Johnson's Russia List
#6091
22 February 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Note from David Johnson:
1. AP: Russian Olympic officials threaten to pull athletes from games.
2. Interfax: Anti-Americanism on the increase in Russia. (poll)
3. pravda.ru: FREEDOM OF SPEECH KILLED RUSSIA. (poll)
4. Interfax: Gorbachev to open "Russia to America" charitable auction in
New York.
5. Reuters: Ex-generals slam Putin reforms as "betrayal"
6. Moscow Times letter: Statistical Clarification. (re Goskomstat)
7. Izvestiya: Sergey Porshakov, 'Revolving Door' Installed. ('Substantial
Shifts'
Seen Within Russian Regional Elites After Recent Elections)
8. RIA Novosti: RUSSIA'S NATIONAL DEBT GETS MORE MANAGEABLE.
9. AP: Russian Foreign Debt Drops.
10. BBC Monitoring: Defence minister speaks to Russian TV about army
reform,
Pankisi gorge.
11. Robert Bruce Ware: FEWER: CHECHNYA PEACE RECONSTRUCTION PLAN.]
******
#1
Russian Olympic officials threaten to pull athletes from games
February 21, 2002
By LARRY SIDDONS
SALT LAKE CITY (AP) - Angered by a string of decisions against its
athletes, Russia threatened Thursday to pull out of the Winter Olympics and
might not compete in the Athens Games if its concerns are not addressed.
Russian Olympic Committee president Leonid Tyagachiov said he told IOC
president Jacques Rogge that his nation was ``greatly unappreciated'' in
the Olympics.
The comments came at a news conference just hours after one of the nation's
top athletes, cross-country skier Larissa Lazutina, was disqualified from
the 20-kilometer relay because of high levels of hemoglobin found in a
pre-race blood test.
``If decisions are not made and issues we raised not resolved, the Russian
team will not play hockey, will not run 30 kilometers, will look very
negatively on other factors,'' Tyagachiov said.
He said there was a 24-hour window to address the situation, and that if
Russia left Salt Lake City it probably would not compete in Athens in the
next Summer Games.
``Once you leave, it is not easy to come back in,'' he said.
Later, Vitaly Smirnov, an IOC vice president from Russia, tempered
Tyagachoiv's remarks, saying there was no ultimatum ``not 24 hours or 48
hours.''
However, he said the Russian team wanted Rogge to write a letter to
Tyagachoiv ``and address our concerns.''
IOC officials were meeting to discuss the complaints, but did not
immediately comment.
The Russian men's hockey team is scheduled to play the United States in the
semifinals on Friday, and a 30-kilometer women's cross-country event is set
for Sunday.
Tyagachiov said that while Lazutina's hemoglobin count was just above the
legal limit, she was not guilty of doping.
``We are clean,'' he said. ``We have nothing to hide.''
A urine test on Lazutina will determine whether her case will be considered
a drug positive. Results were expected Friday; she was scheduled to compete
in the 30-kilometer race.
Lazutina, who has already won two silvers at these games to increase her
career medal total to nine, last raced on Feb. 15 in the 5-kilometer pursuit.
She was hoping for a record-tying 10th medal, but her disqualification
knocked four-time defending champion Russia out of Thursday's relay event.
But Tyagachiov was upset by more than the Lazutina case.
He made repeated references to the figure skating judging dispute, in which
Russia'a Elena Berezhnaya and Anton Sikharulidze won the pairs' competition
but had to share the gold medal with Canada's Jamie Sale and David Pelletier.
``This was a new decision that was practically unprecedented,'' he said.
``We went along with the decision and tried to look at it objectively. ...
But we have only so much patience.''
Tyagachiov also referred to what he said was a high number of Russian
athletes picked for drug tests and an unspecified ruling by a goal judge in
ice hockey.
``I think we are seeing a witch hunt,'' he said.
Smirnov warned against taking his country's complaints too lightly.
``Without Russia, the Olympic Games will be lost,'' he said.
Tyagachiov said he would meet with top officials of the International Ice
Hockey Federation, the International Skating Union and the international
ski federation FIS to discuss his complaints.
``We defend our honor,'' he said.
He also said that if the same rules that led to duplicate golds in pairs
skating were applied to the cross-country relay, Russia should share that
gold with race winner Germany.
``I told Rogge that since the Canadian figure skaters were awarded a second
gold medal, by the same logic our relay should get a gold, too, since it's
been dominant for so long,'' he said. ``Or if this is not an 'objective'
solution, why not stage a new relay on Saturday?''
The Ukrainian team also did not start event because Valentina Shevchenko
failed a blood test. Ukrainian officials declined to comment.
