Johnson's Russia List
#6132
13 March 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Note from David Johnson:
1. UPI: Russian foreign policy revolution?
2. Interfax: Putin gives positive rating for Russia's development, praises
serious journalism.
3. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review.
4. Boston Globe: David Filipov, Putin vows to rebuild Afghan army.
5. Kommersant: GAZPROM FALLS. But Alexei Miller is standing his ground.
6. Interfax: Russian minister says bases in Cuba, Vietnam closed without
external
pressure.
7. Los Angeles Times: Robin Wright, Ties That Terrorism Transformed.
Policy: The Sept. 11 attacks cemented a bond between U.S. and Russia.
The partnership extends beyond Afghan campaign to NATO and arms issues.
8. Christian Science Monitor: Adrian Karatnycky, Bush's Uzbekistan test.
9. Los Angeles Times: David Willman and Alan Miller, Russian Official Had
Dual
Role in Uranium Pact. Security: The former nuclear chief's links raise
questions
about the U.S.' decision to privatize the buying of weapon-grade chemical
element.
10. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: INTERVIEW WITH LIBERAL RUSSIA MOVEMENT CO-CHAIRMAN
SERGEI YUSHENKOV ON BORIS BEREZOVSKY.
11. Financial Times (UK): Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Russia must say no to Opec:
Oil producers need to find a new form of global regulation based on openness
and transparency.
12. The Globe and Mail (Canada)/AP: Irina Titova, Russian train museum a
window
to country's history.]
*******
#1
Russian foreign policy revolution?
[DJ: author?]
WASHINGTON, March 12 (UPI) -- In a move that could have ramifications as
important as the fall of the Soviet Union, President Vladimir Putin is
attempting to reshape Russia's international role by repositioning the
country's foreign policies, according to a respected Russian political
analyst.
"Russia also is trying to redefine its identity to consolidate its society
and a new role on the international scene," said Lilia Shevtsova, senior
associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in a recent
lecture. "It is fighting with the leftovers, with the vestiges of its
former Soviet hegemony."
Shevtsova said changes Putin made in response to the United States' more
unilateralist positioning since Sept. 11 recognize the new role of the west
in Central Asia. She credits Putin with attempting to create a different
paradigm for his country's international policies and an "absolutely
different role" for Russia internationally.
Included in the changes is a withdrawal of troops from Georgia, a
redefining of Russian policies toward Moldova and a new non-militaristic
approach to Chechnya, among other internal and economic moves.
Russian policy analysts accept that these changes were forced from the top
down by the Putin administration, with begrudging acceptance of the Russian
bureaucracy.
But perhaps most importantly, by refocusing its policies regarding former
states and the central Asia region, Russia has allowed the U.S. presence in
the region and accepted the country as a de facto provider of stability,
she said. It is a fact that "few people could have predicted even a few
months ago."
"Russian has closed the chapter and began to extricate itself from the cold
war mesh," said Shevtsova.
She believes Putin's actions are based at least in part on the helplessness
of the Russian government, as well as his own understanding of the limited
resources and asymmetry between the country's resources and former
ambitions. Nevertheless, she said, there is more is at work than simple
geopolitical and economic maneuvering on his part.
"At the same time this is a glimpse of pragmatic understanding (by Putin)
that to survive, Russia has to redefine its role in the new world order,"
she said. "The ramifications, courage and conclusion of which will be
remembered by history."
John Hulsman, Heritage Foundation research fellow in European studies,
agreed with Shevtsova's assessment of the importance of these moves and of
Putin's realism, both of which have critical implications not only for
Russia but also for the United States.
"I think it is immensely important," said Hulsman. "I think there are broad
strategic deals out there that can be reached with America."
Hulsman stressed that Putin was taking advantage of the limited options
available to him and understands that by embracing U.S. demands he has no
chance of resisting -- he has enhanced Russia power in the region.
In addition, he said Putin's nimble politicking has opened the doors to
economic opportunities -- such as joining the World Trade Organization --
and could provide the Russian populace as well as entrenched bureaucracy
with a feeling of importance that has been gone since the fall of the
Soviet Union.
"He understands this reality," said Hulsman. "This is a much subtler
approach than the Yeltsin regime and no other real choices will provide the
country with the kind of economic and worldwide recognition they crave."
Celeste Wallander, director of the Russia/Eurasia program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, said Russia's continued engagement
along these lines is important not only for U.S. strategic interests in the
region, but also for American economic interests.
"The Russian government is going to get (farther) involved in international
trade and economic relations regardless (of the level of U.S. interest in
the region)," Wallander told United Press International. "The question is
what kind of economic relations and with what countries."
Wallander said much focus is placed upon whether Russia will continue to
partner economically with Iran and China, and the implications of this for
U.S. foreign policy. But she says the question is misdirected: The real
question is whether Russia will partner predominately with the United
States or Europe.
A strong economic relationship with Europe is unstoppable, she said, and
already evident in the natural resources and energy sectors.
Nevertheless, Wallander believes that there are strong economic incentives
for both Russian and the United States to cooperate in moving the country's
economy away from the current model based on energy and missile technology
trade. She said that an economic relationship could be developed which
could help the country diversify its markets and benefit American
businesses interests.
But by embracing a new world order, Russia benefits for accepting what the
United States wants, said Shevtsova. She described the acceptance of U.S.
foreign policy demands as "Faustian bargain" riddled with geopolitical and
internal problems. For one, Russian policy analysts believe that Putin
cannot be seen as weak in the eyes of the Russian public, which currently
supports him highly and works to offset his lack of bureaucratic support.
Shevtsova said that a second and more mutually beneficial option would be a
"benevolent asymmetry" or "constructive relationship" along the lines of
the economic cooperation outlined by Wallander.
But this situation requires an even greater change not only by the United
States, but the Russian government and society in general.
"This option demands cooperation not only against the enemy (terrorists)
but also acceptance on the part of Russia of liberal democratic rule within
the country," said Shevtsova.
She said the recent important changes are a significant step toward
returning the country to prosperity, but that in order for them to succeed
Putin will have to abandon the very ruling structure that has allowed him
to push these reforms through an unwilling bureaucracy.
"We need corporate markets and capitol markets, but the most important
(factor) is administrative reform," said Shevtsova. "You can't proceed in
building economic capitalism while suppressing individual freedom. There
are signs evident that he (Putin) understands this pattern of economic
stability will come to its limits."
Despite some signs that Putin recognizes this need, the analysts agree that
part of his power is that he has established himself as an authoritarian
leader in the Russian tradition.
Wallander agreed that despite Putin's success in taking the initial steps
of returning Russia to the world stage, the current top-down political
model is unable to provide the changes needed to turn the country into a
modern economic power.
She cited the failing "Asian Tiger" economies like Indonesia as proof that
market economy reforms can be made under repressive regimes but are
impossible to sustain.
"Ultimately, the kind of economy that Putin and his leadership appear to
want is going to have to drive political reforms," said Wallander. "To have
a successful economic model in the modern world you have to have
information flow, flexible investment and functional financial
institutions. These are the kinds of the things that do not match up with
political repression and control of the media."
