Johnson's Russia List
#6127
11 March 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Profil: HOW MUCH ALCOHOL DO RUSSIANS DRINK?
2. Washington Post: Masha Lipman, In Russia, Complacent About a Free Press.
3. Moscow Times: Yevgenia Borisova, How the Government Plans to Count Heads.
4. Timothy Blauvelt: re Hahn/Pankisi/6126.
5. Novaya Gazeta: Boris Kagarlitsky, ANTICIPATION OF BAD NEWS....Why are
the
Russian authorities constantly anticipating bad news?
6. Finansovaya Rossia: Viktor Plotnikov, THE CHILDHOOD ILLNESSES OF
RUSSIAN
REFORMERS. The Russian economy cannot wait for the state to grow up.
7. Business Week: Catherine Belton, Suddenly, It's Big Business vs. Putin.
Tycoons are turning up the heat against Russia's WTO entry.
8. Moscow Times: Matt Bivens, Foul Play From the Yenisei to Yucca (re
nuclear waste)
9. Peter Lavelle: Untimely Thoughts: Russia, OPEC, and shafting.
10. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Lidia Andrusenko, WHAT WILL PUTIN SAY TO
WASHINGTON'S
BLACKMAIL? The Kremlin has sustained too many foreign policy losses.
11. AP: Uzbekistan Slowly Seeing Change.
12. The Electronic Telegraph (UK): George Trefgarne, It's Russian oil that
counts, not American steel.
13. Reuters: Russia sees no quick end to U.S. poultry ban.]
*******
#1
Profil
No. 9
March 4, 2002
HOW MUCH ALCOHOL DO RUSSIANS DRINK?
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
The Public Opinion Foundation has done a poll asking people how
often they drink alcoholic beverages. Twenty-one percent of
respondents confidently said that they do not drink hard liquor at
all; 7% of respondents said they "unwind" two to three times a week;
and 30% answered that they drink hard liquor only on special
occasions, a few times a year.
After this the Public Opinion Foundation asked whether people had
been drinking more or less alcohol recently. Fifty-eight percent of
respondents believe that Russians are now drinking more, and six
percent of respondents believe that Russians now drink less hard
liquor than they used to. At the same time, 30% of respondents think
Russians drink just as much as they ever have.
*******
#2
Washington Post
March 11, 2002
In Russia, Complacent About a Free Press
By Masha Lipman
MOSCOW -- During the past two years, Russia's largest privately owned media
group, Media-MOST, has been destroyed. Its main asset, national TV channel
NTV, has been put under government control. Another national broadcaster,
TV-6, which had remained beyond the Kremlin's grip, was shut down.
So the government's recent takeover of radio station Ekho Moskvy, another
Media-MOST asset, was simply a matter of time. The station managed to
postpone the takeover, but after the closure of TV-6, Ekho Moskvy's
position became dangerous when it offered shelter to the TV-6 team. Soon
afterward, the disfavored TV-6 journalists were broadcasting on Ekho
Moskvy, and shortly after that, the station was notified of the imminent
takeover.
The chief editor of Ekho Moskvy, Alexei Venediktov, announced that he'd
step down as Ekho's chief editor, and then made a bid for a new frequency,
which he was not expected to receive, given his standing with the
government. But surprisingly, the Ekho Moskvy team won a new frequency at
auction, and Venediktov vows that his new station will pursue the same
independent editorial policy the old one did for more than a decade. He has
solid means to prevent government control: 70 percent of the new station's
shares belong to the journalists of Ekho Moskvy.
How to explain this favorable development? Some say it's a demonstration of
goodwill by the Kremlin, intended as minor compensation for past -- and
possibly future -- crackdowns on media freedom. Some point to strife among
various groups inside the Kremlin. Another factor may be Venediktov
himself: a mercurial, indefatigable and politically savvy editor who has
fought fiercely for his station's independence.
Whatever the reason, Venediktov has won a victory for all those who care
about freedom of the press in Russia. But Ekho is a small outlet. It has an
audience of a few hundred thousand -- negligible compared with the national
TV channels, which may reach more than 100 million viewers. The Kremlin
today, unlike the Communist Soviet state, does not seek to establish full
control over every word. We still have newspapers and magazines (including
my own news weekly), online publications and minor television outlets not
controlled by the government. The Kremlin does not mind minor dissent, as
long as it may send its own controlled message to the bulk of the Russian
people.
Few in Russia doubt Ekho's victory was, in fact, a political decision.
Ekho's journalists may be a highly professional and popular team, easily
Russia's best news radio, but they would never have won the auctioned
frequency without "permission" from the Kremlin.
It took the government two years to gain control of the media market. The
Kremlin used a variety of intimidation techniques against two major media
tycoons, Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky. Both have fled Russia and
live abroad, the bulk of their media taken over by the government.
Having won this war and gotten rid of their two worst enemies, Kremlin
officials can barely hide their triumph. In their public statements they
shamelessly accuse the tycoons of crimes that have never been proven in
court and brag about finally having conquered their nemeses. The tycoons
"used the media to blackmail the government," President Vladimir Putin's
aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky said recently in an interview with a state-owned
news service. "They will no longer be a problem."
Deputy minister of the press Mikhail Seslavinsky, in a recent speech,
described the battle between the Kremlin and the tycoons in ironic terms.
The end result, according to Seslavinsky: In the sphere of the media "the
complicated transition phase is over," and the media are "steadily moving
ahead."
The Kremlin campaign against the two tycoons and their media has had a
grave detrimental effect on the Russian media in general. Journalists have
seen what happens to those the Kremlin regards as enemies. Most people in
the media today know better than to antagonize the Kremlin. The result is
overwhelming self-censorship and a serious decline of journalistic standards.
Seeking to increase its audience, radio Ekho Moskvy had established
partnerships with quite a few provincial radio stations. As soon as it
became clear Ekho Moskvy was in disfavor with the government, one
provincial partner after another informed the station's management that it
would stop using Ekho's programming. We love you guys, they would say, but
we were advised to switch to a government-owned radio station.
The atmosphere in today's Russian media is largely marked by a desire to
demonstrate loyalty to the government. This is a sharp contrast with Boris
Yeltsin's days, when journalists enjoyed a high degree of freedom. (Today's
Kremlin aides, including Yastrzhembsky, refer to those times as "a
bacchanalia of press freedom.") Yeltsin himself, in one of his rare recent
public appearances, said: "I tolerated any criticism, and today even a fair
remark is hard to say aloud." The Democratic Assembly, an informal
association of democratic parties and groups, gave a much more dramatic
assessment of the situation: "There's no press freedom in today's Russia,"
says the opening line of its resolution issued in mid-February.