Germany won the gold medal, Norway took the silver and Switzerland got the
bronze.
The Russians planned to protest the race.
``This is a scandal. They are specifically hunting out Russian sportsmen,''
team leader Gennady Ramensky said.
*******
#2
Anti-Americanism on the increase in Russia
Interfax
Moscow, 21 February: Russian antipathy for the US has grown almost 4.5 times
over the past five years, from 9 per cent in 1995 to 39.3 per cent in 2001,
General Director of the Independent Russian Institute of Social and National
Problems Mikhail Gorshkov has told Interfax.
He said, citing the results of annual opinion polls, that even in the autumn
of 2001, the percentage of citizens who had a positive attitude towards the
US was two times smaller than in 1995 (a drop from 77.5 per cent to 36.8 per
cent).
The psychological motivation of this tendency is clearly seen in Russian
attitudes to the deliberately exaggerated assertion that "Americans always
behave brazenly everywhere". Today, 61 per cent of respondents agree with
this, while the percentage of those who disagree has decreased from 46 per
cent to 20 per cent, said Gorshkov.
The increasingly negative image of the US has to some extent spread to US
strategic allies, which constitute the West as a geopolitical entity and
symbolize what is usually termed "Western policies".
"These are, in the first place, the Western European countries, Canada and to
a certain degree Japan. The level of sympathy for the majority of these
states has lowered by 15 per cent against 1995 and for Britain, which is the
most active supporter of all of the US global actions, by almost 22 per
cent," he said.
Russian attitudes on the East are far more favourable. Even Iraq has lost
just 4 per cent of its supporters since 1995 and China less than 3 per cent.
The number of supporters of India has decreased by 7 per cent, but as before,
that country remains Russians' indisputable favourite in the east.
*******
#3
pravda.ru
February 21, 2002
FREEDOM OF SPEECH KILLED RUSSIA
The fund Public Opinion, which is very respectable and popular in Russia,
carried out another opinion poll, devoted to the following subject: "Russia:
What are we proud of and what are we ashamed of?" The first question in the
poll was: "Have you ever been proud of your country, and if you have, was it
seldom or often?" Fifty-one percent of the respondents gave a positive answer
to the question, whereas 33% said they were not really often proud of Russia.
Seven percent of the respondents were at a loss and nine percent said that
being pride for Russia was out of the question for them.
The next question of the poll changed the picture, but the tendency was
preserved anyway -- the positive scepsis, whether those two notions could
come
together. The question was as follows: "What feeling did you experience most
often about Russia -- pride or shame?" Only 26% said they could boast of
their feeling of pride, 39% said they were ashamed for the country in which
they lived, and 24% experienced both shame and pride. Eleven percent of the
respondents did not have anything to say on the subject.
Forty-eight percent of the respondents experienced the feeling of shame for
Russia very often. There were only 16% of optimists and eight percent did not
feel anything at all.
One of the most positive examples to illustrate this statistics is the
victory in the World War II, first and foremost. The second place is taken by
space exploration. The nostalgic feelings for the USSR come third. The pride
for the Russian athletes is somewhere behind it and the power of the spirit
of the nation, about which there are so many poems and songs, is somewhere at
the bottom of the list. Why is it so?
There are a lot of reasons why, and we can not mention all of them. The
attitude of the state to a human being: never-ending experiments with
perestroika transformed the perception of the people, which eventually
resulted in the spiritual nihilism of the society. Mass media played a
negative role in this respect, the media outlets are really fond of digging
in the dirt, and we are used to that dirt.
Who is going to unite the nation, who will give it the idea that our
ancestors had? The state proved its feebleness and weakness, the church took
its own position and does not move either backward or forward. The freedom of
speech, which we were all so proud of, killed the nation. Russia's citizens
defame their own country, and do not seem to care about it at all. This has
become a usual thing, has it not?
Dmitry Litvinovich
PRAVDA.Ru
Translated by Dmitry Sudakov
*******
#4
Gorbachev to open "Russia to America" charitable auction in New York
MOSCOW. Feb 21 (Interfax) - A "Russia to America" charitable auction to
assist the victims of the terrorist attacks on September 11 will be held in
the U.S. on March 11 and 12, Director of the Museum of Modern Art in Jersey
City Alexander Glezer said at a press conference in Moscow on Thursday.
The auction will be held in Manhattan on the initiative of Russian
cultural figures exactly six months after the tragic events. The money earned
from selling works of art will be given to the New York authorities to be
used in dealing with the consequences of the terrorist acts.
Glezer said that about 150 artists, among them Mikhail Shemyakin, Ernst
Neizvestny, Vladimir Nemukhin and Oskar Rabin, will display their paintings,
graphic works and sculptures. The auction will also involve young artists
from Vladivostok, Ufa, Nizhny Novgorod, Moscow, St. Petersburg and other
Russian cities.
