Johnson's Russia List
#6122
8 March 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
  1. AP: Russian Journalists Join Forces.
  2. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review.
  3. The Russia Journal: Otto Latsis, Economic horizon cloudy.
  4. The Russia Journal: Andrei Piontkovsky, Integration into Europe raises 
security issues.
  5. The Guardian (UK): Ian Traynor, The old enemy moves closer to home. 
Nato's latest wargames are giving the Russian military the jitters and
provoking old suspicions.
  6. Moscow Tribune: Stanislav Menshikov, OIL DRAMA CONTINUES. High-placed 
lobbyist falsifies statistics.
  7. Reuters: U.S. troops can stay, Kyrgyz leader says.
  8. Reuters: Georgia says al Qaeda in its rebel Abkhazia zone.
  9. New York Times book review: Michiko Kakutani, Russia's New Appetite (For 
Those Who Think Young). (revie of  HOMO ZAPIENS by Victor Pelevin)
  10. The Electronic Telegraph (UK): Marcus Warren, Briton stars in Russian 
epic of war on fanatics.
  11. Wall Street Journal editorial: Putin's Shadow.
  12. Moscow Times: Maria Gorban, Sergei Guriyev and Ksenya Yudayeva,  
WTO: Myths and Realities.
  13. Reuters: Russia's Putin fetes women, urges street kids aid.
  14. Baltimore Sun: Douglas Birch, Going to the dogs in Moscow. Strays: In
the 
Russian capital, the official policy on homeless animals of catch-and-kill is 
being replaced with catch-sterilize-release.]
 
*******

#1
Russian Journalists Join Forces
March 7, 2002
By MARA D. BELLABY
  
MOSCOW (AP) - Journalists who ran Russia's last independent national TV
station agreed Thursday to join forces with a broadcasting group created by
former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in a bid to get back on the air. 

The team of journalists, led by Yevgeny Kiselyov, decided to merge their
newly created Channel Six company into Media-Sotsium, a nonprofit
organization that reportedly has the Kremlin's blessing. That makes it a
favorite to win permanent broadcasting rights on Channel 6, which will be
awarded on March 27. 

Kiselyov said Thursday that his group, backed by about a dozen investors,
will bid jointly with Media-Sotsium for the broadcasting rights. Thirteen
other companies are competing in a contest watched throughout Russia as a
test of media freedom. 

The winner of the bid will take over the frequency once held by TV6, which
was yanked off the air in January after losing a legal battle with a
minority shareholder, which had ties to the government. Kiselyov blamed the
station's demise on a government crackdown against an independent media
outlet - a charge the Kremlin has denied. 

Kiselyov denied Thursday that the journalists were putting their
independence at risk by joining with such a high-profile political figure
as Primakov. 

``Having such a political heavyweight as Yevgeny Primakov on the team is a
big plus,'' Kiselyov said, according to the Interfax news agency. ``Many TV
companies in the West dream of having on their board of directors a former
premier, a former foreign minister or even a former foreign intelligence
chief. And here, we have all of them in one person.'' Primakov has occupied
all those posts in a long career. 

Kiselyov said his team of journalists ``look at many things absolutely
differently from Primakov ... but this is no obstacle to our cooperation,''
according to Interfax news agency. 

Other applicants for the Channel 6 broadcasting rights include TNT, a
network that is majority owned by the state-connected natural gas monopoly
Gazprom. Last year, Gazprom took over NTV, at the time Russia's premier
independent station. Kiselyov and other TV6 journalists worked at NTV, but
left in protest after the takeover. TNT said it hoped to create a sports
and entertainment station on Channel 6. 

Another notable applicant was the Gorbachev Foundation, headed by former
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev told Interfax on Thursday
that he wanted to create a channel that was ``serious, national,
responsible and qualified.'' He declined to provide further details. 

*******

#2
ORT Review
www.ortv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu)
Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and
  Policy at Boston University

HEADLINES,
- Russian men may be relieved to know that this year 500 more tons of 
flowers have been imported to Moscow from countries like Holland, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Turkey, Israel and Spain than in 2001 (bringing the total to 4,500 
tons).  Domestic flowers only make up about 10% of the market.
- The Ukrainian Parliament held its last meeting before the next elections.
- Another round of Russian-Chinese consultations on strategic arms reduction 
has been completed in Beijing.  The two nations agree that the US decision 
to unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
had a negative effect on the issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.
- On the eve of the International Women’s Day, First Lady Ludmila Putina 
visited the residence of the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow.  She viewed the 
collection of dolls set up by the ambassador’s daughter to celebrate March 
3rd, the Japanese holiday Girl’s Day, and took a lesson in ikebana -- the 
traditional Japanese art of arranging cut flowers.
- In Chechnya, military servicewomen in the federal forces were honored at a 
ceremony dedicated to the International Women’s Day.
- Workers have begun to tear down the Intourist hotel, considered an eyesore 
by many Muscovites.  The skyscraper, commissioned by Nikita Khrushchev after 
a visit to New York, will be replaced by a building half its height.  The 
demolition and construction will cost at least $130 million.
- In Moscow, Russian Security Council Chairman Vladimir Rushailo met with 
his Moldovan counterpart Valerii Gurbuli to discuss bilateral cooperation on 
security issues; the officials also discussed Moldova’s domestic political 
situation.  Speaking with journalists after the meeting, Gurbuli declared 
that the Moldovan government is seeking a political solution to the conflict 
concerning the mandatory Russian classes in public schools.
- Investigators in Krasnodar have begun interrogating three criminals who 
escaped from a convoy a week ago.  The men were captured last night in 
Adygea’s Psekups settlement.  A total of seven men made the getaway on May 
1st.  One was captured immediately; three others are still on the run.  
Police officers suspect that one of the guards was in on the escape.
- Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov met with his Lithuanian counterpart 
[Antanas Valionis] to discuss the visa regime for Kaliningrad oblast 
residents.  Ivanov will also meet with other Lithuanian officials to discuss 
the development of the Kaliningrad oblast in the context of Lithuania’s 
entrance into the European Union and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.
- Russian customs officers have detained two Estonian truck drivers who were 
smuggling precious metals out of Russia.
- The Russian Cabinet has approved some changes to the Russian postal 
system.  Several technical innovations will be introduced and new 
investments will be sought for the development of the communications system. 
  The ministers also discussed changes to the system of housing and 
utilities payments.  Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov began the meeting by 
congratulating Russia’s women on their holiday.
- In honor of International Women’s Day, President Putin met with a group of 
female educators to discuss abandoned children, child homelessness, the 
institution of the family in Russia, orphanages, foster homes and education.
- Seventy-seven Russian athletes will attend the 2002 Paralympic Winter 
Games in Salt Lake City.
- Georgian computer-game aficionados are playing a game created about six 
months ago but oddly appropriate to recent developments:  In the scenario, 
American special forces hunt for terrorists on the Russian border.
- Two people died and two others were injured a shoot-out in a Moscow-center 
apartment.  An argument between five men got out of hand and guns were 
drawn.  Two of the men were killed and one injured.  The fourth victim, 
Marina Groyetskaya, was a neighbor who came out to investigate the 
disturbance.  The two other men took flight.  An investigation and a search 
have been initiated.

