Johnson's Russia List #6156 26 March 2002 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Note from David Johnson: 1. Moscow Times: Yevgenia Borisova, Plan Put Forth for Bringing Peace to Chechnya. 2. Christian Science Monitor: Fred Weir, Chechnya's warrior tradition. Guerrillas from Russia's longtime nemesis take their fighting skills to Afghanistan. 3. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, Mighty Hercules Is Purged. (re Gerashchenko) 4. RIA Novosti: Yuri Filippov, VLADIMIR PUTIN: TWO YEARS OF PRESIDENCY. 5. Interfax: Share of normally physically developed children in Russia grows. 6. Toivo Klaar: RE: 6151-Yavlinsky at Harvard/Allison. (re Yeltsin) 7. Victor Kalashnikov: Test for the West. 8. Laura Belin: smiling in Russia. 9. Chronicle of Higher Education: Bryon MacWilliams, Russia Announces Plans to Overhaul Its Research Institutes, Increase Government Support. 10. pravda.ru: VLADIMIR PUTIN – RUSSIA’S NEW IVAN KALITA. FEDERATION SUBJECTS TO BE CONSOLIDATED. 11. Reuters: Pro-Kuchma bloc expects big win in Ukraine's poll. 12. Financial Times (UK): Tom Warner, Observers face challenge monitoring Ukraine poll. 13. Washington Times: Margaret Coker, Georgians leery of war on terror. 14. RFE/RL: Jeremy Bransten, Tongue-Tied Former Soviet States Rejecting Russian.] ****** #1 Moscow Times March 26, 2002 Plan Put Forth for Bringing Peace to Chechnya By Yevgenia Borisova Staff Writer A new plan for a peace settlement in Chechnya presented Monday by several Moscow-based institutions said the first steps should be to stop the brutal cleansing operations, which turn Chechen civilians against the federal troops, and to eliminate the shadow military economy that reigns in the region. "The situation in Chechnya is a trap now," said Valery Tishkov, director of the Ethnology and Anthropology Institute with the Russian Academy of Sciences, one of the authors of the plan. "Fighting rebels by means of cleansing operations is not effective any more. Because of big losses among peaceful civilians it only leads to an increase in distrust and hatred of the federal troops. "If a new strategy is not applied in Chechnya, the situation can only get worse," he added. The plan, two years in the making, was prepared by Tishkov's institute; the Peace-Making Mission headed by General Alexander Lebed, which has worked for the release of hostages; and Non-Violence International, a Moscow-based NGO, in cooperation with the Moscow branch of the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response. Tishkov presented a 19-page outline of the plan and said that it offers "mechanisms and tools" to help settle the conflict. The plan includes: dismantling the shadow military economy that is based on illegal trade in arms and oil by creating jobs, restoring the economic infrastructure and creating a positive investment climate in the republic; fighting corruption by making the Chechen economy transparent; fighting impunity by establishing effective law enforcement and judicial systems; creating a sizeable Chechen police force and transferring to it the responsibility for fighting the rebels; addressing the distrust of federal authorities by developing civil society institutions; changing the image of Chechens as the enemy throughout Russian society. The plan also calls for holding negotiations with armed separatists. The authors said the plan was to be provided to Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov; Viktor Kazantsev, presidential representative in the Southern Federal District; Vladimir Yelagin, minister in charge of Chechnya; and Akhmad Kadyrov, head of the Moscow-appointed Chechen administration. But the authors said they had little confidence that their ambitious plan would soon be taken up. Tishkov said they wanted their plan to be coordinated by the Advisory Council that was created last week in Strasbourg to operate under the working group on Chechnya of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the State Duma. The working group is headed by Lord Frank Judd of PACE and Dmitry Rogozin, head of the Duma's foreign affairs committee, but the Advisory Council is yet to get its leaders. "We hope the council will get three co-chairs -- one from [Chechen rebel leader Aslan] Maskhadov's side, one from Kadyrov's side and one from the Chechen community in Russia," said Dzhabrail Gakayev, a professor in Tishkov's institute. "I hope the council will become a body to consolidate Chechen society." Rogozin was not available for comment, but his spokesman Sergei Butin said Maskhadov's involvement would be acceptable. "It would be wise to get all prominent Chechens together so that they can work out a way to settle the conflict and to build their republic." But to get Chechens to talk to one another is a tough job. Some of the groups have already announced they do not recognize the Advisory Council. Ruslan Badalov, head of the Nazran-based Committee for National Salvation, which backs Maskhadov, said Monday that he would not participate in the work of the council because many of the members of its organizing committee "support the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya." Kadyrov's administration also was staying away, according to Gakayev. Gakayev said the council had no plans to bring top rebel commanders such as Shamil Basayev and Khattab into the negotiations, but was hoping to attract "rebels of the middle level who would like to leave the battlefield but are afraid to do so, seeing what federal troops do with the innocent civilian population during cleansing operations." ******* #2 Christian Science Monitor March 26, 2002 Chechnya's warrior tradition Guerrillas from Russia's longtime nemesis take their fighting skills to Afghanistan. By Fred Weir | Special to The Christian Science Monitor MOSCOW – Elusive, swift-striking Chechen guerrillas have been Russia's most ferocious and resolute internal enemy for almost two centuries, and dozens of Russian troops continue to die weekly in Moscow's latest 30-month-old campaign to subdue them. Some reports say US forces may now be squaring off against the same deadly foe in Afghanistan – hundreds of Chechen fighters who have embraced Al Qaeda's global jihad. "There are a lot of them, and they sure know how to fight," an un-named US officer told Agence France-Presse after US troops clashed with Chechen guerrillas in this month's "Operation Anaconda," aimed at corralling diehard Al Qaeda remnants in Afghanistan's eastern mountains. General Tommy Franks, commander of US forces, was more circumspect at a Moscow press conference last week. "The number of nationalities represented in the detainees we have is about 35 and, to be sure, the Chechen nationality is represented among those nations," he said. Russian veterans say they are not surprised to hear the Americans are encountering hard-core Chechen fighters in Afghanistan, and finding the going tough. "Chechens are fanatical soldiers," says Viktor Putilov, chairman of the Union of Vityaz Veterans, an association of former spetznaz – special forces – troopers. "The first thing a male Chechen baby is given is a weapon, and they grow up believing a man's only destiny is to fight. Their great strength in battle is that they do not think of their own lives, or anyone else's." But most experts who study the tiny, traditionally Muslim republic of Chechnya say they doubt its legendary warriors have joined Osama bin Laden's terrorist network in large enough numbers to become its "biggest single component," as some reports have claimed. For one thing, they say, most Chechens are not religious. "Islam did not strike deep roots among the Chechens, and has played only a slight role in their rebellions against Russian rule in the past," says Alexander Iskanderyan, head of the independent Center for Caucasus Studies in Moscow. "Religion is not the key to understanding Chechens; their painful past is." Many experts agree that a history of bloody defeat, mass repression and bitter