Yeltsin expanded and codified the freedom of the press originally granted
by Mikhail Gorbachev. But "granted" is the important word here. The Russian
people did not fight for a free press; it was, like other freedoms, given
to the nation by the government, from "above." This may be one reason why
today the Russian public looks on indifferently as the government subdues
the press.
Venediktov may be allowed to broadcast on a new frequency, but his victory
will never be solid until it is backed by public demand for a free press.
The writer, deputy editor of a Russian newsmagazine financed by Vladimir
Gusinsky, writes a monthly column for The Post.
******
#3
Moscow Times
March 11, 2002
How the Government Plans to Count Heads
By Yevgenia Borisova
Staff Writer
UFA, Bashkortostan -- For eight days in October, 600,000 census
takers will knock at every door, canvas every dacha compound and visit every
inhabited slum to try to reach every single human being in Russia.
They will get help from the police -- who will accompany them to apartment
buildings where people with criminal records are known to live and to places
inhabited by vagrants -- and from maintenance workers, who will be
responsible for getting them into buildings with locked entryways.
But their biggest challenge will be to persuade people to open their
apartment doors and to answer all questions truthfully.
Everyone will be asked to answer 24 questions about themselves, including
questions about their source of income and housing situation. Every fourth
person questioned will be required to give their position and a profile of
the organization they work for.
A survey conducted in Moscow last fall by the Public Opinion Fund showed that
48 percent of the population will be reluctant to participate in the census.
It is the question about income, presumably, that is most worrying for people
in the capital, where the shadow economy is largest and where relatively few
people survive on one official salary.
But even in provincial cities like Ufa, the capital of Bashkortostan, many
are likely to balk at revealing their source of income. Gyulshat Galeyeva,
46, a doctor, said in an interview in her home that her family has only legal
sources of income and even the daughter of her cousin who trades in a local
market has a license.
But Galeyeva's neighbor Irina, who did not want her last name published, said
many people could be expected to lie about their income. "I am a programmer
and I meet many different people," she said. "I know people who own firms on
the side. But if you look them in the eye, you cannot imagine anyone more
honest. Why would such people betray themselves in answering this question?"
Sergei Osipov, a spokesman for Kros, a public relations firm that won a
government contract to promote the census, conceded it will be difficult if
not impossible to make sure people answer honestly. "Those who have illegal
sources of income could say that they are living on a salary and no one would
check them," he said. "Of course it would not be true, but that is how the
census works."
Other people may hide their source of income out of embarrassment.
"What should I answer? That I live on the money that I beg from my
relatives?" said Bulat Abdulbaneyev, 63.
His wife, Pamira, said she did not want to open their door to the interviewer
at all. "Times are not easy now," she said. "I think the organizers must
simply tell us the date and the time that they come for the interview and we
will come out of our apartments and fill in the forms in the corridor."
Census organizers say they are making an effort to hire census takers they
believe will do their job honestly. Many will be teachers and students, and
all will be checked out to make sure they do not have a criminal record.
As a further safety measure, people who are uncomfortable opening their door
to the census taker will be able to fill in the form outside their home.
There will be local census centers, much like polling stations during
elections, where people can go to complete the forms.
Even with these precautions, a problem of trust remains. Some people fear
that their personal data will become known to thugs, or certain government
agencies, either as soon as the information is collected or later when it is
being compiled and recorded.
The personal information listed on individual forms is, by law, to be seen
only by the State Statistics Committee. Even other government agencies must
wait until the data are compiled and processed to study the results of the
census. Tax inspectors, for example, are not legally allowed to see how an
individual answered the census questions.
Akram Ganiyev, head of the State Statistics Committee in Bashkortostan, said
procedures were still being worked out to prevent unauthorized access to
census information. Under the Administrative Code, census takers and census
officials who release information to unauthorized people can be fined.
Foreigners, including tourists staying in hotels, also will be asked to
answer a few basic questions for the census, including the purpose of their
visit. Those who work in Russia will have to give their date and place of
birth, country of permanent residence, citizenship and nationality. They will
not be asked their source of income.
The census runs Oct. 9-16.
*******
#4
From: Timothy Blauvelt
Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2002
Subject: Hahn/Pankisi/6126
While I do not disagree with his underlying thesis, Gordon Hahn in this
piece [JRL 6126] seems to take a lot for granted. Interesting to watch
how assumptions become taken as truths if they are repeated often
enough. Aside from Phillip Remler's rather vague assertions a month ago
in a Georgian newspaper that there are al Qaida members in Pankisi
gorge, there has as yet been no real evidence of this. I have not yet
seen anything except guesses about how many Chechen militants may
actually be in Pankisi among the refugees (estimates range from zero to
1,500). Reports that Chechen militants are in the Kodori gorge or that
Ruslan Gelaev was involved in attacking Abkhazia are dodgy at best, and
there is no evidence at all that the kidnappings in Pankisi were
perpetrated by Chechen militants rather than local criminals.
******
#5
Novaya Gazeta
No. 16
March 7-10, 2002
ANTICIPATION OF BAD NEWS....
Why are the Russian authorities constantly anticipating bad news?
Author: Boris Kagarlitsky
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS VAGUELY CONCERNED ABOUT SOMETHING. THIS
MAY BE SOMETHING THAT HAS NOT BEEN EVALUATED PROPERLY. OVER THE DECADE
OF NEW LIBERALISM IN RUSSIA, THE AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT KEPT THEIR
PROMISES. NOW THE PEOPLE ARE PERPLEXED AND DISAPPOINTED.
Last summer oil prices started falling. The changes in the global
economic situation immediately revealed all the problems that had been
unresolved for the previous eighteen months. Economic analysts tried
to calm the nation down, saying that nothing frightening was happening
and the drop in international oil prices to $18-19 a barrel is quite
acceptable for Russia and is necessary to stimulate the global
economy.
These speculations would be absolutely true if the Russian
economy were not sick. However, the present social differences and
structural imbalances have been accumulating in Russia for years,
while petro-dollars have always been a form of pain relief for Russia.
Petro-dollars do not solve problems, but they at least relieve
symptoms. Over the past three years the Russian economic situation has
not improved in the least; to some extent it has even grown worse.
World prices for Russian metals and other raw materials fell
simultaneously with oil prices. Then the Russian statistics started
playing tricks: there was no economic growth in January. However,
experts explained that absence of production growth in January is not
a disaster.
However, the most unpleasant thing is that the majority of the
population estimates the economic successes of their country not by
statistical data, but by the state of their wallets. Inflation rate is
obviously out of control in the country, but experts again explained
to the population that new prices in themselves are no problem at all.
This is again true, as well as with oil prices and ceasing of the
production growth. The paradox is that no issue is a disaster while it
is only one issue. But as soon as they happen altogether....
