (like Sibneft) will be forced to turn to foreign customers soon. Export will go up, and prices will probably go down. LUKoil and the Tyumen Oil Company would have preferred protectionist preservation of export quotas because of the relatively high cost price. "The LUKoil is already operating in the United States," Sommers said. "Russian companies' interest in activities such as this is clearly growing." Despite all the rhetoric, this sudden friendship with the Americans will continue because it objectively benefits fuel monopolists that rule Russia. No Olympic Games will ruin this friendship. The same goes for the United States. Oil is more important than whatever human rights activists might be saying, more than whatever problems with free speech and poultry meat may arise. Oil is going to take precedence until the situation in the global energy market changes. ******* #6 Gazeta March 29, 2002 RUSSIAN ECONOMY MAY BE RUINED IN A MATTER OF MONTHS Economic growth is a matter of trust in the state Author: Svetlana Ivanova [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] AN INTERVIEW WITH VLADIMIR MAU, DIRECTOR OF THE CABINET'S ECONOMIC REFORMS CENTER. HE DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT DECISIONS WHICH AFFECT THE ECONOMY - SUCH AS TAX REFORMS. HE DESCRIBES SOME IDEAS CURRENTLY ON THE TABLE, AND GIVES HIS VIEWS ON LIKELY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY. THE CABINET WILL DISCUSS AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW WHICH WILL MAKE LIFE EASIER FOR SMALL BUSINESSES. PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN REMINDED THE CABINET RECENTLY THAT THE AMENDMENTS SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE DUMA ON APRIL 10 AT THE LATEST. DUMA SPEAKER GENNADI SELEZNEV SAYS THE AMENDMENTS WILL CERTAINLY BE PASSED BY THE LOWER HOUSE, EVEN THOUGH NO ONE HAS SEEN THEM YET. THUS, THE PRESIDENT WILL KEEP ITS WORD TO SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH MAY GET SOME ADDITIONAL IMPETUS. Question: Our rate of economic growth these past three years has been one of the highest in the world. Unfortunately, growth all but stopped last autumn. The World Bank considers that small business has not been involved in the economic reforms over the past decade. In what direction should the tax reform proceed in order to initiate more economic growth? Vladimir Mau: Taxes are an important factor in economic growth, but not a critical factor. Our tax reforms aim to meet the economic demands of the state in line with its administrative capacities. Getting rid of state hypocrisy is an important factor in creating a healthy economy. Economic growth is more than just a factor of the tax system. This is a matter of trust in the state, in general. Companies may not fear that taxation may be toughened soon. They fear that once they have revealed their true revenue, taxation will be raised again several years from now. That is why the tax reform in itself will fail without simultaneous administrative reforms and reforms of the court system. Question: And these reforms are lagging behind? Vladimir Mau: It is clear that the tax reform is a pioneer. Actually, we do not have problems with economic legislation. Everything is fine there. As for court rulings, they are still bought and sold. This situation seriously undermines the positions of the Russian market in the eyes of potential domestic and foreign investors. Russian capital is leaving the country and settling in the West even though Western markets are less profitable. The thing is that the cost of contract is so cheap that investing there turns out to be more profitable in the end. If we want to win over investors, we need a moratorium on higher taxation for the next five - or, even better, ten - years. Question: What legislative form should it take? Vladimir Mau: No forms. It should be a decision by consensus, like a statement by the president for example. Economics is a psychological discipline. Belief is sometimes more important than laws. If the regime promises no tax rises, the market will respond. All the same, it would be better if it was a joint statement of all political parties represented in the Duma. Question: What does the president think of the tax risemoratorium idea? Vladimir Mau: He takes it seriously. I do not know whether it will be included in his address to the Federal Assembly but it may be included in the budget address. Question: What about the idea of a tax amnesty? Vladimir Mau: I do not think the amnesty will solve the problem of slowing economic growth. It doesn't solve the problem of security, you see. Call a tax amnesty, get money here, and criminals will commandeer it immediately. Tax amnesties do not promote trust in the regime. Question: What should be done to increase this trust? Vladimir Mau: It is necessary to avoid unusual measures. Question: What do you mean? Vladimir Mau: The Russian economy has been growing over these last three years. The rate, however, has been slowing. A considerable part of the Russian elite is distinctly nervous nowadays. There is the impression that political successes are not backed up by economic successes. Panic over the diminishing growth rate would be the worst possible thing under the circumstances. Question: How serious is the danger? Vladimir