Johnson's Russia List
#6136
15 March 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moscow News: War-Time Policy. Interview with Nikolai Zlobin on US policy.
2. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Russia's health sector nears breaking point.
3. Boris Kagarlitsky: Delyagin and Money.
4. Reuters: Slow banking reform said hindering Russian economy.
5. gazeta.ru: Russian Court Outlaws Arrests Without Judicial Approval.
6. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Armen Khanbabyan, GEORGIA IS ONLY THE BEGINNING.
The American presence in the Transcaucasus will quickly expand.
7. RIA Novosti: NAINA YELTSIN TURNS 70.
8. Omaha World-Herald: 'No turning back' clock in Russia. (Gorbachev)
9. Moscow Times: Yevgenia Borisova, Cabinet OKs Bill To Sell Farmland.
10. AP: US, Russia Work to Cut Arsenals.
11. CNN: Stalin-era secret agent to be freed.
12. Moscow Times: Dmitry Rogozin, A Northern Alliance for Chechnya.]
********
#1
Moscow News
No.10
March 2002
War-Time Policy
Interview by Andrei Stepanov
Washington is building a new world order. What is it like from the U.S.
perspective? Nikolai Zlobin, an associate with the Washington-based Center
for Defense Information, addresses this and other questions
Is Bush's "axis of evil" statement a claim to a new foreign policy doctrine
or just Reagan-style rhetoric?
I believe it is an elaboration on the doctrine necessitated by September
11. The crux of it is that U.S. foreign policy is becoming a war-time
policy. It is still in the making, and the Americans welcome alternative
proposals. No one, however, has as yet proposed anything on this new world
order, and this also applies to Russia. Although Bush, unlike Clinton, is
not dogmatic and is open to new ideas.
What is "war-time foreign policy"?
First of all, the military begins to play a much bigger role than diplomats
in decision-making. This is only natural: Foreign policy in a country at
war is designed above all to attain military objectives. The State
Department has proved less able to respond to changes in the world than has
the Department of Defense.
Are there any other differences?
Another important point is that Bush is beginning to distance America from
international organizations in which the United States has traditionally
participated - even NATO and the UN. The administration believes that it is
far more convenient to attain its objectives within the framework of
temporary coalitions. So the coalition set up before the war in Afghanistan
will not necessarily be preserved to conduct operations in Iraq. If action
is taken against North Korea, something else will be formed. This flexible
system of allied relationships is seen by the administration as by far the
most effective instrument in dealing with international problems.
Meanwhile, the Americans are telling everyone: You are free to join or not
to join our coalition; it is all the same to us. But they set coalition
objectives themselves.
Why?
Reality is such that militarily and technically, no country can match the
U.S. So the Americans are ready to carry out military operations virtually
single-handed. Clinton's idea that casualties should be avoided at all
costs is being reviewed.
The new doctrine is based on a different assumption: Attack is the best
defense. The administration acts on the premise that it is impossible to
avert all attacks, therefore it is necessary to destroy the source of these
attacks. Hence the list of countries that could become targets of
pre-emptive strikes, and it already includes second and even third priority
targets. Furthermore, ideological priorities are also being reviewed.
Throughout the past decades, the overriding priority has been human rights,
a strengthening of democracy, market expansion, and maintenance of peace.
This was the basis for selecting allies and formulating foreign policy.
Today, however, what counts is how a given country can help America in
attaining its objectives. Their human rights record or the legitimacy of
their governments is no longer an issue. Take Pakistan, for instance. Its
human rights situation is well known. But then it is a faithful ally.
Incidentally, the same, up to a point, applies to Russia.
Do the Americans see their distancing from international organizations as a
harmless and safe proposition?
Today the Americans refuse to sign any treaties that would tie their hands.
Washington believes that the international community must not influence
U.S. foreign policy, so it is essential to get rid of commitments to
international bodies. Besides, most of the latter emerged in the Cold War
era and were designed to address suitable tasks. A case in point is NATO.
Militarily and technically it is a whole generation behind the United
States. The FRG defense minister once quipped that this made it difficult
to maintain even radio communication. As a matter of fact, at a recent
meeting of defense ministers in Germany, the Americans effectively gave
NATO countries an ultimatum: Either increase your military budgets and
catch up with us or we won't need you militarily. What is to be done with
an organization if the country that created it is no longer interested in
it? Also, the alliance is increasingly emerging as a political, not
military, organization. Maybe NATO is indeed now of greater interest to
Russia than to the United States.
Are there any doubts about this choice in the United States?
The most important thing for the Americans is that outstanding problems
could have worse implications than the pursuit of this foreign policy
doctrine. There is a certain amount of risk about this approach: The
Americans leave the others too little choice: "Either you are with us or
you are against us." This model does not allow for neutrality, and so any
country could easily end up on the "axis of evil." The only loophole is
that support for America can be declared in secrecy if, for some reason, it
is impossible to do that openly. Today some 20 countries have joined the
coalition on such terms. But most important, there is euphoria over the
easy victory in Afghanistan.
So attack on Iraq is a foregone conclusion?
There, the mood has changed considerably. Only recently the question was
whether or not to attack. Now the debate centers on when to attack. The
Afghanistan operation has largely depleted precision weapon stocks, and the
military are loath to tap into emergency stockpiles. It will take about six
months to reach the pre-war level. Besides, ramifications of an attack on
Iraq are yet to be studied in full.
Are there any clear-cut guidelines in identifying "rogue" states or is this
simply based on the arbitrary, unilateral decision by the presidential team?
In the United States, probably more than anywhere else, foreign policy is
shaped under the impact of the internal situation. The president has to
harmonize his decisions with public opinion. There are also lots of
influential organizations and experts dealing with the various aspects of
foreign policy. They take a dim view of the idea of drawing up lists of
"bad" countries. There are lobbying organizations in America who defend the
interests of these "rogues," and there are American business interests. The
ultimate decision is made by taking all of these opinions into account.
Though a key factor is of course the political gains a particular move will
bring to this team. After all, it has to win the next election. The Bush
team is now deliberately overreacting so that later on no one could accuse
it of being wishy-washy, as was the case with Clinton. Although there is a
large group of Republicans who do not like Bush's foreign policy moves, and
there are Democrats who support him. Bush is facing a lot of unpleasantness
both if he decides to attack Iraq right away or if he tarries. In this
situation common sense may no longer apply, and it is intuition that
carries the day. And this is what I see happening in the upper echelons of
power.
Do Putin's calls for the war on terrorism to be waged "according to law"
have a chance of being heeded in Washington?
Putin is greatly respected and supported in the United States, mainly
thanks to the fact that in pursuing what is seen in Russia as a
"pro-Western" policy, he has never asked for anything. So he is perceived
as an equal. Yet this does not mean that the Americans will listen to him
as they make their decisions. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal,
Putin said that everything done in Afghanistan goes against the rules of
international law, but circumstances dictated it. As for Iraq or Iran,
Russia sees no reason for breaching the rules of international law there.
