Johnson's Russia List
#6103
27 February 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Note from David Johnson:
1. Moscow Times: Yulia Latynina, Petersburgers Aren't Cutting the Mustard.
2. Reuters: Russia moves to jury system as crime debate rages.
3. Reuters: Russia against U.S. deployment in Georgia.
4. Versiya: Alexander Hajarov, CHUBAIS FOR PRESIDENT. Russian Joint Energy
Systems has a plan for replacing the head of state.
5. Moscow Times: Matt Bivens, Sins of Omission From Enron to the Oligarchs.
6. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review.
7. The Chronicle of Higher Education: Nina Ayoub reviews Sakharov: A
Biography
by Richard Lourie.
8. Peter Lavelle: Untimely Thoughts - The state of the Putinite state
(re Putin's State of the Union address, Part 3 of 5)
9. Reuters: OPEC won't threaten Russia with oil price war.
10. Washington Post: Sharon LaFraniere, Journalists On Radio In Russia To
Resign. Top Editor Protests State Interference. (Ekho Moskvy)
11. WPS Russian Media Monitoring Agency [press review]: THE END OF WINTER
IN RUSSIA: A POLITICAL CALM AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE DEATH THROES OF
PATRIOTISM.]
*******
#1
Moscow Times
February 27, 2002
Petersburgers Aren't Cutting the Mustard
By Yulia Latynina
After two years with Vladimir Putin at the helm, freedom in Russia is on
the wane, but order is not on the rise. Putin's main lever for maintaining
control over society has been a war waged by several groups close to the
president.
This is perfectly natural in a country where the remaining institutions of
government and control -- the State Duma, the Prosecutor General's Office
and the Interior Ministry -- are for sale to the highest bidder. A ruler
can only really rely on a single team in a democracy. In an authoritarian
society the leadership needs at least two. In Putin's case, they are the
St. Petersburg network and the "family."
The Petersburg clan notched its biggest victories in the corridors of
power: Its members are installed throughout the "power ministries," and not
only in the top jobs but also in the upper ranks dealing with the mid-level
bureaucracy. This has destroyed the infrastructure that once served the
interests of many oligarchs, primarily those within the "family."
The battle for major power requires major financial resources, however, and
here the Petersburg clan comes up short. Its successes in the business
world are negligible. This point was hammered home last year during the
bare-knuckle brawls for control of natural gas producer Rospan
International, the Nosta metals plant, the Karabash copper smelting works
and Kuzbasugol.
In each case shareholders or creditors, fed up with one group of oligarchs,
went cap in hand to other oligarchs instead of to the siloviki, even though
hundreds of millions of dollars were at stake and control over the
companies could have been attained by the judicious flexing of
administrative muscle. This choice was apparently determined by the level
of service provided by the "new Petersburgers." As far as I know, some of
the parties involved in these property fights did in fact turn to the
siloviki for help, but the officials they encountered were hopelessly
incompetent. They couldn't master any of the economic issues involved,
instead suggesting a "radical solution to the problem" or asking those
lodging the complaint to track their opponent's offshore accounts, since
they didn't have the wherewithal to do it themselves. When the dissatisfied
clients went elsewhere, all the information they had provided was handed
over to their opponents.
It's not surprising, then, that only those Petersburgers who have had their
hand held by the president have managed to put down roots -- Alexei Miller
at Gazprom, Sergei Zivenko at Rosspirtprom and Valery Yashin at
Svyazinvest. However, these appointees have scored as few successes as
humanly possible in their new posts.
The siloviki in short, are not a rope around the neck of enterprising
oligarchs, just a run-of-the-mill muzzle meant to keep them from biting
anyone.
The regime's economic strategy seems much more dangerous. It's pointless to
describe what's happening in terms of bribery and corruption. The decision
to replace Rem Vyakhirev with Alexei Miller atop Gazprom, rather than
making the company transparent, indicates that the Kremlin is happy with
the way Gazprom does business. The only thing the Kremlin wasn't happy
about was the issue of whose pocket was being filled.
A system like this obviously makes any real reform impossible. No one is
interested in lowering taxes, because high taxes are what forces the
oligarchs to hide their profits and keeps them on tenterhooks. No one is
interested in restoring order to the natural monopolies, because they are
the most effective means of milking the business community. No one is
interested in straightening up the legal system, because when laws
contradict one another the only real law is the will of the ruler.
This system was created by the oligarchs to satisfy their slightest needs.
Nationalizing this system -- rather than eliminating it -- has been the new
administration's greatest success.
Yulia Latynina is a journalist with ORT.
*******
#2
Russia moves to jury system as crime debate rages
By Richard Balmforth
MOSCOW, Feb 27 (Reuters) - Like a stern headmistress facing a group of
wayward pupils, the judge lectured the 14 men and women on the
practicalities of jury service before she swore them in for the murder trial.
"Now, don't forget. For the next two weeks you're working and you'll come
here and fulfil your citizen's duty.
"It's not enough that one morning, say, your husband doesn't want you to go
and maybe you 'catch a cold'. It's up to me to get you here together and
I'm counting on you," Natalya Alexandrovna said.
Her look suggested something more than a 100-rouble ($3.25) fine.
The hearing in Moscow city centre focused on whether a slight, pale young
man with a crew-cut called Alexei had taken part in the strangling of
another man called Viktor.
A banal and sordid tale of robbery and drug-taking in the town of Klin
northwest of Moscow, it was a routine crime by the standards of post-Soviet
Russia, the outcome destined to become nothing more than a statistic in
Russian criminal registers.
But the hearing in the shabby courthouse near Moscow Zoo is part of wider
court reforms just as public passions hit a new high over violent crime.
Russia had jury trials under the Tsars but the practice was dropped after
the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. During the Soviet period serious crimes were
handled by courts with a single professional judge sitting with two
assistants.
Now they are back again and they are set to be the norm across Russia by
next year.
And as soon as the system is fully in place, juries may find themselves
convicting people who face the death penalty, in abeyance since 1996.
MORE RIGOROUS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
Advocates of the change, meant to bring Russia into line with the rest of
Europe, say that on balance it will result in fairer trials. And a jury
system will force the criminal investigation system in crime-plagued Russia
to be more rigorous.
For President Vladimir Putin that could not come too soon.
Earlier this month Putin, with an eye to the effect on potential foreign
investors, handed a public tongue-lashing to state prosecutors for
poorly-conducted criminal investigations.
"Hundreds and thousands of criminals are roaming the country. More than
7,000 murderers escaped justice last year alone," he told a session of
senior officials from the Prosecutor General's Office.
And all this is happening as the ugly face of crime changes.
Contract and gangland killings characterised the desperate, get-rich-quick
Russia of the 1990s when mafia gangs fought "turf" battles on the streets.
Now it is murders for robbery that have dominated press headlines in Moscow
since the start of the year.