Mau: Serious enough. We hear more and more frequently that the capacities of the institutional reforms have been exhausted, that we need more than 3-5% a year, that the government isn't taking decisive steps to speed up economic growth. Hence the temptation to take some extraordinary measures to achieve a breakthrough. Question: What kind of measures could they be? Vladimir Mau: They are well known, and are mostly restricted to the growth of the role of the state in the economy. First and foremost, we are advised to return to the traditional "industrial policy" again. It means we should determine industrial priorities, redirect financial resources, and so on... Question: We've concentrated on what Russia should not be doing. But what should be done? Vladimir Mau: If it is seasonal, then we should not do anything at all. If the reduction of the growth rate is connected with economic cycles, then we need a smart anti-cyclic program. We should not rule out the possibility that we are moving toward a deeper structural reorganization of the Russian economy. In this case, we should do just what we have been doing - steadily build institutions of a free-market economy, ensuring stability of the rules. Correct decisions are usually boring and trivial, while unusual ones are effective but dangerous. Question: How serious a threat for the government is the possibility of panic over declining rates of economic growth? Vladimir Mau: The government is somewhat immune in this respect, but we hear a lot of advice. Any economy may be ruined, and an unstable economy, like Russia's, may be ruined that much easier. Support certain industries and neglect others, pass a deficit budget - and that's that. The xcenario for an economic crisis is simple. Question: And how long do you think it would take to ruin the Russian economy? Vladimir Mau: A few months. ******* #7 Russia says clamping down on Chechen rights abuses By Clara Ferreira-Marques MOSCOW, March 29 (Reuters) - Russia said on Friday it would crack down on human rights abuses committed by its forces in anti-rebel special operations in Chechnya, but rights campaigners dismissed the move as an empty propaganda step. A military decree, announced in Chechnya by Russia's top officer there, will authorise local authorities, elders and journalists to monitor Russian army "sweep operations" aimed at flushing out rebels from Chechnya's villages. "This document offers a range of measures which could change the way special operations are conducted, increasing the responsibility of the military (for their crimes) and making it impossible to escape punishment," Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky told a news briefing." Under the order, announced by General Vladimir Moltenskoi who commands Russian forces in Chechnya, soldiers will have to bare their faces in such operations and identify themselves to local residents. "When the operations finish, lists of those detained will be drawn up," Yastrzhembsky said. "This will answer residents' concerns about the fate of detained relatives." But campaigner Diederik Lohman, head of the Moscow chapter of Human Rights Watch, said the order would do little to improve the situation in Chechnya where Russian soldiers have regularly been accused of looting, torture and murder. "Most of what Yastrzhembsky said was promised a long time ago," Lohman said. "This is just a propaganda step." The order came after the U.N. Commission on Human Rights discussed Chechnya at its annual meeting in Geneva this week. The Commission is due to meet rights campaigners early next week. Russia's tactics in Chechnya, in particular the way forces conduct "sweep operations," have been sharply criticised by the United States, the European Union and several non-governmental organisations. MURDER AND LOOTING Since the present Chechnya military campaign began in 1999, a total of 33 Russian servicemen, including four officers, had been charged with crimes including murder and looting, Yastrzhembsky said. "Over two-and-a-half years of war, thousands of civilians have been killed," Lohman said. "These numbers are laughable." Earlier this month villagers dragged the charred bodies of what they said were victims of a rampage by Russian soldiers through the capital Grozny in a widely-broadcast protest. In January, Moscow announced 92 rebels had been killed in a month-long crackdown -- one of the bloodiest operations reported for more than a year -- prompting U.S. accusations that Russia was using "overwhelming force" in the region. International criticism of Russia's heavy-handed tactics died down after the September 11 attacks when Western powers accepted the Kremlin's contention that Chechen rebels had links with the al Qaeda network. A Kremlin envoy and a representative of rebel Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov held a single round of peace talks in November. But no one has since returned to the negotiating table. "The door opened with President Vladimir Putin's interview last September is still open," Yastrzhembksy said. "The question is whether Maskhadov's representatives will walk through it." According to figures issued by the Kremlin this week, more than 12,000 rebels and 3,000 Russian troops have been killed in the conflict. The figures are contested by both