Johnson's Russia List
#6157
26 March 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
  1. RIA Novosti: TWO YEARS ON TUESDAY SINCE VLADIMIR PUTIN'S ELECTION AS 
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT.
  2. BBC Monitoring: He is one of us - main reason for Russian president's 
popularity, say analysts.
  3. Moskovsky Komsomolets: SYMBOL IN A JACKET. RESULTS OF OPINION POLLS 
INDICATE...  
  4. pravda.ru: RUSSIAN MENTALITY: UNCERTAINTY AND FATALISM. (re Zinaida 
Sikevich's report 'Ten Years of Russia's Reforms as Seen by Her Citizens')
  5. Interfax: Human rights situation in Russia unsatisfactory, says 
ombudsman.
  6. Interfax: Capital flight from Russia put at $300 bln.
  7. Kommersant: Nikolai Vardul, RUSSIA'S ECONOMY: NOT GROWING, SHRINKING.
Statistics say Russia's economy is still heavily dependent on oil prices.	
  8. BBC Monitoring: Former Russian premier moots peace settlement for 
Chechnya. (Primakov)
  9. Human Rights Watch Moscow: Russian Government Fails to Curb Atrocities 
for Third Year.
  10. Reuters: Elizabeth Piper, West or East? -- Ukraine stuck at crossroads.
  11. Izvestia: Svetlana Babayeva and Georgy Bovt, PRESIDENT'S MIDDAY.
An unfinished portrait of Vladimir Putin's presidency.
  12. Washington Post: Sharon LaFraniere, Kremlin Massages Bid For Television 
Channel. Moscow Seeks Press Control, Sources Say.
  13. St. Petersburg Times: Vladimir Kovalyev, Lessons in Comparative 
Democracy.]
 
********

#1
TWO YEARS ON TUESDAY SINCE VLADIMIR PUTIN'S ELECTION AS RUSSIAN PRESIDENT 
RIA Novosti
March 26, 2002

Tuesday, March 26, 2002 marks two years since Vladimir Putin was elected
the Russian President. 

On December 31, 1999, Putin became an acting head of the State. That day
first Russian President Boris Yeltsin voluntarily ceased performing his
duties and in accordance with RF Constitution's Part 3, Article 92 Russian
government head Vladimir Putin took a temporary seat in the office. 

According to the law "On the RF President Elections", extraordinary
presidential elections were scheduled for March 26, 2000. 

Vladimir Putin expressed his intention to run for presidency in 2000 on
August 9, 1999, after Boris Yeltsin's TV address to the Russian people, in
which he called Vladimir Putin his successor. 

"If the Russian citizens give me credence and elect me President, I will
continue to conduct the present reforms," Vladimir Putin said in his
interview with British newspaper The Financial Times on December 11, 1999. 

On January 12, 2000 an initiative group, which consisted of 20 regional
leaders, heads of the largest natural monopolies, masters of culture, mass
media leaders, nominated Vladimir Putin a candidate for presidency. On
January 13, Vladimir Putin confirmed his intention to run for the
Presidential seat. 

On March 26, 2000 Vladimir Putin was elected the Russian President. In the
first round of elections he collected 39,740,434 votes, which equaled
52,94% of the popular vote. On May 7, 2000, Putin officially came into
office. 

Vladimir Putin's activities as the President enabled most Russians to form
an opinion about him as that of a leader whose prime aim was to return
Russia's former dignity; whose economic choice was market and political
choice - democracy. 

According to the estimates of most political scientists, Vladimir Putin is
a purposeful and a strong politician who knows what to do and acts to
achieve that. That is why an overwhelming majority of Russians trust their
President. 

According to a survey conducted on March 16, 2002 by the Public Opinion
Foundation, 59% of Russians out of 1,500 respondents from 100 localities of
44 (out of 89) Federation constituent members, believe that during his
tenure of office, Vladimir Putin has never given them a reason to be out of
conceit with him. 

61% of Russians believe that Vladimir Putin had many breakthroughs. Only
13% of the respondents express the opposite point of view. 

*******

#2
BBC Monitoring
He is one of us - main reason for Russian president's popularity, say
analysts 
Source: Russian Public TV (ORT), Moscow, in Russian 1200 gmt 25 Mar 02

[Presenter] Today the Civil Debates club is holding a session entitled
"Vladimir Putin. Two years in power. New frontiers." in Moscow. Leading
Russian political analysts are discussing changes that have taken place in
Moscow over the last years.

[Aleksandr Oslon, the president of the Public Opinion foundation] Speaking
about Putin people would often say: He is one of us. Commenting on his
biggest achievements - and this may be one of the explanations of his
stable popularity - they mention an increase in pensions, wages and
benefits, timely payments of wages, care for people, an increase in living
standards, tackling the issue of homeless children. This large group of
responses amounts to 30 per cent of those polled.

Source: Russian Public TV (ORT), Moscow, in Russian 1200 gmt 25 Mar 02

*******

#3
Moskovsky Komsomolets
March 26, 2002
SYMBOL IN A JACKET
RESULTS OF OPINION POLLS INDICATE...
Author: Natalia Galimova, Lyuba Shary
Source: Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 26, 2002, p. 3
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
Russians continue to see Putin as a symbol of stability but they do 
not expect any political or economic breakthrough from his 
administration 

AS ALWAYS, SOCIOLOGISTS MARKED THE ANNIVERSARY OF VLADIMIR PUTIN'S 
PRESIDENCY WITH INNUMERABLE OPINION POLLS. THE LATTER INDICATE AN 
INTERESTING TENDENCY. PUTIN'S "PERSONAL" RATING REMAINS HIGH, BUT THE 
NUMBER OF OPTIMISTS OF HIS POLICIES DWINDLED OVER THE MONTHS WHEN 
RESPONDENTS WERE ASKED TO ELABORATE (LIKE "DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE 
PRESIDENT CAN GET THE COUNTRY OUT OF THE CRISIS?" OR "DO YOU THINK 
ORDER IN CHECHNYA WILL BE RESTORED?").

     Aleksei Levinson, chief of the Quality Survey Department of the 
All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center: The worse the state of 
affairs in the country is, or the worse the state of affairs is in 
some isolated sphere, the more society is eager to express its 
sympathies with the president, the symbol of unity and fame of the 
state. It is particularly typical of elderly Russians who still 
remember slogans like "We will close the ranks around the party and 
its leader in response to imperialist plots" etc. Society is looking 
for a medicine from traumas and many associate this medicine with 
Putin. But a treatment like that is symbolic at best. When actions are 
mentioned, the picture is wholly different.
     This is how many respondents reply. "It does not matter that 
Putin is young and strong that it will be nice for the state to be 
young and strong again. We are sick of lagging behind". Yes, some 
hopes associated with the president are dying out, but the masses do 
not see him as executor of some plans. These masses see the president 
as the symbolic center of society, the pinnacle. It is also important 
that Putin does not have anyone looking like a rival on the political 
arena. Opinion polls show again and again that the people do not see 
any alternative to Putin and actually do not want to see any 
alternative.
     Alexander Oslon, President of the Public Opinion Foundation: Warm 
feelings exist toward Putin not because of who he is. They exist 
because there is a need of such a leader in society. This need, the 
need for stability, was developed  throughout the last decade. Under 
Boris Yeltsin, the masses were secretly confident that everything 
could crash at any time. Not so under Putin. Or so the people now 
believe, and would believe.
     Actually, there is only one threat to Putin, and it exists in the 
distant future. The typical warm feelings towards the president may 
gradually transform into a habit. Meaning that the people will start 
taking it for granted. There will be no contrast: nobody will recall 
what happened the day before yesterday, and nothing extraordinary 
would be seen in what happened yesterday or today. For the time being, 
however, there are no indications of that. A Russian will long resist 
disappointment...
Some results of opinion polls conducted by the All-Russian Public 
Opinion Research Center
     Question: Do you think Vladimir Putin will be able to restore 
order in the country?
     Answer			May 2000	April 2001	January 2002
     I think so			82%		73%		72%
     I do not think so	16%		26%		24%
     I do not know		2%		1%		4%
     Question: Do you think Vladimir Putin will be able to get Russia 
out of the economic crisis?
     Answer			May 2000	April 2001	January 2002
     I think so			73%		66%		64%
     I do not think so	24%		30%		31%
     I do not know		3%		4%		5%
(Translated by A. Ignatkin)