exile, combined with a martial culture in which boys become full-fledged soldiers at age 12, may have led significant numbers of young Chechen men to join Al Qaeda, seeking revenge not just against Russia, but the entire non-Muslim world. "The Chechens cannot forget or forgive the mass suffering they have endured, and which they continue to bear," says Svetlana Omarova, an expert with the Confederation of Repressed Peoples of the former USSR, a human rights organization. "This is not to offer excuses, but one must understand how profoundly offended this nation is. These are men who are used to fighting for a lost cause." General Mikhail Yermolov, who led Russian forces in a ruthless 30-year campaign to crush Chechnya in the 19th century, called them "congenital rebels." Novelist Mikhail Lermontov, who took part in that struggle, was more admiring of the Chechens, writing in 1832: "Their god is freedom; their law is war." Yermolov conquered Chechnya by burning its forests to deny cover to the guerrillas, and by killing dozens of Chechen captives for every Russian soldier he lost. Later Chechen rebellions against czarist and Soviet rule were put down with equal ferocity. In 1944, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin accused the Chechens of collaborating with the Nazis and deported the entire nation, half a million people, to Central Asia and Siberia. An estimated 150,000 of them died in the forced winter march. "Deportation and the exile that followed united the Chechens, in bitterness, sorrow, and rage," says Vladimir Dmitriyev, a top expert on the north Caucasus, with Russia's Institute of Ethnology in St. Petersburg. "We are reaping the harvest today, as the Chechens are the only Russian national minority who are absolutely unreconciled to being part of the Russian Federation." Hoping to restart contact between the Kremlin and Chechen separatists, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly and the Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament, organized a forum, called the Chechen Consultative Council, which had its first meeting in Moscow last week. The forum has not been endorsed by President Vladimir Putin, nor did the Kremlin-backed civilian Chechen administration or rebel Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov send representatives to the meeting. Post-Soviet Russia has fought the Chechens twice. In 1994 President Boris Yeltsin sent in troops to squelch a nationalist independence drive. The Russians were defeated by Chechen irregulars in a 20-month war that killed up to 80,000 people, mainly civilians. In 1999, after a string of terrorist bombings in Russian cities – blamed on, but never proven to be the work of Chechen rebels – the Kremlin invaded again. Russian officials say that after the first war, Chechnya spiraled into lawlessness and became a staging ground for the global pan-Islamic jihad symbolized by bin Laden. The FSB security service, the domestic successor of the Soviet KGB, has provided evidence that money collected by terrorist-front "charities" around the Islamic world has flowed into Chechnya to underwrite rebel military operations. The FSB also claims that up to 1,500 foreign Muslims, turned out by Al Qaeda terror training camps in Afghanistan, are fighting against Kremlin forces in Chechnya while "hundreds" of Chechen military specialists migrated to Afghanistan in recent years to work for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. These allegations appear to jibe with US forces' reports of violent contact with Chechen fighters there. But experts say the evidence should be weighed carefully. "Sometimes I wonder if the Americans don't emphasize the presence of Chechens in Afghanistan just to please Moscow," says Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent military expert. "Of course, there are some; there have always been some Chechen volunteers and mercenaries fighting in wars around the Near East and Central Asia. "But as far as anyone can estimate, the majority of Chechen men are still in Chechnya or the immediate region, and they are continuing to fight the only enemy that has ever mattered to them, which is Russia." Reporters on the Job CHECHEN MYSTIQUE: Reporter Fred Weir has never come face to face with a Chechen fighter, but it's hard to miss their larger-than-life mystique in Russian society. "Russia has over 100 minority groups, 20 of them have their own republics. But there's no other minority in Russia that attracts so much tension, anxiety, and fear as the Chechens do." The rationale for this view lies in Russian history. "The Russians have always ganged up on [Chechens] in battle situations, and have usually been beaten nonetheless. Although Russia has conquered and occupied Chechnya for a century and a half, they've never beaten them." A friend of his is a Russian Army interpreter who spent six months in Chechnya during the 1994-96 war. "He told me being in Chechnya was the most terrifying experience of his life," Fred says. "He says basically what the Army does is man the blockades during the day, and huddle in their bunkers at night. The Chechens own the night." ******* #3 Moscow Times March 26, 2002 Mighty Hercules Is Purged By Boris Kagarlitsky On March 20, the State Duma accepted the resignation of Central Bank head Viktor Gerashchenko. This act not only marked the departure of a man who has played a dominant role in the banking sector for most of the past decade, it also means the departure of the last openly Keynesian central banker in Europe -- maybe even the world. Gerashchenko has always been a hate figure for the neo-liberals who have already made him resign twice before. The first time was while the Soviet Union was still in place and he was seen as an obstacle to economic liberalization. Once the "traditionalist" head of what was then called the State Bank of the Soviet Union was forced out, hyperinflation followed. Gerashchenko was called back to the Central Bank in 1992, but soon was declared an enemy of reform. His opponents saw him as an inflation-loving central banker. In fact, no central banker loves inflation -- Gerashchenko simply retained the strange and unpopular idea that people are more important than money. Thus, each time there was a choice between lowering inflation and attending to social needs, he preferred to do the latter. In 1994, he was removed once again and replaced by a monetarist team, which led the country to default and devaluation in 1998. Gerashchenko was then brought back, and proceeded to stabilize the currency and create the conditions for a massive payment of wage arrears that had accumulated during the period of neo-liberal management. Furthermore, he has never been involved in any financial scandals. That is why Gerashchenko was dubbed "Hercules." Indeed, for many years his job was to clean the Augean Stables of the mess left by neo-liberal economic policies. Now, however, Hercules has himself been purged. The irony of the situation is that a few days before Gerashchenko's removal, the government for the first time appointed a Keynesian economist, Mikhail Delyagin, as adviser to the prime minister. The appointment is strange, to say the least, if we take into account the complexion of the government and its policies. Over the past two years Delyagin has been one of the government's most principled critics, so for him to be given such a job something obviously must be wrong -- either with the government or with Delyagin. The appointment could be viewed as an acknowledgement by the regime that its course is leading nowhere. In such circumstances, however, the logical step would not be a change of advisers, but for the government to resign. The most plausible explanation is that different groups in the president's entourage have been pursuing divergent lines. While the St. Petersburg liberals have been systematically seizing key positions in Moscow, Mikhail Kasyanov has been trying to dissociate himself from liberal