The emergent middle class in Russia puts personal security -- or the lack
of it -- at the top of its worry-list. Law and order is a hot topic again.
The jury system is in force in only nine Russian regions. But by January
2003 it is scheduled to be operating in all 89 regions for trying serious
violent crime.
It brings the ordinary man and woman in the street into criminal court
deliberations in a novel process for Russia.
In theory, the presence of a jury -- which can be swayed by impassioned
argument and emotional appeals -- should breed a new type of advocacy in
Russia.
But there were no Perry Mason-style theatrics in the stark proceedings in
Room Five of Moscow's regional court.
Alexei, speaking from inside a padlocked metal cage, mumbled his version of
what happened on that February day four years ago.
The 12 jury members and two back-ups who included a serviceman, a
pensioner, a machine-operator and a doctor -- all sworn to decide on
Alexei's guilt or innocence "according to inner conviction and conscience"
-- listened stolidly.
He said he'd passed out after taking drugs. When he came to, he saw another
man strangling the victim. Yes, he had helped dump the body in the river.
But he'd not killed him. No, he had not known that the victim had money on
him.
The smartly-dressed state prosecutor carried out her cross-examination
without getting out of her chair. The defence counsel, only just appointed,
made no opening statement.
It was largely down to the black-robed, matronly Natalya Alexandrovna to
once again take a grip on proceedings -- grilling Alexei on his evidence,
though taking a cue from the written questions passed up to her by the jury.
"But just why did you go to Klin? If you wish to remain silent that is your
right. But I am asking you 'why did you go to Klin?'," she asked.
JURY TRIALS ACQUIT MORE
Advocates say juries have shown greater insistence on strong proof to
justify conviction in the few years that the jury system has been back in
use.
To the alarm of critics, they are also showing a greater inclination to
acquit than the previous judge-only courts.
"We can expect judges to continue to dominate proceedings for some time to
come until the new system really begins to take effect and the professional
culture begins to change," said lawyer Sergei Nasonov, an expert in the
jury system.
Nasonov, like many in his profession, believes that with law enforcement
agencies having to provide stronger evidence to secure a conviction by
jury, the whole investigation system will be forced to improve. "New
standards will be set," he said.
This must be beneficial for a police system identified in the minds of most
Russians with the worst features of the old Soviet system -- incompetence,
bribe-taking and excessive use of force.
The transition will also cost money to fund jury service, equip courtrooms
and protect juries from intimidation.
Alexei, if convicted, will not, at least, face the death penalty -- a
sentence meted out in Russia by a single bullet in the head.
Executions were halted in 1996 by a moratorium introduced by Putin's
predecessor Boris Yeltsin to help Russia's case for membership of the
Council of Europe, the human rights body.
Russia's Constitutional Court has since ruled that courts cannot anyway
pass death sentences until the jury system is functioning across the whole
country.
Though Putin and some key ministers are in favour of scrapping the death
penalty, it remains on the statute book. Nor is it clear if, and when, it
will formally be abolished.
Human rights organisations in Russia say scores of prisoners have been on
"Death Row" for years, caught in judicial limbo.
In a further complication, the State Duma (lower house of parliament) has
told Putin that with violent crime increasing it is not ready to discuss
ratifying the commitment to the Council of Europe yet.
If the death penalty is not formally repealed, an anomalous situation could
develop next year. Jury courts could start passing death sentences -- with
only Putin's support for the moratorium stopping them from being carried out.
*******
#3
Russia against U.S. deployment in Georgia
MOSCOW, Feb 27 (Reuters) - Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said on
Wednesday the deployment of U.S. forces in Georgia could only aggravate the
security situation in the Transcaucasus region.
"Regarding possible U.S. military deployment in Georgia, we think it could
further aggravate the situation in the region which is difficult as it is,"
Ivanov told ORT public television in reaction to reports that Washington
was planning to send elite U.S. forces to train troops of the ex-Soviet
state.
"That is our position and Washington is well aware of it," he added as
Russian airwaves gave saturation coverage to the move said to be planned by
Washington.
Ivanov's comment was the first high-level Russian reaction to Tuesday
reports out of Washington which quoted U.S. officials as saying that elite
U.S. military forces would train Georgian troops as part of the U.S.
anti-terrorist campaign.
Georgia, a volatile mountainous country, shares a long land frontier with
Russia to its north. If the U.S. operation takes place it will be the first
time U.S. forces have been stationed in an ex-Soviet country directly
bordering Russia.
Ivanov said however that the U.S. decision vindicated Russia's charges that
Georgia had become a hotbed of terrorism -- a reference to the Chechen
separatist rebels which Moscow says are taking refuge there in the Pankisi
Gorge.
Russia says the Chechen rebels have links with Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda
terrorist network which Washington blames for the September 11 airliner
attacks and is committed to destroying.
Russia itself has had fractious relations with its small southern neighbour
since the mountainous Transcaucasus country, once a jewel in the crown of
the Soviet Union, gained independence in 1991 after the collapse of
communism.
Georgia, which is contending with two secessionist regions in Abkhazia and
Southern Ossetia, has frequently claimed that its big northern neighbour
was trying to undermine its precarious political stability.
It was only recently that Georgia acknowledged there was some truth to
Russia's claims that Chechen rebels holed up in the lawless Pankisi Gorge
had links with al Qaeda, a view quickly espoused by U.S. officials.
Ivanov repeated Russian calls for a joint Russian-Georgian operation in the
gorge without American involvement. "Russia has repeatedly offered to
Tbilisi to join forces to stamp out the terrorist threat."
"We reaffirm our readiness to render all necessary assistance to the
friendly Georgian people in its fight against the terrorist threat," he said.
********
#4
Versiya
February 26-March 4, 2002
CHUBAIS FOR PRESIDENT
Russian Joint Energy Systems has a plan for replacing the head of state
Author: Alexander Hajarov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
COULD ANATOLY CHUBAIS BECOME THE RICHEST AND MOST POWERFUL PERSON IN
RUSSIA? THE ANSWER IS YES, IF ONLY HE CAN MANAGE TO IMPLEMENT HIS PLAN
FOR COLLAPSING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND BRINGING DOWN PRESIDENT PUTIN.
The question of an independent political debut for Anatoly
Chubais has suddenly arisen, thanks to substantial changes in the
public mood and the Kremlin's striking incapacity. Many members of the
Union of Right Forces (URF), primarily Chubais himself, seem to be
believing once more that the head of Russian Joint Energy Systems
(RJES) has a real chance of winning a presidential race.
In this context, Chubais has become more active, turning to
party-building: he has started strengthening the ranks of the URF, and
has also been improving the party's work in the regions, making party
staff doubly accountable for everything. An unexpected confirmation of
Chubais' Napoleonic plans has appeared in the form of a plan drawn up
in the depths of RJES; a plan which would make Chubais the most
powerful person in Russia by as soon as 2003-04, if it succeeds.
