Johnson's Russia List
#6114
5 March 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Profil: HALF OF RUSSIANS PROUD OF THEIR COUNTRY.
2. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, Thank You Comrade Putin.
3. US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices - 2001: Russia.
4. Olga Makhovskaya: Re: 6113-Internet Users.
5. Neil Munro: www.russiavotes.org
6. Reuters: Russian farm sees wealth grow when cash scarce.
7. BBC: Caroline Wyatt, Chechnya's friendly-fire mystery.
8. Baltimore Sun: Russell Working, Far-away war brought home.
Chechnya: The fighting in Russia's breakaway republic has divided
Chechens living in Jordan.
9. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: PRIMAKOV WILL REPORTEDLY BATTLE
OLIGARCHS FOR TV-6.
10. Gazeta.ru: Putin has given Abkhazia to Georgia.
11. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: RUSSIA, US TESTING THEIR RELATIONS IN GEORGIA.
(views of Mikhail MARGELOV, Sergei MARKOV, Alexei PUSHKOV, Igor BUNIN,
and Gleb PAVLOVSKY)
12. Reuters: Problems emerge in Russia-NATO talks-sources.
13. Times Literary Supplement (UK): Geoffrey Hosking, Russia and the Jews]
*******
#1
Profil
February 25, 2002
HALF OF RUSSIANS PROUD OF THEIR COUNTRY
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
The Public Opinion Foundation (POF) has asked people if they are
proud of their country. Half of respondents (51%) said they are often
proud of their country, whereas 33% seldom experience this feeling,
and 9% have never had this feeling at all.
When asked what feeling they have more often, shame or pride,
most respondents (39%) said that they are more often ashamed of
Russia. Some 24% of respondents feel ashamed as often as they feel
proud.
Most respondents (41%) are proud of Russia's victory in World War
II; 14% of Russians are proud of Russia's record in outer space, and
3% are proud of Russia's cultural achievements.
*******
#2
Moscow Times
March 5, 2002
Thank You Comrade Putin
By Boris Kagarlitsky
Members of the older generation still remember a poster with a picture of a
joyful teenager and the words: "Thank you for a happy childhood, Comrade
Stalin!"
Today I'd like to thank President Vladimir Putin. Not because I want to
compare him with Stalin -- that would be unfair to all involved. And not
because when I watch official television news reports I inevitably recall my
own Soviet childhood. It's just that the current leadership has forced me to
experience that same happiness on several occasions. For that, naturally, I
am thankful.
So what exactly do I thank Putin for? Firstly, for the death-blow he has
dealt to the ideology of Great Russian nationalism. During the Boris Yeltsin
years, when the looting of Russia was taking place in the name of "returning
to the bosom of European civilization," nationalist ideas came to look more
and more attractive. Many perceived the social contradictions created by
neo-liberal economics as the result of "Western influence." And the part of
society most susceptible to this view was also most heartened by Putin's
accession to power.
The past two years have shown, however, that no matter how many patriotic
speeches are made, the contradictions in Russian society remain just as
glaring as ever. Talk of "the rebirth of the army" produced only further
decline. After the horror of Sept. 11, the "nationalist" Putin made
concessions to the United States that would never have even occurred to the
"Westernizer" Yeltsin. Nationalism today is as discredited as
"zapadnichestvo," or Westernism. For that I'd like to thank Mr. Putin.
The second achievement of the Putin era is the end of the "communist menace."
The policies of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, led since 1993
by Gennady Zyuganov, have obviously failed. These policies combined
day-to-day appeasement with aggressive rhetoric. The party was relatively
sure of itself so long as the Kremlin assigned it the dual role of "honorable
opposition" and terrible scarecrow. Everyone knows that scarecrows don't
scare the farmer, they scare off pesky birds and other bird-brained beings.
It has to be said, however, that the game of "liberal government vs.
communist opposition" worked exceedingly well throughout the Yeltsin years.
Only with Putin's arrival did the rules of the game change. The new Kremlin
guard simply has no inkling of why an opposition might be necessary, and as a
result they make less and less of an effort to maintain the irreconcilable
opposition's image and material well-being.
The opposition, in turn, seems ready to resume a principled fight with the
anti-popular regime, but has already forgotten how to go about it. Not to
mention that its slogans, put to effective use over the past 10 years, no
longer work. The ruling elite has co-opted the language of the nationalists
and communists and put it to use to justify its neo-liberal line.
By undermining the Communist Party's position, Putin scored a third success:
He eradicated popular anti-communism. The anti-communist mood once so
widespread -- and not only among the intelligentsia in the two capitals --
enabled the new regime to justify all sorts of outrages by warning of a
return to the past. Sure, stealing is a bad thing, education is in decline,
science is in free fall and the living standards of most Russians have
plummeted. You don't want to go back to the totalitarian past, do you? If
not, then reconcile yourself to what's happening and have some patience. Hope
for the best and sit tight.
The political cul-de-sac into which Putin led the Communist Party obviates
all that. The "return of totalitarianism" turned out to be a myth. In
hindsight it's obvious that no one voted for "the future of Russia" in 1996,
because the election was a farce from the outset, and the result fixed well
in advance.
As anti-communist fears subside, social discontent gains the capacity for
greater expression. Society now has the chance to express its views about the
present without looking back to the past. And to demand change. If this
process precipitates a rise of the left, at least the nation's collective
psyche will be much healthier.
It's clear to everyone by now that the threat of authoritarianism issues not
from old women carrying portraits of Stalin, but from the energetic Kremlin
functionaries who have received the full backing of their Western buddies for
their "nationalist oriented" policies.
Quod erat demonstrandum.
Boris Kagarlitsky is a Moscow-based sociologist.
*******
#3
[Excerpt/introduction from much longer report on Russia]
Russia
US Department of State
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
March 4, 2002
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8331pf.htm
The 1993 Constitution established a governmental structure with a strong Head
of State (a president), a government headed by a Prime Minister, and a
bicameral legislature (Federal Assembly) consisting of the State Duma (lower
house) and the Federation Council (upper house). The Duma has a strong
pro-Presidential center that puts majority support within reach for almost
all presidential priorities. Both the President and the Duma were selected in
competitive elections, with a broad range of political parties and movements
contesting offices. President Vladimir Putin was elected in March 2000, and
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov took office in May 2000. Both the
presidential elections and the December 1999 Duma elections were judged by
international observers to be largely free and fair, although in both cases
pre-election manipulation of the media was a problem. The judiciary, although
seriously impaired by a lack of resources and by high levels of corruption,
continued to show signs of limited independence and was undergoing reforms.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security Service (FSB),
the Procuracy, and the Federal Tax Police are responsible for law enforcement
at all levels of Government. The FSB has broad law enforcement functions,
including fighting crime and corruption, in addition to its core
responsibilities of security, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. The
FSB operates with only limited oversight by the Procuracy and the courts. The
primary mission of the armed forces is national defense, although they have
been employed in local internal conflicts, and they are available to control
civil disturbances. Internal security threats in parts of the Russian
Federation increasingly have been dealt with by militarized elements of the
security services. Members of the security forces, particularly within the
internal affairs apparatus, continued to commit numerous, serious human
rights abuses.