President Putin summoned ministers and scolded them, the
ministers quarreled with one another. The problem is that Russian
officials are as a rule economically educated people and no matter
what they say to the people, they are perfectly aware that this is
only a beginning.
In addition, economy is not the only source of bad emotions in
Russia. It has become obvious that Russia is unable to win the Chechen
war, however, the Kremlin prohibited itself to start peaceful
negotiations. Those who think that 1999 explosions of apartment
buildings in Moscow were necessary for starting the second Chechen war
are greatly mistaken. The explosions were necessary for not allowing
the war to cease. At present the attitude towards the war has changed,
everyone openly talk about involvement of the security services in the
explosions, from Boris Berezovsky to the Zavtra communist paper, but
it is impossible to reverse things. A war is like a chronic disease,
it constantly reminds of itself. Besides, every spring the disease
recurs, as the number of Chechen guerrillas fluctuates depending on
the season. The Russian army has never learnt how to fight against
this force major situation. At the same time, every winter, when the
activity of Chechen guerrillas reduces, the top army leadership
organizes a campaign of senseless purges, i.e. they do their best not
to allow the number of Chechens who take their arms in spring to
reduce.
The two years of Putin's presidency have not increased the number
of his supporters, while the number of perplexed people has
considerably grown. Anticipations of the Moscow intellectuals about
another dictatorship in the country have not come true: the
authorities have hustled up with one television channel for a whole
year. At the same time, there are no crowds of supporters of the new
leader, who can honestly say that life has become better.
Those, who like the new president the most, are especially
disappointed. Who loved Putin the most profoundly two years ago?
Resigned Soviet military and unemployed KGB officers. To be honest, I
should say I like far from all these people, still it was not good to
deceive them: many of these people are vindictive and revengeful.
Besides, there is Boris Berezovsky. I still cannot understand why
it was necessary to exile him to London. He had neither ideological
not "class" reasons to fight the Kremlin during the first months of
Putin's presidency. However, it was the same vindictiveness and
pettiness of KGB officers, together with the provincial inexperience
of the St. Petersburg team. For some reason, they needed to start this
internal debate and create an enemy out of thin air. Now the war is
very serious and neither Berezovsky nor the Kremlin will stop until
they finish it.
Constant expectation of bad news spoils the mood more than bad
news themselves. On the other hand, we do not have much to be scared
of: prices may grow, production may fall, unemployment rate may
increase, old people may be unable to buy expensive medicines, new
zinc coffins may arrive from Chechnya, a half-dozen more helicopters
may fall down, Berezovsky may publish his compromising materials,
people may grow more unsatisfied - but all this will not influence the
authorities at all. Berezovsky is far from Russia. The west will
eagerly trade human rights for access to the resources of Central
Asia. Opposition has long been tamed. Liberals are demoralized. There
is no left wing in the country. Regional governors will never dare to
start a serious opposition. All election commissions are formed from
loyal people. Indignation of the military will never go further than
kitchen talks.
Still, the Russian government is vaguely concerned about
something. They may be worrying in vain. On the other hand, there may
be something that has not been evaluated properly. Ten years of new
liberalism in Russia has created a new middle class in large cities,
and this class was promised that it would become the foundation for
democracy and the foundation of stability in Russia. The authorities
have not kept their promise, as such a society can be neither
democratic nor stable, by definition. Expectations of economic
progress turned to be as ephemeral as expectations of liberty.
However, the middle class became a reality. It is concentrated in
large cities and for the past decade it has been the support of the
new order. Now these people are perplexed and disappointed, and the
social support base of the Russian government is starting to narrow
rapidly.
A rebellion by the disappointed Russian middle class is most
unlikely to be a serious threat, at least as long as it is a separate
issue. The problem is that in Russia nothing happens as a "separate
issue".
No matter how strong the Russian political system formed over the
past decade may be, it is hard to believe that the authorities can
rely on tycoons and officials alone. However, very soon we will be
able to test this in practice.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova )
*******
#6
Finansovaya Rossia
No. 8
March 7-13, 2002
THE CHILDHOOD ILLNESSES OF RUSSIAN REFORMERS
The Russian economy cannot wait for the state to grow up
Author: Viktor Plotnikov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
APPARENTLY, PUTIN DOES NOT HAVE ANY INTUITIVE GRASP OF REFORM
DECISIONS. HE REPLACES IT WITH A CULTURE OF MAKING DECISIONS:
CONCILIATION COMMISSIONS ARE ESTABLISHED FOR EACH PROJECT, AND
CONSERVATIVES START COMPETING WITH REFORMERS IN ARGUMENTS.
Of late, the idea of Russia joining the World Trade Organization
(WTO) has become a symbol of successful economic reforms. It is
believed that if we join the WTO, everything will be great in Russia;
if not - the last hope to be among the richest counties of the world
will evaporate.
Last week, there was a disturbing note: Deputy Economic
Development Minister Maksim Medvedkov mentioned that Russia might not
join WTO. Of course, joining the World Trade Organization is a
specific detail, but the general analysis of other reforming
activities of the Russian government leads to very sad conclusions.
The fate presented us almost two years of situational economic
growth on the basis of a low ruble and high prices for major Russian
exports. However, the stake on exporting natural resources, or the
"Dutch disease" cannot be the engine for economic growth for long.
Just because large volumes of export proceeds inevitably strengthen
the real ruble rate, which in turn increases the expenses of internal
producers.
All economic indices worsen, as it critically depends on foreign
trade balance. In December the Russian economy "stopped".
Only a project for deep reforming the structure of the Russian
economy could "start" it again. Has it been realized?
Actually, the Russian tax reforms is the graphic example of the
Russian government to realize the "small state" ideology. About 40% of
the Russian GDP is redistributed through the federal budget, which is
the root of inefficiency of the state. The only thing the government
managed to realize is to introduce equal for all 13% income tax, at
the same time, the single social tax is still 35%. As a result, the
national project for withdrawing wages from the shadow has failed.
According to polls among entrepreneurs, 90% of enterprises decided not
to withdraw wages from the shadow.
The profit tax turned to be a greater issue. According to
calculations of Kakha Benukidze, cancellation of all privileges,
including the investment privilege required decreasing the profit tax
from 35% to 15% - but the profit tax is fixed 24%. This means that for
industries where the investments are large, the reform of the profit
tax caused not reduction but increase of the tax burden.
The pension reform followed the same conservative way: German
Gref lost it to Pension Foundation head Mikhail Zurabov. At first the
Ministry for Economic Development relied on saved pensions, which were
to be paid by non-budgetary pensions foundations and insurance
offices; however, in the long run, the ministry accepted the most
conservative scenario, which in fact revives the Soviet pension
system. The state has never started using pension money as a resource
for economic development.
