| JRL #6101: | Plain Text - Entire Issue |
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TITLE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH NIKOLAI ZLOBIN [nzlobin@cdi.org]
AND IVAN SAFRANCHUK [isafranchuk@cdi.org],
Center for Defense Information OFFICIALS, REGARDING RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS Moderator: Good day, dear colleagues, and welcome to the Press Development Institute. The topic of the press conference is "US Foreign Policy After the Terrorist Acts of September 11, 2001 and Russian-American Relations". It gives me pleasure to introduce our guests, Nikolai Vasilyevich Zlobin, fresh from the United States. He is director of Russian and Asian programs with the US Center for Defense Information and director and chief editor of the Washington Profile news agency; and Ivan Alexeyevich Safranchuk, head of the Moscow branch of the Center for Defense Information. Nikolai Vasilyevich Zlobin. Zlobin: Thank you. I am aware that everybody in Washington is aware that the American foreign policy at present has a lot of question marks and makes more and more people think what that policy is. And I think looking from Russia one can see that the foreign policy has not yet been determined. And I will try to explain to you in a nutshell what the new American foreign policy is, the policy that they are trying to implement. It is no secret that President Bush changed his foreign policy three times during the past year. After the elections he tried to implement his electoral platform and it didn't fly. Having been confronted with international realities he had to change his foreign policy. And if you have questions, I may elaborate on this topic afterwards. And again after the tragedy of September 11 American foreign policy had to be revised to its very foundations. And as far as I am concerned, I see the Bush Doctrine taking shape in foreign policy. Its main elements are already discernible and I think the Bush Doctrine will influence American foreign policy for a long time after Bush even if he is a two-term president. I will try to tell you about some of the main features of the present foreign policy of the US. One such feature is that the administration is openly pursuing a war-time foreign policy. This is one of the main things about the US foreign policy as a result of which the military are coming to play a bigger role in foreign policy. The news makers are Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and the military agencies which can be seen much more often on the screens here and there and all over the world. Journalists seek them out for interviews rather than seeking out representatives of the diplomatic establishment of America. The US foreign policy is geared to the military aims that country sets itself. We may later discuss these goals if you like. But considering that the war going on is obviously non-traditional and from the outset the Bush administration took the stand that in this war there are friends and foes, but no neutral countries and each country should take sides. This is a new element in the American foreign policy because until recently the US has been fairly tolerant of neutrality. Now they are extremely intolerant of neutrality. And I think it should be said that there is growing awareness in the White House in Washington that the US has no military rivals at present and the US can formulate its military goals without consulting its allies. And I think one should include this element in the Bush Doctrine, almost total revision of the relations with the traditional allies and the new allies which has already begun. And the basis for that is that militarily the United States is a whole generation ahead even of its West European NATO allies. The Americans understand this and in their foreign policy proceed from this. I know for sure that there is a group within the US administration that would be prepared to go ahead with this policy and htese military actions even if the United States does not have any allies. What are the goals of the present foreign policy? I have said already that it is a policy of a country at war. Of course, to some extent the military policy is characterized by the fact that the internal policy has not been put on a war footing. And this creates economic and legal problems. But the foreign policy of the United States increasingly looks like the policy of a country at war and it is aimed at achieving military goals. There are six goals that I can formulate: protecting the US territory from new terrorist acts, strengthening the US positions practically throughout the world, undisguised strengthening, possible liquidation of the territories where terrorists may be hiding or regrouping or training; fourth, protecting the US information space from any attacks on its information systems; fifth, possible use of new technologies to organize support of US military actions by any means anywhere; and sixth, protecting the US space interests and assets against possible terroris attacks. At present the foreign policy, like its military policy, is based on the principle of a four-theater war and the capacity to make war against two aggressors simultaneously. And it is openly declared in the United States that it should not stop at seizing the capitals of countries and replacing their regimes. And it is quite openly said that it is necessary to give up the position of the Clinton administration, namely, refusal to commit ground forces. Washington believes that there is a misconception in the world that America will never decide to use ground forces. At present the US foreign policy establishment is driving home the message that America would not stop at significant loss of American lives. They believe that it is a naive misconception that America will confine itself to using high-precision weapons. No, if necessary they will use their ground forces. Another side of the doctrine is that the United States is at present less prepared than in the past decades to see its foreign policy determined by the international community. They don't want any international accords or agreements, any protocols with any countries, be they allies or enemies, to constrain the actions of the United States. So, it is obvious that a reluctance to sign any papers and any treaties is connected to the fact that there is a very strong feeling in Washington that the position of the United States must be determined only by the United States, only in this concrete period of time and it should not be bound by any agreements intended for some more or less prolonged period of time. Hence, we have a set of implications and if we have time we will discuss them. Yet another component of this doctrine, as I see it, is the US refusal to use the full potential of international organizations, including NATO or the United Nations. The US is today distancing itself from these organizations by virtue of different reasons and putting it down to the weakness of these organizations or to the impossibility for these organizations to solve the foreign policy problems that are faced today by the United States. But instead of these organizations, established on the basis of formal procedures, the US today is offering a different picture, a different structure of international relations, based in the first place on what is called "international coalitions." From the very outset the word coalition, from September 11, became as you know an element of the international relations lexicon but from the very beginning the understanding of the word coalition began to diverge -- in the United States, in Washington and in the world. Today this divergence in interpretation is perfectly obvious. The US today and the Bush Administration today regards a coalition as something exceptionally flexible, something very amorphous and on each particular question, on each particular objective of the US foreign policy doctrine and Washington thinks that it is possible to create one's own coalition. This is to say that the coalition that exists today in the war on the terrorists in Afghanistan, this coalition must not necessarily be preserved if the United States, say, begins