The country has a total population of approximately 144 million. The economy
continued to grow strongly, although at a slower rate than in 2000. The gross
domestic product (GDP) figure for 2000 was recalculated to show an 8.3
percent growth rate, and growth during the year was estimated to be 5
percent. Industrial production growth was estimated to be 4.9 percent. GDP
was $224.3 billion for the first 11 months of the year. During the same
period, total foreign investment grew by 23 percent and equaled $9.7 billion
(283 billion rubles). A significant part of this investment was portfolio
investment (principally oil company stocks). In 2000 inflation reached 20.2
percent and was estimated at 18.6 percent at year's end. An increase in
domestic demand continued to spur economic growth, partially compensating for
a decline in net exports during the first half of the year. Real income grew
during the year by 6.5 percent, compared with 2000. Average wages increased
to $143 (4,294 Rubles) per month compared with $89 (2,492 Rubles) per month
in 2000; however, approximately 27 percent of citizens continued to live
below the official monthly subsistence level of $52 (1,574 rubles). Official
unemployment was 9 percent at year's end, down from 10.2 percent at the end
of 2000. Reported levels of barter transactions--which make up an important
but declining element in the economy--continued to fall during the year. The
sectors moving most quickly to cash-only transactions included chemicals,
petrochemicals, machinery, and light industry. Corruption continued to be a
negative factor in the development of the economy and commercial relations.
Although the Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in some areas, serious problems remain in many areas. Its record was poor
regarding the independence and freedom of the media. Its record was poor in
Chechnya, where the federal security forces demonstrated little respect for
basic human rights and there were credible reports of serious violations,
including numerous reports of extrajudicial killings by both the Government
and Chechen fighters. Hazing in the armed forces resulted in a number of
deaths. There were reports of government involvement in politically motivated
disappearances in Chechnya. There were credible reports that law enforcement
personnel regularly tortured, beat, and otherwise abused detainees and
suspects. Arbitrary arrest and detention and police corruption remained
problems. The Government prosecuted some perpetrators of abuses, but many
officials were not held accountable for their actions. Lengthy pretrial
detention remained a serious problem. Prison conditions continued to be
extremely harsh and frequently life threatening. Existing laws on military
courts, military service, and the rights of service members often contradict
the Constitution, federal laws, and presidential decrees, raising arbitrary
judgments of unit commanders over the rule of law. The Government made some
progress during the year with implementation of constitutional provisions for
due process and fair and timely trial; however, the judiciary continued to
lack resources, suffered from corruption, and remained subject to some
influence from other branches of the Government. A series of so-called
espionage cases continued during the year and raised concerns regarding the
lack of due process and the influence of security services in court cases.
Authorities continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights.
Despite the continued wide diversity of press, government pressure on the
media increased and resulted in numerous restrictions on the freedom of
speech and press. The Government generally respected freedom of assembly;
however, at times this right was restricted at the local level. The
Government does not always respect the Constitutional provision for equality
of religions, and in some instances local authorities imposed restrictions on
some religious groups. Despite constitutional protections for citizens'
freedom of movement, the Government placed some limits on this right; some
regional and local authorities (most notably the city of Moscow) restricted
movement in particular by denying local residency permits to new settlers
from other areas of the country. Government institutions intended to protect
human rights are relatively weak, but remained active and public.
Violence against women and abuse of children remained problems, as did
discrimination against women. Persons with disabilities continued to face
problems from both societal attitudes and lack of governmental support.
Societal discrimination, harassment, and violence against members of some
religious minorities remained a problem. Ethnic minorities, including Roma
and persons from the Caucasus and Central Asia faced widespread governmental
and societal discrimination, and at times violence. There are some limits on
worker rights, and there were reports of instances of forced labor and child
labor. Trafficking in persons, particularly women and young girls, was a
serious problem.
Chechen fighters reportedly committed abuses, including killing captured
civilians and federal security forces, and kidnaping individuals,
particularly to obtain a ransom. Government officials accused rebel factions
of organizing and carrying out a series of bomb attacks throughout the
country beginning in September 1999 and continuing into the year; hundreds of
civilians were killed or injured. During the year, the Government convicted
several persons in connection with these bombings.
********
#4
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2002
From: olyam@u.washington.edu (Olga Makhovskaya)
Subject: Re: 6113-Internet Users
Dear JRL Community,
I would add the good news about increasing
percentage of women Internet users
"(MOSCOW. March 4 (Interfax. It was estimated that women accounted for over
40% of the 4.2 million regular uses of the Internet in 2001 (Galina
Grishina, director general of the "East-West: Women's Innovative Project,"
told a news conference in Moscow on Monday)."
They didn't even mentioned an increase of numbers of international
interactive marriage agencies in Russia. According to my data, more that
400 sites in the US and about 200 in Russia serves for these purposes. On
American state program on women trafficing about 75,000 Russian women have
emigrated on fiancee visas last decade.
So, Grishina makes sense pointing to the activization of Russian women, but
she might be desappointed about content of female activities via the
Internet.
With regards to the community
Olga Makhovskaya,
A Russian Fulbrigh Visiting Scholar,
project concerns Russiam female immigration in the US.
*******
#5
From: Neil Munro [nmi.munro@strath.ac.uk]
Sent: Monday, March 04, 2002
Subject: New Data Reminder from RussiaVotes
On the RussiaVotes site, we have uploaded data from a VCIOM Express survey,
fieldwork of 22-26 February 2002, including some new questions on Russian
attitudes to military service.
For what's new at RussiaVotes, go to:
http://www.russiavotes.org/rvwhatsnew.htm
Centre for the Study of Public Policy/U Strathclyde VCIOM/Moscow
*******
#6
Russian farm sees wealth grow when cash scarce
March 4, 2002
By Andrei Shukshin
GORLOVO, Russia (Reuters) - Ivan Matantsev does his utmost each month to
ensure the 100-odd workers at the Gorlovsky Collective Farm are paid in kind
and not cash, earning nods of approval from every quarter, including the
workers themselves.