Though Hulsman freely admits reforms eventually will be needed for total
market and international success, he said the powerful Putin regime might
not need to make such changes for some time and that the nature of Russian
political power may work against this for some time.
"Putin is a very powerful president and he can disengage or discard anyone
that gets in his way," Hulsman told UPI. "Due to the very nature of Russian
governments, change comes from the top down. This is a system that Russians
understand and it has been an organic part of their system for a thousand
years."
Hulsman said that some dangers to Putin's success come from the way in
which he sold some of the policy changes -- such as giving in to Bush's
missile treaty demands in return for the dismantling of U.S. nuclear
warheads -- which require America to recognize and act upon a mutually
beneficial relationship.
"It think there is a key point in that Putin has to be able to prove to
people in the medium term that he is getting something for these
concessions, which in reality he cannot stop," said Hulsman.
Wallander and Shevtsova both raised the problem of the Russian military,
which is described as mired in Cold War thinking, as a hindrance to
governmental reforms.
According to Shevtsova, other government problems with the country also act
as hindrance to reform.
"A lot depends upon the western attitude, a lot of this depends upon the
western willingness to reciprocate," she said. "Russia is standing on the
doorstep and the West is not ready for Russia's newly redefined role. The
world is not ready to have Russia as a partner."
Despite the problems, all three analysts believe that democratic reforms
leading to a successful market economy and a stronger relevance in the
world are possible.
Hulsman did not agree with Shevtsova that the needed political and economic
reforms could come within the next decade.
"The good news is that we have the opportunity to open this country for
change," said Hulsman. "The long-term cementing of a democratic mindset in
Russia, however, is at least a generation away."
*******
#2
Putin gives positive rating for Russia's development, praises serious
journalism
Interfax
Moscow, 13 March: Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that "by and
large" he rates as positive the development of the country over the last
two years.
Responding to questions by journalists on Wednesday [13 March] while
visiting the offices of Izvestiya, Putin, without revealing the ratings,
noted that "in a number of areas the changes for the better are taking
place even quicker than it seemed two years ago".
Asked whether he read about himself in the press, Putin replied: "I don't
read about myself. I don't even read books about myself. I know everything
about myself anyway, and this kind of reading would be a pure waste of time."
The president said that the reading of objective and serious material in
the press filled him with a desire to "keep going with some things, but
improve others". He said that reading an article by a good commentator was
comparable with a "conversation with an intelligent person".
*******
#3
ORT Review
www.ortv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu)
Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and
Policy at Boston University
HEADLINES,
Tuesday, March 12, 2002
- The Palestinians were rather upset by Federation Council Chairman Sergei
Mironov’s decision not to meet with Palestinian Authority Leader Yasser
Arafat, but Palestinian Ambassador to Russia Hairi al-Oridi said that
Mironov’s decision expressed his personal attitude, and added that he hopes
Russian-Palestinian relations will not be affected by it. Israeli Deputy
Prime Minister Natan Sharansky stated that Mironov made a brave and wise
political move, which speaks to Russia’s appreciation of Israel’s problems
and to the significance the fight against international terrorism holds for
the Russian parliamentarians. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
announced that there has been no change in Russia’s position on regulating
the Arab-Israeli conflict and noted that Mironov’s program in the region was
“coordinated with Moscow and provided for meetings with Israeli and
Palestinian officials.
- Defense Ministry’s former finance chief Georgy Oleinik has been accused of
abusing his position. A sentence for this crime carries 3-10 years.
Oleinik is pleading innocent.
- Russia will appeal the decision of the Olympic judges to disqualify skiers
Lazutina and Danilova in the international Court of Arbitration for Sport.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov continues his visit to Washington.
Earlier today he visited the Arlington Cemetery and met with US Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Last night he attended a basketball game.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Interim leader of Afghanistan
Hamid Karzai and promised to support Afghanistan in creating an army and to
help de-mine Afghani territory. The Russian President declared that Russia
wants Afghanistan to be a friendly and independent state. Hamid Karzai also
met with Foreign Minister Ivanov to discuss specific reconstruction
projects.
- A collection of journalist Nikolai Dolgopolov’s short stories about
Russian reconnaissance officers was presented in Moscow today.
- Miners from across Russia gathered in Moscow for a congress. They will
discuss safety, economic questions, and the future of the mining industry.
- Russian Agriculture Minister Aleksei Gordeev declared that the import of
low-quality foodstuff is a problem for national food safety. He also said
that, despite the ban on “Bush’s legs”, there will no poultry shortages in
Russia.
- The Russian-Belarusian Council of Ministers met in Minsk today to discuss
the creation of a single Russian-Belarusian economic space. A package of
documents on the topic will be signed by April 1st.
- Over 100 artists are holding a benefit art-show to help the victims of
September 11.
- A team of hot-air-balloon pilots is on a mission to set a Russian record
for flight length and time. One pilot lost 7 kilos so that he could take
more supplies.
- Teachers in the Sverdlovsk oblast city of Zarchny are striking for wage
payments. According to the new Labor Code, employees can legally strike
once wages haven’t been paid for fifteen days.
- The Riga city court has released WWII veteran Mikhail Fartbukh early from
his 5-year sentence for health reasons.
*******
#4
Boston Globe
March 13, 2002
Putin vows to rebuild Afghan army
By David Filipov, Globe Staff
MOSCOW - Russia is ready to help Afghanistan build a modern national army
as part of its contribution to reconstruct the war-ravaged nation,
President Vladimir Putin told the interim Afghan prime minister, Hamid
Karzai, who was visiting Moscow yesterday.
Putin also said that Russia would help restore about 140 factories that
made up the bulk of Afghanistan's industry, most of which were built by the
Soviet Union prior to Moscow's 1979 invasion.
''Russia has no other goals in Afghanistan except one, to see an
independent, prosperous, neutral, and friendly Afghanistan,'' Putin said as
he welcomed Karzai in the Kremlin.
Putin's offer to help rebuild the country the Soviets once helped destroy
is part of Moscow's effort to develop close ties with the new Afghan
government, whose stability the Kremlin sees as critical to the security of
the former Soviet states of Central Asia.
Building an independent national army and police to replace the hodgepodge
of militias and armed gangs that currently hold sway in much of Afghanistan
has been a priority of Karzai's administration. Putin said that Russia,
which provided military aid to the Northern Alliance opposition that fought
the Taliban regime for years before the United States became involved, was
a logical choice to help.
''Russia's participation in this work is natural, since much of the
weaponry on the territory of Afghanistan is of Russian and Soviet make,''
Putin said, as Karzai looked on.
Among the weaponry are Soviet-era mines planted and replanted by warring
sides over 23 years of conflict. Putin said Russia would help rid
Afghanistan of these mines.
''We've had all sorts of different relations,'' Putin said in his only
comments that alluded to the brutal, decade-long Soviet occupation that
ended with a humiliating withdrawal in 1989. ''This is all the more reason
why it is our duty to build relations between the two countries for the
good of both peoples.''