The ceremony for preliminary examination of the works will be opened by
former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on March 11. Gorbachev's presence
is expected to attract visitors and potential buyers, as "he is profoundly
respected in the West," the organizers said.
*******
#5
Ex-generals slam Putin reforms as "betrayal"
MOSCOW, Feb 21 (Reuters) - A group of 20 retired generals and admirals have
written a scathing open letter to President Vladimir Putin rubbishing his
reforms and charging him with pursuing the same ruinous policies as his
predecessor.
The broadside, published on the front page of the hardline communist
Sovietskaya Rossiya daily, accuses the Russian leader of betraying voters who
elected him to office in March 2000 following the snap resignation of Boris
Yeltsin.
The letter, headlined, "Who Will Answer for the Disintegration?," was signed
among others by former defence minister Igor Rodionov and two other members
of parliament.
Its authors said Putin had "lied to the people and betrayed their interests.
Today it is obvious that the president is not for the people but those who
robbed and continue to rob them."
The "tragic consequences" of the Yeltsin and Putin years "cannot even be
compared to the Nazi aggression during the Great Patriotic War," the letter
said, referring to the German invasion of the Soviet Union during World War
Two.
The letter attacked Putin for allowing U.S. forces to be based in Central
Asia, Moscow's traditional sphere of influence, as part of the war on
terrorism in Afghanistan.
"These bases are not a strike against (Osama) bin Laden, but in reality
against Russia's interests," they said, echoing the view of many in Russia's
current military establishment.
"Russia's international policy has become the policy of horse-trading the
state's interests," it added, criticising Putin's order to close a key base
in Cuba used to spy on the United States, Moscow's erstwhile Cold War
arch-rival.
The letter, which concluded with a call for a referendum on reinstating
socialism and the planned economy, was published 48 hours before "Defender of
the Fatherland Day," which in Soviet times was known as Army Day.
Output plunged around 50 percent after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, and hyper-inflation and banking scandals in the Yeltsin years robbed
many ordinary Russians of their life savings, even as living standards
plummeted.
Since coming to power, Putin has sought to restore order to the economy,
pushing on with market-style reforms, which he says are key to improved wages
and funding Russia's ailing military.
The Kremlin chief is also said to be mulling inclusion of a bold plan to
slash army numbers and boost pay in his annual keynote address to parliament
in late March or early April.
(Additional reporting by Robert Eksuzyan)
*******
#6
Moscow Times
February 22, 2002
[letter]
Statistical Clarification
In response to "Goskomstat Rewrites Economic History," an article by
Valeria Korchagina on Feb. 19.
[JR:/6085]
Editor,
I was surprised to read as front-page news that Goskomstat "rewrote
economic history" by increasing 1999 GDP growth retroactively by 54
percent; and more surprised to find myself quoted in this article.
It deserves to be clarified that this claim is based on false premises.
Goskomstat did not, by increasing GDP growth for 1999 from 3.5 to 5.4
percent, all of a sudden revise growth data that are more than three years
old. Rather, GDP growth for 1999 has, in Goskomstat's own statistical
publications, been put at 5.4 percent consistently since March 2001, and
has not been revised since. At the World Bank, we have taken this figure
seriously enough for our publications to show the 5.4 percent growth rate
since this latest revision.
Therefore, neither I nor any of my colleagues would have reason to publicly
support the claim that economic history had been "rewritten."
I can not say whether, as stated in the article, someone from Goskomstat
originally stated that such an adjustment has taken place now. But they do
take place at regular intervals and it seems to me that the story published
in The Moscow Times throws an undeservedly bad light on Russia's
statistical agency. As this is taken up by people abroad, I would think it
appropriate to correct this impression.
Christof Rühl
Chief economist for Russia
World Bank
Moscow
******
#7
'Substantial Shifts' Seen Within Russian Regional Elites After Recent
Elections
Izvestiya
19 February 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Political Scientist Sergey Porshakov: "'Revolving Door' Installed"
The elections to the Russian regions' executive and legislative power
bodies that took place late last year and early this year have led to
substantial shifts within local elites. In some regions, parliaments
oriented toward the governor were elected and there has been a
consolidation of the regional elite (Perm, Tomsk, and Novosibirsk Oblasts
and Khabarovsk Kray). In others, on the contrary, atomization has
intensified (Samara Oblast and Krasnoyarsk Kray).