extremes. His moves can be characterized as an attempt to pursue a new course without changing the old one. And while Gerashchenko was at the helm of the Central Bank, the prime minister had in him an ally and counterbalance to the St. Petersburg group. Irrespective of how relations between the Central Bank and the government now develop, there will have to be some corrections made to economic policy. Exporters are complaining of protectionism by Western governments, but Russia can do nothing to oppose this apart from responding in kind with its own protectionist measures -- which per se will not solve the problem. The choice we are faced with is either to raise the population's standard of living and re-orient industry to the domestic market, or devalue the ruble, thereby reducing living standards once again and increasing exporters' profits. Undoubtedly, Delyagin will support the former course, and the St. Petersburg liberals in coalition with exporters will support the latter. However in the final analysis it is the Central Bank's decision. The new head, Sergei Ignatyev, has promised not to change the course set by his predecessor. And indeed, the ruble exchange rate has not undergone major change in the week or so since Gerashchenko's departure. The Central Bank is in good shape and foreign debts continue to be serviced in full. However, this fiscal well-being can last only as long as the economy continues to grow. The early months of this year have demonstrated the futility of trying to beat inflation. Gerashchenko was one of the few who, in the words of Charles de Gaulle, understood that sometimes you should learn to live with problems rather than fighting them. Boris Kagarlitsky is a Moscow-based sociologist. ******* #4 VLADIMIR PUTIN: TWO YEARS OF PRESIDENCY MOSCOW, MARCH 25 (from Yuri Filippov, RIA Novosti political analyst) - Russia elected Vladimir Putin federal President, March 26 two years ago. What, now, are his achievements at the helm of a vast country? Surprising as it may seem, the best progress was made in the economy. The nation has fully recovered from the shock of the 1998 economic crisis. The foreign debt problem has receded into the background while, a mere three or four years ago, top-notch economic experts in Russia and other countries regarded it as Russia's worst plague for several decades to come. Invisibly to the people-in-the-street, the baffling problem has evolved into a mere technicality which the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank are smoothly tackling. We have an economic rise to thank for that. It started in 1999, while Mr. Putin was Premier. Hopeful economic developments have been going on during Putin's presidency. Too many industrial companies stood idle while the Russian economy was grappling for a road to affluence through structural reforms. Now, the same companies are approaching the peak of their performance. Last year's economic rise closely approached 5%. More than that, the Russian economy and entire life are getting rid of dependence on petroleum exports. Importantly, Russia is not currying favour with the OPEC, and is not playing in close team with the organisation in global oil price formation. On the contrary, Russia is regaining independence in the world petroleum market--largely because the two years of Vladimir Putin's presidency have allowed it to get free from petrodollar dependence, and from dependence on overseas loans--the fatal pair which hampered its previous progress. So, Russia is all but free from its recent fetters. Many people had misgivings as the young President became aware of the nation reviving, and steadily supporting him. What if he would drive Russia back to the well-trodden road of militarisation and imperialist claims? The fears proved ungrounded. True, Putin is displaying tremendous interest in the army, the navy and military-oriented research. Now he gets on board a fighter plane, now a submarine. But then, he is drawn to the military no closer than any other national leader throughout Russian history--Mikhail Gorbachev, for instance. The essence of Putin's presidency hardly lies in a revival of the late unlamented imperialist spirit. Indicatively, he was blueprinting a sweeping administrative reform even when president-elect, while the Kremlin was preparing for his inauguration. The country was soon divided in seven federal districts. Every regional governor and republican president became State Council member with the right of direct contact with the federal president. The formative patterns of the Federation Council, parliament's upper house, changed beyond recognition. Those were not the only resolute steps made by President Putin. As it appears, he sees his main goal in arranging federal rule as rationally as possible--which promises harmonious contacts with an emergent civil society in a free democratic country into which Russia ought to evolve. Characteristic in that context is Vladimir Putin's comparative aloofness to the practical aspects of economic reforms. He pronounces on matters within governmental competences only in emergencies--for instance, an urgent pension rise, bridling inflation, or getting overdue government allocations back on schedule. Vladimir Putin can well afford his aloofness. He was, perhaps, the first within the last twenty years or so to lay the basis of a consolidated Russian political system. Parliament is backing essential government initiatives instead of torpedoing them, as was constant practice in recent Russian history. More than that, a Centrist majority on the State Duma, lower house, assumed a part of duties guiding public dialogue with the government so to free the President from mediating the dialogue. Next, his teamwork with the State Council promotes his vitally important contacts with regional leaders, and he is abreast with political developments in that field. Most probably, a reform of local self-government is approaching. That will be another pivotal reform as local self-government is the basis of every democratic regime. The presidential staff is only preparing for that reform after several busy years of blueprinting it. Vladimir Putin is working for new Russian statehood. Many characteristics of his efforts give grounds for optimism--we hope Russia will be a free democratic country. There are formidable barriers on that road, however. Chechnya is the worst. Next comes the officialdom, with its bloated initiative and excessive zeal. Too many administrative officers are out to strangle free speech, especially in the provinces. They are to blame for prejudice which the democratically-minded community are developing against President Putin, while he vitally needs support from that part of the nation for his democratic reforms. Chechen developments and freedom of the media are the two reasons why liberals are accusing Vladimir Putin of undemocratic conduct and authoritarian trends. As I see it, Chechnya and freedom of speech are on what democratic reforms depend the closest for final success. ******* #5 Share of normally physically developed children in Russia grows MOSCOW. March 25 (Interfax) - About 70% of Russian children had a normal height/weight ratio last year, reads a report by the Russian Health Ministry summing up outcomes of 2001. Medical specialists point out in this connection that the increase in the number of children suffering from insufficient weight and height, which was recorded by researchers in the past several years, has stopped, and the physical development of children has actually approached the level of 1991. The decline in the number of Russian children with normal physical development, which took place before 1997, was chiefly attributed to the fact that they "rarely or never ate the right food for their development." At the present time, however, "there has been a positive dynamic in the average parameters of physical development of children in the country," and "the declining number of children suffering from