Chechen representatives and non-governmental organisations. Russian forces returned to Chechnya in 1999 to crush separatists three years after a 1994-96 war ended in a humiliating retreat from the region. ****** #8 The Guardian (UK) 28 March 2002 Moscow dispatch From Chechnya with love Mutiny and military bungles are key features of the war in Chechnya - a far cry from the victorious scenes depicted by Russia's TV and film industry By Ian Traynor Wednesday night's episode had a bunch of Russian Rambos routing a gang of evil Muslim extremists in the forbidding mountains of Chechnya. The Chechen Islamists, led by a British-born SAS veteran and mercenary recruited in Islamabad, sported green headbands with white Arabic script. The Russian commandoes wanted not for the best of gear - automatic weapons, state-of-the-art communications equipment, crisp uniforms. Fearless and cynical, the commandoes finished off the Chechens in a hail of hot lead in yet another victory for the Spetsnaz, the elite Russian commandoes and the eponymous heroes of the latest Russian TV blockbuster. The new TV serial, Spetsnaz, started this week on Russia's main channel. It features non-stop violence, a stirring rock music soundtrack, and celebrates the tough guy New Patriotism of President Vladimir Putin's Russia. The same mood is evident at the cinema in the new box office smash, War, by Aleksei Balabanov, whose previous Brat-2 movie had Russian hit men outwitting and gunning down feckless Americans in Chicago. War is also set in Chechnya, recounting the exploits of a fierce young Russian warrior coming to the aid of a desperate English couple kidnapped by horrible Chechens. Balabanov's cameras like to dwell on scenes of shocking violence, with Chechens portrayed chopping off limbs and ears. Some find such scenes pornographic in the way the camera lingers, relishing the blood and cruelty. Russians are used to such scenes, however, from "reality TV" as news bulletins have shown the charred corpses of bomb victims and a notorious Chechen warlord shooting a kneeling Russian captive in the head at point-blank range. Spetsnaz started with its tales of heroic exploits in Chechnya at prime time on Monday evening. The next morning the best-selling tabloid, Komsomolskaya Pravda, offered a very different glimpse of the reality in Chechnya for the crack Russian troops. "Pitiful" equipment, "clerks" sitting behind desks trying to run a military campaign, huge corruption and incompetence, and rank insubordination mounting among the very crack units who are the vanguard in Mr Putin's 30-month war. The newspaper revealed that elite Russian military units are increasingly refusing to do combat duty in the war in Chechnya, embittered by the wretched conditions, poor pay, and the corruption of the Russian officer class. "We won't be cannon fodder in Chechnya," declared a police ministry rapid reaction unit from Cherepovets, 400 miles north of Moscow. They set the authorities an ultimatum to which the men expect a response by next week. "If not, we see no sense in further taking part in the Chechen adventure," the men announced. The picture they painted of the situation in Chechnya was a far cry from the uplifting scenes depicted in the new patriotism of the TV serial and the smash Balabanov movie. In the past six weeks, anger and bitterness have been evident among special police units in Kaliningrad, Syktyvkar, Vorkuta, Vologda, Kirov, and Murmansk, all in northern Russia and all part of a spreading mutiny against serving in Chechnya. When eight members of a special police unit refused to go to Chechnya last month, they were sacked. The men had to be reinstated after more than 20 of their colleagues then joined the rebellion. It is not difficult to see the grounds for complaint. Day by grinding day, the Russians are sustaining heavy casualties, although the issue is barely publicised and there has been no public uproar. According to statistics released this week by the defence ministry, 2,331 Russian soldiers have been killed and 5,898 wounded in Chechnya, since Mr Putin launched his war in August 1999. That works out at nine Russian troops killed or maimed every single day on average for the past 30 months, although these figures are widely viewed as understated. In any case they refer only to army conscripts and not to security service troops or interior ministry paramilitaries, who represent a large part of the 80,000-strong Russian military in Chechnya. In this context, the damning and defiant indictment of the Russian war effort by the men from Cherepovets, highlighted the plunging morale of the Russian forces almost three years into a conflict that shows scant sign of ending. "The leadership of our mobile units in Chechnya is in the hands of those who know nothing about special units' tactics and methods of operation," the Cherepovets ultimatum stated. "There has effectively been a halt to payments to combat units although you can get a bullet or be blown up by a mine any time. "Many billions are being directed at the reconstruction of Chechnya. The results are not visible. But the Chechen administration is drowning in luxury. "You get the impression that everything is being bought and sold. So give us a reason why we should be cannon fodder?" Pavel Felgenhauer, a military