The project for restructuring natural monopolies was to become a
most important impulse for investment growth of the Russian economy,
as the Transportation Ministry, the Russian Joint Energy Systems, and
Gazprom evidently need approximately $50 billion dollars each for the
next decade. However, no investment boost is to take place in the
natural monopolies sector. The edition of separating railroad
businesses from infrastructure is extremely slow and it does not allow
relying on large inflow of private capital to this sector. Investment
processes in the energy sector is also slowed down by the tough rate
policy of the state: purposely 5-8 times understated rates - comparing
to the world rates - do not attract investors to our country.
Gazprom's reform died in a personal talk between President Putin and
new Gazprom leader Miller, who asked the president for "some time to
clear things up".
Reformers also failed the project for consolidation of the
banking sector, which seemed to be the only chance to systematically
increase reliability and viability of the Russian credit system. In
fact, 90% of Russian banks that have licenses are busy with not
crediting banking business, but half-illegally cash proceeds and
launder illegal proceeds. The volume of banking activities they
declare obviously demonstrated that they do not live on banking
activities, as this is unprofitable.
The project for Russia's joining WTO is nothing but Putin's
political declaration that Russia will be developing with the help of
integration to the system of world financial and political resources.
Joining the World Trade Organization is a sign of mental readiness of
the country to stay in the world investment system. However, having
started with statements on urgent necessity to join WTO, the Russian
government ended up upholding in negotiations typically protectionist
positions on agriculture, automobile industry, steel industry and so
on.
It is more and more difficult for German Gref's deputy Maxim
Medvedkov to convince western investors that preserving 50% of duties
on importing, for instance, food products for the next ten years
agrees with the market status. But it obviously contradicts it, as
well as 35% duty on importing foreign automobiles, that has almost
been approved by the government. So, forecasting the reaction of WTO,
Medvedkov started to publicly suppose that Russia would not join this
organization for the next twenty years. This seems to be true.
From the standpoint of mentality, economic philosopher Vitaly
Naishul described this issue the briefest. Taking Chilean dictator as
an example for Vladimir Putin, Naishul says that a reformer must have
intuition for making unexpected decisions. Chilean economy "opened"
only because Pinocet purposely paid no attention to trade balance
forecasts. He morally put a stake on integration to the world economy.
Since then, the Chilean economy has growth 5-10% a year.
Apparently, Vladimir Putin does not have an intuition for
reforming decisions. He replaces it with a culture of making
decisions: conciliatory commissions are established for every project
and conservatives start competing reformers in arguments. As all this
takes place on the official level, in the long run, money always win.
As is known, monopolists have more money that is why Russia is still a
country of super-conservative reforms that do not influence the
state's participation in the economy in the least.
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)
******
#7
Business Week
MARCH 18, 2002
Suddenly, It's Big Business vs. Putin
Tycoons are turning up the heat against Russia's WTO entry
By Catherine Belton in Moscow
It was quite a meeting. At a time when criticism of the policies of Russian
President Vladimir V. Putin is scarcely heard, a politburo of one-time
powerbrokers gathered in the vast State Kremlin Palace on Feb. 27.
Addressing hundreds of executives from Russia's heartland, speaker after
speaker questioned Putin's plan to have Russia join the World Trade
Organization by 2004. "WTO entry could have the same effect as the shock
therapy that destroyed the nation's industry in the early '90s," said
Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, a former Prime Minister who now heads the Russian Union
of Manufacturers, a lobbying group that represents over a thousand companies.
This was no mere powwow of political has-beens and managers of irrelevant
rust-belt companies. Political pressure against Putin's bid to speed
Russia's entry into the WTO is well-organized and mounting. It's being led
by a group of business barons whose holdings account for 30% of Russia's
gross domestic product in sectors ranging from autos and aluminum to
agriculture, banking, and insurance. Their drive to postpone WTO entry
could evolve into the first real opposition to a major policy from Putin,
who until now has silenced criticism by taking control of national
television, cowing parliament, and forcing outspoken oligarchs Vladimir A.
Gusinsky and Boris A. Berezovsky into exile.
But the big bucks at stake are making the anti-WTO crowd bold enough to
take on the President. If Russia joined the WTO, it would have to slash a
host of subsidies and import tariffs, opening its market to foreign
producers--with dire consequences, according to Putin's opponents. The
country's sputtering auto industry and inefficient farm sector could
collapse in the face of large-scale imports. Influential WTO members, such
as the European Union, are pushing for Russia to liberalize heavily
subsidized energy prices. The resulting price hikes could wipe out the
competitive advantage Russian producers enjoy in global markets.
Daunting stuff. Yet Putin still believes that the benefits of joining WTO
far outweigh the drawbacks. The President argues that WTO membership will
help attract more foreign investment and stimulate diversification of an
economy that is too dependent on commodities. Joining the body would also
help eliminate discriminatory trade measures against Russian exports such
as steel that now cost Russia $4 billion in lost imports annually. To be
sure, Putin wants Russia to enter the WTO with protections for some
sectors, particularly agriculture. But his proposals are unlikely to go far
enough to satisfy the tycoons.
Before talks with the WTO get serious, Putin wants to hammer out Russia's
negotiating position at a Cabinet meeting scheduled for Mar. 14. As that
date approaches, the anti-WTO business crowd is turning up the heat. On the
same day as the Kremlin rally, automakers lobbied the government for higher
tariffs on car imports. "Nobody can openly criticize Putin now," says
Andrei Ryabov, an analyst at Moscow's Carnegie Moscow Center, an
independent think tank. "But they can object by asking for conditions that
would put WTO entry into doubt."
While the maneuvering started at the Kremlin Palace meeting, the main foe
of WTO entry kept his distance. He is Oleg V. Deripaska, a politically
wired tycoon related to former President Boris Yeltsin through his marriage
to Yeltsin's step-granddaughter. He's also a kingpin in a group that
controls over 70% of the nation's lucrative aluminum industry through his
Russian Aluminum holding company. And he has controlling stakes in
Russia's second-largest carmaker, Gorky Avtomobilny Zavod (GAZ), as well as
holdings in banking and insurance. All these industries could be hit by
Russian WTO entry. A consultant hired by Deripaska's aluminum group
organized the Kremlin rally.
Deripaska has shrewdly kept a low public profile while the pressure on
Putin builds. But he may soon find a way to bring the anti-WTO message to
the masses. He and close partners are leaders of a diverse group of
business barons that is bidding for the broadcast license of TV6. The
former opposition channel, which reaches 80 million viewers across Russia,
will be auctioned off on Mar. 27, following a controversial bankruptcy. The
well-funded Deripaska group and a rival group led by former Prime Minister
Yevgeny Primakov, who also pushes a go-slow approach to WTO, are the
favorites to win. Whoever nabs the station, Putin's WTO opponents could
turn up the volume in this surprising debate.
