Johnson's Russia List
#6109
2 March 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: US European Command to Include Russia.
2. UPI: Bruce Tober, Big increase forecast in Russian Net use.
3. Harley Balzer: RUSSIAN POLITICIAN DENOUNCES “TRIPLE AXEL OF EVIL”
4. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review.
5. The Russia Journal: Alexander Kondorsky, Knowledge costs.
6. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace meeting report: David Hoffman,
Oligarchic Capitalism in Russia: The Past, Present and Future.
7. AP: Putin Backs U.S. on Georgia Effort.
8. eurasianet.org: Ian Bremmer, DEFINING THE LIMITS OF TERRORISM:
THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND CHECHNYA.
9. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Kremlin puts immigration into police hands.
10. The Russia Journal: On nukes, trials and Russia’s new role. (discussion
with Andrei Piontkovsky, Pavel Podvig, and Eduard Lozansky)]
*******
#1
US European Command to Include Russia
March 1, 2002
By ROBERT BURNS
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Pentagon plans to place responsibility for Russia with
the U.S. European Command, which is now in charge of American military forces
and military-to-military relations in Europe.
No U.S. warfighting command has ever had Russia as part of its area of
responsibility. Military-to-military relations with Russia have been handled
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.
The change is intended, at least in part, to make management of U.S. military
relations with Russia work more like it does with other countries. It would
make the commander of European Command, Air Force Gen. Joseph Ralston,
responsible for activities with Russia, including joint exercises and
military-to-military exchanges.
U.S. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Friday the change
is part of a larger reorganization of geographic responsibilities of the five
``combatant commands,'' which have operational control of U.S. combat forces
in defined parts of the globe. President Bush has been briefed on the changes
to the Unified Command Plan but has not yet approved them, officials said.
George Joulwan, a retired Army general who was commander of European Command
from 1993 to 1997, applauded the change. ``It makes eminent good sense,'' he
said Friday, because it will allow for more direct communications with
Russian military officials by the U.S. commander who deals them most often.
``We have a great opportunity to develop ways to work together as partners,''
Joulwan said. He noted that Russian and American troops are operating
together as peacekeepers in Bosnia. European Command also has
responsibilities in other areas of interest to Russia, including Israel and
most of Africa.
The post-Sept. 11 war on terrorism requires an even closer
military-to-military relationship with Russia, Joulwan said. This week the
United States said it plans to send a small number of troops to Georgia, a
former Soviet republic on Russia's border, to train its military in fighting
terrorists.
The commander of European Command is also commander of all NATO forces in
Europe. Russia is not a NATO member, but it has an association with the
alliance through a program called Partnership for Peace.
Besides European Command, which is based in Stuttgart, Germany, the other
U.S. combatant commands are Miami-based Southern Command; Hawaii-based
Pacific Command; Norfolk, Va.-based Joint Forces Command; and Central
Command, which is based in Tampa, Fla., and is running the war in
Afghanistan.
Pentagon officials have said in recent weeks that other changes to the
Unified Command Plan include creating a new defense command - perhaps to be
called Northern Command - to oversee all military personnel involved in
protecting U.S. territory. It is not clear who would run the new command.
On the Net:
U.S. European Command: http://www.eucom.mil/
******
#2
Big increase forecast in Russian Net use
By Bruce Tober
Special to UPI
March 1, 2002
Russia is expected to see a doubling of Internet connections during the next
four years. And unlike most of the Western world, the majority of those will
be businesses, according to a leading industry analyst, who also says that
contrary to most of the rest of the world where Nokia is king of the mobile
phone mountain, in Russia, it's Siemens that leads the pack in the $560
million mobile-phone market.
"The key factor is where computers are used," said Simon Baker, research
analyst for the Russian office of international technology consultancy IDC, a
specialist in e-business strategies, telecommunications and mobile and
wireless. "The number of computers in use in the home is low compared to that
in more wealthy countries. IDC measures computer sales and our projections on
Internet use are made in close relation to our forecasts of PC sales and what
proportion of PCs will be in use in the home," he told United Press
International.
Baker does, however, forecast faster take-up of the Internet by consumers
during the next four years. "Growth in the consumer market is, however, even
faster. The number of consumer connections will expand at an average of 30
percent per year to 2005."
Although it's not been studied, Baker believes the Siemens mobile-phone lead
is due to "the generally good image of German technology in Russia, and in
particular the status of German cars as the most desirable. Siemens' sales as
a percentage of the market are noticeably higher in Moscow than in St.
Petersburg and the regions, where the position of Nokia, which already had a
strong position in the Russian mobile market before Siemens became very
active here."
There are two major mobile operating standards, GSM (Global System for Mobile
Communications) and CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access). GSM, which
originated in Europe, accounts for approximately 70 percent of the total
digital wireless market today. Hence it offers the largest selection of
handsets. CDMA is primarily used in the USA. Baker says the Russian market is
predominantly GSM.
He notes that while CDMA is licensed for use in Russia, "the Russian
government has restricted its use to fixed wireless applications (in which
mode it is used by Sonet here in Moscow)."
What this means is that third generation (3G) mobile services will be slowed
in Russia because "these applications need lots of bandwidth and hence will
be launched in many countries under newly licensed frequencies, which were
often auctioned (the 3G auctions which accounted for so much hype in 2000)."
"However, they could be launched using existing bandwidth allocations in
Russia if there were not many users," Baker added.
Baker believes it's very much up in the air as to when 3G will come to Russia
"in the forms to be used in Western Europe, as these 3G technologies are
CDMA-based, and note the current licensing restriction in Russia. The Russian
government has so far made no official pronouncement on how it may license 3G
here."
The key factor in the growth of the consumer market, he says, "is sale of
PCs. With Russia's economic recovery from the 1998 crisis, and in particular
continuing internal inflation which is producing an increase in real incomes
in dollar terms, PCs are becoming affordable for more households." And in the
regions outside Moscow and St. Petersburg, falling costs of Internet access
will contribute greatly to this growth. "In Moscow and St. Petersburg tariffs
are lower than in the regions and will fall more slowly."
Broadband connectivity, a major issue in the telecom industry in both the
United States and the UK, where its rollout is exceedingly slow in comparison
to user demand, will likewise be very slow in Russia during the next few
years, especially for consumers, though businesses will see a higher and
faster take-up, he says. "In Russia Internet access will continue to be
dominated by conventional dial-up access for several years. Broadband will be
a small business here for a long time in the consumer market. In the business
market we expect leased line and DSL broadband service to have a substitution
effect on dial-up."
So who are the winners?
