Johnson's Russia List
#6134
14 March 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
*******
TITLE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS ON
GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS AFTER THE ATTACK ON SEPTEMBER 11
[RIA NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY, 11:00, MARCH 12, 2002]
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/)
Kortunov: Good day, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to
begin with an apology for some replacements in our team. First,
Yuri Mikhailovich Baturin is unable to take part although he was
the key figure in preparing the document. Pyotr Ivanovich Ladygin
was also to take part in the press conference, but he has fallen
ill. With your permission, we have another worthy general, Dvorkin
Vladimir Zinovyevich whom many of you know. And perhaps he can't
totally replace the absentees by as far as nuclear affairs are
concerned and nuclear terrorism is concerned, he can answer your
possible questions even more competently.
My name is Kortunov, I am a Vice-President of the Foreign
Policy Association.
First, a few words about the history of this document. I would
describe this document as a commentary or as an intellectual
spin-off of a series of Round Table meetings which we at the
Foreign Policy Association have held. You may remember that the
Foreign Policy Association is an international organization which
is currently headed by Alexander Alexandrovich Bessmertnykh, former
Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. These round tables include a
group of military, diplomatic experts and Russian political
scientists and international affairs experts. The group had a
meeting shortly after September 11. We gathered together to discuss
how we should react to the events on September 11 and their
aftermath.
After two months of holding such meetings we decided to commit
our conclusions to paper especially since it was clear from the
actions of our executive branch that it was acutely short of
strategic and analytical support. Yesterday was exactly half a year
since the terrorist acts in New York and Washington. A lot of
events have happened since then. Many emotional assessments and
predictions have not come true. The assessments now are more
balanced and they are contained in the report that we present to
you.
Of course, during the last six months no new world order could
have emerged. It did not happen. We cannot even speak about the
outlines of a new world order. We can only enumerate some of the
factors under whose impact this new order is being formed.
These factors are described in the report. One thing is clear:
the mechanisms and concepts of the post-confrontation period in
international relations, that is after the end of the Cold War --
one can say that these concepts no longer work. I mean the concept
of the "unipolar world", the concept of the "multi-polar world",
the mechanisms of collective security within the CIS and in fact
the North Atlantic Alliance. And of course, everybody could see
what a heavy blow was delivered by the events of September 11 and
subsequent events to the mechanisms of global international
security such as the United Nations.
This period has seen an overt foreign policy offensive of the
United States. Everybody can see that. And the special feature of
this stage in the geo-political offensive is that it occurred with
the tacit agreement and often total approval of Russia. The
American side made a number of milestone statements, notably, on
the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, its renewed commitment to
deploy a strategic nuclear missile defense, to expand NATO by
admitting not just three new members, but seven, as Brzezinski
among others is suggesting.
Some statements were made hardening the US military doctrine,
especially its nuclear aspect which greatly lowers the nuclear
threshold and makes US military actions still less predictable.
However, our reaction has been to say that nothing terrible is
happening, that it is also in the Russian interests and our side
did not raise any serious objections.
This period has seen a major step toward the destruction of
the international legal system and international law as a whole.
This is something that everybody can see. The anti-terrorist
coalition has failed to become a strategic alliance and no
strategic rapprochement with the West has occurred because the
West, the United States have not reciprocated the obvious Russian
concessions, including the concessions that Russia made of its own
accord.
I believe that on the whole Russia and its foreign policy had
been increasing their political weight in the world in the past six
months. But these are merely tactical gains. And if one looks at
strategy, many questions arise. And these often unpleasant
questions will face Russia after a while. And these questions will
have to be answered because the West will be keen to test the
declared loyalty of Russia to the West. The questions are obvious.
We will have to respond to the way the US will deal with the axis
of evil. NATO expansion is a painful issue. The US will most likely
increase pressure on our only strategic ally -- Belarus. And a
number of other questions will be relevant in the next political
season.
I think we can already speak of some tactical mistakes made by
Russia. One is that we were not persistent enough to engage the
mechanisms of the UN Security Council, the Collective Security
Council, the Shanghai Six, the Group of Eight, etc. I believe that
if Russia had been more active in using these mechanisms, we would
have stronger positions now.
My main conclusion is as follows. Although tactically, I
stress, we might have won, these events showed that our leadership
lacks a strategic vision for the development of international
relations. Just as it lacks an effective mechanism for making
foreign policy decisions. As a result, Russia is destined to play
the role of a minor partner, the role of the one that is lead.
Clearly, if there is no clear vision of strategic national
interests, you inevitably get in the sphere of national interests
of other influential countries which do have such a vision. I would
like to stop my opening remarks here. And now, in keeping with the
tradition, perhaps each of the participants in our press conference
sitting at this table will speak for a minute or two, and then we
will answer your questions.
Zolotaryov: I would like to say just a few words to give a
little bit more insight into the problem of international terrorism
and its causes. Everybody is talking about military actions being
carried out by the US in Afghanistan. But strictly speaking, what
is happening there may be relatively called a fight against
international terrorism.
The root causes of international terrorism are as follows.
First of all, it's the heritage left behind by special services
since the Cold War when -- (audio break) --
Second, the processes of globalization and accompanying
events. Third, a systemic crisis of the world order, that is the
unstable condition of the world that some call one-polar and others
multi-polar. As we know, only a bipolar system is stable, if we are
talking about a self-developing system.
I will not dwell upon the first cause -- the heritage of
special services -- except, perhaps, for the fact that what Western
special services created turned out to be more enduring because it
was based on the ideology and extremist trends of Islam. This
ideology turned out to be more lasting and applicable in the
current conditions.
