Johnson's Russia List
#6137
15 March 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Note from David Johnson:
1. therussianissues.com: Legal Revolution.
2. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review. (DJ: Please note Luba's remarks
about moving to Moscow.)
3. Peter Lavelle: Untimely Thoughts - The state of the Putinite state.
4. The Times (UK) editorial: Putin's prize. Bush needs to tend this vital
relationship more carefully.
5. The Times (UK): Michael Binyon, Russia 'will stand by coalition even if
Iraq is attacked'
6. Reuters: Russian-US arms differences remain, says minister.
7. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Marina Volkov, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE FEDERAL
ASSEMBLY. The president will deliver his annual address to parliament on
April 18.
8. Reuters: Russia, NATO at odds over stature of new forum.
9. Vremya Novostei: Yuri Golotyuk, USA HAS CONVINCED RUSSIA TO STOP
DISARMAMENT.
10. pravda.ru: MAJORITY OF RUSSIANS STILL FAVOR PUTIN.
11. The Russia Journal: John Helmer, WHO CAN YOU TRUST IN RUSSIA?
12. Krasnaya Zvezda: WE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS WORLD. (Interview with
Colonel-General Yuri BALUYEVSKY, First Deputy Chief of the Russian General
Staff)]
********
#1
Legal Revolution
March 15 press review
By Anna Bondarenko
therussianissues.com
Something extraordinary happened yesterday about the Russian procedural
criminal law. The Russian Constitutional Court decided that since July 1,
2002 no one in Russia could be detained for more that 48 hours without a
court approval. All regulations of the criminal-commitment code that
entitles the Office of Public Prosecution to sanction detainment pronounced
to be void.
It has been a while since the Russian press was so unanimously supportive
of something that happened in either political or social life of the
country. Izvestia calls the decision "sensational", Vremya Novostei states
that "the country has parted with yet one more remnant of the Soviet
juridical practice" and Kommersant goes as far as declaring that the
Constitutional Court "has performed a revolution in the Russian procedural
criminal law system".
In principal, the constitutional right of sanctioning detainment was
recognized as a court's privilege in the Constitution of the Russian
Federation but due to the "transition period" it was to come into force no
earlier than January 1, 2004. Three Russian citizens who were detained for
the investigation period without a court approval decided to appeal the
Office of Public Prosecution's decisions. Independently from each other
they challenged the long-drawn transition period and demanded to pronounce
their detainment as contradictory to the Constitution. On March 14, 2002,
the Russian Constitutional Court agreed with them.
The decision taken by the Constitutional court is now valid not only for
those three citizens but also for everyone who investigating agencies might
decide to detain in the future. As quoted by Kommersant, the Court's
resolution considers detainment sanctioned by the Office of Public
Prosecution as a "transition measure, which is to be valid only until
appropriate changes are introducing to the legislation". The changes are to
be launched in the shortest possible time. Thus, the present resolution
that has made the transition measures permanent is "contradictory to the
realization of the court mechanism that protects an individual's rights and
freedoms."
*******
#2
ORT Review
www.ortv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu)
Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and
Policy at Boston University
[Note: Dear JRL readers,
In May I will graduate (MA: Contemporary History; BA: International
Relations) and move to Moscow (my family emigrated from Moscow in 1989;
I'm a US citizen). I will continue doing the ORT Reviews, but I'm also
looking for part-time (15-30hrs/week) work -- translating, news analysis,
PR, or any job directly related to current information about Russia. For
a copy of my resume and/or more information please e-mail me at
luba7@bu.edu.]
HEADLINES,
Thursday, March 14, 2002
- Police officers and representatives from soccer clubs met today to
develop a joint plan for keeping out-of-control soccer fans in check. To
prevent disturbances, video surveillance cameras will be installed and
ditches between the seating area and the playing field will be dug at a
number of stadiums.
- The Russian General Prosecutor's office has dispatched a team of
investigators to Chechnya to verify reports that civilians were killed
during a special operation in the Starye Atagi settlement.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov met with Secretary of State Colin
Powell and with directors of American special services before leaving the
US. He also met with Russian journalists at the Russian Embassy in
Washington.
- The Russian Cabinet has approved a bill allowing the sale of
agricultural land. Certain limitations will be imposed on foreign
ownership of land and regional authorities will have control over the size
of the plots.
- The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has imposed some
limits on the Prosecutor's Office. It will now be unlawful to detain a
suspect for more than two days without a court sanction.
- Police officers have detained Sergei Mukhtasarov, a criminal who faked
his death to avoid prosecution for offenses he committed in Belarus.
Mukhatasarov will be extradited to Belarus in the near future.
- The world's first space tourism vehicle was presented at the Zhukovsky
space salon in the suburbs of Moscow.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohammad. Muhammad was supposed to come to Moscow six months
ago, but the visit was postponed after the tragedy of September 11th.
Cooperation in the energy and high-tech spheres, environmental action, and
cadre preparation were at the top of the agenda.
- President Putin submitted the new rotation of the Presidium of the State
Council: Chitin Oblast Governor Ravil Geniatulin, Astrakhan Oblast
Governor Anatoly Guzhvin, Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug Governor Yuri
Neelov, Novgorod Oblast Governor Mikhail Prusak, Orlov Oblast Governor
Yegor Stroev, Samara Oblast Governor Konstantin Titov, and Sakhalin Oblast
Governor Igor Farkhutdinov are the new members.
- Former First Lady Naina Yeltsina celebrated her 70th birthday today.
President Putin and First Lady Ludmila Putina visited Yeltsina to wish her
a happy birthday.
- About 5 kilograms of hexogen were stolen from a chemical factory in the
Nizhegorod oblast. Police officers captured the two factory workers who
stole the explosive as they were trying to sell it.
- President Putin announced that Russia welcomes the UN resolution that
basically recognizes Palestine as a state.
- The four men accused of kidnapping ORT operator Dmitry Zavadsky were
found guilty and sentenced to life in prison
- Russian skiers Larisa Lazutina and Olga Danilova have filed appeals with
the international Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland.
- An armed soldier deserted a Maritime-region garrison.
- Search and rescue efforts in the Port of Hong Kong have failed to locate
the five sailors who disappeared in yesterday's shipwreck.
- Police officers carried out an operation to round up prostitutes who
work the Leningrad highway.
- Ten people were buried in an avalanche in North Ossetia.