******
#8
Moscow Times
March 11, 2002
Foul Play From the Yenisei to Yucca
By Matt Bivens
Having problems with nuclear waste? From Krasnoyarsk to Kansas, the solution
is: just change the rules.
The Nuclear Ministry, or Minatom, has long dreamed of importing spent nuclear
fuel for cash. Never mind that a State Duma deputy two weeks ago waltzed into
a Siberian spent fuel facility via a gaping hole in the fence, took pictures
and left unchallenged. Minatom still plans a lucrative business turning
Russia into the world's nuclear pay toilet.
Few like the idea. In 2000, 2.5 million Russians signed petitions demanding a
national referendum on it. Officials threw out 600,000 signatures, for
"offenses" such as abbreviating the word "street" in a signer's address.
Environmentalists tried again, and on Feb. 21, they were again stiffed:
Officials in Krasnoyarsk, presented with 100,000 signatures, agreed to look
at only 40,000 and then rejected 36,000 as invalid.
But is this just "Russia's rocky transition to democracy?" Or is it, as the
Russian environmental group Ecodefense! says, evidence "democracy and nuclear
energy cannot exist at the same time and place"?
Even as Siberia's bureaucrats were trashing signatures, President George W.
Bush was announcing a historic decision to ship America's nuclear waste to a
hole in Nevada. Twenty years ago, Congress had directed the Energy
Department, (the U.S. Minatom) to find a place for such a dump. And
recognizing that man-made waste containers corrode with time, Congress
insisted the dump's geology be uniquely suited to holding hot waste on its
own in case of leaks. Scientists suggested carving a depository out of salt,
which keeps water out, or granite, which holds it in.
Over the years since, the Energy Department has spent $3.6 billion studying
Yucca Mountain in Nevada, and has pretty much proven the site unsuitable. The
mountain is made of volcanic tuff riddled with cracks and fissures -- more a
leaky sieve than a granite bowl. Over the past 20 years, there have been more
than 620 earthquakes above 2.5 on the Richter scale (i.e., strong enough that
you'd feel the ground shake and think "earthquake") within a 80-kilometer
radius.
One quake in 1992 registered 5.6 and cracked walls and windows at the Energy
Department's Yucca Mountain field office. Warnings don't come much more
bluntly than that, short of a burning bush in the desert that cries out,
"Thou shalt not bury all the nuclear waste here!"
Four dormant volcanoes are nearby, so scientists are grudgingly studying what
would happen if lava blasts up through thousands of tons of radioactive
waste. ("Grudgingly" because it's a highly unlikely scenario.) Selected for
study because it seemed arid (and because Nevada is a political weakling),
Yucca has turned out to be quite wet underground. Water moves through and
under the mountain more rapidly and unpredictably than initially thought (and
Nevada's cities depend on underground drinking water).
It's almost beyond parody: Asked to pick a place to bury nuclear waste, who
says, "there's earthquakes and volcanoes and it leaks and drips -- it's
perfect"? The Congressional emphasis on geology had outlawed exactly this
scenario. So in December, after 17 years with one set of rules, the Bush
administration slyly issued a new set: No longer was it judging a geological
site. Now it was judging an entire waste-storage package, in which some
hair-raisingly expensive feats of engineering were plugged into computer
models to mask the site's bad geology. Apparently whether it's Moscow or
Moscow-on-the-Potomac, the rule is: If you can't win a fair fight, don't
fight fair.
Matt Bivens, a former editor of The Moscow Times, is a Washington-based
fellow of The Nation Institute [www.thenation.com].
*******
#9
From: "Peter Lavelle"
Subject: Untimely Thoughts
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2002
Peter Lavelle - Untimely Thoughts: Russia, OPEC, and shafting
Since the end of last year, OPEC has been in panic mode. The economic
recession of the American economy and the new war against terrorism gives
OPEC grave concern. Recession limits demand, the war against terrorism is
not far from the Arab producers of the cartel. Both issues, independently,
could be manageable. However, there is a new player - or rather an old
player - in the game. Russia pretends to cooperate with OPEC. In fact, it is
not only indifferent to the cartel's fate; it just may be bend on destroying
it. Few in the world, except for some royal families and corrupt
governments, will mourn its passage.
What does Russia want? It is simple: market share. Russia intends to replace
Saudi Arabia as the world's largest producer and exporter of crude oil. It
is very much in a position to do so in the not too distant future. This
would mean returning to the situation when in 1991 the Soviet Union
accounted for 15.8% of world production; or current Saudi and Iranian
production combined.
Given the above is true, then why all the fuss about meetings, negotiations,
agreements, etc. with the cartel? Why doesn't the Kremlin just state bluntly
that Russia has it own agenda and is indifferent to OPEC's desires? The
reasons are clear enough. None of the oil producers want a price war. In an
international environment that is as uncertain as today's, calculating the
impact of lowering oil prices is taunting. Russia itself has devised three
budget scenarios based on a range of oil prices. The membership of OPEC is
no different.
Russia also is on a PR binge. Russia aims to join the west, its desires,
using Russian terminology, to become a "civilized" member of the
international community. The nature of the oil price regime is a card in
Putin's hand to deal with the west, especially the US. Certainly there is a
new US- Russia relationship in the making. Concrete terms and conditions are
being thought out and Putin knows that Russia's energy policy will have a
significant impact on world politics moving forward. Russia has few strong
cards in the game; Putin will use this one in the most advantageous fashion.
Before elaborating further on how Russia intends to marginalize OPEC, a few
comments on Russia oil politics. There are two major players: the Russian
government and the oil companies. Being an observer of Russian politics, it
would appear that there is a considerable amount of squabbling between the
government and the oil companies. In fact, when looking at the big picture,
the most important disagreement between the two parties is who speaks for
Russia. Clearly the government believes this is the prerogative of the state
authorities. The government has a point; the international oil price regime
is an important element of the country's foreign policy. The oil companies
prefer to speak for themselves (and their shareholders), they are, after
all, publicly traded companies.
Russian oil companies also have different agendas, not always duplicating
Russia's international interests. Thus, when Prime Minister Kasyanov speaks
about Russia's oil sector, he is talking about companies in various growth
stages and relative financial condition. LUKoil is fat and happy. It is
focusing on down-stream development programs in Eastern Europe and the US.
Sibneft is not a major exporter, thus the domestic price of oil means a lot
to the company. YUKOS, which has invested enormous sums in development to
expand it export capacity, is probably the most concerned about the
government's export promises.