Sometimes even the poorest nations, which become even poorer
due to globalization, are beginning to pool under the green banners
of extremist Islamic trends. The second cause is globalization. It
divides countries into very rich and very poor, into very weak and
very strong. And very often, very poor countries have no other ways
of fighting very rich countries but terror.
Another factor that accompanies globalization is the
appearance of transnational corporations, including criminal ones.
And they do not have anything else to lean on but international
terrorism. Plus, a systemic crisis of the single-polar world. These
are the causes of international terrorism.
The fight against international terrorism does not eliminate
these causes. So apparently the US and other countries, including
Russia, should revise their priorities. As for our relations with
the US, I think we still have megalomania by inertia as we claim
that everything the US does in the field of defense is directed
against Russia. It's not directed against Russia, it's directed
against the whole world, because the US clearly and openly stated
its strategic goal -- retain its leadership. And it is taking
concrete measures to achieve this goal, including in the field of
defense.
So, we must be realistic on the one hand, but on the other
hand, if we have made our choice in the system of values -- and we
have chosen democratic values -- we must proceed from the premise
that there will be no confrontation with the US. But at the same
time, I think we can't speak about tactical or strategic
partnership because the sole leader must always feel certain
counteraction from his partners. In the international arena, such
partners for the US are European countries, including Russia, but
again taking into account its Eurasian nature.
I think we must not talk about Russia's weakness because
Russia's strength is not in its economic and military might but in
the spiritual and intellectual potential, in certain moral
principles which influence Russia's foreign policy. I think that
when demand for moral principles in foreign policy in the world
grows, Russia will become a more and more important player. And I
think that jointly with Europe Russia will be able to serve as a
healthy opponent, but not a confronting force -- there is no point
in talking about attempts to drive a wedge between Europe and the
Americans -- an opponent to the US, thus making it possible in the
temporary one-polar status of the world to work out a more
reasonable policy and avoid making a transition to bipolar world
through confrontation between north and south. I can see a future
role for Russia there. Thank you.
I am sorry, I forgot to introduce myself. I am retired general
Zolotaryov Pavel Semyonovich, President of the Interregional
Independent Fund in Support of Military Reform.
Dvorkin: My name is Vladimir Dvorkin and I am from the firm
IMEMO Center of Strategic Nuclear Forces Problems and PIR center.
I would like to stress an important threat to international
security emanating from regional instability. Besides, the
countries in the regions of instability seek to acquire mass
destruction weapons and means of their delivery. And another factor
is that these unstable regions are usually the stomping ground of
terrorist groups and of course terrorism with the use of mass
destruction weapons is a threat to all countries and all people.
No single country can solve the problem of counteracting such
terrorism and such regional instability. Therefore there is no
option for us but to cooperate in some form or other with the
United States and with the European Union. And I wouldn't read too
much into the publication of the plans which mention Russia as a
target for nuclear weapons. This is routine practice of all defense
ministries. If there are weapons, their use should be planned. And
because the largest number nuclear weapons targets are on Russian
territory, naturally, such use is planned. I assume that Russia in
planning the use of its nuclear weapons does not exclude the
territory of the United States, in fact, the United States account
for the largest part of the plan.
I stress, this is routine practice of all defense ministries.
Rather more dangerous are the US plans to develop high-precision
penetrating nuclear weapons which dramatically lowers the ceiling
of the use of nuclear weapons. And this should, of course, be
opposed. Thank you.
Konovalov: My name is Konovalov Alexander Alexandrovich. I am
President of the Strategic Assessments Institute. I would like to
single out two points in the report. First, the Russian foreign
policy strategy after September 11 involved a choice, a choice
between civilizations. It should not be construed in terms of
concessions. It is not a choice in favor of Christianity and
against Islam. Such a choice would be disastrous for Russia. The
same is probably true for most countries of the world. It is a
choice between democratic values, the values of human rights and
freedoms and totalitarianism, violence and terrorism as a form of
solving state problems.
I think the consequences of the events on September 11 will be
long lasting because they changed the strategic landscape
dramatically. We argued a lot whether it should be described as a
strategic change, a decisive change and so on. Several definitions
are warranted. But several things are already obvious. First, in
the face of new threats not a single country, no matter how strong
and how rich it is, can assure its security single-handed. The
euphoria in the United States over the brilliant success in
Afghanistan will pass. In fact, there were no brilliant military
successes in Afghanistan. It was more of a trade and economic
operation than a military operation. The land forces involved
numbered a little more than a regiment.
Actually, bombings even with high precision weapons, have
shown that one can pound the mountains for a long time without any
success and you cannot bomb out ideology. And finally, another
thought which has already been formulated very professionally by
Vladimir Zinovyevich is that we will have to revise many concepts.
Although we have made a choice civilization-wise, it is unclear
whether the West will welcome it, or on the contrary, will assume
that this is just a natural choice of Russia's. But many concepts
will have to be revised, both military-strategic and political.
For example, the well-known concept of deterrence. A
paradoxical situation is arising. Where deterrence has any
military-strategic meaning, for example between Russia and the US,
deterrence is not needed because there is no confrontation and
there won't be a confrontation and there are no contradictions that
would make it necessary for us to deter each other from some
actions by threatening the use of nuclear weapons. And where
deterrence is indeed necessary, where terrorists or terrorist
organizations need to be deterred and terrorist acts and regional
conflicts need to be prevented, nuclear deterrence is totally
ineffective.
In general, how can you deter a person who has tied explosives
to his body and is prepared to sacrifice his life in order to take
as many lives around him as possible? He cannot be deterred by the
threat of death. He has already chose death. And it makes even less
sense to deter ideological extremists.