Putin told reporters in the Kremlin that he and Karzai had discussed joint
efforts to fight the spread of terrorism and crack down on heroin and opium
trafficking along the route from Afghanistan via Central Asia to Russia.
The route has become known as the Great Drug Road.
On his first visit to Moscow since being named interim prime minister in
December, Karzai thanked Russia for its support and made it clear that any
bitterness over the Soviet occupation, during which 1 million Afghans died,
was in the past.
''I hope that the development of friendly ties between Afghanistan and
Russia will help stability in the whole region,'' Karzai said.
Russia had favored restoring to power its ally, former Afghan president
Burhanuddin Rabbani. But Moscow later accepted the appointment of Karzai.
The Russian Emergency Ministry helped to clear out the Salang Tunnel, a
major transportation route between Kabul and the north that had been
destroyed and closed by Northern Alliance rebels fighting the Taliban.
The tunnel was built by the Soviets in 1964, at the height of Moscow's
friendly relations with Zahir Shah, Afghanistan's former king. Much of what
Soviet engineers built in the 1960s and 1970s was later detroyed by Soviet
tanks, bombers, and helicopter gunships.
But even now, factory towns that the Soviets helped build, such as the
settlement for workers at a fertilizer factory near Mazar-e-Sharif, are
among the best places to live in Afghanistan, with round-the-clock heat,
gas, and water.
*******
#5
Kommersant
March 13, 2002
GAZPROM FALLS
But Alexei Miller is standing his ground
Author: Dmitry Butrin, Kseniya Nechayeva
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE TAX POLICE INTEND TO START A CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST GAZPROM. AS A
RESULT OF THIS NEWS, GAZPROM'S VALUE FELL BY $1.1 BILLION IN ONE DAY.
A VERY INTRICATE GAME HAS BEGUN, AIMED AT GAINING CONTROL OVER THE GAS
MONOPOLY.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL VICTOR VASILYEV, CHIEF OF THE MOSCOW DEPARTMENT OF
THE FEDERAL TAX POLICE SERVICE (FTPS), STATED YESTERDAY THAT HIS
DEPARTMENT IS CONSIDERING LAUNCHING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
GAZPROM'S SENIOR EXECUTIVES - ON CHARGES OF TAX EVASION AMOUNTING TO
OVER 30 BILLION RUBLES. RUMORS ARE CIRCULATING THAT ALEXEI MILLER,
GAZPROM'S CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, WHO WENT ON LEAVE ON MONDAY, WILL
SOON BE DISMISSED. AFTER THAT STATEMENT GAZPROM SHARES FELL BY 7.6%.
THE COMPANY'S VALUE DECREASED BY $1.1 BILLION IN ONE DAY: THIS IS MUCH
MORE THAN FTPS IS SEEKING TO RECOVER FROM GAZPROM.
Vasilyev's press conference was dedicated to the tenth
anniversary of his department.
Vasilyev listed the main violations allegedly committed by
Gazprom: "non-payment of taxes on gas used for internal needs, sales
of gas at an artificially low price, and under-reporting revenues."
According to the press service, Gazprom has not received any
specific complaints. The gas monopoly has only received a note with a
list of comments. Vitaly Savelyav, deputy chairman of the board, says:
"It is not ethical to announce the results of an audit which has not
yet been completed. Such reports can hurt Gazprom's reputation, at
home and abroad. Officials must understand what consequences their
hasty conclusions may have for the nation's business."
Savelyev knows what he's talking about: Gazprom's share price
continued to fall all day. According to our sources, such an
unprecedented fall was caused by the FTPS chief's statements and
rumors that President Putin has signed a decree dismissing Alexei
Miller. Alpha-Bank and the UFG company were the main unofficial
sources of rumors, and Gazprombank was the most active seller of
Gazprom securities. Naturally, these companies deny that they were
involved in circulating such rumors. The press service of the
brokerage said that Boris Fedorov, a co-owner of UFG and a member of
Gazprom's board of directors, did not know anything about the events,
because he was holding talks with partners all day. At the same time,
reports about staff reshuffles in Gazprom were not unfounded. PR
manager Igor Plotnikov said that Miller went on leave on Monday.
According to our sources, Miller will return on March 22, and his
duties will be carried out by Savelyev until that time.
There are several possible explanations for the events around
Gazprom. The simplest explanation is that the Tax Ministry will not be
able to collect enough taxes in the first quarter of 2002, due to
declining oil prices. This is why it's possible that Vasilyev's
statement was a delicate proposal to resume the practice of advance
payments to the budget. It should be noted that the FTPS used such
methods (threatening major companies) in 2000 and 2001. To all
appearances, stock-brokers used this situation to make a profit, since
rumors about Alexei Miller's replacement have been circulating since
February.
According to another theory, the FTPS statement is addressed to
Miller's team. The fact that the statement was made by Vasilyev (a
memeber of the "St. Petersburg team" and former intelligence agent)
shows that various forces in the president's team are battling for
control over Gazprom.
The last theory is not linked to politics. The markets expects
some deregulation of Gazprom's shares, and negative reports about the
company present a good chance to organize cornering the market on
Gazprom shares. Structures which have insiders' reports about the
timing of signing the document linked with liberalization of the
market can earn $20-30 million using such an operation.
As far as the criminal case is concerned, it does not have much
of a prospect in court. Vasilyev's statement about gas sales at
artificially low prices is absurd: Russia does not have a free market
for natural gas, so the term "market price" is nonsensecal. Under-
reporting revenues concerns the transfer price formation in Gazprom's
transactions with its subsidiaries (Yamalgazprom, Astrakhangazprom,
and others). It should be noted that the use of transfer prices is not
forbidden by the law.
Non-payment of taxes for gas used for internal needs (for
supplying gas-compressor stations) is an unconvincing reason for
starting a criminal case.
However, the lack of economic prospects for Gazprm's case does
not mean a lack of political prospects. The FTPS isn't showing all its
cards yet; the investigation into the Gazprom case is due to be
completed by late March.
(Translated by Alexander Dubovoi)
*******
#6
Russian minister says bases in Cuba, Vietnam closed without external pressure
Interfax
Moscow, 13 March: Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has denied that external
factors influenced Russia's decision to close down a naval base in
Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay and the Lourdes radar station in Cuba.
The closure of the Lourdes facility "was discussed only with the Cubans",
Ivanov said during Government Hour in the State Duma on Wednesday [13 March].
On 1 January 2002, "the station in Cuba stopped working and the technical
issue of its closure is being coordinated with the Cuban side", he said.
"The opinion of Russian defence officials was taken into consideration.
[They said] that from the technical point of view, this station was
'outdated'. Therefore, a decision was made not to invest in its upgrade,
but to channel the funds into creating technical alternatives for
implementing the tasks that the centre in Cuba used to carry out," he said.
Commenting on remarks that Americans might replace Russian troops in Cam
Ranh Bay, Ivanov pointed out that "the Vietnamese leadership has repeatedly
denied that the base will be used for military purposes". "Following our
request, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry made its latest statement to this
effect on 10 February 2002," he said.
Russia suggested "various options for the peaceful use of the Cam Ranh Bay
base" and it is waiting for Hanoi's reply, he said.