It is only in Russia that "the first time doesn't count." In the American
view, the first time sets a precedent. So the law does not exist anymore.
There have been unconfirmed reports that the United States has already
included Russia into the "axis of evil."
Militarily, the U.S. will never do anything aggressive against Russia. This
is an axiom. It'll never end up on that list.
Not even if it helps Iraq?
No. I don't think that Russia will send its troops to Iraq to fight
Americans. Today it is important to bring the relationship between our
countries to a state where it would not be unduly affected by changes on
the international arena.
This will be an uphill task - building a long-term relationship while the
Americans do not want to bind themselves with any treaties.
Treaties can't make us friends, just as the 1972 ABM Treaty did not. It
merely enshrined a Cold War relationship in international law. The main
snag here is Russia's internal problems. America was a Stalin ally. So
what? In a new environment we became enemies. Only shared values and
priorities can make us friends. Pakistan is providing colossal assistance
to the United States, but it does not occur to anyone to invite it into the
EU or NATO.
Condoleezza Rice has said that if Russia wants a normal relationship with
the United States, it should influence its friends, such as Iraq,
accordingly. Meaning that it should persuade Hussein to step down?
Russia has lots of levers it doesn't use. Many in the United States are
disappointed with lack of vibrancy in the RF's foreign policy. There's the
same old defensive/aggressive knee-jerk reaction. Maybe it would help to
replace the team? In a word, what Ms. Rice probably meant was: Come and
bring your own ideas while the door is still open.
MN File
Nikolai Zlobin moved to the United States in the early 1990s. A former
Moscow State University professor, he is now an associate with the
Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI). The Center was
established in 1972 by a group of critically minded high ranking military
officers - former officials at the State Department and other agencies as
well as independent experts. The CDI gives high priority to the study of
the country's defense and security policy. This expert organization put
itself on the map with an analytical report on the so-called black programs
- Pentagon programs whose expenditures are not shown in the country's
official budget.
*******
#2
Asia Times
March 13, 2002
Russia's health sector nears breaking point
By Sergei Blagov
MOSCOW - An increase in the use of illegal drugs and a rise in the number of
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis cases is overburdening Russia's health sector,
analysts say.
Between 2 million and 4 million of Russia's population of 146 million are
thought to use illegal drugs, either occasionally or regularly, says William
Bichner of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
(UNODCCP). He says that since 1990 the number of officially registered drug
users in Russia have increased by almost 400 percent.
Nikolai Ivanets, Russia's chief expert on illegal drugs and head of the
Narcotics Institute, says 230,000 drug addicts were treated in hospitals in
Russia last year. However, says Ivanets, the true number of drug users is
five to seven times that figure. Senior Russian officials have also admitted
that drug abuse poses a serious threat to national security and have vowed to
get tough with drug dealers. Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that
the spread of drugs in Russia has reached a point where it "poses a threat to
national security". He also described drug dealers as "roots of evil".
Russia is increasingly being used to transfer large amounts of heroin and
cannabis from Afghanistan and southern Commonwealth of Indepent States
countries into Western Europe, says the UNDCCP. Although Russian drug
dealings still represent just a fraction of the world's total illegal drugs
trade, which is estimated at US$500 billion, last year Russian police seized
69 tons of illegal drugs, compared with 62 tons in 2000.
Analysts say domestic and international drug dealers increasingly view Russia
as a lucrative market. Smugglers funnel an estimated $2 billion in illegal
drugs to Russia every year, according to the Russian Interior Ministry
estimates. To face the challenge, Russian lawmakers have approved a
controversial anti-drug bill, effective from April 1998, making treatment of
drug addicts obligatory.
However, four years after the tougher drug law came into effect, human-rights
groups say the police crackdown on illegal drugs has forced addicts to go
further underground and use homemade drugs, thus increasing the risks of
infection with the human immunodeficiency virus, which causes AIDS. Russian
health officials have warned that a rapid rise in the number of people
infected with HIV could result in a pandemic if not tackled.
In addition to HIV, Russia is beset by an epidemic of tuberculosis that,
health officials say, is set to break world records. They say the country's
post-Soviet economic decline and tattered social safety net have all
conspired to breathe new life into the once-tame bacteria. Since 1991, the
number of Russians with TB has nearly tripled. The country is averaging
150,000 new cases annually. According to Ruslan Khalfin, head of Russian
Health Ministry's organizational department, roughly one-third of all new TB
sufferers are being diagnosed in Russian jails.
The Russian government has approved an anti-TB program for 1998-2004. Last
year, the program's disbursements reached some 900 million rubles ($30
million).
The source of infection, in the vast majority of cases, is a jail cell.
Russia's teeming prisons rank among the world's most prodigious TB
incubators. Among the country's 1 million inmates, as many as 15 percent
carry the TB bacterium. There are a total of 150,000 TB sufferers in Russian
prisons, including 90,000 cases of so-called "active" - contagious, airborne
- form of the disease, says Alexander Borodulin, the deputy head of the
penitentiary department at Russia's Justice Ministry.
Worse still, some 20 percent of jailed TB sufferers in Russia carry TB
strains that do not respond to traditional drug treatments - the so-called
multidrug resistant, or MDR, strains, says Borodulin. Their treatment could
cost up to $10,000 a year, while they are entitled only to receive $17 a
year, he adds.
Because of the scarcity of state funds, tens of thousands of prisoners,
untreated TB carriers, are released early every year. Russia has one of the
highest burdens of TB in the world, and the number of cases has doubled
during the past decade. The World Bank has pledged $100 million for TB
programs in Russia. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies has received a $3.4 million grant from the US Agency for
International Development (USAID) to battle the disease in Russia.
Highly contagious, tuberculosis is among the most deadly infectious diseases
in the world. World TB Day is observed each year on March 24, the anniversary
of the date in 1882 when the TB-causing bacterium was discovered. Moreover,
the theme for World TB Day 2002 is "Stop TB, Fight Poverty", quite a timely
issue for Russia, analysts say.
Russian experts agree that the battle to control illegal drugs and TB could
take years, if not decades. It is understood that a viable solution is simply
a matter of time and money - commodities in short supply in Russia's
health-care system.
(Inter Press Service)
*******
#3
From: "Renfrey Clarke"
Subject: Kagarlitsky on Delyagin appointment
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2002
Delyagin and Money
By Boris Kagarlitsky
Mikhail Delyagin has been appointed as a new economic adviser to the
Russian government. The appointment is strange, to say the least, if we
take into account the make-up of the government and the policies it has
been pursuing. Over the past two years Delyagin has been one of the
government's most principled critics, so for him to be given such a job,
something obviously must be wrong. Either with the government, or with
Delyagin.