********

#4
pravda.ru
March 26, 2002
RUSSIAN MENTALITY: UNCERTAINTY AND FATALISM

On March 19, 2002, at the Rosbalt News Agency, Zinaida Sikevich, a reputed
sociologist from St. Petersburg, presented her analytical report 'Ten Years
of Russia's Reforms as Seen by Her Citizens'. The materials Mrs. Sikevich
presented concerned the specifics of Russia's - and St. Petersburg's -
society. The following is the abridged version of that report. 

When speaking of Russia's mentality, one must consider that it was forcibly
broken twice within the past century. For the first time it happened during
the Bolsheviks' 'modernisation' and 'the forming of the Soviet man'. Then,
in the end of 1980s, the consciousness of the Soviet man was speedily
transformed to fit into the liberal model of values. 

Figuratively, Russian mentality is like a two-ply cake. The Bolsheviks
broke down the preceding political institutions of Russia and cleverly
adjusted the people's everyday notions to the new reality. They instilled
in the minds the priority of 'labour collective' over individual interests
and the idea of equality as the equivalent of the levelled distribution of
incomes. Russia's Christian Orthodox self-identification was transformed
into class self-identification and the belief in the Kingdom of God was
replaced with that in the inevitable coming of Communism. This is why now
the system of liberal values is opposed not just by the Soviet but also by
the traditional Russian psychology. 

The core of the traditional and mostly unconscious Russian outlook is the
belief in favourable fate and the hope that things will 'somehow work out'.
This is why 83.6% of all respondents in a poll conducted in St. Petersburg
in 2000 agreed with the old saying 'whatever is done is for the better',
singling it out of 42 proverbs offered. These words are the quintessence of
the typical Russian optimistic fatalism coexisting with passivity and
non-interference with life that goes on as if 'all by itself', while people
think, 'All I can do is hope' or 'Let's hope for some luck'. This position
is the polar opposite of the basic reliance on individual initiative
typical for the Protestant ethics, according to which one must make oneself
and one's life. 

The other basic element of Russian mentality is the peculiar interpretation
of the value of the freedom of will understood as non-restricted
self-assertion with no regard for anyone else. In Russian mentality,
fatalism and will compete unceasingly and yet, paradoxically as it may
sound, rather add to than oppose one another. I believe these are the
ancestral myths comprising the social forms of the collective unconscious,
in which conscious values, the idea of the norm and social expectations are
rooted. 

According to the results of research done between the years 1996 and 2000
by the Laboratory of Ethnic Sociology and Psychology of the St. Petersburg
State University, the basic values of the Russian people include the
following: egalitarianism, collectivism as a preference for group as
opposed to individual self-identification, paternalism and the Russian
version of etatism, that is, adherence to strong consolidating state. 

Egalitarianism is interpreted as the rejection of the social stratification
of the modern society. The mass consciousness adheres to the traditional
approach to wealth. Of the total number of respondents in a 1997 poll in
St. Petersburg, 66.3% agree with the saying 'Honest work won't grow your
stock'. A content analysis of responses involving the words 'socialism' and
'capitalism', meaning the Russian forms of these two economic and political
systems, revealed that 28.8% of all respondents believe the largest merit
of the gone-by regime was equality among people, which some of them called
social justice, while 29.6% said inequality was the largest flaw of the
present system. 

For its supporters socialism represents not only justice but also 'true
freedom' and 'happy life', while capitalism is to them a phantom society
where everything is untrue, where instead of freedom there is only its
semblance, civil rights existing on paper only and life itself being
illusory. While the former system 'held social guarantees for everyone', as
believed by 12.3% of the respondents, the present one, according to 6.9%,
is 'the sinecure of thieves' where 'only bandits and thieves thrive'.
Besides, many think socialism means 'the power of the people', existing for
the people and in the interests of the people, while capitalism is 'the
power of money', that is, of the rich. 

Continuing with the poll, the supporters of the present system are all
young people, mostly highly educated, residing in St. Petersburg. In
provincial Russia, there is a lot of nostalgia for socialism. In the town
of Michurinsk, the Tambov Region, where a control group was polled, 74.4%
of the respondents supported socialism and only 25.6% supported capitalism. 

Equality represents the 'lost Eden' where 'all were together for better or
for worse'. People were 'brethren', each 'feeling the elbow of the next
man'. Inequality is bad in that it sanctifies 'exploitation', 'justice for
the chosen' and 'contempt for the poor'. That is, inequality is 'Eden for
some and hell for the rest'. The use of biblical notions shows that in all
their outward atheism the Soviet man always remained a profound believer,
except Eden for him was replaced by communism with 'plenty of everything
for everyone'. 

Considering that 10 years is too short a time for basic values to change,
it is easy to understand that the mobility of social statuses and the
income-based division of people, the opposite of the basic value of
collectivism, causes in many people the sense of uncertainty and of the
instability of their personal lives. Interestingly, according to the
results of the aforementioned poll where folk proverbs were used as
associations, 71% agreed with the one saying 'My pocket is lean, yet my
soul is clean', only 29% identifying with its opposite, 'Money in my purse
makes me welcome anyplace on Earth'. The other such pare of opposites was
'A penny from each makes a beggar fed and rich' (68.5%) and 'Friends go
together yet count their money apart' (31.5%). It seems that to the
residents of St. Petersburg wealth is incompatible with morality and
'equality in poverty' is more moral to them than 'inequality in wealth'. 

Paternalism is understood as the expectation of fatherly care from the
state towards its ordinary citizens who play the role of children and whose
estimation of the father-state depends, first of all, on how effectively it
functions as such. In the 1999 all-Russian poll, 84.7% of the respondents
believed that the state should extend its unflagging fatherly care not only
to children, the old and the handicapped but also equally to every citizen.
This opinion appeared to be universal, not depending on age, sex, the level
of education or the place of residence of respondents. Nearly two thirds of
those residing in St. Petersburg (60.7%) believed that the financial status
of a family depended mostly on the government and not on the efforts of the
family's members. Just 30.4% of all respondents had supplemental incomes,
despite there being lots of opportunities for initiative in St. Petersburg. 