"Already in the 90s, the base was not used as intended, because the Russian
navy has not sailed to the Indian Ocean since then," he said.
Vietnam raised the issue of payment for the use of the Cam Ranh Bay base
after 2004. A pertinent agreement was signed in 1978 and will expire in
2004, he recalled.
"At present, exploitation of this base does not meet our interests. It no
longer carries out the functions for which it was set up," he said
******
#7
Los Angeles Times
March 13, 2002
Ties That Terrorism Transformed
Policy: The Sept. 11 attacks cemented a bond between U.S. and Russia. The
partnership extends beyond Afghan campaign to NATO and arms issues.
By ROBIN WRIGHT, TIMES STAFF WRITER
MOSCOW -- As a light snow fell at dusk, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
showed up at the busy subway station on Pushkin Square here to place a
bouquet of red roses beneath a plaque marking the spot where a suitcase
bomb killed 13 and injured dozens Aug. 8, 2000. Powell bowed his head as
Russian TV cameras filmed the scene.
The brief ceremony last December contrasted sharply with President
Clinton's visit here barely a month after the attack. Clinton never went
near the site. It was Powell's first stop on his maiden visit here as
secretary of State.
"It's showing solidarity with the Russians," Powell said. "It's showing
that this kind of violence exists in many forms--not just in America." The
Pushkin Square tribute reflected a far-reaching consequence of the Sept. 11
attacks--a transformation of relations between Russia and the U.S.
At the dawn of the 21st century, the two countries are fighting the same
war. Half a century of superpower rivalry gave way to awkward coexistence
in the 1990s and has become a strategic partnership.
"Not only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold War period is also over,"
Powell said as relations between the countries warmed last fall.
Russia quickly became one of America's most important allies in the
campaign against the Al Qaeda terrorist network. Moscow provided political
support and technical assistance for U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan and paved the way for an American military presence in the
former Soviet republics bordering the war zone.
The new spirit also lent impetus to changes that were in motion before
Sept. 11.
Russia's New Stature Among NATO Nations
With strong American backing, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization took
the historic step in December of establishing formal cooperation with
Russia. The alliance and Russia will now meet regularly in a new council to
"pursue opportunities for joint action," according to a NATO communique
crafted largely by U.S. officials.
In addition, Moscow and Washington have agreed to a new framework for
strategic relations, including steep reductions in their nuclear
stockpiles. An agreement on arms reductions may be signed as early as May,
when President Bush is scheduled to visit Moscow for talks with Russian
President Vladimir V. Putin.
The two countries still have their differences. When Bush announced tariffs
on foreign steel imports last week, Russia retaliated by banning imports of
American poultry. And when Bush suggested that the U.S. might extend the
war on terrorism to Iraq, Putin declared that he saw no justification for
such a move.
But such disputes now fit into a broader picture of U.S.-Russian
accommodation. The change is widely viewed as historic. "No Russian leader
since Peter the Great has cast his lot as much with the West as Putin has,"
said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
The rapprochement is just one element in a broad realignment in U.S.
foreign policy sparked by Sept. 11. Overnight, priorities were redefined,
resources reallocated and troops redeployed. The war against terrorism has
taken precedence over all other foreign policy issues, even the promotion
of democracy and free markets.
Bush, the former Texas governor who made just one foreign policy speech
during his presidential campaign, now finds himself prosecuting a global
war against terrorists from Somalia to the Philippines.
Still, "the most far-reaching geostrategic effect" of Sept. 11 is likely to
be the change in U.S.-Russian relations, said John L. Helgerson, chairman
of the National Intelligence Council, which provides intelligence estimates
to all branches of the U.S. government.
Helgerson said Russia's realignment is comparable to "the historic
post-World War II change, when Germany became solidly anchored into the
European and North Atlantic communities."
Many of the tensions that defined U.S.-Russian relations after the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991--such as Kremlin worries over American plans
for a missile defense shield and Moscow's fears about NATO expansion into
Eastern Europe--have subsided.
The new tone was set Sept. 11 when Putin phoned Bush to offer condolences,
using the hot line left over from the Cold War. It was the first sympathy
call Bush received from a foreign leader.
The warming grew, in part, out of a pragmatic realization that the two
nations needed each other. The American interest in closer ties was
obvious: Better than any other nation, Russia knew the rough Afghan terrain
after its 1979-89 occupation of the nation. Moscow also had influence in
its former Central Asian republics, which have airfields and military bases
near the Afghan war front.
For their part, Russian leaders were pleased to see Washington giving top
priority to terrorism, a long-standing problem on many fronts in Russia.
After Sept. 11, the U.S. immediately eased pressure on Russia over its
suppression of the separatist rebellion in Chechnya.
The new sense of common cause was evident at the NATO meeting in Brussels
in December, where the alliance and Russia agreed to create a council for
joint action on issues ranging from terrorism to missile defense.
Russian Foreign Minister Igor S. Ivanov co-chaired a meeting with his
counterparts from NATO's 19 member countries around the same conference
table where Western military strategists plotted for decades against the
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites.
"We have turned an important corner in NATO-Russia relations," Ivanov said.
"What we are talking about is a mechanism that will enable us to draft and
adopt decisions together on the crucial issues of security that will
correspond to the spirit of the age."
The U.S.-Russian partnership is visible in Central Asia and its
predominantly Muslim countries of sweeping steppes, rugged mountains and
ancient trading centers along the old Silk Road. The Soviet empire's
southern flank until 1991, it is still a region Moscow considers distinctly
within its sphere of influence.
Before the terrorist attacks, Central Asia was emerging as a source of
friction between Washington and Moscow. During talks in Powell's office at
the State Department last summer, Ivanov expressed concern about heightened
U.S. interest in a region that for decades was not even on the American
diplomatic horizon.
"Igor was saying, 'I really don't like it when I see you guys doing
things,' " Powell recalled in an interview. "I said, 'What is it you're
bothered about?' He says, 'Well, we just know you're meddling around down
there and that's not good. That's our realm of influence.' "
Sept. 11 dispelled such worries.
"Along comes this crisis, and within a few weeks the Russians are
comfortable about us being there," Powell said. "Now we've got bases in
Uzbekistan. We've got guys running around Tajikistan. We've got guys all
over the place, and all I have to do is call Igor and coordinate. He's OK."
During his visit to Moscow in December, Powell brought up Central Asia
again to explore how Russia and the United States might expand their
collaboration beyond the war on terrorism. Ivanov outlined his government's
worries about instability in Central Asia--its concern that illegal
immigration, smuggling and drug trafficking could cause problems in Russia.
Powell immediately saw an opportunity. "We can help you with those problems
more than you can help yourself," he told his Russian counterpart. Among
other things, he said, the United States could encourage American
investment to help create jobs and stabilize the new independent states.
Now Central Asia is an arena of cooperation between the two countries.
"It's not quite 'Let's tiptoe through the tulips together,' " Powell said.
"There will be tension. But if you had suggested this to a Russian foreign
minister a year ago, there would have been quite a different response."