At first sight, this plan looks like a network. According to
Chubais' forced restructuring of RJES, a transition to market rates
for electricity is taking shape. The state will not control these
rates, since the idea of market regulation has prevailed. The state's
role will be reduced to implementing the mechanism of setting the
rates.
It is proposed to use the so-called marginal method of
determining rates for electricity. That is, the rates will only cover
the costs of electricity generation.
The secret is that a marginal rate is determined based on the
costs at the most expensive facilities. As a result, power plants
which are operating more successfully will begin to make substantial
profits. Hydro-electric power stations will become the most
profitable, or rather mega-profitable. The primary cost of electricity
at such power plants will only amount to 5-7% of the new rates, so the
profit would be 93-95% respectively.
A few people now know which power plants will actually become
profitable and which won't. RJES will be broken up by the time the new
rates are introduced, and the power plants will be privatized. The
federal budget will gain considerable sums of money; and about a year
later, the socio-economic situation in Russia will become quite
favorable. The nightmare will happen later, in 12 to 14 months, when
the rates will be increased by 3-3.5 times.
The socio-economic consequences of this measure will be
catastrophic, but not for Chubais himself. He will not head the
electricity sector by that time.
Together with his team, Chubais will incur almost no losses, even
though he will get possession of only one-third or, probably, a
quarter of power plants. However, these enterprises will become the
most profitable, since Chubais will alone be duly informed in the due
time. Thus, his team, as proprietors already, not as hired managers,
will get 90% of the profits from the electricity sector, instead of
30% as before. In other words, Chubais will own the largest sack of
spare cash in Russia.
Chubais' negative public image will be improved as state coffers
temporarily fill and society stabilizes.
However, an overall social-economic crisis which the majority of
experts have predicted already will follow. At that very moment
Chubais will appear on the scene as the people's savior; what's more,
he will have very big money.
He will replace Putin as president easily enough. All actions of
Chubais' team are aimed solely at this goal lately, some sources
report.
Any PR expert knows well how such a scenario can be staged.
Chubais' team has enough experience in that sphere. Probes into RJES
by the governors prove that they could eagerly accept Chubais' plans
for the presidency and even loyally support him. The case is also
appropriate for the so-called "red" governors. It is no wonder: not
Chubais' team alone will benefit by the distribution of ultra-high
profits and revenues gained from privatization.
Distribution of funds gained from privatizing power plants by the
federal center and the regions is the simplest example. Not each
region has large power plants, and only specific regions will gain
additional money.
Thus, in his economic-political plans Chubais can figure not on
the liberals alone. Can you imagine how many political dividends can a
direct political bribe benefit? The potential of it is almost infinite
in the contemporary Russia. It is just the matter of money. Chubais
will surely have it thanks to implementation of his plans.
Even the nationalists among marginalized social groups are ready
to support the sovereignty of liberals and foreigners. "The
nationalists of Russia must do their best to support the radical
economic reforms of liberal-monetarists aimed at a resolute
privatization," S. Gorodnikov, a most bellicose ideologist of nazism
in Russia says in his latest book.
Thus, by the moment of his decisive clash with Chubais, Putin
won't retain many affiliates (mainly plump generals). Chubais will
easily set the people on him.
Moreover, the given circumstances permit of a sure statement the
circumstances are more significant here, rather than the personality.
As is rumored of late, Voloshin will soon replace Chubais in the post
of RJES's head. Most interestingly, this will result in no
considerable changes. Replace the name Chubais with a name Voloshin in
the said above and you will easily be convinced that all the
consequences and conclusions will remain the same. Even Voloshin will
be able to compete with Putin under given circumstances.
(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)
*******
#5
Moscow Times
February 27, 2002
Sins of Omission From Enron to the Oligarchs
By Matt Bivens
WASHINGTON -- Imagine a magazine article three years from now about Ken
Lay's exciting new pig-farm-and-movie-theater holding company. "Lay leads a
new generation of responsible CEOs, who renounce the free-wheeling excesses
of the past," the article intones -- without mentioning the name of Lay's
old company, Enron.
Absurd? Not at all. Merely the latest Western business journalism out of
Russia.
When the ruble collapsed a few years ago, journalists, academics and Big
Five auditors were plunged into 30 seconds of introspection: It seems all
had been too busy composing odes to the debt market to notice it was a
Ponzi scheme. (Sound familiar?)
In those dark days of 1998 and 1999, Russia's leading banks were stiffing
clients -- and laughing about it. Uneximbank became the first Russian
institution ever to default on a Eurobond, but founder Vladimir Potanin
just shrugged, telling The Wall Street Journal, "We like to be first."
Uneximbank changed the sign out front to "Rosbank" and left the problems
(i.e., the desperate depositors lined up out front) behind in "Uneximbank."
Next Potanin threw an elite party in the French Alps for friends and
employees. "I understand the perception that people are spending money when
they are not paying debts," Potanin told the Journal about that soiree.
"But look, let's be realistic here. This does not mean you can't live a
normal life."
But why single out Potanin? Alexander Smolensky of SBS-Agro mocked people
who had savings at his bank. "They must be idiots," he told the Journal.
(He added solemnly that his "new" bank would be different.)
Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Bank Menatep moved the goods to "Menatep St.
Petersburg" and left the bads in "Menatep." Whenever I visit Moscow, I
admire the Menatep sign near Mayakovskaya metro: It has a "St. Petersburg"
patch riveted to it.
Ugly behavior? Sure. But nothing new. The same oligarchs in 1995 paid
laughable sums for oil fields and nickel mines bought at rigged auctions.
In 1996, they bragged about carrying the presidential election for Boris
Yeltsin on a sea of ill-gotten and illegal political spending. In 1997, the
privatization of the Svyazinvest telecommunications company sparked a
government-threatening row that pitted Potanin and the "young reformers"
against the equally repugnant oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir
Gusinsky.
So here we are in 2002. Journalists in the United States are upset over
misreading Enron; colleagues in Moscow are doggedly misrepresenting the
oligarchs.
Forbes, for example, on Feb. 2 profiled mover-and-shaker Potanin, freshly
elected to the board of New York's Guggenheim Museum. Forbes puts Potanin's
worth at $1.8 billion. (For comparison: wage arrears across Russia are
still estimated at $1 billion, including wages owed to public-sector
teachers and doctors.)
Potanin in November sold the Sidanko oil company for $1.1 billion, and he
still controls the nickel and platinum mines of Norilsk -- all courtesy of
rigged auctions, and the only reason he merits a splash in Forbes. But
Forbes insists Potanin has turned his attention away from oil and nickel
and toward businesses "that add value by producing goods and services for
long-suffering local consumers."