Cardboard debit cards have largely replaced cash in this central Russian
village, a move locals say has halted plunging living standards and ensured a
modicum of domestic harmony.
"They know that if they get money in their hands they will waste it all on
vodka and their families will go hungry," says Matantsev, the collective's
director, as he starts his morning tour of a cluster of 10 villages under his
authority.
In a far-flung corner of the depressed Kostroma region, Matantsev's
once-wealthy farm is a shadow of what it was in Soviet times, when the state
spent lavishly on the country's inefficient agriculture system to keep
farmers happy.
These days, Gorlovsky lives hand-to-mouth, producing milk and dairy products,
meat, bread and -- out of necessity -- some timber for sale.
Rusty hulks of tractors and harvesting machines, like tanks destroyed in
battle, dot snow-bound fields that roll from Gorlovo's skewed hovels to the
horizon and beyond.
Dirt-track streets, frequented by stray dogs and small groups of children
during the day, empty when night falls.
But even in this pitiful condition, Gorlovsky is an oasis of well-being and
contentment compared to the ruin and desolation on nearby farms brought low
by the alcoholism and economic devastation wrought by Russia's attempt at
market reforms.
"We don't live, because you can't call it a life," Matantsev says. "We
survive. But that is so much better than dying and something to be cheerful
about."
CAPITALISM BLAMED
Gorlovsky residents tend to blame their woes on capitalism, which destroyed
Soviet-era collective farms and did away with laws that punished lazy
workers.
"Before, there was discipline and now there is freedom," said Arkady
Bolshakov, a pensioner who devoted his life to tending animals on the farm.
The word "freedom" is invariably pronounced with bitterness and is widely
interpreted as meaning freedom to hit the bottle whenever people can get
their hands on one.
Officials and villagers agree drinking has taken on epic proportions since
the Soviet system of obligatory employment collapsed and collective farms
went out of business.
Today, many rural families live off the pensions of their grandparents, whose
meager funds are often plundered by their alcoholic children while their own
offspring go hungry for months on end, say Gorlovo residents.
"These days they beat their old folk to extort money for vodka," Bolshakov
said ruefully.
"There are no moral or legal incentives to stop people drinking," said
Gennady Suvorov, head of the local government administration. "And to buy
vodka they would rather steal than work."
Two local men recently ripped five miles of copper wire off power lines
leading to their village, then sold it as scrap metal for a paltry 3,000
rubles ($100).
"We caught them after the money had already been spent on drink. There was
nothing to take from them or their homes in compensation. It cost us 100,000
rubles to repair the damage."
ACCESS TO ALCOHOL
Matantsev attributes his farm's relative prosperity to his ability to resist
ill-conceived reforms and an ingenious method of limiting his workers' access
to alcohol.
In the early 1990s, when farm workers around the region started to carve up
their farms' assets in line with Moscow's insistent recommendations to
organize business along Western lines, Matantsev persuaded his staff to stick
together.
"People realized they would not be able to survive on their own," he says.
"What can you do with one cow when taking the milk to the town market costs
twice what people will pay for it? People who chose to go it alone ended up
slaughtering their cattle because they had nothing to feed them with."
Local officials said that Gorlovsky, virtually the only functioning farm in
the area, largely owes its staying power to Matantsev's energy and zeal.
But the real coup Matantsev pulled off was a scheme to keep farmers on a food
distribution list and restrict cash payments to a minimum.
Workers receive their wages partly in money and partly in their own produce.
The latter, complemented by items like sugar, cigarettes or chewing gum, can
be acquired at one of the farm's shops with a special signed and stamped
cardboard card.
Shop assistants keep track of all transactions and see to it that people
don't spend above the sums in their accounts. The system allows a small
overdraft or can be used as a savings vehicle if end-of-the-month balances
fall in a shopper's favor
One thing you can't buy with such "debit cards," however, is vodka.
WOMEN HAPPY
Gorlovsky women are particularly pleased with the scheme which makes sure
that their children always have something to eat no matter what the men's
drinking habits.
"It is good for everyone," said accountant Valentina Koneva, adding that
despite her husband having a soft spot for vodka she usually managed to get
her hands on the family's cash first and used it to buy clothes rather than
spirits.
"In many other households it is a matter of children having something to eat
or not," she said.
Male farm workers said they were sometimes frustrated at not being able to
make full use of their wages but generally agreed that the system was good
for their families and kept them fit for work.
"If you pay all the money in cash, who will work then?" a sawmill operator
asked, laughing.
Matantsev, who has been occasionally criticized for allegedly infringing on
workers' rights, said that last year he attempted into introduce full cash
payments. But the plan had to be abandoned after work came to a complete halt
in teams paid in cash.
"On New Year's Eve we paid 70 percent in cash as it is such a big holiday and
people have to celebrate," he said with a sigh.
"The result? Nobody turned up for work before January 10."
*******
#7
BBC
4 March 2002
Chechnya's friendly-fire mystery
By Caroline Wyatt
BBC Moscow correspondent
It is incredibly noisy in the back of a Russian armoured vehicle. It is also
so dark you can barely see out.
Chechen rebels ambush these vehicles when they can. The driver keeps a
crucifix and three icons of Jesus and Mary close to him.
This is a little how it must have felt when Russian special forces drove in
convoy into Grozny two years ago - and came under fire suddenly from all
sides.
Unlike most human rights controversies in Chechnyna, this is one case where
where Russian soldiers and Chechen civilians alike believe justice may never
be done.
Twenty-two soldiers and officers, including the commander, were killed in the
incident. What made it worse was that they were being fired on by other
Russian troops, as well as rebels.
Alexei Strahkov and Igor Sukhov say they were lucky to survive the attack,
though Alexei was seriously injured.
Both are testifying at the trial of some of the officers involved. They
believe the truth may never emerge.
Forgotten tragedies
Igor says the friendly fire was no accident and that someone in Russia wanted
his commander dead.
"I've spoken to people who heard how we called for back-up. They went to
their superiors and said 'Can't you hear them, the guys have been
ambushed?'," Igor Sukhov says.
"But they replied: 'Until we get an order, we're not going anywhere'. So,
yes, I think we were set up. It's offensive that the truth won't come out.
That's putting it lightly. But that's Russia for you - the small man always
carries the can."
The Russian soldiers are buried in graveyards around Sergeyev Passad, the
small town they came from.
Yet most people here seem indifferent as to whether anyone is brought to
justice for the mysterious deaths of so many young men.
Local journalist Sergei Shilayev has his own explanation.