Putin Terms U.S. Plan for Georgia 'No Tragedy'
The new spirit was evident in the Kremlin's reaction to a U.S. plan to arm
and train an anti-terrorist force in Georgia, a former Soviet republic.
When Russian politicians protested this month at what they saw as American
meddling, Putin quieted the uproar by pronouncing the U.S. plan "no tragedy."
The scope of change in a mere six months has been clear in the most
contentious issue between the two nations: the Antiballistic Missile Treaty
crafted during the Cold War.
From the moment he took office, Bush raised the possibility of amending or
withdrawing from the 1972 treaty, considered the cornerstone of nuclear
arms control. With equal determination, Putin insisted on keeping it,
pointing out that it had helped keep the peace between the countries for a
generation. The dispute created fears of a new arms race that might expand
to include China and India.
But as Bush prepared to announce America's withdrawal from the treaty in
December, Putin felt sufficiently secure in his new relationship with
Washington that he lodged no serious protest.
Indeed, Powell and Ivanov quietly choreographed the U.S. announcement and
the Russian reaction to minimize the appearance of discord.
There is now a firm consensus among American conservatives and liberals
alike that the new bonds are genuine and enduring.
"The hallmark of the 20th century was the great power rivalry," said
Richard Haass, chief of policy and planning for the State Department. "At
the beginning of the 21st century, we've ensured that it's now over."
Researcher Robin Cochran contributed to this report.
******
#8
Christian Science Monitor
March 13, 2002
Bush's Uzbekistan test
By Adrian Karatnycky
(Adrian Karatnycky is president of Freedom House)
NEW YORK - Uzbekistan, which sits on Afghanistan's border and faces its own
terrorist movement, has played host to US troops. The Uzbek strongman, Islam
Karimov, has rightly earned points for this.
But President Karimov, meeting with President Bush this week in Washington,
also has a dark side. His government has shown little respect for human
rights and severely represses political opposition.
Indeed, while Karimov uses the recent terrorist threat to justify suppression
of opponents, he has been repressing his opposition for years.
In 1992, Karimov banned all peaceful democratic parties. Over the years, he
has tried political opponents on trumped-up charges of "antistate
activities." He has near-total control of the media. Political opponents have
disappeared. Peaceful Uzbek opposition leaders who were in neighboring
countries have been abducted. Political prisoners have died from torture.
At the same time, Karimov has faced a real threat from extremist guerrilla
and terrorist movements, most notably the Al Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan. The IMU espouses a revolutionary ideology supported with Saudi
money, including heavy cash infusions from Uzbeks who have settled in Saudi
Arabia and, according to author Ahmed Rashid, are close to former Saudi
security chief Prince Turki al-Faisal.
In addition, Uzbekistan has seen the rapidly growing appeal of
Hizb-ut-tahrir, a secretive political movement that preaches the doctrine of
violent jihad against rulers, like Karimov, whom they call nonbelievers who
suppress Islam.
This underground party preaches the cleansing of Central Asia of all other
religious groups, including Shiite Muslims. Some observers from the region
argue that it is likely linked to the drug trade, that it cooperates with the
IMU, and that some of its adherents are likely eventually to practice what
they preach: the violent overthrow of leaders they see as guilty of
infidelity to Islam.
The IMU may even pose a threat to US national security. A document appearing
on Hizb-ut-tahrir's website in October - declared that "a state of war exists
between [the US] and all the Muslims."
Groups that engage in hate speech and advocate violence pose a complex
problem even for democracies. Many democracies - including Germany - have
banned groups and publications that preach hatred and call for violence.
In the context of widespread terrorism in Uzbekistan, such bans may be
justified; but the banning of periodicals and movements that support human
rights and democracy is not. Nor is it acceptable to subject hundreds of
youths drawn to extremist movements to sentences exceeding 15 years just for
having banned literature.
The US's new relationship with Uzbekistan allows Washington an opportunity to
address the regime's dismal human-rights record, and for Bush to press
Karimov to open up his country to peaceful critics.
Karimov is susceptible to pressure, because he needs US engagement more than
the US needs Uzbekistan's cooperation in the war on terror. US military
operations in Afghanistan have eroded the threat of the IMU, which trained
and sought shelter under the Taliban. Any operations mounted by IMU remnants
would be crushed. Thus, Karimov cannot argue that the terrorist threat
precludes reforms.
Indeed, US resolve against extremists is already encouraging some Muslim
governments - most notably, Bahrain - to move toward devolving power to
elected parliaments. In the past, Turkey has successfully controlled radical
Islamist and terrorist movements while pursuing greater political openness,
partly as a result of pressure from Europe and the US.
The Uzbek Human Rights Organization has urged the US to press Karimov to
legalize the democratic opposition and allow the safe return of exiles. Bush
should press Karimov to stop repression of legitimate human-rights and
political activists, legalize civic groups, allow an independent review of
the estimated 8,000 political prisoners, and restore the rights of political
parties such as Erk and Birlik.
Karimov's US visit gives Bush an opportunity to show that the US can balance
the war on terrorism with promotion of basic human rights and democratic
reforms in a repressive regime.
The Uzbek government can enhance its security by ceasing repressive actions
against human-rights defenders, establishing the rule of law, and allowing a
free media and an engaged civil society.
Unchecked, Karimov's policies will drive discontent further underground.
There, it will likely be more susceptible to the manipulations of extremists,
who may reemerge to menace Uzbekistan, its neighbors, and - through links to
global terrorist networks - the US.
*******
#9
Los Angeles Times
March 12, 2002
Russian Official Had Dual Role in Uranium Pact
Security: The former nuclear chief's links raise questions about the U.S.'
decision to privatize the buying of weapon-grade chemical element.
By DAVID WILLMAN and ALAN C. MILLER, TIMES STAFF WRITERS
WASHINGTON -- Two years ago, a small Pennsylvania consulting firm was quietly
hired by another American company responsible for carrying out a sensitive
nuclear security agreement between the United States and Russia.
As it turns out, one of the Pennsylvania firm's owners was Yevgeny O. Adamov,
who then also headed the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. At the time,
Adamov's ministry was overseeing multimillion-dollar negotiations between
Russia and USEC Inc., the same company that hired the Pennsylvania firm.
These circumstances have raised new questions about the U.S. government's
decision to hand a momentous national security function to private industry.
USEC buys bomb-grade uranium stripped from Russian warheads as the exclusive
agent for the U.S. government under a novel, post-Cold War agreement known as
Megatons to Megawatts. The uranium is shipped to the United States, where it
is resold as fuel for nuclear power plants.
The urgency of removing weapon-grade uranium from circulation in Russia has
been underscored since the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. President Bush and other leaders have warned that terrorists,
including Osama bin Laden, are intent on obtaining nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction.
Adamov's Involvement Unknown, Officials Say
USEC executives say they did not know who owned the consulting firm, and did
not learn of Adamov's involvement until he resigned his government post last
year amid allegations of corruption.
They said the firm was hired for legitimate consulting work to identify
prospective joint ventures between USEC and the commercial arm of the Russian
atomic energy ministry. No projects were launched before the contract expired.