to wage active hostilities against Iran or North Korea or it begins doing something in the Philippines. They say okay in that case we will put together another coalition and we shall act within another coalition. The idea is that, and it has expounded several times by high officials of the administration at different meetings. So, it is not the coalition that determines the objectives, it is the objectives that determine what the shape of the coalition will be. Those who sign under these objectives, they will be the members of the coalition. If they do not sign on, they will be our enemies. This is yet another element that I would draw your attention to today. The United States does not see it necessary to fight for the preservation of the coalition that existed in the wake of September 11. It takes a normal view of the circumstance that with the change in the tasks, the coalition will change. Countries will agree with the new problems or they will not agree with them, to accede or to withdraw, and so there is the possibility for the simultaneous existence of several coalitions that will be aiming to accomplish different objectives. There is yet another element to which I would like to draw your attention, it is the question of an ideological reorientation of the priorities of the US foreign policy. We hear increasingly less and less of late or maybe we are not hearing at all that the US foreign policy is aimed at asserting human rights, development of democracy or maintaining peace in the world. So, the US is openly avoiding any peace-making initiatives. Just remember that their actions in Yugoslavia. On the contrary, increasing the priorities of the US foreign policy are decided by what other countries may offer to the US. It is bases, intelligence data, diplomatic possibilities, territory, air corridors and so on. And at this present stage these priorities in the US foreign policy today play a greater role than the priorities implying the degree to which a country is democratic, how much it has progressed toward better exercise of human rights, freedom of the press, exposure of corruption and so on. Today the country most useful to the United States is without a doubt Pakistan. And there are no problems, in the eyes of the Americans, as regards what Pakistan is in political terms. And the last point I would like to mention is the following. So far these have been only the components of the doctrine and the doctrine is in the stage of emergence yet and incidentally I would now interrupt myself and say that the doctrine is taking shape today and today there are good opportunities to participate in the molding of the doctrine. And many countries are allowing this opportunity to slip, by taking a passive posture, and here I largely include Russia. Today this doctrine and the US foreign policy is still soft, inchoate, in the state of formation, not complete. So, there is a great opportunity to influence the molding of it. The last point I would like to mention is this: Increasingly the US foreign policy is showing signs of the idea that the best defense is attack. You cannot protect yourself, you cannot defend yourself from all imaginable terrorist attacks. Everybody agrees with this. Over this, the US foreign policy elite gets split into two camps. If you cannot defend yourself against all foreign policy threats, so, what is to be done? Does one try to prevent, to defend and to prevent the occurrence of those that will materialize with greater certainty or one tries to take a preemptive action in order to destroy the possible sources of those attacks. Hence the notorious concept of the axis of evil -- Iran, Iraq and North Korea, among others. A significant part of the US foreign policy elite, and I will not say the bigger part, including members of the administration, members of Congress, participants in the brain trusts in the ruling US entities, -- believe that preemptive action today is an important component of the defense of the United States. It is not to wait being attacked, it is to nip in the bud the very possibility to launch the attack expected. It is not certain that this position will gain ascendancy. It is by far not certain. But somewhat outpacing myself, I will tell you that while with regard to Iraq several months ago the question posed itself in these terms: to attack or not to attack, today the question is phrased -- when to attack, to a greater extent than the attack or not attack dilemma. So, there is a movement toward the dilemma of when is it profitable to do this. There is such a movement and the number of people, including administration officials, who resolutely opposed any military actions against Iraq or North Korea or Iran is diminishing, it seems to me. The more so that US military, day after day, continue to assure people that with regard to Iraq, Iran and North Korea there will be no military difficulties. That the difficulties are extremely exaggerated. That the US army will face no notable problems to "sort it out" with those regimes and to remove Saddam Hussein if it is necessary. And when others begin to object them, they would say that we heard the same objections in dealing with Afghanistan. They told us that in Afghanistan it will take many years, that we will bog down in there. Nothing of this has happened and the military task will be accomplished by us, says the US army. If political problems follow in the wake, this is none of our business. It means that as regards the axis of evil, since I mentioned it, I would say only two things which today is much discussed in the Russian and international press. As far as I am concerned, in the top leadership of the United States today nobody can say what decision will finally be taken. Different circumstances and different factors are being analyzed, but there is no decision and the decision will hardly be taken soon. And here there are several circumstances that restrain the freedom of action of the US President. Firstly, it is the election year, election to Congress. Bush has an incredible rating of support, of popularity. The thing uppermost in the minds of many is whether the US President risk taking a political action, a military action that can diminish his popularity. Will he risk that in the election year and it is obvious to many that Bush will finish running for a second term (sic--FNS). Now there is no need for him to be concerned with his popularity because things are running well so why take risks, as many ask. On the other hand, and add to this the not so good state of the US economy. There are problems in the economy. On the other hand, I can say that the war in Afghanistan has quite depleted the US arsenal of precision arms which will have to be used at any other theaters of operations. Today America is very close to starting to use its strategic military reserves which is normally done under pressing military circumstances. It has used almost everything that it had in storage, especially high-precision weapons. This is not easy to replenish. Yes, the enterprises that are working in this field are working in three shifts, they are working vigorously and screwing on ever new warheads, self-targeting warheads. But that would take at least several months, I mean going back to the state it was in before the attack on Afghanistan. Some experts believe that America needs half a year to replenish the weapons it has spent in Afghanistan. This is one of the circumstances that makes it possible to judge about the reality or otherwise of the decision on the timeframe. And one should remember that the decision calls for substantial military training which, as far as I can judge, is not in progress. There are no concrete military plans in the process of implementation to train troops, prepare the equipment, the air force and the navy for starting military actions against Iraq, Iran and North Korea. For the time being it is mainly theoretical talk among the military, various plans of operations, the assessment of political and military risks, but it hasn't yet come to the development of strategic and tactical plans. Military experts believe that this will take at least several