The content analysis of the associations of respondents in the poll
conducted in St. Petersburg in 2000 revealed that 48.3% of them were
resentful of the government as of a bad father because it 'does not provide
jobs for people' or 'humiliates people with unemployment'. Most
respondents, with the exception of young male businessmen, had a basic
stereotype of 'the good' as 'the fair distribution of incomes'. 

According to polls, the current President of Russia is perceived as a kind
though strict father who is deceived by 'bad' corrupted officials. Whatever
a popular leader does, to the people it is justified by that he, as the
father who is their own, has the right to punish or pardon as he wills. The
tradition of perceiving the leader this way dates back to Peter the Great.
While in pre-revolutionary Russia for a noble to make a career or for a
peasant to survive they had to 'listen to their superiors' and 'be loyal',
in the USSR the same things were called 'work discipline'. 

Sociologists say the Soviet system allowed a citizen to remain socially
infantile. On the other hand, now the social upward mobility and financial
well-being of a person directly depend on his or her individual initiative.
And this is why so many citizens feel unhappy as children abandoned by
their parents. For this to change may take a much longer time than just
getting used to social inequality. 

Etatism is closely related to paternalism and is one's special perception
of the state as a great power assuring, first of all, national
consolidation. To a Russian person, the great consolidating power of the
state is the rationalisation of sorts of one's ethnic feelings. In the
research titled 'The National Self-awareness of the Russian People' done
according to the method of free characteristics followed by a content
analysis, the conception of values related to the historical past was used
as an 'indication' of 'historical memory' and the indirect indication of
the modality of orientation toward the consolidating state. 

It was found out that to the respondents the Great Patriotic War was the
central event of the national history making them (59.8%) infinitely proud
of the state and the people. To just 2.1% of St. Petersburg's residents the
war was associated with the tragedy of the siege of Leningrad and the
bitterness of losses. Rather characteristically, the war is remembered not
just by those who lived then but also by the young (37.1%). In the
pre-revolutionary history of Russia, the greatest event referred to as such
by 10.6% of respondents was the Patriotic War of 1812. The two wars were
not only associated with the heroism of those who fought in them but also
with the sense of national unity. 

This way history serves as a compensation of sorts for what people lack in
their everyday lives. One out of every five or six people perceived Russia
not as the cradle of the nation and the birthplace of many great poets and
scientists but only as a great superpower. About 5% of St. Petersburg's
residents replied they were proud of all Russia's military victories
without exception, from the Ice Battle to the fall of Berlin. The memory of
the great victories as if alleviates national resentment resulting from the
collapse of the USSR, which to some St. Petersburg residents (11.3%) was
the most bitter loss among all the other consequences of Perestroika. 

Nostalgia for Russia's great-superpower past of 14.7% of respondents is
also an unconscious compensation for true or imagined humiliation before
the West. People are ashamed of the pittance thrown their way by the
International Monetary Fund. They are irritated by store signs in foreign
languages and by Russia's lackey's stance before the West, which in the
Russian consciousness is the antithesis of being a superpower. Generally,
to a Russian, the West is not a geographical term but an equivalent of some
spirit, the way of life, the style of behaviour and the way of
self-realisation, which is 'not ours'. This approach also dates back to the
time of Peter the Great. In our time, position toward the mythologized West
splits our society in two. 

During the associative experiment in the year 2000 involving 783
respondents, a noticeable symbolic distance between the West and Russia was
revealed, the mythologized West perceived sooner as 'evil' than as 'good'.
To obtain the symbolic associative lines, two uncompleted sentences were
offered: 'To the West, Russia is:' and 'To Russia, the West is:' This
resulted in the following modal responses: To the West, Russia is:
raw-stock base (9.5%), a cow to be milked (6.8%), enigma (6.5%) and feeding
rack (5%). The ratio between negative and positive responses was 93.2% to
6.8%. To Russia, the West is: enemy (14%), economic assistance (11.5%), bad
example (10.9%), and a school of life (8.5%). The ratio between negative
and positive responses was 69.7% to 30.3%. 

Comparing these responses we see that 'we' believe that 'their' attitude
toward 'us' is just as bad as 'ours' toward 'them', if not worse. On the
other hand, displaying negative attitudes toward and distancing ourselves
from the West as we do, we still do not mind taking advantage of the West's
financial resources (to :'the West is:', there were responses like
'rescuers when we need them' or 'the bottomless money-bag'). Remarkably,
the combinations of diametrically opposed responses, such as 'enemy' and 'a
hope for development' or 'dangerous lure' and 'life-belt' in the answers of
the same respondents occurred in 30% of the total number. 

Then again, 'we' are unconsciously proud of our being so mysterious. To the
West, Russia is: 'an unexplainable natural mystery', 'brain-buster',
'sphinx', etc., while to Russia, the West is: 'normal good life', 'good
roads', 'good-looking picture', etc. That is, to so mysterious 'us' the
West is just trivial and boring. Also, positive responses toward the West,
such as 'a goal for us to achieve' or 'an example for us to follow', came
exclusively from young (25 to 35) male businessmen and financiers. People
of the same age but of different occupations and social statuses, such as
students or state employees, were far more critical, leaving alone other
social, age and sex groups. 

Interestingly, 72.3% of all respondents were sure the West was
treacherously unfriendly towards Russia, just 25.1% believing otherwise and
2.6% having no opinion. Remarkably, in Russia one can only be either pro or
contra the West, without the third alternative, so to say. Among the young,
the number of those suspicious of the West was also predominant (56%) and
that allows us saying this is a basic index in our national mentality. 

In the fall of 1998, two thirds (67.8%) of the polled residents of St.
Petersburg thought Russia must try and preserve her status as a superpower
even though it might worsen her relations with the West. Somewhat less
(65.2%) believed this would require achieving law and order and therefore
toughening the regime in the country. In the year 2000, the poll did not
contain a question about this, yet indirectly an orientation toward a
strong consolidating state showed. For instance, 58.9% of the respondents
welcomed the return to the music of the anthem of the USSR (the answers
from 'totally approve' to 'sooner approve than not'). These were opposed by
just 20.6% and 30.5% couldn't care less. 

We expected that a motif of the war in Chechnya might appear in response to
the uncompleted suggestions like 'What is bad in Russia is:' And it did: in
3 responses out of 783. I guess tough policies toward separatism agree with
the etatism of the Russian public and that is why they are supported. This
may be where the secret of the stable popularity of the President Putin
lies. Crisis mentality is internally contradictive. What is clear, however,
is that psychologically people take the transformation of their lives
rather hard. This is the reason for the constantly growing psychological
uneasiness and uncertainty as to what may follow. Today, this is the
predominant condition of the majority of the citizens of Russia that,
regretfully, we are taking with us into the 21st century. 

*******

#5
Human rights situation in Russia unsatisfactory, says ombudsman 
Interfax

Moscow, 26 March: The number of complaints about human rights violations
has sharply grown in Russia in the past few years, presidential human
rights commissioner Oleg Mironov has said.

He called the observation of human rights unsatisfactory. He said his
office receives more than 2,000 complaints every month and that action is
taken in one in five cases.