insufficient weight points to a general improvement in the health of children in Russia," reads the report. ******* #6 From: Toivo Klaar Subject: RE: 6151-Yavlinsky at Harvard/Allison Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2002 Graham Allison's offhanded remark about President Yeltsin, that "Yeltsin has gone back to his bottle or whatever" illustrates once more what to me is a completely undeserved refusal by many western former sovietologists to acknowledge Boris Yeltsin's achievements in opening Russia up. Certainly Yeltsin was not perfect and his policies were often quite erratic. His policy towards Estonia and our Baltic neighbours was not one we liked. All too often his 'great russian' instincts came to the fore. But nonetheless he is the man who stood on a tank in August 1991 and was instrumental in destroying what truly was an evil empire. Where Gorbachev tinkered Yeltsin acted. The result was the freeing of the Russian political landscape, of the Russian press - of a lot of Russian history - and also of Russian markets. His economic policies were not perfect, and often indeed quite flawed. But despite all flaws that he had he did bring along with him a conviction that there is merit in facing up to the evils of the past and in allowing free discussion of the future. Gorbachev was not ready for this and we all see where Russia is steering today. Thus we might find that the period of greatest individual freedoms in Russian history was in fact the Yeltsin era. And for this he does deserve credit. Sincerely, Toivo Klaar Arlington, VA ******* #7 From: Victor Kalashnikov Subject: Test for the West Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2002 2 Lord Judd's statement on persecution of Chechnya war criminals (JRL #6149, 22 March 2002) is bound to have tremendously positive spin-offs both in Russia and elsewhere. After Kremlin's "tsar" Pal-Palych Borodin (controlling the values twice more than Gasprom's assets) had spent several weeks in New-York and Geneva jails last year, a number of big cheeses here saw it reasonable to cut their appetites. So, many poor, orphans, widows and nuclear scientists have been saved from starvation. This time, I guess dozens of Kremlin's officials and army generals will get signals to show more restraint in the genocide they're committing in Chechnya on the daily basis. The question is, how serious the West is on that tribunal. Or, maybe, Yastrzhembsky has to be more generous with some of Western institutions and media. A-propos - generosity. I'm really puzzled about the nonchalance showed by parts of the Western media community in Moscow. Some of them, including world- famous outlets, seems to think, that making business with the Kremlin propaganda office is a normal business. I think it is not, since the ultimate result of such cooperation is normally resulted in more suffering of ordinary Russians. I hope, that the tribunal idea, expressed by lord Judd, will draw back some of the cheque-book journalists. Time is running faster these days, so you haven't necessarily to wait till a Mitrokhin will come and spoil your well-earned retirement. Let me finally suggest a TEST for the Western commitment to the basics of law and humanism. There're two guys, Grigory Pasko and Igor Sutyagin, both with families and children, still in jail on flagrantly falsified spying charges. "Spying to the West",- FSB said. Now, when we all are friends, it's high time to ask for their immediate release. So, why don't you make Moscow's sitting at prestigious tables in Brussels depending on the release of these two men? Isn't it absurd to negotiate the Nato-Russia rapprochement, while Pasko and Sutyagin are still submitted to torture of the Russian prison? Don't postpone it till better or more convenient times. There's no guarantee you'll ever have them. Just demand: LET THEM BE FREE NOW! Victor Kalashnikov, Moscow ******* #8 Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2002 From: Laura Belin Subject: smiling in Russia Stephen Dalziel's piece "In search of a Russian smile" (JRL 6152) reminded me of a game show I saw on Russian television around 1996. It was the equivalent of the American show "Family Feud," where teams try to guess the most common answers that 100 respondents gave to various questions. One of the questions was something like "What kind of person smiles a lot?" or "What kind of person is always smiling?" I don't know what answers a random group of Americans would give to this question: optimist? sales rep? I'm pretty sure, though, that they would be different from the top three answers on the Russian program I watched: 1. lucky person ("schastlivets") 2. idiot 3. American It stuck in my mind, since several Russians had told me over the years that they could spot Americans walking down the street because they were the ones smiling for no reason. Like Dalziel observed, even though we think of smiling as a universal gesture, it can mean different things in different cultures. ******* #9 Chronicle of Higher Education March 25, 2002 Russia Announces Plans to Overhaul Its Research Institutes, Increase Government Support By BRYON MacWILLIAMS Moscow The Russian government has announced a sweeping agenda of reform for science that would revamp the country's ungainly system of research institutes. The plan would reform the institutes by rewarding research disciplines that adapt to the free market and contribute to the country's wealth, and by cutting off support to those that don't. Until 2010, money would be channeled to nine fields of research and several dozen spheres of technology that were identified as crucial to the country's interests during a meeting last week of the State Council, the Security Council, and the Presidential Council on Science and Technology. The last time a meeting of such scale took place was in 1974, in the Soviet Union, according to Ilya Klebanov, the minister of science, industry and technology. Presentations at the meeting brought to light a host of salient facts: The number of researchers in Russia has fallen by half since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, as a result of brain drain. An estimated 200,000 researchers have emigrated during the past decade. The average age of Russian scientists now is 56. The reforms being proposed would emphasize innovation -- particularly in academe -- and coordinate the scientific research in government institutes with the research on college campuses. "Today governmental support of science is completely ineffective ... and poorly organized. This is the first step toward a sensible, self-regulated departure from the senseless scattering of resources," Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, said in a Kremlin address to the country's most influential figures in science. The plan would quintuple the money for research in fields such as telecommunications and electronics, aviation and space, new materials and chemistry, advanced armaments, production technologies, energy conservation, and transportation. The government would also increase spending on the sciences from 1.7 percent to 4 percent of the federal budget, a move already required by a 2001 law. Moreover, salaries would be raised for scientists under the age of 35, while pensions would be increased for those of retirement age, in an effort to encourage senior scientists to make way for new blood. "Everyone is declaring that they are on the path of innovation, but nothing, or almost nothing, has been done in real terms," Mr. Putin said. "The choice of a path of development for domestic sciences is, as a matter of fact, a choice of the prospects for our nation." ******* #10 pravda.ru March 25, 2002 VLADIMIR PUTIN – RUSSIA’S NEW IVAN KALITA. FEDERATION SUBJECTS TO BE CONSOLIDATED The law on the admission to the Russian Federation and creation of new subjects in the Federation that was ratified by the State Duma and provided for the merger of Federation subjects has been discussed by the