#6
From: "Robert Jaeger" <rnj@jaegerdesigns.com>
Subject: Aleksandr Nikitin summary
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2002
Aleksandr Nikitin
Speaking at the University of Washington
Jackson School of International Studies
On Environmental Activism and Human Rights
(Summary of his 12 March 2002 presentation, by Lois DuPey and Robert Jaeger)
Alexandr Nikitin, who received training as a nuclear engineer at the Sevastopol Engineering Institute and served in Russia's Northern Fleet as an officer on a nuclear submarine is well qualified to comment on the state of environmental activism and human rights in Russia. His contribution to the Bellona Foundation report on the Russian Northern (nuclear) Fleet resulted in his imprisonment and house arrest while he fought a successful legal battle for five years in defense of his right to expose safety information regarding the Russian nuclear industry.
His Seattle talk focused on Russia's nuclear policy, dangers to public health and the environment posed by currently inadequate nuclear safety regimes and the state of US-Russian cooperation on nuclear threat reduction. The specific content of the talk seemed well matched to the constituency present, the audience being mainly students of foreign affairs and political science.
Geographically prioritizing areas where public safety is most threatened by nuclear materials and waste, in addition to the Mayak nuclear facility at Chelyabinsk he ranked Kola Peninsula, Severodvinsk, Krasnoyarsk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii and Vladivostok as posing the gravest dangers. Upon private questioning, Mr. Nikitin was clear in saying that quality information about specifics of the distribution of nuclear materials and related waste was not generally accessible. The direct implication of this observation being that the actual magnitude of this disaster in Russia and the FSU has never been published in open sources, and by inference may be vastly greater than here-to-fore indicated.
He sees an imminent threat posed by the Northern and Eastern nuclear fleets to the Russian nation and to the international environment. He contends that this threat entails some 260 nuclear submarines of which 80 remain active. The others have been removed from service but cannot be scrapped safely due to a lack of funds and total absence of facilities to accomplish safe defueling and contamination removal.
In addition, 15,000 tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel is being temporarily stored in various repositories. It should be emphasized that while depleted fuel material is the most energetic and potentially toxic substance involved, it does not comprise the bulk of the contamination hazard. The largest volume and mass of material of concern in this regard is contaminated secondary material from the manufacturing, use and removal of the fuel. This amounts to an unknown but many times larger mass than the fuel, itself.
Forty years of accumulated radioactive waste in these nuclear hotspots includes discarded reactors with liquid and solid waste inside. Some waste is stored underwater (dumped) in highly ecologically sensitive arctic and northern environments. These are the priority threats in Mr. Nikitin's view, to say nothing of the nation's nuclear power plants that also lack adequate security of all kinds and suffer repeated mechanical difficulties.
Information on the range of problems presented can be perused in detail on the website www.bellona.org. Mr. Nikitin observed that secure repositories do not exist for dismantled existing vessels and spent nuclear fuel. This has direct implication for the contemporary and future problem of special nuclear material diversion.
With respect to protection of the legal rights of individuals to environmental advocacy, Mr. Nikitin's message contained both positive and negative information. He suggested that there has been a definite increase during the past decade in unjustified imprisonment and harassment of scientists and activists concerned with nuclear and environmental security. However, the recent decision of the Russian Supreme Court in favor of military journalist Grigory Pasko, not unlike its earlier decision clearing Mr. Nikitin suggests that judicial reforms are moving in the direction of protection of human rights. Mr. Nikitin's extended battle for those rights has resulted in formation of a nascent constituency capable of pioneering the organizing and securing of legal protections under the current body of law, in spite of resistance from state organs.
Mr. Nikitin touched on the dangers posed by those U.S. policies that could potentially result in further degradation of the security environment of the Russian nuclear industry. In this regard, he warned that U.S. financing of Minatom (the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry) should be accompanied by strict functional control over the uses of such financing, rather than the loosely conceived accountability measures expressed in recent negotiations. It is anticipated that funds provided to existing Russian governmental agencies will be used for non-program activities, leaving the main mission unfunded and unaccomplished, and 'private' groups enriched. When this fiscal forecast is combined with the materials in question, the resulting threat to US national security as well as global concerns cannot be ignored.
Mr. Nikitin pointed out that U.S. approval of proposed imports into Russia of some 20,000 tons of additional spent nuclear fuel from Asian countries would add substantially to the already unmanageable level of security risk posed by unsafe storage conditions, lack of secure infrastructure and untenable transportation options. Such policies could significantly decrease the effectiveness of counterproliferation and counterterrorism efforts by both nations. The main goal of such policy on the part of the Russian agencies concerned seems to be revenue generation. The implication is that more creative and effective non-proliferation and cooperative threat reduction programs should be introduced, obviating the need to import additional dangerous materials.
Mr. Nikitin expressed considerable concern regarding further expansion of closed cycle spent fuel reprocessing capability in Russia, citing this as the primary area of immediate risk. The Mayak facility at Chelyabinsk was identified as an especially vulnerable target for diversion of special materials. In short, his expert opinion suggests that U.S.-Russian cooperation in nuclear threat reduction must be substantially redirected in order to avoid aggravating the grave dangers that have accumulated in Russia, as well as elsewhere in the world, as a result of the Cold War.
This presentation in Seattle was at the invitation of groups directly involved with academic research and environmental awareness, and their interests were articulately addressed. Not publicly addressed was the direct connection between these activities and conventional national security, of both Russia and the USA. Mr. Nikitin demonstrated his awareness of this connection in private communication. Much information exists in open sources describing various paths leading from nuclear material issues to direct interaction between national representatives.
Mr. Nikitin so aptly emphasizes the critical value of open publication of information previously considered not for public consumption in either country. It is really no surprise, then, that many barriers remain between the fact of what currently exists and the general knowledge of it. Mr. Nikitin has demonstrated his conviction and ability to lead others in bridging this gap. We can anticipate more publications of specifics about this issue, enabling discerning observers to make verifiable and correct assessments for a change.
L. DuPey is a private consultant working on economic development issues. R. Jaeger is an independent consultant in security, counterterror and related issues.
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