Delyagin's appointment might be interpreted as an acknowledgement by the
regime that its entire course in recent times has been leading nowhere. In
such a case, however, the logical step would not be a change of advisers,
but for the government to resign. Or, we can surmise that this is not a
case of the government preparing to review its positions, but of an
opposition economist renouncing his principles. In actual fact, it is
neither. Delyagin's motives in taking up the offer are perfectly
understandable. In Roman Catholicism there is no salvation outside of the
church, and in Russia there is no constructive activity outside of the
government. Hence any oppositionist, if offered a post within the regime,
calmly accepts it, without giving any thought to the fundamental
contradictions and without regarding the move as a renunciation of his or
her views. On the contrary, it represents a chance to do some constructive
work. How could you refuse? Would you rather wait for a change of regime?
The regime is not about to change itself, and will not allow anyone to
replace it.
Such is the reasoning of our honest oppositionist who becomes a government
bureaucrat. And what is the reasoning of the bureaucrat (not necessarily
altogether honest) who invites an oppositionist to join him or her as an
adviser?
Here things are somewhat more complex. Some say that the appointing of
Delyagin is a sign of the political ambitions of Premier Kasyanov. Others
see it as the result of an internal struggle within the government. It may
be that in inviting Delyagin on board, the cabinet was indirectly admitting
its mistakes. No-one, however, is about to punish the culprits. German
Gref, Delyagin's main antagonist, is not about to resign. How will the
neo-liberal, pro-Western Gref get along with the Keynesian and "patriot"
Delyagin? While Illarionov has argued with Gref, these exchanges have
merely amounted to discussions within the framework of what has
fundamentally been a common approach. Both Illarionov and Gref are
Westernisers, both are market-oriented, and both support privatisation and
free trade. But if Delyagin enters the picture, discussion loses any point;
now it is no longer a matter of arguing over tactics, but of choosing a
strategy.
When Yeltsin replaced Gaidar with Chernomyrdin, Moscow wits said that the
new prime minister had been given the task of pursuing a new course without
changing the old one. This is exactly how the recruiting of Delyagin should
be regarded. Meanwhile, why did the government want a change of course? If
we are to judge from its own statements, from the official statistical
indices and even from such "objective" criteria as prices on the stock
market, things could not be better. Unfortunately, statistics do not tell
the whole story. There is also another reality, conveyed to us by our own
perceptions....
The New York economist Doug Henwood is inclined to assess the state of the
US economy not so much on the basis of the statistical reports, as
according to the frequency with which the words "crisis" and "recession"
are repeated in the press. I have an even simpler way: asking people if
they have any money to spare. Not long ago my wife was in the situation of
having to do just this. She had to collect money to buy gifts for the women
working in a child care centre on the occasion of International Women's Day
on March 8. This is a custom dating from Soviet times. The particular child
care centre, moreover, is a fee-paying establishment, and the people who
bring their children to it are typical members of the Moscow middle class.
They are well dressed, and almost half of them bring their children by car.
In past years there were no problems with collecting money. But this time,
for some reason, everyone was in a bad way financially. The gifts that were
finally given were worth half as much as last year.
Several days later I talked to a senior official of the "alternative"
trade unions. Over the ten or twelve years since their inception, many of
these "alternative" organisations have acquired their own premises and
financial resources. In short, they no longer suffer from a lack of funds.
Unexpectedly, however, the official started lamenting how things were
going. "It's strange," he said. "Usually we're all right for money. But
lately, we've had constant problems."
The next person I talked to was a businessman, the manager of a large
textile concern. Not long before, he had told me that his company had
completely made up all the losses it had suffered during the financial
crisis of 1998. But placing a glass of expensive whisky before me, my old
acquaintance began this conversation by saying: "There's something bad
going on. Formally, you'd think everything was OK. But before, there was
always spare money in the company. Now there isn't."
Something of the kind is evidently being felt in the government apparatus
too. Funds have not dried up, but they have come to be chronically in short
supply. Despite rising stock market prices and respectable-looking
statistics, officials at various levels are complaining of a lack of ready
money. Provincial governors are explaining that they are short of funds.
The centre is demanding that they raise the pay of budget-sector workers,
but itself provides nothing. Meanwhile, the wicked Chubais is constantly
reaching for the cut-off switch. This year we will be saved by the fact
that the cold weather will end before the money does.
Meanwhile, the press has been saturated with figures from "confidential"
surveys, according to which Putin's popularity is falling rapidly. In
sociological terms, we have been living for a long time now with a sort of
dual exchange rate. The president's fixed rating remains around 70 per
cent, while the "floating" rate is falling below 20 per cent. Concealing
such a gap has now become impossible. But Putin remains the only politician
in the country.
The popularity of the government is not making up for the declining
confidence in the president. This is simply because the cabinet of
ministers does not have its own political face. The old questions, that
were thought to have been successfully resolved, are having to be
revisited. Perhaps the government is making urgent efforts to acquire a
political face? Moreover, one which differentiates it from the image of the
president? With big problems in the offing, this is by no means an
unnecessary precaution. For the government, however, the desire to take its
distance from the Kremlin could have dire consequences. The government
could inadvertently repeat the experience of Yevgeny Primakov's cabinet, to
which the very same Delyagin was a consultant. When they engage in
politics, prime ministers in Russia risk losing their posts even if the
economy is recording successes.
At any rate, the issues cannot be reduced to questions of personnel. By no
means everything depends on who holds which job. Even before journalists
learnt of Delyagin's new post, information had been leaked to the press
from government circles about a forthcoming review of the tax regulations.
If the newspapers are to be believed, the government is about to revoke the
income tax rates, "the lowest in Europe", of which it has boasted on
television. In one form or another, a progressive tax will be reimposed,
and at the same time a review will be conducted of the way in which the
combined social tax is collected.
Delyagin has still to put forward proposals to answer the need that is now
urgent both in the regions and within the ruling apparatus - the need to do
something to ensure that there is once again money in the budget. But even
if John Maynard Keynes himself were in Delyagin's position, that would not
change a thing. It is not a question of whether Delyagin has the talent; it
is simply that he does not have the power. An effective change of course
does not require a change of advisers, but a change of government. The
Russian elites have long since come to resemble a loss-making brothel where
the beds are shifted round instead of the girls being changed. Though on
the other hand, there is no-one else to change them for.
It does not hurt to correct mistakes. But this is the economy, and
decisions by a government are already the stuff of politics. Let's take the
tax reform. To talk of reducing taxes is a winner for any politician, but
to raise them is distinctly unpleasant. Responsible politicians differ from
irresponsible ones in that they do not promise, and still more do not do,
things they will subsequently have to swear off. By going into reverse, the
government is admitting its own incompetence. Though in reality, there is
something more here than a mistake. The government's errors were not the
result of its choice of personnel, nor of mistaken readings of the
conjuncture, but of its blind adherence to neo-liberal dogma.