*******

#3
The Russia Journal
March 7-13, 2002
Economic horizon cloudy
By OTTO LATSIS 

Presidential economic advisor Andrei Illarionov recently held another press
conference at Alexander House, the place where the so-called Gref program –
the government economic strategy – was drawn up two years ago. Illarionov
began by warning journalists that he was essentially going to give a
lecture on the real exchange rate and economic growth. With charts, slides
and detailed explanations, the result really was something of a lecture.
What’s important, however, isn’t how Illarionov spoke, but what he said.

The links between the exchange rate and economic growth are an issue of
interest to specialists. What interests the wider public are the many facts
about the state of the Russian economy that formed the background to
Illarionov’s learned thoughts. These facts point to serious changes in the
economic situation over recent months.

The government is still full of optimism, repeating all the indicators of
economic success over 1999-2000. With growth rates at a record 30-year
high, the last three years really were good, no matter what the reasons for
the success. Looking at the results – not for the three-year period overall
but for each year separately – it’s clear that the best year was 2000, when
the GDP increased by 8.8 percent. In 2001, growth slowed noticeably to 5.5
percent by preliminary figures. The government forecast for 2002, which the
budget calculations are based on, is for growth of 3-4 percent. For the
United States or some other highly developed Western country, this would be
a decent result, but for Russia, which still has a long way to go to catch
up in many areas, this is insufficient, though still noticeable, growth. A
closer analysis shows, however, that Russia might not achieve this growth
rate this year.

The fact is that basic indicators (industrial and agricultural output,
freight-transport volumes, investment) have shown no growth month-on-month
since the beginning of October 2001. According to preliminary estimates,
GDP in the fourth quarter was in stagnation or even decreased a little.
True, fast growth in the third quarter improved the overall picture for
2001, and there was still an increase in production volume compared with
the fourth quarter of 2000.

If the stagnation continues, however, this optimistic picture given by
statistics will last a few more months and make it possible to speak of
economic growth in January 2002 compared to January 2001. But, compared to
December 2001, growth slowed in January 2002 for the fourth month in a row.

These kinds of three-month standstills in growth have happened more than
once before over the last three years. Economists haven’t always been able
to explain convincingly why and, anyway, no one showed much interest, so
long as growth then picked up again. Foreign economists have tended to put
Russia’s economic success down to higher oil prices, while Russian
economists have given more complex interpretations.

Illarionov made no attempt this time to link the halt in growth to last
year’s fall in oil prices. Instead, he argued that the rise in the ruble’s
real exchange rate is to blame. This rise, in turn, he put down above all
to growth in the non-market sector of the economy.

Under the term "non-market sector," Illarionov includes all state expenses
(federal, regional and local budget spending and extra-budgetary funds) and
the output of natural monopolies regulated not by the market, but by the
state, which sets their tariffs. Despite (or maybe thanks to) direct
regulation of their goods and services (gas, electricity, freight
transport, pipelines), the natural monopolies’ tariffs are rising much
faster than the general price index. But, rather than spurring economic
growth, rising incomes for the natural monopolies dampen it.

Illarionov said the bigger the share of the non-market sector in the GDP,
the lower the economic growth rate, and vice versa. Statistics back this up
– between 1992 and 2000, the non-market sector was generally reduced, and
its share in the GDP dropped from 69 percent to 44.9 percent. Over the same
period, there was at first a slowdown in economic decline and then a halt
in decline followed by fairly rapid growth. But, in 2001, the non-market
sector rose to a 47.5 percent share of the GDP and economic growth
decreased. Unfortunately, the non-market sector is forecast to expand
further in 2002. This goes for both state spending and the natural monopolies.

Illarionov doesn’t see the situation as catastrophic yet. He noted that the
government has now abandoned plans to considerably increase
natural-monopoly tariffs and has set a stricter framework for them than was
initially expected. But the fight goes on. The government has admitted it
thinks gas tariffs are a bit too low and plans to review them in May, and
the electricity people and railways are also trying to push the government
into deciding on a real increase in tariffs.

Debates on borrowing policy are also not over yet. The government is still
holding (though not very confidently) to its new foreign-debt strategy –
borrowing has been minimal over the last two years and the debt has begun
to decrease. But, recently, the government has been talking more and more
of increasing domestic borrowing. It was excessive domestic borrowing that
helped cause the 1998 financial crisis. Illarionov thinks that, so long as
there is a primary budget surplus, there isn’t a need for domestic borrowing.

Illarionov has a reputation for being an economic pessimist. At the
beginning of the 1990s he left his job as economic advisor to Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin because he didn’t agree with what he saw as
too generous a state-spending policy. Illarionov was proved right by the
"black Tuesday" financial crisis in October 1994.

In the spring of 1998, Illarionov had a serious dispute with a large part
of the liberal economic elite as he tried to prove that the "currency
corridor" policy that kept the ruble at a high exchange rate was mistaken.
Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko didn’t listen to these warnings, and the
country paid with the financial crisis in August of that same year.

This time, Illarionov isn’t sounding the warning bells so loudly and thinks
the government’s mistakes can be fixed. But is he right this time and, if
he is, will the government listen? As presidential advisor, he’s in a
stronger position than ever before. But cutting back state spending would
cause President Vladimir Putin a number of problems, too.
 
*******

#4
The Russia Journal
March 7-13, 2002 
Integration into Europe raises security issues
By ANDREI PIONTKOVSKY

Russia’s integration into Europe is completely senseless and absurd so long
as mutual suspicions regarding military security persist. The Russian
political elite must get over the schizophrenic attitude that has it
enthusiastically discussing the prospects of political and economic
integration with European countries, while at the same time seeing these
same countries as the "aggressive" NATO bloc creeping ever closer to
Russia’s frontiers.

In this respect, Russia’s relations with Poland since it joined NATO
provide a positive model. Relations between the two countries have shown
visible improvements over this period. There is nothing surprising here:
Having secured its place within European organizations, Poland has been
able to put behind its historic "Russian complex" and can now look on
Russia without prejudice as a normal and friendly neighbor for the first
time in its history.

The issue of creating a European security system often comes up in debates
on Russia’s integration into Europe. At the risk of sounding paradoxical, I
would put forward the idea that Europe does not need a "security system."
The fact of the matter is that, in using this term, we forget that it
implies the existence of acute hostility between this or that country that
could potentially spark an armed conflict. The purpose of a "security
system" is to codify this state of hostility and prevent it from turning
into armed conflict.

There’s no need today to create a security system to prevent a war between
France and Germany, though this would have been a perfectly reasonable aim
in the second half of the 19th century or first half of the 20th century.
But today, there’s simply no way these countries could go to war.
Similarly, Russia’s relations with European countries have reached such a
level now that here, too, a war is inconceivable.