An Influx of "New Blood"
The compositions of the Khabarovsk Kray Legislative Duma, Murmansk Oblast
Duma, and Samara Provincial Duma have been over half changed. Tomsk
Oblast's representative authorities have been two-thirds renewed, mainly
from major businesspeople and the bosses of enterprises in the oil and
gas sectors, the electricity industry, and transport (including Yukos,
Vostokgazprom, and Tomskenergo). In Novosibirsk Oblast, none of
"yesterday's heroes" who ran for parliament -- two ex-governors, four of
their former deputies, and three former State Duma deputies -- managed to
get through to the lawmakers' number. Serious cadre reshuffles are
taking place in the executive power bodies (Krasnoyarsk Kray, Irkutsk
Oblast, and Komi Republic).
Over the course of 1990s, the formation of local elites largely proceeded
autonomously, independent of the federal center. Political and economic
processes in the center are now exerting a much more substantial
influence over the crystallization of a new stratum of the provincial
elite. The generation of old nomenclature-type bosses who reached the
height of their power in the "Yeltsin epoch" -- the period of the
regional "sovereignty parade" -- is gradually receding from major Russian
oblasts' political scene. It is hard for them now to fit into a new
system of coordinates and to play by the Kremlin's new rules. A fresh
generation of politicians -- "controlled golf players" -- pragmatic and
acting with a keen weather eye on the federal center and the president's
plenipotentiary representatives is moving into the foreground.
A Business Blitzkrieg
One major catalyst of the cadre changes taking place within the local
elites has been major Russian financial-industrial groups' large-scale
expansion into the regions, which has led to a new property carve-up, a
change in the orientation of financial and raw-materials flows, and
homegrown oligarchs being squeezed into the background. Thus, the
arrival in Irkutsk Oblast first of Yukos and Russkiy Alyuminiy and then
of the MDM-Group and TNK [Tyumen Oil Company] has radically changed both
the economic and political landscape of the Angarsk region. Informal
but quite influential "parties" have taken root at a local level -- those
of Lukoil or Gazprom, for instance, whose work has been subordinated to
lobbying the interests of the relevant structures. The battle between
them currently essentially determines the dynamics of many Russian
regions' political life.
The regional elites that bypassed a renewal phase are beginning to take
on an increasingly closed nature. Many local parliaments are turning
into elite directors clubs, slightly diluted by people who have come from
the executive power structures and municipal formation heads. They now
contain many more representatives of medium-sized business. The Kama
Region Industrialists are now the most numerous deputy group in Perm
Oblast Legislative Assembly. Thirteen of Stavropol Kray Duma's 25
deputies are the directors or management body chairs of large and
medium-sized enterprises. That is to say, the legislative power bodies
in the regions are now a conglomerate of various economic and
sector-based interests. Previous sources for recruiting the elite are
running dry. People coming from the non-manufacturing sphere -- higher
education establishments' chancellors and teachers, media bosses,
journalists, and doctors -- have naturally not entirely disappeared but
their level of representation has noticeably shrunk. The result is that
the oblast parliaments' work is becoming ever less socially oriented.
The division of a regional elite into economic and political elites has
become quite nominal as their interests are closely intertwined. The
resolution of key financial and commercial problems has shifted into a
purely political dimension on both federal and local levels. It has
become practically impossible for the business elite to work without
political cover in the guise of the governor, mayor, or a deputy faction
in the legislative body. The scale of large industrial and business
structures' bosses moving into the power bodies and back -- which in the
West is customarily called the "revolving door" effect -- has increased
noticeably recently. Irkutsk Oblast administration's recent large-scale
"changing of the guard" resulted in many key positions in it being taken
by people whom local analysts consider to be close to Alfa Group and the
SUAL holding company. As a rule, around the figure of the governor
there forms an "inner circle" of local business structures close to him
and patronized by him, which also serve as a source for replenishing the
administrative elite.
Forming a new Mentality
Polls held in a number of Siberian regions show that representatives of
local elites view the federal center as a growing factor of influence
over provincial political processes. Over one-third of experts --
mainly local parliament deputies, financial-industrial structure bosses,
and political analysts -- believe that the balance of political forces in
their kray or oblast would change substantially in the event of direct or
even indirect intervention by Moscow. Around 20% are convinced that it
would change but not by so much as to prevent a governor who has fallen
out of Kremlin favor from being elected for a new term. There is also a
widespread point of view that the center's stance is rather a tuning fork
for political and business elites but by no means a handbook for action
for voters.
Federal financial-industrial groups' penetration into the provinces has
become a serious watershed within the regional elite. In a number of
large regions, two centers of influence have formed within the
administrative elite: "Isolationists" oriented toward local industrial
and entrepreneurial groups and "globalists" convinced that the budget
cannot be replenished or the local economy revived without large-scale
injections of Moscow capital.