*******
#3
From: "Peter Lavelle"
Subject: Untimely Thoughts
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2002
Peter Lavelle: Untimely Thoughts - The state of the Putinite state
(re Putin's State of the Union address, Part 4 of 5)
Putin started his presidency with two aims in mind - to reverse Russia's
economic and structural decline. Without such a plan Russia was doomed to
slowly drift into oblivion. As reviewed earlier, the President has reason
to believe he has stopped the decline of the economy and even initiated a
recovery of sorts. Russia's present is much more desirable than the
listless Yeltsin second administration. However, the comparison is
beginning to be less convincing and meaningful.
The economic successes of the last two years have almost nothing to do with
reforms debated, passed into law or promulgated by presidential order under
the current administration. Actually, structural reform of the state has
not really even started. On paper there are hints of improvements - some
offices even look something like what state bureaucratic structures appear
in the west. Unfortunately, the old Soviet bureaucratic mentality remains
pervasive. The postal system is one of my favorite examples. The same old
and failed attempt to train people to think in a particular fashion is still
the state's modus operandi. If Putin is to make his rhetoric a reality, he
better get on with it - his presidency (after reelection) has only six years
left under the current constitution. Time is of the essence. I hope that
this address will finally tell us where Putin wants to take Russia - the
last two years have demonstrated only that he can take personal control of
the country's political establishment without having a specific policy
agenda.
State restructuring and corruption
Considering the last decade, Russia has achieved a modicum of political
stability backed-up by sustained economic growth. However, the foundation
of Putin's political stability rests on a rigid bureaucracy that rightly is
described as authoritarian. State institutions remain weak, personalism the
norm. The political elite, at least for the time being, has settled on the
person of Putin to be leader. Representative institutions look to the
President and the Presidential Administration for clues or orders to
determine their next step.
The economy, where it really counts, is likewise tightly controlled from the
top down. Over the last two years small and medium size business continued
to struggle to survive due to state supported (or partially state-owned)
industrial-financial empires. The state's role in the energy sector remains
critical. Without this involvement, the state would not be able to fill its
coffers to pay for social programs or even national defense. The economy's
reliance on the export of raw materials has changed little over the last two
years.
Will the President articulate on how he intends to continue restructuring
the state under conditions of economic growth? With the grip of the
oligarchs weaken, what is the next step to untangle the state's involvement
with big business? With meaningful political opposition hardly likely in
the near and medium-term, is it time to start to examining the consequences
'vertical centralization of power' has on reforming state and social
institutions.
To give flesh to some of the issues Putin's needs to address in the nearest
future, the following recent examples of state-directed reform gone adrift
or simply absent should suffice.
Last week, I heard Kozak speak about legal reform for almost an hour. When
he finished, I turned to the person next to me and asked if he had any idea
what he had just said. The answer was no. Maybe my Russian (and English)
legalese is not up to scratch, maybe the translation was lacking.
My gut feeling is that most of the audience had the same impression I did -
a lot of words, not a whole lot of substance. What was very disturbing was
the fact that people were not mentioned; just obscure structures. This
reflects how the law remains only printed words to menace and threaten, a
realm where the ordinary person and businesses are acutely aware of the
state's administrative fait.
The print media is full of rumors and speculations that the President will
focus his address on the need to seriously push through military reform and
restructuring of the defense sector. This may account for the gossip
concerning Sergei Ivanov's dismissal last week and Klebanov's recent job
description change. While I have a strong dislike for rumors planted in the
press, I have to agree the current military situation presents Putin with an
opportunity to push Russia's wayward military into the new century.
The military's inability to resolve the "Chechen nuisance", coupled with the
memory and reality of the Kursk tragedy gives Putin ample room to criticize
the military. It should be remembered the last military "success" of this
establishment was Czechoslovakia in 1968. These two issues alone though
would probably not be enough to bestir high military officials out of their
antiquated worldview. However, Putin can take virtue from necessity from
the perception that Russia has not only collapsed as a world power, but it
is also seen as a bystander to America's growing hegemony in areas that were
the Soviet Union.
Putin can cogently make the argument that the reason American forces are in
Georgia is the result of a military that has lost touch with the times.
Putin can make the claim that his foreign policy can only be as strong as
Russia's military. On a more mundane note, Putin should also stress that
much of Russia's valuable intellectual property is tied to the defense
procurement sector and is not currently being put to the best (profitable)
use.
Gazprom's share value dropped 7% in one day this week (a loss of over $1
billion in market capitalization) due to a charge made by the tax
authorities that the company was fraudulent in its tax payments. The rumor
mill went into over drive: "Miller to resign", "Vyakhirev's rearguard coup",
"New wave of terror against business", etc. Well, the tax authorities were
probably just panicking that it was not exceeding the tax collection rate it
had gotten use to over the past two years. There is the fear of not
pleasing the boss. Putin should be displeased that one of the country's
most important assets was attacked for little more reason than one
institution's inability cope with the fact that the economy is slowing.
In the meantime, there were a few individuals who laughed all the way to
bank during the confusion.
These three examples bring me to my last point - corruption. Corruption in
Russia is not only about theft, kompromat, and racketeering. More
importantly, corruption should be understood as political corruption
retarding the organic growth of the economy and society. Corruption in
Russia is a pathos - a way of thinking that is diametrically opposed to the
general welfare of the state and society. Putin has made little if any
progress in this area. Little of what he has done is encouraging. The
examples mentioned above are very telling in the sense that much of what
Putin is doing and can do is amiss in everyday political discourse for the
average Russian. Most of the perceived attacks on corruption are
interpreted as mere asset reallocation for the politically loyal - proof
enough that most Russians believe the system is inherently corrupt. I am
at a loss as how the President should proceed in this realm.
What I do know is this; Putin's vision to build a liberal democratic and
market order lacks a liberal spirit. The reform project has only just begun
and where it will go remains unclear. Maybe his address will give us some
direction.
Part 1: Foreign policy
Part 2: Civil society project
Part 3: Economic reform
Part 5: Overall assessment - (after the address).
Peter Lavelle, Head of Research, IFC Metropol, Moscow, Russia
********
#4
The Times (UK)
March 15, 2002
Editorial
Putin's prize
Bush needs to tend this vital relationship more carefully
By 291 votes to six, the Russian Duma yesterday accused Washington of
seeking, under the guise of curbing the twin threats of international
terrorism and nuclear proliferation, to “settle scores” with Iraq, Iran and
North Korea. In a condemnation couched in Soviet-era rhetoric, the deputies
declared that an American overthrow of any these regimes would be “an
interference in the internal affairs of these states”.