Baker says with regard to the Internet, "there is only one ISP with a
national brand name, Golden Telecom, and then it does not offer service in
many areas. Scale matters, but a preferential link to the city phone network
can be a more important factor in success. Overlay networks such as Comstar,
Peterstar, Sovintel and Combellga also have advantages as they can bundle
Internet access with voice and other data services to their business
customers, and it is this business Internet market in which most of the
profit lies."
And with regard to mobile phone services, he notes, "The advantage in mobile
is clearly with large GSM operators with a well-known brand name, a presence
in major markets and access to capital at reasonable cost (i.e. MTS,
Vimpelcom and Megafon/North West GSM). They will increasingly dominate the
business."
The mobile business in Russia, he concludes, is growing fast and "will
continue to do so for several years, and in the longer term will catch up
with markets in Central Europe." In the Internet business, low PC ownership
will stymie rapid growth. "A key difference," he adds, "in both markets from
the international norm is that in neither is the former state telecoms
monopoly the dominant player."
*******
#3
Date: Fri, 01 Mar 2002
From: "Harley D. Balzer"
Subject: RUSSIAN POLITICIAN DENOUNCES “TRIPLE AXEL OF EVIL”
In the tradition of Herman Melville's last novel, I offer this item from
a new Rusian web site:
www.rodinamoya.ru
April 1, 2002
RUSSIAN POLITICIAN DENOUNCES “TRIPLE AXEL OF EVIL”
Vladimir Zhirinovskii, leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party,
today added a new twist to Russia’s complaints regarding the judging of
Olympic figure skating at the Salt Lake City Games. Speaking to
reporters, Zhrinovskii stated that there are reliable rumors that U. S.
Gold
Medalist Sarah Hughes received secret training at a previously unknown
skating facility in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia. “According to
information from the top levels of Russia’s Ministry of Defense,” said
Zhirinovskii, “it is impossible to rule out a scenario where Hughes
prepared for the Olympics with assistance from groups tied to Usama Bin
Laden. Just think; if she trained wearing a Burqa, she would have had an
unfair advantage over the other skaters when she performed without it.
That would explain her unprecedented success in landing all those
triple jumps.”
A spokesman for a spokesman for a spokesman for White House Press
Secretary Ari Fleischer rejected the Russian Duma Vice-Speaker’s
allegations. According to the White House Press Secretary, “President
Bush sees nothing wrong with U. S. skaters training in Georgia. The city
of Atlanta has a solid Olympic tradition after hosting the games.”
*******
#4
ORT Review
www.ortv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu)
Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and
Policy at Boston University
HEADLINES,
Friday, March 01, 2002
- Journalists in Chechnya were shown a terrorist training videotape that
was discovered during a special operation in the Alleroi settlement of the
Kurchaloev region. Special service operatives noted that the tape shows a
woman driving a truck and explained that Chechen fighters are using more
women as suicide bombers.
- Afghanistan's Interior Minister Yunus Qanooni, who is in Moscow on a
visit, announced that his country counts on receiving Russia's help in the
fight against narcotics.
- General Yuri Baluevsky, the first deputy chief of the General
Headquarters of the Russian Armed Forces announced that a new
Russian-American agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive
weapons could be signed as early as this May. At the same time, he said
that, according to Russian experts, the US is starting new military
programs and increasing defense spending.
- Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba has sent the Russian government a
document asking for the establishment of "associated relations" between
Moscow and Sukhumi.
- Representatives of the Georgian Ministry of Defense announced that about
200 American military instructors will arrive in Georgia in the second
half of March.
- The third part of the Civil Code, one establishing inheritance rights,
has gone into effect.
- Leonid Grach [recently taken off the ballot in the Crimea] has
registered his appeal with Ukraine's Supreme Court. He has also collected
documents proving that his civil and constitutional rights were violated
and sent them to the Commission of the Council of Europe.
- A special passport control operation is being carried out in Grozny.
About 100 people have been detained.
- Vladislav Listiev, a renowned journalist and the first general director
of ORT, was killed seven years ago today. The investigation of his murder
is still open, but no one has been accused.
- The informal meeting of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)
presidents has began in Alma-Ata. Russian President Vladimir Putin said
that normalization in Afghanistan was discussed and that the presidents of
Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan signed a declaration on
cooperation in the energy sphere. President Putin stated that he sees no
danger or tragedy in the arrival of American military specialists to
Georgia.
- Russian skiers Larisa Lazutina, Olga Danilova and Natalia Baranova will
dispute the decision of the Olympic Committee to exclude them from the
games.
- Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov met with his Finnish counterpart
Paavo Lipponen to discuss forestry. Kasyanov promises that Moscow will
offer Helsinki terms that will make buying timber in Russia cheaper than
anywhere else.
- Seven of the 500 "richest people of the world" as published by the
Forbes Journal are from Russia: Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Roman Abramovich,
Mikhail Fridman, Vladimir Potanin, Vladimir Bogdanov, Vagit Alekperov and
Oleg Deripaska.
- March 1st is the International Day of the fight against narcotics.
According to some statistics, Russia is one of the five countries with the
highest rate of drug use.
******
#5
The Russia Journal
March 1-7, 2002
Knowledge costs
By ALEXANDER KONDORSKY
Contrary to what is commonly believed, the Soviet system of education was
far from perfect. It was totally free, of course. Education from first to
10th grade was mandatory. It was fairly comprehensive, but offered few or
no ideas in the way of what students wanted to do with their future.
Universities, academies and other higher educational establishments were
also free, but required that students travel directly to their prospective
institutions of study and sit through lengthy exams. Again, they failed to
make people into professionals, and were perceived by students as a
five-year extension of childhood. Many young men enrolled to study in
higher education institutions for the sole purpose of dodging military
service. Furthermore, CPSU history and Marxism-Leninism constituted at
least one-third of class hours at any college, regardless of whether its
primary orientation was mathematics, chemistry or foreign literature.
It often happened that it was only after having received a diploma and a
job placement – guaranteed in the Soviet Union – that a student recognized
what a terrible mistake he or she had made. As a result, many graduates of
Soviet era higher education institutions chose different professions than
the ones they had spent five years studying for. A favorite joke among
students at Moscow State University’s Department of Chemistry (where I
studied) was: "Our glorious university supplies such important
professionals as actors, singers, musicians and even diplomats."
Nobody forces people to study or work in this country now. Some two million
children under 16 do not go to school for various reasons. Ninety percent
of parents whose children do go pay for their education – including, to no
small extent, paying bribes. Russian education’s "gray economy" is
estimated at between $2 billion and $5 billion a year.