So, I think there is a lot of work to be done, work together
with the West in many areas. One shouldn't entertain great
expectations. Russia in general tends to expect a great deal from
its partners before being disappointed. Russia has a highly
feminine character in political terms. First, we do not notice
shortcomings and then we cannot forgive them.
So, we should proceed from our own interests that should be
clearly understood and spelled out. We have backed and joined the
anti-terrorist operation not to curry favor with America but to
liquidate Al Qaeda close to our borders. And for the first time
Russia has acted not as a foot soldier of Europe and the West
paying with blood to achieve its political goals. On the contrary,
we promoted our own goals and national interests on the money of
American taxpayers which bought the bombs that were dropped on
these targets and with the help of the Northern Alliance which we
have backed and provided with weapons, with some external financial
assistance. At least Iran took an active part in it.
So, I think the main thing is a clear idea of our interests
and corresponding actions and an awareness that there is no other
option. But we are moving in that direction not because we want to
please the West, but because it meets our objective needs today and
tomorrow. Thank you.
Oznobishchev: I am Sergei Konstantinovich Oznobishchev,
Director of the Institute of Strategic Assessments. I would like to
draw your attention to those provisions in the report, contained in
the recommendations, that speak about those general affairs and
those things in terms of cooperation with the US that we have to
deal with in the first place.
There are two major vectors which means two understandings of
the current situation. There are very many common things to do and
there is the behavior of partnership and a non-partnership
behavior. These two trends are hindering each other and they can
explode each other, which was the case during the 1990s. We say in
the report that there are coinciding spheres of interest which have
to be pursued. Actually, at issue is the Ljubljana formula, under
which we have to assess the joint, common threats and challenges
and find ways to overcome them.
We need to draft uniform criteria and assessments of both the
current situation and of terrorism as such. Terrorism combined with
non-proliferation, and other perils. We need a universal approach
criterion because now -- which is absolutely visible and
increasingly so as our politicians used to say during the 1990s --
the US is going beyond the boundary of the legal field. And we have
every opportunity not to strike at the rear of the conflicts that
have already materialized, trying to reduce their scope at the
price of much or little bloodshed, we need to prevent the
conflicts. We have every possibility for that, if we act together
from the outset.
There is also an "unpartnership" behavior which I mentioned at
the beginning and which resulted in a situation when in the late
1990s the declared partnership turned out to be absolutely
destroyed. And this non-partnership behavior is based on such
simple things when a partner, one of the declared partners, makes
concessions which instantaneously elicit an expected, absolutely
expected negative response from the other side.
You would remember that the 1990s saw the beginning of NATO's
enlargement which we absolutely rejected. Actions were started in
Kosovo without agreement with us and those actions were absolutely
outside the legal field, and very many other things also started.
If this repeats itself, then not just partnership but also actions
within the framework of normal constructive cooperation will become
impossible, and without this cooperation we -- in America and in
Russia -- will find it very difficult to live.
Moderator: Thank you. Chkuaseli Vakhtang Otarovich.
Chkuaseli: I am director of the Pro-Crisis Research Institute.
I support what my colleague Sergei Kortunov began with. So, what
does the report begin with and why was it released so late? It
should have been released a week after the terrorist acts but today
we would be changing it against the backdrop of those changes that
have occurred during these six months in the world, mainly as
initiated by the United States. That is why if we today already
speak about wishing to become equal partners of the US, the
groundwork for this was laid during the first month following the
terrorist attacks. After the United States withdrew from the ABM
program, we received a statement to the effect that we will never,
Russia will never be an equal partner of the United States. The
statements to this effect were made by the US Secretary of State
and the Secretary for Defense. That is why Russia has to adjust
itself to this role in this long story.
That today we need the truth about the terrorism is not the
main cause that determines the development of actions in the entire
world, including the globalization process, pursued by the United
States. We are sort of forced to give in to the changes occurring
today. It goes all the way to stating that we have already missed
the possibility for Russia to control the situation in the
territory of Afghanistan, except may be some peace mission or help
to the local population. We have missed this opportunity at much
closer boundaries of the Russian state. The current events on the
border of Northern and Southern Caucasus show this realistically.
This report does not take into account one major block. On
this block we think that we will work somewhat more on it and then
we shall present our vision of the economic component of the
beginning of all these stories. The stories began from the moment
when for the first time during the last year of Clinton's
incumbency, America got the chance to inflate its national budget
with revenues "in air" -- the money that encumbered the United
States and which is now so easily wasted in the conduct of the
counter-revolutionary operation. The US is sort of buying the
situation, investing some military forces in the selfsame
Afghanistan. It seems that the fighting was done by a deployed
regiment but the money spent was more than the amount needed for
three full divisions. So, we must take into account how much
America is prepared to spend today so that the program never ends.
So, this report of ours will enable all politicians and people
to become aware of what we want today in the world and what road we
must choose.
I think that today, after the passage of half a year, we can
clearly speak about what we have at the output. We have a
humiliated, offended state, even in the sense of sport, and we can
state even from today what we would like our country to be over the
short term. The harming of Russia's interests and of its
territorial and political interests will in the near future affect
even issues of our territorial integrity. I think that this will
first start in the European part and then the development will go
eastward.
That is why our report today is presented to the judgment of
politicians and journalists which are expected to express their
opinion and their decision. Thank you.
Moderator: The last speaker would be Vladimir Vladimirovich
Lebedev whom we give one minute. After that it will be the
questions-and-answers session.
Lebedev: I am Director of the Center for Problems of Russia's
National Security and I am deputy head of the International
Relations Department of the Moscow government.