"The rights and liberties of individuals are still violated on the whole
spectrum covered by international standards, and in some areas such as
Chechnya on a mass scale," Mironov said in an interview with [Russian
newspaper] Nezavisimaya Gazeta published on Tuesday [26 March].

At the same time he attributed the growing number of complaints to the
increasing importance of the commissioner, his influence on people who do
not want to tolerate the arbitrariness of officials, and not to a
skyrocketing rise in human rights violations.

In Mironov's opinion, there is a true threat to the freedom of speech in
Russia.

"The cases of NTV and TV6 channels are presented as economic disputes, but
why then should things be driven to the closure of the channels," he said,
adding that 80 per cent of the Russian media is controlled by the federal
or local authorities and therefore "it is difficult to speak of their
independence".

*******

#6
Capital flight from Russia put at $300 bln

MOSCOW. March 26 (Interfax) - An estimated $300 billion have been taken out
of Russia, an official at the Economic Development and Trade Ministry said
on Tuesday. 
   The gap between required and actual investment in the Russian economy
could be narrowed if some of the capital that previously left the country
were to return, and if capital flowing through the shadow economy,
estimated at $100 billion to $150 billion, were to be legalized, Sergei
Bayev, the ministry's investment chief, said at a round table on Russia's
economic strategy. 
   Investment from all sources currently totals $50 billion to $60 billion
annually, he said. 
   "Of course not all this money can go towards investment as a result of
the structural economic reforms now underway, but we hope that 30% to 40%
of this money will go into the Russian economy in coming years," Bayev said.. 
  Russia needs more than $100 billion in investment to maintain economic
infrastructure at current levels, and at least 30% more than this in order
to improve infrastructure, he said. 

*******

#7
Kommersant
March 26, 2002 
RUSSIA'S ECONOMY: NOT GROWING, SHRINKING
Statistics say Russia's economy is still heavily dependent on oil prices	
Author: Nikolai Vardul
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN HOPING THAT THE FALL IN GLOBAL OIL PRICES 
WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON RUSSIA'S ECONOMY COMPARABLE TO BEING CURED OF 
DRUG ADDICTION, AND WOULD SPEED UP RUSSIA'S DEVELOPMENT. THERE IS NO 
SIGN OF THIS AS YET. THE ECONOMY IS STILL DEPENDENT ON GLOBAL OIL 
PRICES.

     On March 25, the Economic Development Ministry presented an 
account of the economic situation in February.
     February is a peculiar month, not only because is it shorter than 
any other month but because after January, which is usually "not quite 
sober" in Russia, the rate of development of the economy starts to 
increase. That is why the Economic Development Ministry pays special 
attention to February's statistics. As "Kommersant" has reported 
already, the ministry has found out that in February, the economic 
growth in 15 basic branches of industry was 0.7% compared to January. 
However, later it was announced that this growth is not favorable for 
the concept of economic growth.
     At first, reports of news agencies were promising, if not 
exulted: the growth of the GDP in 2002 has been 3.2%, and in February 
alone this figure was 3%. However, this figure sounds promising only 
for those who have forgotten that the government has envisaged the 
growth of the GDP in 2002 as 4-4.5%. Thus, the index of the growth of 
the GDP in February lags behind the schedule.
     Then it turned out that the State Statistics Committee has 
calculated that in five basic branches of Russia's economy (but not 15 
as had been initially reported) - industry, construction, agriculture, 
transport, and retail trade - the economic growth in February 2002 was 
2.8% compared to February 2001. However, the State Statistics 
Committee states that the output in these branches dwindled by 1.7% in 
February compared to January 2002. Keeping in mind that there are 
fewer days in February than in any other months, statisticians 
calculated that the average daily output in February, with the season 
allowance, was 99.5% compared to January 2002.
     Three conclusions may be drawn from this situation. The first 
conclusion is that the government failed to stop the decline of 
production in February, which means that the Russian economy has been 
declining for five months already. The second conclusion is that the 
government is hoping to save the Russian economy from a crisis at 
least in March if it has failed to do it in February. The third 
conclusion is that the growth of the Russian economy stopped just when 
oil prices collapsed. If the government manages to amend the situation 
in March, this will be because oil prices have started to rise this 
month. In other words, the hope that a decline in global oil prices 
would have an effect on Russia's economy comparable to being cured of 
drug addiction - as Presidential Adviser Andrei Illarionov put it - as 
well as dreams that this would speed up the nation's development - are 
not coming true yet. The Russian economy is still regulated by world 
oil prices.
(Translated by Kirill Frolov)

*******

#8
BBC Monitoring
Former Russian premier moots peace settlement for Chechnya 
Source: Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian 0700 gmt 26 Mar 02

Former Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov has said that Moscow sees a need to
hold talks with Chechen separatists. Primakov said that the federal
government had to deliver a fresh ultimatum to the separatists for them to
cease contacts with international terrorists. A similar ultimatum was given
by Russian President Vladimir Putin in September 2001.

Primakov made his remarks to Russian Ekho Moskvy radio in an interview on
25 March. In the interview, part of which was broadcast 26 March, he said:

"Sooner or later - along with the putting down of bandit groups and the
suppression of terrorist units by our military - we will have to proceed
toward talks. During these talks Chechnya's status within Russia might well
be discussed.

We can draw on existing examples: we have national republics which possess
rather extensive rights and authority. For instance, there is Tatarstan -
this is a very good example as both the federal interests and the interests
of the territory inhabited by the titular [Tatar] population are taken into
consideration.

If you are talking about Russia - it also has had such examples. Finland
once was a part of Russia with a special status."

*******

#9
Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2002 10:34:21 +0300
From: Human Rights Watch Moscow <dlohman@hrw.ru>
Subject: Russian Government Fails to Curb Atrocities for Third Year

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
For further information, please contact:
In Geneva, Joanna Weschler: +4179-387-4868
In Moscow, Diederik Lohman: +7095-764-5938
In New York, Rachel Denber: +1-212-216-1266

Chechnya: U.N. Rights Commission Must Act
Russian Government Fails to Curb Atrocities for Third Year

(Geneva, March 26, 2002) - The United Nations Commission on Human Rights
should adopt a resolution condemning abuses in Chechnya and calling on
Russia to investigate them, Human Rights Watch urged in a briefing paper
released today. 

The memorandum was addressed to members of the Commission, holding their
annual meeting in Geneva, on the eve of their discussion of agenda "Item
9"-the debate about abuses in particular countries.  

The Russian government has refused to implement resolutions adopted by
the Commission during its 2000 and 2001 sessions.  These resolutions
called for the creation of a national commission of inquiry and access
for U.N. human rights monitors, but the Russian authorities have taken
neither step. 

"For two years straight Russia flouted Commission resolutions," said
Elizabeth Andersen, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch's Europe
and Central Asia division.  "Now Commission members have to make a
choice to protect human rights in Russia, and to uphold the Commission's
integrity."

The Human Rights Watch briefing paper is based on more than fifty
interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch researchers in December 2001
and February 2002.  The Human Rights Watch account contrasts sharply
with Russian government assertions that the situation in Chechnya is
returning to normal. 