Russia’s integration into Europe raises other security issues with origins
beyond the European continent. These are the issues Russia would bring with
it. Russia’s real, not phantom, security issues are concentrated on its
southern and far eastern borders. It wouldn’t seem right for Russia to
burden its European allies with these problems. The United States could
play a significant part in this respect. The Americans have already
demonstrated how this would work when they pursued above all their own aims
in Afghanistan and at the same time brought a long-term solution to one of
Russia’s most pressing national-security issues – preventing Islamic
extremists from entering the Central Asian republics.

If we agree that Russia is through with several centuries of searching for
its geopolitical self-identity and has finally decided that it is part of
Western civilization, then there is no avoiding problems within the
triangle (United States, Europe, Russia) forming this new West. The events
of last September-December clearly demonstrated a number of trends that
experts had spoken about but that politicians hadn’t yet become aware of.

Europeans now realize fully that they will never close the military
technology gap between Europe and the United States, and that attempts to
do so by increasing defense spending will only undermine the European
economy, while the gap will just continue to grow.

But there is another, more serious, problem. What is the sense of the
European Union’s defense policy, and what kind of wars should its armed
forces be prepared for? The European Union faces no threat on the European
continent itself, and the United States isn’t going to call on its allies
in operations in other parts of the world, preferring if need be to make
use of local ad hoc coalitions. But what, then, is NATO’s raison d’etre?
European politicians’ initial reaction to these thorny questions has been
irritation and an increase in complexes when it comes to the United States.

It would be a great temptation for the Russian and European elites to unite
around these common gripes and mutual complaints against their American
partner. But this would be a purely emotional approach and not constructive
at all with regards to a genuinely serious problem, namely, how the West
(Russia, the European Union) should build its relations with its Big
Western Brother. This big brother may not always live up to our ideals and
expectations, but will stay on top for the next 20 years at least and will
remain our natural geopolitical ally.

Above all, we absolutely must not let ourselves sink into an irrational
anti-American knee-jerk reaction and distance ourselves from the United
States on any world-politics issue or use each other as pawns in our own
games with the United States. We should debate jointly with the United
States on a narrow range of issues, basing ourselves on two criteria – the
importance of our security and the extent to which our position is
convincing and intellectually well-founded.

(The writer is director of the Center for Strategic Research.)
 
*******

#5
The Guardian (UK)
7 March 2002
Moscow dispatch
The old enemy moves closer to home 
Nato's latest wargames are giving the Russian military the jitters and
provoking old suspicions
By Ian Traynor

It is difficult becoming pals with the biggest enemy you've ever had.

And Russian generals are finding it particularly irksome to embrace Nato as
a cuddly new partner despite the orders issuing from the Kremlin that the
top brass has to learn to love the Pentagon and Nato. 

It's easy to see why. A quick glance at a map of Nato's fictional states
(Woodland and Treeland, Limeland and Blueland) provides ample grist to the
mill of Russian suspicions of the western military alliance. 

In the changed days since September 11, Tony Blair, Vladimir Putin, George
Robertson and George Bush have decided that Nato and Russia are to be
allies and partners against global terror. 

And so far they have been. The relationship is to be deepened further this
year with notions of a new Nato forum giving Russia a full veto in the
areas selected for common decision taking. 

According to plans being drafted in Brussels and Moscow, Russia will in
effect enjoy the status of full Nato membership in areas such as
international peacekeeping, search and rescue missions, non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism and joint exercises.

Yet already the hawks in the Russian military and the parliament are
grumbling that the new forum will be no better than the old, an exercise in
consultation that the defence minister, Sergei Ivanov, has already
denounced as a useless talking shop. 

A map of Woodland may be mythical to Nato planners hunched over their
computer graphics in Brussels, but to the Russian top brass, there is
little that is fictional about the wargames in Blueland and Limeland. 

These "areas" are currently the theatre for some of the biggest Nato
military exercises in years and they are taking place directly on Russia's
western borders at the same time as the US is engaged in some of the
toughest fighting of the Afghan war. 

More than 25,000 troops are taking part in two mock military campaigns in
Poland, close to Kaliningrad, and in northern Norway close to Russia's
border in the Arctic. 

In the real world to the south, the Americans are about to move into
Georgia on Russia's border after establishing footholds in the post-Soviet
states of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. 

Nato's "Strong Resolve 2002" exercises include the participation of Uzbek
forces a long way from home as well as troops of the local post-Soviet
Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania who hope to gain admission
to the western alliance at a summit in Prague later this year. 

The Nato scenario for a fictional foe in the wargames includes the country
of "Granica", the Russian word for border. 

If you are a Russian general, you don't need to be paranoid to be feeling
less than comfortable. "The alliance's exercises in Norway and Poland yet
again confirm our doubts about Nato's role in guaranteeing European
security," noted General Anatoly Kvashnin, the hardline chief of the
Russian general staff. 

The wargames in Poland see Nato practising a rapid response peacekeeping
operation in a mock crisis involving partition, ethnic clashes, guerrilla
warfare, and black propaganda - the kind of nightmare scenario prevalent in
the Balkans for the past decade but which Russian commentators say could
also potentially apply, for example, to Latvia with its large Russian
minority. 

In the Norwegian wargames, meanwhile, Nato's pledge of common defence is
invoked to defend a Nato member against attack by a neighbouring country on
the alliance's northern flank. There are not many candidates for the
identity of the fictional invader. 

"The exercises demonstrate the constant Nato view that the likely adversary
is from the times of the cold war - that is Russia, Belarus, and other
[ex-Soviet] states," commented Ivan Yegorov in the Gazeta newspaper. 

Krasnaya Zvezda, the Russian armed forces newspaper, demanded to know "why
Russia, which has become the west's solid ally in combating terrorism, is
not taking part in these exercises...Nato is obviously learning how to
defend itself against possible aggression from Russia." 

The alliance's planning, the paper added, is ten years out of date and Nato
seems to be rushing forward into the past. 

******* 

#6
Moscow Tribune
March 7, 2002 
OIL DRAMA CONTINUES
High-placed lobbyist falsifies statistics
By Stanislav Menshikov

Early this week two top OPEC executives visited Moscow to talk with Mikhail
Kasyanov about oil exports in the April-June quarter. Their purpose was to
convince the Russian prime minister that continued co-operation with OPEC is
a wise policy. In the first quarter, Russia had agreed to reduce its exports
by 150 million barrels per day. Due to similar reductions by other
independent exporters (Mexico, Norway and Oman) and a much larger cut by
OPEC itself, world oil supply came into balance with market demand.
Consequently, oil prices, which had hit a low point in last October,
recovered to $19 per barrel for Urals crude. This is considered satisfactory
by the Russian government, which has planned its budget for 2002 based on
oil prices in the $18 - 25 range. If Moscow chooses to keep the arrangement
in the second quarter, it would further help maintain adequate prices or
even improve them.

Because oil is a touchy subject in Russia where oil companies and the
government do not necessarily see eye to eye on various matters, Kasyanov
did not give a definite answer. A decision is expected later in the month,
presumably after the OPEC ministerial meeting in mid-March. The prime
minister's position all along has been one of caution. The government
favours keeping the arrangement for pragmatic budgetary reasons. On the
other hand, some domestic oil concerns and the US administration exercise
pressure to break it up. This is not an easy position to be in. Waiting
another fortnight and watching the market reacts to general economic news is
another good reason not to rush.

