#6145 #6146 #6147
#6
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 2, No. 9, 18 March 2002
A Weekly Review of News and Analysis of Russian Domestic Politics
IS PUTIN POPULAR BECAUSE HE'S NOT YELTSIN? Russian President Vladimir Putin's continued high popularity rating has proven puzzling to many analysts -- if for no other reason than that Putin has made controversial choices on the foreign-policy front, including repeated overtures to the West. At the same the economy has stabilized rather than surged, and, outside of Moscow, there are few signs of economic prosperity. The results of a recently released report analyzing more than 10 years of polling data may shed some light on the Putin phenomenon. Some lead authors of the report wrote an article summing up their results in a recent issue of "Obshchaya gazeta" (no. 10). According to the authors, the Russian public distinguishes very sharply between the era of President Boris Yeltsin and the post-Yeltsin era. And Putin, correspondingly, seems to benefit from the widely held perception that he represented and continues to represent a fresh start.
In a list of 12 key events of the past 10 years, respondents responded most positively to Yeltsin's resignation. That action was viewed positively by more than 86 percent of respondents. The only other event viewed as positively was Putin's election, with 73 percent. The public was not only happy to see Yeltsin go -- it also views Putin as following a different course. Only 11 percent of respondents considered Putin as a promoter of Yeltsin's policies while 37 percent felt he was pursuing policies that have little to do with Yeltsin's programs. And, 12 percent believe -- and/or hope -- that Putin will stop everything Yeltsin set in motion.
Another key finding of the report is increased optimism. For example, over the last three years, the number of poll respondents who view the situation in Russia as catastrophic has fallen from 51 percent to 14 percent. In addition, almost two-thirds of Russians view their current social status as satisfactory while 41 percent call themselves middle class. This is despite the fact that almost 42 percent of those polled believe that they personally lost from the reforms -- first of all in a material sense. Anxiety over insufficient food supplies has also dropped dramatically. In 1994, fear of starvation was a widely held phobia, whereas now 92 percent of respondents said they are confident that the current food supply will not worsen. At the same time, certain fears have persisted. More than half of those polled --57.4 percent -- are afraid that crime will grow while 47.1 percent are afraid of a decline in their standard of living.
But such fears are likely more characteristic of a society that has stabilized than is its fear of starvation. "Obshchaya gazeta" observed in the lead-up to the authors' discussion that revolutions typically go through four phases. At first, there are "revolutionary expectations" and then, after the first changes are made, euphoria. Then comes disillusionment, which turns into depression. And during the final, fourth stage, life again becomes stabilized, and psychological equilibrium is restored. If the revolutionary cycle theory is applied to Russia over the past 10 years, then perhaps phase three -- disillusionment and depression -- lasted a little bit too long, and the period of stability ushered in by the arrival of a taciturn little man from St. Petersburg was long overdue. (Julie A. Corwin)
Back to the Top Next Article
March 20, 2002:
#6144 #6145 #6146 #6147
- Back to the Top -