Peter R. Orszag, a Brookings Institution economist and critic of privatizing
the nuclear security agreement, said the consulting deal involving the
Pennsylvania firm reflects badly on USEC's management.
"I find it inconceivable that the United States government would sign a
consulting contract with a firm owned by the [Russian] minister of atomic
energy," Orszag said. "Most private sector entities would not undertake such
a transaction."
Federal law discourages companies from making private business arrangements
with public officials in foreign governments. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act makes it a crime for a U.S. business to make payments to a
government official that could be construed as an inducement.
A USEC spokesman said the company did not violate the law, and he noted that
the contract called for the consulting firm, Omeka Ltd., to comply with all
applicable Russian and U.S. laws, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Interviews and records reviewed by The Times show that USEC paid Omeka
$123,880 for consulting fees and expenses incurred from Jan. 1, 2000, to
March 31, 2001. At the same time--under terms specified in its contract with
USEC--Omeka also received payments totaling $90,000 or more from the
commercial arm of Adamov's government ministry.
The contract ended around the time Adamov resigned from the Russian
government in March 2001. Earlier that year, an investigative report
circulated by a panel of Russia's lower house of parliament, or Duma, alleged
that Adamov had mixed his private business dealings and public
responsibilities. At the time, Adamov denied any wrongdoing.
Company Official Tells of Blind Trust
The report noted Adamov's ownership in Omeka; The Times could not confirm
other allegations contained in the document. The report did not refer to
Omeka's contract with USEC.
Adamov declined to respond to requests for an interview for this article or
to answer written questions submitted to him in Russia. An Omeka executive
said he did not believe Adamov received revenue from Omeka while he was a
government minister.
"We more or less put it [Adamov's ownership] in a blind trust," said Mark M.
Kaushansky, who co-founded Omeka in 1994 with Adamov.
Now based in Bethesda, Md., USEC once was a government-owned corporation,
like Amtrak, and it processed the nation's uranium for use in nuclear power
plants. As such, USEC had responsibility for carrying out the Megatons to
Megawatts pact with Russia. The 1993 agreement calls for 500 metric tons of
weapon-grade uranium to be stripped from the Russian warheads, blended to a
lower level of radioactivity and sold to the U.S.
When the federal government sold USEC to investors for $1.9 billion in 1998,
the privatized entity retained responsibility for the national security
agreement between the U.S. and Russia.
The agreement calls for the publicly traded company to purchase a certain
amount of uranium each year from the Russians. But it is up to USEC to
negotiate the price for the uranium, which it resells to utilities in the U.S.
Analysts estimate that the Russians, over a 20-year period ending in 2013,
would be paid approximately $12 billion for the uranium under the Megatons to
Megawatts accord. The exact price, however, has been subject to recurrent
negotiations between the Russians and USEC.
Indeed, the financial terms have been contested intensely; even a slight
shift in price can be worth huge sums to the Russian government or USEC.
Both sides now are trying to reach an agreement for new pricing terms,
through 2013. The negotiations got underway in early 2000--about the same
time that USEC retained Omeka.
The discussions that led to the consulting contract between USEC and Omeka
began in late 1999. In a series of interviews for this article, USEC
executives and a representative of Adamov's company said the dealings had no
connection with the negotiations regarding the national security agreement
between the U.S. and Russian governments.
A USEC senior vice president, Philip G. Sewell, said Omeka was retained to
provide "a speculative assessment" of opportunities with the commercial arm
of the Russian atomic energy ministry, known as Tenex.
The contract specified that services were to be performed by "no one other
than" Kaushansky, a Pittsburgh-based representative of Omeka who is Adamov's
business partner and whose title is general manager. Noting that Omeka is
privately held, Kaushansky declined to quantify Adamov's ownership, other
than to say, "Yes, he had an equity stake in the company. . . . He is one of
the owners."
USEC executives said they hired Omeka to gain the consulting services of
Kaushansky, a nuclear engineer and Russian immigrant who speaks English and
Russian fluently. Until the report of the Duma's Anti-Corruption Committee
began circulating, they said they had no idea of Adamov's involvement with
Omeka.
No Attempt to Identify Ownership of Firm
Charles B. Yulish, a USEC spokesman and vice president, acknowledged that the
company did not attempt to identify the ownership of Omeka before hiring the
firm. Yulish said this was consistent with standard practices at USEC.
Upon learning of Adamov's involvement with Omeka, the USEC executives said
they had an in-house auditor review the contract and Kaushansky's
performance. The audit, they said, upheld the propriety of the arrangements.
"There's nothing on its face or there's nothing behind the face that warrants
looking at it askance, in terms of whether monies were paid for favors or for
work that wasn't performed," Yulish said.
The hiring of Omeka was handled by Sewell, who was and remains USEC's chief
negotiator with Adamov's former ministry on the national security agreement.
Sewell said officials from Tenex were the first to recommend Kaushansky's
services, and that he relied on their word that Omeka was a bona fide entity.
Kaushansky told The Times that Tenex hired Omeka at some point before the
company's contract with USEC. Sewell said he was surprised when he learned,
through the Duma report that began circulating in early 2001, about Adamov's
ownership stake in Omeka.
Should Kaushansky have disclosed Adamov's role to USEC?
"I wish he had," Sewell said. Company spokesman Yulish said USEC would not
comment regarding whether it would have hired Omeka if the executives had
known of Adamov's role.
Yet Adamov's involvement with Omeka was less than a secret:
On March 26, 1999, Energy Daily, a well-known industry publication in the
U.S., reported that Adamov, his wife and Kaushansky had founded Omeka in the
Pittsburgh suburb of Monroeville. In April 1999, this report was cited in the
Moscow Times, an English-language daily.
Yulish said that USEC subscribed to Energy Daily. But he said the article,
headlined "Russian Atomic Minister is Card-Carrying U.S. Capitalist," was not
included in the daily summary of news clippings that USEC distributed among
its employees.
Yulish, Sewell and USEC's general counsel, Robert J. Moore, said the national
security agreement between the U.S. and Russia encourages USEC to pursue
joint ventures with the Russians.
Kaushansky, while acknowledging Adamov's ownership in Omeka, said his partner
ceased any operational role upon becoming atomic energy minister in 1998. "He
had no control over it," said Kaushansky, who spoke with The Times by phone
and at an office building in downtown Pittsburgh. Kaushansky said that he
doubted that Adamov had been aware of Omeka's contract with USEC.
Official Was in Position to Influence Talks
This much is not in dispute: Adamov and his subordinates were positioned to
influence the outcome of the Russians' negotiations with USEC regarding the
Megatons to Megawatts accord.
And in May 2000--less than five months after hiring Adamov's
firm--representatives of USEC say the Russians tentatively agreed to new
financial terms that were advantageous to USEC. However, the terms were not
ratified by both governments before Adamov left his ministry post. They
remain unresolved to this day, although USEC and Tenex recently submitted new
pricing terms to both governments. The new terms are also considered
beneficial to USEC.
Times staff writer Carol J. Williams in Moscow and researcher Janet Lundblad
in Los Angeles contributed to this report.