The regime has taken its lead from two fundamental principles. The first
holds that cutting taxes is in and of itself good for the economy, which
will start to boom as a result. Unfortunately, the economy is hitting the
brakes. It is short of investment, and stimulating this investment through
low taxes alone is impossible. It lacks a prosperous population, and the
incomes of the population are determined by many factors apart from tax
concessions. The second principle embraced by the regime is its unshakable
belief that if it gives presents to the rich, the situation in the country
will improve, and its own positions will be strengthened. What is good for
the oligarchs is good for Russia. This is transparently false, especially
since Russia's raw-materials oligarchs are nothing like General Motors,
whose president could never quite convince America that his income was
identical to the country's well-being. On the contrary, Russia would be
well served by more just tax legislation.
The natural course of events has placed the government in the position of
a chess player who is trying to take back a move he has already made. And
furthermore, after the game has mostly been played out.
The regime cannot admit that it is running the country on false
principles, and as a result, it is becoming more and more enmeshed in its
errors. It is angering the very middle class on which it proposed to base
itself, but it cannot make new friends. No appointments of new officials
will solve its problems. A change of course is something far more dramatic,
occurring on a much greater scale.
In earlier times Delyagin fought Gref on the pages of newspapers; now he
is to do it in meetings of the government. I am sincerely glad for him.
Watching Gref will now be more interesting; before, he could ignore his
critics, but now he will somehow have to come up with answers. The plot is
thickening; there is intrigue, food for the journalists who throw light on
the doings of the government. This is a plus.
On the other hand, we shall most likely be deprived for a time of
Delyagin's press articles laying bare the complete incompetence of the
government functionaries. This is a minus.
In any case, there will be no extra money in the treasury. Even if the tax
system is adjusted yet again, and if various suggestions from the new
adviser are considered. Some time back the government could very well have
drafted into the treasury a certain quantity of "excess" money, that was
roaming about the country being spent in the most extravagant fashion. It
might even be suggested that the government could have spent these
additional sums on something useful, such as paying teachers' wages.
Unfortunately, the time of "excess" money has come to an end.
This is not a crisis. It is simply a disgrace.
You cannot have a government without money.
*******
#4
Slow banking reform said hindering Russian economy
By Daniel Bases
NEW YORK, March 14 (Reuters) - Russia's inability to pass or implement
meaningful banking reform will continue to impede its development from
nascent market economy to mature financial system, analysts and bankers said
on Thursday.
While Russian President Vladimir Putin has succeeded in passing limited tax
and judicial reforms, banking reform appears stalled, causing concern both in
and out of the sector that this could prove the Achilles heel to the
currently optimistic outlook for the country.
Russian bankers speaking at an investor conference pointed to the Russian
central bank's inability for the past six years to pass a deposit insurance
plan for retail account holders, as just one example of the sector's "gloomy"
situation.
"Going forward, delaying reforms of the banking sector will be a constraining
factor in raising Russia's credit rating," Dr. Helena Hessel, director of
sovereign ratings at credit rating agency Standard & Poor's, told Reuters in
an interview.
Hessel, who spoke before investors at the 6th annual Sachs Associates and
Bloomberg conference on investing in Russia and the CIS, was quick to point
out that in general, just because reforms have been legislated, the benefits
would not come until they are implemented.
S&P raised its long-term local and foreign currency sovereign credit rating
for Russia to B+ from B with a positive outlook, reflecting confidence in the
growing economy and diminishing dependence on oil prices.
Hessel said that by the end of 2002, there was a possibility that the rating
could increase to BB-, which is just two notches below investment grade, only
if the trend in legislating and implementing reforms continues.
"At BB-, the lack of reforms would be a restraining factor in pushing the
ratings higher," she said.
BANKER FRUSTRATION
While investors were largely optimistic about Russia's prospects, frustrated
Russian banking executives laced their enthusiasm with criticism.
"Banking sector reform is lagging far behind the rest of structural reforms
in the Russian economy," said Dominic Gualtieri, managing director at Alfa
Bank, Russia's largest private bank. "We see a difficult time ahead."
Running down a laundry list of discouraging factors, Gualtieri said one big
problem is the numerous underfunded "pocket banks" which fragment the market
and are usually controlled by and serve just corporate customers, creating an
inefficient banking system.
There are about 1,320 banks in Russia. However, MDM-Bank Chief Executive
Officer Vladimir Rashevsky, said only 10 percent had capital of $10 million
or more.
Alfa Bank's Gualtieri said the lack of political will by the central bank to
institute reforms faster has allowed the sector to languish.
"(Central Bank chief Viktor) Geraschenko has gone to a number of meetings and
bragged about being called the world's worst central banker. Nonetheless Mr.
Geraschenko maintains a very strong position within Moscow with even some
discussion now that his term which is due to end in September 2002 is to be
extended," said Gualtieri.
The prospect of leaving the current central bank administration in place
would disrupt prospects for a faster pace of reforms.
"We have a very positive relationship with the central bank but it is quite
conservative," said Rashevsky, who added he expected rapid changes to occur
if a new central bank administration were put in place.
Among the changes Rashevsky and others hoped would materialize are a
mandatory deposit insurance measure, which would help shift assets out of
Russia's largest bank, Sberbank, which controls and estimated 72 percent of
retail deposits, and diversify the market.
Gualtieri said he expects implementation of deposit insurance to take another
two to four years.
*******
#5
gazeta.ru
March 14, 2002
Russian Court Outlaws Arrests Without Judicial Approval
By Irina Petrakova
The Constitutional Court of Russia has outlawed arrests on prosecutor
warrants. On Thursday the Constitutional Court ruled that several articles of
the Russian Criminal Procedure Code, allowing prosecutors in certain cases to
authorize detention of suspected criminals for more than 48 hours, were
non-constitutional and therefore inapplicable. A well-known Russian defence
attorney Maxim Smal commented to Gazeta.Ru on the revolutionary ruling.
Henceforth, in line with the Constitutional Court ruling, arrest, detention
and keeping in custody shall be allowed only by an order of a court of law.
No one may be detained for more than 48 hours without an order of the court
of law. To bring the effective criminal procedure legislation to conformity
with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Constitutional Court has
invalidated the articles 90, 96, 122 and 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
allowing for prolonged detention.
In its ruling the Constitutional Court specified that all other similar
provisions of legal acts allowing for detention pending court sentence for
the period exceeding 48 hours, as well as arrest, taking in custody and
keeping in custody without an order of the court of law, must be invalidated
in accordance with established procedure.
The Constitutional Court instructed the Russian legislature -- the Federal
Assembly -- to see to it that all laws and supporting legislation are
reviewed
and amended accordingly.
The Russian Constitution, adopted in December 1993, has enshrined the
citizens' right to freedom and personal inviolability requiring a judicial
decision to make an arrest, take someone into custody, or detain someone
suspected of crimes; however, the Constitution also states that until the
Criminal Procedure Code is brought into conformity with the Constitution,
existing legislation, which provides for the prosecutor's office rather than
courts to approve arrests and searches, remains effective.