The Human Rights Watch briefing paper describes atrocities committed in
Chechnya on an everyday basis.  Despite repeated calls from the
Commission and other international bodies, the Russian government has
failed to hold those responsible accountable, the group said. "The
Commission should not tolerate Russia's blatant defiance of its past
recommendations," Andersen said.  "The Commission's own credibility is
on the line, not to mention justice for hundreds of victims who have
been detained, tortured, 'disappeared,' and executed over the past two
and a half years."
Since the last Commission meeting in April 2001, violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law by Russian troops-arbitrary
detentions, forced disappearances, summary executions, indiscriminate
fire and large-scale looting-have continued apace.  The Chechen rebel
forces have also been responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law, including the assassinations of dozens
of Chechen civil servants working for the administration established by
the Russian government.

"Chechnya is the only place in Europe where civilians are being killed
on a near daily basis," Andersen said.  "Our research contradicts
Russian government assertions that Chechnya is returning to normal. 
What's happening there is certainly not normal." 

Tracking the conduct of Russian forces in six military sweep operations
between August and December 2001, the Human Rights Watch briefing paper
documents nine forced disappearances and five cases of the
indiscriminate use of force.  It analyzes the Russian authorities
limited efforts to investigate these crimes and describes the problems
faced by internally displaced people in Chechnya's neighboring regions. 
The briefing paper also describes assassinations and threats against
officials and ordinary civilians by Chechen forces. 

Among the victims whose cases are detailed in the briefing paper are:

ž Madina Mezhieva and Amkhad Gekhaev who were machine-gunned from a
military helicopter on October 27, 2001, while driving home from a
turnip field in Komsomolskoe. The soldiers took these two away alive,
and several days later, family members obtained their bodies, both
missing limbs, from the military commander's office in Gudermes. 

ž Malika Lalaeva and Raisa Taramova, two children killed during a
shelling of Goity on October 28, 2001, when three of the nine shells
lobbed into the village hit Lalaev's family house. 

ž Musa Yunusov and Lom-Ali Yunusov, both detained at night on December
9, 2001 by Russian soldiers, who also torched their houses. Five days
later, the relatives identified their mutilated bodies among seven
corpses dumped in a forest near a Grozny suburb.

ž Magomed-Emi Alsultanov, Khasmagomed Esuev, Mukhadi Khamzatov,
Saidmagomed Mutsukaev, Anzor Ismailov and others, detained by Russian
forces and subsequently "disappeared." For months, relatives were trying
to get information about their fate from Russian authorities, but never
succeeded. 

In none of these cases have the authorities taken adequate steps to
investigate the abuses.  Since the last commission meeting, the
government has claimed to be carrying out criminal investigations into
abuses in Chechnya.  Human Rights Watch has analyzed several key
investigations, including those into the Sernovodsk sweep
"disappearances," the mass grave in Dachny village, and the massacres in
Alkhan-Yurt, Staropromyslovskii, and Aldi.  The group found that
investigators have consistently failed to take basic investigatory steps
that could lead to the identification of perpetrators.
The volatile security situation in Chechnya continues to prevent more
than 200,000 internally displaced persons from returning to their homes.
The Russian authorities pressure them to return to Chechnya, but the
majority remains in Ingushetia, in conditions of squalor, insecurity,
and uncertainty.

Human Rights Watch urged the Commission to adopt a resolution: 

ž Deploring the continued serious violations of international
humanitarian law; 

ž Noting Russia's failure to establish a national commission of inquiry
or other accountability mechanism;

ž Noting the absence of any official national or international record of
violations committed in the context of the conflict in Chechnya;

ž Calling on Russia to issue invitations to the relevant U.N. human
rights monitors; and

ž Calling on Russia to invigorate the domestic accountability process.

The briefing paper is available at http://hrw.org/un/unchr-chechnya.htm. 

-- 
Diederik Lohman,
Director, Moscow Office
Human Rights Watch
Russian Federation, Moscow 125267,  A/Ya 2

Tel:  7 095 250 6852
Fax:  7 095 250 6853
dlohman@hrw.ru

Website
English: http://www.hrw.org 
Russian: http://www.hrw.org/russian

Listserv address: To receive Human Rights Watch's press releases on 
the Former Soviet Union, send an e-mail message to moscow.office@hrw.ru
with the request to be included in our mailing list.

********

#10
West or East? -- Ukraine stuck at crossroads
By Elizabeth Piper
  
ODESSA, Ukraine, March 25 (Reuters) - Ivan has lived under Germans,
Romanians and Russians and it's clear in his mind who was the worst -- the
"thieving Russian Communists" who stole his country. 

An 82-year-old Ukrainian farmer-turned-builder, Ivan Onishko knows about
living in an occupied land, and says he fears that Russia will again force
Ukraine away from what he calls its European roots and back towards the
hated old empire. 

Many elderly voters in Ukraine will back the Communists in a parliamentary
election on March 31, but Ivan says he supports reformist ex-prime minister
Viktor Yushchenko in the hope that Ukraine will shed its Soviet past and
become truly independent. 

"We've woken up now. Let's not go back to sleep again," says Ivan, making
the walls of a tiny train compartment vibrate as he shouts of his pure
Ukrainian blood -- apart from a tiny bit of him, "maybe an ear," which
belongs to neighbouring Poland. 

"The bloody Russians, they are nothing more than thieves. I never thought
the Soviet Union would break up, but it did happen, thank God. Now our
politicians have to make sure they never come again." 

Both Russia and the West are wooing Ukrainians ahead of the election.
Russians warn of the dangers of the West exploiting an economic weakling,
while European and U.S. officials have urged Kiev to turn West and provide
them with a stable buffer zone. 

For Ivan, the debate is yet another invasion into his country, whose
history is one of occupation by a series of countries, including Poland,
Germany, Romania and Russia. 

"Just leave us be. I'm sorry but you all have had your fun with us, now
it's our turn," he says, sighing as he remembers the days he lived under
Nazi forces and then Communists in his agricultural village near the Black
Sea port of Odessa. 

BATTLE OVER THE BORDERLAND 

After a few horilkas -- Ukraine's vodka -- Ivan cannot make up his mind
whether Ukraine can be independent, or needs Russia or the West. His
effusive but indecisive monologue sums up Kiev's wavering position over
which way to go. 

More than 10 years after winning independence from the Soviet Union,
Ukraine -- the country's name means "borderland" -- is still stuck at a
crossroads not sure of which way to turn. 

And rather than leaving Ukraine to it, Western and Russian officials have
decided to wade in, using the parliamentary election as a stage for their
own war of words. 

A string of U.S. and European officials have either been to Kiev or spoken
on television to urge the almost 50 million population to turn West and
shed its Soviet skin. 

Russian officials have also visited, with President Vladimir Putin
travelling to Odessa to meet Ukrainian leader Leonid Kuchma just two weeks
before the poll. 

"The West is primarily interested in preventing Ukraine from falling back
into Russia's orbit," analysts at Commerzbank said in a recent report. "The
West appears concerned about maintaining a buffer zone between the
expanding NATO and European Union on one side and Russia on the other side." 

Russia, a former superpower anxious about the shape of the post-Soviet
world, wants to keep Ukraine firmly in its fold. 

"Russia is interested in preventing the West from increasing its influence
over Ukraine," Commerzbank said. "Russia may also be interested in gaining
favourable access for Russian capital into Ukraine." 

RUSSIA OUTBIDS EUROPE 

Europe has wooed Ukraine with promises that the country could play a larger
role in European organisations, appealing to its European roots. 