affairs analyst, said: "This sort of thing is happening all the time, though it's seldom reported.It's all risk and little pay. Officers are resigning rather than go to Chechnya." The venality of the Russian officer class is a persistent cause of the low morale, and a trial that ended with acquittals of two senior officers last week in Moscow has done nothing to restore motivation. The trial revolved around the worst known case of "friendly fire" and who was to blame for the deaths of 22 Russian troops in Grozny, the Chechen capital, two years ago this month. The special police paramilitaries were killed by a fellow Russian unit in an enormous bungle. The authorities then sought to cover up the tragedy by blaming the deaths on an ambush by Chechen gunmen. The acquittals last week meant that no one alive was held responsible, although one officer who died in the shooting was singled out for chastisement. But the trigger for the Cherepovets mutiny was an attempt to extend the tour of duty in Chechnya from three months to six months. The rapid reaction forces refused and insisted instead on serving only two months. "You'd think we had no families, no homes, and no jobs to do," the men stated. "Go to Chechnya without a clue, without money and come back to find your family gone? Why? What for?" Money is also a major grumble, with the paramilitaries complaining they are not receiving the combat bonuses they are supposed to receive. But the criticism is more broadly targeted. On television and in the cinema, the Russians, of course, are winning the war. The Kremlin, in any case, proclaimed victory a long time ago without ever officially having declared a war. This also angers the men from Cherepovets. "There is still not martial law but a state of emergency law which does not reflect what's going on. There's a war on in Chechnya." ****** #9 From: "Ariel Cohen" Subject: RADIO LIBERTY LAUNCHES CONTROVERSIAL CHECHEN SERVICE Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2022 The Analyst BIWEEKLY BRIEFING Wednesday/March 27, 2002 RADIO LIBERTY LAUNCHES CONTROVERSIAL CHECHEN SERVICE Ariel Cohen The Bush Administration has allowed the North Caucasus broadcasts of Radio Liberty-Radio Free Europe to go ahead on April 3. These 15-minute broadcasts from Prague will include programming in Chechen, to which the Russian government strongly objects. The Bush Administration's decision to take action may be interpreted as support for the Chechens, and may complicate its relationship with Putin at the time the U.S. troops are poised to take on terrorist elements in the Pankisi Gorge. However, the reasons for this action may be distant from the Caucasus and have roots in domestic policy and electoral politics. BACKGROUND: Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty is planning to launch its North Caucasus service, including controversial broadcasting in the Chechen language, on April 3. The newest radio service was scheduled to go on the air in the Chechen, Avar, Circassian and Russian languages on February 28 of this year, but at the last moment Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, the second highest ranking U.S. Department of State official, had pulled the plug. Armitage intervened with the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which ordered the Radios to postpone the broadcasts, and to cover the region through its Russian service. BBG is a body appointed by the President of the United States, which supervises the U.S. international radio broadcasters, such as Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America. Radio Liberty is funded by the U.S. Congress and is nominally independent from the executive branch of the U.S. Government. The North Caucasus service was mandated by the U.S. Congress, the Radios' funder, in 2000, and then-Chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms (Republican of North Carolina) led the charge for its creation. Russian officials viewed the genesis of the service in conspiratorial terms. They suggested that Helms's staff member for Russia Ian Brzezinski, spearheaded the effort together with Paul Goble, then-Director of Public Affairs at Radio Liberty. The two are supporters of the Chechen independence, the Russian officials alleged. Mr. Goble is currently a senior executive with The Voice of America. The North Caucasus broadcasts will be conducted from the Radios HQ in Prague, and will last 15 minutes in each of the four languages. According to Andrey Sharyi, the Moscow bureau chief of Radio Liberty, the Chechen and other broadcasts for North Caucasus will be separate and independent from the Russian service, which uses AM and FM frequencies in Russia. Mr. Sharyi refuted accusations that Radio Liberty supports the separatists: "The position of the Russian service on the Chechnya war has always been the same: calls for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, defense of human rights and [coverage of] humanitarian issues. There will be no changes in our position," Sharyi said. IMPLICATIONS: Russia has long seen Radio Liberty broadcasts in Chechen as a direct affront. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reportedly spent half an hour complaining to Colin Powell about the pending broadcasts in January. The Kremlin Administration reportedly threatened to pull Radio Liberty AM/FM broadcasts off the air and shut down the Moscow bureau. While Yastrezhembsky later denied media reports and limited himself to a promise to monitor the broadcasts "in accordance with the law," Minister of the Press Mikhail Lesin warned that the U.S. radios' actions are "improper." Lesin said that his ministry will "address the situation from the position of information security" and added that Russian legislation on incitement to ethnic conflict "should be observed, and that measures will be taken if laws are broken." Vremya Novostei, a Moscow weekly with ties to the Kremlin, compared the Chechen broadcasting to Radio Liberty's Radio Free Iraq and the Farsi Service, which broadcasts to Iran. The weekly pointed out that the broadcasts are calling for regime change in these countries. Radio Liberty Russian broadcasters, speaking on the condition of anonymity, expressed concern that the Government of Russia may actually shut down their large Moscow bureau and deny access to the coveted AM and FM frequencies. "No one listens to short wave any longer," they said, referring to the World War Two technology which was is still used to beam U.S. international broadcasting around the world. "And it is not clear how the station management will monitor broadcasts in rare languages, such as the Chechen, which very few Americans know." The issue of editorial control will be crucial to keep the broadcasts from becoming a major friction point in the U.S.-Russian relations. CONCLUSION: At the time of the delay, the U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated on the record that broadcasting would be counterproductive in the campaign against terrorism and because of the talks between the Russians and Chechens. What has changed? A Radio Liberty memo and State Department sources agree that factors as diverse as the Republican Party strategy to win 2004 presidential elections, and the lobbying power of the U.S. poultry industry had played a role in changing the mind of Mr. Armitage. To win the crucial, mostly blue-collar states of West Virginia and Pennsylvania in 2002 Congressional and 2004 presidential elections, Republicans needed to protect the shaky steel industry there. Thus the imposition of steel import tariffs earlier this month, that would hit Russian exports of steel to the U.S. In retaliation, on March 10, the Russians limited imports of American chicken legs, since the late 1980s colloquially referred to as "Bush's legs," after the current president's father, George H.W. Bush. And Tyson's Chicken, the U.S. poultry giant, weighed in with its considerable Washington lobbying power, to send a message to the Russians on the necessity of chicken imports. Last but not least, the Congress, protective of its prerogatives to fund foreign policy priorities, insisted that the Radios' North Caucasus service must go ahead, thus rejecting the earlier State Department position postponing the broadcasts indefinitely. In February, the U.S. Senate launched a bipartisan initiative spearheaded by Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota), and Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Missouri), seeking the adoption of a resolution on Chechnya which would require President Bush to pressure Russia for a negotiated settlement. In the end, all these factors led to the U.S. reversal on Chechen broadcasting. AUTHOR BIO: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. He is the author of "Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis", (Praeger/Greenwood, 1998). ******* #10 The Russia Journal March 28-April 4, 2002 Pundit’s views shift with political winds By MATT TAIBBI This is the second in a series of columns profiling "Russia experts." Much like international investment, the field of international punditry fascinates and attracts the mediocre. In both, there is the opportunity to profit wildly in an arena completely free of consequence – a precondition for participation by those unburdened by the demands of foresight, talent or conscience. Investors take advantage of insurance provided by the U.S. government’s Overseas Private Investment Corporation and bailouts to guarantee their investments abroad, no matter how stupid or ill-considered they might be. The World Bank makes loans knowing that governments must pay them back to protect their credit ratings, so little attention is paid to the efficacy of their investments. In punditry, successful "experts" learn early on that it’s not particularly important to be either right or consistent in one’s pronouncements. Instead, the important qualities are enthusiasm and the compatibility of one’s positions with those of the regime in power. On Russia, there has been no better example of this phenomenon than Michael McFaul, Stanford University professor and fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. About Russia McFaul has been wrong often enough, and changed his mind often enough, that had he been investing his convictions in a just business environment, he would have gone bankrupt long ago. But because of the forgiving nature of the expert business, McFaul’s influence has not decreased over time, but actually increased, as skillful politicking on his part has allowed him to become a favorite son of the Clinton