In a whole string of cases, the arrival of powerful corporations and
skilled managers has led to a rejuvenation of enterprises' social
situation, significant tax receipts for the oblast budget, and,
consequently, the elimination of pension and wage payment arrears.
Thus, Norilsk Nikel mining and metallurgical complex's tax payments form
68% of the Krasnoyarsk Kray budget and Yukos's taxes replenish almost
half of Tomsk Oblast's budget.
At the same time, the diametrically opposed viewpoint close to social
sentiments, according to which the capital's magnates are going into the
Russian provinces exclusively as concessionaires in order to turn them
into raw-materials adjuncts without caring about the development of local
industry, is also widespread among regional elites. Their work is
"opaque" to the authorities and the public, as a result of which a
significant proportion of the profit they derive leaves the region. The
heads of oblast and rayon executive power bodies and, entirely naturally,
heads of local enterprises and business structures are more critically
disposed toward federal financial-industrial groups.
Stability and Changes
In the conditions of the transformation that is taking place, the
regional elites have not lost their "best" qualities by which they were
traditionally distinguished -- conformism, susceptibility to fluctuations
in circumstances, and a wait-and-see stance upon the emergence of
ambiguous situations. It has become much harder for the local
opposition's "disturbers of the peace" to "stir them up" and to put the
current "party of power" up for replacement. Intra-elite wars of
"mutual destruction" are becoming a thing of the past. If conflicts do
nevertheless flare up, influential forces are found capable of
successfully quelling them and not allowing the warring parties to
overstep the limit of what is allowed. This is all evidence of the
regional elites gradually acquiring political maturity.
*******
#8
RUSSIA'S NATIONAL DEBT GETS MORE MANAGEABLE
MOSCOW, February 21 /from Yuri Filippov, RIA Novosti political analyst/ -
Quite recently regarded as a calamity, Russia's debt is shedding its dramatic
tint to get on a par with routine governmental matters, as is easy to
conclude from today's federal cabinet session, which debated a concept for
unified national debt servicing patterns.
The country had been awaiting next year with trepidation due to the so-called
Challenge 2003--meaning one of the scheduled peaks of foreign debt payments.
The problem is gone now, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov reassured yesterday
in a sensational address to an enlarged attendance conference of the Finance
Ministry board.
The Premier substantiated his optimistic point for the cabinet today.
Russia's total foreign debt amounted to 130% of its gross domestic product a
mere three or four years ago--now making less than its half.
The debt will amount to 40% of the GDP before the year's end, added Alexei
Kudrin, Finance Minister.
The federal government statements boil down to forecasting that Russia can
avoid crises with foreign debt service. It takes a simple calculation to see
that the debt is getting an ever smaller burden on the federal purse--foreign
debt payments amounted to an approximate 30% of federal revenues two years
ago, now making do with 20%.
Not that Russian financiers can sleep on their laurels, the total foreign
debt currently making 132 to 143 billion US dollars even according to its
most optimistic estimation, as offered by Sergei Kolotukhin, Deputy Finance
Minister.
The cabinet cannot feel satisfied, and is anxiously inventing the ways to
make the debt smaller and reduce routine service expenses at once.
Today's cabinet session approved, de facto, a Finance Ministry idea to set up
a Federal Debt Agency on the basis of the Vnesheconombank, central government
bank for transnational deals, which Russia inherited from the USSR. The new
agency will gather into its competence all problems of foreign and domestic
debts. Its establishment is likely to come up as principal move to streamline
national debt servicing.
The conferees offered no serious objections to the initiative. Even Central
Bank spokesmen were peaceable, though the concept makes it delegate to the
new agency a part of domestic debt competences, and obliges the bank to
regulate the cash amount and coordinate its currency rate policies with
government budgetary policies closer than now.
However meek today's session may have been, analysts expect the founding
fathers of the tentative Federal Debt Agency to clash with the Central Bank,
whose gold and currency reserves they are likely to regard as potential
source of foreign debt payments in moves that will transform the debt into a
domestic through government securities issuance.
The document which came under cabinet debates today did not say a word about
practical arrangements proposed for agency contacts with the Central Bank.
The matter will possibly get clearer after March 30, when the Finance
Ministry is to offer a streamlined concept to the government.
That, too, does not promise a financial revolution. As the thinktank sees it,
concept implementation will take two or even three years, and lances will not
be broken till the State Duma, parliament's lower house, receives related
bills and amendments of the acting legislation--within this year's latter
half, at the earliest.
One of the basic ideas of the concept, to gradually transform Russia's
foreign debt into domestic, is unlikely to be revised, as Mr. Kasyanov
transparently hinted with his sceptical evaluation of last year's 26.3
billion rouble cut on the domestic government debt obligations. The shrinkage
does not belong to triumphs of federal financial policies, remarked the
Premier.