*******
#10
TITLE: INTERVIEW WITH LIBERAL RUSSIA MOVEMENT CO-CHAIRMAN SERGEI
YUSHENKOV ON BORIS BEREZOVSKY
[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA DAILY, P. 3, MARCH 11, 2002]
SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/)
WHO LIED TO THE PRESIDENT?
Saturday evening 900 video cassettes with the film "An Attempt
on Russia" about explosions of apartment houses in Moscow,
Volgodonsk and the abortive terrorist acts in Ryazan were taken to
Russia. While the Liberal Russia co-chairman Sergei Yushenkov
talked to the Nezavisimaya Gazeta correspondent in the VIP hall of
Sheremetyevo-2 airport about the facts presented in the film, the
customs officials were calculating the amount the deputy would have
to pay for importing 800 video tapes into Russia. Sheremetyevo
officials did not know the price of one ordinary VHS cassette and
so they decided to ask Yushenkov himself. Thinking about the price
of his video luggage, the deputy thought: If they don't take it
away -- it is okay with me, if they do -- will also be a result. In
Moscow everything went smooth -- some of the cassettes successfully
cleared by the customs were distributed by Yushenkov tight there in
Sheremetyevo-2 to journalists and bystanders interested in the
tape. In St. Petersburg, however, there were problems -- Yuli
Rybakov, a Liberal Russia member, attempted to bring into the
northern capital 100 cassettes with the film, but the Pulkovo
airport officials took all of them. According to Rybakov, despite
his deputy immunity, the customs officials without any legal
grounds forcibly took the boxes with cassettes from him, opened
them and said that the cargo could be commercial. Instead of the
cassettes Rybakov was given a receipt which said that the cargo was
taken for storage.
The Nezavisimaya Gazeta editorial board asked Liberal Russia
co-chairman Boris Berezovsky to comment the incident at Pulkovo
airport.
Berezovsky said that "if the film is not shown on any of the
leading Russian TV channels and if the authorities prevented its
dissemination inside the country," he would "prepare at least one
million cassettes to be disseminated in Russia."
Questioned about the way of dissemination -- legal or
clandestine -- the Liberal Russia co-chairman said: "The cassettes
will be disseminated in the country in accordance with the Russian
legislation. The rights to disseminate the Russian version of the
'Attempt on Russia' in the country belong to the Liberal Russia
movement".
And this is what Sergei Yushenkov said yesterday.
Q: Sergei Nikolayevich, many critics of An Attempt on Russia,
the film made by French journalists, say that essentially it
contains no new facts. What is in your opinion on the importance of
the film and what conclusions have you drawn for yourself?
A: The value of the film is that all the known facts have been
lined up into a logical chain that helps the viewer to gain a
coherent picture of events of the fall of 1999. There is not a
single false fact. I personally became even more convinced that the
society has very serious and justified questions. The first
question is why hasn't there been any investigation into the chain
of horrific terrorist acts that took hundreds of human lives and
served as the pretext for the start of the war in which scores of
thousands of Russian citizens continue to be killed? The second
question: why has President Putin not dismissed the heads of the
FSB despite the fact that they lied so shamelessly, which the film
shows very convincingly? They did not only lie themselves. They
actually forced the President to state falsehoods. In any country
this would be sufficient ground to start the procedure of
impeachment. Finally, the third question: why isn't there in Russia
so far any system of civilian, above all, parliamentary control,
over the activities of special services? Indeed, the heads of the
special services have said many times that they continue the KGB
traditions. And what is KGB traditions? This is an unending string
of crimes against their own people. Today the special services
control all and sundry. There is no force to get them in check:
they are omnipotent and uncontrolled. This is very dangerous for
the further development of our country.
Q: What will be your further actions?
A: We will strive to enable the society to get answers to
these questions. We shall be working to show the film on
television. If this does not happen, we shall disseminate the film
all over the country through regional Liberal Russia organizations.
Q: The film stresses that FSB officials were connected with
events in Ryazan, although this does not contradict the version
about the exercises. What images, in your opinion, prove that the
Kremlin knew about the action being prepared?
A: Indeed, in the film there is no direct proof of the
President's participation in the Ryazan events. But the film shows
the actions of the President. Immediately in the wake of explosions
he says that the vigilance of the citizens helped prevent the
terrorist acts in Ryazan. Two days passed and the President,
following the statements of the special services, began to say that
those were not terrorist acts, but exercises. But it can only be
one of the two: did he know or did he not? Strictly speaking, this
question could be enough to start the procedure of impeachment: did
the President lie or he did not? Or who lied to the President and
who actually prompted the head of state to mislead the public
opinion? Finally, this issue calls into question the legitimacy of
his election.
Q: Do you intend to initiate the procedure of impeachment?
A: With this Duma, what impeachment are you talking about! And
there is also another question: the fact is that in the wake of the
explosions, a secret decree was released on September 23, 1999,
based on which military activities are being waged in Chechnya. We
in the State Duma have drafted an appeal to the Constitutional
Court concerning the legitimacy of the decree. Only 176 deputies
voted for the decree, while the required number is 226. But we can
submit a request to the Constitutional Court not only on behalf of
the Duma. The request itself has been drafted already and now we
will collect signatures. We need to collect 90 votes, and
considering that 176 people have already voted "in favor", this is
not a problem for us. We will also try to establish a public
commission to investigate the events in Ryazan, that can include
experts and party leaders and human rights activists. We also
intend to appeal to the European parliament to conduct hearings on
this issue, but we hope that the Russian parliament will respond to
our initiatives.
Q: You mentioned the presidential decree which provides the
basis for the current military activities in Chechnya. What kind of
a document is it?
A: This is a secret decree. I cannot tell you its number and
its content. I can only say what has already been publicly stated
by the then Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev during the "Government
Hour" in the State Duma. In late 2000, Sergeyev said that the
presidential decree of September 23 provided the grounds for
pursuit of military activities in Chechnya. But in my opinion the
war which is being waged in Chechnya is illegal. Under the
Constitution it can be waged in three cases: in the event of a war,
an emergency or martial law. Now we have nothing of this.
Q: Have Russian officials shown an interest in the film? Were
you requested to give up showing the film?
A: There has been nothing like this. Special services
officials said that they were not interested in the opinion of
Berezovsky as a private individual. But this is not a film by
Berezovsky, it is a film by French journalists.
Q: Aren't you going to send the film to the Prosecutor
General's Office?
A: We will. We will send all the documents we have there. We
will send them the statement by Nikita Chekulin (former acting
director of the research institute NII Roskonversvzryvtsentr --
note by NG) and the conclusions of the experts and the film itself.
Although I think that the Prosecutor General's Office knows all
this very well. Indeed, Chekulin has already written to the
Prosecutor General's Office. He had quite a correspondence: with
the Education Ministry and with vice premier Valentina Matviyenko
and with the Prosecutor General. So, they have documents. But they
appear to be wishing to hide the truth. And we want to know the
truth.