"We have to work with you as members of the same family, as brothers in the
same family," Adrian Severin, head of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, told Ukrainian
politicians. 

"Ukraine has a European history, European life and European
civilisation...We have to develop democracy here," he told a slightly
bewildered parliamentary speaker, Ivan Plyushch. 

But the Russian argument seems to be winning as Plyushch made clear that
European aspirations were well in the future. 

"We respect our Russian neighbour very much and consider it as a major
strategic partner," he said. 

"We do not want to act as a buffer zone. We want to be equal partners with
the European Union and Russia...but to become an equal partner, we have to
know how to dance." 

Under Kuchma, who hails from Ukraine's mainly Russian-speaking east, Russia
looks set to be the focus. 

"Weakness is not liked by Europe, but strength is," Kuchma told reporters
after meeting Putin. "We can only become strong by ourselves, no one else
is going to do that for us." 

Few political parties are willing to discuss foreign policy, and
Yushchenko's bloc is the only major group pledging to steer West. They lead
opinion polls with about 20 percent support, but a handful of pro-Kuchma
parties are also expected to do well. 

Although Ukrainians generally bemoan Russian influence, many see it as
unavoidable. 

"What's going to change? We cannot get away from Russia. Gas pipelines and
trade are like the veins that join Russia and Ukraine as one body," said
Volodymyr, an unemployed engineer, who now picks up fares on the street in
his beaten-up Lada. 

"And the heart? I don't know if either of us have a heart." 

********

#11
Izvestia
March 26, 2002
PRESIDENT'S MIDDAY
An unfinished portrait of Vladimir Putin's presidency
Author: Svetlana Babayeva. Georgy Bovt
Source: Izvestia, March 26, 2002, pp. 1, 4
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
EXACTLY TWO YEARS AGO VLADIMIR PUTIN CAME IN FIRST IN THE EARLY 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
A critical analysis of President Putin's two years of presidency 