In this return to verbal hostilities, Russia’s MPs are not alone. Anatoli
Kvavshin, the powerful and authoritarian Chief of the General Staff,
recently told elite troops of the Moscow Military District that Nato still
sees Russia and Belarus as its enemies, that its partnership with Russia is
just a “media smokescreen” and that they must be alert against external
aggression. Not since Aleksandr Lebed ridiculed Boris Yeltsin for being “a
goat running after the Nato carrot” has the Russian high command so
contradicted a President. Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports that Vladimir Putin’s
quest for a strategic alliance with the United States has the backing of
barely a third of Russia’s career servicemen. A recent request by Georgia’s
President Shevardnadze for US help in hunting down terrorists linked to
al-Qaeda in the Pankisi Gorge — an area described by Sergei Ivanov,
Russia’s Defence Minister, as “a mini-Afghanistan ten kilometres from our
borders” — created a firestorm, not least because Georgia has refused
repeated Russian requests to send in its own troops. Igor Ivanov, the
Russian Foreign Minister, whose guarded caveats on Iraq The Times prints
today on page 19, came close to accusing the US of destabilising the
Caucasus until President Putin pointedly, and accurately, observed that the
US presence was “no tragedy” for Russian security.
Too much should not be made of these mutterings. President Putin’s dramatic
declaration, on September 11, that Russia’s cause was identical with
America’s was always bound to make him enemies in the Russian political and
military establishments, schooled as they have been for decades in
suspicion of the West. His pursuit of that strategy has not troubled his
rapport with Russian voters, where his popularity rating remains a
remarkable 75 per cent. Throughout the past six months Mr Putin has been
unswervingly determined in his pursuit of his broader goal, which is
nothing less than an enduring transformation of Russia’s relationship with
the West. He has treated such disputes with Washington as there have been
as irritants to be dealt with as they arise, but that must not disrupt the
maturing partnership.
The US needs, however, to be as willing as Mr Putin to shed the Cold War
thinking that permeates the establishment. President Bush should urge
Congress rapidly to review a raft of laws that unduly restrict trade,
technology exchanges, visas and the freedom of movement allowed Russian
diplomats in the US. America must shed bad old habits of its own in dealing
with Russia, if it wants it to be a predictable and reliable partner. If Mr
Putin wants strategic arms reductions sealed in some sort of formal
agreement, Mr Bush should oblige. Contracts are stabilisers, not traps. It
is a small price to pay for Russian restraint on Iraq.
Mr Ivanov is right, too, about the importance of bringing Russia closer to
Nato. Not only is Nato’s refusal to purchase arms from Russia pointless and
offensive, but the alliance’s machinery for consultations with Moscow badly
needs oiling, if not redesign. Before Nato welcomes the Baltic states later
this year, Tony Blair’s proposal of a new “Nato at 20” council, where
Russia sits as an equal, needs to be acted upon. It must be clear where
Russia can be a full part of Nato consultations, and what are matters for
Nato members alone. Counter-terrorism is an obvious starting point. Mr
Putin will welcome Mr Bush to St Petersburg in May, on the heels of Nato’s
next summit in Reykjavik. What Mr Putin wants, and what he needs, is for
the two leaders to emerge from that sensitive meeting visibly united in
their common purpose. Mr Bush would be wise to meet him well over halfway.
********
#5
The Times (UK)
March 15, 2002
Russia 'will stand by coalition even if Iraq is attacked'
From Michael Binyon in Moscow
RUSSIA made clear yesterday that it would not pull out of the American-led
coalition against terror even if the United States launched a unilateral
strike against Iraq.
Igor Ivanov, the Foreign Minister, said that Moscow opposed any US strike
on Baghdad which would cause turmoil not only in the Gulf but throughout
the Middle East.
In talks next week in London with Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, he
will remind him that Moscow opposed the Anglo-American strikes on Baghdad
in 1998.
In an interview with The Times, Mr Ivanov said: “We would hope that the US
and UK do not make the same mistake again.” A strike would deal “a serious
blow” to the coalition. But he stopped short of any threat to cut off
Russian help for the anti-terrorist campaign, which he insisted Russia
supported.
“It would not be expedient to issue any ultimatums to say that we would
withdraw from the coalition,” he said. “Participation in this coalition is
not some present or gift to give to someone, but in our own interests. We
have common positions with Britain on this.”
Mr Ivanov said that only the United Nations was authorised to act against
any country breaking UN resolutions, and he urged Britain and America to
focus on talks to return weapons inspectors to Iraq.
But he acknowledged the signs from Washington that it was preparing to take
military action. Russia was therefore now urging President Saddam Hussein
to implement all UN resolutions and allow the weapons inspectors to return.
Moscow wanted to see an end to all Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, but
believed that the chance of a political settlement was not exhausted. Mr
Ivanov said that Russia “cannot but be concerned” by the unilateralism in
US policy.
Russia has been vexed by a series of US actions and statements that have
stirred up an angry public response here. He said that these ranged from
last year’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to
the recently leaked document that includes Russia among American nuclear
targets.
The Kremlin wanted to build a “partnership and predictable relations” with
America. But this was hard if calls by President Bush and President Putin
for better relations were not supported by deeds.
Predictability was possible only with more transparency and mutual trust.
He cited as an example, America’s dispatch of military instructors to
Georgia. This did not hurt the sovereignty of either Georgia or Russia, he
said.
But Moscow was upset at not being consulted. “Taking into account the
proximity of Georgia to Russia and the fact that from Georgia terrorists
are making assaults on Russian territory; if we are partners, then they
should have let us know and consulted us.”
He attributed the Bush Administration’s failure to do so to “past
stereotypes” and an underestimate of the sensitivity of the Caucasus for
Russian public opinion. Without naming anyone in the Bush Administration,
Mr Ivanov also denounced continued Cold War thinking, especially on Russian
relations with Nato. Moscow welcomed the proposal by Tony Blair to give
Russia a bigger say by bolstering the 1997 Russia-Nato treaty. It wanted a
consultative mechanism to be turned into a decision-making mechanism.
But talks between Russia and Nato members to underpin this change were not
going well. This was entirely due to the refusal by some to overcome Cold
War stereotypes.
“These new negotiations should show whether we have really reached a new
stage in our relations or not, and whether we have really turned the page
of the Cold War.”
He made it clear that Russia’s opposition to the admission of the Baltic
states to Nato — likely to be approved at the Nato summit in Prague this
summer — would be modified only if Moscow was given a real say in the way
that Nato decisions were made.
If agreement could be reached at Nato’s Reykjavik council in May that would
make Russia and Nato members partners — “then, naturally, many questions of
European security will be regarded differently”.
Mr Ivanov, who reiterated Russia’s opposition to enlargement in Lithuania
last week, said that Moscow could not ban any sovereign state, including
the Baltics, from joining this or that organisation.