mass media and authorities for several months already. Why is the Kremlin so interested in the liquidation of small autonomous districts that are of little political and economic significance? In fact, eighty-nine districts is a too large of an amount for Russia. The decision of the president to create seven federal districts seems to be quite logical, as it is always easier to manage a larger territorial formation. We can hardly imagine, to what extent the work of the 89 presidential envoys in the federal districts can be effective. It is really difficult to realize the idea of federal districts’ consolidation. Many complications arise at once: to liquidate small autonomous districts, Russia needs the Constitution to be amended. Article 65 is meant in particular, as all federation subjects are enumerated in it. Although t article 66 of the RF Constitution allows for the change of the status of a federation subject “on a mutual consent of the Russian Federation and the subject itself and in accordance with the federal constitutional law," the Kremlin will certainly face legal problems upon the settlement of the issue. This is also despite the fact that the idea of the consolidation of the federation subjects is becoming more popular in the center and in the regions as well. Sverdlovsk Governor Eduard Rossel has supported the idea for several years already. During his visit to the town of Kamensk-Uralsky in June of 2001, Eduard Rossel said that he supports the idea of the consolidation of federal subjects in order to make the statuses of districts and regions equal from a legislative point of view. In his words, it is becoming more evident that a state is to consist of equal republics, not unequal districts and regions. The Sverdlovsk governor himself is ready to adopt several regions into the Sverdlovsk region. A special department for political forecasting was created in the Sverdlovsk regional administration for work on consolidation of the federation subjects. The existing schemes for subjects consolidation differ from the point of view of the principle and concept of the consolidation itself. Even absolutely unexpected variants are suggested: it is suggested that the regions should be consolidated the same way military circuits are formed or regions are to be consolidated in accordance with the existing railway subdivisions. The department for political forecasting is sure that one of the schemes being designed in the Sverdlovsk region for federation subjects’ consolidation will be of use to the presidential administration, even if slightly changed. Presidential envoys also support the idea of the consolidation of the federation subjects. Such a conclusion can be drawn from the statement voiced by president’s envoy to the Siberian federal district Leonid Drachevsky: “89 federation subjects is too much for Russia, the number of regions will be reduced. The Irkutsk region and Ust-Ordynsky autonomous district are the most likely candidates for consolidation.” Presidential envoy to the Urals federal district Pyotr Latyshev shares the same opinion. Perpetually arising conflicts between the Khanty-Mansiisk and Yamalo-Nenetsk autonomous districts are really problematic for the envoy. The idea is actively supported on the legislative level as well. Gennady Raikov, the leader of the People’s deputy faction in the State Duma is sure that “the problem of the consolidation of the federation subjects has been pressing in Russia for a long period already. Eighty-nine independent republics, regions, and autonomous districts is a too large amount even for a state that occupies one-ninth of the world’s land. Yeltsin’s formula of 'get as much sovereignty as you wish' has failed. Sovereignty, as I see it, means economic independence first of all. It is impossible to be independent and ask for help at the same time. After consolidation, we may have 12-15 federation subjects on the political map of Russia. If all of them are financially independent, we may consider the reform to be a success.” All the same, it is not that easy as it seems. Political scientist Dmitry Ogulchansky thinks that, even if the federal center initiates a consolidation process, the formation of public opinion may take several years. The process is to be evolutional, and it is to start at the place where all pre-conditions exist, this is the opinion of political scientists Anna Trakhtenberg. “ Unfortunately, there is no single point of view on federation subjects’ consolidation in the presidential administration now. On the whole, it is necessary to consolidate the subjects. Every federation subject, even the smallest one, has elite of its own that wishes to preserve its position. As practice shows, presidential envoys are successful with counterbalancing the regional elite and manage to restrain their excessive arrogance. If the federal subjects are consolidated, the role of the envoys will be of use even then.” The number of supporters and opponents of innovations is approximately the same. No matter what is said, the precedent has been created in the Krasnoyarsk region. Gazeta.Ru informs, the first trial of strength in the sphere of subjects’ consolidation carried out in the Krasnoyarsk region on the New Year’s eve was a success. The interests of the Kremlin and Krasnoyarsk governor Alexander Lebed coincided completely. As a result, the municipal council of the city of Norilsk supported creation of a single municipal formation named “the city of Norilsk” that will consist of the city itself, the satellite towns of Norilsk – Kayerkan and Talnakh, and the urban-type community of Snezhnogorsk. Alexander Lebed was satisfied with the situation and said the president was planning to liquidate a number of autonomous districts at the end of January – beginning of February. As a result, the autonomous districts of Evenkia and Taymyr are to become parts of the Krasnoyarsk region, as well as the Jewish autonomous region. President Vladimir Putin arrived in the Krasnoyarsk region to examine the complicated social and economic situation, as well as the conflict with the Taymyr autonomous district. Kommersant newspaper supposes that Putin’s visit to Norilsk is closely connected with the opposition between the authorities of Taymyr and the Krasnoyarsk region. The president had promised to examine the situation personally, although some officials from the presidential administration recommended not to interfere with the conflict. The visit’s result is paradoxical, as it proves once again that it is difficult to guess what the president’s reaction will be concerning this or that problem. Vladimir Putin tries to avoid the behavioral schemes imposed on him. It was supposed the president would criticize the Krasnoyarsk governor, who is not so popular in the Kremlin, but it turned out to be just the other way round. General Alexander Lebed has been criticized greatly, but has done a great deal at the same time. News agencies report that President Putin held a private conversation with Taymyr Governor Alexander Khloponin; the subject of the conversation is not reported. What is to be mentioned here is the claims of Norilsk have been changed after the conversation. The Legislative Assembly had originally threatened Krasnoyarsk with separation, but now the governor says it will be possible to liquidate the Taymyr autonomous district, and the dependent territory will merge then with the Krasnoyarsk region to make up one federation subject. Polit.ru informs that Taymyr Governor Alexander Khloponin supports consolidation of Taymyr, Evenkia, and the Krasnoyarsk region into one federation subject. In Khloponin’s words, there are two disputable problems between the Krasnoyarsk region and Taymyr, particularly, budget funding and the management of the territories. There are no territorial problems between them. Dmitry Chirkin PRAVDA.Ru Translated by Maria Gousseva ******* #11 INTERVIEW-Pro-Kuchma bloc expects big win in Ukraine's poll By Natalya Zinets