(Interviewed by Lyudmila Romanova)
*******
#11
Financial Times (UK)
13 March 2002
Russia must say no to Opec: Oil producers need to find a new form of global
regulation based on openness and transparency
By MIKHAIL KHODORKOVSKY
The writer is chief executive of Yukos Oil
The Organisationof Petroleum Exporting Countries failed last week to
persuade Russia to maintain cuts in its crude oil exports in an attempt to
prop up the world oil price. The Russian government will make a formal
decision on whether to continue production cuts this month. It should act
with determination and decisiveness and say no to Opec's demands.
When Opec officials asked Russia to go ahead with the cuts, they did not
use threatening tones as before but asked politely. They even met
executives of private Russian oil companies in Moscow. As a result, Opec
and Russia have so far avoided a dispute. But we shall surely not be able
to prevent one for long. It will remain like this as long as Opec assumes
that it can continue to act as producer, exporter and global regulator all
in one.
Yukos is a leading advocate for resisting Opec's recent and current
demands, believing that they benefit neither the consumer nor the global
economy. But we are far from ruling out reaching an understanding. Opec
must reconsider its tactics and seek dialogue, not prescription. To achieve
this, Opec must change, as the world is changing. There can be no free ride
for Opec; no conditionality without co-operation.
The events of September 11 have shown us that nations are interdependent.
They are stronger when they work together. In the search for global
security, we must tackle key economic issues such as the supply and pricing
of oil. Energy security must be based on diversification of sources and
their long-term reliability. The time has come for new forms of global
co-operation and co-ordination to ensure security of supply and stable
prices. This policy must not be determined only by politicians; it has to
take account of the needs and interests of the private sector as well.
Opec has to accept that its 1970s and 1980s heyday is over. The world is a
different place. There is greater volatility and instability in the Middle
East and the Gulf. The Opec countries can no longer assume the unequivocal
support of the US. Their economies remain overly dependent on oil. The
Soviet Union was once the world's largest oil producer. Since 1998, the
Russian oil industry has made a remarkable recovery. Last year output
increased by 7.7 per cent, making Russia the world's second largest
producer after Saudi Arabia.
History has shown that, by its very nature, Opec is incapable of balancing
an inherently unstable oil market on its own. Traditionally, it has focused
on short-term cuts in production. These act against the interests of
consuming nations seeking security of supply and controls on price
volatility. At the height of Opec's power, oil prices were at their most
unstable. Its market-rigging tactics have resulted in volatility, not price
stability.
Short-term cuts in production also operate against the interests of
non-Opec producing countries such as Russia and Norway. In Russia, start-up
investment and production costs in the oil industry are high. Opening a new
field, given Russia's huge distances, involves laying and installing pipes
and transmission lines. It is impossible simply to close the pipelines and
wait 18 months until the price changes - the dormant wells would freeze up
and be completely destroyed in the bitter cold of the Russian winter.
Opec must open its eyes to this interdependence of oil markets. In the
longer term, both producing nations and consuming countries need stability
of supply and of prices as fluctuations in oil prices have serious
macro-economic effects. If conditionality is to work, Opec must co-operate
to develop procedures for regulating production in the medium term.
Production levels should be established for a period of between three to
five years, helping supplies to become more predictable and giving
consumers and producers greater protection against external shocks.
We all have a common interest in the security of oil supply and the
reduction of price volatility. We should not underestimate the difficulties
of the task but we must not assume it is impossible. We need to emphasise
the values of co-operation rather than competition; consensus over
conflict; partnership not dictatorship; and trust rather than threats.
All sides will have to develop greater openness and transparency. We must
enhance the dialogue between non-Opec producing countries and recognise the
important role of the private sector; improve the quality of discussions
and negotiations between producing and consuming nations; and develop a
framework for tri-lateral negotiations between Opec, the consumer countries
and other producers.
We shall not always get exactly what we desire; we must negotiate and
compromise. But surely co-operation is preferable to chaos. Holding the
world to ransom is no longer a defensible policy. For the Russian
government, saying no to Opec now could mean greater scope for a negotiated
agreement in future.
*******
#12
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
13 March 2002
Russian train museum a window to country's history
By IRINA TITOVA
Associated Press
ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA -- The scores of steam engines, diesel and electric
locomotives on display in St. Petersburg's converted Warsaw Railway Station
provide an unusual window into Russia's history.
Here are the S-68 steam engine, the type of locomotive that transported the
first Soviet government from St. Petersburg to Moscow in 1918; the first
diesel locomotive in the world, designed in 1924 on the order of Soviet
founder Vladimir Lenin; and the very last passenger steam engine built in
the Soviet Union in 1956.
The occasional train whistle and slightly bitter smell of diesel fuel
wafting in from the neighbouring Baltic Railway Station help bring Russia's
largest museum train collection alive.
"I feel as if I'd suddenly found myself in 1903 and come to see off someone
in this wagon," says Valya Smirnova, 14, standing in front of a
pre-Revolution green car with small wood-framed windows and half-drawn
curtains.
"I feel as if in a second I might see some graceful lady in a small, veiled
black hat who could have been sitting behind the glass a century ago."
This is a particularly apt prism through which to view the history of
Russia, a huge expanse that even today takes eight days to cross by rail.
Like the United States, much of Russia was made accessible only when the
country's rail system was built in the 19th century.
The first Russian train started from the capital St. Petersburg on Oct. 30,
1837. The first national railroad was 30.5 kilometres long, connecting St.
Petersburg with the suburb of Tsarskoye Selo (Tsar's Village).
The first Russian main line connected the country's two leading cities, St.
Petersburg and Moscow, in 1851. It took a year and a half to build the
647-kilometre route between the two cities, one of the straightest railways
in the world.
The first train to try the new line set off from St. Petersburg and spent
almost 22 hours en route to Moscow. Nowadays, it takes less than four hours
for the Sokol (Hawk) speed train to cover the same distance.
The oldest of the 85 engines on display at the museum dates back to 1897: a
47-tonne steam engine that could cover 32 kilometres an hour. With huge red
wheels and a black, round body, it worked into the 1980s in the Chechen
provincial capital Grozny.
Another cargo steam engine, the FD, carries the initials of Felix
Dzerzhinsky, one of the Soviet leaders, who became head of the first
post-Revolution secret police and of the railroads. Between 1932 and 1941,
the country built 3,211 similar units, each displaying a red star.
"Head To Communism!" calls the slogan painted across the front of a diesel
locomotive built in 1948 to mark the 30th anniversary of the Soviet youth
organization, the Komsomol or Young Communists' League.
The museum includes foreign-made trains as well.
A brown cargo car was built in what was called New Glasgow, Canada, back in
1915. Over the next six years, Canada and the United States built 20,000
similar wagons for the country. Later on, the design of these cars strongly
influenced national projects of carriage-building.
The collection includes armoured locomotives and artillery units that were
used in the Second World War. There are also various railway appliances,
such as a snow remover that could clear snow up to a metre deep and five
metres wide, a handy tool in much of Russia's frigid expanse.
The Central Railway Museum, 190068, Sadovaya Ulitsa 50, St. Petersburg,
Russia; phone: 315-1476.
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