On the one hand, fewer people are getting an education, while, on the
other, motivations have become genuine. Young people go to study in order
to master a certain profession they really like and see as their future
occupation.
There are still a lot of free educational institutions in Russia, but the
private sector has established itself and is rapidly gaining momentum,
presenting strong competition for state-run institutions.
Private preschools and secondary schools are boasting high standards, but
prices averaging $500 a month are obviously unaffordable even for the
middle class (in today’s Russia, the "middle class" is defined as families
with a per capita income of more than $200 per month and constitutes
approximately 20 percent of the population).
Foreign schools charge around twice as much: The cost of studying in a
boarding school in Malta (room and board included) is around $10,000 per
year. Newcastle College (U.K.) charges $12,000 a year.
The last decade has seen a boom of "alternative education," i.e., schools
you officially have to pay for. However, experienced people say that, even
in order to enroll in a free university or academy (except for the
"rigorous" science departments, which are not prestigious these days) one
has to hire a private tutor ($10,000 per course) or pay a similar amount of
money to bribe the enrollment committee’s head.
Moderately priced at from $300 to $2,500 per semester in Moscow and from
$200 to $1,000 per semester in other cities of Russia, private higher
educational institutions have won popularity among representatives of
Russia’s middle class. As things stand today, 350,000 people study in
commercial higher educational institutions, nine percent of the total
number of students in the country.
*******
#6
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
meeting report
Oligarchic Capitalism in Russia: The Past, Present and Future
February 27, 2002
Speaker: David Hoffman, Foreign Editor, The Washington Post
On Wednesday, February 27th, David Hoffman spoke at the Carnegie Endowment
about his new book, The Oligarchs: Wealth, Power, and the New Russia, which
has just been published by Public Affairs Press. Based on extensive
interviews and exhaustive research, Hoffman has assembled a remarkable
account of the lives of six of Russia's most influential personalities: Boris
Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Alexander Smolensky,
Anatoly Chubais, and Yury Luzhkov. Before taking up his current post as
Foreign Editor of the Washington Post, Hoffman headed the Post's Moscow
bureau from 1995 to 2001.
For some, Russia's oligarchs are criminals, for others they are capitalists.
For David Hoffman, there is no clear-cut answer. What is a capitalist in a
country without private property? Likewise, the term, 'criminal' is a
misnomer in a system without the rule of law. 'Oligarchic capitalism' may be
a controversial term when used to describe the economic system that has
developed in Russia, but it is necessary. There is more to being an oligarch,
according to Hoffman, than just stealing. Becoming an oligarch requires
cunning, ingenuity and, above all, an indefatigable reserve of energy. That
is why the common assumption that these oligarchs came from the underworld of
the Soviet Union is wrong. The roots of Russia's oligarchs stem primarily
from neither organized crime, nor the Soviet nomenklatura, but from
entrepreneurs who got their starts taking advantage of the opportunities
created by the shortage economy in the waning days of the Soviet Union.
The evolution of Russia's oligarchs over the past ten years can be broken
down into three distinct phases. The first of these phases coincides with the
early days of Gorbachev's reform initiatives, when state control of the
economy began to loosen and opportunities for turning an easy profit first
appeared. Hoffman illustrated this by recounting how Vladimir Gusinsky got
his start. In the late 1980s, Gusinsky worked as a taxi driver in Moscow
until he happened upon a surplus of copper wire at a tram station. Seeing an
opportunity, he acquired the wire and began producing bracelets. With clever
marketing, these bracelets made Gusinsky a fantastic profit.
In the second phase of the oligarchs' development, banking became the
endeavor of choice. As Hoffman describes, this was the time of 'easy money'
when pyramid schemes and ruble-dollar speculation were rampant. It was during
this period that the emerging oligarchs discovered the 'time-value' of money.
'Time-value' being the profit oligarchs were able to make by diverting
government transfers that passed through their banks to other ventures while
stalling for time with IOUs. One of the key players in this scheme was
Alexander Smolensky. In the Soviet Union, Smolensky had been a construction
foreman who began a small dacha building business on the side during
perestroika. By 1991, with his dacha building business booming, Smolensky
opened SBS-Agro bank to handle his cash flow. Before long, SBS-Agro emerged
as the largest bank in Russia and a large handler of government transfers.
In September of 1994, the oligarchs embarked on the third phase of their
development with the formation of a private club designed to facilitate the
transformation of their wealth into political power. Hoffman succinctly
dubbed this phase, 'the grab for power.' The paramount issue was how to limit
competition among themselves so that each could focus on accumulating as much
wealth as possible. The fruits of this cooperation came in schemes like the
loans for shares program, export control manipulation and culminated in the
Davos pact that helped to re-elect Yeltsin. It was during this period that
the oligarchs began searching for political sponsorship and influence within
the Kremlin. The oligarchs also began to diversify their holdings, expanding
their holdings to include ownership of natural resource companies and media
outlets. Boris Berezovsky was able to use his growing political influence to
gain ownership of ORT, Russia's state television, while Gusinsky established
NTV.
This third period of oligarchic expansion reached its peak in the late 1990s
and, to a certain extent, has stabilized since President Putin came to power.
Although Putin has declared that the 'oligarchic method is the worst system
for Russia,' it is not clear that he knows how to move beyond it. Putin did
move assertively to rid Russia of the two oligarchs that were most
threatening to him politically - Gusinsky and Berezovsky. However, Hoffman
does not believe that this spells the end for Russia's remaining oligarchs,
rather he posits that Putin has reached a modus vivendi with the remaining
oligarchs that will allow most of them to retain their holdings as long as
they do not oppose the Kremlin. At the same time, Putin is attempting to
address the systemic flaw that allowed for the initial rise of the oligarchs,
the weakness of the state. This weakness was the result of conscious
decisions made by early Yeltsin administrations to pursue liberalization and
to maximize freedom at the expense of creating a stable rule of law.
Looking back on ten years of oligarchic capitalism in Russia, the negative
impact it had on Russia's development is obvious. Clearly, this rent-seeking
class of oligarchs hurt the market system by failing to establish rules of
the game that were stable over time. Yet, this period was not completely
devoid of positive developments. Hoffman proposed three ways in which
oligarchic capitalism may actually have been good for Russia. For one, the
loans for shares program may have resulted in grossly unfair distribution of
property, but it did facilitate the expulsion of some of the worst red
directors. Wherever oligarchs took over, be it Yukos or Sibneft or Norilsk
nickel, improvements in management were made and the focus of the companies
were shifted to turning a profit. Oligarchic capitalism was also good for
Russian democracy. For all their rapacity, the media wars the oligarchs waged
did support a struggling media establishment and provided a spectrum of media
outlets. The ends may have been wrong, but the means were of benefit to
Russian society. In the end, oligarchic capitalism did bring a form of
pluralism to Russia. For better or worse, power and wealth were taken from
the state and diffused among independent actors. That diffusion is now an
established fact that guarantees Russia cannot easily return to its past.