months. So, one can say with a degree of certainty that the Bush statement in his state-of-the-union address was based mainly on the need to sound out international reaction, to provoke a reaction and to see what the United States might expect if it moves in that direction. As far as I can say now, Washington is intensively analyzing that reaction. And it seems to me that the United States is inclined more and more to think that it can get away with it. The reaction will be negative, the reaction will be neutral, but on the whole many will breathe a sigh of relief if the problem of Saddam Hussein is solved. Many will breathe a sigh of relief if the question of North Korea is solved. Right or wrong, but this is how it is seen from Washington today. And another problem -- I will just name a couple of problems that are the most obvious in the US foreign policy. It is the problem of NATO. The problem of the United States and NATO takes on added importance at present because it has become evident that NATO countries are lagging far behind the United States of America militarily. At the recent conference in German the Americans posed a very stark question about the need to significantly increase the NATO countries' military budgets. The US increase in the military budget is 49 billion which President Bush requested and obtained. This very increase is more than the overall military budget of the principal countries -- the European NATO member countries. The Americans believe that this makes it impossible to pursue joint military cooperation. As the former German Foreign Minister recently said: Soon we will not be able even to deal with the Americans because we will be at completely different technological levels. As to what is to be done, nobody knows today because the Europeans are not burning with desire to increase their military budgets and as you know the Americans demand that they increase them. As Robertson said it also in Germany, the NATO countries are gradually turning into military pygmies. It makes no sense for the Americans even to ask. As to Britain, Germany, France and Italy, they maybe considered, but the rest of the NATO countries are "an empty place" in military terms. And the technological gap is leading to serious political consequences. The US interest in cooperation with NATO today becomes irrelevant. And then the question arises as to what will happen to the organization, if the country that founded it, loses any interest in it? Hence, one can pose differently the question about Russia's cooperation with NATO. Much depends on the future shape of NATO and on future relations between the US and NATO. Many things will stem from this. What can, strictly speaking, Russia get from cooperation with NATO? There is a whole range of issues which I would not wish to raise now. This unilateral character of America's policy at present is aimed not only against Russia. Or rather it is not aimed at anyone. Or rather it is aimed against all. The best NATO allies today are becoming victims. US allies are becoming, so to say, unwitting victims of that one-sided policy, as also are adversaries and neutral countries. Today the US makes it clear and they made it perfectly clear in Germany that they are giving the NATO countries the last chance to decide what they should be. I have the suspicion that if the US gets what it wants, meaning an abrupt increase in the military spending of the European NATO countries, the US will lose interest in NATO as a military entity and then NATO can quite be transformed into a political European structure with some form of US participation. But any US military actions will not rely -- and I started my presentation with this -- on contractual documents, papers signed or formal unions, but on the coalitions that will be changing every month, every day and every year if you wish. And another question I would like to briefly raise the following question. After that I will stay something about Russia, but Russia will mainly be discussed by Ivan, so I will not touch it for the moment. I will raise the question of ABM defense. I think that here there is one serious mistake. The withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty and the question of establishing an ABM defense in the form as proposed by President Bush -- these are not two events which are connected between themselves. It is not certain that withdrawal from the treaty prompts the establishment of the system. Moreover, between the withdrawal from the treaty and the establishment of the system there may be a space of several decades, as we know. So, the position that -- the Americans have exited from the treaty and this automatically leads to the establishment of an ABM defense system unveiled by President Bush and so the question is settled -- such a fatalistic position is irrelevant. Firstly, there is a number of circumstances and the first circumstance is that there is no system as such. So far, it is only a concept. You can imagine that the Americans have not yet decided the most important question: what will the system be? -- Will it be Earth-bound, sea-based, space-based or combined? And this is something on which everything else hinges: how much money is needed and what technology is needed and what factories will take part, and what countries? So, even this question is not decided. And the main thing is that there are at least two decades which make it possible to take part in the work and I will tell you how the thing is seen from Washington -- renouncing the 1972 Treaty leads to a situation in which renouncing the old system of international security leads to a situation in which one needs to put together a new system of international security. And what President Bush has proposed is one of the variants preferable for this administration but by far not the only option and the one that does not lead automatically to the acceptance of the idea unveiled by Bush with regard to the ABM defense system. So, I think we have a period of time when Russia and other countries, including the NATO countries, have very good opportunities to participate in developing a new system, an international system of security and they will not and they do not wish to reconcile themselves to the variant proposed by Bush. The more so that the variant is of course not a "satisfactory" one, considering not only the tremendous resistance, the huge discontent with this variant in the US itself. There are many more people and organizations who know how the US political system operates. You know that the US President is quite a dependent political figure, the product of compromise, and he has to take into account the aggregate huge set of interests of different groups, segments of society and his electorate. It is a country where the foreign policy depends on the domestic situation to the greatest extent. As to the opponents of US withdrawal from the 1972 Treaty, their number was many times less than the number of opponents to the establishment of an ABM system in the form proposed by Bush. But these forces have not yet genuinely joined the struggle in the US itself -- but they are joining in. I would like to say that the system faces a very hard future and there is a possibility to vigorously influence that future. I would even say that the problem of withdrawing from that treaty can be turned into a field for international cooperation and the conflict may be transformed into an opportunity for cooperation. And a couple of words about how Washington views Russia today. To be honest, I must tell you that the US administration and Congress and the entire US political elite were greatly surprised by the support offered by President Putin. Without a doubt, the support was unexpected, it was expressed so clearly and sincerely that the Americans were very much surprised. This is one thing. President Putin gained immense popularity and respect in America by acting the way he did plus there were two things more -- Putin's extremely restrained response to America's withdrawal from the 1972 treaty influenced very well the image of the Russian President in the United States. And the third thing which the