It is no secret that after spending many months in the dirty overcrowded
cells of the pre-trial prisons, many suspects confess to crimes they did not
commit. People, whose guilt has not been yet proven, are forced to serve
their sentence before their case is heard in court.
The Constitutional Court passed its ruling after reviewing a complaint filed
by three Russian citizens -- Malenkin, Poustovalov and Martynov, who have
spent many months in custody awaiting trial.
In their appeal the plaintiffs paid attention to the collision between the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Article 22 of the Russian
Constitution, which explicitly bans arrest, detention and keeping in custody
unless such measures are authorized by a court of law. In line with the
constitutional provision, "no person may be detained for more than 48 hours
without an order of a court of law," however, the criminal procedure
legislation allows prosecutors to proceed with discretion and issue arrest
warrants.
It is worth noting that earlier Anatoly Bykov, once the head of the giant
Krasnoyarsk smelter, addressed the Constitutional Court with a similar
appeal. Bykov spent many months in custody on money-laundering charges.
After the case against him was dropped due to lack of evidence, he was
detained again on charges of masterminding a contract killing. At present, he
is still held in custody. However, shortly before the court examination of
Bykov's case began, the tycoon withdrew his appeal from the Constitutional
Court.
Human rights activists and prominent lawyers hailed the Thursday ruling of
the Constitutional Court.
In comments for Gazeta.Ru a well-known Russian defence attorney Maxim Smal
explained that from now on a person detained by police for more than two days
may complain to a district prosecutor, or directly to the Prosecutor
General's Office. In compliance with the Criminal Procedure Code, a
prosecutor must review the complaint immediately and discharge the person
from custody.
The lawyer said that, given the severe of lack of manpower in Russian courts,
backlog, and serious delays in trial proceeding, there is a serious risk that
judges will authorize arrest automatically, without going into the root of
the matter.
In the opinion of Maxim Smal, the Constitutional Court ruling will eliminate
numerous flaws of the Criminal Procedure Code currently in force. However, as
soon as the ruling becomes effective the prosecutors and the judges will face
many serious problems.
One of the key problems the judicial authorities will encounter is the lack
of judges. "To date, for instance, practically all Moscow courts are short of
judges. It is quite likely that in these circumstances judges usually
handling civil cases will have to decide on detention of suspects," Smal
said.
"This means literally the following: a prosecutor applies to a judge at the
civil court within two days following the detention of a suspect and asks him
or her to issue a court order authorizing taking a suspect in custody pending
trial. The civil judge, who is not a specialist in criminal law, will most
likely issue the order automatically," he said.
Moreover, according to Smal, there is a certain risk that judges will be
subject to serious psychological pressure on prosecutors' part. Even before
the probe is launched they will have to decide whether the person is guilty
or not, and to determine the degree of participation in the crime he has
allegedly committed.
In the opinion of Maxim Smal, technically 48 hours is more than enough for
the prosecutor to persuade the judge that a certain suspect must be held in
custody.
"Usually the procedure of gathering preliminary evidence proving a person's
complicity in a crime is very easy," Smal said. "Let's suppose a murder has
been committed. There are witnesses who saw an Ivanov entering an apartment
with a gun, the witnesses heard the shooting, and then Ivanov fled. Later he
is detained. In this case, the evidence given by eye-witnesses will be quite
enough for the judge to issue a court order to take that man in custody."
Even if the prosecutor fails to submit sufficient evidence to the court, he
still has one day to persuade the judge that if the detainee is discharged he
may flee or obstruct investigation.
********
#6
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
March 14, 2002
GEORGIA IS ONLY THE BEGINNING
The American presence in the Transcaucasus will quickly expand.
By Armen Khanbabyan
The unprecedented pace of the expansion of the US and NATO in the post-
Soviet space is so worrying to the Russian political elite that it is
obstructing their ability to objectively evaluate the real meaning of
what is happening. Naturally, in Russia people are inclined to see things
solely Òfrom their own bell tower.Ó In reality, however, the vector of
this expansion is not so much Òtowards the north,Ó as Òto the south.Ó Put
more simply, the Americans now are not after Russia. They have more
important and more urgent tasks.
As our newspaper has already observed (cf. NG, 03.11.02), the fundamental
goal of Washington and the West as a whole is to establish firm and long-
term control over the energy resources of Central and Upper Asia. This
explains the appearance of their bases along the notorious Òarc of
instability,Ó from Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan to Georgia. Thus they are
setting up a ring around Iraq and Iran Ð countries that are obstructing
these plans. But if punitive action against Baghdad can be considered a
decisive action, then things with Iran are not quite so simple. President
Carter once even organized a raid by his paratroopers on Tehran, and his
special forces were effortlessly taken captive by the guards of the
Islamic Revolution. Generally speaking, it is not so easy to cope with a
country with a territory three times that of France, a population of
seventy million, and a sufficiently entrenched political and economic
system. What is more, in distinction from Iraq, Tehran has no powerful
neighbors who are interested in destabilizing the country and changing
the existing regime.
Therefore, not only Central Asia, but also the Transcaucasus should
become a zone of complete Western influence. For the resolution of the
task, Georgia alone is not sufficient. Very soon Americans and Turks will
appear in Azerbaijan, and in quantities much greater than in Georgia, as
Washington has already signed an agreement with Baku on the modernization
of the local armed forces. It is also important that Azerbaijan and Iran
have a number of mutual grievances, and in particular the issues of the
northern Iranian territories, which are populated by Turkic peoples, and
the division of the Caspian.
But the transformation of Azerbaijan into a secure staging area for the
realization of the military-political goals of the US is impossible as
long as there exist the Karabakh conflict and the mutually advantageous
cooperation between Iran and Armenia.
Recall that the relations between Yerevan and Tehran represent an
enviable example of good-neighborliness between a Christian and an
Islamic state. This, incidentally, is confirmation of the thesis of the
absence of a confessional basis to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
Nevertheless, the pragmatic friendship between the two neighboring
countries has always annoyed Washington. Until recently, however, Yerevan
was able to explain that the danger of Islamic fundamentalism does not
threaten Armenia by definition, and the contacts with Iran serve to
strengthen regional stability.
Today the quickening withdrawal of Russia from the region and the efforts
of the American and Turkish factors have become a catalyst for a future
Armenian-Iranian drawing together. In the beginning of March, during the
visit of the Iranian Minister of Defense, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, to
Yerevan, the two countries signed a memorandum on cooperation in the
sphere of defense and security, which proposes a wide range of
interaction, including the creation of joint enterprises. This is
promising, if one considers that in the Soviet period 92 percent of
Armenian industry was in the defense sector.