I would like to point out two things. This is probably what
you will find in the text in front of you: there are very many
bitter admissions, relating to the Russian-US relations. It says
what we have left undone and it contains serious criticism of the
United States. Nevertheless, however, I would like to urge you not
to regard this as an anti-American or as a destructive document.
We are all faced with one threat. It so happened that the
Americans took the brunt of the attack. It so happened that even by
the geography of response actions, Russia has become an organic
participant of all the developments that were occurring over the
past half year. We honestly tried to analyze what was good and what
was bad. I believe everybody is aware of the high professional
level of experts who were involved. It is very important to us that
this is not a confrontation document. It is a document that exposes
the problems and challenges, new challenges and threats facing the
world in the 21st century.
As the second element, I would like to say that this is the
first such document of the Foreign Policy Planning Committee. We
hope to continue this work, and in this area too. I think this is
a rather balanced document, and most importantly it contains,
although it is modestly called commentary, conclusions and
recommendations that have been sent to everybody, to us, to society
and to authorities.
Q: Speaking of the recommendations, what do you propose to do
in the current situation?
Kortunov: I don't think we should simply read them out now.
Just read them and then, if you agree with them, we will be able to
make your assessment. But I don't think we should spend our time on
this now.
Q: But what is the most important point?
Kortunov: In my view, the most important thing is what I said
in my opening remarks. Russia must have its own strategy and its
own effective mechanism for making foreign policy decisions.
Otherwise it will always trail behind the policies of other strong
states. I think this is the most important thing. But this
conclusion, and I am saying this absolutely frankly, is disguised
in the document. Perhaps my colleagues will not agree with me, and
they may be right.
Chkuaseli: On the contrary, the name of the Foreign Policy
Planning Committee indicates that planning is possible only when
there is a clear-cut development strategy, which is something that
Russia doesn't have today. This is why the main conclusions and
recommendations call for working out a coherent strategy of our
development.
Q: A question to Kortunov. Actually I don't know to whom I
should address it, but anyone who wants may answer it. Should we
respond if the US moves against Iraq or North Korea? If you talk
about mediation, Russia already had negative experience during the
1991 war when it tried to use its influence with Hussein. And with
Kim Jong Il too, when he kind of promised something at first but
then backtracked.
So, should Russia respond or not? And second, a question to
Mr. Konovalov. You said it's useless to fight an ideology. Doesn't
it remind you of a well known statement by Molotov who said that it
was senseless to wage a war against the ideology of Hitlerism? And
this was after the pact.
Kortunov: On Iraq, I think that US unilateral actions to
overthrow Saddam Hussein without consultations with the
international community and without the approval of the UN Security
Council cannot be welcomed by Russia and must not be. Otherwise, we
would be helping the US further destroy the international legal
system that it began to destroy in 1999 by committing an aggression
against Yugoslavia.
This is why I think that the main task for Russian diplomacy
under these circumstances -- and it is Russian diplomacy that must
have its say in this situation -- is to prevent such unilateral
actions on the part of the US without consultations with other
members of the international community. Otherwise we may indeed get
the following situation. Now the world has at least one strong
policeman. We may not like him because he is strong, he is the
strongest. But if this policeman fails, the world will have no
policeman at all. And then international stability and the efforts
to build a new world order will suffer.
Therefore for this policeman to act effectively, his actions
must be based on decisions of the entire world community and
appropriate structures, particularly the UN Security Council. So
the main foreign policy task now is to make sure, including by
putting diplomatic pressure on Iraq, that international inspectors
go back to Iraq in order to close not only chemical and biological,
but also nuclear files. This is how I would answer your question.
Konovalov: If you don't mind, I would like to add a couple of
things to the question about Iraq first. I think the US is trying
if not to garner the support of the world community then at least
find out if such an action will not cause an explosion in the Arab
world. This is what US Vice President Cheney is doing now touring
Middle East countries.
I think the US public opinion is ready for carrying out an
operation against Iraq under all circumstances, with or without the
blessings of the international community. There is a bipartisan
consensus on this issue in the US -- Iraq must be punished.
I fully agree with Sergei Vadimovich that our task is to
prevent this from happening outside the Security Council. There are
means to prevent this, and these means are quite impressive. And
there are possibilities for this too. But what if this happens all
the same? I think we must not go into hysterics and make a pause
because America which has already bogged down in Afghanistan,
America which has already moved into the Philippines and which has
almost moved into Yemen, if it begins an operation in Iraq -- there
is no Northern Alliance in Iraq, and it would be very unwise to
count on Kurd communists as manpower that could be used in the
fight against the Saddam Hussein regime, or to think that the Arab
world will not respond or explode and that this will not affect the
situation in Israel, some already say that the Americans have
changed Yemen for Iraq, perhaps temporarily, because they fear the
consequences of such an action not for themselves, but for Israel.
So, I think that if the Americans get into Iraq in spite the
will of the international community, this will be one of the
biggest stupidities on their part, and in this case we will simply
have to step aside and let the situation develop by its own
scenario. Let them realize what fighting feels like, although there
will be no quick victory in Iraq -- victory is a rather relative
term here -- like in Afghanistan. And a coalition will also be in
question. I don't know how European countries will react.
In other words, the price the Americans will have to pay for
this will be incomparably higher than the price they paid for
Afghanistan. I have big doubts that this will be justified. But I
repeat, if they do such a stupid thing, we must not participate in
it and we must not go into hysterics because of this.
Now about an analogy between myself and Vyacheslav
Mikhailovich. I don't see any analogy, although this may be quite
tempting because he is a rather prominent person. But I repeat, we
misquote each other. I didn't say that fighting is senseless. I
said that it is not possible to bomb out an ideology. It's not the
same.