"People here are a little bit indifferent because everybody is busy.
Everybody works, almost day and night, just to survive and the next tragedy
covers the previous one. That's the problem. And we forget our tragedies
unfortunately rather quickly," he says.
'Give back his body'
If the Russian public care little about the 3,000 Russian soldiers who have
died in Chechnya, they care even less about the Chechen civilians who have
died or simply disappeared.
But Asmart Basayeva cares desperately. She is a middle-aged Chechen woman
whose husband, Shahid, disappeared the day those troops were fired on.
She says he witnessed the killing of other Chechens by Russian soldiers in
revenge for the attack and she has not seen her husband since he left for
work that morning.
What makes it worse is that when Asmart went to the Russian soldiers to ask
if they had seen her husband, she says they sold her a video of him lying on
the ground being kicked and beaten by Russian special forces.
They even sold her a map of where his body was allegedly buried.
She took both to the prosecutor's office in Chechnya but soon afterwards the
investigator on her case was blown up in his car and the video disappeared.
"It's true that waiting is the hardest part," she says.
"I was raised an orphan and now I am raising fatherless children. And I am
deceiving them, too. If my sons find out what happened to their father, they
will join the rebels.
"If the Russians would only give me back his dead body so I could bury him. I
pleaded, begged on my knees, 'give me back my husband, even if he's dead!'.
I've dug through so many corpses looking for him. I can't tell you the things
I've seen."
Government pledge
Russia's special envoy for human rights in Chechnya, Vladimir Kalamanov,
insists that Moscow is trying hard to ensure that justice is done for all in
Chechnya.
"From time to time our army has been violating human rights, unfortunately.
But, at the same time, all violations are now under control.
"And now I have the obligation before the Chechen population - all violations
will have the punishment from the government, especially when we are speaking
about missing people," he says.
Asmart does not believe him. And when we ring the prosecutor's office to ask
about progress on her case, they cannot even be bothered to look for the
documents.
Two years is a long time ago, they say, and we have lots of cases here.
Casualties
At a tiny demonstration in Moscow, protesters call for an end to the conflict
in Chechnya. But they are sworn at or ignored by passers-by.
Lyudmila Vakhinina of the human rights group Memorial says she has got used
to it.
"Some people call us traitors and they are very angry with us. But most of
all people believe that our action is of no use," she says.
After more than two years and countless deaths and injuries on both sides in
Chechnya, truth and justice are the other casualties of this campaign.
Now, the war on terror has enabled Russia to pursue its military campaign in
Chechnya with only muted international criticism.
Few Russians know or even care about what is happening in Chechnya.
Since 11 September, the same, it would seem, applies to the international
community.
******
#8
Baltimore Sun
March 4, 2002
Far-away war brought home
Chechnya: The fighting in Russia's breakaway republic has divided Chechens
living in Jordan.
By Russell Working
ZARQA, Jordan -- When the wounded Chechen fighters arrived in this desert
kingdom, everything changed for Younis Ashab.
In 1994, as the first Chechen war against Russia was beginning, television
reports showed the young rebels in a hospital in Amman. Seventy rebels
injured in the breakaway republic's revolt had been brought to Jordan by an
Islamic charity.
They inspired Ashab, a 53-year-old Quranic judge. He sought out the young
fighters, married off his daughter to one and even ended up moving to
Chechnya for a while.
"They are our people, and they speak our language," he says. "We welcomed
them and supported them through every means we could."
Ashab is one of 8,000 ethnic Chechens living in this Middle Eastern nation.
A minority in a sea of Arabs, Jordan's Chechens have retained their
language and customs over more than a century since their ancestors first
fled czarist repression in the Caucasus.
The fighting in Russia's rebellious south has divided Chechens here as it
divides their kin at home. Some blame Chechen leaders for provoking Russian
brutality. Some support the cause by collecting money and lobbying foreign
governments. Some send their sons to fight.
Chechens first came to Jordan from 1895 to 1905, settling in the towns of
Zarqa, Sweileh, Azraq Janoobi and Sukhna. Like Jordan's 80,000 Circassians,
who began fleeing Russia's southward expansion in 1879, the historically
Muslim peoples of the Caucasus found a home among fellow Muslims in what
was then part of the Ottoman Empire.
The Chechens retained their language and customs. But over time, they
became Jordanians, serving as police officers, career army officers and
government ministers. By law, one of Jordan's 80 elected parliamentary
seats is reserved for Chechens.
"The purest Chechen language is spoken in Jordan," insists Abdul Baki-Jamu,
75, an ethnic Chechen who has served as a senator and Cabinet minister
during his 45 years in politics. "We've kept the culture and traditions.
I've been in Chechnya itself, and the Chechen language they speak has been
mixed with Russian words."
Baki-Jamu considers the rebellion against Moscow a hopeless cause. He
delivered a series of lectures in Chechnya in 1991, and he said he urged
separatists not to seek independence. "I advised [Chechen leader Dzhokhar]
Dudayev and the rest of the leadership not to get involved in any war. I
said, 'You will be destroyed, and you will go backward 100 years, and it
will take you 100 years to recover.' But they didn't listen."
Yet many Jordanian Chechens say Baki-Jamu's conservatism is out of touch.
Bader Al-Deen Izzedeen Bino Shishani is a Jordanian professor who serves as
the roving ambassador for Chechnya's rebel leadership (the surname
Shishani, shared by most Chechens in Jordan, is the Arabic word for
Chechen). He has traveled the Muslim world from Indonesia to Morocco,
raising what he estimates to be $2 million in "humanitarian aid" for
Chechnya.
Asked whether the money buys weapons for the rebels, Bader Shishani says
no. His brother, Rifat Shishani, adds: "Weapons [aren't] what they really
need anyway because they can capture them or buy them from the Russians."
Bader Shishani persuaded Lal Malika, the Moroccan king's sister, to donate
a $250,000 field hospital. It still sits in Rabat; Malika hasn't figured
out how to get it to Chechnya amid the fighting. Shishani helps bring
wounded soldiers and civilians to be fitted with prostheses in Jordan. He
is trying to find a world body that will try Russian President Vladimir V.
Putin as a war criminal.
To cover his costs and raise money, Bader Shishani sells a $3 tape that
recounts Chechen history. The cover urges listeners to donate to the
Waqfu'l Waqifin Foundation "to assist the people of Chechnya."