Washington reacted very promptly and brusquely. We have already reported
(cf. NG, 03.12.02) that literally a week after the visit of Shamkhani to
Yerevan the US State Department ÒdiscoveredÓ a new Òinternational
channelÓ of drug trafficking: Iran Ð Nagorno-Karabakh Ð Armenia Ð Russia
Ð Europe. Commenting on this question for NG, the press secretary for the
Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dzyunik Agadzhanyan, observed that
the conclusions of the American foreign policy agency were constructed
exclusively on information from the Azerbaijani side, and fully
contradict the evaluations of a number of authoritative international
organizations. This indicates BakuÕs striving to Òmake the Karabakh
question the object of discussion in all conceivable instances.Ó But the
important thing here is not the striving of Baku, but rather the plans of
Washington. It is curious that in one of the Moscow newspapers an article
appeared in which the Karabakh movement is called Òsadly notoriousÓ (that
same paper had earlier called it a democratic and national-liberation
movement) for its alleged links with the illegal arms trade, the mafia,
and terrorism.
Taken together, all of this is an element in the unfolding ideological
preparation for future punitive action. It would seem that they realize
this in Yerevan. In any case, the Armenian Minister of Defense, Serzh
Sarkisyan (the second most politically significant person in the
Republic), will visit Washington. Most likely he will again try to
convince his American colleagues that the shift in Armenian-Iranian
cooperation to the area of defense was dictated strictly by the demands
of national security and does not present a threat for the US. But it is
very doubtful that now these traditional arguments will satisfy the
Americans. In its external appearance, Karabakh diverges too clearly from
the paradigm of their conceptions of the future alignment of forces in
the region. Therefore for the Armenian side, apparently, there will be a
difficult and meager choice between the bad and the very bad variants of
the future development of events.
(Trans. by Timothy K. Blauvelt)
*******
#7
NAINA YELTSIN TURNS 70
MOSCOW, March 14, 2002. /from a RIA Novosti correspondent/ -- The wife of
Russia's first president Boris Yeltsin, Naina, is celebrating her 70th
birthday. She was born in the Orenburg region, southern Urals, to the family
of a state employee. In 1950 she entered the construction department of the
Urals Polytechnics Institute and graduated from it in 1955.
Upon completing her university studies she qualified for a post at a
designing institute. She met Boris Yeltsin during her student years: they
were students of the same department and in the same year. In 1956 Naina
Girina and Boris Yeltsin got married.
At first, Naina Yeltsin's destiny resembled much the destinies of women of
her generation: institute, wedding, post of an engineer, family,
housekeeping. Everything changed when her husband switched to party work.
People around Naina took her mostly as the wife of the secretary of the
regional party committee, and years later - as the first lady.
Meanwhile, Naina continued to consider herself a wife, mother, grandmother
and great grandmother. Despite the perturbation of her life with Yeltsin, the
family, children and taking care of her husband were priorities with Naina.
Sharing the Olympus of power with him, she tried not to interfere in his
affairs. Certainly, she voiced her attitude to the events and people around
him but only at home during dinner talks.
"I've always realised that the higher was my husband's post the greater
responsibility he assumed and, naturally, it couldn't but make my
responsibilities more important," the first president's wife reported. Boris
Yeltsin's wife never learnt about all decisions connected with his work
before other people. Naina Yeltsin said: "He never consulted anyone."
However, supportive and considerate, she was his right hand in many difficult
situations, for example, during the 1996 presidential campaign. Though rare,
her meetings with voters and interviews were noted for her captivating
sincerity and added to people's sympathy for Boris Yeltsin. It was also the
case later, when the president fell ill and was operated on. Naina's
statements about her husband's health were trustworthy, while her feelings
and care for him evoked compassion and understanding.
Naina soon took command of protocol and stood the pains of foreign visits.
Both in the international arena and in Russia she was known as the wife of
the first president.
Naina Yeltsin was more popular in Russia than abroad. Her name was not
associated with state business issues. However, while accompanying her
husband Naina tried to visit schools, hospitals and old people's homes. Hence
her charitable patronage of children's institutions and schools. In 1999 the
international prize Oliver-For Human Heart was awarded to Naina Yeltsin. The
prize is awarded by the Frank Foundation Child Assistance International
(FFCAI).
Boris Yeltsin dedicated many pages of his book "The Midnight's Diaries" to
his wife: "...When Naina goes to an orphanage or a children's hospital or
visits her favourite actress at the hospital she never tells anybody about
it. She sincerely believes that charity and good deeds are her private
affairs." "She has always fled publicity. People can feel Naina's modesty,
tact and humanity in those few and brief TV interviews and her rare public
appearances when she accompanies me. They feel it and it attracts them,"
Boris Yeltsin writes.
*******
#8
Omaha World-Herald
March 14, 2002
'No turning back' clock in Russia
BY DAVID HENDEE
WORLD-HERALD STAFF WRITER
Mikhail Gorbachev said the next few months will determine the future of
Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The 71-year-old former Soviet leader told an Omaha audience Wednesday night
that Putin has shown he is a capable leader.
"When he came in, he did not have much experience in the economy, in the
government. He didn't have his own team," Gorbachev said. "He has shown that
he can learn. He is now a more mature politician. He represents a new
generation."
There is a political battle waging in Russia about the direction of the
country during the next decade, and Putin faces tough decisions on issues
ranging from labor laws and tax policy to support for small business and
foreign investment, Gorbachev said.
But Russia will not return to its old self, he said.
"There is no turning back the clock," Gorbachev said. "There is no
possibility of returning to the old communist model. The younger generation
and the middle generation of Russians ... it is those people who will be
shaping Russia today and tomorrow."
Gorbachev said there is an annual public opinion survey in Russia that always
asks one question: What kind of Russia do you envision?
More than 80 percent of those surveyed recently said they saw Russia as a
free and democratic country, he said.
The audience of nearly 500 people at the downtown Doubletree Hotel burst into
applause.
Gorbachev's appearance in Omaha was a fund-raiser for the Russian Farm
Community Project and his host, the Knights of Ak-Sar-Ben civic group. The
Russian Farm Project is a program led by Americans to help people in rural
Russia make the transition from communism to capitalism.
The audience was a mixture of local business and government leaders and
others, ranging from teen-agers too young to have any memory of Gorbachev as
a world leader to retired Admiral C.R. "Bob" Bell, who targeted U.S. nuclear
weapons at the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Gorbachev's 49-minute speech was delivered without notes. He spoke in Russian
and was translated simultaneously by his longtime interpreter.
Sometimes pausing to think, Gorbachev spoke in slow phrases before bursting
into a torrent of words.
He answered two questions from the audience afterward, including one from
14-year-old Jack Miller of Omaha, a freshman at Westside High School. Miller
asked Gorbachev for the toughest decision he had to make.
Gorbachev said it was ending perestroika, the reforms he instituted but saw
disappear in the last days of the Soviet empire.
Miller also was one of 75 people who earlier posed for a photo with
Gorbachev, wrapping an arm around the elder statesman as if he were a
grandfather.
Gorbachev's trip to Nebraska originally was planned for last October but was
canceled by security concerns after the United States started bombing
Afghanistan in the war on terrorism.