The concept promises to offer new financial tools of the debt market, with an
united agency to represent the government in that market. The prospects are
in harmony with current government strategies to promote macroeconomic
stability.
Russia still depends to a large extent on global petroleum prices, with all
their ups and downs, and ought to reduce to the least possible the losses
that may come with an oil market crisis. Foolproof national debt service
strategies will come in handy here.
*******
#9
Russian Foreign Debt Drops
February 21, 2002
By ANGELA CHARLTON
MOSCOW (AP) - Russia's staggering foreign debt dropped by billions of
dollars more than expected last year as the economy continued to grow,
according to figures released Thursday that proved the debt burden was now
``within safe limits.''
Meanwhile, the State Statistics Committee released revised growth figures
Thursday for 1999 and 2000, saying the economy had expanded by a total of
20 percent in the last three years - a welcome accomplishment for a nation
that suffered a financial meltdown in 1998 and near constant decline in the
preceding decade.
The growth for 1999 was 5.4 percent instead of the 5 percent reported
earlier; in 2000 it was 9 percent instead of 8.3 percent; and in 2001 it
was 5 percent, the committee said, according to the Interfax news agency.
It said the figures were based on more accurate calculations of gross
domestic product, without elaborating.
The growth - which has largely been attributed to high prices for oil, a
key Russian export - helped put the government in a position to pay off $ 3
billion more of its foreign debt last year than planned, Deputy Finance
Minister Sergei Kolotukhin said Thursday.
That was in stark contrast to previous years, when Russia borrowed
relentlessly from abroad and begged for debt relief.
However, total estimates on how much debt Russia still owes varied.
Kolotukhin said that according to preliminary data, Russia had paid $13
billion to $15 billion last year, reducing the foreign debt to $132 billion
to $134 billion.
Earlier Finance Ministry figures quoted by the ITAR-Tass news agency said
the country had reduced its debt by $19 billion, bringing the total to
$138.7 billion.
Russia's foreign debt amounted to 130 percent of GDP in 1999, and less than
50 percent of GDP today, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said, according to
Interfax.
Kolotukhin said Russia was able to cut its debt because it no longer has
payments to make for overdue interest.
In another sign of Russia's efforts to reduce its dependence on foreign
lenders, Economics and Trade Minister German Gref said the country would
scale back World Bank programs, saying half of the funds received by the
bank had gone unused and the rest were often used ineffectively, according
to Interfax.
The Central Bank's hard currency reserves matched a record high this week,
reaching $36.8 billion, the bank said Thursday. The last time it reached
that level was October.
Despite the positive indicators, many economists warn that the government
is too dependent on energy exports and needs deep infrastructure changes to
ensure long-term growth.
******
#10
BBC Monitoring
Defence minister speaks to Russian TV about army reform, Pankisi gorge
Source: Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 2000 gmt 20 Feb 02
In an exclusive interview for Russia TV, Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov
explained the reasoning behind current reforms in the armed forces. Funding
priority, he stressed, would be given to the Space Troops, with some
additional money going the way of the navy. He welcomed the introduction of a
contract-based army and the option of alternative service, insisting,
however, that civilian ministries would be responsible for the latter. Ivanov
reserved his sternest comments for the Chechen rebels said to be hiding in
Georgia's Pankisi gorge. However, he would not be drawn to comment on reports
that Usamah Bin-Ladin was also in the area. The following is the text of the
interview by Russia TV on 20 February. Subheadings are inserted editorially.
[Presenter Sergey Pashkov] Our main topic today is of concern to everyone. We
are talking about reforms in the Russian army, alternative service and
fighting the Chechen rebels, as well as the state of our military hardware,
which is especially significant in the light of all those reports about
helicopter and plane crashes. In an exclusive interview with our programme,
Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov says that Russia is to be rearmed with new
weapons, starting in the most modern area - the Space Troops.
Top priority for Space Troops
[Ivanov, speaking to Pashkov in a pre-recorded interview] We did not have
enough spacecraft, and there is no point in building normal armed forces when
you are blind or deaf. So, on the approval of the supreme commander-in-chief
[President Putin], priority this year was given to the Space Troops. We are
planning to restore our spacecraft grouping, targeting it primarily towards
information gathering, communications and reconnaissance. Without this, no
arm of the forces can function normally.
At bit more money is allocated to the navy, which has its own specific
problems. Because of the technical complexities and because navy construction
simply involves quite a lot of metalwork, state orders here can take two to
three years to complete. Such is the case when, for example, a heavy cruiser
or a nuclear submarine is to be commissioned. As you can appreciate, this is
not possible to do within a year or two, and prices are constantly rising.