One can and must fight ideological extremism, and it's
necessary. If we are talking about the tasks of a common field in
the sphere of security for the US and Russia, and Europe too, one
of them is to separate the war against terrorists from the war
against Islam. There is no and can be no war against Islam. Islam
has much more healthy and rational forces. Islam is not a hostile
religion. The fact that there are extremist groups within Islam, it
so happened that extremism and terrorism come from Islamic regions.
But the art of politics consists precisely in separating Islam from
Islamic terrorists, and in ruthlessly exterminating terrorists.
They should be fought by all means available.
By the way, that would call for new instruments. A paradox has
been revealed: the strongest military-political alliance was
created so that the United States should offer security safeguards
to Europe. But Article 5 of the Washington Treaty envisaging
collective defense was first invoked in order to protect the
territory of the United States, something that didn't occur to
anyone at the foundation of that organization. The attack occurred
in the very heart of America.
And even more paradoxically, America practically turned down
the services of NATO because NATO was not created for this purpose.
All its military might is useless in the struggle against
terrorism. Neither its methods nor its strategy, nor the structure
of its armed forces seemed to work.
And, I repeat, you cannot bomb out an ideology. You can pound
the mountains of Afghanistan endlessly and nothing will change. But
ideological extremism must be fought. Only the methods should be of
a totally different nature.
Chkuaseli: Could I just add something on the subject of Iraq?
At the beginning of the operation in Afghanistan war was declared
not just on terrorism, but mainly on Islamic terrorism. The
Americans dropped the word "Islamic" after the Islamic world
expressed its objections, especially the wealthy Persian Gulf
countries. And this in spite of the fact that military action was
far removed from their territories.
Today in any case America will bomb Iraq although it will be
a violation of the opinion of the world community. But there is no
getting away from the fact that Iraq is mainly populated by
orthodox Muslims who are Arabs and you know that it is the
consolidation of Arab interests that is sure to bring forth a
negative response from most Persian Gulf countries, in the first
place of Saudi Arabia, then the United Arab Emirates and
subsequently smaller countries which are basically under US
control, such as Kuwait. So, in this situation I am not sure how
well America will be able to cope with Iraq and single out
terrorists while not touching Muslims. But in principle, America
will have its hands tied. In the first place NATO countries no
longer contribute to the war effort. NATO countries together with
leading Muslim countries will express their disapproval of the US
partners and this may lead to further deterioration of the
situation inside the NATO bloc and among the Islamic allies of the
United States.
Q: A question for Mr. Kortunov. You have said that the West
has not responded to the Russian moves, including some moves Russia
hadn't been asked to make and you have said that Russia has made
many miscalculations. What were the Russian moves toward the West
that you consider to be a mistake? And my second question. You as
the authors of the commentary, don't you have a sense that there is
a build up of anti-American feelings in the country although, as a
recent Izvestia opinion poll has revealed, the attitude of the
majority of the population to the US has not yet changed. Aren't
you afraid that your commentary will contribute to this
anti-American campaign?
Kortunov: As for me, I don't see any groundswell of
anti-American feeling in our society and in our press. I see
another period of euphoria in Russian-American relations. And I see
that at least some of our leaders are ready to step on the same
rake as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Boris Nikolayevich
Yeltsin stepped on in their time. I was in the corridors of power
at the time and I observed it from within. And we all know what the
results of that euphoria were. So, we are talking about a euphoria,
and we are about to step on the same rake for the third time.
What are the concessions to the West that we have made that
were unsolicited? One example is a withdrawal from Cam Ranh and
from Lourdes base on Cuba. Nobody asked us. But of course, we were
applauded by the Pentagon and other agencies in the United States.
And as you know, military specialists in the United States promptly
announced that these bases will be used by the United States in
future anti-terrorist operations.
I also think -- but this is my personal view -- that our
reaction with regard the ABM Treaty was too restrained. We should
have taken at least two or three months before making a carefully
bound political statement on the issue that would not only assess
the withdrawal of the US from the ABM Treaty as posing no threat to
the national security or Russia, but also the future of arms
control which was undermined by this move of the United States by
pulling out of the ABM Treaty. And the fact that this regime was
forged over decades through much travail, in the years of the Cold
War, by the way, this is something I know at first hand because I
was involved in it. And many around this table took part and they
know how difficult it was.
Speaking about Russian diplomatic mistakes we should perhaps
have been more persistent in pressing for the use of the mechanism
of the UN Security Council. From the early start, after the
terrorist acts. You know that the Security Council was brought in
later to approve the US actions after they had been made.
The "Shanghai Six" mechanism could also have been used. We
should have insisted on an emergency meeting of the Shanghai Six.
Now we see that this mechanism has collapsed because the United
States is the leader in the region even though the United States
have never been a member of the Shanghai Six. So, one could say
that Shanghai Six no longer exist. The same can be said about the
Collective Security Council set up under the treaty on Collective
Security of 1972. Why wasn't an emergency meeting of that body
called, a body which is essentially the only and the most important
body within the CIS framework in the aspect of collective security.
I cannot understand this. So, I believe that the body is actually
doomed to degradation if we go on behaving this way.
Of course we could say that we did not show sufficient
persistence in convening G-8. Many of us probably remember that
Russia and Italy suggested holding an emergency meeting of the
Eight on this issue, the issue of terrorist acts. But the US said
-- and this was in September and October -- that this was not
necessary and so such a meeting never materialized. I think that if
we took all these steps and if we did not do what we had not been
asked to do, our position now would have been much more solid.
Konovalov: A couple of words about the importance of our
report: is it not a contribution to increasing anti-Americanism?