Americans did not expect was that President Putin did not ask for anything in return throughout all this time. The Americans are not very much accustomed to such a policy -- because others are trying all the time to get something from them or to bargain for something with them. And believe me, one can clearly see all this from Washington, namely, that President Putin and Russia did not ask for anything in return and the US administration was extremely favorably impressed. They are perfectly aware that in Russia there are very mighty forces, a massive movement and that enormous pressure is exerted on President Putin to force him to ask for something. But the fact that he is not asking for anything makes America today think: what we ourselves can give him? This makes up for an entirely different situation, as you understand: Russia is not asking for anything any longer, while the Americans are thinking about what they can give Russia in order to back President Putin in his rather pro-Western foreign policy orientation. Unfortunately, the Americans cannot give much, in principle, because, clearly, the Vanik amendment over accession to the World Trade Organization -- well, the latter is not solely the US prerogative. Of course, the Americans can help with resolving some trade or economic problems. But even in NATO the Americans are not all-powerful simply to dictate to NATO. Therefore, as to what American can offer Russia today is largely an enigma for the US foreign policy elite. But indeed, what does Russia need from America today? As you know, over the past week there has been increasing speculation to the effect that, although America flatly refuses to sign any international accords, perhaps, if Russia so wishes, they will agree to conclude some treaty with Russia. Believe me, America or the US administration do not need that treaty, and they will do it exclusively out of respect for Russia and President Putin. It will be an imperfect treaty. There is little time left till May, and they want to bring it along in May. Perhaps, it will even be not a full-fledged treaty, but just an accord between the two executive branches. Indeed, the Americans feel obliged to Putin and Russia for the Russian President having turned around his foreign policy and, in spite of domestic pressure, his having given explicit and consistent support to the US. Admittedly, and Washington understands that, the main obstacle to cooperation between the US and Russia is the domestic problems of Russia itself. There are too many problems. Cooperation with NATO or military cooperation with the US immediately brings forth the lack of reform in the Russian army. We just live in different timeframes. Economic cooperation immediately demonstrates that we exist in different economic dimensions from the point of view of not just size, but also economic rules and regulations, including transparency, finances, etc. Therefore, Russia's domestic problems are extremely important to the establishment of strategic partnership with the US. The US and Russia cannot be strategic partners so long as Russia's domestic problems remain unresolved. Believe me, the US would like very much to have Russia as a strategic partner, but there is a range of objective problems depending on Russia. After Clinton's failure to expedite solutions to these problems, I think, Washington is very unwilling to exert any influence on Russia's domestic political evolution or on political evolution in other FSU nations in order to avoid provoking new negative reactions. What we have is a sort of Catch-22: on the one hand, they want Russia to become a strategic partner, which would benefit the US in many ways, especially today, while on the other, the problems hampering such strategic partnership are largely beyond US control. In this sense the Russian authorities have great opportunities to help resolve such problems. Take Afghanistan, for example. The US has absolutely no experience of work in Afghanistan. The military operation aside, the US does not know how to work with Afghanistan's authorities. They frankly say that they need assistance in that. Take the problem of the Soviet Union's 30-billion debt, still unpaid. As far as I understand, no one is going to forgive these debts. Therefore, ways need to be sought to resolve this problem. Of course, Russia is unable to repay these debts. Recently I came up with an idea which seems to have provoked a flicker of interest in Washington, but seems to have failed to register in Russia. I suggested the following solution to this 30-billion debt, much of which, admittedly, is owed to Germany. Still, America and Germany, I think, could agree and divide that debt into three parts, and 10 billion out of that debt give back to Russia, so to speak, as payment for the termination of any nuclear contract with Iran. Indeed, Russia hopes to earn just about 8-10 billion. Why not buy out those contracts with Soviet debts? Russia will keep that money all the same. The second part, another 30 billion (sic - FNS) could be invested back into Russia through the US government-run external bank, EXIMBANK. This means that the money will stay in Russia, but they will be invested by the Americans. The third part, the last 30 billion (sic - FNS) dollars, could be invested in Russia, too, but in civil society, in the independent press and the development of civil society. This is huge money, enough to establish a host of independent TV stations, newspapers and magazines. Incidentally, the latter idea has evoked some reflection at the two presidents' meeting in Texas. The other two are still in the air. So, these are some purely practical matters which America and Russia can and must discuss today. The overall problem, I can say, is that there is huge mistrust between our two countries. There is extremely inadequate expert evaluation on both sides. Ivan and I talked about that yesterday and agreed that very many problems of Russian-US relations still are in the hands of people who over the years have concerned themselves with arms control. Traditionally such people in our country continue to deal with the Americans, and similar people at the other end deal with relations with Russia -- people who supervised arms control 10, 15 or 20 years ago. The Russian-US relationship must not be allowed to boil down to arms control, which should be a 20- or 30-rank issue. That is why Americans today do not quite understand Russia's insistence on having some agreement precisely on this issue. But there is this momentum on both sides. I will just give you one example, which I came across recently and which outraged me. As everyone must know, there an institute of Russian studies in the US, and the Department of State funds a program of regional exchanges with Russia. Now the Department of State has closed that program, denying 400 million dollars, including the Galina Starovoitova prize. In other words, America does not have the money for the Galina Starovoitova human rights prize, which is ridiculously small. They are die-hard bureaucrats there. This momentum as regards relations with Russia and kin suspicions -- this lack of trust still exists. There is one more factor, which, perhaps, is not yet taken seriously in Russia -- lack of a normal Russian lobby in the US, one capable of influencing US policy, and I think that serious work needs to be done in this respect. Any country which has self-respect maintains such a lobby today, and through that lobby the interests of such a country are brought to the attention of the US leadership without any significant distortion. There is no such thing in Russia. The reason for that is a different matter. But I believe that America would like to have strategic relations with Russia, it would like to have Russia as a strategic partner. I think that Russia for its part would like to have a similar relationship with the Americans. But a host of these problems, some of them temporary, are in the way of establishing such relations today, and, generally, blur the picture. I will finish my monologue at this point and give the floor to Ivan. If you have any questions later... Moderator: Thank you, Nikolai