But he gave a warning that if there was no agreement and Nato followed its
old path of “mechanical expansion”, Russia would be forced to take measures
to protect its interests. He did not specify these.
European security will be a main topic of his talks next week with Mr Straw
and also in Germany. But the acute dangers in the Middle East are also
worrying Russia. Moscow has no intention of presenting any new peace plan.
There were plenty already, Mr Ivanov said, and the important thing was to
end violence and get them implemented.
For the first time he acknowledged that the presence of a million Russian
Jewish immigrants in Israel — many of whom still retained close links with
their former homeland — had increased Russia’s influence there considerably.
He wanted Moscow to use its improved relations with Israel, while retaining
traditional good links with the Arabs, as an honest broker to encourage an
end to violence.
This did not mean Russia was claiming any special role for itself in the
region. It was not realistic to act alone.
He cast doubt on America’s ability to act alone to encourage a settlement
in the Middle East. Moscow acknowledged Washington’s “key role”, but
criticised the Clinton Administration’s efforts to keep all others out of
the picture. “We know the results.”
In Afghanistan Russia would not play any military role nor send
peacekeeping troops. Russian society was still far too sensitive over past
military intervention for that.
But he urged the West to help the Afghans to strengthen their armed forces
so that the interim Government could assert its authority.
The new American bases in Central Asia did not worry Russia, especially as
the US had promised that it would not remain there for long. It all
depended what the bases were for. If they were to help fight terrorism,
Russia supported them, as it had long been worried about Islamic terrorist
movemements in the region. But the Kremlin would not be so supportive if
there was any other motive for these bases.
*******
#6
Russian-US arms differences remain, says minister
By Ron Popeski
MOSCOW, March 15 (Reuters) - Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said on
Friday that talks this week in Washington had failed to resolve differences
over nuclear disarmament, one of the last major vestiges of the Cold War.
The two sides are under enormous pressure to clinch an agreement on
reducing strategic arsenals to be signed at a May summit.
"Differences in approach to the text of the future agreement remain between
Moscow and Washington," Russian news agencies quoted Ivanov as saying
during a stopover in Ireland on his way back to Moscow.
"But I would not say that this is a dead end."
His caution was in contrast to earlier optimism in Washington where
President George W. Bush said on Wednesday he was confident a formal deal
on joint nuclear arms cuts would be ready for a May 23-26 summit with his
Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.
Ivanov said experts would pursue discussions next week in Geneva on
outstanding issues -- mainly U.S. proposals to store rather than destroy
warheads taken out of service.
Moscow sees the summit as a consolidation of Putin's pro-Western foreign
policy, underpinned by his backing for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition.
"At the moment a certain window of opportunity in our relations has been
opened, or at least a small window, for a considerable improvement," he was
quoted as saying. "It is vital to make use of this at once. Otherwise it
might close."
RESERVATIONS OVER WARHEAD STORAGE
Russian concerns over U.S. plans to store rather than destroy warheads are
part of broader differences in approach to post-Cold War disarmament --
including Washington's plan to build a missile shield.
Washington wants to keep the warheads in store just in case of new threats
to its national security.
Bush was optimistic after his talks with Ivanov, saying an accord would be
"a good thing." He favoured a "document that outlives both of us" and said
verification was more important than storage or destruction of warheads.
Ivanov suggested for the first time that Russia might also consider
storing, rather than destroying, warheads as well as the missiles or
bombers that would deliver them.
Both Putin and Bush have called for a cut in strategic arsenals from
current levels of between 6,000 and 7,000 warheads to 1,500-2,200.
Some commentators predicted a breakthrough in time for May's summit.
"Ivanov put on a brave face. Russia's concern is destroying delivery
vehicles, not warheads, to maintain its position and Ivanov appears to have
encountered a clear refusal," independent analyst Alexander Golts said.
"Still, I think there will be an agreement by the summit. There is nowhere
else to go."
*******
#7
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
March 15, 2002
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY
The president will deliver his annual address to parliament on April 18
Author: Marina Volkova
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE CONTENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY
WERE DISCUSSED YESTERDAY AT A CABINET MEETING. THE PROPOSALS WERE
LACKING IN FRESHNESS AND ORIGINALITY. WHETHER ANY OF THEM WILL BE
INCLUDED IN THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS REMAINS TO BE SEEN.
The date of the president's annual address to the Federal
Assembly was set yesterday. Vladimir Putin will address members of
parliament, and guests from other branches of government, on April 18.
The shift of the date is in no way connected with his unwillingness to
follow the traditions of Yeltsin, who addressed the Federal Assembly
every March. The work on the text of this year's address is making
slow progress.
The economic part of the speech, which usually makes up a third
of it, should be prepared by the Cabinet. Recently, there was a
meeting with Mikhail Kasianov, Alexei Kudrin, Herman Gref, Alexander
Voloshin, Jahan Polpyeva and Andrei Illarionov in the Kremlin, where
they were to present their version of the economical dream for the
year. According to our sources, they did not manage to formulate more
or less reasonable ideas about economy. Being disciplined civil
servants they submitted their suggestions on "national ideas for the
year". But they turned out to be so far from reality that could not
evoke anything else but bewilderment.
Our sources called development of space industry and aviation as
the most "reasonable" ideas. Against the backdrop of the US national
missile defense system with its space programs, and plane crashes in
Russia, a presidential address with such an idea would seem like
science fiction. Another great Cabinet idea - to analyze how the
reform programs are being implemented, and on the basis of the results
to create a program for this year. According to our sources, after
criticizing their thought processes, the ministers were advised not to
depart too far from reality, and think of something new.
There are several trends in the Cabinet which could be included
in the presidential address. Firstly, the military reform. Secondly, a
passage about economic activity and deregulation. Thirdly, aim at the
bank and land reforms. Fourthly, a couple of paragraphs about the need
to increase monitoring over natural monopolies and transparency of
their cash flows. Great hopes are placed on investment programs, and
state representatives "with clean hands and cool heads". Fifthly, the
problem of expanding the tax base. In 2003 the turnover tax will be
abolished, and the revenues should be compensated somehow. And the
government is thinking how not to affect the poor, but to put the tax
burden on the rich. Sixthly, the Cabinet is going to produce something
like industrial policies: to select priority-driven industries (space,
aviation, automobiles), which the state will support in the first
place, and also try to understand in which industries the state should
decrease its presence, or withdraw permanently.