As examples, Forbes quotes Potanin talking about a $100 million investment
into a pig-and-poultry farm, some vague investments into "retail," and
investing into an unnamed outfit that plans to open movie theaters. Forbes
also tells us Potanin is "researching" the tourism business. (For those
keeping score: So far, we've got a pig farm and some vague talk.) Forbes
sniffs that tourists won't visit Russia, "a country known for crime,
surliness and bad food." But Potanin reassures Forbes that Russia may lack
a "culture of service" -- but "the desire to serve exists."
Forbes is not alone in shilling for an oligarch. The Times of London in a
Feb. 2 article tells us Khodorkovsky of Yukos "came to oil via banking,
seizing his chance to consolidate his holdings." That's like saying: "Jesse
James came to the railroad business via horseback riding," or "German
troops came to the Sudetenland via marching." And what sort of tortured
logic could equate wresting wealth away from the public to "consolidating
his holdings?" (His?)
Khodorkovsky, we are told, was one of the "freewheeling tycoons of the
Yeltsin era." But happily, "that era is rapidly coming to an end," and "now
Khodorkovsky is held up as an example of the new breed of businessmen," a
group that "may yet succeed in instilling a culture of honest dealing and
transparency into Russia." In fact, Khodorkovsky is "the archetype of the
new, sober, responsible industrialist." As to Yukos, "there is a distinctly
un-Russian feel to the place," in part because "all is clean, computerized
and tasteful."
Did I mention Khodorkovsky is "emerging as a patron of the arts"?
Neither article describes the "free-wheeling Yeltsin era," even as both
breathlessly insist it's over. In fact, neither the profile of Potanin nor
that of Khodorkovsky includes a single mention of their failed flagships.
Uneximbank and Menatep were as mighty in their day as Enron, yet they are
lovingly airbrushed away: "Ken Lay, patron of the arts, fights for honesty
and transparency."
Then there's the Financial Times, which cuts to the chase. A Feb. 1 article
begins: "It was scandalous. Grotesque. The looting of a nation. Or so said
many people when Russia privatized much of its oil industry in the
mid-1990s, letting a clique of financiers grab the best bits for next to
nothing."
"But," the article continues, "a few years on, the results are looking
quite respectable. The proprietors have learnt how to manage their assets.
They have discovered corporate governance. They have grown secure enough in
their ownership to reinvest profits in new fields and new technology."
So let me get this straight: The looting of a nation is starting to look
"respectable" -- because those who engineered it are (supposedly) doing a
better job managing the loot?
Does all this carping make me "a Russophobe?" Well, in 10 years of living
in Russia I never wrote of it as "a country known for crime, surliness and
bad food." I never found cause to characterize cleanliness and taste as
"distinctly un-Russian."
To write such things requires a distinctly un-Russian source of
inspiration. From The Times:
"The foreign multinationals prowling round the carcass of the old Soviet
oil industry during the chaotic days of privatization in the mid-1990s
found themselves up against a man whose soft-spoken manner and rimless
glasses hid [blah blah blah, Khodorkovsky]."
This is the only nod to the Great Oil Field Robbery: When they were
stealing the oil companies, those evil oligarchs didn't give BP Amoco a turn!
And now, the foreigners' turn is here. Potanin has sold Sidanko; the FT
notes rumors that Yukos itself might be for sale, and suggests foreign oil
majors are ready to buy out the oligarchs.
The emerging story line: The oil field "auctions" were once, ahem,
troubling, if only because foreign oil majors were snubbed. Yet today, as
foreign majors move in, suddenly it's "Oil Oligarch Finds Jesus" --
oligarchs recast as champions of honesty and transparency, cleanliness and
taste, good food and good service, pork and poultry, fine art and foreign
managers.
Gee, how did we miss that Enron story?
Matt Bivens, a former editor of The Moscow Times, is a Washington-based
fellow of The Nation Institute [www.thenation.com].
*******
#6
ORT Review
www.ortv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu)
Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and
Policy at Boston University
HEADLINES,
Tuesday, February 26, 2002
- The Voronezh Music Institute has been named after renowned cellist
Mstislav Rostropovich. Voronezh was home to Rostropovich's father and
grandparents.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his condolences to Daniel
Pearl's widow, his family and his colleagues at the Wall Street Journal.
- Over 5,000 families received foodstuff from the Chechen government. The
charity action was timed to coincide with the Muslim holiday of
Kurban-Bairam and with the Day of the Defenders of the Fatherland.
- Chechnya's first library for the blind has been opened in Grozny.
- In Moscow, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Kalyuzhnyi opened the
International Conference on the Status of the Caspian. Representatives
from Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and the United
States were in attendance. The Caspian Region is one of Russia's foreign
policy priorities. The most valuable resource in the Caspian, however, is
neither gas nor oil, but sturgeon.
- According to a report presented at today's Health Ministry Collegium
meeting, the increase in the rate of tuberculosis in Russia has been
stopped over the last few years. Despite negative forecasts by foreign
experts, the number of patients has decreased significantly in 55 regions.
- Ukraine's Simferopol Regional Court denied an appeal request by Crimean
Parliament Speaker Leonid Grach.
- The Federal Migration Service will now be a part of Russia's Interior
Ministry structure. Andrei Chernenko was appointed to head the service by
a presidential decree; Chernenko will also serve as a Deputy Interior
Minister.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting of the Presidium of
the State Council. State policy on the mining of minerals and control
over Russia's natural resources were at the top of the agenda.
- Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov met with representatives of the
Palestinian-Israeli Coalition for Peace. They asked to Russia to support
Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah's peace proposal.
- In Moscow, the Interstate Council of the Eurasian Economic Community has
opened at the level of the heads of government from Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzia and Tajikistan. Trade and related issues, including
transportation, tariffs, customs fees and taxes are on the agenda. The
five Prime Ministers are expected to consider expanding membership in the
Economic Community.
- President Putin met with Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov to discuss the
Armed Forces, perspectives for development, and defense cooperation among
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) nations.
- Private Ivan Sapsaev, a soldier who deserted his Chitin Oblast post
while guarding an ammunitions dump has been captured. The Army's press
service reported that Sapsaev committed no crimes during his time away
from the post.
*******
#7
The Chronicle of Higher Education
March 1, 2002
NOTA BENE
'Sakharov: A Biography'
By NINA C. AYOUB
In the final decades of the Soviet Union, each new leader inherited
problems from his predecessors. One of the most troublesome was Andrei
Sakharov. What could be done about the acclaimed physicist turned
dissident? Father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, three-time Hero of Socialist
Labor, Sakharov could not be dismissed or "disappeared." Sometimes even the
scientist himself seemed bemused by his impact. "My fate proved greater
than my personality," he wrote, "I only tried to keep up with it." A "shy
defier of tyrants," agrees Richard Lourie in Sakharov: A Biography
(Brandeis University Press/University Press of New England).