Vasilyevich. Ivan Alexeyevich Safranchuk, welcome. Safranchuk: Thank you. I will touch upon just three matters which, I think, are especially relevant in relations with the United States. The first is the challenges and openings for Russia in the context of the clear US policy line of unilateral action on the world scene, the so-called unilateralism. Second, the prospects of America's relations with China and the implications for Russia. Third, my answer to the question asked more and more frequently of late, whether the honeymoon in Russian-US relations is over. So, the challenges and openings in the context of US unilateralism. From my point of view, the main challenges posed by this approach are that the United States intends to act in most international circumstances unilaterally. The victims of that approach are both American allies and permanent American coalitions, such as NATO, or traditional coalitions based on bilateral treaties, such the US-South Korean or the US-Japanese coalition. This undoubtedly is a challenge to Russia, because it will find it harder to make the US reckon with its own position if the Americans in principle are not inclined to take account of anyone's position except their own. And their key foreign policy goal is to minimize any negative implications of their own unilateral action. Undoubtedly, this is a challenge to Russia, which has limited opportunities for imposing its foreign policy will on the US. But alongside the challenge there are openings, I think. For example, in proclaiming unilateralism as its main foreign policy principle, the US ceases to be dogmatic. This is a difference of principle between the Clinton administration and the Bush administration. Bush does not stick to dogma, he is willing to revise his viewpoint, and has already done so on more than one occasion. Bush is willing to buy an idea, if it is really a good idea. He will not dump it just because it has been offered by his political adversary or because it was not he personally who came up with it. In this sense Russia has a great chance to sell good foreign policy ideas to the United States, it has good opportunities for cooperation. As a matter of fact, the only limitation in this sense is the wits and probity of Russian foreign policy. In my view, on the US side today there are virtually no restrictions on Russian-US relations. It is a different matter that the US itself is not ready to offer anything to Russia. But it is absolutely open to any Russian proposals. In this sense greater demands are placed on Russian foreign policy at the level of both formulation and implementation through diplomatic action. It is necessary to draw up an agenda of interest to Russia and sell it to the US. I repeat, in my view, the United States today is ready to buy, quote-unquote any good idea -- or perhaps, even buy it literally if we talk about the economy. Second, the Chinese-US relations and their implications for Russia. These relations are evolving from the clear goal of Bush as candidate for president to take a tougher stand on China and to promote relations with Japan and South Korea as America's traditional allies in the region to Clinton's policy of engagement with regard to China. But I see here a serious problem which Bush is currently disregarding, but which he will have to reckon with in the future. Over the past 15-20 years one of the main tools of the US foreign policy on China was human rights. In the present situation it ceases to be a tool of US foreign policy, giving way to the fight against international, regional, local and all other terrorists. The universal concept of human rights protection across the globe ceases to be a US approach, and the number of aces the US holds with regard to China is decreasing dramatically. It will be rather difficult to put pressure on China without resorting to human rights rhetoric, and this, I think, is the fundamental difference between the Bush administration and the Clinton administration, and also the weakness of the Bush administration. In this context Russia can play a far more significant role in the dialogue between the US and China, between China and Russia, and so on. The third question is whether the honeymoon in Russian-US relations is over. I think that those who ask this question had an absolutely wrong idea of what has been happening in the Russian-US relations over the past six months, or over the past 8-9 months, roughly since preparations for the Ljubljana summit. The very formulation of this question testifies to failure to understand the essence of the Russian-US relationship. I think that the Russian-US relations are not in the phase of some temporary rapprochement, which can eventually end in rollback. On the contrary, any rollback is virtually ruled out, barring some extraordinary circumstances. I believe that there was no honeymoon at all in Russian-US relations over the past years, therefore, there can be no end to it. Over those six months of the so-called honeymoon Russia has asked virtually no questions or made no serious foreign policy concessions; under concession I mean something that would contravene Russia's interests. Nothing has been done that would be contrary to Russia's interests as they are understood by the incumbent Russian administration, of course, not as they are understood by the Communist Party of Russia. There have be no concessions. Therefore, there can be no talk of any temporary or tactical nature of these new relations. These are fundamental changes for years and decades to come. Thank you. Moderator: Thank you. For those who are late, I can tell you that the transcript of this press conference will be posted at our web site, pdi.ru, and you will be able to read what Nikolai Vasilyevich Zlobin said. I mean this mostly for Renmin Ribao. Thank you. Your questions are welcome. Zlobin: I already have a question here. The question is about yesterday's statement by president Powell -- no, that's too much for him. By Secretary of State Powell -- to the effect that the relations between Russia and the US today are as good as they have never been, and there is an attitude of great trust between the diplomats of the two countries, is that correct? And you ask me to comment. I think I will agree with the first part of that statement, I will agree with Ivan that the Russian-American relations generally are in a very good shape. The only alarming thing in the Russian-American relations today is that they still depend to a significant extent on the events in the world arena. This must somehow be avoided. When the relations improve or worsen, depending on some developments, this is not normal because relations must be quite stable and survive any international perturbations even if countries disagree on certain issues and then their leaders adopt a negative attitude to one another. But the relations today are in a very good shape. And there are prospects for their improvement. I think that Washington, and not only Washington, is disappointed by the quality of Russia's foreign policy activities and by the quality of the team that drafts Russia's foreign policy today. Russia has not proposed any new offers, new ideas or new solutions. And I take it, at least from conversations with my friends and colleagues, that the following conclusion can be made, namely that the Americans tried to hint it to Putin several times, as well as to other ranking leaders of Russia that it is necessary to change the foreign policy team, it is necessary to generate new ideas, to have new people, it is necessary to do something. But this is not happening. It seems to me that here is some problem. That is why with all due deference to Powell, I am not sure I can agree with the second part of his statement that they are working well. Voice: I am gladdened by this. Q: Is there a possibility to sign a new agreement along the lines of Gore-Chernomyrdin? I have in mind the US and Russia against Iran. Safronchuk: No, there is no such possibility. I believe that the idea mentioned by Nikolai about buying Russian contracts, has been repeatedly stated and discussed and in my opinion, this is impossible. For a certain