KIEV, March 25 (Reuters) - The leader of Ukraine's main pro-presidential bloc said on Monday his party, For United Ukraine, was bound to form a majority in the ex-Soviet state's next parliament and vowed to maintain stability. Western investors and officials are watching Ukraine's election on Sunday to see if the country can form a reformist-led parliament to force through stalled reforms under President Leonid Kuchma and shed its Soviet past. Volodymyr Lytvyn, party leader and head of the presidential administration, said his party would speed up the adoption of a new tax code, but most analysts say a pro-presidential majority would do little to change Ukraine's next parliament. "Speaking about the future of the bloc, I can say only one thing -- it is clear that the bloc will have the largest number of seats in parliament," Lytvyn told Reuters in an interview. "Now the bloc has the necessary, skilled staff, which will allow us to implement the necessary and required tasks for another 10 years of Ukraine's development." Over 30 political parties and alliances are contesting the poll, the third since Ukraine's independence in 1991, but only eight or nine parties are expected to overcome the four percent hurdle and get into parliament. Our Ukraine, a coalition of nationalist and right-wing forces led by reformist former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, is leading opinion polls with over 20 percent of the vote. The Communist Party is running second with about 15 percent. According to the polls, For United Ukraine, which includes Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh, four other government ministers and several regional leaders, should get about seven percent. Lytvyn said his bloc's popularity was increasing closer to the poll. He denied widespread violations during campaigning, saying concerns by the West over media freedoms were unwarranted. Western officials say pro-presidential parties have had too much influence over local election committees. "Talk about undemocratic elections and falsifications humiliates our people," Lytvyn said. "Parties and blocs are organising the election, their representatives make up electoral commissions. The authorities, actually, have not taken part in it." ****** #12 Financial Times (UK) 26 March 2002 Observers face challenge monitoring Ukraine poll By Tom Warner in Kiev As hundreds of foreign observers pour into Ukraine to monitor the fairness of parliamentary elections this Sunday, Yuri Orobets, a candidate in one of Kiev's districts, says he feels "ashamed". "I'm very embarrassed that we need foreigners to tell us how to be democratic," he says. "For a country with a European culture and tradition, this is a very heavy shame." When he was a member of parliament in 1994-1998, Mr Orobets crusaded against the consolidation of power in his country by groups he describes as "economic-political mafias". He won re-election in 1998 but the results were declared invalid. Then Mr Orobets won in two successive repeat elections but each time the results were thrown out. In June 2000, he lost a third repeat election to Ivan Saly, a former official in the administration of President Leonid Kuchma (pictured) . Mr Orobets' case gained notoriety after the appearance in late 2000 of a set of scandalous recordings allegedly made in the president's office. In one recording, the voice of the then interior minister brags how a special squad "with no morals" terrorised a man who distributed Mr Orobets' leaflets. In another, the voice of Mr Kuchma calls Mr Orobets an "ass" and orders the then secret police chief to push the vote in Mr Saly's favour. As Mr Orobets and Mr Saly prepare to face each other again, his case reflects the challenge facing the teams of foreign election observers now spreading out across the country. Last week, both houses of the US Congress adopted resolutions warning Ukraine that future US aid would depend on the fairness of the elections. The resolutions noted that Ukraine's domestic election observers had already reported numerous violations, including government pressure on opposition and independent media and coercion of individuals to join particular political parties and contribute to their campaigns. Similarly, most western observers, especially the Americans, believe they should be prepared to complain vociferously about electoral abuses. But Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russia's ambassador in Kiev, shot back last week by accusing the US Congress of "warning and dictating how elections should be in Ukraine". "Why doesn't Ukraine come out with a similar statement, that in the US they elected one president but another man is in power?" Mr Chernomyrdin remarked at a news conference, referring to the disputed 2000 US presidential election. The US-Russian spat is exacerbated by the fact that Ukraine's most pro-western political force, former prime minister Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc, appears to have the most to lose if there is manipulation. Our Ukraine has taken a strong lead in the polls, with an estimated 25 per cent to 30 per cent of voters' support while its main rival, Mr Kuchma's For a United Ukraine bloc, is wallowing in the single digits. Mr Yushchenko's bloc is likely to do well in the nationwide contest among parties and electoral blocs, in which half of the parliament's 450 seats will be divided among the parties that receive at least 4 per cent of the votes. However, Mr Kuchma's allies are expected to win most of the other 225 seats that are being contested in direct, first-past-the-post elections. The chairman of the largest Ukrainian observer group, Igor Popov, praises the US government's support for election monitoring, which includes funding for his group. But he predicts that after the elections, Ukrainian media will give most of their attention to the appraisals of observers from the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States, who are expected to be less critical of any abuses. ****** #13 Washington Times March 25, 2002 Georgians leery of war on terror Margaret Coker COX NEWS SERVICE PANKISI GORGE, Georgia -- There are no obvious signs of danger in this fertile valley that the Bush administration says is a refuge for terrorists. Under sunny skies, many of the 14,000 inhabitants plow muddy fields outside their two-story family farmhouses. Dozens of brown pigs rooting around wooden barns suggest a certain laxity in the inhabitants' Islamic beliefs in this former Soviet republic. Yet this 10-mile-long patch of land, cradled between the Caucasus mountains that border Russia's breakaway republic of Chechnya, has a long history as a haven for smugglers and bandits. U.S. authorities searching for Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda lieutenants have focused on the Pankisi Gorge as a place that Islamic extremists may hide, or pass through on their way to safer, more remote hide-outs. Volunteers from Muslim Chechnya were among the fighters serving the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. A few hundred U.S. military personnel are to arrive next month to train Georgian anti-terrorist squads, and the CIA has beefed up its relations with Georgian KGB officers — developments that President Eduard Shevardnadze has welcomed. However, questions remain about how real the terrorist threat is in Georgia, and whether Washington's offer of $60 million in aid is just old-fashioned diplomacy. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has sought to stabilize this strategically important country. Georgia, with a population of 5 million, is situated near vast Caspian Sea oil reserves as well as near Iraq and Iran, two of the three countries that President Bush labeled the "axis of evil." In the last three or four months, some 30 Islamic fighters have arrived in the valley, crossing the border from neighboring Azerbaijan, according to Georgian intelligence officials. Otar Peterashvili, the agent in charge of surveillance of the Pankisi Gorge for six years, said the men have taken refuge with some of the region's known criminal kingpins, making them hard to extricate. Mr. Peterashvili said he presumes the men are Arabs. But Georgian authorities do not have any evidence linking them to al Qaeda or the Taliban, and do not know where the men were before making the trek from Azerbaijan to the Pankisi Gorge. "We haven't noticed an influx of foreigners since the war in Afghanistan began. We believe that the few people that are here aren't looking to stay in Georgia, but are on their way to someplace else, probably Chechnya," Mr. Peterashvili said, adding that he's given the same information to the CIA. Still, the White House is moving ahead with plans to send U.S. Special Forces to train four army battalions in anti-terrorist operations, according to Georgia's deputy defense minister, Gela Bezhuashvili. A team of U.S. military engineers numbering around 20 is currently in Georgia surveying the airstrip and other installations at one of two military bases where the Americans will work, the minister said. Part of the aid will include equipment for about 2,000 Georgian soldiers to be trained, including uniforms, binoculars and tents, Mr. Bezhuashvili said. "Our military is greatly underfunded and in need of training," Mr. Bezhuashvili said. "Our country needs a small, efficient, mobile army that can protect our territorial integrity. We are very glad that the Americans are going to help us do that." Georgia, a centuries-old, predominately Christian country, has had its share of difficulties since the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the last 10 years, Georgians have fought a bitter civil war that has left two provinces virtually autonomous from the central government in Tbilisi. Widespread corruption has made the central government ineffectual in many other regions. Electricity throughout the country is spotty, unemployment is in the double digits and hospitals are in disrepair. These problems led thousands of people in December to demonstrate against Mr. Shevardnadze, who was the Soviet foreign minister under President Mikhail Gorbachev before becoming Georgia's leader a decade ago. Many analysts in Georgia believe the policy to bring in American forces is aimed at raising the stature of the ailing and unpopular president. "We are all glad to see the Americans come here, but we are all asking, 'What will Georgia get out it?'" said Georgi Khutsishvili, director of Tbilisi's International Center on Conflict and Negotiation. "American military advisers are not going to help us fight corruption. They are not going to help strengthen law and order. They are only going to help Shevardnadze consolidate his power." ******** #14 East: Tongue-Tied Former Soviet States Rejecting Russian (Part 1) By Jeremy Bransten Mass popular rallies with protesters chanting: "Down with communism! Resign! Ole! Ole! Communism exists no more!" which have recently engulfed the Moldovan capital, Chisinau, forced the government to scrap its plans to reintroduce compulsory Russian language instruction in the country's schools. The confrontation in Chisinau is but one example of conflicts occurring in many of the post-Soviet states, where ethnic Russian populations co-exist alongside representatives of the titular nationalities. Late in 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin raised concerns that Moscow would try to exploit these tensions to its advantage when he promised that Moscow would push for official recognition of the Russian language, at least in the Commonwealth of Indpendent States (CIS). Is the Russian language to become Moscow's new weapon in its bid to reconstitute part of its former empire? RFE/RL correspondent Jeremy Bransten reports in this first of a two-part series. Prague, 25 March 2002 (RFE/RL) -- The call-in show on Russian television was billed as a chance for viewers to ask their president, Vladimir Putin, some spontaneous questions. But one part of the 24 December program seemed to have been scripted in advance. An ethnic Russian listener from Latvia telephoned President Putin to ask whether Moscow was ready to use concrete actions to defend the rights of Russians in the Baltic states, Central Asia, and other regions of the former Soviet Union. Without skipping a beat, Putin delivered a lengthy, fluent reply in which he pledged to pursue a "much more vigorous course" in protecting the interests of Russian speakers in the former Soviet republics. He further urged ethnic Russians in post-Soviet states to fight for proportional political representation, signaling Moscow's readiness to support them in their quest. Putin's words raised hackles in the Baltic states and several CIS countries. A decade ago, the campaign for language rights was a hallmark of independence movements across the former Soviet Union, with national cultures re-emerging from decades of Russification. The issue remains highly sensitive and with Russian language use in retreat, the idea that Moscow might now push to reverse the trend sits uneasily with leaders in capitals from Tallinn to Astana. An estimated 25 million Russian speakers live outside the borders of the Russian Federation, in countries Moscow still refers to as the "near abroad." How have they fared since the breakup of the Soviet Union? What is the status of the Russian language in Moscow's former empire, and is there solid evidence that the Kremlin is using the Russian language as a Trojan horse to undermine the independence of its neighbors? A closer look at the situation and interviews with area analysts leads to two conclusions. First, the post-Soviet space is as varied as it is vast. In some countries, such as Armenia, ethnic Russians constitute less than 1 percent of the population, while in other countries, such as Kazakhstan, Russian speakers make up almost 40 percent of the total. While in general Russian use can be said to be ebbing, the trend has obviously been far more rapid in Armenia and the rest of the southern Caucasus than in Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia, largely because of demography. Secondly, despite regular rhetoric emanating from Moscow -- as far back as 1996, former President Boris Yeltsin called for a program to promote Russian language use in the CIS -- Russia's government has so far done little to put such ideas into practice. William Fierman, a specialist on Central Asia, is director of the Inner Asian and Uralic National Resource Center at the University of Indiana. He tells RFE/RL that the rate at which Russian language use increases or decreases in the former Soviet republics depends more on internal factors than policy decisions made by Moscow. "Moscow can do some rather minor things, which are significant, to encourage these countries to use Russian, such as [making] speeches, either in the Duma or by the president. Moscow does things like supporting educational institutes locally and they can subsidize, to some extent, the broadcast of mass media and lobby with the local governments to make the media more accessible," Fierman says. "They can give free opportunities to students from these countries to study in the higher educational institutions of Russia. But I think that the main dynamics having to do with the use of Russian or the local language have to do with events inside the respective societies." Central Asia is a case in point. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have both faced problems in their drive to promote their titular languages since independence. Neighboring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, meanwhile, can objectively be said to have been far more successful. The reasons have to do with demography, economics, and the degree of Russification imposed during Soviet times. Fierman says: "The Kazakh language never attained the role in Kazakhstan that Uzbek did in Uzbekistan. One very easy indicator of that, for example, is that there is not even a good Kazakh-Russian dictionary that you can find. It was never published in the Soviet era. Only now are there so-so dictionaries from Kazakh to Russian that are appearing, whereas there were very good dictionaries from Uzbek into Russian. In Kazakhstan, Russian had a much firmer role, and who needed to translate things from Kazakh?" The governments of both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while maintaining Kazakh and Kyrgyz as their countries' sole state languages, have both recently accorded Russian official status. Ever since a visit in 2001 by Russian State Duma Speaker Gennadii Seleznev to Dushanbe, the issue of whether to grant Russian official status in Tajikistan has been repeatedly discussed by that country's politicians. But Tajikistan's President Imomali Rakhmonov indicated recently that he does not favor any change for now. Although the Kazakh and Kyrgyz move was loudly welcomed in Moscow, Fierman says the decision was driven more by pragmatism than by direct pressure from the Kremlin. Kazakhstan alone has lost some 2 million Russian speakers in out-migration over the past decade. Kyrgzystan has seen the proportion of its ethnic Russian population shrink from 21 percent to 13 percent in the same time frame, due to a combination of declining Russian birthrates and migration. Most of the emigres were skilled professionals, and both Bishkek and Astana are eager to halt any more of the brain drain that could harm their economies. Education is another sector where economic pragmatism for now assures the continuing widespread use of Russian in both countries. From the government's point of view, switching away from Russian language instruction is too costly to implement across the board. And many parents, even ethnic Kazakh and Kyrgyz parents, continue to see greater benefits in sending their children to Russian language schools. Again, Fierman: "Economic reality is the greatest factor -- that is, people are more concerned about other things. For example, the great wave of sending children to indigenous language schools -- let's say in Kazakhstan, but I believe it's a pattern one would find everywhere -- was in 91, 92, 93, and since that time, the proportion of parents sending their kids into the first grade in titular language schools has somewhat declined. It's not nearly as far down as it was, let's say, in the 80s. But the reason for this, I think, is that parents have come to realize that the quality of education that could be afforded in, let's say, Kazakh schools is likely to be inferior to that in the Russian schools." The situation is quite different in the three southern Caucasus countries. In Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, relatively homogenous populations, intermarriage, and deep linguistic roots -- the Armenian and Georgian alphabets are both centuries older than the Cyrillic alphabet used in Russia -- have helped to strengthen the influence of the titular nationalities. Minorities, including ethnic Russians, have tended to learn the titular language when marrying into local families. Richard Giragosian is a Washington-based regional analyst and publisher of the monthly newsletter "TransCaucasus: A Chronology." "If we look at the last decade, all three countries have had a much easier time to establish their own linguistic identity. And [all] have had much less of a problem overcoming conflict also because the Russian minority population in each of the three countries has always been much less than in, say, Ukraine or some of the other Slavic former republics, or compared to Kazakhstan, for example," Giragosian says. There are sectors, says Giragosian, especially the military, where Russian continues to play an important role in the South Caucasus: "If we look at say the Armenian armed forces and to a lesser extent the Georgian armed forces, Russian language skills are highly valued. And in fact, if we look at, say, the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, the armed forces' officer corps is predominantly [composed of] Russian-speaking ethnic Armenians who migrated from parts of the former Soviet Union when that conflict erupted. It is interesting in that the Russian language in the Caucasus is still very much a path of advancement and in some places such as Armenia and Georgia, more than Azerbaijan, [knowing Russian is] seemingly rewarded in terms of career advancement." But in general, the trend away from Russian in the region is apparent and can be seen most clearly in Armenia -- even though Yerevan continues to maintain good relations with Moscow on a political level. Currently, the country operates only five Russian language schools -- four of them exclusively for children of Russian military personnel stationed in Armenia. Yerevan hosts a Russian-language university for 700 students, but the overwhelming majority of tertiary education takes place in Armenian, and there is a growing emphasis on English language study. Giragosian says: "If we look at the enrollment patterns and some of the World Bank data, we see that there's been a steep decline in Russian language teaching in the curriculum. This has mainly been due to budget shortfalls, mainly because we see across-the-board declines. However if we do look at the cases of foreign language instruction, we see a sharp increase, interestingly, in the teaching of English, German and to a lesser degree French, in the Caucasus -- which is very interesting." Surveys show Armenian students cite fluency in English as a necessity for their future careers. Giragosian comments: "And I think that follows a global trend as well and it's also matched, interestingly, when we look at Internet use in the Caucasus. Internet use in all three states -- although they do vary in terms of access and overcoming the digital divide -- is predominantly in English, just as in the world and other developing areas. But it is interesting and that will only combine with other factors to I think promote this trend." In the Baltic states, a new generation of students with no Russian skills has already grown into adulthood. Russia's "Pravda" newspaper illustrated this in a recent article. The paper recounted how one of its reporters had stopped a 17-year-old girl in Tallinn to ask for directions, only to be met with an uncomprehending stare, followed by a request to repeat the question in English. Estonia and Latvia, like Ukraine, retain large ethnic Russian populations and the language issue in those countries remains highly sensitive and politicized -- with Moscow regularly weighing in to defend the rights of Russian speakers. Giragosian notes that recently, Moscow has been getting help from some unexpected quarters: "NATO is now a very unlikely ally in promoting the rights of Russian speakers throughout the CIS and if we look at the current negotiations over a new cooperative relationship with Russia, we see the NATO Secretary-General George Robertson -- in a speech to the Latvian parliament on February 22nd, and in a speech as well in Estonia -- denouncing the so-called practice of 'ethnic democracy.' Those words are sure to please Moscow, but soon the Baltic states will likely find themselves in NATO and Russia will have far less leverage to use the language issue as a pressure tool. Russian, for the foreseeable future, will continue to play a major role across the former Soviet Union. But its once-dominant role has been eroded, and, within a few years, English may prove to be an important challenger. Moscow will have to offer more than threats and denunciations if it wants to ensure the continued international future of the tongue that 19th century writer Ivan Turgenev once called the "great, powerful, truthful, and free Russian language." (Salimjon Aiubov of the Tajik Service, Narynbek Idinov of the Kyrgyz Service, Naz Nazar of the Turkmen Service, Hrair Tamrazian of the Armenian Service, and RFE/RL's Pavel Boutorine contributed to this report.) *******