Mr. Lourie, translator of Sakharov's memoirs, traces the physicist's life
from his 1920s childhood in the crowded communal apartments of
postrevolutionary Moscow to youth as a brilliant but socially inept student
of physics. The young researcher was ordered to join the Soviet Union's
version of the Manhattan Project at a site called the "Installation." It
was there, writes Mr. Lourie, that Sakharov came to know the "political
physics of applied pressure." He tracks the scientist's growing concerns
over fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests and his efforts to help
colleagues out of favor.
Sakharov was banished eventually from the Installation for his dissident
views, and in 1969, saw his life change dramatically with the death of his
first wife, Klava. He would soon meet Elena Bonner, his second wife and a
fierce activist in her own right. Six KGB men, clad in identical black
suits, were uninvited guests at their wedding. Yuri Andropov, the KGB head
and later Soviet leader, had ordered the bugging of Sakharov's apartment in
1970 as part of an official quest to learn the "contacts inciting him to
commit hostile acts." That bit of spy bureaucratese reveals the KGB's
psychology, argues Mr. Lourie. To still be considered salvageable, he
writes, Sakharov had to be viewed as a dupe. Still, the life of a harassed
dissident wasn't all bad. Mr. Lourie paints an appealing picture of hearth
politics. "Andropov had the might and weight of the state behind him;
Sakharov had his kitchen," writes the author, where "people came for
liberty, conversation, cabbage soup before prison."
The dissident physicist never lived to see post-Soviet Russia. After he
spoke against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he was sent into internal
exile in the closed city of Gorki for more than six years. Freed by Mikhail
Gorbachev, he was elected to the Congress of People's Deputies and
experienced the opening acts of glasnost and perestroika but missed the
finale.
******
#8
From: "Peter Lavelle"
Subject: Untimely Thoughts
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2002
Peter Lavelle: Untimely Thoughts - The state of the Putinite state
(re Putin's State of the Union address, Part 3 of 5)
Putin's annual address to the Federation Council, dubbed his "State of the
Union" address, will most likely focus on the country's current economic
condition and the necessity to push reform forward. Russia's economy is
bucking global trends. The greatest concern is an economic slow down
compared to the last two years - not with the possibility of recession. The
economy has taken virtue from necessity since the financial crisis of 1998.
However, the value of the ruble and the extreme uncertainty surrounding the
global crude oil price regime will be Putin's first real macroeconomic test
as president. Uncertainty appears to increase from day to day and the
multitude of voices coming out the government as to what exactly the
government's aims are is not encouraging. Putin will be doing himself and
the Kasyanov Cabinet a tremendous favor by making clear Russia's financial
and economic priorities.
Part 3: Economic reform
In terms of the economy, the year 2002 to date is not encouraging. In an
Enron-like accounting fiasco, it seems to be anybody's guess what GDP growth
was in 2000 (or even 2001 for that matter). What was inflation in January -
3.1% or 2.8%? And like a capricious teenager, will Russia cooperate with
OPEC or not? The mixture of uncertain accountancy and intense speculation
of Russia's participation in the global oil price regime is unsettling for a
country that writes in to its budget various scenarios depending on the
price of a barrel of oil. As is the tradition here, those responsible for
the screw-ups in accounting will be found and punished. Those playing
Russian roulette with oil prices will have to pay an even higher price.
Russia remains an unattractive environment for Russians themselves to invest
here. Capital flight has indeed decreased, though money will always follow
value. Putin's Russia is indeed more stable and predictable, but that same
stability and predictability may discourage return investment in Russia.
The very dubious use of the courts surrounding the recent closure of TV6
does not send the right signal to investors.
Reform of the natural monopolies - especially RAO UES and Gazprom - remains
far from clear. What remains obvious is that both companies will be starved
of capital investment to pay for the political imperatives of the moment,
most notably the fight against inflation. Keeping both companies hostage of
being the last lender to extort maintains the supposition the state remains
too weak to enforce economic order. Miller seems only able to demonstrate
his loyalty to the Kremlin; Chubais uses UES as a private platform to serve
his personal political agenda - what is missing in both cases is the
creation of value. These two companies are key to Russia's future; both
remain pawns in shortsighted political conflicts for financial turf.
For all the fanfare in the media due to government statements, banking
reform remains stillborn. This issue should be the litmus test for next
year's address. It is critical for Putin to reform this sector. Not unlike
the Yeltsin era, Russia's faltering and intensely untransparent banking
system remains a safe haven for corruption and political influence peddling.
Gerashchenko is not only from the Soviet era; he is a living symbol of how
little progress has been in the banking sector. If Russia's banking system
is not reformed, it will simply become irrelevant and redundant. Russia's
financial interests will simply be sentenced to working in the gray area of
legality and thus further undermine Russia as an investment opportunity.
Last year we heard a lot how the business of business should be business and
that politics was the purview of the government. Has progress been made?
Well that is a matter of perspective. Putin's reforms now inform us that
there are 'good oligarchs', 'quiet oligarchs', 'bad oligarchs', and
'oligarchs beyond the pale'. The lack of legal reform only creates
trepidations and fear in the business community. After two years, Putin
appears to demand to be the nexus of authority, in return he should take up
the mantle of protecting the development of all businesses - large and
small.
The government's most immediate economic concern is inflation. The
government and the Central Bank are faced with a difficult policy question:
either to slow inflation by limiting the money supply and lowering the ruble
rate as against the dollar (thus sacrificing economic growth and encouraging
the further expansion of imports), or gradually correct the ruble rate, thus
stimulating economic growth while permitting higher inflation. Hopefully,
Putin will give us an idea where is stands in this issue.
Joining the WTO presents Russia with great promise and threats. The promise
is Russia's beneficial participation in the world economy in terms of the
areas where it has a competitive advantage. The threats and indeed pain
will demonstrate just how backward so much of Russia's industrial production
is at present. There is awareness here that Russia lags international
standards and expectations of quality. Joining the WTO will heighten this
awareness even more; it will inflict enormous pain on Russian industry.
Putin has heard many opinions concerning the consequences of entering the
WTO, will he tell us in his address just how Russia will be become a member
without forcing most of the country's industrial infrastructure to undergo
shock therapy even Jeffrey Sachs could not imagine?
Putin seems to have learned from Clinton's first presidential election: "It
is the economy, stupid". This is a lesson well learned. He has also
defined himself as a reformer, the man who will make Russia a 'normal'
country. Putin has also absorbed the Clinton logic that foreign policy
initiatives rarely produce political dividends. Putin the Great will only
be possible if he shows that he is Putin the Reformer. This year will be
much difficult than most pundits and analysts predict. Will Putin tell us
as much in his address to the nation?
Part 1: Foreign policy
Part 2: Civil society project
Part 4: State restructuring and corruption
Part 5: Overall assessment
Peter Lavelle, Head of Research, IFC Metropol, Moscow, Russia
*******
#9
ANALYSIS-OPEC won't threaten Russia with oil price war
By Tom Ashby
LONDON, Feb 27 (Reuters) - OPEC plans to use quiet diplomacy with Moscow
rather than raising the threat of an oil price war at talks next week on
extending Russian export curbs, OPEC sources and industry analysts said on
Wednesday.