and Bush administrations. In the mid-1990s, McFaul was perhaps the most visible cheerleader for the "reform" movement, a confirmed optimist (he actually devoted several columns a few years ago to the theme of "optimists and pessimists") who saw progress everywhere while U.S. proteges like Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov were running Russia’s economy. McFaul’s tone and rhetoric back then suggested a kind of defiant centrism and a general sympathy with the Democratic Party; the Republicans who criticized the Clinton regime’s Russia policy were among the foremost of his "pessimists." He was among the first of the Russia experts to describe Boris Yeltsin’s 1996 re-election as a triumph for democracy. Here he is shortly after the election, on July 6, 1996: "Yet even with all these birth defects, Russian democracy is still alive and growing. Before expecting the worst again once the next crisis in Russia occurs – the pessimists already are warning of an economic meltdown in the fall – we should remember how poorly the gloom-and-doom school served us in this historic and ultimately triumphant year for democrats and democracy in Russia." The widespread embrace of this notion that Yeltsin’s re-election meant a definitive triumph for Russian democracy was a key factor in the spread of the "optimism" around Russia that spurred massive investment in the country in 1996-97. As the investment bubble continued to grow, McFaul continued to hammer home the theme of pessimists vs. optimists, and defended vigorously the notion that Russia was a democracy. Even after a series of corruption scandals in the summer of 1997 inspired observers to describe Russia as a mafia state, McFaul went out of his way to claim the opposite. In his Nov. 21, 1997, Moscow Times commentary, headlined "The Myth of Absolute Power," he argued that because the power of Chubais had been checked, Russia could not be an authoritarian state: "In both Russia and the West, most analysts portray Russia’s political system as an authoritarian regime. According to this view, the executive branch of government dictates state policy. Somebody should tell First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais. As the privatization tsar, the architect of market reform and the mastermind of Yeltsin’s re-election campaign, Chubais should be in a position to manipulate this super-presidential system to serve his policy agenda. Yet Chubais’ series of political setbacks during the last year demonstrate that the Russian regime is not a dictatorship. Such constraints on political authority only occur in democracies, not dictatorships." Getting McFaul to abandon the themes of progress, democracy and developing-market capitalism proved about as simple as stealing a steak from a hammerhead shark. Even as protesters sat on railroad tracks and investors fled the country in anticipation of the impending economic crash, McFaul continued to chide doubters for their pessimism. A May 23, 1998, Moscow Times piece even described the looming crisis as one of perception, not reality. The article was headlined "Russia’s Image Problem." Here is a key passage: "A second factor that contributes to pessimism about Russian democracy is the Russian economy. Analyses of political and economic reform are often conflated. Commentators accurately report on the dismal record of economic growth and the subsequent human suffering that has accompanied Russia’s painful and slow economic reform, but then misleadingly suggest that this poor economic performance will precipitate a meltdown of the political system." This despite the fact such a meltdown, or something very close to one, was just a few months away. Like many Russia experts, McFaul proved himself incapable of predicting events already under way. It is important to consider the context of McFaul’s 1997 and 1998 pronouncements. Then, as now, his analyses of the Russian situation were aimed squarely at the American political elite, and his measurement of Russia’s progress was conducted in terms that made sense only to interested Russian politicians and Americans far from the situation. He instinctively avoided the viewpoint of the average Russian. In 1998, for instance, McFaul was essentially describing as "pessimism" the protests of coal miners who blocked the railroads, pessimism rooted in an inability to suffer through the necessary "pain of economic reform." This was outrageously offensive by any standard, but typical of the positions of Russia experts at the time: Russians who protested the nonpayment of their $40-a-month salaries, the wiping out of their pensions, the rolling back of their medical benefits and the general wholesale theft by the state of their dignity were inevitably described as revanchists and pessimists who did simply not understand the mechanics of capitalist development. In order to preserve their ideological stands, experts like McFaul rejected any kind of empathy with the ordinary Russian. McFaul struggled to find his sea legs for some time after the economic crash of 1998. In September of that year, a month after the crisis began, he was still clinging to the old model, writing op-ed pieces under headlines such as "Russia Still Redeemable." In 1999, he backed off the specifics somewhat and began painting his