The question for Russia's future is whether these oligarchs will go the way
of America's robber barons from a century ago. For David Hoffman, figuring
out how to turn a Khodorkovsky into a Rockefeller is key. Whereas the robber
barons of America were so successful because they were able to serve as
conduits for the immense amounts of capital flowing into the United States,
Russia's oligarchs have protected their wealth sending capital abroad. Of
course, the robber barons had 60 years of growth in the United States to
learn the benefits of philanthropy and legitimacy; the Russian oligarchs have
only had 10. The answer to this last question will have to wait for the
future.
Summary by Karlis Kirsis, Junior Fellow, Russian and Eurasian Program.
*******
#7
Putin Backs U.S. on Georgia Effort
March 1, 2002
By ROZLANA TAUKINA
ALMATY, Kazakstan (AP) - Russian President Vladimir Putin said Friday he
would support a U.S.-led anti-terrorist operation in neighboring Georgia
despite grumbling from within his government.
President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia, meanwhile, sought to reassure Putin
that Washington would not have a long-term military presence in the region.
The two men met on the sidelines of a summit of leaders of 11 former Soviet
republics. The U.S. plan to send up to 200 troops to Georgia to train and
equip anti-terrorist forces has dominated much of the talks at the two-day
summit. Many Russian officials have reacted angrily to the development,
seeing it as an invasion of Russia's traditional sphere of influence.
But Putin said Moscow would back any efforts to bring the situation in
Georgia's Pankisi Gorge under control. The United States believes fighters
linked with the al-Qaida terrorist network are hiding in the crime-infested
gorge, which borders Russia's breakaway Chechnya.
``If we are talking about a fight against terrorism in the Pankisi Gorge,
then we support this fight no matter who is participating in it,'' Putin told
journalists after his meeting with Shevardnadze, according to Russia's
Interfax news agency.
Shevardnadze said Russia need not fear U.S. influence in Georgia.
``There is no American military presence in Georgia, and there will be no
such threat,'' he was quoted as saying. ``The Americans themselves don't want
this.''
Earlier, Shevardnadze said his country had long relied on U.S. military
assistance and that only Washington was capable of helping Georgia deal with
the threat in the Pankisi Gorge.
``It has been no secret that the United States helped us form a border guard
force. Without their help we would not have done it,'' he said. ``Now they
seriously intend to create an anti-terrorist group. No other country was
capable of doing that.''
But he added that Georgia intends to cooperate with Russia as well.
Georgia, eager to shed Russian influence and reach out to the West, refused
Russian offers to help crack down in the Pankisi Gorge, which Moscow has long
pointed to as a base for Chechen rebels. Shevardnadze admitted only recently
that the gorge could house terrorists and welcomed U.S. offers of help.
Putin, who has raised no objection to the U.S. military's operations in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia, said the presence of U.S. troops
in Georgia was ``no tragedy'' for Russia.
U.S. and Georgian officials insist that the forces would not be involved in
combat in the Pankisi Gorge. The U.S. troops will train four battalions, each
comprising about 300 servicemen, said a Western official in Moscow.
The United States has already provided military training and equipment under
other, more modest bilateral programs. Georgia has about 20 or 30 U.S.
military instructors in the country at any given time, Defense Ministry
spokesman Miryan Kiknadze said Friday.
Kiknadze said wryly that the instructors would not travel to the Pankisi
Gorge ``unless they go as tourists.''
Some U.S. instructors were on hand Friday as Georgian forces conducted a
training flight from a Tbilisi airfield in a U.S.-donated helicopter. Deputy
Defense Minister Gela Bezhuashvili said Georgia would use its eight
foreign-provided Iroquois helicopters - six from the United States and two
from Turkey - to help transport paratroopers to a base in Telavi, 12 miles
from the entrance to the Pankisi Gorge.
The gorge is only about 20 miles from Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, but is
reached over 150 miles of winding mountain roads.
The U.S. forces will train infantry and border guard units for up to 12
months, said the Western official, speaking on condition of anonymity. He
said that the program, expected to cost $64 million, would also provide food,
communications equipment, light weapons such as pistols and rifles,
ammunition and vehicles.
U.S. officials hope to start training headquarters units, which are
responsible for planning military operations, by mid-March, the official
said.
******
#8
eurasianet.org
March 1, 2002
DEFINING THE LIMITS OF TERRORISM: THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND CHECHNYA
Ian Bremmer
US-Russian relations reached new levels of accord following the 11 September
attacks. Moscow and Washington shared intelligence and offered military
support to the Northern Alliance, and American troops used Central Asian
bases with Russian assent. Presidents Bush and Putin proclaimed a new
partnership between the two nations, which would encompass political,
economic, and strategic objectives.
There was much speculation that the war on terror would nullify one of the
most consistent public areas of disagreement between the two states: Russia's
handling of Chechnya. Eventually, given US strategic priorities in Central
Asia and Russia's tactical significance, Russia's fight against Chechen
separatists was poised to merge with the US anti-terrorist campaign, and US
policy on Chechnya seemed ready for conciliation.
A substantive change never came. Before 11 September, US condemnation of
Russian policy on the conflict had little implication. Chechnya was secondary
to a host of concerns linked to Russia, from missile defense to amending the
ABM treaty and expanding NATO to foreign policy in the Middle East.
Since the war began in 1994, American policy on Chechnya has been remarkably
consistent. Despite periodic overtures to Chechen leadership and criticism of
Russia on human rights grounds, Washington has been fundamentally unwilling
to challenge Russia's sovereignty in the conflict. Even those seeking to use
outward Washington sentiment on Chechnya as a bellwether for US-Russian
relations would be disappointed.
Chechnya unchanging
When President Bush came to office, there were few expectations that this
would change. On the one hand, Russian-US relations were expected to worsen.
In the September 2000 Cox report, House Republicans detailed how Russian
foreign policy had become sharply anti-American, developing ties with such
regimes as Iraq and pursuing a strategic partnership with China. On the other
hand, Bush's campaign criticized the Clinton-Gore years of cosying up to
Russia, as well as meddling in internal affairs. National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice announced a new pragmatism focusing on limited, national
security concerns - which did not include Chechnya.