Bearing this in mind, we have built in an appropriate mechanism in this
year's expenditure schedule for our long-term projects. Roughly speaking, a
different pricing policy has to be applied when placing an order for
automatic rifles as against ordering a submarine. And we have taken account
of this.
Aircraft - it's what's inside that counts
Regarding the state of our aviation and our helicopter fleet, which many are
talking about nowadays and for which we are being justly criticized,
regrettably, at present we can only speak about repairs and modernization
work. I see nothing terrible in this. Take other countries' experience, for
instance, including the USA, which many people here favour so much and cite
as an example. In Afghanistan, they used B-1 and B-52 bombers, which are much
older than the pilots who flew them. It is not the hardware, not the wings,
it is the stuff inside them that counts. If the aircraft is being properly
maintained and modernized on time, if its on-board target-designation
instruments and high-precision weapons equipment are being constantly updated
- and our programme naturally envisages that too - the planes, as well as
helicopters, are perfectly able to carry on flying for a long time.
Alternative national service - checks must be made
[Pashkov] Hard and almost vicious debates are now raging about plans for
alternative service and a professional army. Have you already shaped up the
military's position on that? Are you in favour of alternative service? What
form will it take? Are you in favour of a professional army?
[Ivanov] The Defence Ministry was involved in the development of the law, but
I want to tell you that the Defence Ministry will not be in charge of
alternative service. Civilian ministries will be in charge.
Very often people say that military enlistment offices will now determine
whether an objector is genuine or not. It won't be military enlistment
offices, but conscription commissions, which are predominantly made up of
civilians. They include a representative from a military enlistment office,
but he isn't the head of the conscription commission, and he doesn't take the
decision. But I think that the authenticity of a statement made by a
candidate for alternative service must be checked. That issue was discussed
by the government, and entirely reasonable questions were being posed. So, if
a young person submits a statement saying that he upholds some religion, and,
due to moral considerations, cannot take up arms in his life, while police
records show that he has been caught being a hooligan on three occasions and
been convicted twice, including with the use of weapons: well, what's that?
Genuine motives? And so, I believe that checks made in that specific way are
essential. That doesn't mean that the checks will develop into a serious
operation reminiscent of the old regime, but an elementary check must be
carried out all the same. Otherwise, those undertaking alternative service
may be joined by people who shouldn't be there.
The version of the law which was examined by the government suits us
entirely, we support it, and will happily pass on the baton for organizing
that service to civilian ministries. This will help us to concentrate
primarily on our own problems. That is the first part, and it has absolutely
no connection with the move to contract-based service.
A professional army - the sooner, the better
We have no doubts that this needs to be done. This needs to be done, and the
sooner, the better. I think that in the very near future, provisionally in
something like one-and-a-half months, we will be able to present the
president, the supreme commander-in-chief, with a clear, absolutely clear
concept of our vision for the move to contracts, what it will require in the
way of resources, what changes need to be made to the system of officer
training, because, without doubt, I think you will agree, training an officer
in command of 18-year-old lads is one thing, but to command people who are
often, or can be, twice as old, is something rather different. Also there are
questions of redeployment, transport, and support for those units where only
contract soldiers will be serving, given that they will probably need all the
social conditions which exist in civilian life, whether that be schools,
kindergartens, and so on - the things which don't exist in ordinary military
units at present.
But I repeat, to complete my answer to your question, the armed forces are
ready for it, and want it. The state's capabilities are another matter, and
it needs to be carried out in close coordination with the economic bloc of
the government, in the same way, incidentally, that we carried out the arms
programme.
[Pashkov] Sergey Borisovich, the president is instructing [Emergencies
Minister] Sergey Shoygu to return the refugees in the Pankisi gorge to the
territory of Chechnya - those who want that, of course. You say that you are
not ruling out the possibility that [Usamah] Bin-Ladin, even Bin-Ladin, might
be hiding in the Pankisi gorge. Igor Ivanov says that everyone really has had
enough of the Chechen rebels in the Pankisi gorge. Does it not follow that
Russia is on the brink of starting an operation in the Pankisi gorge, and
what sort of operation will it be?
The Pankisi gorge - a source of serious concern and worry
[Ivanov] It is not just bandits there, I want to stress. There are refugees
there, whom - a relevant decision has been made - we are prepared to accept
and accommodate on the territory of the Chechen Republic. Sergey
Kuzhugetovich [Shoygu, emergencies minister] has undertaken to actively
implement this task. However, there are also bandits there. We have noted
lately that, as the situation in Chechnya has been slowly but surely
stabilizing, a sort of headquarters, which issues commands, gives
instructions, transfers material resources, communications equipment, the
means for staging terrorist acts - well, they have been massing more and more
in the Pankisi gorge. We cannot just tolerate this and look at it passively.