You know that to my mind the entire decade of 1990s was marked by
growing anti-American sentiment in Russia and for the first time --
in Soviet history -- this was not the result of an ideological
campaign started from the top, when anti-Americanism was needed but
did not go well with the ordinary citizens, this was the result of
natural processes when the rank-and-file responded to their own
idea of what the US was doing.
A public opinion poll has found that while ten years ago about
every tenths respondent said he felt hostility toward the United
States and regarded it as an enemy, now 44 percent of respondents
answer the question positively.
I think one of the main tasks of our report is to reverse the
tendency. The growth of anti-Americanism does not correspond to
Russia's national interests. But this is happening because of the
lack of a strategy and because of misunderstanding the opponents
both inside Russia and on the part of the United States. It is for
this reason that we have to clearly understand our interests, we
should not await too much and we should not demand something we
cannot get or cannot ask; we must understand the actions of each
other.
In former times there was a permanent monitoring. We, the
Soviet Union, and America would keep monitoring each other and try
to predict the response. The response was based on fear because the
fear of nuclear weapons, the fear of a big war forced one into
efforts to understand and to assess the opponent. But when the fear
disappeared, those mechanisms underwent total degradation. And now
we sometimes fail to see what is going on in the US and why, and
they also fail to understand why and at what we get offended.
Our report aims at reversing the negative tendency of growing
anti-Americanism, which is undoubtedly in existence in Russia.
Q: Iranian news agency IRNA. You say that it is necessary to
reverse the tendency of growing anti-Americanism. But how can this
be done when Americans and their president declare whole countries
to be part of an axis of evil, such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea
and US newspapers start writing about how tomorrow they would be
bombing Russia and other countries which are also included in the
number. What can you accomplish in this way?
Kortunov: Firstly, I did not hear statements by US
administration that tomorrow they will be bombing Russia.
Q: It is not the leaders, it is the newspapers.
Kortunov: The newspapers do not issue official statements. So,
I don't think we should react so nervously to publications in even
highly respectable US media.
It is a different thing that today indeed we simply learned --
and I have no doubt that this leakage was deliberate -- that one
element of the new US nuclear doctrine is direct listing of
countries at which nuclear weapons are targeted, and China and
Russia are in the list. But to the mind of a military expert there
is nothing surprising in this and the esteemed General Dvorkin has
already spoken about this. Naturally, each country has its plans of
targeting and, because nuclear weapons are quite a conservative
element of bilateral relations, the nuclear weapons of nuclear
powers are bound to be targeted at each other. So, in this case the
calm response from our political and military leaders indicates
that the military experts are perfectly aware of this.
So, I don't think that the leakage was deliberately organized
in order to sound the attitude of Russia. I don't think it should
stimulate us to some nervous or hysterical conclusions or, worse
still, official statements of protest.
Lebedev: Can I put in a couple of words to follow up on the
topic? You know, gentlemen, we tried to do the following. In our
commentary we tried to present not a unidimensional view but rather
a comprehensive approach. All of us over the past years have grown
accustomed to regard Russian foreign policy and what was happening
on the international plane as some kind of single-move
combinations, as a game for children.
We are urging you now and we urge you in our report to see
things according to a multiple scenario. We should not get tempted
by simple and facile assessments. At issue is the fact that the
foreign policy must be much more deliberate and broad and more
weighed. So, we are urging you to adopt this. So, it is not always
good for the professionals to respond to some engineered leakages.
Q: Golos Rossii radio station. How can you assess or trace the
recent anti-Russian publications in the Western press? I was
browsing the Internet and I was simply shocked. They refer to
different historical facts such as Marinescu's (?) attack on the
German man of war and to the Red Army soldiers raping millions of
German women in 1945 and so on. And the information is cropping up
in France, in Spain and in Britain. What are the sources? Who
directs all this? And what are the sources? This is the first
question.
Now the second. I was very much interested to know that
Russia's strength is not in the economic or military might but
rather in the spiritual potential of moral principles. Does the
brochure also speak about this? In this case, does the brochure
also mention common sense because it is high time. So, the second
question is somewhat rhetorical but we would like your comment on
the spiritual potential and moral principles.
Kortunov: I will start from the second question. Concerning
the spiritual potential, in a serious report we strove to avoid
such politically contentious words and expressions. And we'd better
leave the spiritual potential for other political forces that
occupy an appropriate niche in our policy. For example,
Podberyozkin's Spiritual Heritage, or Zyuganov or the Russian
Orthodox Church which covers, analyzes and considers this problem
from different angles. Each organization does so as much as its
possibilities and spiritual potential permit. So, I personally
deleted such expressions from the final version of the report. And
I think this is a separate issue. We tried to use the language of
professional diplomats, military experts and politicians.
As for the anti-Russian campaign. Frankly speaking, I read the
Western press very attentively but I have not noticed the beginning
of any large-scale anti-Russian campaign. Moreover, I think that
Russia's international political weight has increased and Russia
has begun to get more sympathy in the world over the six months
after the September 11 terrorist acts. I can say this as a
professional.
It is true though that there always be certain forces in the
West that do not like Russia, just like there will always be
certain anti-American forces in Russia. And we can't avoid this.
This is why we must be ready for attacks against each other that
will be made in our and Western press from time to time.
Fortunately, there has been less and less of this recently. In my
view, with every passing month Russia is more and more perceived by
the West as its integral part.
Dvorkin: You know, I also follow all publications and I have
also noted what you noted. But I would just add that this is true
not only of Russia. We are very sensitive, of course, to everything
that concerns us, but look at the repercussions caused by the
increase in steel duties. Americans are being criticized by all
European countries and not only European countries. So, it's some
sort of a wave-like campaign that in my view is not connected with
any anti-Russian cycle.