Our guess is that eventually Kasyanov will opt for keeping the OPEC
arrangement intact until at least mid-year. That is in spite of Andrei
Illarionov's public insistence on the contrary just a few hours before the
prime minister saw his visitors. Illarionov, top economic adviser to
president Putin, has adamantly opposed agreement with OPEC for many months
now. Last December he predicted that interfering with free market forces in
the oil market would inevitably end in disaster. The government and
president then ignored his advice. Now that his doomsday scenario went
wrong, he is suggesting new arguments for taking a tough line towards the
oil cartel.

Point 1. According to Illarionov, OPEC does not observe its own quotas, so
why should Russia keep its word? However, actually the cartel has lived up
to its decisions to the extent of 90%, not a bad performance in view of
lenient control mechanisms in most cartel countries.

Point 2. Russia should restore the share of the world oil market that the
Soviet Union enjoyed 15 years ago. According to Illarionov, the share, which
was then 12 percent, has now fallen to only 7 percent. The Kremlin adviser
does not reveal the source of his figures but statistics published by the
International Energy Agency are different. According to the IEA, countries
of the former Soviet Union in 2001 accounted for 15.9 percent of total net
global oil exports, out of which Russia accounted for around 12 percent.
Today Russia exports more than 200 million tons of oil and oil products,
while the Soviet Union in 1987 sold 196 million tons. Contrary to Illarionov
's claim, no loss at all has occurred.

Point 3. Illarionov claims that in recent years Russia was loosing its oil
export markets while OPEC was profiting at its expense. Well, consider the
following IEA statistics. Between 1998 and 2001 Russian oil exports
increased by 35 million tons while OPEC oil exports fell by 45 million tons.
Russia is indeed becoming a strong competitor to the oil cartel, which in
previous years practically ignored it. It cannot afford to do so any more.
When the current world slump is over Russia will be in a good position to
expand its oil exports further.

Point 4. Industrial production in Russia has been stagnating in the last few
months while oil output grew. If exports are cut, Illarionov says, that
would exacerbate overall recession. His assertion would be correct if the
reduction in oil exports was large. In fact, it is only 1.5 percent of oil
output which is 12 percent of total industrial production. Consequently, the
negative effect on industry as a whole is only 0.18 percentage points - too
small to cause a general slump.

Apparently, the president's adviser has made his points privately to the
prime minister and his aides but was politely turned down. He then chose to
voice his objections in public knowing full well how much the media loves
scandals at the top. This, of course, is in flagrant breach of normal
procedure that prescribes a negotiating government to speak in one voice
only. If Illarionov dares disregard this rule, he must have strong support
from the oil lobby and certain foreign interests.

Whatever the explanation, using rotten statistics to prove one's point is a
sign of incompetence or evil design or both. Let us hope that the government
ignores this escapade and reaches its decision based on solid facts and the
national interest.

*******

#7
INTERVIEW-U.S. troops can stay, Kyrgyz leader says
By Peter Starck
  
STOCKHOLM, March 7 (Reuters) - U.S. troops may use their brand-new military
base in remote Kyrgyzstan for as long as it takes to pacify and stabilise
Afghanistan, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev said on Thursday. 

In a Reuters interview, the leader of the former Soviet republic spelled
out terms for an extended U.S. military presence in his small but
strategically located Central Asian country, on China's western border and
south of Russia. 

Akayev, who said he will adhere to the Kyrgyz constitution and step down
when his third five-year term runs out in 2005, signalled the base could
operate long after the expiry of a one-year agreement in effect since
December. 

Led by the United States, more than 1,000 troops from six countries have
arrived at the rapidly expanding facility at Manas international airport on
the outskirts of Bishkek. 

The United States sought the use of bases in Central Asia in the wake of
the September 11 attacks, in its bid to root out Saudi-born Osama bin Laden
and his protectors in Afghanistan's hardline Islamist Taliban government. 

"Of course we consider the deployment of the coalition as an interim or
temporary shield...we are talking about one year, but we are realists and
we understand that we may need even more time," Akayev said, speaking
through an interpreter. 

NOT A PERMANENT BASE? 

Senior U.S. officials have said the plan is not to establish a permanent
base in Kyrgyzstan, but they have given no indication of how long the
troops might remain in place. 

U.S. and Kyrgyz authorities have said the base may grow to some 3,000
soldiers and 40 aircraft. 

Critics in China and Russia fear that Kyrgyzstan is handing the United
States the keys to Central Asia on a silver platter, permanently altering
the sensitive power balance in the politically unstable region. 

"As responsible politicians we understand that we need to bring this
mission to a complete end," Akayev said. 

He defined such an end as an Afghanistan with a government capable of
looking after the interests of all groups, ensuring internal security and
safeguarding a secular development. 

"It is highly unlikely that all problems in Afghanistan will be solved in
one year and if need be, of course in consultation with our regional
partners on security, we can find a positive solution to the question," he
said of extending the mandate. 

"Both Russia and China also exhibit some understanding on the issue because
they are both also interested in terrorism being eliminated in the region,"
said Akayev. 

The Kyrgyz president began a four-day official visit in neutral and
militarily non-aligned Sweden on Wednesday. 

NO DEBT TRADE-OFF 

Some analysts have said Kyrgyzstan, with a huge foreign debt relative to
the size of its economy, had no choice but to accept Washington's request
to establish a base on its territory. 

But Akayev said: "The two processes are not linked at all." 

Negotiations between the International Monetary Fund and the Kyrgyz
government are going on and James Wolfensohn, the head of the World Bank,
is scheduled to visit Bishkek next month. 

"Our decisions were not motivated by any pressure from outside. This was
our own choice," he said in a speech at the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs. 

He said the Kyrgyz army fought militant Muslims who entered the country
from training camps in Afghanistan a few years ago. 

Such "terrorist gangs" were "like a forest fire" that knew no borders and
countries, especially developed ones, which believed they could hide from
the threat were mistaken, he said. 

"We welcome the energetic activities of the United States in building a
wide international anti-terrorist coalition," Akayev said, adding, that
Kyrgyzstan would "continue to act in close coordination with Russia as our
strategic partner and ally." 

"Our activities are also carried out in consultation and in conditions of
mutual understanding with our great neighbour China." 

Asked by Reuters whether he believed that Russia and China could co-exist
peacefully with U.S. troops and contribute to stability in Central Asia,
Akayev said: "Yes. I believe that this is positive. It is a good chance for
Afghanistan to start a new life but it also opens new opportunities for the
region." 

*******

#8
Georgia says al Qaeda in its rebel Abkhazia zone
By Niko Mchedlishvili

TBILISI, March 7 (Reuters) - Georgia said on Thursday militants from Osama
bin Laden's al Qaeda network were in rebel Abkhazia, raising the spectre of
military action by Georgian forces under the banner of the U.S.-led war on
terrorism. 

Georgia grabbed world headlines this month when Washington said it would
send elite troops to train and equip Tbilisi's rag-tag armed forces to
restore order in its lawless Pankisi Gorge, where al Qaeda members are said
to have taken refuge. 