Exactly two years ago Vladimir Putin came in first in the early 
presidential race. Boris Yeltsin stepped down leaving the country to a 
virtually unknown man, not particularly charismatic, a man from the 
security services. The man became popular all at once. The voters 
never expected or demanded a program from Putin. It was not that he 
was different. He was young, energetic. Not from the Family. Nothing 
has changed in this respect over the last two years. Putin is still 
popular, trusted, and nothing is demanded from him. Putin immediately 
became associated with an energetic leader. This is the image he has 
retained. This is good from the point of view of political stability. 
It is not so good since society put all initiative in a single pair of 
hands. Let him do right by us. Putin is doing his honest best.
     One thing Putin lacks is a team of professionals. The problem is 
becoming all the more pressing as the inertia of the socially passive 
post-Soviet society becomes more and more apparent. Putin is pointedly 
trying not to become another Napoleon, General Peron, Peter the Great, 
or Alexander II i.e. an authoritarian reformist. It certainly seems 
that he wants the grass root mechanisms to start working 
"constructively".
     Neither does Putin have any considerable social foundation behind 
him - something like a party, a caste, or young reformers. He lacks 
something to dip into in search for professionals. There is no 
"Putin's party" in the sense of generation of new ideas or ideology.
     Putin has been combing one "personnel field" for the last two 
years. The yield is scrimpy. It is clearly impossible to find enough 
competent administrators in St. Petersburg or in the KGB-FSS only. In 
the first place, however, this is the sectors (or spheres) Putin knows 
the best. In the second, state security is one of the few spheres 
retaining somewhat efficient career principle of rearing the personnel 
built on a definite and logical system of values.
     Staff problem is the most pressing for all spheres of life in 
Russia, not only for state service. Businesses cry for competent 
managers.
     Putin dislikes sharp gestures. He dislikes dismissals. Some 
observers ascribe it to his reluctance to alter the political course. 
They may be right. On the other hand, can we expect much less liking 
for sharp gestures from a man walking by feeling, without so much as 
navigational gear (strategy of development) or even IR-vision 
(perception of what we intend to build in Russia 10, 20, or 30 years 
from now)?
     Consolidation around Putin and a new psychological atmosphere at 
and around the Kremlin succeeded without any structural revolutions in 
doing in two years what had not been done in years of awareness of its 
necessity. There is a reverse side to it here: the staff loyal to 
Putin personally does not believe in what is being done and what is to 
be done yet. Hence the impotent half-measures.
     The tax reform is not working. Russia has the lowest income tax 
in Europe, 13%, but the absence of symmetric measures does not 
encourage capitals to start emerging from the shadows. The revenue tax 
was lowered but an effective mechanism of reinvestment was never 
established. Pensions legislation is adopted but nobody knows how the 
"long money" of the numerous pension funds will operate. Budget, Tax, 
Land, and Civil codes, and the Labor Code have been approved but also 
with restrictions, compromises, and discord...
     In the near future, we are in for the adoption of the new law on 
bankruptcy, Arbitration Procedure Code, law on the land sale. Not all 
of these accomplishments have an immediate effect on the life of 
ordinary Russians.
     The situation in foreign policy is the same. Who could imagine 
three years ago that the president of Russia, a man from secret 
services, would be meeting with the NATO general secretary to discuss 
closer contacts between Russia and the Alliance? That integration into 
the European Union and not into the Commonwealth would be proclaimed 
one of the priorities of the foreign policy? The actions of the 
Russian leadership on the foreign political arena indicate its 
intention to revise its imperial way of thinking and trying to make 
Russia a normal pragmatic state. Even here, however, the popular mood 
(in this, they mirror the moods prevailing in the majority of the 
Russian political elite) continues to fall behind, retaining all 
complexes and phobias of the Cold War.
     We would like to talk of rapprochement with the European Union 
and NATO and about membership in the World Trade Organization but 
there is nobody to talk of it for us. Foreign policy is a presidential 
solo in other countries as well. But not to the extent it is in 
Putin's Russia!
     Not so long ago one of these correspondents met with a prominent 
diplomat from the West who offered an interesting comparison. When a 
rock star is to appear on the scene, the audience first sees some 
minor singer or band, who warms them up for the main thing. The same 
goes for negotiations. Experts should thoroughly discuss their 
leaders' future accords. On Russia's side, the diplomat says, the 
warming up begins when Putin or Premier Mikhail Kasianov gets 
involved. Or at least some minister. Not before then.
     There is some staff aura or retinue around the president already. 
It comprises of men whose job is to adore another man, the president. 
"This is what the president needs", "it will harm the president", "the 
president is of the opinion that this is what should be done" - this 
is what these men are fond of repeating.
     Who surrounds the president - personalities - does not even 
matter. What matters is the ability of the inner circle to offer 
adequate solutions to existing problems. Its ability to tell the 
president when he is wrong or is about to make a mistake.
     It is almost fashionable, politically, to fear the energetic 
Federal Security Service or the Prosecutor General's Office nowadays. 
Smart businesses and businessmen have already made friends with the 
appropriate structures, eagerly joining the assorted support 
foundations with all their hearts and wallets. Growth of foundations 
is a fashion as well. As for security and secret service structures 
joining the business sphere, this reached its current scale only under 
the present president. 
     As for the much-feared intensity in the actions of the 
prosecutors, a simple analysis shows that not a single figure of all 
serious scandals has ever been jailed. Shall we expect this to happen? 
It is unlikely. Many observers are very confident that secret services 
are not out to jail, they are out to scare only. To make businesses 
subtle and tame. What is there to be made subtle and tame? Businesses 
themselves and financial flows. Some spheres (like the Ministry of 
Railroads, Nuclear Energy Ministry, and the Rosenergoatom) have new 
leaders already. Others, like the State Customs Committee, are still 
under siege.
     Experts who know chekist psychology say, "Men like that can only 
create obstacles", they cannot produce bold strategies in principle. 
They will never make a breakthrough in economy, particularly if the 
breakthrough implies a risk of social tension.
     At the same time, Putin believes in the state, and 80% of the men 
around him are apparatchiks to the core. They have not become 
successful businessmen, made any discoveries, or proved themselves as 
prominent top managers. They are "grey", as one of the enemies of men 
from St. Petersburg put it. The man added quite reasonably that an 
inner circle like that can only result in a slide into stagnation (in 
the sense of reforms and new ideas) or into authoritarianism with a 
vague program of creative (not punitive) actions.
     There is the widespread or at least the oft repeated opinion in 
the Kremlin that Putin himself is satisfied with "the broad assortment 
of opinions and views". It is clear already that he is building his 
own system of checks and balances. After two years in the Kremlin 
walls, Putin cannot help understanding what an unchecked fortification 
of one wing of a clan may result in.
     According to some forecasts, the president is bound to encounter 
serious economic difficulties by September. More realistic analysts 
say that the economy will last this year all right and strike problems 
next spring. This is when Putin is going to be forced to give a 
serious thought to taxation, a radical reorganization of powers, 
revenues, and responsibility split among three lawyers of the state 
power structures (what is happening nowadays is but a prelude to the 
federative reforms restricted to the appearance of federal state 
officials on the level of federal regions), reorganization of natural 
monopolies, social welfare system, and foreign debts. But 2003 is the 
year of election of the Duma and the year before the presidential 
election. This is a year that should go smooth, without crises and 
cataclysms by definition. What is that? A dead-end?
     Experts have been commenting on negative economic tendencies 
since last fall. Industrial growth rate has been falling along with 
domestic demand, one of the major sources of economic progress after 
1998.
     Putin has already castigated his subordinates for the high 
inflation. "We would like the government to pay special attention to 
what is happening in the economy, to macroeconomic parameters", he 
said in February. "There have not been any catastrophes or problems, 
but these things should be watched against".
     The Russian White House assures that the government has 
successfully negotiated the problem of foreign debt payments in 2003 
(one of the most pressing problems Russia is bound to face). 
Allegedly, Russia will have to pay $12 billion or even less instead of 
the $17 billion. The difference has already been shifted to domestic 
holders and they can wait.
     There is however another problem here, a problem which already 
generated a quarrel between Kasianov and Finance Minister Aleksei 
Kudrin. The matter concerns domestic loans. The Cabinet claims that 
reanimation of the short-term state bonds or their equivalent is only 
needed to keep in check the monetary mass. At the same time, banking 
reforms are not underway. They have merely been proclaimed and that is 
that. Participants of the market have been offered no actual 
instruments. Money continues to roam around the country. There are no 
mechanisms for shifting it from one sector to another. There is no 
effective mechanism of attracting foreign investments or runaway 
Russian capital amounting to billions and billions.
     The other day, rumors began in the corridors of one respectable 
structure that large businesses were allegedly discussing presidential 
election'2004 with Kasianov. That some business tycoons allegedly 
wanted Kasianov to succeed Putin.
     This "sensational" news is too fishy, since its authors' dislike 
of the premier is too apparent. As a matter of fact, there are only a 
handful of business tycoons who are actually capable of negotiations 
like that. Well, they are not involved in anything of the sort. One of 
them was even quoted as saying in private that "Kasianov will never go 
for it. He is not a suicidal type. Moreover, he keeps his promise..."
     These and similar speculations on Kasianov's alleged political 
aspirations show quite the opposite. They show that the premier is 
sturdy enough to withstand the blow and to do what he can to protect 
the government from various "instructions" directly given to ministers 
by the men who consider themselves to be "close to the president", 
close enough "to act on his behalf".
     There are numerous reports that Kasianov irks many of the strong 
and powerful. He has his own opinion on everything, he even dares to 
disagree with the president. He defends his ministers. Some rumors 
even indicate that a certain part of what calls itself a Putin's team, 
chekists from St. Petersburg in other words, would dearly like to see 
him toppled. According to the same rumors, this clan even have a 
substitute for Kasianov, a deputy premier.
     Rumors often concern Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov every now and 
then. Some well-informed and usually trustworthy sources say that 
Ivanov's enemies recently succeeded in putting some distance between 
him and the president. Recent intensity in the actions of Director of 
the Presidential Administration Alexander Voloshin in the foreign 
political sphere (the Foreign Ministry board recently made him a 
certified diplomat at a closed meeting) is reputed to be a prelude to 
his promotion to the foreign minister or at least an ambassador to 
Canada. According to information  compiled by Izvestia, Aleksei 
Gordeev may be ousted from his post of deputy premier in late spring. 
He will follow in Ilya Klebanov's steps in this case and merely retain 
his portfolio as a minister (according to sources in the Kremlin, it 
was Putin who left Klebanov his portfolio, Kasianov had made a mistake 
- he wanted Klebanov completely out but for some reason failed to 
suggest a substitute).
     Putin and the country enter the second half of his presidential 
term in a state of stagnation.
     This period is drawing to its end. Both Putin and the inner 
circle are aware of the necessity to move forward.
     The country needs more than reforms to survive. It needs a 
breakthrough into the future. A breakthrough all over the front is 
impossible - too much has been lost. It is nevertheless possible yet 
to retain the spheres and sectors called priorities. These priorities 
have to be defined first.
(Translated by A. Ignatkin)

********

#12
Washington Post
March 26, 2002
Kremlin Massages Bid For Television Channel
Moscow Seeks Press Control, Sources Say 
By Sharon LaFraniere
Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, March 25 -- On Wednesday the Russian government is to award a
national broadcasting license in what Kremlin officials have promised will
be a fair and open auction. But those with knowledge of the process said
the auction will be anything but open.

For weeks, they said, Kremlin aides have been hard at work tailoring a
winning bid by Kremlin supporters. The object, said those familiar with the
bid, is to portray the Kremlin as a supporter of a free and open press --
but to ensure that the operator of a new national television station does
not repeat the sort of anti-government diatribes that turned owners of the
last two independent stations into unofficial Kremlin foes.

Supporters of the bid hope it will repair at least some of the political
damage wrought by what appeared to be state-orchestrated takeovers of
Russia's last two independent television stations in the past year.

The Kremlin-backed bid, the result of weeks of negotiations, is a strange
hybrid of Kremlin skeptics and allies; of a dozen business leaders and a
noncommercial partnership; and of people viewed as political commissars and
champions of an independent press. 

Analysts say the complexity of the bid is a sign of the Kremlin's
discomfort with a free, commercially controlled press and its struggle to
somehow manage it. "The guys who invented this ridiculous scheme don't
understand anything," said one of those involved in the bid, who spoke on
condition of anonymity.