Which suggestions will be included in the presidential address
will become known only on the eve of its presentation, as they say in
the Cabinet. The Kremlin considers that the ideas of the ministers, as
well as all other proposals, are lacking "in scale". However, they do
realize that expanding scale will require additional resources.
Otherwise, the president can speak about outer space - that idea can't
be implemented, anyway.
(Translated by Daria Brunova)
******
#8
ANALYSIS-Russia, NATO at odds over stature of new forum
By John Chalmers
BRUSSELS, March 15 (Reuters) - Talks between Russia and NATO for a new
joint council have run into difficulties, with Moscow pushing for a robust
relationship that could challenge the very nature of the 53-year-old
defence alliance.
"There is now a feeling that the Russians are going too far, and there is
some annoyance," said one NATO official. "We are not going to change the
basic operating procedures of the alliance just because of this new forum."
NATO has set itself a deadline -- a meeting of its foreign ministers in
Reykjavik, Iceland, in two months time -- to create a forum in which Russia
would sit as an equal partner with the alliance's 19 nations and have a say
in decision-making on specific security issues.
The plan grew out of President Vladimir Putin's decision to align Russia
unambiguously with the international alliance against terrorism after the
September 11 attacks on America.
That solidarity spurred efforts to address Moscow's complaint that it had
no voice in the Permanent Joint Council, a five-year-old forum for
consultation with Russia where decisions are usually "pre-cooked" by the 19
allies.
Moscow is now bargaining hard ahead of Reykjavik to win considerable clout
within the ranks of its Cold War adversary, and perhaps quicken NATO's
evolution from a military machine to an umbrella force for wider, regional
security.
Diplomats said Putin needs to show sceptics in his government and armed
forces, many of whom are anxious about the prospect of NATO's imminent
enlargement to Russia's frontiers, that he is getting something in return
for pro-Western policies.
STANDARD BARGAINING
One senior diplomat said Moscow wants the new forum, which will probably be
called the NATO-Russia Council, to set decisions taken "at 20" in stone --
making it impossible for the 19 allies to review them in their own North
Atlantic Council.
He said Russia is also seeking to enshrine principles of the United Nations
Security Council within the new body, effectively making it less of a NATO
forum.
The same thinking formed the basis of a Russian proposal which was roundly
rejected by NATO last month. This envisaged a council of 20 nation states
in their own right, though still under the chairmanship of NATO's secretary
general.
"It's a standard bargaining technique: you put out an outrageous bid and
then back down to what you can live with," said one NATO nation diplomat.
"But one thing is for sure, there will be a firewall between the new
NATO-Russia Council and the North Atlantic Council."
The United States applied the brakes last December to what some, including
new NATO members the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, feared was an
ill-considered dash for a new partnership that could effectively have
handed a non-member the power of veto over alliance action.
Since then, alliance strategists have been working to agree on a mechanism
and agenda topics for the forum.
Unlike Russia, they have focused on a restricted list of softer issues
which would not risk the kind of discord triggered by NATO's 1999 air
campaign against Yugoslavia over Kosovo.
This initially modest list would probably include counter-terrorism, civil
emergency preparedness, airspace management and joint military training and
exercises.
COMRADES -- BUT IN ARMS?
But Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said after his deputy held talks
with a senior NATO official in Moscow earlier this month that "a purely
cosmetic mechanism...scarcely meets the reality of the age or interests of
our country."
Russia's Interfax news agency quoted sources as saying after the meeting
that there were "considerable difficulties" which may not be resolved
before NATO's Reykjavik meeting.
NATO diplomats say that Russia wants to trumpet the new relationship as a
huge political breakthrough, keep the Permanent Joint Council alive to
underline the importance of the new forum and even set up a secretariat at
NATO's headquarters.
"Look, NATO is NATO," said one alliance official. "At the end of the day we
are confident that our Russian colleagues will be pragmatic and realistic."
Although there is a broad consensus within the alliance that the West needs
Russian comrades, there is doubt about whether they should be comrades in
arms.
But Franklin Kramer, former U.S. assistant secretary of defense, argued in
a commentary this week that NATO should bring Russia into a military
command structure as part of efforts to shore up its relevance for new
security challenges.
He wrote in The Washington Times that NATO should create an Allied
Expeditionary Force to complement the United States' superior military
capabilities, and a new NATO-Russia brigade should be part of that force.
"If an effective working relationship can be developed with Russia --
certainly an achievable goal -- the continent will have a common security
system for the first time," he said. "...NATO's old habits and structures
will not allow for an institution significant to the problems of today, and
tomorrow."
******
#9
Vremya Novostei
March 15, 2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
USA HAS CONVINCED RUSSIA TO STOP DISARMAMENT
By Yuri GOLOTYUK
The Washington visit of Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov had
a paradoxical result. Ivanov made a striking admission after
the talks, during which the sides did their best to convince
each other of their exceptional love of peace and the need for
further reductions of strategic armaments. He said that Russia
might follow the US example and not destroy but store its
nuclear warheads.
Replying to a question about Russia's plans concerning the
nuclear warheads, the minister said: "We are pondering
different variants relying on principles of equal security and
we will inform our American partners about our decisions." In
other words, the USA seems to have convinced Russia to halt, if
not stop altogether, nuclear disarmament, which Russia has
actually launched unilaterally.
Until recently Moscow did nothing to reciprocate the
actions of Washington, which seems bent to demonstrate to
Russia the vulnerability of its peaceloving stand. In the past
few months the USA and its military allies have made a series
of fundamental steps, which can have very sad consequences for
Russia's national security in the future. In particular,
Washington announced its withdrawal from the ABM treaty. NATO
launched a new stage of its eastward enlargement and had
greatly reinforced its nuclear planning structures. And the US
administration has publicly stated that its nuclear reduction
plans stipulate not the liquidation but storage of nuclear
warheads, which can be easily mounted on delivery vehicles in
case of need.
The official expression of Russia's disagreement was the
only proof that it took note of these aggressive acts. On the
other hand, the Kremlin formulated its disagreement extremely
politely and did not allow itself to undertake anything
resembling old-style demarches, which were traditional for
Russian diplomacy in the past (like Khrushchev's "showing them
a thing or two" and Yeltsin's "last warnings").
Moreover, Russia even continued the reform of its
strategic nuclear forces, during which the number of nuclear
warheads on its delivery vehicles is to be reduced to more than
one-third in the next few years. The Russian military continued
to honestly fulfil even the provisions of the START-2 treaty,
which legally expired after the ABM treaty kicked the bucket.
Russia is speedily liquidating the weapons which the Americans
fear more than anything else - the SS-18 Satan heavy ICBMs and
railway based ballistic missiles, those untraceable missile
trains, the Russian super-weapon.