What unites the Russian government and oil companies is money. The
government is dependent on oil export taxes to realize its budget
commitments. Oil companies see the possibly of expanding exports as (Arab)
members of OPEC find themselves facing growing domestic pressures. At the
end of day, there is little disagreement within Russia as to what the
country needs to do. Russia has clearly lost its superpower status with the
passage of the Soviet Union. However, energy resources give Russia the
opportunity to return to the world stage in a very meaningful way - and
generate enormous revenues in the process. A richer Russia integrated in to
the world economy threatens no one; a richer Russia helps create a partner
more stable to work with. This is part of Putin's plan to make Russia strong
again.
The logic of fighting the war against terrorism has serious consequences for
OPEC. Most OPEC countries are not very democratic; most are regimes that are
not particularly popular and this not very stable. Because of September 11,
Saudi Arabia has found itself under heighten scrutiny at home and abroad.
How Islamic is it for those at home, how strong does it support destroying
internationalism for those aboard? It is a no win situation for the Saudi
royal family. This applies for the rest of the Arab oil exporting OPEC
world. Without the Saudi participation in OPEC, the cartel quickly becomes
irrelevant. This is an almost irrefutable logic at work here; relying on
Arab oil is quickly losing its relevance. While it is commonly believed that
oil price is considered of primary importance, the reality is the certainty
of supplies over-rules all other concerns. This is where Russia can play a
very important role.
Much of the Kremlin's thinking surrounding American's war against
international terrorism in Afghanistan is about energy. The war of words
about the US military presence in the former republics of the Soviet Union
clearly hurts Russian pride for the moment. But the stakes are much higher.
Securing oil and gas exports far outweigh short-term issues of pride. Putin'
s Russia at present is far too weak to enforce order on its southern flank.
Having the US create a modicum of rationality in that part of the world is
only to Russia's advantage. Historically, this has been Russia's sphere of
influence, but Russia is rarely seen as a fair broker. The US wants to
destroy elements that threaten US interests - let them. Russia's influence
due to history and geography is almost impossible to replace. The foreign
policy attention span of the US is not as long as most believe. Once the
primary threats to the US and its interests are secured, the US political
establishment will lose interest.
Putin has seemingly decided to place Russia's fate inline with the future of
the west. This may be the result of a certain philosophical understanding of
what he believes what Russia needs to do to survive in a world dominated by
the US and its allies. If this is the case, then Putin should be appreciated
and supported. If Putin's support of America's war against international
terrorism is simply based on Russian self interest to strengthen his country
's economic prospects, who can fault him?
One thing is clear, Russia and US interests coincide. OPEC is not a reliable
partner. Expect Russia, if it agrees to limit exports during the second
quarter, to cheat - in the same OPEC honored tradition. Russia very much
needs to return to an independent international policy action as it
restructures and reforms its economy. By confronting OPEC it has the
opportunity to fill it budget coffers through market share. The US desires
allies and partners who are not indifferent to its interests securing its
energy priorities. Oddly enough, the US and Russia may have truly found an
issue that can meaningfully bring them together.
For investors, the obvious conclusion to be drawn is this: Russian oil
companies are a screaming BUY.
Peter Lavelle, Head of Research, IFC Metropol, Moscow, Russia
*******
#10
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
No. 45
March 11, 2002
WHAT WILL PUTIN SAY TO WASHINGTON'S BLACKMAIL?
The Kremlin has sustained too many foreign policy losses
to continue tolerating the situation
By Lidia ANDRUSENKO
The widely publicised Russia-US friendship is crumbling.
However, the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty, refusal to sign
an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons
and even the surprise appearance of US troops in Georgia all
look minor aberrations compared to the "chicken conflict" and
the "steel war." The top Russian officials try to calm down
society saying that nothing terrible is going on, that these
are merely minor economic issues that will not harm the
strategic partner relations of the two countries. But it is
becoming clear that the problem has a political and not merely
economic roots.
The complaints which Russia and the USA are exchanging now
are not a mere commercial dispute but a very harsh geopolitical
confrontation. This time the USA does not see Russia as a
serious adversary and it is showing this clearly, tactlessly
and even with pleasure. One proof of this is the latest
statement made by US State Department spokesman Richard
Boucher, who said the problem of US chicken deliveries to
Russia can darken the forthcoming meeting of the two presidents
in Moscow. Translated from diplomatic parlance, this statement
can be evaluated as blackmail. And the Americans actually do
not pretend otherwise.
Boucher made his statement virtually simultaneously with the
so-called information leak from the Pentagon.
The Los Angeles Times published a secret Pentagon report
sent to the US Congress on January 8. It proceeds from that
document that not only the countries of the "axis of evil" but
also four other states can become targets for US nuclear
weapons.
These four countries are China, Libya, Syria and Russia. The
explanation for this potential pre-emptive strike, which means
aggression against Russia, is very simple: Russia is no longer
an adversary of the USA but the existence of a major nuclear
arsenal in it presents a genuine threat to the USA. This is how
the overseas "victims of international terrorism" plan to
pursue their new policy of saving the civilisation and
reinforcing their global domination.
It should be said that exactly six months passed since the
September 11 tragedy in the USA, when the whole world shuddered
at the terrorist act in Manhattan. It should be said that
Vladimir Putin was the first head of state to express, by
phone, not only condolences to but also support for President
Bush. That support later took the practical form of assistance
in the struggle against international terrorism and top US
officials noted more than once that Russia's contribution to
the counter- terror operation was larger than the efforts of
the NATO bloc as a whole.
The point at issue is not only the close collaboration of
US and Russian special services (Russia could have limited
itself to this kind of support) but also the fact that Russia
allowed the USA to use its air space. Russia did not say a word
against the US use of the airfields of Central Asian states.
Russia provided serious military-technical assistance to the
Northern Alliance.
Russia has closed its military bases in Cuba and Vietnam. In
short, Russia was giving up its positions consistently and
consciously, hoping that the words of the US administration
about strategic partnership in the name of peace would have a
practical continuation.
But what did Russia get in return? Even when the Americans
admitted, at long last, that not only separatists but also
international terrorists closely connected with Usama bin Laden
are operating in Chechnya, US officials continued to divide
terrorists into "good" and "bad." They continued to say that
Russia is not acting adequately in Chechnya. Russia's
"strategic partners" have not helped it to maintain high oil
prices. The USA is still promising to cancel the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, which has become badly outdated and which they
invoked now in the chicken conflict.
In other words, the USA does not care whose rights are
infringed upon in Russia, the rights of Jews or of chicken
quarters. What is it, idiocy or American cynicism? On the other
hand, knowing the pragmatism of US administrations, we can
safely assume that the Americans coldly considered the step
before taking it.