Having already implemented its own cuts for six months from January, the
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries has little negotiating
power left with the world's No.2 exporter Russia, which is not an OPEC
member.
Instead of the threats it used last November to cajole Russia into
cooperating, the cartel will rely on the Kremlin's own interest in
maintaining fiscal oil revenue by extending the restrictions now in place
into the second quarter, they said.
"If Russia decides not to extend the cuts to the second quarter, then OPEC
will lose market share, but we are not stupid enough to threaten a price
war," an OPEC source said, asking not to be named.
The group of mostly Middle East countries, which controls more than half of
world exports, does not want to jeopardise a deal with five independent
producers, including Russia, which has held up prices despite the sharpest
recession in demand for 20 years.
"Other producers like Mexico and Norway have a good record on cooperation
and we don't want to spoil that," the OPEC source added.
Oil prices have recovered by 20 percent since late last year when a
stand-off with Moscow drove Brent crude briefly below $17 a barrel. Brent
now is worth $20.70.
Russia has kept the international oil market guessing over whether it will
prolong its export limits to match the timescale agreed by 10 OPEC
countries plus Mexico, Norway, Oman and Angola.
"There is certainly potential to bring the walls down but we expect that
matters can be kept on an even keel," said Paul Horsnell, oil analyst at
investment bank JP Morgan.
OPEC Secretary-General Ali Rodriguez and OPEC President Rilwanu Lukman are
due to meet Kremlin officials on Monday and Tuesday next week, 10 days
before an OPEC meeting in Vienna.
Ministers from Venezuela and Algeria also plan to press the message home in
separate visits ahead of OPEC's Vienna date.
"If Russia maintains its position for the second quarter, then we can reach
our objective of price stability," Rodriguez said last weekend in New
Zealand.
PAPER CUT
Many analysts believe Moscow will maintain the reductions on paper, even if
they have little impact in reality.
"Few are willing to place strong probabilities on the outcome of next
week's meeting though our own sense is that it's in Russia's best interests
to cooperate," said Mike Rothman of U.S. bank Merrill Lynch.
In November, OPEC played hard ball with its arch-rival Russia, insisting
the cartel would not cut a single barrel unless other countries, in
particular Russia, cooperated.
Under pressure from the consequent sharp drop in prices, Moscow gave in and
promised a five percent cut for three months from January. OPEC in turn
promised to trim its own output by six percent.
Unofficial data since then has shown that exports of crude oil actually
rose from December to January, while exports of refined products leapt.
"Everyone in the market knows that Russia never really cut, but if the
Russians stop cooperating with OPEC, the price would go lower," said an
official from another country participating in the cuts.
Several analysts say Russian exports would have risen even more strongly in
January without the OPEC deal, and powerful Russian business interests are
strongly opposed to the policy which they blame for a bottleneck of oil in
the country's huge pipeline network.
"Muddling through is the device. It has worked up until now," one OPEC
official said.
*******
#10
Washington Post
February 27, 2002
Journalists On Radio In Russia To Resign
Top Editor Protests State Interference
By Sharon LaFraniere
Washington Post Foreign Service
MOSCOW, Feb. 26 -- The editor of Russia's most influential radio station
said today that he and dozens of other journalists are quitting rather than
work for a news outlet he said is becoming another voice of the state.
Alexei Venediktov, editor in chief of Ekho Moskvy, announced his
resignation less than three weeks after a subsidiary of a state-controlled
monopoly moved to seize control of the station's board of directors.
"I am not going to work for a radio station that belongs to the state,"
said Venediktov, 46, a fixture at Ekho Moskvy for more than a decade. "I
prefer to keep my reputation but not my job."
His decision appears to spell the end of an era for Ekho Moskvy, the first
radio station to broadcast from Russia without state control. Since its
initial broadcast in 1990, Ekho Moskvy built a reputation for breaking
news, hard-hitting analysis and interviews with key political figures,
including visiting presidents. It broadcasts in 70 cities, reaching an
audience of between 4 million and 6 million.
Ekho Moskvy lost financial independence in June when Gazprom-Media, an arm
of the state-controlled natural gas monopoly, took over 51 percent of the
station's shares. But the station's board remained autonomous until this
month, when Gazprom-Media exercised its right as majority shareholder to
name five of nine directors.
Venediktov said today he believes that a change in editorial policy is not
far off, and that the only hope for him and the station's reporters to
practice objective journalism is to find another frequency.
Venediktov and 12 other Ekho Moskvy journalists have bid in a state auction
for two radio frequencies on the same FM band as Ekho Moskvy. The
frequencies were formerly held by the Russian military, according to an
Ekho Moskvy reporter. Venediktov said 58 of the station's 98 journalists
have voted to go with him if he wins. Asked how many would quit if he
didn't, he said, "57."
The government's press ministry is scheduled to announce the results of the
auction Wednesday. The announcement will be followed next month by an
auction for a television channel that formerly belonged to the independent
channel TV-6.
Taken together, the auctions will help determine the new shape of Russia's
broadcast media. They will also help settle a debate about whether the
Kremlin is carrying out a wholesale crackdown on the media or a vendetta
against two media tycoons, Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky.
Gusinsky controlled Ekho Moskvy and a national television network, NTV,
until Gazprom-Media took over his shares. Berezovsky owned the smaller TV-6
until a state-connected shareholder forced the station off the air last month.
Lawrence McDonnell, a spokesman for Gazprom-Media, said Venediktov's
announcement seemed timed to attract publicity for his bid for his own
radio frequency. He said that Gazprom-Media planned no editorial changes
and would not even own the station much longer, and suggested that
Venediktov had manufactured a crisis. Gazprom has said it intends to sell
its media assets, although it has not set a date for the sale and has
failed to give some potential buyers information that might support a bid.
Others characterized Venediktov's departure as a new low for Russia's
independent media. "My reaction is very emotional," said Vladimir Ryzhkov,
a politically independent and influential legislator from southern Siberia.
"This is a very dangerous trend.
"We have lost all the national television channels, and now we are losing
the only independent radio station that broadcasts news and political
analysis across the country."
"This is really a blow to the whole system of free information," said Yasen
Zasursky, dean of the journalism department at Moscow State University.
"The situation is really getting out of hand."
The relationship between Venediktov and Boris Jordan, who runs
Gazprom-Media, has been acrimonious for months. Venediktov said the
station's journalists wanted to buy up Gazprom-Media's shares, but Jordan
did not answer their letters.
Venediktov said Jordan promised him complete editorial freedom. But
Venediktov said he could see what lay ahead simply by turning on the
Gazprom-controlled version of NTV.