It is interesting that the Kremlin is not trying to get at
least ideological dividends from its unilateral love of peace.
The reduction of the Russian strategic nuclear forces is kept
top secret, just as the programme of the reform of the
strategic forces that provides for the removal of missiles from
combat duty. Is this a sign of incredible modesty? Or does the
Kremlin fear that the public will not approve of such love of
peace?
The latest statement made by Sergei Ivanov on the
possibility of storing nuclear warheads has hardly changed the
overall picture. The thing is that the bulk of US nuclear
warheads are mounted on aircraft, while Russia has mostly
stationary missile warheads. Since it is liquidating its
missiles now, in case of conflict it would not have enough
missiles on which to mount the stored warheads (the
technological cycle of the production of modern Topol-M
missiles lasts for months).
Consequently, it would be extremely difficult to see the stored
Russian warheads as a reliable "return potential."
******
#10
pravda.ru
March 14, 2002
MAJORITY OF RUSSIANS STILL FAVOR PUTIN
The rating of Russia’s president is still very high. The Public Opinion
Fund informs that 46% of the Russian population consider Putin’s work to be
good or even excellent. Forty-one percent consider it to be satisfactory,
while a minority of 8% say that Putin’s work is bad or very bad. The rest
of those questioned hesitated to give an estimate of Putin’s work.
As for the attitude to the incumbent president, 67% said they like him, 23%
do not care for him, and 7% think bad of the president. The attitude of 8%
of the Russians to Vladimir Putin has improved within the last week, and 4%
of the population have changed their opinion for the worse. The attitude of
85% of the Russians to President Putin has not changed.
The respondents were asked for whom they would vote if a presidential
election took place next Sunday. The following results have been obtained:
51% would vote for Vladimir Putin, 13% would for Communist leader Gennady
Zyuganov, and 4% would vote for Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir
Zhirinovsky.
At the same time, President Putin is as popular with Moscow’s population as
in Russia on the whole; only 41% of Muscovites would vote for him again. As
for Gennady Zyuganov, his popularity is even lower: he would receive only
9% of the votes in Moscow in a hypothetical presidential election.
The poll confirmed once again that the Russian president is still very
popular among the majority of Russians. It seems to be very surprising for
some experts, as some factors exist that are likely to mar Vladimir Putin’s
image. The continuous war in Chechnya, problems with freedom of speech, and
the poor material welfare of many Russians can be mentioned here.
For many Russians, it is hard to avoid comparing the incumbent president
with ex-President Boris Yeltsin. To tell the truth, Vladimir Putin is very
successful against the background of the ex-president. The ten years of
Yeltsin’s eccentric behavior were disliked by the Russian people. Thus, the
support to President Putin can be explained with the wish to have a
president able to meet his promises and deeds, and the president has not
disappointed the people yet. This sympathy can be also explained with
Putin’s ability to avoid scandals of any kind, political or economic.
Russian and foreign journalists and political scientists suppose that the
launching of unpopular economic reforms will inevitably decrease Putin’s
rating. The reason for such expectations is not perfectly clear: the
tariffs on natural monopolies are on rise, the communal and housing reforms
have already started. At the same time, it produces no negative effect on
the president's ratings.
This means that Vladimir Putin is not likely to lose the support of the
population within the nearest future. Moreover, the high rating of the
president may come in handy: it will make for a successful realization of
economic reforms in the country.
It is more problematic for the president to keep the faith of the
population and not to refer to ratings regularly. Will Russia’s president
cope with the dilemma?
Vasily Bubnov
PRAVDA.Ru
Translated by Maria Gousseva
*******
#11
The Russia Journal
March 15-21, 2002
WHO CAN YOU TRUST IN RUSSIA?
By John Helmer
The only foreign-language sentence that managed to lodge itself
correctly in the brain of Ronald Reagan, before he developed Alzheimer's
Disease but after he became President of the United States, was "doveryai no
proveryai". As he never tired of explaining, that is Russian for
"trust but verify."
Reagan and his successors always meant to apply that to treaties
on arms deployments and limitations. Bankers and other businessmen mean to
apply it to every form of financial or commercial contract that can be signed
with Russian counterparties, especially since the government and the
leading commercial banks defaulted on their obligations in 1998.
"Trust but verify" is the reason most foreign investment agreements with
Russians contain a clause that places the jurisdiction for dispute resolution
outside Russia in countries like Sweden, the United Kingdom, or the US.
It is also the reason why both Russians and foreigners, who have
lost assets and money to Russian raiders, are increasingly turning to
the US court system to apply the US racketeering statute, with its triple
damages clause. Among the Russian corporations now in the dock facing
racketeering charges, there is LUKoil, Russian Aluminum, Alfa Bank, and
Tyumen Neftegas. The list is growing fast.
Back when Reagan was getting out his bit of Russian, John Le Carre published
a novel called "The Russia House". It's a tale about a Scotsman and minor
publisher, whom British intelligence, then the CIA, use to obtain secrets
from
a high-level Soviet military scientist. The go-between is Katya Orlova; but
the Scotsman falls in love with her. To save her, he has to dupe his British
and American handlers, and make a deal with the KGB.
In the film version, Sean Connery playing the Scotsman tells a panel of
KGB officers, after he's delivered the secrets of the Anglo-American
team: "We have a deal, and I expect you to honour that deal. I am talking
about honour, not ideology." The climax of the film comes when Michelle
Pfeiffer, playing Katya, steps off a Russian boat and into Connery's arms,
proving that Russians honour their commitments, even if westerners don't.
Fast forward to a new film version of a similar moral predicament. This is
the new release called "Birthday Girl", in which Nicole Kidman plays
Nadia. She is a Russian girl who answers a lonely English banker's request
for a mail-order bride, and establishes herself in his home. John the banker
is then set up by Nadia, and two Russian accomplices, who move into the
house,
and use John to steal 90,000 pounds from his own bank, before making
their getaway.
"Don't feel too bad", Yuri, the mastermind of the scam, tells John after
gagging and tying him up. He then shows him photographs of all the other
western
men Nadia and her gang have duped. But that isn't the end of the tale. John
pursues the trio, who start fighting among themselves over the money. Having
betrayed John, Nadia then betrays her accomplices, taking all the money for
herself -- and also, it seems, for John. With Nadia and the money, he climbs
on board the return flight to Moscow, improbably equipped with a Russian
passport in the name of one of the accomplices. What will happen to John at
Sheremetyevo isn't of interest to the filmmakers, who think they have tied
up their flic with a happy ending in midair. We can guess what the
airport officers will do to John on arrival -- and what Nadia will do once
she's home.