The license became suddenly available in January after what many saw as a
Kremlin-inspired court order to liquidate TV-6, a channel controlled by
magnate Boris Berezovsky. That drove Berezovsky, a one-time Kremlin insider
who has become Putin's harshest critic, out of the broadcast business.

And for the second time in a year, the closing of TV-6 forced a well-known
team of journalists, led by Yevgeny Kiselyov, off the air. The journalists
resigned en masse last year from their first channel, NTV, after media
magnate Vladimir Gusinsky lost control of it to the state-dominated natural
gas monopoly, Gazprom.

The Kremlin's press ministry announced it was accepting tender offers for
TV-6's license, and it attracted 15 proposals. Due to the Kremlin's
handiwork, one proposal from Kiselyov's group is widely considered the
leading contender. Other bidders include a subsidiary of Gazprom, a group
promising sports programming and at least five companies set up by other
journalists or television broadcasters.

Publicly, the Kremlin has taken a hands-off stance. "The Russian government
is not going to influence the tender for the right to broadcast on the
sixth channel," Alexei Volin, deputy chief of staff of the Russian cabinet,
said last month.

In fact, though, Putin's aides were deeply involved in shaping the bid of
the TV-6journalists, according to two sources knowledgeable about the
discussions. The Kremlin's hand in the contest has become increasingly
apparent over weeks of negotiations.

The Kremlin's first move, sources said, was to enlist Anatoly Chubais, a
top government official under former president Boris Yeltsin who now heads
RAO UES, the state-controlled energy monopoly. Chubais persuaded 12 wealthy
businessmen to back Kiselyov's bid. 

Leonid Gozman, a top aide to Chubais, said Chubais got involved because he
wanted to protect the free press. Chubais, who is also a leader of the
left-wing Union of Right Forces political party, said in an interview last
month that he was concerned about "political forces not far from Putin" who
favor a police state.

Some of the financial backers Chubais recruited are well known for their
Kremlin ties, including Roman Abramovich, the wealthy governor of the far
eastern region of Chukotka, and Alexander Mamut, a bank owner. Chubais
informed each business leader that Putin was in favor of the plan, sources
said.

Together, the businessmen and the journalists formed a company called Sixth
Channel, withthe journalists controlling 10 percent of the shares. The
capital stake was set at $10 million.

Sources said the firm's bid seemed on track until Feb. 27, when Chubais
informed Kiselyov that the Kremlin wanted it restructured. The spokesmen
for the Kremlin's position were Alexander Voloshin, the chief of
presidential administration, and Mikhail Lesin, the press minister.

The sources said Kiselyov was told that Putin wanted the license to go not
to a business, but to a noncommercial partnership headed by two people:
Putin's political ally, former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, who now
heads the Russian Chamber of Commerce, and Arkady Volsky, head of the
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.

Sixth Channel -- the alliance of businessmen and journalists -- would be
nothing but a contractor. The businessmen's contributions would be
considered donations, much like the donations that fund Strana.ru, a
pro-Kremlin Internet site.

In a meeting a few days later at Primakov's vacation home, Kiselyov
rejected the plan, the sources said. The two men ultimately agreed on a
compromise that would allow Sixth Channel to join the noncommercial
partnership, with one vote.

But at the same time, the Kremlin aides diluted the influence of that vote
by adding eight more members to the partnership.

Lesin and Voloshin later briefed Putin on the final arrangement and said he
found it acceptable, the sources said.

Whether it will produce independent journalism is another question.

Certain changes are supposed to make it more difficult for the partnership
to fire Kiselyov, who will serve as editor in chief. But Kiselyov is taking
no bets. "The chances are very high that we will be put under heavy
political pressure," he said.

"But we want to try to continue the line of independent journalists in
Russia. For the sake of a last chance, we are going to play this game."

*******

#13
St. Petersburg Times
March 26, 2002
Lessons in Comparative Democracy 
By Vladimir Kovalyev

A COUPLE of weeks ago, March 8 to be exact, I found myself at the Finnish
parliament in Helsinki. Although back in Russia this was, of course,
International Women's Day and I probably should have been presenting
flowers to all the people in my life whom I fail to appreciate properly the
other 364 days of the year, instead I was being ushered around the Suomen
Eduskunta (the Parliament of Finland) by a female deputy of the chamber. 

Naturally, I was curious about the differences between Russian and Finnish
legislative practices. For instance, faithful readers may remember that I
wrote a column last fall about how the deputies of the St. Petersburg
Legislative Assembly frantically run around the chamber during the big
votes to cast ballots for their absent colleagues.

"This question may sound stupid," I said, fearing that any question based
on Russian practice may, indeed, sound stupid, "but can you vote in place
of another deputy if he or she is absent? You may have heard that this is a
common practice in the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly and even in the
State Duma."

I could see an expression of complete surprise wash over her face.

"No, you can't do that," she said politely after she got over her shock.
"Even if a deputy is pregnant and absent for a long time, she is simply
absent, and nobody is allowed to vote for her."

Last week, I was back in the Legislative Assembly, watching in amazement as
deputy Igor Mikhailov ran from table to table, doing the voting honors for
a surprisingly large number of deputies, who may or may not have been
pregnant but certainly weren't present at the session.

Fellow deputy Viktor Yevtukhov, a Unity member who had sponsored the bill
being slowly voted down, watched Mikhailov vote and vote and vote.

"A lot of issues that have not been resolved could have been settled if we
had a strict ban on voting in someone else's place," Yevtukhov told me with
a sigh. "The Finns are absolutely right. This shows the level of their
legal culture, which is one of the highest in the world."

I suppose that there is a reason why the Finnish system looks so mature
compared to our wild parliament. The Finnish system has been in place more
or less as it is now since 1906, and the constitutional provisions
controlling the activity of legislators hasn't changed significantly since
the mid-1980s. The same number of deputies - 200 - have worked in the same
building for more than 70 years, spending at least 150 days a year in session.

As my guide pointed out to me old black-and-white photographs of the
parliament building and the legislature in session, I was overwhelmed by an
enviable feeling of stability. As I stood in the chamber itself, I noticed
that the only things that seemed to have changed since those pictures were
taken was some of the furniture and the microphones on the deputies' desks.

But some other things have changed in Finland and these changes too show an
advanced society moving forward. The most noticeable change that struck me
- since it was March 8 - was the increase in the number of female deputies.
In 1907, Finland had 19 women in parliament and now there are 72.

There is one woman, by the way, currently serving in the St. Petersburg
Legislative Assembly, and I can't report that she is always treated with
the respect that she deserves. On more than one occasion, I've seen Yabloko
deputy Natalya Yevdokimova nearly reduced to tears after one or another
"colleague" insulted her on the floor of the chamber. And who can forget
the indelible image of Duma deputy Vladimir Zhirinovsky pulling the hair of
a female deputy during a legislative session? These colorful images project
the state of Russian legal culture.

Of course, some may argue that St. Petersburg has an even more venerable
parliamentary system than Finland, pointing out that there were local and
national legislatures in Russia before the 1917 revolution.

But I think that it is the gap of more than 70 years that seems more
important whenever I see a deputy walking past me with a fat key ring of
his colleagues' voting keys.

*******