In March 2001, a US assistant secretary of state met with representatives of
Aslan Maskhadov's government of Chechnya, including Iljas Akhmadov, the
self-declared "foreign minister" of Ichkeria. The first encounter between the
Bush administration and Chechen rebels was the highest-ranking US meeting
ever with a Chechen official. Stopping short of recognizing Chechnya as
independent, the Bush administration clearly wanted the Russian government to
understand that Washington would meet with whom it liked, regardless of
Kremlin opinion.
State Department spokesman Charles Hunter asserted that the United States
would emphasize the need for a political resolution of the conflict in
Chechnya, the renunciation of terrorism and the importance of human rights.
Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky responded quickly: "Russia views such
contacts," which can only have "a negative influence on Russian-US ties," as
"absolutely unacceptable." The view in the Russian press was no more
equivocal, announcing: "USA supports Chechen fighters," and "Russian
Federation against contacts between the USA and Chechen separatists."
Indeed, as late as 5 September a senior State Department official announced
that US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow would be visiting Chechnya
(pending Russian permission), as the US government was "distressed that no
progress appeared to have been made in bringing Russian soldiers to justice
for alleged atrocities in the republic." The official stated that the visit
was aimed at showing "we are genuinely concerned about the path the Russians
are on."
Despite the American overtures to Chechen leadership, the conflict in
Chechnya played second fiddle to ABM revision and missile defense plans, and
any other bilateral issues. Chechnya continued to be more a matter allowing
periodic criticism of Russia for a poor human rights record, than an issue
preventing stable bilateral relations. As such, it joined trade policy and
press freedom as issues to which the Bush administration was indifferent.
US-Russia relations actually perked up in the summer, with American plans for
revising the ABM treaty. The unofficial Slovenia summit between Bush and
Putin occurred in June, as preface to the G-7 meeting in July. President
Bush's agenda was dominated by the future of the ABM Treaty, missile defense,
NATO enlargement, and Russia's accession to the WTO, an agenda that prevailed
at the meeting. Chechnya was occasion for some criticism on human rights
grounds, but without serious consequence or cost to Russia.
Chechnya post-11 September
There appeared to be an abrupt change in attitude toward Chechnya among world
leaders following 11 September. In a telephone conversation with President
Bush two days after the attack, Putin spoke of acting against "a common foe"
in Chechnya. German Chancellor Schroeder asserted that "as regards Chechnya,
there will and must be a differentiated evaluation." White House spokesman
Ari Fleischer called on leaders in Chechnya to "immediately and
unconditionally cut all contacts with international terrorist groups such as
Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda organization." Washington appeared to be
moving toward solidarity with Russia on the conflict.
Kremlin spokesman Yastrzhembsky stated that the American declarations were "a
demonstration of a better understanding in the US that the normalization of
the situation in Chechnya is directly linked to the struggle against
international terrorism." "Silence on Chechnya is the price for this new
solidarity," said a senior member of Chancellor Schroeder's party, "and I
don't think Germany will be the only country to pay it."
This apparent willingness to reevaluate Russian operations in Chechnya
intersected with Russian politicians' escalation of rhetoric against the
separatists. In Germany following 11 September, Putin stated that "with
terrorists, we cannot come to terms, we must leave them no peace," asserting
that Islamic militants and terrorists funded the Chechen rebellion against
Russia. Even Russian reformist Boris Nemtsov declared that instead of talks
with the separatists, "the very term 'negotiations' should be dropped. All
talks should be conducted in the language of Kalashnikovs."
Bush seemed to concur. "To the extent that there are terrorists in Chechnya -
Arab terrorists associated with the al Qaeda organization - I believe they
ought to be brought to justice," Bush announced. "And we do believe that
there are al Qaeda folks in Chechnya."
But 11 September aside, al Qaeda's connection to Chechen separatists was old
news. The State Department's April 2000 report "Patterns of Global Terrorism:
1999" stated that Chechen separatists "received some support from foreign
mujahidin with extensive links to Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Central
Asia Islamist extremists, as well as to Usama Bin Ladin." This link, however,
delivered no blanket endorsement to Russia for its operations in the conflict.
And even as Putin offered support in the anti-terrorism effort, Fleischer
qualified Bush's statements by remonstrating: "The principle of adherence to
human rights is always important." US Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage went further, setting out the "new" policy very clearly: "We are
trying to disassociate participation in the events in Chechnya of
mujahidin…
from participation of the Chechens themselves who operate on the territory
that is part of the Russian Federation. As for the former category, we enjoy
absolute understanding with the Russian authorities. There is a certain
discord when the latter category is concerned. We have always thought that a
political resolution offers the only way out and will actually be a blessing
for Russia."
The Bush administration had in fact set a policy that echoed Clinton's
precisely: gain Russian cooperation while maintaining steady pressure on
Chechnya.
With the momentum of personal friendship and military coordination between
Bush and Putin leading up to the Crawford Summit in November, human rights
qualifications were easy to dismiss. Yet after the Crawford public relations
glow faded, it was clear that the summit brought no fundamental shifts in
affairs.
Thus in January the US State Department announced that recent Russian
operations in Chechnya were "a continuation of human rights violations" and
an inappropriate "use of overwhelming force against civilian targets." On 23
January, State Department officials met with Ilyas Akhmadov after Washington
criticized Russian security sweeps in Chechnya. In parallel with American
statements, the British Foreign Office in January met in London with a
representative of Aslan Maskhadov, Ahmed Zakayev, prompting formal protest by
the Russian Foreign Ministry: "This London meeting with… Ahmed Zakayev is
an
act against Russian-British cooperation, notably in the fight against
international terrorism."
In the past, Russian anger at such meetings was as routine and
inconsequential as the meetings themselves. Today, such overtures to Chechen
leadership, combined with criticism of Russia, risk much more. The United
States now demands that other countries endorse the war without a quid pro
quo. Simultaneously, Putin's critics are increasingly vocal: renewed Western
criticism on Chechnya, they protest, shows that support for the
anti-terrorist coalition has delivered Russia nothing. Russia has become
increasingly pragmatic about its Middle East policy at the same time that
Washington has become value-driven.
The United States has withdrawn from the ABM treaty, installed military bases
in Central Asia, and pushed for an expanded NATO. Even as Putin closed the
Lourdes listening facility in Cuba and announced withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay
in Vietnam, Russia's accelerated membership in the World Trade Organization,
and the write-off of Soviet-era debt, remained uncertain. The biggest
upcoming problems are in the Middle East - for which Russia expects to be
paid. US interests have not moved decisively in this direction.