The tape opens with the sounds of automatic weapons and mortar fire. A
narrator says in English: "From the burning ruins of Grozny came what may
be a final, heartbreaking message from its Chechen defenders, asking
Muslims around the world not to forget the ordeal of its brothers in
Chechnya, fighting the jihad holy war against Russian oppression. In the
words of one combat soldier, he had never seen anything that equals the
heroism and boundless heroism of the Chechen mujahedeen."
Putin has blamed foreign "terrorists" for joining the battle against
Russia, but despite the tape's talk of holy war, Bader Shishani insists
that he doesn't recruit fighters abroad. The foreign guerrillas are mainly
ethnic Arabs who subscribe to the strict Wahhabi branch of Islam practiced
in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.
"Any of these people who comes to me to volunteer to fight, I report them
to the Jordanian authorities, simply due to the fact that they do more harm
than good," Bader Shishani says.
For some Jordanian Chechens, the war became personal. Ashab, whose daughter
married the Chechen veteran, wears the skullcap of a devout Muslim. Ashab
and his wife moved to Chechnya in 1998, a year after his daughter and her
husband moved there. He translated, taught English and Arabic in the
schools, and served as a judge enforcing sharia, or Islamic law.
While Ashab remembers this period as idyllic, many have darker memories.
Stung by its defeat in the 1994-96 conflict, Russia washed its hands of
Chechnya. But the breakaway republic became a Lebanon of the 1990s.
Kidnappers snatched children from neighboring Russian regions and sold them
back to their families. A slave trade flourished. Armed goons captured and
beheaded four foreigners.
Chechnya's meltdown spilled into Russia in 1999. About 300 people were
killed in string of apartment bombings attributed to Chechen terrorists.
Rebels invaded the bordering Russian republic of Dagestan to bring holy war
to a fellow Muslim region that wanted nothing to do with it. Moscow had had
enough, and President Boris N. Yeltsin launched a second war.
During those violent days, Jordanian Chechens used to seek out Ashab. "Most
of them used to come to me in Shali because they wanted to meet a
Jordanian," he says. "Most of them are dead now."
Ashab's son-in-law, Visskhal, tried to re-enlist with the rebels, but they
turned him down. "You've done your duty," they told the veteran, who had
lost an eye when a Russian soldier beat him with a rifle butt.
Ashab and his extended family eventually escaped from the fighting in
Chechnya through Turkey and returned to Jordan.
Visskhal was a student at an oil institute in Grozny when the first war
started. Now 24, he is living in Jordan and smoldering at Russia. "I am
outraged when the Russian politicians say, 'Chechnya is a cancer on the
body of Russia, so we should cut it out,'" he says. "They want Chechnya
without Chechens."
Visskhal's father, Lyoma, 57, also fled Chechnya for Jordan after the
second war began. He was born in Kazakstan to parents whom Stalin had
exiled from Chechnya. In 1961, he returned and felt he built himself a good
life: a house, a garden, a decent job as a radio engineer. All that
vanished with the war.
"During the second war, in the month of Ramadan, on Jan. 9, 2000, Putin
gave us a surprise: A bomb blew off in the downtown," Lyoma says. "Its
fragments were poisonous, so many people died. Two of my sons were killed,
and my wife was wounded in both legs.
"In our village, Shali, the Russian soldiers rounded up people for a
'holiday,' but instead they started shooting them. They killed 427 people,
including about 100 young girls."
Since 1994, the fighting has raised Chechnya's profile in Jordan by casting
its people as heroes in a lost cause.
"Some small villages in Jordan -- they never even heard about people called
Chechens until the war started," Rifat Shishani says. "Now they've heard
about us. The writers started writing about the struggle we have been
through for 300 years."
As the latest battle in the Chechen struggle finishes its third winter, it
shows no sign of winding down. And in a distant desert kingdom, there is
discord.
*******
#9
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
March 4, 2002
PRIMAKOV WILL REPORTEDLY BATTLE OLIGARCHS FOR TV-6.
The Press Ministry's auction for the broadcasting license of
TV-6, the national television channel majority owned by Boris
Berezovsky that was taken off the air in January, will be held
at the end of this month. But it may already be possible to
identify the probable winner.
The Gazeta.ru website reported yesterday that former Prime
Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who currently heads the
nongovernmental Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Arkady
Volsky, head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs (RSPP), the country's leading industrialist's
group, have created a noncommercial partnership to bid for
TV-6's license. They will be joined by leading academics,
"cosmonauts, writers and hockey players," the website claimed,
adding--significantly--that the Primakov/Volsky partnership has
received President Vladimir Putin's personal backing. This would
appear to give it an advantage over another group of investors
that has been set up to bid for the TV-6 license--a consortium
called "Shestoi Telekanal" (Sixth Channel). This was formed by a
group of twelve leading oligarchs, including Chukotka Governor
Roman Abramovich, former MDM Bank chairman Alexander Mamut,
Russian Aluminum director Oleg Deripaska and United Energy
Systems chief Anatoly Chubais. Yevgeny Kiselev, TV-6's general
director, has joined up with Sixth Channel.
According to Gazeta.ru, however, Primakov and Volsky have
already tried to convince Kiselev to switch sides. Their
attempts, however, have apparently been unsuccessful thus far,
perhaps because the deal Kiselev and the TV-6 journalists team
reportedly cut with Sixth Channel gives them 10 percent of the
company and an option to buy another 10-percent stake once it
has become self-financing. The Primakov/Volsky partnership, for
its part, is not-for-profit and thus, besides offering little in
the way of financial incentives, would make Kiselev and his team
fully dependent on whomever finances them. On the other hand,
Gazeta.ru reported that the Primakov/Volsky group has certain
advantages over its rival. That is, it has received support from
Press Minister Mikhail Lesin and been registered as a media
outlet by the Press Ministry. Sixth Channel, on the other hand,
put in its request to be registered as a media outlet only last
Friday (March 1). The ministry is legally obligated to respond
to such a request within a month, meaning that it could choose
not to register the company before March 27, the day TV-6's
license will be auctioned. This, of course, would effectively
keep Sixth Channel from participating in the auction (Gazeta.ru,
March 3; NTV.ru, March 2).
According to some observers, the Union of Right-Wing Forces,
which includes Chubais among its leaders, helped put together
the Sixth Channel consortium, with the Kremlin's blessing.
Keeping Kiselev and the old TV-6 team at the new TV-6 would
shield the Kremlin from charges that it is limiting press
freedom while putting the channel in the hands of a group of
tycoons who are at a minimum not oppositionists in the mould of
Berezovsky or Media-Most founder Vladimir Gusinsky (see the
Monitor, February 28).