The move spurred speculation that Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze
might use his newly-trained troops to retake the Black Sea region of
Abkhazia, lost in 1993 to local rebels in the most humiliating setback of
his political career. 

Despite Shevardnadze's assurances that he would do his best to find a
peaceful settlement, his ministers on Thursday seemed to have started
preparing public opinion for action against Abkhazia. 

"I am sure that Abkhazia is in contact with al Qaeda," Interior Minister
Mamuka Nachkebia told Georgian television. "Arab Muslims and African
nationals have surfaced there." 

Security Minister Valery Khaburdzania said reports of an al Qaeda and
Taliban presence in the breakaway territory stemmed from information
gleaned from Afghans arrested as they tried to cross Abkhazia's border into
Georgia. 

PRESIDENT WELCOMES U.S. HELP 

The imminent arrival of U.S. army instructors has further soured Georgia's
uneasy ties with northern neighbour Russia, which complained it had not
been informed about the move. 

Speaking on Thursday on Georgia's private Rustavi-2 network, Shevardnadze
said the arrival of the U.S. experts was an important boost to Georgia's
security, but played down talk of permanent American bases in the former
Soviet republic. 

"If I said that the Americans had a strong desire to set up military bases
here, it would not be correct," he said. 

Moscow, which has given strong support to the global U.S. anti-terrorism
campaign in the wake of the September 11 hijack attacks, has suggested a
joint operation to rid the Pankisi Gorge of militants, but been rebuffed by
Shevardnadze. 

Russia says the gorge has become a rear base for rebels fighting Moscow's
forces in Chechnya, which borders the Pankisi. 

Shevardnadze said he did not rule out joint operations with U.S. forces at
some time in the future, "but I don't think we will have to go that far."
He mentioned no area by name, but appeared to be referring to Pankisi
rather than Abkhazia. 

Moscow has voiced concern Tbilisi might use force against Abkhazia, which
has sought Moscow's protection. Russian President Vladimir Putin has said
Shevardnadze had promised him he would not send troops into the region. 

Russia's Foreign Ministry said on Thursday it had received U.S. assurances
it did not expect U.S.-trained Georgian troops to fight in Abkhazia or
Georgia's unruly South Ossetia province. 

******

#9
New York Times
March 8, 2002
book review
Russia's New Appetite (For Those Who Think Young)
By MICHIKO KAKUTANI

Viking
HOMO ZAPIENS
By Victor Pelevin. Translated by Andrew Bromfield.
250 pages. Viking. $24.95.

Victor Pelevin, the enfant terrible of post-Soviet Russian literature, is a
cultural magpie, borrowing the hip poses of MTV and disaffected argot of
the Beat poets and combining them with elements reminiscent of his great
countrymen: the ferocious satire of Mikhail Bulgakov and the
phantasmagorical sense of the absurd purveyed by the dissident writer
Andrei Sinyavsky.

At its best, Mr. Pelevin's pastiche has resulted in hilarious and
unsettling works like "Omon Ra," which leave the reader with a coruscating
vision of the cold-war-era Soviet Union and post-Glasnost Russia. At its
worst, as in his new novel, "Homo Zapiens," it results in a messy
hodgepodge of philosophizing and manic invention, perfunctorily glossed
with druggy stream-of-consciousness ruminations and lots of willfully
juvenile humor.

"Homo Zapiens" quickly became a cult best seller in Russia, where it was
published as "Generation P" (meaning, the author has said, "Generation
Pelevin" or "Generation Pepsi"). But while the novel gets off to a rousing
start, satirizing contemporary Russia's headlong embrace of consumerism, it
quickly devolves into a self-indulgent (and frequently incoherent) rant
about everything from the mass media to the Russian Mafia to the evils of
advanced capitalism.
 
The hero of "Homo Zapiens," Babylen Tatarsky, belongs to the generation
that grew up with memories of Communist rule and came to maturity in the
chaotic days that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union: a lost
generation, cut off from its parents' past and uncertain about the future;
in thrall to Western pop culture but skeptical of the West's promises;
eager for change but cynical about politics.

Though Tatarsky was once intent on a career as a poet, he decides that with
the collapse of Soviet power his verses — which were concerned with eternal
verities, things that were "unchangeable, indestructible" — have "lost
their meaning and value." With the help of a friend, he becomes an
advertising copywriter, which he jokingly compares to being a propagandist
under the old Soviet regime.

In the opening chapters, Mr. Pelevin provides an amusing look at the
personal fallout that the momentous social changes in Russia have had on
people like Tatarsky, and he also finds considerable humor in Tatarsky's
efforts to tailor American ads to the tastes of Russian consumers. There
are some shameless attempts to enlist the help of Shakespeare in selling
laundry soap and Calvin Klein clothes and exploitive allusions to Russia's
Parliament to promote Parliament cigarettes.

One of Tatarsky's ads uses Chekhov to market Gap clothing and reads:
"Russia was always notorious for the Gap between culture and civilization.
Now there is no more culture. No more civilization. The only thing that
remains is the Gap. The way they see you."

Mr. Pelevin's initial descriptions of his hero's dabbling in psychedelics —
he ingests some hallucinogenic mushrooms and experiences a series of
bizarre visions — are entertaining enough. But as Tatarsky becomes
increasingly invested in supernatural promptings, the book's narrative
grows more and more flaccid and long-winded. 

A session with a Ouija board leads to an encounter with the spirit of Che
Guevara and a portentous Marxist- Freudian disquistion on the evils of
television and capitalism and modern man's obsession with money. An acid
trip similarly leads to a dreamlike encounter with a dragonlike creature
that discourses upon subjects like the Tower of Babel, assorted Sumerian
gods and the "fire of consumption" that is eating away the soul of modern man.

These experiences seem to have little effect on Tatarsky's determination to
continue his copywriting career, and he soon finds himself working for a
mysterious organization that supposedly manufactures virtual-reality
versions of Russian politicians. It is suggested that for years politicians
— in both Russia and America — have been animated three-dimensional images,
created and orchestrated by teams of computer-graphics technicians working
in concert with scriptwriters. 

"Our scriptwriters are 10 times as good" as the Americans', says one
Russian patriot. "Just look what rounded characters they write. Yeltsin.
Zyuganov, Lebed. As good as Chekhov."

Although this conceit is mildly amusing, it feels like a pale echo of the
uproarious conclusion to "Omon Ra," which purported to reveal that the
Soviet space program was an elaborately contrived fraud. What's more, in
this novel Mr. Pelevin does not even try to make the most of his story's
satiric possibilities, allowing his story line to dribble away in silly
hallucinatory subplots involving Tatarsky's being selected as the husband
of the ancient goddess Ishtar. As a result, "Homo Zapiens" ends with a
whimper, not a bang, a conclusion unworthy of a writer of Mr. Pelevin's
antic talents.

******

#10
The Electronic Telegraph (UK)
8 March 2002
Briton stars in Russian epic of war on fanatics
By Marcus Warren in Moscow

AS a salute to the war on terrorism - and for good timing and symbolism -
no film can hope to rival a new Russian blockbuster pitting a Siberian thug
and a doubt-torn British liberal against Islamic fanatics.