Russia views the revival of criticism on Chechnya as a betrayal of the
post-11 September understanding for the Kremlin's fight against terrorism. A
Russian Foreign Ministry statement on 25 January made the point: "It is
surprising that the US administration, which says it is necessary to fight
any manifestation of terrorism all over the world, is actually encouraging
Chechen extremists, whose direct connections with Osama Bin Laden and
Al-Qa'eda are constantly being proved." Yastrzhembsky's office responded to
renewed Western criticism of Russia by stating: "It is impossible to
successfully fight Al-Qa'eda in Afghanistan and at the same time actually
encourage its actions in Chechnya."
But a change still seems implausible. State Department officials are most
likely to support a warming of US-Russian relations, but most critical of
Russian activities in Chechnya. The US defense establishment, particularly
given the international drubbing it has received over the treatment of
prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, is most sympathetic to Russia's Chechnya
position - but least in favor of friendlier relations.
What next?
In the new vocabulary of the "war against terror," countries will
increasingly be identified as friend or foe based on their acceptance of US
policy. Kremlin opposition to widening the war could accordingly result in a
volte-face in Washington. Simultaneously, Putin's critics angrily charge that
concessions to the West following 11 September have brought few returns. In
this polarized climate, the issue of Chechnya could lose its peripheral
status…and US criticism on Chechnya could have more bite.
Editor's Note: Ian Bremmer is President of Eurasia Group and Senior Fellow &
Director of Eurasia Studies at the World Policy Institute. Dr. Bremmer
received his PhD in political science from Stanford University and has held
positions at the Harriman Institute, Hoover Institution, the EastWest
Institute and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. An expert on US foreign
policy, Eurasian states in transition and international political risk, he
has published widely on nation- and state-building, and international
relations in global emerging markets. Dr. Bremmer's recent publications
include New States, New Politics: Building the Post Soviet Nations, and
articles and essays in International Affairs, World Policy Journal, Journal
of Democracy, The New Republic, The Los Angeles Times, The International
Herald Tribune and The New York Times. He is a regular commentator on CNN,
CNBC and CBC Newsworld, and a regular contributor for The Financial Times. He
lives in New York.
*******
#9
Asia Times
March 1, 2002
Kremlin puts immigration into police hands
By Sergei Blagov
MOSCOW - The Kremlin has pledged to create a system of transparent migration
institutions designed to protect the rights of legal immigrants, while
cracking down on illegal migrants. Yet it remains to be seen whether putting
immigration issues under direct police authority will improve the situation
for millions of aliens in Russia, legal or illegal.
In an abrupt departure from the practice of the previous decade, the Kremlin
has made immigration a police issue. On Tuesday, Russian President Vladimir
Putin appointed four-star Police General Andrei Chernenko as head of the
Interior Ministry's Migration Service and named him a deputy interior
minister. Putin ordered Chernenko to improve the situation in the areas of
immigration and naturalization. The Interior Ministry was put in charge of
immigration and naturalization "so as to restore order, which was lacking
recently" Putin was quoted as saying by RIA, the official news agency.
Russia is interested in the immigration of qualified human resources, and
migration services should help them, Putin said. These people, former Soviet
Union nationals and others, should go to those regions that need their
skills, he said. On Tuesday Putin signed a decree to improve state migration
policies and put the Interior Ministry in charge of dealing with immigrants,
refugees and asylum seekers. The decree also ordered the Foreign Ministry to
hold talks on migration issues with the former Soviet republics of Armenia,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where most of the immigrants
come from.
Last year the Russian government revealed a plan to encourage immigration,
mainly from other former Soviet states, in order to put to stop to its
frightening population decline. In July, the Russian government approved a
program for 2002-04 and the subsequent decade, aimed at solving the country's
population decline by encouraging immigration. Government officials have
argued that Russia needs to attract between 700,000 and 1 million migrants a
year in order to sustain its population at its current level. According to
official estimates, unless the situation changes, the Russian population will
fall by close to half from the current 144 million to only 80 million by
2050.
Government officials, including Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, have
conceded that in recent years Russia has not had a clearly defined migration
policy. However, during the past decade more than 8 million people - of whom
nearly 90 percent are Russian-speakers - came to Russia as permanent
residents, while 4 million left the country, according to the official
statistics. On the other hand, according to the statistics, there are some
800,000 legal immigrants in Russia, while tentative estimates put the figures
of the illegal migrant population at anywhere between 6 million and 16
million.
Yet many more "Russian-speakers" could arrive in the future. According to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), some 25 million ethnic
Russians are currently living outside the Russian Federation. Many of them
are returning, though, mainly from Central Asian states. Nonetheless, despite
official pledges to encourage immigration, not all of the potential settlers
in Russia are particularly welcome. Moreover, the government has made no
secret that its immigration policies are likely to be selective. Russia is
interested in attracting ethnic Russians of working age or those with
financial resources, officials have said. Yet those same officials have
conceded that in previous years many Russian-speaking returnees from the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) found it very difficult to find jobs
or integrate into the society.
Human-rights activists have repeatedly urged a better treatment of the
immigrants. Just this week Mikhail Arutyunov, head of Human Rights Defense
Assembly, a Moscow-based non-governmental organization (NGO), suggested
legalizing the presence of all immigrants and migrants in Russia. Many
immigrants just wanted to live with their own people, speak their own
language and put their skills to good use reviving Russia. However, without
Russian citizenship or local registration many immigrants have no rights, no
way to complain to the authorities and nowhere to go and are being mistreated
and abused.
For instance, the city of Moscow strictly enforces a registration policy for
all visitors. The police typically conduct identity checks in places such as
markets and public transportation, but they also visit the private homes of
refugees. As a result, many migrants choose to isolate themselves indoors to
avoid the police altogether. Moreover, Moscow municipal authorities shot down
the Russian government's plan to invite more migrants. On Tuesday, Moscow
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov argued that without a registration system the capital
would be further swamped with illegal migrants.
Furthermore, there have been signs that migrants from countries other than
those in the CIS are even less welcome in Russia. Notably, governors of
Russia's Far Eastern regions have been lobbying the federal government to ban
land sales to foreign nationals. The local governors have voiced concerns
that Chinese could buy up land in Russia's Far East. The talk about Chinese
migrant workers has become a hot political issue in Siberia, underpopulated
but rich in natural resources. According to Interior Ministry data, every
year more than 500,000 Chinese "tourists" come to Russia, but not all of them
return to China, with those who do stay on doing so illegally.