If, however, the Gazeta.ru report is accurate, it suggests that
the Kremlin does not fully trust the motives of the tycoons who
people the Sixth Channel consortium. Indeed, while they are all
members of Volsky's RSPP, they are also for the most part
connected to the Family, the group of Yeltsin-era Kremlin
insiders. Volsky and Primakov, on the other hand, were always
closer to the so-called "red directors," as the corpus of late
Soviet-era industrial managers is known. These were both
generally hostile to the Yeltsin-era oligarchs and always more
"centrist" than "liberal" in their stated political orientation.
If Putin is indeed backing a Volsky/Primakov bid for TV-6's
license, he might be reflecting the interests of the "Chekists,"
the group of Kremlin insiders dominated by St. Petersburg KGB
veterans and long-time Putin associates said to be in an ongoing
power struggle with the Family. Gazeta.ru reported that two
other powerful entities are also behind the Volsky/Primakov bid
for TV-6. First is VGTRK, the state television and radio company
that includes RTR state television. The other, Russian Public
Television (ORT), the 51-percent state-owned channel. The
reasoning of these Sixth Channel tycoons, according to the
website, is that ORT and RTR have absolutely no interest in
seeing a new relatively high-quality independent television
channel--which a new TV-6 majority-owned by a wealthy oligarchic
consortium could become--that could cut into their own ratings
(Gazeta.ru, March 3).
But there is an additional player in the upcoming bidding war.
Former TV-6 executive director Pavel Korchagin, in an alliance
with the TPG Aurora investment fund, also plans to bid for
TV-6's broadcast license on March 27 (Kommersant, March 2). Last
December, TPG Aurora, which is part of the U.S.-based Texas
Pacific Group investment fund and owns stakes in MTV Russia and
Russkoye Radio, offered to buy out TV-6 and reportedly held what
were ultimately unsuccessful talks with Berezovsky (see the
Monitor, December 17, 2001; January 2).
*******
#10
Gazeta.ru
Putin has given Abkhazia to Georgia
http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/03/04/putinotdalab.shtml
4 March, 2002 21:00
Mariya Tsvekova
As became clear on March 4, a secret agreement was reached in Alma-Ata
between the Presidents of Russia and Georgia . Eduard Shevardnadze will
minimize the American military presence in the republic, and for this
Vladimir Putin will change the mandate of the Russian paratroopers who are
fullfilling a peacekeeping function in Abkhazia.
The details of Putin and Shevardnadze's agreement came to light only on
Monday. In distinction from the Russian President, who immediately stated
that instead of 200 commandos from the US there will be only 20 in Georgia,
Shevardnadze put off telling about his diplomatic success until his return
to Tbilisi.
At today's briefing he reported that Putin agreed to change the mandate of
the Russian peacekeepers in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. This
means that the Georgian head of state was able to put into action his long
held plan for the gradual shift of the Georgian-Abkhaz border deep into
Abkhazia.
Recall that Russian paratroopers took up positions along the border river of
Inguri in the summer of 1994. From that time they have controlled the 24
kilometer security zone which divides the Georgian partisans from the
Abkhazian separatists. Despite this, low intensity skirmishes have taken
place in the border regions of Zugdidi and Gali, and the Akbazis always
complain about the very indifferent attitude of the peacekeepers to local
ethnic contradictions. The Inguri river receives rapt attention from both
sides, since a hydroelectric station supplying both Georgia and Abkhazia is
located on it. The border lies directly between the reservior and the
station iself. The local residents are sure that the Georgians will cut the
water off to the Abkhazians at the first opportunity, and if this happens,
the latter will turn off the switch to their neighbors.
The mandate of the Russian peacekeepers, which in Sukhumi is considered, and
not without basis, to be their singular defense from Shevardnadze, ran out
on December 31 of last year.
Several months before that, however, the question of the extention of the
mandate was raised in the Georgian Parliament - on a wave of of
anti-Georgian sentiment in both Russia and Abkhazia, following the invasion
of the Abkhazian part of the Kodori gorge by armed detachments which were
primarily commanded by the Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelaev. The
deputies decided not to extend the peacekeepers' mandate, to which official
Sukhumi reacted with near hysterics, declaring that the Abkhazi residents
would not allow the Russians to withdraw their troops. Incidentally, they
are no less frightened by the nearly completed evacuation of the Gudauti
base.
Meanwhile, Shevardnadadze has been waiting for the expiration of the mandate
for a while now, intending to immediately set about returning the Georgian
refugees to Abkhazia, which would give the possibility of a rapid regime
change in the unrecognized republic.
According to his plan, the peacekeepers must free Abkhazia region by region
for the Georgians. In this connection, the first step is the plan to
relocate them from the Inguri river across the whole of the Gali region to
its border with the Ochamchiri region, which extends to the Galidzga river.
With Putin, Shevardnadze has agreed to an intermediate measure for the
withdrawal of the peacekeepers from the Inguri. Instead of withdrawing, they
will be distributed throughout the entire Gali region, in order to guarantee
the security of the returning refugees. It is no secret that the only threat
for the Georgians in this region could be the Abkhazi authorities. The
majority of the local residents are ethnically close to the Migrelian
Georgians.
The new format for the peacekeeping mission will be confirmed in the next
two months.
In this, Moscow will not exclusively control the peacekeeping units. On last
Wednesday at the conference of the Council of Ministers of the CIS, the head
of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Sergei Ivanov, agreed with his Georgian
colleage, David Tevzadze, to expand the national composition of the
peacekeepers to include servicemen from other countries of the CIS.
Neither Moscow nor Tbilisi has been advertising the new agreement, in order
not to stir up the government in Sukhumi, which always reacts sensitively to
any announcement. Nevertheless, the alarms are sounding in Sukhumi all the
same.
On Monday the local security service distributed an announcement to the
information agencies about certain "unconfirmed information" it had received
on the preparation of a "large-scale operation in Abkhazia, in which
American troops might be involved." "One of the goals of the planned
operation is the collapse of the Russian peacekeeping mission and the
creation of conditions for the introduction into the autonomous republic of
peacekeeping forces under the aegis of the US or NATO," the announcement
states. All of this will be carried out under the cover of an anti-terrorist
operation in the Pankisi gorge. As proof, the Abkhazian authorities report
that on Saturday a Georgian air force helicoptor of American manufacture was
spotted over the Kodori gorge.
Recall that Georgia has received military assitance from the US for a long
time, and Shevardnadze uses this to explain the arrival in Tbilisi of
foreign military advisors. At today's briefing he stated that "the four
battalions and one company of the Georgian Ministry of Defense that are
being prepared by the American specialists will, in the case of necessity,
carry out operations on their own on the territory of the republic."