optimistic picture with broader strokes. "Russia is a radically different place today than it was 10 years ago," he wrote. "And just seven years into the transition, basic arrows on all the big positions are pointing in the right direction." As his benefactor Bill Clinton – McFaul had been an adviser to the U.S. government during Clinton’s presidency – prepared to leave office, and as he was faced with the prospect of irrelevance in light of his pre-crisis record, McFaul reinvented himself. His most significant innovation came with the abandonment of the word "transition" and its replacement with "revolution." Since revolutions are by nature messy, it was now possible to excuse everything that had happened in Russia over the past decade, and since there was no mass guillotining going on in Red Square, it was even possible to describe the preceding 10 years as unusually speedy progress. Here is McFaul on Jan. 28 of this year, in a piece titled "Two out of Three is Not Good Enough": "Ten years ago, President Boris Yeltsin and his newly minted government launched a set of revolutionary changes comparable in scale and scope with the French Revolution and the Bolshevik Revolution. Unlike their counterparts in France in 1789 or Russia in 1917, Russia’s anti-communist revolutionaries added an additional task – the dissolution of the Soviet empire. In some respects, then, the agenda of change introduced a decade ago in Russia was even more far-reaching than that which the Jacobins or Bolsheviks sought to achieve. "A decade ago, few predicted that ‘the reformers’ (they were really revolutionaries, but the label has a very negative connotation in both Russian and the West) would be successful in implementing their agenda of triple transformation. At the time, Russia’s elite and society were deeply divided on every issue of this agenda. . . "A decade later, one has to be impressed with the scale of change already achieved. Well into the 1990s, it remained unclear (1) if boundaries between new states would become permanent and peaceful, (2) if capitalism would ever take hold or (3) if democracy would ever be consolidated. Amazingly, only a decade after this revolution began, two out of three of these transformations have been completed. Ironically, however, democracy – the one change that seemed most secure in 1992 – is most threatened in 2002." It’s not clear which two out of three McFaul is talking about here, since Russia’s borders are dotted with military conflicts in several places and there is still plenty of evidence that the capitalism practiced in Russia is not distinguishable from that practiced by the Lucchese or Genovese families. But one gets the point: McFaul has recast the "transition" as "revolution," "reformers" as "revolutionaries," and decided to measure favorably their progress against the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks – not the most demanding of intellectual tasks. Note the casual disingenuousness, so characteristic of McFaul, in the line, "[F]ew predicted that the reformers would be successful in implementing their agenda of triple transformation." McFaul includes this passage knowing full well he was one of those who DID predict the reformers would be successful. Not surprisingly, he does not bring this up here, as that would weigh down his argument in favor of low expectations. McFaul’s final adjustment, spurred by the changes in the post-Sept. 11 political climate, was to abandon his earlier touchy-feely rhetoric about human rights, and to dress in the costume of a hard-line Reagan rightist. Previously, his career had been dedicated to the idea that American-led "reform" was an expression of the United States’ desire to help others, that it was first and foremost in Russia’s best interests. Now, in the new flag-waving atmosphere of today’s Washington, McFaul has abandoned his concern over human rights and come out as an open colonialist. Here he is in a recent op-ed: "The process of defeating the enemies of liberty is twofold: Crush their regimes or the regimes that harbor them and then build new democratic, pro-Western regimes in the vacuum." Then, in the Moscow Times last month, he changed his attitude not only about Chechnya, but about democracy and authoritarianism in general. In the above-mentioned "Two out of Three is Not Good Enough," he mused sarcastically that "perhaps the emasculation of the Federation Council and the brutal methods used in Chechnya could be overlooked or justified." Eventually, though, he came out against the expansion of executive power under Putin. Why? Not because it would be wrong or because it would be harmful to Russia, but because it might be harmful to America’s commercial interests: "A Russian state strong enough to take away TV6’s license can also seize Boeing’s assets." McFaul, a master politician, understands well that the crowd now in charge in Washington doesn’t respond to the same rhetoric the Clinton administration did. To maintain his position as an influential expert, he had to learn to talk a different game. And he has. As a result, McFaul today remains one of the most-quoted analysts in the Russian arena, and his opinions continue to appear in major American newspapers. (Matt Taibbi is co-editor of the Moscow alternative newspaper The eXile.) *******