Incidentally, on Wednesday the authorities of Russia's Far Eastern Kamchatka
region announced a decision to restrict the entry of Chinese migrants and ban
those Chinese already there from working as small vendors.
Russian politicians have long voiced concern over the alleged influx of
illegal aliens from "far abroad". However, officials pledge there will be no
massive police crackdown. The Migration Service will not be a militarized
agency, Chernenko pledged on Tuesday. However, the service has to know
clearly "who comes to Russia and why", he told RIA. Migration processes
should be put into "civilized forms", Chernenko stated.
Russian cabinet minister Vladimir Zorin described the move as a "good
decision, because the role of migration service was set to be increased".
After a recent approval of Russia's citizenship law, the Migration Service
should be improved and its "stagnation and flaws" must be eliminated, Zorin
was quoted as saying by RIA on Wednesday.
In October, a civilian agency in charge of immigration, the Russian ministry
of national, federation and national affairs, was disbanded. There have been
repeated allegations of widespread graft at this ministry.
However, the record of the Russian police is not flawless either. In many
regions, police enforce the immigration regulations by routinely detaining
individuals to check registration documents. However, illegal aliens in
Moscow say that police let them go for a mere 600 rubles (US$20). Some said
they easily "purchased" Russian driver's licenses from traffic policemen for
$350.
Therefore, the relevance of Russia's new immigration policy remains a matter
of discussion. While the Russian government pledges to improve the treatment
of migrants, it's still far from clear whether direct police control over
immigration could be helpful.
(Inter Press Service)
******
#10
The Russia Journal
March 1-7, 2002
On nukes, trials and Russia’s new role
The Russia Journal’s Washington, D.C., office received a recent visit from
Andrei Piontkovsky, the director of the Center for Strategic Studies (and a
columnist for this newspaper) and Pavel Podvig, a researcher at the Moscow
Institute of Physics and Technology’s Center for Arms Control Studies. They
came to the United States to take part in various conferences and met with
Eduard Lozansky, The Russia Journal’s U.S. publisher, to discuss the most
important issues in U.S.-Russian relations. We are offering excerpts of
their conversation.
Eduard Lozansky: What brings you to Washington?
Andrei Piontkovsky: I was invited by the Pentagon to take part in a
conference called "New Challenges in the Informational Age." We discussed
new military technologies and post-Cold War strategy in a new century of
globalization, computerization and technological change in all areas of
life, including in the military. My role, as an expert on nuclear strategy,
was to remind the audience that we live in a post-nuclear era and that,
though nuclear weapons have lost considerable importance in strategic
plans, they continue to have a negative impact on our consciousness. At the
conference, we talked about how Russian-U.S. relations during the recent
military operations in Afghanistan were essentially those of allies and
that this political alliance could transform into a fundamental long-term
union. The paradox is that, at the same time, we are still locked into the
classic paradigm of mutually assured destruction and have thousands of
missiles targeted at each other.
EL: MIT Press recently published a book edited by Pavel Podvig, "Russian
Strategic Nuclear Forces." Pavel, tell us a bit about the book and what
you’re doing here in Washington.
Pavel Podvig: The book is a major project we worked on at the Center for
Arms Control Studies in Moscow. It was planned as a source of information
on Soviet and Russian strategic nuclear forces and the whole organization
that supports the Russian nuclear-arms infrastructure.
EL: Given that this book deals with a lot of sensitive areas, one can’t
help wondering just how open this kind of subject matter can be and whether
you ran into problems with the authorities.
PP: All our information comes from open sources of information, including
Defense Ministry and Atomic Energy Ministry publications and publications
by scientists who were involved in creating the Soviet and Russian nuclear
complex. I hope, then, that the final picture we have given of the
development and current state of Russia’s nuclear arsenal does correspond
to reality.
EL: But did you have any problems with the authorities?
PP: Unfortunately, we did. In 1999, the remaining books we hadn’t been able
to distribute yet were seized and confiscated as part of a criminal case
launched by the Kaluga FSB. The case didn’t go anywhere, though we never
got the books back. At the same time, Igor Sutyagin, one of our authors,
was accused of spying, but these accusations aren’t connected at all with
his work on the book.
EL: I remember a case 20 years ago when John Barron’s book "KGB" came out
in the United States. The book gave the names of 200-300 agents and the KGB
ordered the whole print run bought up immediately. But the publishers then
published a new, much larger run. This kind of thing can give a book a lot
of free publicity.
PP: We’d be better off without that kind of publicity. We didn’t have
access to any secrets, and therefore we don’t have anything confidential to
reveal.
EL: Are you still having any problems?
PP: As far as I know, the case against us for divulging state secrets that
led to the confiscation of our books is still open. It was probably halted
and could stay in that state a long time.
I’d like to point out that, with regard to the accusations against
Sutyagin, a court in Kaluga essentially admitted they were without grounds
in December. There was never any doubt about this. Now the court has
established that the prosecution hasn’t been able to provide any evidence
to confirm Sutyagin’s alleged guilt.
EL: That’s a good sign; it shows that the court system is becoming more
independent in Russia.
PP: Unfortunately, that’s not entirely the case. The case against Sutyagin
hasn’t been dropped, but has been sent for further investigation. What’s
more, he hasn’t been freed from custody. There’s hope that the Supreme
Court, which will soon examine the case, will either drop it completely or
release Sutyagin.
EL: Let’s turn to strategic issues in Russian-U.S. relations. Everyone says
they entered a new phase since Sept. 11, but now things are moving backward
again. It’s essential now to take concrete steps to ensure that these fine
words about partnership and alliance don’t just dissolve in a flood of
mutual accusations. Rather, they must become reality, and we must at least
try to move in a positive direction.
PP: If you look at the history of Russian-U.S. relations, you can use the
old analogy of a pendulum. Many of us observing Russia’s reaction to the
Sept. 11 events probably had the feeling that, after drawing closer to the
West, Russia could move away again and there could be serious consequences.
We’re seeing a cooling-off now. I hope you will agree with me that we are
now taking a more sober look at our possibilities and prospects for
cooperation and at Russia’s role in this. Of course we have to strengthen
the positive aspects of our relations and avoid hidden obstacles. The main
thing is that both sides have to be realistic about possibilities for
cooperation. Russia has to clearly define its position, and the United
States also has to ask itself what it wants from Russia and what it can
offer in return. Only then will we be able to discuss the concrete steps we
can take.
AP: As a follow-up to this introduction, I would point out things that on
both sides form a foundation for long-term, fundamental cooperation.