In the new film, there's a lot of talk about love, as there was in the
earlier film. But not a word about honour. What a difference the decade
between the two films makes, at least to the image of Russian women, and
Russian honour.
In that decade I've known many Russian women, including one who is the most
wicked individual of any gender I've known. She's exceptional. But as a
general
rule, in the decade between "The Russia House" and "Birthday Girl" it has
turned
out that Russian women lost their honour, as did the other gender, as well as
almost every type of Russian organization from the KGB on up, or down,
depending
on your point of view. The dishonouring process has been so thorough, you
have to
wonder whether it was a mistake to imagine it, when Le Carre thought so, in
the Soviet
period. We have arrived at a time when Russian dishonour is a topic for
comedy; and honour, in the old fashioned sense, is laughable.
The honour of Joes (spy jargon) and Johns (sex business) may be
misplaced enough to amuse. But of course, bankers to Russia can't afford
the luxury. When one of the largest banks in the world decided (this month)
that it won't even review the state of the Russian metals sector, because it
doesn't want to lend any money to the companies that occupy it,
that suggests how fundamentally flawed the methodology of trust-and-verify
has become. After all, Russian metals producers are among the market
leaders and price makers of the world. If bankers judge they can't trust them,
because they can't verify their financials, then the small sums of credit
that are trickling through on short-run, high-price terms won't be anywhere
near enough to sustain the growth and competitive edge which these producers
need.
This is no joke, unless Russian metals producers think they can outlive their
bankers. Now that's funny.
******
#12
Krasnaya Zvezda
No. 44
March 13, 2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
WE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS WORLD
Colonel-General Yuri BALUYEVSKY, First Deputy Chief of the
Russian General Staff, interviewed by Oleg FALICHEV of Krasnaya
Zvezda
Question: The USA decided to withdraw from the ABM treaty
unilaterally. What lessons should Russia draw from this act?
Answer: I may repeat myself, but we still regard the
December 13, 2001 US decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM
treaty, which played the key role in ensuring strategic
stability, as a mistake. The US president disregarded the
arguments of Russia and the opinion of the international
community.
The USA has abandoned the time-tested international legal
system of maintaining strategic stability, which was created
with great difficulties. In fact, the system rested on the ABM
treaty, as proved by direct references to it in the START-1 and
START-2 treaties on the limitation and reduction of strategic
offensive weapons, which are effective only in conditions of
compliance with the ABM Treaty, and by the fact that these
treaties seal the quantitative and qualitative parameters of
the sides' strategic arsenals.
The US decision created a fundamentally new situation in
Russia-US relations, which calls for greater care in making
decisions and for a substantial and detailed analysis of the
situation in the sphere of strategic offensive and defensive
weapons.
For our part, we intend to take further steps to preserve
the international-legal foundations in the sphere of
disarmament and non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons.
There must be no legal vacuum in ensuring strategic stability
and international security. We are trying to preclude the
consequences of the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty and the
undermining of the existing system of disarmament treaties that
may damage the security of Russia and the world.
Question: Can Russia formulate an adequate reply to the US
withdrawal from the treaty without being involved in a new arms
race?
Answer: The US decision, as President Vladimir Putin said
in his statement, "does not pose a threat to the national
security of the Russian Federation." Our plans of developing
and improving weapons and military hardware, which are being
implemented in accordance with the federal armaments programme,
will ensure requisite standards of combat characteristics of
the national strategic nuclear forces at present and in the
future. Our programmes of modernising old and creating new
strategic weapon systems allow us to look into the future
without fear.
However, the analysis of the military-political situation
and nascent geopolitical situation and the evaluation of the
design and test plans of the US NMD project and the potential
characteristics of future US NMD systems may encourage us to
take corresponding (including asymmetrical) effective reply
measures to ward off new threats and challenges to the security
of Russia.
Question: What are the main principles of Russia's
attitude to the elaboration of new agreements?
Answer: Acting as part of preparations for the summit
meeting of the Russian and US presidents, we are negotiating a
new agreement on further radical reductions of strategic
offensive weapons. Relying on the current level of mutual
understanding between our leaders and the agreements reached
during their meetings in Genoa and Texas, we are using
consultations and negotiations to convince the Americans that
we should formulate legally binding agreements on further
controlled and - mind you - irreversible cuts of strategic
offensive weapons.
We are guided by the following fundamental principles:
equal security of the sides; predictability of the nuclear
policy; the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive
weapons in combination with the limitation of defensive
weapons; the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament; joint
search for mutually acceptable ways to cut liquidation costs;
and effective verification of reductions.
Since the very first steps taken in the 1970s to limit and
subsequently reduce strategic offensive weapons, the two
leading nuclear powers (the Soviet Union and the USA and
subsequently Russia and the USA) have relied on the mutually
accepted and objective link between possible reductions of
strategic offensive weapons and limitation of ABM systems. That
link was reflected in the text of all strategic arms reduction
treaties and agreements we have signed. It was that mutual
understanding that enabled our countries, which still have the
world's largest nuclear arsenals, to start acting to limit and
subsequently reduce these arsenals.
Of course, the world changed radically in the past three
decades. But the feeling of responsibility for the world, for
stronger stability and international security has not dwindled.
Awareness of this responsibility puts the spotlight on the
following tasks during the elaboration of new agreements:
- the development of Russia-US relationship on principles
of cooperation, respect for each other's position and mutual
benefit, a pledge not to seek unilateral advantage, and the
ensurance of equal security of the sides;
- the elaboration of legally binding agreements on
radical, controllable and irreversible reductions of strategic
offensive weapons in combination with the limitation of
strategic defensive weapons, which I mentioned above;
- the coordination of measures designed to raise the
predictability and confidence in military-strategic operation,
including by maintaining dialogue on military issues.
Seeking to develop bilateral relations Russia and the USA
have coordinated the following main spheres of collaboration:
the reduction of strategic offensive weapons;
military-technical cooperation, including in the sphere of
non-strategic ABM systems; and struggle against international
terrorism.
Question: The US striving to dominate the world is
becoming ever more apparent. The US military presence in
Central Asia is objective reality. How long will the US troops
stay there? And how can their presence there influence Russia's
relations with its CIS partners?
Answer: The US military presence in Central Asia is
explained by the counter-terror operation in Afghanistan.
Russia welcomed the decision of Central Asian governments to
provide their territory for the deployment of US troops.
