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March 17, 2002:    #6140

#11
www.globalsecurity.org
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm
Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]
Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001.
8 January 2002

Nuclear Posture Review Report

The following is a summary of the highlights in this report.

First and foremost, the Nuclear Posture Review puts the Cold War practices related to planning for strategic forces behind us. In the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, planning for the employment of U.S. nuclear forces has undergone only modest revision, despite the new relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Few changes had been made to the size or composition of the strategic nuclear force beyond those required by the START Treaty. At the same time, plans and funding for sustaining some critical elements of that force have been inadequate.

As a result of this review, the U.S. will no longer plan, size or sustain its forces as though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Following the direction laid down for U.S. defense planning in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review shifts planning for America's strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach. This new approach should provide, over the coming decades, a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and allied security....

"Russia maintains the most formidable nuclear forces, aside from the United States, and substantial, if less impressive, conventional capabilities. There now are, however, no ideological sources of conflict with Moscow, as there were during the Cold War. The United States seeks a more cooperative relationship with Russia and a move away from the balance-of-terror policy framework, which by definition is an expression of mutual distrust and hostility. As a. result, a [nuclear strike] contingency involving Russia, while plausible, is not expected." (p. 17)

(U) "Adjusting U.S. immediate nuclear force requirements in recognition of the changed relationship with Russia is a critical step away from the Cold War policy of mutual vulnerability and toward more cooperative relations.” (p. 17)

(S) "Russia’s nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many strategic problems around its periphery and its future course cannot be charted with certainty. U.S. planning must take this into account. In the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture." (p. 17)

START II Treaty "...the Russian resolution of ratification, adopted in 2000, contains unacceptable provision contrary to the new strategic framework and establishment of the New Triad."

De-Alerting "U.S. forces are not on "hair trigger" alert and rigorous safeguards exist to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapons safety, security, reliability, and command and control. Multiple, stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against U.S. accidental and unauthorized launch."

"The New Triad addresses concerns about the accidental or unauthorized launch of certain foreign forces. For example, it provides missile defenses to protect the United States, it allies, and friends against limited or unauthorized launches. It also will provide a spectrum of defensive and non-nuclear response options to an accidental or unauthorized launch, allowing the United States to tailor an appropriate response to the specific event and to limit the danger of escalation."

"The elimination of the Peacekeeper ICBM will be phased to correspond with the introduction of the Trident II (D-5) missile in the Pacific. As they are eliminated, those Peacekeeper missiles remaining during the elimination process will be kept on alert to provide a necessary contribution to the U.S. portfolio of capabilities." (p. 54)

"Following the initial phase of U.S. nuclear reductions, subsequent reductions will be achieved by downloading warheads from missiles and bombers. Force structure will be retained as the basis for reconstructing the responsive force. Delivery systems will not be retired following initial reductions and downloaded warheads will be retained as needed for the responsive force." (p. 54)

The Comprehensive Test Ban "The United States has not conducted nuclear tests since 1992 and supports the continued observance of the testing moratorium. While the United States is making every effort to maintain the stockpile without additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible for the indefinite future. Some problems in the stockpile due to aging and manufacturing defects have already been identified. Increasingly, objective judgments about capability in a non-testing environment will become far more difficult. Each year the DoD and DOE will reassess the need to resume nuclear testing and will make recommendations to the President. Nuclear nations have a responsibility to assure the safety and reliability of their own nuclear weapons." (p. 55)

Transparency "The START I Treaty includes provisions that provide a useful baseline of transparency for offensive strategic forces. Any additional transparency that may be useful to provide added confidence and predictability would be in the form of separate political commitments."

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March 17, 2002:    #6140

 

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