*******
#11
WPS Russian Media Monitoring Agency
www.wps.ru
February 27, 2002
[press review]
THE END OF WINTER IN RUSSIA: A POLITICAL CALM AGAINST THE BACKDROP
OF THE DEATH THROES OF PATRIOTISM
This year, February 23 was declared a public holiday for the
first time in Russia's history. Thus, there are now 11 official
holidays in Russia.
The newspaper [Kommersant] joyously reports that Russia holds
sixth place in terms of the number of public holidays on its calendar
- after Bhutan, Brazil, India, Belarus, Puerto Rico, and South Korea.
According to UNESCO, the average number of official holidays is 12.4 a
year. The smallest number of official holidays is in Micronesia: there
are only six days a year there. It seems that the climate in
Micronesia does not prompt the inhabitants to rest and recreation
after hard labor.
[Vek] weekly has reported that the "Chubais off-season" has
reached Russia. After the demotion of Ilya Klebanov, the first
demotion of a St. Petersburger within the Cabinet, many experts
concluded that Yeltsin's old guard is gaining strength and will soon
make Anatoly Chubais prime minister again. Meanwhile, other experts
believe that the president himself has sacrificed Klebanov in order to
make his peace with Yeltsin's old guard and stabilize the position of
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov.
There are also some experts assert that Klebanov's dismissal is
aimed at distracting the public from a real personnel revolution in
the government that will start in spring. These experts state that
quite new political figures may come to power as a result of this
revolution.
[Vek] explains this variety of explanations of Klebanov's
dismissal by the general confused situation in the Russian politics.
In the opinion of the weekly, the new political configuration is
only beginning to acquire a shape in the country. The Russian elite
has gotten used to the relative political stability in the country,
and the unexpected exacerbation of the economic situation at the start
of the year took it aback.
Nevertheless, the government keeps on conducting painful reforms
in the country, simultaneously increasing wages and pensions as
compensation. The center that has deprived regions of part of their
budget revenues insists that regional authorities should fund the
increase of salaries promised to state sector employees. This causes a
considerable resistance in regions. The army is also annoyed with the
lack of money. If we add the customary fight for power between
different political groups to the general tense situation, we will see
that this is a war engrossing the entire country, which is likely to
read to a systemic social crisis, as [Vek] states. To prevent this
crisis the government should choose between continuation of reforms
and the socially oriented policy.
In the first case the government will have to appeal to large
business and liberal political forces. In this case people's standard
of living will be worse. It is also not ruled out that the relations
between the government and security agencies will be worsened too.
However, the policy of social justice envisaging preservation of
basics of market economy has its own specificity. There is no doubt
that the country will need a strong presidential power in this case,
which may serve as a "political cudgel" against those displeased with
the government's policy. The government will also have to reanimate
the "image of an enemy" that will help the government justify the
increase of military expenditures and politically mobilize the
society.
There is also the third alternative, to which the government
sticks: to follow the natural course of events putting off the choice
until better times. This policy may have certain tactic results, but
it does not have any long-range prospects. The number of those
dissatisfied will inevitably grow in the country, which will destroy
the remainder of political stability.
[Vek] notes that "all dramatic events in Russia's history,
including the Bolshevist revolution and the breakup of the Soviet
Union, were outcomes of delayed political decisions."
[Novaya Gazeta] cites the data of the latest opinion poll
conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Study Center (VTsIOM,
showing that the number of people disapproving of activities of all
levels of state government is about 13%. These people do not like
either the president or the Duma, or the prime minister, or the
Federation Council. About 17% of Russians approve of activities of
only one subject of state government, and only 10% approve of
activities of all government agencies. In other words, rather many
people approve of the government only because it is the government.
This phenomenon is sometimes called servilism.
VTsIOM asserts that the president with his high rating is not
interested in such an attitude of the people. Experts of the think-
tank also assert that the current tendency of development of public
opinion shows that Russians may be most loyal if there is only one
government agency in the country. In other words, people want
autocracy.
According to observations of sociologists, the decisive turning
point in this sphere took place at the end of 2001 and the start of
2002. There had been an evident pluralist tendency in all opinion
polls up to September 2001. After September 11, there was a
considerable outburst of servilism: up to 18%. Then, in October, the
greatest approval of one single subject of state government was
registered: 80% (it is clear what subject of government this was).
[Vek] republished an article by the Swiss newspaper "Die Neue
Zuericher Zeitung" stating that President Putin has given Russia
incomparably greater stability than his predecessor. However, "this
stability is based on the people's indifference to the great extent.
As the affairs surrounding television of the past few months have
shown, this stability is also based on the merciless persecution of
those criticizing the government." The newspaper also believes that
Putin uses his power to modernize Russia and make it closer to the
West "despite anti-American spirits widespread in the country."
However, this is allegedly a typical Russian reform "from above"
reducing not only ordinary citizens but also most of the political to
the level of mutes. Those political parties that want to stand their
grounds are in a rather difficult situation now.
In the opinion of Valery Vyzhutovich, observer of [Vremya MN],
the Union of Right Forces (URF) is an example of a tiresome search of
a compromise. As a result of this search, its rating is only 4% now.
Its permanent rival Yabloko is supported by 7% of the people, and only
Women of Russia lag behind it.
Vyzhutovich thinks that there are only two alternative ways out
for the URF: they can either move to the zone of radical opposition
and "get marginalized there," or follow the example of the servile
United Russia.
The recent scandalous transition of Viktor Pokhmelkin from the
URF to Berezovsky's Liberal Russia showed that the right have already
split into conformists and radicals. Recently, Leonid Gozman, Anatoly
Chubais' colleague from Russian Joint Energy Systems (RJES), suggested
a plan, according to which all liberal actions of the government
should be viewed as implementation of recommendations of the right.
The observer also notes that the president doers not hinder his
"prompters" share his successes and enjoy their influence.
Anatoly Chubais is certainly the main resource of influence of
the URF. It is he who is able to impart some democratic idea to the
president or prevent a tendency of constructing a police state system.
Sometimes Chubais makes quite frank statements. For instance, he
made a few such statements in his interview to "The Financial Times"
given to a correspondent of this newspaper in the Moscow restaurant
Izumi. This interview has been quoted by practically every Russian
newspaper. [Sovetskaya Rossiya], an ultra-left newspaper, has even
published its complete translation.
Russian journalists paid most attention to Chubais answer to the
question about the hazard of construction of a police state. He said,
"There are such fears not only in the West but also in Russia. We
cannot close our eyes and say that this is nonsense. No, it is very
serious." Chubais asserts that there are some political forces "rather
close to President Putin" that support this tendency of Russia's
development. There are also some other political forces protesting
against this tendency, and the URF is allegedly the main one.
Then "The Financial Times" says that market economy is starting
to work in Russia and that Chubais' ideas are gradually coming true in
a way, although he is only 46. The correspondent of "The Financial
Times" even said that he was even ready to eat up sticks from the
restaurant Izumi is Chubais does not intend to run in the presidential
election of 2008.