Zolotarev: Just a few words. I have already talked about
spiritual potential and I said that I expressed my own point of
view. The document is must more precise about this and speaks about
new geopolitical ethics and new geopolitical moral principles based
on international law.
Very briefly. A question has been asked, and it has already
been answered, about ways of fighting anti-Americanism if they
behave like this. First of all, if we say that anti-Americanism
does not benefit us, this does not mean that we must not counter
the US actions that run counter to our interests. On the contrary,
we must act and act very vigorously.
Vladimir Lebedev is absolutely right. We must not stick to a
single-dimension logic. We tend all the time to move toward a
two-dimension logic and combine he white with the black. I tried to
point out in my speech that Russia's role is to actively counter US
moves that are wrong and that are not based on international law,
that go against certain moral principles.
The third world is looking for some ideology that would bring
it together. It sees the injustice of this world and it is looking
for the green banner of extremist trends of Islam. Ideas of the red
banner are still alive in this world. Something must take their
place. And I think that Russia's efforts may direct things along a
new route other than the red banner of course.
Q: We all know that the role of mass media in times of world
crises grows immensely. How would you assess the activities of
Russian mass media since September 11? How tactful and professional
have Russian mass media acted?
Chkuaseli: It is very hard to judge how tactful or untactful
Russian mass media have been because it's one thing when we may
discuss something among ourselves when there are no journalists
around. But if we talk in front of the journalists we would not
like to lie. But if we are frank, we should say that Russia's
national interests were violated by our journalists in many
respects.
We are not talking about Western mass media that get paid for
criticizing us. But I think that our mass media must be more
tactful and must not hurry to assess the situation before they get
concrete information and not to use unverified or untruthful
information as they did, for example, not so long ago with regard
to the arrival of American specialists in Georgia. In principle,
everything our mass media made a fuss about this past week,
including our politicians, proved wrong and everybody was in
trouble because nobody could understand anything. The President
knew everything, but no one else knew anything. So, I think that
the truthfulness of information must be a priority for our mass
media.
Kortunov: I would like to add something. Russian mass media
are part of society and therefore they go through the same stages
the entire Russian society goes. For example, in September and
October thee was human sympathy for the Americans that had fallen
victim to these tragic terrorist acts. Then euphoria began about
strategic rapprochement with the West.
Just yesterday I opened Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a newspaper that
I respect and like, and nearly fainted because every second article
in it was strongly anti-American. I was very surprised that the
journalists I respect allowed themselves such emotional
anti-American rhetoric.
Konovalov: I do not want to evaluate my colleagues, but I just
want to say that when we cover some event, we often lack
professionalism. Of course we cannot expect a journalist to have
intimate knowledge of all the things he writes about. But when we
say that we have been named along with rogue states and put on the
list of countries against which the Americans are going to use
nuclear weapons, this is absolute nonsense. Vladimir Zinovyevich
has spoken about it and many years ago dissertations were written
about the American plan called SIOP, or Single Integrated Operation
Plan. This plan envisages a certain number of targets on the
territory of each of the countries which may appear in the worse
case scenarios. General staffs have always been doing it. While
previously there were 10,000 such targets on the territory of the
Soviet Union, there are now two thousand of such targets in Russia.
And in ten years time that number will go down to one thousand.
Russia is seen now as less of a threat than China. This is just a
reaffirmation of staff plans. These are not plans of state actions
and nobody has put us on the list of rogue states.
That is why people sometimes overreact. When they hear that we
are targeted, they naturally feel sore. But nothing like it has
been done.
Q: Rosbalt news agency. How do the experts see the approaching
discussion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty? Ivanov is in the
United States, many say in order to prepare the Bush visit. How do
you see the prospects of the signing of such a document?
Kortunov: Dvorkin Vladimir Zinovyevich who took part in the
drafting of the document and in negotiations with the Americans at
all the stages will take that question.
Dvorkin: Well, not quite that document. We expect there will
be two variants. Either it will be a very short agreement which has
nothing to do with previous treaties. And this only possible if the
Russian side secures a legally binding provision making cuts
irreversible and verifiable, in connection especially with the fact
that the US is putting the dismantled weapons in storage.
And it may happen that if all these issues are not hammered
out, the signing of the document will be postponed because it is
not only the question of this document, the package should include
protocols on further transparency in the field of strategic
offensive weapons, and preservation of verification and confidence
measures, the attitude to START-1 and many other provisions.
I would say that 60 percent probability is that a very brief
document will be signed, that is, if a consensus is reached on this
issue along with the proposed package, treaties on non-orbiting of
offensive weapons in space, some kind of NMD transparency
confirming that it is limited and is not aimed against Russia and
there is a 40 percent chance that it may be postponed until a later
stage.
Kortunov: I think there is an understanding among the
political and military leaders of Russia that we don't need just
any treaty, a hollow declaration on the topic of Russian-American
relations without concrete provisions on irreversibility and
verifiability of cuts. So, if we don't reach such an agreement by
May, it is better to put if off than sign a hollow document.
Q: Vremya MN, Viktor Myasnikov. A question for Pavel
Semyonovich Zolotaryov. In the conflict between the rich North and
the poor South the far-from-poor Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates are the main sponsors of the spread of Wahhabism and
support of extremism. Don't you see elements of a conflict of
civilizations there?
Zolotaryov: I don't think so. Rather it's a case of double
standards on the part of the United States. As you see, they don't
include these countries into the "axis of evil."
Q: They should know better.
Zolotaryov (laughs): That's why I said that there is no real
evidence of a real fight against international terrorism. There is
this much publicized show in Afghanistan. But the real fight still
lies ahead.