The work of Russia's most bankable production team, War is set in the
mountains of Chechnya. It has already been billed as a guide to "killing
Russian-style", outdoing earlier hit films by the same director, Alexei
Balabanov, in strident nationalism.

War follows a young Briton as he tries to rescue his girlfriend from the
dungeon where she is held hostage. 

Under the tuition of a tough but noble-hearted Russian called Ivan, the
Englishman, John, metamorphoses from a weedy victim whining about human
rights into a gunman taking bloody revenge on the kidnappers.

"If you play Dostoevsky, I go," the Siberian tells John halfway through his
transformation when the Briton agonises over the morality of killing their
Chechen foes.

"The director saw himself as grinding a Western liberal's nose into the
hard realities of what Russia thinks it is doing in Chechnya," said Ian
Kelly, the British actor who stars in the film.

He and the Lithuanian actress Ingeborga Dapkunaite, playing his British
girlfriend, were both protected by bodyguards to deter real life kidnappers
during filming in the North Caucasus.

The cast and crew were on location in the mountains on September 11, when
the attacks on New York and Washington cast the film in a new light. The
attacks came as little surprise to Mr Balabanov. "The numbers who died are
not important," he said.

"What is important is that the terrorists wanted to kill the maximum amount
of unbelievers, that is you and me." 

Recent developments in the region have made the film, to be premiered next
week and expected to be this year's Russian-produced box office sensation,
even more topical.

The Chechen kidnappers first abduct the British couple in neighbouring
Georgia. Presumably, they are smuggled into Russia via the Pankisi gorge,
claimed by America to be a safe haven for al-Qa'eda sympathisers.

According to Mr Balabanov, the plot was inspired by the fate of four
telecommunications engineers, three Britons and one New Zealander,
kidnapped, murdered and then beheaded by their Chechen captors in 1998.

The on-screen events also suggest parallels with the ordeal of the British
aid workers Camilla Carr and Jon James, seized in Chechnya and tortured but
released alive earlier the same year.

Mr Balabanov showed some of the cast videos of the executions, torture and
beatings of hostages filmed by Chechen kidnappers in order to terrorise
their families or taunt the security forces.

While Mr Balabanov's films have been seen as the cinematic expression of
President Putin's promise to "waste" Chechen terrorists, War is a far cry
from the jingoism favoured by the Kremlin.

The character Ivan is an idealist loner in a world of corruption, betrayal
and greed, with parts of the Russian state often in league with the Chechen
gangsters they pretend to be fighting.

Despite its patriotic message and the cult status of their previous films,
if the makers of War thought that they would receive special help from the
military in shooting the film, they were disappointed.

Not only did they have to pay for all co-operation from the armed forces,
but army incompetence and bureaucracy delayed the supply of weapons and
ammunition and put filming weeks behind schedule.

*******

#11
Wall Street Journal
March 8, 2002
Editorial
Putin's Shadow

Mention Chechnya and human rights in the same sentence and it is often said
that Vladimir Putin comes unhinged. The Chechens are terrorists, the
Russian army is behaving itself, the war is winnable. There is no Chechen
problem. But like a rich uncle who was generous at a crucial time but ever
after demands favors in return, the Russian president's dubious political
beginnings continue to extract a price.

Mr. Putin was born -- politically speaking -- in Chechnya. The first war in
Chechnya was a military and political disaster, nearly costing Boris
Yeltsin his job. Russia withdrew in defeat in 1996.

When Russian troops returned to Chechnya in September 1999, having been
driven out three years earlier, then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was an
obscure official, a career spy plucked seemingly out of nowhere by
President Boris Yeltsin to be his successor. A spate of apartment bombings
around Russia , killing nearly 300 Russian civilians and injuring more than
550, was blamed on Chechen terrorists. Mr. Putin vowed to make Russia safe
again and root out the Chechen threat once and for all. Their defeat, he
pledged, would be swift.

But the Russian army remains mired in an unwinnable campaign against a
war-hardened, destitute people who have nothing to lose by continuing to
repel a hegemon that has caused them mostly suffering since Stalin's time.

There are two reasons for recalling this history now. First, the annual
State Department human-rights report out this week is a reminder that at a
time when Slobodan Milosevic is on trial in The Hague for war crimes,
Russian forces in the breakaway republic continue to behave deplorably.
According to the State Department, Russians in Chechnya have "demonstrated
little respect for basic human rights." The State Department cites
"credible reports" of torture, extortion and killings by Russian troops.

The Kremlin dismisses the charges as politically motivated. Russia's
foreign ministry issued a statement yesterday blaming the criticism on
"certain circles in the U.S. . . . who oppose the constructive development
in Russian-American relations."

Then there is the lurking question of the pretext for the second war in
Chechnya -- the apartment bombings. This was Russia's Oklahoma City, except
the death toll was higher and the bombing got a war started and changed the
course of Russian politics by determining beyond question who would be the
country's president for a while to come.

But there are other differences from Oklahoma City -- the main one being
that we still don't know who did it. The Kremlin has always blamed "Chechen
terrorists." Some presumed culprits were arrested and a trial closed to the
public conducted. But it turned out not to have anything to do with the
bombings themselves. There are still no answers.

Now the controversial self-exiled oligarch Boris Berezovsky has fulfilled
his threat to release evidence that the attacks were orchestrated not by
Chechens but by Mr. Putin's own Federal Security Services. Mr. Berezovsky
doesn't accuse Vladimir Putin of ordering the attacks but says he must have
known "such things" were taking place. "The FSB thought that Putin would
not be able to come to power through lawful democratic means," he theorized
at a press conference Tuesday.

The "evidence" turns out to be not so much a smoking gun as a catalogue of
suspicious circumstances that raise reasonable doubt. For the uninitiated
it must be said that Boris Berezovsky is not known as a great defender of
democratic values. Whether fairly or not, his wealth is often attributed to
his close ties to the Yeltsin family during the 1990s. He left Russia to
escape corruption charges (which he says are politically motivated). There
is not much mutual fondness between Mr. Berezovsky and Yeltsin's successor,
Mr. Putin.

But Mr. Berezovsky is by no means the only one to have suspected the 1999
bombings might have been an inside job. The theory has been around for
years. The circumstantial evidence centers around the one bomb attack that
didn't come off -- on Sept. 22, 1999, in Ryazan, 125 miles southeast of
Moscow.

Bags of white stuff with a detonator were found there by local police
following a tip from a suspicious resident. The FSB claimed that it was
simply a prop in a training exercise, nothing more than sugar and a fake
detonator. Local police experts on the scene differed with this account but
have apparently since come under pressure to hold their tongues. Mr.
Berezovsky produces other supposed pieces to the puzzle, but Ryazan --
foiled FSB attack or bizarre training exercise? -- is the most intriguing.

The idea of a state security service committing mass murder would seem too
ludicrous to be entertained until you remember that the FSB was the renamed
KGB, whose raison d'etre for decades was basically institutionalized terror
in the service of the Communist Party. It is not entirely unfathomable that
some cell of the FSB might have done something truly horrific.