[Sovetskaya Rossiya] wonders in this connection if Putin's aides
showed the president this passage and how he reacted to it if they
did.
Meanwhile, another newspaper of radical communists, [Zavtra],
asserts referring to data of some "secret polls" that today Putin's
actual rating is no more than 12-14%. "This figure is comparable to
the support of Yeltsin in 1995."
[Zavtra] asserts that the decline of Putin's influence is
becoming a commonplace topic in Russian and foreign media.
At the same time, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov is still
displaying his confidence despite numerous rumors about his upcoming
dismissal. According to sources of [Zavtra], Kasianov has received
some guarantees in Washington that he will retain his current
position. Moreover, the newspaper asserts that under some set of
circumstances Kasianov may even become "the first person" in the
country. In the opinion of the newspaper, this scenario is possible in
connection with Berezovsky's campaign of defamation of Putin by means
of asserting that he had to do with the explosions in Moscow and
Volgodonsk.
According to [Zavtra], Washington has decided to support this
campaign in its usual manner it will allegedly do its best to
"undermine the fundamentals of the Russian regime by means of
propagandaic war conducted through third countries and forces."
[Zavtra] states that the plan of Washington's actions is as
follows: first Berezovsky's accusations will be submitted to the
Strasbourg Court. The court will demand that the Kremlin limit the
influence of security agencies and give Chechnya sovereignty. Then it
will be the turn of "the final coup, which will lead a figure like
Gorbachev to power to completely destroy the Russian political space."
The newspaper thinks that Kasianov may serve as a link before the
transition of power to the "confederalization leader."
[Zavtra] asks in this connection, "Will the Russian military and
special services, our society and political parties of the patriotic
slant keep silent and accept the 'new reality' like they did in 1991?"
There are some problems in Russia with the patriotic way of
thinking. As [Komsomolskaya Pravda] says, "There are none of the
factors necessary for the existence of patriotism in Russia now."
Indeed, the economic roots of patriotism are based on a high
standard of living; its ideological roots are connected with
traditions and spiritual unity of the nation. Currently, Russia has a
shortage of all these things. The newspaper claims that there is no
pride in their country among Russian citizens, nor is there any
spiritual unity. Most Russians are convinced that their country has
done nothing good for them and are not obliged to it. [Komsomolskaya
Pravda] notes that a few years ago "the feeling of shame prevailed
among Russians. Now they mostly have no feelings at all." In such a
situation appeals for restoration of patriotism are interpreted as a
"cheap propaganda action."
Alexander Zinovyev, a prominent observer, has states in
[Literaturnaya Gazeta] that there are no forces in Russia interested
in restoration of patriotism. "Currently, only an imitation of
patriotism is possible: political verbosity accompanied with shows on
this topic that do not encourage most Russians to patriotic demeanor."
Using the market language, patriotism is a "long-term investment
project" is Russia, whereas such projects are not funded in the
country now. Nearly the only ground for the spiritual unity is the
obvious disgust for America and Americans, which was displayed during
the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City.
The Russian media has long been trying to discover the reasons
for Russians' dislike for America. Pro-Western media assert that the
reason for this dislike is just the envy for Americans' prosperity.
More patriotic media state that Americans are too self-concerned and
conceited, so the US does not take any account of the interests of any
other countries.
The Olympic passions have led even such a moderate and respected
periodical as the newspaper [Izvestia] to make a rather harsh
announcement: "The Olympic Games are a model of the world. The model
of the modern world is as follows: here is the US and there are all
the rest. The fate of all the rest depends on whether the US will
acknowledge their existence."
In the opinion of [Izvestia], the strong pressure on Russian
sportsmen during the Olympic Games and the aspiration to gain a
victory at any expense destroyed naive hopes of the Russian society
for the possibility of a new unity with the West on the anti-terror
ground.
The cause of what took place at the Olympic Games is rather
simple. Americans are traditionally not much interested in Olympic
Games preferring more customary spectacles, such as American football
or basketball. It was necessary to make these Olympic Games American
games to make people watch them.
However, [Izvestia] thinks that "wishing to raise its ordinary
citizens shocked by the tragedy of September 11, America hurt ordinary
citizens of many other countries of the world, who could have become
its sincere allies." As a result, sport has become a new arena of cold
war.
Famous writer Vasily Aksenov has noted in his article in
[Moskovskie Novosti], "It seems to me that Olympic Games should not be
excessively patriotic. This is a festival of the entire human race.
Why should we get even with one another remembering the times when
sport was a weapon of the permanent ideological squabbling?"
The newspaper [Vremya MN] says in this connection, "A search for
enemies is the worst thing revived by these Olympic Games. At the same
time, the newspaper believes that the recent Olympic experience may
prove useful. "The hysterical reaction of the society revealed what
actually goes on in our country." This reaction was especially
impressive against the background of the society's indifference to
really acute domestic problems, such as the Chechen war or homeless
children. The newspaper also states that the games showed that the
world has radically changed. This happened not on September 11 but
much earlier. "The extent of business, television, the press, and
politics was so great that it did not correspond to initial values of
Olympic Games. Earlier, participation in Olympic Games was more
important that a victory. And now the main aim is a victory at any
expense, by any possible means."
This lesson may easily be understood by the country, where every
third person thinks that nuclear weapons are the main thing that makes
a country great.
[Moskovskie Novosti] states that the number of those who think so
has doubled over the past four years. Two years ago the number of
those who thought that a country's scale depends on its cultural
heritage was larger by 10%. The number of those who think that the
highness of a country is determined by observance of human rights and
freedoms has dwindled too.
As [Izvestia] has noted, "it will be difficult for politicians of
'offended countries to explain to their citizens why America is the
empire of the truth and kindness and international terrorists belong
to the empire of evil." It is noteworthy that the anti-terror
operation in Iraq has not begun yet.
Against this background all intrigues of the Russian "evil
genius," Boris Berezovsky, seem needless. Why arrange a special
conspiracy to destroy Russia if it still lives by ideas of the 20th or
even 19th century? It is not ruled out that Berezovsky will only have
to wait a little and everything will be as he wants.
It is only necessary for him to remember to present all
inevitable events as his predictions coming true. It is not worthwhile
to return to Russia for this purpose, thus provoking unfriendly
actions against him. As Sergei Dorenko, Berezovsky's former
mouthpiece, has said, Berezovsky is the second Prince Kurbsky (the
person who opposed Ivan the Terrible - translator's note) only in
London, while in Russia he is just a political pensioner, a person
from the previous era.
Mavra Kosichkina
(Translated by Kirill Frolov)
*******
Web page for CDI Russia Weekly:
http://www.cdi.org/russia
Archive for Johnson's Russia List:
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson
With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and
the MacArthur Foundation
A project of the Center for Defense Information (CDI)
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20036