Q: Yes, but I see no economic element of the conflict. The
richest and strongest countries of the South don't believe it.
Zolotaryov: But there must be other reasons why Saudi Arabia
supports extremist trends in Islam. I am afraid I am not an expert
in this field to answer this question.
Q: In other words, it is motivated by some mentality.
Zolotarev: There must be some other factors here.
Q: Religious?
Zolotarev: I don't think so. May I add? Extremist trends
always appeared in Islam when it was necessary to bring people
together under its banner, like in Chechnya, when it was necessary
to make people rise. Then always Islam was used and now it has
become traditional. But now it has exhausted itself and it can't
summon people under its banner. So, extremist trends of Islam are
being exported to and encouraged in Chechnya and neighboring
regions. Apparently Saudi Arabia is experiencing a need to support
this ideology which could be used to prod people into action. Why
they need this, I don't know.
Kortunov: I was surprised to see Pavel Yevgenyevich here. He
has raised his hand and I understand he did this not in order to
ask a question, but in order to speak or make some comments. I will
tell you a secret. Pavel Yevgenyevich participated in the
discussion of these theses from the very beginning and he made a
very important contribution.
Voice: The secret is on page 31. I just wanted to correct
something. If we take any world almanac, we'll see that Saudi
Arabia's official name is Wahhabite monarchy. Wahhabism to them is
what communism was to the Soviet Union, and it's part of the name
of the country. This is why one must not be surprised by the fact
that they advocate Wahhabism. Ibn Saud built state on Wahhabism
when he kicked the Hashemite dynasty which is in Jordan now.
There are so few good specialists in Islam and so many stupid
things are said about Islam not only in Russia but everywhere, that
it becomes outrageous. In principle, the report is very balanced
and, most importantly, timely because it is very important to
differentiate between terrorism and terror and understand the
difference between them. And the difference is quite big. So, the
report is quite timely.
Q: A question to Mr. Konovalov. Yesterday President George
Bush made a rather interesting statement about military operations
in the countries where international terrorists are hiding. After
the Philippines and Yemen he named Georgia. How, in your view, the
Russian Foreign Ministry should respond to this? And is there any
real danger that America will carry out a military operation in the
Pankisi Gorge?
Konovalov: We must find out whether information that Gelayev's
band and Al Qaeda fighters are hiding in the Pankisi Gorge is true
and how they got there. If this is true, urgent measures must be
taken. However, there are many illogical things in the statements
made by our and American politicians.
For example, if al Qaeda militants have indeed found harbor
there, action must be taken without delay. It is obvious to me that
Shevardnadze does not control the situation in the Pankisi Gorge
even though they organized a fashion show there, just as he doesn't
control it in many other parts of Georgia.
If Shevardnadze can't do this, someone else must. But who? If
Americans are going to do this, I am absolutely convinced that
there is some bad-staged agreement between our and American
leadership. They simply can't afford carrying out such an operation
on the border with Chechnya without notifying Russia first. One
doesn't make such jokes in foreign policy. It's not Afghanistan.
It's not Afghanistan at all.
Then we have to assume that they reached some agreement. I
don't know what this agreement is about because I was not
consulted. But even if there is no such agreement and if American
instructors have come to Georgia to train its special forces, which
is a noble undertaking considering the danger of extremist
appearances in Georgia, then it's not clear at all what all this
fuss is about. If it's just six or seven instructors or maybe even
200 instructors, it's not quite clear why they need a battalion of
200 instructors. How many people are they going to teach then? But
at any rate, this has nothing to do with the current terrorist
operation, I mean the current terrorist situation.
In order to properly train two battalions in using modern
means of communications, flying American helicopters and destroying
targets, preferably hostile ones, it will take several months if
not years. In that case how is all this related to the current
situation? When there are many illogical absurdities like these,
one begins to suspect that we are being fooled. Where and who? I
am sure that Americans will not begin any operation unilaterally
without consulting and notifying Russia.
I believe that any operation involving a considerable number
of people like in Iraq or Yemen or the Philippines or Afghanistan,
stretching rather limited resources, and such an operation requires
special forces, and the whole of NATO has not more than 5,000
troops like that. As a result, they have to give it to those who
are not properly prepared. So, this is a very serious question. And
I believe that Americans can't afford fighting on different fronts
at the same time.
And if they plan to do something jointly with Russia, it is
necessary to reach an agreement with Georgia because it's a
sovereign country after all. When the Americans bombed Afghanistan,
they did not need any agreement. They used the rights granted by
the UN charter and the right to repel an aggression. If militants
are acting against Russia from Georgian territory, one may think
the same way. But I do not think that the situation in this case is
so tragic and dangerous as to require a massive operation.
There is a lot of rumor about this in Georgia. It is even
rumored that Americans only need Georgian airfields for an
operation against Iraq. But Turkey may not allow this because
Turkey does not want the Kurd movement to rise inside Iraq, for
this would be another headache for Turkey. And there is no other
opposition in Iraq besides the Kurds. All others are outside it.
Therefore, they should be brought in and armed, if it is not
virtual, that is. Saddam worked things out with the opposition very
quickly. Actually not quickly but deeply.
Dvorkin: It's untactful to add anything to what such a
professional as Alexander Alexandrovich has said, but still I would
add that in my view Americans are experiencing some sort of a
vacuum between Afghanistan and future major actions. And they are
simply filling in this pause more for internal consumption in order
to show the continuity of the fight against terrorism.
Moderator: I see that there are no more questions, and I thank
everybody. I hope very much that your criticism of the report will
be benign.
*******
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