What gives these allegations legs is not that the bombings provided the
pretext for a war that helped elect a president. It is that the most
horrific crime of the post-Soviet era has not been solved and authorities
seem to have lost interest. The Duma twice voted down proposals for an
independent investigation . The public has been kept in the dark about who
or what might have caused so much fear. It would be as if the American
government dropped the ball after Oklahoma, failed to catch Timothy McVeigh
and then shrugged its shoulders two years later.

Could the bombers strike again? Nobody knows. But questions about those
attacks, like Russia's conduct in Chechnya, continue to follow Mr. Putin
like a shadow.

*******

#12
Moscow Times
March 8, 2002
WTO: Myths and Realities
By Maria Gorban, Sergei Guriyev and Ksenya Yudayeva  
Maria Gorban, Sergei Guriyev and Ksenia Yudayeva work at the Center for
Economic and Financial Research in Moscow. The full version of this report
is available at: www.cefir.org

Although the Russian goverment has decided to join the World Trade
Organization, there is no consensus in society regarding WTO membership and
the consequences of it for the economy. Moreover, despite growing public
awareness, many stereotypes still prevail concerning accession. Below we
offer a review of the main stereotypes or myths, and look at the arguments
on which they are based.

Myth 1: Russia will be flooded with imports and the country's industry will
be wiped out. 

This assumes that tariffs currently protect domestic industry against
outside competition, that WTO membership will lead to a drastic reduction
of tariff barriers and that the government will lose all instruments for
protecting industry. The truth is more complex. 

First, average tariffs are between 7 percent and 15 percent, which is
fairly low by international standards. Moreover, due to the poor
functioning of the State Customs Service only about half of tariff payments
are actually collected.

Second, joining does not necessarily mean a reduction in tariffs. Tariff
rates will be decided during accession negotiations, and some tariffs may
even be raised. However, it is true that tariffs will be more or less fixed
-- a point that might not appeal to Russian manufacturers, many of whom are
used to the idea that tariffs can be arbitrarily changed at any time. It is
important, therefore, that both the government and industry think very
carefully about tariff policy before the agreement is signed. 

Third, the government will not lose its ability to protect domestic
industry, since WTO members are allowed to implement temporary defensive
measures. Furthermore, the exchange rate provides a lever for protecting
industry. 

Finally, it is true that exposure to international competition may be
detrimental in the short run to certain sectors of the economy. However,
the long-term consequences of not joining could be even more damaging, if
serious industrial restructuring does not take place.

Myth 2. Agriculture will be destroyed and the country will become dependent
on food imports.

Claims that the agricultural sector will cease to develop if the economy
becomes more open are unfounded. Many of the problems in this sector will
persist regardless of whether Russia joins the WTO or not. These include
soft budget constraints, ill-defined property rights and farmers' lack of
access to credit. WTO rules allow for substantial support and protection
for agriculture -- in fact, to a much greater extent than is currently the
case in Russia.

Myth 3. The financial sector will wither away.

Advocates of this myth claim that since the banking system, insurance
industry and pension funds are still too weak to face foreign competition,
and that joining the WTO will lead to the collapse of financial institutions. 

Many people favor continued protection of the financial services market.
However, as the experience of the past decade has shown, without the
credible threat of foreign competition banks lack proper incentives to
improve their operations. 

It should be noted, however that WTO membership will not immediately
saturate the market with foreign banks, as a period is provided for
acclimatization to a more competitive environment.

Myth 4. Lower tariffs will cause imports to surge and discourage foreign
investments.

The logic of this myth is that countries with poor investment climates have
to choose between imported goods and foreign investments. If the domestic
market is protected by tariffs, it is cheaper to build a factory inside the
country. If the market is open goods will be produced abroad and imported.

However, this is not corroborated by the experience of other countries that
have joined the WTO. Their experience shows that accession works as an
invitation for foreign direct investment. Not only do member countries
receive more FDI than non-members, but also the accession process itself
tends to be accompanied by FDI growth. 

However, we emphasize that improving the investment climate remains a
prerequisite for achieving long-term economic growth, regardless of whether
Russia joins the WTO or not.

Above are just the main myths regarding WTO membership. Such stereotypes
are widely used by both pro- and anti-globalization campaigners to support
their causes, while the most important issue of what needs to be done tends
to be ignored.

WTO accession alone will not help Russia to survive in the global economy,
just as staying out of the WTO will not save the country from structural
unemployment, lack of investments etc. To better prepare for competition,
Russia needs to pursue policies aimed at increasing mobility and
flexibility. At this stage, it is crucial that both government and business
get more information about WTO rules and are fully briefed on potential
benefits as well as the problems that may arise.

*******

#13
Russia's Putin fetes women, urges street kids aid
March 7, 2002
By Ron Popeski
  
MOSCOW (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin decried the plight of vast
numbers of street children as Russia geared up Thursday for a Women's Day
holiday dominated by speeches about the feminine virtues of its
long-suffering womenfolk. 

Putin received a dozen social workers and child-care specialists with pomp
in the Kremlin on the eve of the holiday, one of the most popular on the
calendar of many ex-Soviet republics. His prime minister, hosting a vast
banquet, pledged to do more to put women into positions of authority. 

Russian men, incited by huge posters to be good to their "dearest
beauties," scurried through markets ahead of the holiday to scoop up
flowers for wives, girlfriends and sisters. 

Roses were selling in Moscow for about $3 apiece, a third more than usual,
with prices due to rise further Friday. 

Putin resorted to Soviet-era tradition in praising women for "giving
society that something without which it cannot develop: intuition, goodness
and beauty." 

But, two days after calling for a new moral code to help children find
their way, he asked his guests for ideas on improving the lot of hundreds
of thousands of what he said was a "third wave" of abandoned children. 

"The first two waves were linked to the (1918-20) civil war and the Great
Patriotic War (World War II), when children were left without parents," he
said in televised comments. 

"Today we know that 80 percent of abandoned children have parents who are
still alive. What prompts parents to reject their children or children to
run away from home?" 

Russia's economic transition was partly to blame, but children's welfare
was not an issue "on which to be sparing with money." 

Putin, who last year feted businesswomen, presented flowers and a watch to
each guest, including Siberian Natalya Kolesnikova, mother of five children
and foster mother to 12. 

She called for reinstatement of the Soviet-era honor of "mother heroine"
bestowed on women with 10 children or more. 

GIFTS FOR WOMEN SERVING IN CHECHNYA 

Television also showed pictures of Russia's top officer in Chechnya
offering tulips and other gifts to women serving in the 2 1/2-year-old
campaign against Chechen separatists. 

But the charity Medecins Sans Frontieres, in an Internet message written by
a Chechen woman, said there would be "little celebratory spirit among tens
of thousands of women ... who have lost their sons or husbands in the war
in Chechnya." 

International Women's Day, March 8, was vaunted in Communist times as a
festival underscoring the equality of the sexes said to be lacking in the
capitalist West. 