He is the first speaker in what Ak-Sar-Ben hopes will be an annual series of
appearances in Omaha by national and international leaders, said David Sokol,
chairman of the Ak-Sar-Ben board of governors.
"I don't think anything could bring to people's consciousness the importance
of what he did more than Sept. 11 because the worldwide cooperation of
dealing with terrorism would have been impossible in the'80s," Sokol said in
reference to Gorbachev's role in ending the Cold War as the Soviet Union was
disintegrating.
Sokol, who accompanied Gorbachev to Omaha aboard a private jet, said he was
impressed with Gorbachev's inquisitiveness, thoughtfulness and humor.
"He could be the leader of any country," he said.
Gorbachev spoke Monday at Columbia University in New York City. Before he
leaves the United States on March 23, he is scheduled to visit Lincoln,
Denver, Los Angeles, Florida and Washington, D.C. He is accompanied by his
daughter, Irina Virganskaya, a physician.
Today, he will deliver an address at the Lied Center for Performing Arts in
Lincoln.
********
#9
Moscow Times
March 15, 2002
Cabinet OKs Bill To Sell Farmland
By Yevgenia Borisova
Staff Writer
Calling it a "burning issue for the nation," Prime Minister
Mikhail Kasyanov on Thursday signed off on a government plan to legalize
agricultural land sales for the first time since the Bolsheviks seized power
in 1917.
"There is now no law on the sale and purchase of land, yet such sales and
purchases exist in large quantities," Kasyanov told a Cabinet meeting. "This
lowers the real value of Russia's farmland and encourages corruption and the
ineffective use of land," The Associated Press quoted him as saying.
"The time has come to remove the irregularities and establish a clear,
transparent law," Kasyanov said.
Of Russia's 1.7 billion hectares, roughly a quarter, or 406 million hectares
-- nearly five times the size of Brazil --is classified as agricultural, and
about half, or 190.7 million hectares, is arable.
Liberals have long argued that legalizing the sale of agricultural land is an
integral component of overall market reforms, but conservatives fear foreign
ownership of national soil and argue the bill could hurt poor farmers.
The government's draft law, officially called the Law on Agriculture Land
Turnover, would allow foreigners to lease but not own land near national
borders. It would also preserve so-called land parcels, which are technically
owned by some 12 million peasants but used by former collective farms.
Under the government's proposal, such parcels must be dedicated to
agricultural purposes if they are sold on the secondary market, and regions
will have some authority on some issues.
"[This bill] is of fundamental importance," Agriculture Minister Alexei
Gordeyev said after the Cabinet meeting. "And it attracts the attention of
all the political parties, movements, the population and economic
organizations."
"The main target of the law is to preserve property rights," he said.
Five other versions of the same bill have already been prepared and submitted
to the Duma.
They are sponsored by: Boris Nemtsov's Union of Right Forces; Adrian
Puzanovsky's People's Deputy faction; Duma Deputy Gennady Kulik, a former
deputy prime minister in charge of agriculture; Nikolai Kharitonov, the head
of the Duma's agro-industrial group; and Alexander Chetverikov, head of the
Duma's agriculture committee.
At just a single page, the Union of Right Forces' draft is the shortest. It
says simply that agricultural land must be sold without limitations.
The other drafts include a variety of proposals, including one requiring
landowners to have a higher education in agriculture. Four call for a blanket
ban on foreign ownership.
Experts, however, say it is doubtful that any of the alternative bills will
be accepted, as was the case with the seven Land Code drafts prepared by
different Duma factions. In the end, the government's version was voted in.
The government's bill is expected to be submitted to the Duma on Tuesday. It
was expected to elicit even more opposition in the Duma than last year's
debate on the Land Code, which legalized the buying and selling of urban
land.
But Nikolai Plotnikov, head of the Duma's Agrarian faction, appointed by the
Duma to steer the draft through the required three readings, said such
virulent reaction is less likely now that the government has opted for a
compromise version. "[The government] has found the right approach to the law
already -- it has prepared a compromise version," Plotnikov said by telephone
Thursday.
There will be, however, constructive debates.
Plotnikov said that the bill was filled with inconsistencies and hazy
definitions. "But it is very good that the government has already taken into
consideration many of our proposals -- I mean not hurrying to single out
private land plots that are held in common by agricultural farms now," he
said. "This will only lead to a war between peasants [for the best plots].
"It is also good that the regions will be able to make some decisions. We
have very different regions, and what works in the Moscow region would fail
in, say, Dagestan," Plotnikov said.
Plotnikov said the bill would be "posted to the regions for their thorough
examination straightaway." The other five have already been sent, he said,
adding that the Duma will likely vote on the state's bill before summer
holiday.
*******
#10
US, Russia Work to Cut Arsenals
March 14, 2002
By BARRY SCHWEID
WASHINGTON (AP) - Setting aside a controversial Pentagon nuclear blueprint,
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and Secretary of State Colin Powell
worked Thursday on a formal agreement to cut U.S. and Russian nuclear
arsenals.
The aim is a ``concrete text,'' but there is still no decision on how the
cutbacks will be made legally binding, a persistent Russian demand, a senior
U.S. official said after the meeting.
An agreement may be reached at talks Undersecretary of State John Bolton will
hold in Geneva with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gregory Mamedov next
Thursday and Friday, said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Powell's meeting with Ivanov over lunch at the State Department gave both men
a better idea of where the talks are going on nuclear reductions, the
official said.
If negotiations are successful, President Bush and Russian President Vladimir
Putin will announce the accord at their talks in May in Moscow and St.
Petersburg.
The two leaders agreed last December to reduce U.S. and Russian arsenals of
long-range nuclear warheads to 1,700 to 2,200. Bush said the U.S. cutbacks
would take 10 years to complete.
What remains to be decided is how to formalize the agreement, and how to
verify the reductions are being carried out.
On another front, Powell and Ivanov affirmed their countries had a mutual
interest in countering terrorism.
But Ivanov also told reporters after seeing Powell that the two sides had
differences in approach on some fronts.
Ivanov may have been referring to a classified Pentagon report on nuclear
planning that could result in targeting Russia and six other nations.
Russian officials have reacted heatedly to the report. But Ivanov steered
clear of any public signs of irritation after talking to Powell and, earlier
in the week, to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld.
Powell told Congress on Tuesday that no country was being targeted ``day to
day'' and then made no reference to the report in a brief exchange Thursday
with reporters.
He said he was making plans to meet in Europe with Russian Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov before Bush's trip to Russia.
``I just had a good exchange of views on all of the subjects that will be
raised at the summit,'' he said of his meeting with the Russian defense
minister. ``And I think we are both looking forward to a very, very
successful summit which will show the people of the world and especially the
people of the United States and the people of Russia, how our relationship
has changed so fundamentally and in such a positive way.''
Ivanov said in Russian that there was no major impasse with the United
States, only differences in approach on some issues. He said he discussed
with Powell countering terrorism in all parts of the world.