Let’s begin with the American side. After the Sept. 11 tragedy, Russians
were full of sympathy for the United States. In fact, the reaction was even
stronger than in countries that are America’s traditional allies. People
spontaneously took flowers that very evening to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow,
and our president’s reaction was suitable and dignified. Americans
understood that they weren’t alone in the world, that they needed to
cooperate with other countries. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
visited a dozen countries in order to create an effective coalition. This
marked a retreat from the policy with which the Republicans had come to
power – that the United States had to retain the freedom to resolve its own
national problems. But Sept. 11 showed that the United States can resolve
its own national-security issues only through multilateral cooperation. The
brilliant military operation in Afghanistan, for example, was helped in
many ways by Russia’s contribution. Russia did more than any of the United
States’ NATO allies except Britain.
Time and again, we have let slip opportunities for compromise that would
have been in Russia’s favor. Now, instead of serious discussions, the
American administration is repeating over and over the mantra that "We are
friends, and who needs treaties among friends?" But you can’t be for
signing agreements in one area and not in another. This approach is not
just dogmatic, it’s intellectually unconvincing, and it is having a highly
negative impact on current negotiations on strategic-arms cuts.
On the Russian side, the political elite is still dealing with its
complexes, the painful defeat in the Cold War and Russia’s transition from
a global to a regional power. The same people who worked in the Soviet
system form today’s Russian political elite. They are used to playing in a
super league where there were only two teams – the Soviet Union and the
United States. Now they feel as if their team has been demoted. For them,
this isn’t just a political issue, it’s a personal and psychological problem.
Russia and the United States should be equal partners in their relations.
But let’s look at other countries – Germany, France, Japan. Are they equal
partners in their relations with the United States? Politically they are,
but it’s obvious that the United States plays a greater diplomatic,
economic and military role, whether we like it or not. This is why we have
to be objective about our place in the world. We are part of the G-8, in
which all these powers take part, and if we want to play with them in a
single team, we have to accept that the United States is in many respects
the team leader. We can follow two roads; either we keep our status in the
club and accept being a power on the level of Germany, Britain or France,
or we head for confrontation with the United States and lose this status.
In short, I’d say that the Russian political elite suffers from a complex
of defeat in the Cold War, while the American side suffers from a victor’s
complex.
EL: Given that the ideas and worldview of today’s elite were formed during
the Cold War, it’s all the more important to work with the young people who
will take over from them, to ensure they don’t share these same prejudices.
AP: Despite the fact that the world has changed greatly over the last 10
years, in Russia, America, Europe and China the thinking has remained
unchanged. Just look at the immense inertia of today’s bureaucracies. The
defense bureaucracies in the United States and Russia were adapted to
resolving specific tasks, as were the Foreign Ministry, State Department
and so on. It’s highly unlikely that these organizations will change
overnight and begin to look at issues differently.
The eternal theme of government and society looks rather paradoxical in
Russia at the moment. I can’t help recalling Pushkin’s words that "The only
European in Russia is the government." After all, by choosing to be with
America and the West on Sept. 11, Putin has broken with the Russian
political elite. At the same time, "fundamentalists" in Moscow and
Washington are doing everything they can prevent our countries from drawing
closer, thus playing into each other’s hands. But, at the same time, we
shouldn’t be dependent on the elite. They should also be subject to reform.
PP: Coming back to the question about working with young people, there’s no
doubt that students of top universities today will look at all these issues
through different eyes. And, of course, it’s the task of the Moscow
Institution of Physics and Technology to educate this new elite. You can’t
just let it run its own course.
EL: What role can so-called "people’s diplomacy" play in U.S.-Russian
relations? In the United States, the public has a tradition of influencing
both foreign and domestic policy. In Russia, we’re not seeing this yet,
especially in foreign policy, since it’s seen as the state’s prerogative.
It’s therefore very important that the young generation understand that it
can and should influence the policies of its country.
EL: Who is more interested in a military-political and economic alliance,
Russia or the United States?
AP: I think this is a dangerous way to phrase the question. In this case,
we should be defining a framework for our cooperation rather than talking
about who is more interested. Regarding the United States and Russia, we
don’t need to just speak hypothetically, but look at the events of recent
months. Russia had a very real security problem on the C.I.S.’ southern
borders. A year ago, the Russian authorities were seriously discussing the
possibility of bombing the Taliban. But with our army in the state it is,
it was hardly likely this would have been a successful operation and
probably would have caused all kinds of unforeseen problems. But, thanks to
a brilliant move by Putin, something completely new and unexpected happened
– the entire military, political and economic might of the United States
was used to resolve Russia’s security challenge.
It was then expected that the Taliban would rush into the Fergana Valley
and that the death of Northern Alliance leader [Ahmad Shah] Massoud, who
was supported by Russia, and the Sept. 11 attacks weren’t just coincidence.
But now we can say that Russia’s security problem in this region has been
solved for the coming decade at least. This is a completely new experience
for the Russian establishment. If we look at the geopolitical and
geo-economic map of the world, we see there are two major areas where
Russia’s and the United States’ interests coincide. The first is Northeast
Asia, where the Americans are very concerned by China’s increasing role.
And we’re interested in a more pragmatic aspect – we don’t want to lose the
Far East and Siberia. With today’s demographic and economic trends the way
they are, they could fall out of our zone of influence without any military
conflict.
EL: We represent not the government, but the public. In the United States,
there’s a tradition of lobbying. Corporations, NGOs, ethnic groups and
others lobby their interests in Congress, including foreign-policy
interests. Russia has no experience lobbying in the United States. At any
rate, we know what it is we have to do, but lack of money is the obstacle.
The next natural question is, "What can we do to lobby the idea of
integration with the West in Russia?" You yourselves say that Putin is the
only European and that society isn’t ready yet.
PP: The situation in America is clear enough. The main problem is that the
Russian government hasn’t yet worked out what exactly to lobby and what
Russia’s interests in America are. These interests obviously exist. These
are not just geopolitical relations but also issues relating to the
military-industrial complex, oil and steel industries and many other
sectors. We have to learn to talk about all this openly, learn to lobby our
interests and find ways of being able to influence American policies.
EL: Does Russia have an analytical center that can generate ideas for a
Russian-U.S. strategic alliance?
PP: We don’t have such a center because society hasn’t yet become entirely
conscious of the interest of this issue. But obviously, such a center is
needed. There needs to be an injection of new blood. At the Center for Arms
Control Studies, we try to analyze the technical side of cooperation.
Today, unfortunately, the level of understanding of these issues in Russia
is very low.
*******
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