time there could be some doubts on this score but yesterday or the day before, there was an interview in the Wall Street Journal which contained the key phrase of the Russian President which also answers the following question that there are things we do not bargain over. So, purchasing the contracts is not possible. And there are economic and political reasons for this. The economic reasons boil down to stating that the Russian income from the Russian-Iranian cooperation cannot be compensated on the "one for one" principle. If you simply give exactly a billion dollars to the Russian Treasury to make up for the billion dollars mentioned in the contract to build a nuclear power plant in Busher, the one you give will not "perform" like the Iranian billion, because the money from the treasury will go to pay pensions and at best will go to pursue some good things: education, medic care, pensions, the army reform, larger wages for civil servants and so on. In a less optimistic scenario, the money will go as a loan to Gazprom, as other loans to restructure the RAO UES or other loans the Russian treasury will not benefit from. As to the money that is received at the construction of the NPP in Busher, it gets spread over the entire sector, thus triggering the so-called "multiplication effect" when within the sector that one billion turns into several billions or into squares of billions. The bad thing about the situation only is that the Russian military-industrial complex and the Russian Atomprom unlike the procedures in the United States. is much more isolated from the civilian economy. If there were a greater spill over into the civilian economy, then the "multiplication effect" would spread over into the civilian economy and it would be very good. Essentially, however, there are several international contracts, the deal with the Americans to transform highly enriched uranium into lean and selling it to the United States; the Russian-Chinese contract to build an NPP and uranium-enriching factory and the Russian-Iranian contract for an NPP in Busher and then the research reactor -- these are essentially several international contracts (and there are lesser contracts) -- so several major contracts actually keep busy a whole sector. And I don't know how to change this situation -- maybe to ask some billions from the United States so that they would maintain the Atomprom-Russia, but I think this has no prospect. So, we have to understand that giving up Iranian contracts as also giving up Chinese contracts would not mean renouncing one deal, it is renouncing a whole industrial sector. Such a decision in my opinion cannot be taken from the economic standpoint. As to politics, despite all the contentious character of the Russian leadership's attitude to internal processes in Iran where modernization and reform processes are still very remote from completion, so, despite all the disputed nature of these processes, Russia, giving up on contracts with the current regime in Iran, which is somehow heading toward democracy, Russia would de-legitimize its entire foreign policy vis-a-vis that country. By giving up the Iranian contracts Russia would have admitted that its entire foreign policy has been wrong. And in general, the entire policy vis-a-vis the so-called rogue nations and problem countries would happen to be wrong and all the Russian-American differences on this score would turnout not to have been worthwhile. It is political point which makes me think that it is impossible to give up the contracts. This does not mean that the subject cannot be discussed. I think, for instance, that Russia-American relations must give some space to matters of policy coordination and approach coordination, coordination of understanding the countries which are regarded by the US as problem countries. And this should not be done in the form of bargaining -- to buy or not to buy, but rather in the form of understanding the processes occurring in those countries. Zlobin: I will add a couple of words. I also believe there is little likelihood of Russia agreeing to an exchange, double or triple exchange of the value of the contracts. But it is not because the money is so important for the treasury, I don't think the money will ever make it to the treasury anyway but because some of the political and powerful political entities in Russia are interested in those contracts and they will not permit violating the contracts. This is one point. And another. I think that in the US today one feels as never before some movement in the foreign policy elite toward trying to understand Iran and to try to clarify the relationship with Iran. The generation of people who would not tolerate to hear the word "Iran" is gone. Those people would immediately recall the chronicle of hostages and so on. Iran was an absolute evil empire, so to speak. But this generation is on its way out, and a more sane generation of American politicians is emerging. I think, the Americans today are beginning to understand the colossal strategic and geopolitical importance of Iran. Although this is a slow process, but today we see more and more interest in Iran, and the Americans are indeed beginning to discuss what US policy on Iran should be like. Perhaps, cooperation with Russia in this matter is indeed possible, perhaps, necessary because Russia has many levers and a lot of experience of cooperation with Iran. The Americans for their part can reciprocate by helping Russia to establish good relations with Pakistan, for example. Indeed, Russia has no foothold in Pakistan, while the Americans have very strong positions there. Clearly, Iran, Pakistan and a number of other countries, divided into two camps, for various reasons, at the time of the Cold War, today are becoming important players in international affairs, and our countries should formulate their policies on those nations. Americans can no longer afford to ignore Iran, that is beyond doubt. Russia can no longer afford to ignore Pakistan. Our two countries can help each other. One more detail regarding Iran. The Americans cannot determine what is really happening as regards the Iranian nuclear program. Why isn't Iran developing the atomic bomb, or why is this development program proceeding so slowly? Or don't they have the political will to make the bomb? Indeed, they seem to have the capability to make it. So, what is going on? If there is really the political will to refrain from making the bomb, perhaps, this will should be supported and nurtured, and Iran should by no means be attacked verbally or militarily? The Americans seem to be scratching their heads, so to speak, undecided as to what to do about Iran. This is a very good sign, I think. Moderator: Thank you. TASS, welcome. Q: Nikolai Vasilyevich, back to my question, excuse me. For some reason, I think that your optimism, like that of Powell, is not quite justified, although you live in Russia and he lives over there. Zlobin: I live over there. Moderator: He lives in Washington. No questions, then? Q: No, the point is that you said many good words about the leadership, and so on. But you should not delude yourself: there was Kozyrev, now there are others; there was Yeltsin, now there are others. Therefore, it is correct that things should not depend on developments or personalities, but now you both say that Putin is good. Perhaps, there should be something else at the base of the Russian-US relationship. Zlobin: You see, we have a heavy burden of the past: throughout the 20th century the relations between the United States and Russia, the Soviet Union, were reduced to relations between the political leadership of the US and the political leadership of Russia, the Soviet Union. There were virtually no relations between nations. This is very important to understand because this is different from America's relations with any other allies or countries, where they had normal relations between societies, people and organizations. We used to have relations between the two groupings in power. They could agree, like each other, hate each other, make treaties, refuse to make treaties, wage wars or refrain from them. After the Soviet