Shevardnadze did not confirm the information on the smaller number of
arriving advisors that Putin stated after the summit. He said that for the
preparation of the "model detachments" of the Georgian army there would be
as many specialists as necessary, although he promised that not a single one
of them would take part in military action.
(Trans. by Timothy Blauvelt)
******
#11
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
No. 41 (March 4, 2002?)
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA, US TESTING THEIR RELATIONS IN GEORGIA
Russia and the United States, which have teamed up within
the framework of the international anti-terrorist coalition,
are using Georgia as a litmus test for their relations.
Despite Eduard Shevardnadze's assurances that nothing
serious is happening in Georgia, US military presence on
Georgian territory is already becoming a fait accompli. Russia
has once again found itself in an ambiguous situation, all the
more so as rumors concerning the division of Georgia into
Russian and US spheres of influence have not been confirmed.
Passions are running high; for its own part, the State Duma was
even ready to study the possibility of recognizing Abkhazia's
independence. At the same time, President Vladimir Putin noted
during the Alma-Ata summit that he saw no tragedy in the
Georgian side's decision to ask the United States for help.
Does Russia face any real-life dangers during this obvious
crisis in Russian-Georgian relations?
So, here's what Nezavisimaya experts have to say on this score.
Mikhail MARGELOV, chairman of the Federation Council's
foreign-affairs committee:
We've been telling the Georgian side and the entire world
for quite a while now that the Pankisi canyon serves as a hide-
out for international terrorists. It goes without saying that
Georgia is unable to cope with this problem all on its own. It
would be really great, if US military advisers prove
sufficient, helping Georgia in line with the bilateral
military-technical cooperation agreement. Any possible
international counter- terrorist operation involving Russia and
the United States should commence after lengthy and intensive
Russian-US consultations.
Besides, the relevant resolution should be passed by the UN
Security Council. I'd also like to remind our readers that no
foreign troops can be deployed on Georgian territory without
the national Parliament's resolution. Apart from that, the
deployment of Russian forces elsewhere must be approved by the
Federation Council.
Sergei MARKOV, Institute of Political Studies:
Georgia had wanted to become a US satellite a long time
ago;
and this line is currently being implemented. Georgian secret
services have been controlled by US secret services for a long
time now (where possible). However, Georgian secret services
are so corrupt that the US side can't influence all aspects of
their behavior. Right now, one can safely say that Russian-US
relations are being tested in Georgia; meanwhile this doesn't
imply the aggravation of Russian-Georgian relations alone. In
other words, this amounts to the first-ever joint actions in a
region where Russia has its clear-cut interests. As far as the
recognition of Abkhazia's independence is concerned, any abrupt
actions would aggravate Russian-Western relations, also
damaging Russia's vital national interests. The situation in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia resembles the Kosovo situation. To
my mind, the creation of an independent Abkhazian state could
be rigidly linked with Kosovo's status for the sake of avoiding
any international isolation.
Alexei PUSHKOV, Postscriptum analytical program, TVTs
television channel:
Georgia is a certain moment of truth. In other words, the
deployment of US military units in Central Asia could be
justified by the fact that such military presence was something
important for the Afghan counter-terrorist operation and for
fighting the Taliban. However, US military presence on Georgian
territory can't be justified by any strategic considerations
whatsoever. The Russian leadership is telling the truth when it
says that Georgia is an independent state, which can ask anyone
else for help, if it wants to. Still I find it hard to explain
why Russia should pay for this Georgian foreign policy. Why
should Russia sell its gas for half its price? Moreover, why
should we prop up the Georgian fuel-and-energy sector?
Shevardnadze has every right to cooperate with the United
States, which should then furnish Georgia with cheaper gas.
Igor BUNIN, Center of Political Technologies:
To my mind, the very same algorithm, which is typical of
the Central Asian situation, the latest winter Olympics, as
well as the situation in Moldavia and Georgia (albeit with some
exceptions), continues to manifest itself at this stage. The
majority of Russia's political elite believes that it's staying
inside some besieged fortress. In its opinion, Hannibal is at
the gate; Americans are coming; they have already invaded
Central Asia; moreover, Russia, which has lost the Olympics, is
now being baited. Despite the fact that different mechanisms
operate in each particular case, this "besieged-fortress"
mentality, as well as a sufficiently aggressive anti-Western
attitude, are currently being escalated. For example, Romanian
nationalists, rather than the West, are being blamed for the
current Moldavian situation.
However, one and the same psychological mechanism, i.e. a
feeling of weakness, a feeling of the super-power's demise, as
well as a striving to rally and to repel the attackers, tend to
manifest themselves nowadays. At the same time, all these
wishes and aspirations tend to vanish into thin air, after the
President makes the appropriate decisions. The President said
from the very outset that nothing terrible was happening in
Central Asia, and that this was a natural process. The
situation with Salt Lake City Olympics was a bit different,
with Putin himself wondering whether the Russian Olympic team
should leave for home, or not.
This moment of doubt immediately became something more
pronounced, with everyone else also advocating such a radical
decision. However, the Russian elite retreated in no time at
all, after the President decided that the Olympics didn't
constitute a sufficiently important pretext for severing
relations with the West. The situation with Georgia is
well-nigh the same. Bilateral relations were aggravated to the
utmost, with Moscow even saying that Abkhazia might become part
and parcel of Russia. However, the President said that nothing
terrible was going on, that the situation was quite normal, and
that everybody will be acting together. As I see it, emotions
are now going to subside.
However, the entire Russian elite will raise its head once
again, if Putin loses his nerve, and if he voices an
anti-Western stand all of a sudden.
Gleb PAVLOVSKY, Effective Policy Foundation:
Russian-Georgian relations have been suffering from a
crisis for ten consecutive years. First of all, this crisis was
linked with the presence of terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge.
Consequently, Russia was forced to close its border with
Georgia already at the beginning of the second Chechen war. As
I see it, regional US military presence serves to enhance
Russian security, as well as that of Russia's logistics-support
infrastructure on Chechen territory. Moreover, such presence
reduces the Tbilisi leadership's maneuvering room. Mind you,
the Tbilisi government had used Russian-Georgian relations as a
domestic-policy bargaining chip. Therefore Caucasian security
is being enhanced just because, regardless of the gist of
America's regional presence, the United States is not Russia's
adversary.