Ivanov referred apparently to the secession movement in the republic of
Chechnya and an insurgency in the former Soviet republic Georgia.
*******
#11
CNN
Stalin-era secret agent to be freed
MOSCOW, Russia --An 85-year-old convicted Stalin-era secret service agent
will be released from prison because he is too ill, a Latvian court has ruled.
Mikhail Farbtukh is the only person known to be serving time for repressions
carried out during Josef Stalin's reign in the Soviet Union.
He was jailed in May 2000 and sentenced to seven years in prison, though the
term was later reduced to five years. He was convicted of deporting scores of
people during World War II.
A district court in Riga on Wednesday upheld Farbtukh's request that he be
released from a cramped cell in the city's Matisa Prison for health reasons.
His previous appeals for release were repeatedly denied.
Russia's Foreign Ministry praised the decision, saying: "We evaluate this as
a humane act, although it is two years too late."
"The imprisonment of this veteran was for him a moral torture. We continue to
believe that the charges of genocide against him are unfounded," the
statement said.
Russian officials strongly criticised Farbtukh's conviction, saying Latvia
was taking revenge on an elderly man who had fought valiantly against the
Nazis.
"Russia will continue to speak out against efforts for similar historical
revenge by well-known political forces, whose ideological forefathers were
guilty of a genocide on Latvian soil known in world history as the Holocaust.
It was with those forces that Farbtukh and other anti-Fascists fought, and it
is no one's right to redefine history," the ministry said.
The vast Communist secret police apparatus during Stalin's rule is believed
to have killed at least 15 million people, mainly Soviet citizens, and
deported 40 million, including more than 200,000 people from the Baltics.
******
#12
Moscow Times
March 15, 2002
A Northern Alliance for Chechnya
By Dmitry Rogozin
Dmitry Rogozin, chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the State Duma,
contributed this comment to The Moscow Times. The views expressed are his own.
When a U.S. State Department official furtively met with a
representative of Aslan Maskhadov, former leader of Chechnya, toward the end
of January, he could have delivered a simple but effective message from the
administration of U.S. President George W. Bush: If you want international
legitimacy and respect, join the anti-terror coalition by turning the Chechen
forces you claim to command into a "Northern Alliance for Chechnya."
The Russian authorities are urged by many in the West to engage in political
dialogue with what are called "moderate Chechen leaders," including
Maskhadov. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees recently portrayed Maskhadov
as someone who is not a terrorist and is worth entering a political dialogue
with.
The situation, however, is not so clear-cut. Before engaging in a political
dialogue with someone like Maskhadov, it is entirely justifiable to ask him
which side he is really on in the war on terror. Does Maskhadov actually want
to free his native Chechnya from international terrorists? His answer so far
has been very vague.
Maskhadov's track record in fighting terrorism in Chechnya is not good. Soon
after he was elected president in January 1997 (after an "election campaign"
in which many of his opponents were not just muzzled but killed), he allowed
the territory of his republic to become a safe haven for international
terrorists and Islamic extremists, some with direct support from Osama bin
Laden. This is not because he supported their cause but simply because of the
ineptness and pervasive corruption of his administration and his own
indecisiveness.
Under Maskhadov, Chechnya rapidly descended into anarchy and complete
lawlessness. Field commanders established control over small pieces of
territory and eroded his authority. Kidnapping became a growth industry. More
than a thousand people were abducted and held hostage. Many were tortured and
mutilated, sometimes on direct orders from bin Laden. A few lucky ones were
exchanged for multimillion-dollar ransoms.
Public executions under Sharia law were the norm and, as in Afghanistan under
the Taliban, women's rights were trampled on. Ethnic Russians still living in
Chechnya, including small children and elderly people, were slaughtered and
raped. Maskhadov himself issued public statements that fueled ethnic and
religious intolerance.
Criminal raids across the Chechen border became daily events that terrorized
the surrounding populations. In 1999, militant groups from Chechnya led by
Jordanian-born commander Khattab, a close associate of bin Laden, launched a
large-scale invasion of Dagestan killing dozens of local people, most of them
fellow Muslims.
The Russian authorities repeatedly offered help, including military
assistance, to Maskhadov's government to deal with the terrorist threat. But
just like the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Maskhadov promised to fight
terror and then did nothing. For example, he failed to bring to justice
Chechen warlord Salman Raduyev for his hostage taking and killings in
Dagestan (Russian human rights activists describe Raduyev as "ultimate scum")
because Raduyev belonged to the same clan as Maskhadov's wife. So much for
leadership.
In the fall of 1999, after the al-Qaida raids into Dagestan, Maskhadov was
given an ultimatum: hand over the terrorists or share their fate. He opted
for waffling and then joined forces with the terrorists.
In short, Maskhadov failed every basic test of good governance in Chechnya
and essentially forfeited his moral right to lead the Chechen people.
After Sept. 11, Maskhadov was quick to distance himself verbally from the
al-Qaida crowd. In an act that smacked of monstrous hypocrisy, he even sent a
letter of condolence to Bush. Some analysts, misled by these statements, have
suggested that Maskhadov now wants to play the role of the Northern Alliance
in Chechnya.
However, his actions in the past six months prove otherwise. Unlike the
Northern Alliance, Maskhadov has not openly condemned Chechen terrorists like
Khattab and Shamil Basayev, although he did issue statements condemning
Wahhabism and terrorism more generally. Nor has he taken military action
against foreign fighters and al-Qaida operatives in Chechnya. In fact, he
continues to maintain extensive ties with extremist Islamic groups around the
world.
To restore his moral and political credibility, Maskhadov needs to
demonstrate, with deeds rather than words, that he is prepared to fight
international terrorism in Chechnya. Although joining forces with Russian
troops in combat operations against Khattab and Basayev is probably
impossible for practical reasons, extensive intelligence sharing on the
whereabouts of the terrorists might be in order.
Is it worth having a political dialogue with Maskhadov? So far, he has not
proven himself a viable partner for peace. Neither is he any longer the only
force on the ground with whom to conduct a dialogue.
There is already a mechanism for structuring a political process in Chechnya.
The joint working group of the State Duma and the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe is working hard to establish a broad-based consultative
council with the objective of initiating a political dialogue between
Chechens with different views.
This consultative council is not a stooge for the Russian government, it is
an NGO. Several pro-Maskhadov groups and even some members of his 1997
parliament have agreed to participate in it. The Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe has endorsed the creation of the council in its latest
resolution on Chechnya. And it has called upon the appropriate Russian and
Chechen authorities to actively support the council's work. An invitation to
Maskhadov's representatives is still standing. So far, they have refused to
participate.
Today Maskhadov has a clear choice. He can either become another Gerry Adams
by directly confronting the al-Qaida terrorists and fundamentalist radicals
in Chechnya or he can be a Mullah Mohammed Omar by continuing to coddle them.
He cannot be both. It is up to Maskhadov to decide.
*******
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the MacArthur Foundation
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