It should be said, for justice' sake, that the leaders of
the USA and its allies quickly organised, prepared for and
launched a mostly successful counter-terror operation in
Afghanistan.
As for the duration of the Americans' stay in Central
Asia, the agreements they signed with Central Asian states
stipulate that the coalition troops would remain on their
territory until the end of the counter-terror operation in
Afghanistan. However, some Central Asian states may decide,
while maintaining a semblance of good relations with Russia, to
shift the vector of their interests, above all in the hope of
improving their economic situation. But Russia will carry on a
policy of strengthening friendship and neighbourly relations
with these Central Asian states and developing all-round
cooperation with the CIS countries and members of the
Collective Security Treaty.
Question: Russia and US-led NATO got a new enemy -
international terrorism - after September 11. However, the West
is not in a hurry to invite Russia to join NATO, possibly
believing that our armed forces are too poor to meet NATO
standards. Is this true? And what is Russia's stand on the
issue of a European security system?
Answer: I don't quite like the way you formulated your
question. Russia has been suffering the effects of interference
of international terrorism in its internal affairs for years. I
am sure that if the West heeded our warnings, there would have
been more chances of preventing the tragedy in the USA.
As for the form of Russia's involvement in European
security structures, one may gather a mistaken impression that
Russia is eager to join NATO. Absolutely not. And the
statements made by the Russian president on this issue leave no
doubts of this. It is another matter that Russia should become
an equal partner of NATO in the creation of a new system of
European security. And it must be a full-fledged partner with
the right to vote.
Not all states are ready for this turn of events. They are
probably still influenced by the old stereotype according to
which Russia is the enemy with imperial ambitions. Even the
events that took place after September 11, 2001, when Russia
clearly expressed its opinion with respect to international
terrorism and supported the counter-terror efforts of the
international community, failed to convince some politicians
that the time is ripe for raising our relations to a higher
level.
Instead, our opponents are using all kinds of arguments,
including the "poverty" of our armed forces, to explain their
unwillingness to upgrade the quality of our cooperation. I
don't think the armies of new NATO members or candidates are
much "richer" than the Russian armed forces.
But I must repeat here that Russia does not wish to join
the military organisation of NATO. Ideally, we would like the
bloc to be not a military but a political organisation with
which we would collaborate with due consideration for changes
in the world and new realities.
We could cooperate with NATO in various spheres, above all
in peacekeeping and crisis settlement. The spotlight in that
sphere can be put on summing up the experience of the Balkans
crisis settlement and on determining the outlines of further
cooperation in a broader context, with the joint actions
coordinated in the UN, the OSCE and other international
organisations.
Further dialogue with NATO within the framework of the
Permanent Joint Council on military-political aspects of arms
control, in particular START, ABM, the CFE Treaty and the Open
Skies Treaty, would meet the interests of creating a new system
of European security and the interests of maintaining strategic
and regional stability in Europe. Both sides would clearly
benefit from discussing the possibility of creating a European
ABM system, the implementation of Russia's Military Doctrine
and NATO's strategic concept, the retraining and social
adjustment of retiring Russian servicemen, and several other
vital issues.
Question: The war in Chechnya has been going on for
several years, although with certain respites. But the bandit
chieftains - Basayev, Khattab and Maskhadov - are still at
large. Was it wise to stop large-scale military operations in
favour of special operations? How effective are they? And how
can the situation develop in that republic?
Answer: The situation in Chechnya is slowly (for several
reasons) but surely changing for the better. The tasks of the
counter-terrorist operation set to the armed forces were
fulfilled, in the main, and now the bandits have to adjust to
new conditions, which are rather harsh for them. The scale and
methods of their operation have changed. They are mostly mining
the routes of our military convoys, stage harassing fire raids
at our facilities and terrorist acts against members of local
authorities and persons who collaborate with the federal forces.
The extremists' envoys carry on propaganda work among the local
population, seeking to inspire anti-Russian sentiments,
discredit the staff of the local law-enforcement agencies and
recruit new members.
But we have overhauled our tasks, too, and improved the
tactic of operation of the federal forces. The key tasks now
are to detect and cut short the criminal activity of bandit
chieftains and their accomplices; ensure the safety of the
people and local authorities; block the channels of financial
and material-technical assistance and the delivery of weapons
and ammunition to the bandits from abroad; and create
favourable conditions for the economic and social restoration
of Chechnya.
It is not true that bandit leaders enjoy freedom of action
in the republic. The operation of the federal forces has
greatly limited the chieftains' possibilities, although not as
much as we would like to, in particular the possibility to
destabilise the situation. But we are working on this problem.
As for their neutralisation, this issue is not as simple as it
is sometimes presented. And yet, with time we will accomplish
this task, too.
In 2001-02 we tracked down and liquidated 11 members of
the Shura military council, 20 field commanders and leaders of
small groups.
Now that we stopped large-scale military operations and
launched special operations, the troops' main tactics are
special pin-point operations and search raids, which enable us
to attain our goals with smaller losses. Practice shows that
this is the correct tactic in the current situation. The
bandits, although they are extremely cautious, are sustaining
losses.
The bulk of extremists operating in Chechnya are bent to
carry on fighting for a long time. We estimate their number at
up to 1,500, including about 250 mercenaries from foreign and
ex-Soviet countries. The core of the bandit resistance includes
the groups of Khattab (up to 400 men), Basayev (up to 350),
Maskhadov (up to 150), as well as R. Akhmadov and M. Salamov
(up to 100 men in each group).
The opening of mountain passes on the border with Georgia
in late April and early May can seriously influence the
situation in Chechnya and the activity of the bandit groups,
because bandit groups currently staying in Georgia (up to 400
men) may use the passes to go over to Chechnya. There are no
grounds to assume so far that the US instructors will train and
rearm the Georgian spetsnaz troops so effectively that they
would wipe out bandits in their country. If the Georgian
authorities had wanted to cut short the operation and training
of bandits on their territory, this task would have been long
fulfilled, including with Russia's assistance. But this does
not seem to be the main goal of Georgia's policy.
We should expect a rise in the terror campaign against
members of local administrations and law-enforcement agencies
and civilians who assist the federal forces in Chechnya. Since
the bandits also want to discredit the federal forces, they
will most probably stage provocations where they, dressed as
representatives of power departments, would deal ruthlessly
with civilians.
But despite the complicated conditions in which we are
trying to restore the economic and social life in Chechnya and
continued resistance of reactionary forces, the situation in
the republic has changed radically. Its key elements now are
normalisation, restoration of republican institutes of power
and the shift of the federal effort to the sphere of
law-enforcement.
And these processes are becoming irreversible.
******
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