Union had collapsed, that relationship survived in many respects. The Americans take note of who heads Russia, of his policy, and deal with that. Many US politicians today understand that this is a wrong approach, that they need to do business with Russia, not with the Kremlin, and to build relations not with Putin, be he good or bad, but with Russia as a whole. And that relationship should be built not by the White House, but by America as a whole. Business, non-governmental organizations, the media, culture and education should establish relations with their counterparts in Russia, and then everything will far less depend on international political developments or changes in leadership. Unfortunately... Perhaps, this takes time, or perhaps, there are forces opposing that, forces that would like to monopolize these relations and continue to manipulate them. Perhaps, there are such forces on both sides. The same elite group formed on the basis of arms control are still very strong, and the military-industrial complexes are strong in both countries, and there is a very powerful trend in favor of reducing the relationship to counting the warheads on both sides. So, this sensible idea current in America today as regards dropping the warhead count in favor of establishing a normal relationship is now and again coming up against these declarations: let us count everything, put it on paper and respect it. This is not normal. I mean, these are not normal, healthy relations, but old mentality. I mean, I absolutely disagree with you. We do need new ideas. I agree with Ivan: America is badly in need of new ideas. Whoever offers ideas as regards the fight against terrorism, the building of a new world order or the formulation of America's foreign policy, they will look at those, analyze them and launch an open discussion because they need ideas. But Russia has so far failed to offer any. Moderator: Thank you. Express Khronika, welcome. Q: Could you say whether America indeed understands that only a democratic Russia can be a full-fledged partner and ally? Or they can get an ally like Iosif Vissarionovich once. Zlobin: They understand that only a democratic Russia can be a strategic ally, but as for temporary allies, Stalin was America's ally. This can be exploited. The Americans are perfectly aware that dictators must be used, if the dictators are helpful. Safranchuk: And at that time America was not so democratic a country, it was a different country, not to mince words. Zlobin: I will cite the example of the attitude toward Pakistan. There is no doubt that it is a dictatorial military regime. But the Americans regard them as remarkable allies, but there is no talk about helping Pakistan to somehow introduce itself into the Western community, nobody gives even a thought to this. Well, you know, they are a dictatorship, so how can they claim to some association with NATO or the European Union. They are a dictatorship. They are now helping us, the Americans, they are good guys and we, so to say, support them and like them. But we will not accept them as one of us. Same with the attitude to Russia. We can now be friendly, we can now even pursue colossal projects together but you know we have our own criteria that we must ourselves meet and these criteria are quite serious and democratic foundations of any society. Usually Turkey is cited as an example: Turkey entered the Western community but then it was a different epoch, there were different needs and different geo-political interests. Incidentally, Turkey, has excellently demonstrated an ability to get away from the traditional and to turn into a civil, non-religious society. Incidentally, many Americans today believe that Iraq can be next in line to fulfill the role of Turkey. Hence, the tendency which asks whether Iraq should not be helped to emulate the Turkish road by eliminating Saddam Hussein, because by education, by psychology, by reducing the impact of religion, Iraq is the most prepared Eastern country to adopt a system of democratic values. This is what they say at least. Whether it is justified or not, is a different matter. Hence, the special interest taken in Iraq and the desire to topple Saddam Hussein. In this way we can democratize and Westernize Iraq, a country most prepared for this. Q: Voice of America. It is about China meeting with Bush. Do you have a forecast about what the visit can give and what can be its results? Safranchuk: I can give you a recommendation. If I were Ziang Zemin, I would present President Bush with a Boeing aircraft. A whole plane in a box not open. In principle, I believe that the visit will be a success and Russia has things to learn. The Chinese foreign policy is full of initiative, pragmatic and looks into the future. This is an apt example of leaders, the Chinese leaders, who are concerned about themselves and simultaneously about the future of their country. In the coming years China will face a change of the political elite, including at the highest level. For Ziang Zemin it is probably the last meeting at the summit level with the US President and of course the Chinese leader must bequeath to his successor and to the new generation in the Chinese elite some "groundwork" that would immortalize him in the Sino-American relations and in the Chinese history. So, Jiang Zemin is guided by a pragmatic interest which, in my opinion, coincides with the interests of his country. So, the ground for relations is very good: China is prepared, in its relations with the US, to come up with initiatives and pursue an imaginative foreign policy. Russia must follow this process attentively for it offers things to learn from. But on the strategic plane, the Sino-American relations as well as the Russian-American relations -- now I am on the previous question -- will be influenced by the exit of the topic of human rights from American politics somewhere into the shade. This will largely complicate the tasks of the US diplomacy in relation to China. Without the human rights agenda, it will be much more difficult for the United States to exert foreign policy and diplomatic pressure on China, and thus it will have to talk to China as with an equal partner. This will happen, I assure you, and the US would not find it easy. Zlobin: What does all this look like from Washington? Firstly, I can say that China's significance in the US foreign policy is very rapidly growing, and China is becoming one of the principal countries with which America would wish to have reliable strategic relations over the long haul. It is interesting to note that the Americans perceive China, and maybe with sufficient grounds, as a country capable of pursuing a predictable foreign policy as distinct from Russia. As you know, a predictable foreign policy is a very prized thing. Even if it is a hostile policy but still predictable: this makes it possible to dealing with the country. China is not pursuing a hostile policy vis-a-vis America, absolutely, the Americans feel this, they feel how China's policy is changing vis-a-vis America. This predictability enables the Americans to see the movement, to clearly see the prospects for the relations with China today clearly, at least more clearly than they see the relations with Russia where there are too many surprises on the road. This is first. Second it is the question that interests Americans today about China -- Bush will be asking about this and they will and they will speak about that in Beijing -- it is China's reaction to any changes in the relations between Russia and NATO. So, any changes in the relations between Russia and NATO and any participation by Russia in NATO leads to a situation in which Russia gets included in particular NATO structures and that means that NATO gets closer and will stop on the borders of China. I think that the Americans today wish to calculate China's position very clearly before discussing these subjects with Russia. As far as I know, China has not expressed its position. As usual, the Chinese are sitting and waiting. I will agree with regard to human rights -- this topic is receding into a shadow. But I think that the Americans still have a