Unfortunately, Russia is opposed by separatists, terrorists and
their allies. Tbilisi's actions to aggravate bilateral
relations still further are perceived as the only danger. This
game used to entail a Chechen threat from Georgia. To cut a
long story short, the Georgian side might once again try and
transport terrorists from the Pankisi Gorge all the way to the
Kodori Gorge, in the direction of Abkhazia. Still I think that
the US side can monitor such attempts, also preventing these
actions. Consequently, Russia is now obtaining real-life
opportunities for streamlining operational and political
interaction with the United States, which plays the part of our
partner in the context of the anti-terrorist coalition. Georgia
constitutes the stage of such interaction; therefore it would
be very good, if the Georgian leadership displays its loyalty
toward the anti-terrorist coalition's goals, and if it takes
part in this process.
*******
#12
Problems emerge in Russia-NATO talks-sources
March 4, 2002
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said Monday that Russia
wanted changes to ensure joint decision-making in a new relationship with
NATO, but Interfax news agency said talks on the issue had run into trouble.
Ivanov, speaking to journalists as NATO and Russian officials held a new
round of talks on a closer partnership, said: "A purely cosmetic
mechanism...scarcely meets the reality of the age or the interests of our
country.
"It must not simply be a consultative or advisory body but must be an organ
that genuinely works out decisions, takes them and jointly carries them out,"
he said.
Interfax quoted informed sources as saying that the talks, led by a Russian
deputy foreign minister and a senior NATO official, had encountered
"considerable difficulties" in working out a new framework for Russia and
NATO's 19 members.
"It is not yet clear how the new '20' will differ from the old Permanent
Joint Council or whether we are talking merely of a cosmetic change,"
Interfax quoted the sources as saying.
Senior NATO official Guenther Altenburg had arrived in Moscow with the aim of
setting up a new structure by next May to run the relationship. The Russian
side was led by Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeny Gusarov.
The sources suggested that the problems could prevent the two sides from
meeting the deadline, but said there were assurances in both Moscow and
Brussels that talks would continue.
Creation of a new body is widely seen as an effort to bolster Russian
President Vladimir Putin as he reaches out to the West, most prominently in
his support for the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism.
Western alliance foreign ministers agreed late last year to set up a new body
by the time they meet in Iceland in May, enabling Russia to sit as an equal
with the 19 allies and have a say in decision-making.
Ivanov, quoted by Interfax, said the new body could decide on joint action
against terrorism and organized crime. It could also be responsible for
organizing peacekeeping operations and taking action to stop the spread of
weapons of mass destruction.
*******
#13
Times Literary Supplement (UK)
February 27, 2002
Russia and the Jews
By Geoffrey A. Hosking
[excerpt]
Solzhenitsyn's revision of the traditional version
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
DVESTI LET VMESTE
509pp. Moscow: Russkii put'. 176Rs.
5 85887 110 0
In spite of mounting evidence to the contrary, we are still inclined to
think of Russians as congenitally anti-Semitic. We carry mental images of
Cossacks with whips charging Jewish crowds and smashing into Jewish shops.
Yet in 1915, at the height of the First World War, when Russian mobs in
Moscow were trashing and plundering German shops, Jews – whose surnames
were often indistinguishable from German ones – would hang notices outside
their enterprises saying “Jewish shop”. It is reported that the hooligans
would then pass them by.
It is true that the Russian–Jewish relationship has often entailed
suspicion and tension during the two centuries or more since Jews were
first absorbed in large numbers into the Russian Empire. But at the same
time, seldom have two peoples of such different ethnic origins achieved
such a degree of coalescence as the Russians and the Jews. This is one of
the great love-hate relationships of history, and it has left an indelible
mark on both peoples: Jews were prominent in the Bolshevik party which
seized power in Russia in 1917, while Jewish exiles from Russia formed the
main ranks of the Zionist movement and created the state of Israel.
The first volume of Dvesti let vmeste (Two hundred years together) is an
account of this relationship by one of the outstanding writers of the
twentieth century. We have tended to forget Alexander Solzhenitsyn in
recent decades, but in the 1960s and 70s, everything he wrote seized the
immediate attention of the world’s literati. Not all the comment on him was
favourable, since he was seen as anti-Western, anti-liberal and a Russian
nationalist. Some whispered that he was anti-Semitic.
Not the right person, then, to write about the Jews in Russia? On the
contrary, when he launched this book in Moscow last summer, Solzhenitsyn
declared that he wanted to help reconcile Russians and Jews. The result is
a fascinating work, written with all its author’s verve and linguistic
inventiveness. It is sympathetic – though far from uncritical – towards the
Jews and often disparaging about the weakness of Russian government and the
fickleness of Russian public opinion.
The partitions of Poland between 1772 and 1795 brought nearly a million
Jews into the Russian Empire. Over the next century, they were to increase
fivefold. Their energy, communal cohesion and highly literate education
made them formidable competitors, well placed to take advantage of the
economic growth of Russia during the nineteenth century. Many Jews enriched
themselves in occupations like tax and liquor-farming, sugar-refining, the
grain and timber trade. By the second half of the century, Jews were in
leading positions in the railways, banking, newspapers, the professions and
culture. The so-called Pale of Settlement in the west and south, to which
most of them were confined, proved extremely porous in practice, and not
only because of exemptions for the wealthy and educated. The salaries of
some big-city police officers were probably exceeded by the backhanders
they received from Jews living illegally.
By the end of the nineteenth century, Jews were split into two major
categories: on the one hand, those living in the main cities, largely
assimilated to Russian language, culture and ways of life, and so
successful as to arouse chronic envy among other peoples; and on the other,
the majority, far from affluent, many in fact dirt-poor, living in a shtetl
somewhere in the Pale, visiting the synagogue regularly, taking their
disputes to the rabbi and observing the traditional dietary laws.
The imperial regime reacted to the success of the urban Jews like
proverbial rabbits in headlights. Both the Government and the Orthodox
Church saw themselves as embattled, constantly under threat from border
tribes and disloyal ethnic groups, as well as from religious sects whose
zeal always seemed more intense than that of ordinary peasant Orthodox
believers. The Jews appeared to the servants of Church and State to be
ultra-disloyal and ultra-zealous, and, to make matters worse, they were
energetic, talented and living in the strategic western approaches to the
imperial heartland. So they had to be confined and regulated. When Moscow
merchants complained about the Jews’ competition, the Government restricted
their trade to Lithuania, Belorussia and Ukraine. This was the first step
towards setting up the Pale of Settlement, where all except wealthy or
highly qualified Jews were supposed to live for the next century. The Pale
was a measure of the Jews’ success. It was the only measure of its kind in
an empire which otherwise promoted inter-ethnic mixing. Who would have
dreamt of confining the Tatars, the Georgians or even the Germans in that
way?
******
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