The unprecedented US egoism and slyness are outrageous,
but we must admit that Russia has lost this geopolitical battle
to the USA. And it did this largely because of its own
political myopia. We have been saying to frequently and too
loudly of late that we benefit from everything the Americans
do. Given this evaluation of their actions, our Western
"partners" became convinced of their infallibility and think
that Russia will not only approve of but also support any US
action. The "chicken conflict" looks out of place in this
context. Even though the USA has conquered nearly the whole of
the post-Soviet space and has put unprecedented pressure on
Russia in virtually all spheres of foreign and domestic policy
- in an extremely humiliating and harsh manner.
We are not going to analyse the motives and goals of the
USA here. It is much more important for us to try to predict
the reaction of the Russian authorities and above all President
Putin to these latest developments. It is apparent that the
Kremlin can no longer ignore US actions and cannot keep saying
that nothing terrible is going on. In fact, a major blow has
been delivered at the image of the Russian president and the
Russian authorities surely pondered this possibility back when
they decided to make a U-turn to the West. But we have neither
the military nor the economic possibilities for an adequate
reply.
We can speak only about a violation of moral principles,
about political betrayal and brazen US neglect for written and
oral agreements. But this will not save the day, especially for
Putin. The worst reply of helpless Russia in this situation
would be the tightening of screws at home in an attempt to
compensate for foreign policy losses. So as to keep up one's
prestige for the forthcoming presidential elections. So as to
prove to society - and above all to themselves - that the
authorities can still control something. Especially in view of
the external threat posed by the USA. Any other way of mending
the situation would be much more complicated. Because it is
linked with the unreliable "partner" who completely disregards
the interests of Russia.
******
#11
Uzbekistan Slowly Seeing Change
March 11, 2002
By BURT HERMAN
TASHKENT, Uzbekistan (AP) - Under the hole in his ceiling where a KGB
microphone once monitored his every word, activist Mikhail Ardzinov proudly
displays the document he's earned after years of campaigning: the
first-ever official registration of an independent human rights group in
Uzbekistan.
Ahead of Uzbek President Islam Karimov's visit to Washington on Tuesday,
U.S. officials and independent observers say the registration of Ardzinov's
organization a week ago is among a series of actions that show the
authoritarian government is loosening the reins.
They say it's evidence the international attention that has focused on
Central Asia since the Afghan war began is bringing changes for the better.
Expectations were that Uzbekistan's involvement in the U.S.-led
anti-terrorism coalition would give Karimov's regime a green light to step
up persecution of alleged religious extremists. But Ardzinov said the
number of arrests and convictions on religious grounds is running at a
fourth or a fifth of previous levels.
``There was a misconception that we would somehow go easy on human
rights,'' U.S. Ambassador John Herbst said in an interview. ``It is our
hope that a closer relationship will lead to some improvement in the human
rights area.''
Uzbekistan was the first of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia to
offer a military base for U.S. use in the war in neighboring Afghanistan.
More than 1,000 American military personnel remain at the southern Khanabad
air base.
The cooperation has brought tangible results for the impoverished country:
aid from Washington has jumped to $160 million this year, up from $55
million the year before.
Along with the troops have come increased international media attention and
numerous visits from top U.S. military and political leaders - more than 40
by the count of Karimov's press secretary, Rustan Jumaev.
He said Uzbekistan is working to make changes. ``Uzbekistan has no
tradition of democracy. In 10 years we have taken the first steps toward
democracy. The United States took 200 years to establish its democracy.
There is a political will and desire for this to happen.''
Human rights experts say that the country has much to do and that the
fundamental attitude of repression has yet to substantially change.
In January, Karimov won an extension of his presidential term in a
referendum that the United States and other international critics labeled
as neither free nor fair. Karimov has ruled since before the 1991 Soviet
collapse.
The State Department's recent report on human rights in Uzbekistan for 2001
ran even longer than last year's - detailing questionable deaths of
prisoners, torture by police using suffocation, electric shock or rape, and
virtually nonexistent basic civil liberties such as freedom of expression,
press and religion.
``There is no doubt that Uzbekistan has an appalling human rights record
and registering one group doesn't change that,'' Rachel Denber, Human
Rights Watch deputy director for Europe and Central Asia, said from New
York. ``What it does is set a precedent of what can be achieved if you
really engage the Uzbeks and press them for a human rights concession.''
Upon his departure Monday, Karimov said he would negotiate future military
relations with the United States , as well as discuss his government's
human rights record and economic ties in six documents to be sign. The
agreements ``open a new opportunity to build a new relationship with the
strongest and most powerful country - the United States,'' Karimov told
reporters.
But hopes of greater economic cooperation will remain stymied until the
country's economy opens up. It remains mired by Soviet-style monopolies and
central planning, and corruption and cronyism are rife. Banks are compelled
to give credit to those who have the government's favor. Agriculture is in
ruins from the Soviet regime turning the country into a cotton monoculture.
Stability in Afghanistan has given Uzbek leaders confidence to undertake
some economic reform without as much fear of domestic unrest, said Yuliy
Yusupov, an economist and deputy editor of the local Economic Review
magazine.
Along with scattering al-Qaida forces based in Afghanistan, the
anti-terrorism campaign has targeted the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a
group blamed for a series of 1999 bombings in Tashkent as part of its
campaign to establish an Islamic caliphate across Central Asia.
Human Rights Watch said it hoped the Bush administration presses for
further concessions during Karimov's visit, including release of political
prisoners, more registrations of independent groups and repeal of laws that
criminalize religious expressions associated with extremist groups.
``Karimov is going to get a photo op - what are the people of Uzbekistan
going to get?'' Denber asked.
******
#12
The Electronic Telegraph (UK)
March 11, 2002
It's Russian oil that counts, not American steel
By George Trefgarne
IT is funny how often we work ourselves up over a particular issue, only to
discover something more important is going on behind our backs. This struck
me last week as I found myself cursing President Bush and his absurd steel
tariffs.
I was just about to compose a traditional eulogy to Adam Smith and his free
trade apostle David Ricardo when I noticed out of the corner of my eye the
oil price spurting up like a new Texan well, jumping through $24 a barrel.
The cost of the fuel that drives the world economy is twitching upwards.
That is a potentially more important issue than steel, which is being
overproduced by the mega-tonne, only to rust away in the scrapyards of the
Far East.
Almost unnoticed, the dynamics of the world energy market have changed
dramatically since the terrorist attacks on America six months ago. Russia
has suddenly emerged as the new oil superpower.
So drag your eyes away from Washington for a moment, swivel round 180
degrees, and let's focus on the pepperpot towers of the Kremlin.