mighty lever to influence the Chinese policy -- it's the economy. The economy remains and the American-Chinese economic relations are developing at a vigorous pace. Economically, the countries are increasingly dependent on each other. And I believe that the economy will remain one of the levers to influence China on the part of Washington. And the last small remark that I will make. People in Washington today are attempting to analyze yet another process at work in China, namely how China is experiencing the globalization which has now reached China. It is huge country, of diverse facets -- economically, political, ethnically and culturally. And now the globalization process has reached China, and at least as part of the American stereotypes, China is a country that has always been a thing in itself and this was the strength of China. Now one cannot remain a thing in itself because the boundaries of states cease to exist. The Internet, the capital flows, the finances combine to produce the need to open up. And this openness will be experienced by China and the Americans are concerned to see this process being peaceful, so that China does not explode. Then everything again will go to the dogs and America will have to get involved in God knows what conflicts. The Americans are keenly monitoring this. China, Russia, NATO, the economy and China and globalization. It seems to me that Washington is now trying to analyze these three things. There is, of course, a host of smaller things but the Americans are attempting to analyze these three groups of questions. I think that Bush will try to understand this during his visit. Q: The US military presence in Central Asia will raise some questions between China and America? Safranchuk: Of America in China? Of course, US presence in Central Asia is a blow to China's interests because, as you must have noticed, since the US came to Central Asia, apparently, for a long time, any talk about the Shanghai Five, the Shanghai Forum, has disappeared. This is no chance because over the recent years, in the late 1990s, Russia understood that it could not cope with the Central Asian crisis single-handed and looked to China as a key ally in addressing the problems of Central Asia. All of a sudden, the US took those problems upon itself. This is beneficial to Russia for certain reasons, and I think, will continue to be beneficial. But China is confronted with a number of questions. It is losing its initiative in Central Asia, not only as regards exerting some influence on Central Asia, but also as regards defining who is a terrorist and who is not, who can be dealt with through the use of force and who cannot. In view of China's domestic problems, including its Moslem enclave this is very important to it. Therefore, China has lost its initiative in this sense, and I think that this is very important to China. And I think China is going to discuss this with the US. But I suggest that the tenor of these discussions will be as follows: China will ask the US to respect the interests of Eurasian nations in defining the goals of its presence in the region. In other words, this should be a presence in the interests of a number of nations rather than the interests of exclusively the US. But I do not think China will ask the US to withdraw its troops from Central Asia. Zlobin: I will add a couple words. Although we are working together, I disagree. I think that the presence of US troops in Central Asia to a certain degree contributes to stability in the region, and China has an interest in stability on its northern border and in its northern regions. China will welcome any contribution to stability, any change in favor of stability in that region. Second, I think, -- I know that there was an energetic attempt to involve the US in the Shanghai Five, to encourage US interest in participation. But the US declined. Why is that grouping on the wane? Because the US has shown no interest. We can at least assume that there are certain forces trying to involve the US as a guarantor of stability in the region. I suspect that China is one of such forces. Q: A question for Mr. Safranchuk. You say that the presence of US troops in Central Asia benefits Russia. I personally think that it's the other way round because the CIS, especially Central Asia, is a very special zone of Russia's influence. Could you clarify your viewpoint? Safranchuk: There are two problems. One is relations with Central Asian countries per se, the other is relations with China and China's political and security presence in Central Asia. It was costly and difficult for Russia to sponsor those Central Asian regimes in their struggle against possible Islamic intrusions into their territory supported both from the outside and by domestic Islamists in those countries. It is far less expensive and arduous if the US does this job. Indeed, Russia is losing some of its political influence, but simultaneously it saves money and resources, including human resources, especially since the US promises to pursue cooperative policies there and respect Russia's interests. This is the benefit, the pragmatic balance of political benefits and material costs. There are certain political benefits, but there are costs as well. In fact, we are containing hostile forces in that region and outside it through US military presence. In very simple terms, the Americans are fighting Russia's fight, among other things. This is beneficial. I think that this view will prevail for a long time to come. The second question is Russian-Chinese relations. I repeat, Russia could choose between engaging China and the United States as the key partner in ensuring stability in the region. China provokes some suspicions by virtue of the presence of a Chinese diaspora in Russia, especially in the Trans-Baikal area. I think that China's heavy presence in Central Asia as well was frowned upon by the Russian political elite. Nevertheless, over the past years China was the only real partner in ensuring Central Asian security. That was the driving force behind the Shanghai Five as an international organization. When it turned out that the Americans could step in, while the Chinese would not become rivals or adversaries, but would see their numbers decline in the region, that evoked some pragmatic interest. In very simple terms, Russia opted for the United States rather than China in the specific Central Asian circumstances. That was a pragmatic choice, one open to argument, but I think that was the rationale. Moderator: Do you agree, Nikolai Vasilyevich? Zlobin: Generally, I do. I don't think Russia had a choice. No one asked Russia. Overall, it was a chance that the United States was attacked from Afghanistan. It was a chance that Central Asia became part of the US sphere of interests. If the attacks had been launched from Latin America or Africa, from Somalia, the focus would have been there. But it so happened that the danger arose from that region, and Asia now is the focal point. The US today believes it necessary to establish its control over the region for obvious reasons, without asking Russia or China. I don't think Russia had a choice because it was losing Central Asia anyway. It was impossible to keep it in the Russian sphere of influence whatever the circumstances. Perhaps, it could for 5, 10 or 15 years, but no longer. Central Asia would slip away, most probably into the sphere of interests of Islam, most likely, radical Islam. So, objectively American presence is very beneficial to Russia and China today. The Americans are aliens in the region, and it is difficult for them to stay there. They have no interests, no strategic interests in that region, as a matter of fact, at least today. The Americans are doing there what Russia has failed to do due to many reasons, in particular, the weakness of the Russian army and the lack of army reform. Moderator: Thank you. There seem to be no further questions, right? Let us leave our speakers in peace, although individual questions may continue. Thank you all, and you, Voice of America, can continue torturing my guests if they are willing. |
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