That equality has been exposed largely as a sham, with women subjected to
heavy labor, confined to low-paid jobs and offered little access to
contraception other than abortion. 

Though many social problems have been addressed, women bear much of the
burden of day-to-day post-Soviet problems, with high rates of alcoholism
and domestic violence blighting their lives. 

******

#14
Baltimore Sun
March 8, 2002
Going to the dogs in Moscow
Strays: In the Russian capital, the official policy on homeless animals of
catch-and-kill is being replaced with catch-sterilize-release.
By Douglas Birch

MOSCOW - When workers renovating the Bolshoi Theater complex found a couple
of dogcatchers stalking four stray mutts that live at the theater, the
intruders told a preposterous tale. 

Under a new city program, the dogcatchers claimed, they wanted to spay or
neuter the scruffy animals, vaccinate them and tattoo them with a serial
number. Then they would release the strays back on the steps of the
Bolshoi, a short stroll from the Kremlin. 

Moscow's dogcatchers are known for ruthlessness and cunning. "Why should we
trust them?" muttered Viktor Kuznetsov, deputy construction manager. 

The dogs at the Bolshoi serve as the 1,000-member construction crew's
mascots. They're fed chicken soup with noodles and allowed to trot through
the buildings being renovated. The construction workers protect them. 

Amid curses and threats, the dogcatchers fled. 

But in an unlikely twist, their story turns out to be true. 

In this cold and cynical city, animal rights activists have persuaded
officials to adopt a sterilize-and-release policy for homeless dogs. And to
make sure the new program works, some of these same animal lovers are
muscling in on the private firms that since the mid-1990s have been paid by
the city to nab stray cats and dogs. 

The new policy - designed with the aid of wildlife biologists - is barely 7
months old. And there is still some fierce resistance, from business
interests and the minority of dog-loathing Muscovites. 

But advocates say the program is very popular, and it appears to have
reduced the population of homeless pets in Moscow's core. "It's a great
victory," says Tatiana N. Pavlova, the crusading chief of the Department of
City Fauna. 

The failure of communism taught Russians to fear idealistic schemes, and
the economic shocks of the 1990s nearly discredited the word "reform." But
Russians are crazy about their pets (the Moscow government plans to erect a
monument to cats and dogs), and the animal rights movement is one of the
nation's few native grass-roots reform efforts. 

Several years ago, biologists surveyed Moscow and determined that its
garbage bins and Metro stations support a stable population of about 25,000
homeless dogs. These strays occupy an ecological "niche" in Russia's capital. 

Rounding up and killing animals never made much difference. Exterminate a
dog, the biologists say, and another will take its place. But replace
fertile females with sterilized ones, and the population will gradually
decline. 

After the adoption of the new program last August, Pavlova's dogs should
rank among the most protected strays in the world. But animal rights
activists say the animals are still prey for politically connected private
companies that provide dog-catching services. 

These companies claim to be following the new rules, Pavlova and others
say, but in reality continue to destroy homeless pets. 

Some dog-catching services, Pavlova alleges, continue to kill animals,
while charging the city $70 apiece for sterilization. Some sterilize males
but not females - which are the key to controlling the population. Both
scams undermine the program. 

A year ago, dogcatchers snatched two pets of an elderly woman. One dog had
lost an eye in an accident. Pavlova suspected a company called ZooService,
but employees insisted the woman's dogs weren't there. 

Pavlova went to the company anyway, opened a freezer, found a stack of
yellow bags and started to dump them on the floor. 

Dead dogs fell out. 

"'The second dog to fall out of a sack was the one-eyed dog," she says.
"After that trip, I could not eat and I could not sleep for three days."
Police, she says, refused to investigate. 

Later, letters began arriving in city government offices accusing Pavlova
of scheming to defraud the city and of leading a terrorist animal rights
group. 

Pavlova went to court, accusing the director of ZooService, Ilya Musnitsky,
of slander. She says he wrote 20 of the letters, using a pseudonym. "He's
clever, diabolically clever," she says. 

Musnitsky, meanwhile, describes himself as an honest businessman victimized
by Pavlova's "dirty campaign" against him. He insists that ZooService
scrupulously obeys the city's new catch-and-release regulations and its ban
on destroying animals. 

"Our company has nothing to do with killing animals," he says. "I wouldn't
do it for one simple reason. For each animal, I am paid 50 rubles a day." 

Animal rights advocates say the city once treated strays brutally. Soviet
public health programs in the 1930s had animals shot to death on the
street, sometimes in front of children. 

"'Somehow," Pavlova says, "the cruelty of Soviet society filtered down to
animals." 

After the Soviet Union dissolved, Moscow turned to the private sector for
animal control. Companies sprang up that charged the city $8 a head to
catch strays, $1.60 a day to hold them. If the owners didn't show up, the
animals were destroyed. 

But the bounty system led to abuses. Some contractors killed animals,
animal rights advocates say, then billed the city for feeding and housing
them anyway. 

Moscow's animal rights revolution began in 1997 when Mayor Yuri Luzhkov was
rumored to be planning a massive roundup and disposal of strays, in
preparation for Moscow's 850th-anniversary celebrations. 

Reports of this plan drew the wrath of French screen idol Brigitte Bardot.
"Muscovites, please protect your cats and dogs from Luzhkov!" Bardot wrote
in an open letter published in a Moscow newspaper. "He wants to kill them!
He must be stopped from shooting them down." 

Animal rights advocates mobilized an intensive lobbying campaign. Orthodox
Patriarch Alexei II appealed to the mayor to halt dog fighting. Luzhkov had
a change of heart. He hired Pavlova to run city animal programs,
implemented the sterilize-and-release law and last fall blocked plans for
Moscow's first bullfight. 

The leaders of Moscow's animal rights movement include Yelena Khatskalyova,
a stylishly dressed woman who is married to the vice president of an oil
company. A couple of years ago, Khatskalyova and a wealthy friend set out
to try to use the catch-and-release technique to reduce the number of
homeless dogs. 

They hired staff, bought the trucks, surgical supplies and office
furniture, and went into the dog-catching business. Their spaying and
neutering center, ObzorZoo, is in an old vivarium - where lab animals were
once housed. 

The nonprofit group has been so successful that animal rights activists
hope to set up another soon and expand operations to more Moscow districts.
They're also pressing for investigations of some of the companies that hold
city contracts. 

"'Unfortunately the fight against those who have been in the dog business -
catching and murdering them - is still going on," Khatskalyova says. 

After ObzorZoo's dog catchers left the Bolshoi, a shy dog called Mukha -
"Fly" - had six pups. When they are old enough, says Kuznetsov, the deputy
construction manager, the puppies will be taken to other construction sites
to serve as mascots. 

Meanwhile, they're cared for by Lida Lisyanskaya, a 41-year-old bricklayer.
She is touched by the dedication of the parents, Mukha and Palkon: "They
are a very tender couple. He never leaves her." 

Access to the Bolshoi site is strictly controlled. But two elderly women
come every day with a few scraps of food for the dogs. The guards wave them
inside. 

"We cannot deny someone the pleasure of feeding the animals," Kuznetsov says. 

*****

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