A pointless trade war over steel is possible. But more likely is an oil war
in which the main players, battling it out for supremacy, will be Russia,
Saudi Arabia and the West. The market is also worried that American designs
on Iraq will further disrupt the oil supply.
For as long as anyone can remember, Saudi Arabia has been the world's
biggest oil producer. It has held sway over the world through Opec, the
cartel of oil producing countries.
The peak of its power came in 1973, when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel
during Yom Kippur. A week later, Arab countries introduced an oil embargo
to punish the West for supporting Israel.
In the few days after September 11, the oil price leapt as traders feared a
re-run of the 1970s. But then a strange thing happened. The oil price fell
back. Spying his opportunity, Vladmir Putin, president of Russia, decided
to set his country's oil wells going like the clappers and put the market's
fears to rest.
As a consequence, Russia is expected to knock Saudi Arabia off the number
one spot this year, producing between 8.5 million and nine million barrels
of crude a day. As a reward for this, and the use of military bases in
central Asia, Washington has turned a blind eye to the butchery in Chechnya.
Of course, the gushing of the Russian geyser hasn't gone down well with the
bejewelled potentates of Arabia. Throughout the winter Opec tried to
persuade Russia - which is not a member - to cut production. Mr Putin
responded by tricking the cartel. He promised to cut exports, not production.
But Russian exports would have fallen anyway, as the Siberian winter causes
domestic demand to rise. As it turns out, the latest figures show that in
February Russian production was actually up 20 per cent. Furthermore,
exports have not fallen as promised and Russian oil companies have resorted
to lorries and barges to evade the state pipeline company, Transneft.
Great, you cry. Serves the Middle East bully boys right. Now the Russians
are on-side, we can crack open the vodka and celebrate by cruising around
in a giant gas guzzler. But it is not as simple as that. Nobody can be sure
what happens now.
Last week, Ali Rodriguez, the secretary-general of Opec, was in Moscow
begging for production cuts again. Mr Putin replied he would make a
decision this week, maybe. One theory is that the Saudis will punish Russia
if Mr Putin does not agree to their demands.
They could use their special reserves to flood the market, driving the
price below the level at which Russian companies can profitably produce.
This was a tactic the Saudis used to undermine Venezuela in 1998.
But that seems unlikely. It is potential price rises, rather than cuts,
that give the Saudis their leverage. Much depends on Mr Putin, who has
manoeuvred himself into a commanding position.
He is popular in Russia. Its backward economy is booming. He has reformed
the tax code, introducing a flat income tax rate of 13 per cent (yes, 13
per cent) and begun land reform. He has also, incredibly, paid back some
government debt.
Mr Putin has also given his provisional backing to those who wish to reform
Russia's huge but lawless oil companies. An example of this is Gazprom.
Partially privatised by Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, Gazprom is the
world's biggest gas company and has more oil reserves than the North Sea.
Mr Putin has used the state's 38 per cent shareholding in support of Boris
Fedorov, a former deputy prime minister, now a director of Gazprom. Mr
Fedorov has the backing of foreign investors, who have about nine per cent
of the shares.
He is campaigning to end corruption at the company and sell off its
non-core assets. These include a television station, yacht clubs, fashion
chains and numerous herds of cows.
But who can be sure what Mr Putin will do now? Churchill's dictum - Russia
is "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" - could have been
coined to describe the president himself, with his curiously inscrutable
face and his reliance on cronies from St Petersburg and the KGB. There can
be no telling whether he is a genuine liberal reformer, or a cunning
nationalist, or perhaps both.
One reason the Pentagon wants to go for Saddam Hussein is to reduce
America's dependence on the Saudis by putting Iraq's oil reserves into
friendlier hands. But they cannot move without Mr Putin's say so.
He is already talking about creating an "Opec for gas", based around the
old Soviet Union. Alternative oil supplies from Africa or Alaska are
unlikely to be much use for several years.
The best option for the West is to court Mr Putin, to try to civilise him
and make it in his interest to keep the oil flowing. We could start by
offering membership of, say, the World Trade Organisation (although he may
not want to join an outfit that Mr Bush has treated so clumsily over steel).
There is an opportunity too for Western investors, if they can accept the
risks in that cruel country, to join the Russian oil rush. But they should
beware. Our new best friend Mr Putin could yet show his nasty side. If that
happens, he might suddenly turn off the tap.
*******
#13
Russia sees no quick end to U.S. poultry ban
By Aleksandras Budrys
MOSCOW, March 11 (Reuters) - Russian officials at talks with U.S. experts
said on Monday they saw no quick end to the row over a ban on imports of
U.S. poultry after tests had revealed fresh cases of salmonella.
The Russian ban has soured ties with Washington despite assurances from
both sides that it was not in retaliation for draconian tariffs introduced
by Washington on steel imports, and that the move would not fuel a trade war.
"The U.S. side wants the problem to be solved as quickly as possible, but
so far there seems to be little scope for solving it as quickly as the
Americans want," Russian First Deputy Agriculture Minister Sergei Dankvert
told reporters.
A 12-strong team from the U.S. Agriculture Department, the Trade
Representative's office and the Food and Drug Administration flew to Moscow
after Russia imposed a blanket ban on all imports of U.S. poultry from
March 10.
Russia said it had to resort to the ban after the U.S. failed to produce
proof the poultry passed necessary quality controls.
U.S. officials said earlier the poultry ban was not justified, and that
exporters had obeyed all Russian regulations.
Dankvert said during a break in talks that prospects of sorting out the
poultry row were dimmer after the latest tests showed the presence of
salmonella in five more samples of U.S. poultry meat, bringing the total of
confirmed cases to 15.
A spokesman for the Russian ministry said meat shipped from the United
States before March 10 would be accepted.
Despite initial Russian pessimism, U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Alexander
Vershbow, said the negotiations were off to a good start but he stopped
short of predicting an early outcome.
"It is premature to judge how quickly the talks will end but our experts
are ready to stay as long as possible to ensure the ban is lifted," he told
reporters.
Vershbow said the talks had broad political implications as the dispute
affected relations between Moscow and Washington.
As of midday, the two sides had set up four working groups to deal with a
list of problems which Russia says justify the ban.
In addition to detecting salmonella in some samples, the Agriculture
Ministry has complained of importers bringing in poultry meat without
proper licences, with incorrect package markings, or without certificates
proving their safety.
Dankvert said Moscow wanted to set up a system of quality control that
would allow both sides to operate effectively.
Washington has called the ban precipitous and said it was "very
disappointed" by the move. Russian and U.S. foreign ministers discussed the
ban over the telephone on Friday.
Half of U.S. poultry and poultry product exports worldwide are to the
Russian market. Poultry accounts for 20 percent of total U.S. exports to
Russia, according to the U.S. Trade Representative's office.
*******
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