It causes the most serious concern and worry in our country.
As for solving this issue, it is, naturally, the government and leadership of
the sovereign state of Georgia which have to solve this issue first of all.
However, they have to solve it fast and effectively. We are prepared to hold
relevant negotiations on interaction along these lines. And we are actually
holding them. Not so much along the lines of the Defence Ministry, but other
departments. However, in my opinion, the issue has not just ripened but
over-ripened. Something has to be done there. All this, this hotbed which I
have already mentioned, very much like a mini-Chechnya in the past or a
mini-Afghanistan, I would like to stress, is situated 10-20 km from our
border. Not just somewhere over the seas and oceans. It is not just near us
but right under our noses.
[Pashkov] You mention Bin-Ladin - is it just a figure of speech or is it
based on intelligence information, among other things?
[Ivanov] You see, first of all, I never comment on intelligence information
and, secondly, I have never said it and never asserted it, and am not
asserting it now, that Bin-Ladin is there. However, there are so many
mercenaries there and militants that, in my estimation, the Pankisi gorge is
currently one of the most convenient or ideal places in the world where
anybody could hide, anybody. On the other hand, nor do I have any categorical
information that he is not there.
******
#11
From: "Robert Bruce Ware" <....@brick.net>
Subject: CHECHNYA PEACE RECONSTRUCTION PLAN
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002
Dear David
I wonder if the following reconstruction proposal might be of interest to
JRL readers. FEWER includes experts based in the Caucasus who often have a
grasp of the situation.
Rob
CHECHNYA PEACE RECONSTRUCTION PLAN
FEWER; January 2002
1. INTRODUCTION
As part of the general FEWER strategy on multi-stake-holder planning for
early response, FEWER members in the Caucasus (EAWARN, Peace Mission to the
Caucasus, in a joint effort with Non-Violence International), have organised
a series of roundtable meetings on peace reconstruction in Chechnya.
* The first roundtable was held in Pyatigorsk (Russia) in December 2000.
Participants included leaders of Chechen communities in and around Chechnya,
experts, representatives from the governments of Chechnya and neighbouring
republics, representatives from Federal ministries, as well as international
organisations.
* The second roundtable was held in Lovik (Sweden) in June 2001.
Participants included representatives from the government of Chechnya and
Federal ministries, international organisations, bilateral donors, and
non-governmental organisations.
* The third roundtable was held in Moscow (Russia) in December 2001.
Participants came from Federal ministries, Chechen government and religious
movements, international organisations, bilateral donors and
non-governmental organisations.
This Peace Reconstruction Plan has been prepared as a guide for donors and
implementing agencies working on Chechnya. Groups that participated in its
elaboration recommend that the agencies working in the region continue to
participate in regular information sharing and co-ordination meetings for
the enhancement of the cumulative impact of reconstruction related
activities.
Three critical response issues are raised in this document:
* The need to initiate a co-ordinated reconstruction process in Chechnya.
* The need to strengthen law enforcement, and protect the rights of the
civilian population.
* The need to start a political settlement process led by the people of
Chechnya themselves.
The Peace Reconstruction Plan is a dynamic document. Although the roundtable
process has now been completed, the work carried out in consultative
frameworks (OCHA and PACE/State Duma) and the monitoring of implemented
activities means that this document is subject to regular revisions.
This document includes two sections: (a) the Peace Reconstruction Plan; and
(b) an analysis of past and on-going efforts relevant to the Plan.
2. THE CHECHNYA PEACE RECONSTRUCTION PLAN
The Peace Reconstruction Plan covers the following issues: (1) long-term
peace objectives; (2) overall response directions; (3) specific response
options for economic reconstruction and security; (4) gaps in current
strategies and possible solutions; and (5) strategic requirements for peace
reconstruction in Chechnya.
2.1. LONG-TERM PEACE OBJECTIVES FOR THE REGION
1. Economic reconstruction (particularly access to employment and
education); and 2. Strengthening the rule of law and the protection of
rights; 3. A comprehensive political settlement to the conflict.
2.2. OVERALL RESPONSE DIRECTIONS IDENTIFIED
2.2.1. Initiate and co-ordinate reconstruction efforts
The long-term and complex process of reconstruction presents great
challenges and it is important that peacemakers at all levels are involved.
In particular, there must be co-ordination of the efforts of the Russian
Presidential administration, the Russian government and legislature, the
Chechen Republic administration and local authorities, and the
Representative of the President in the Southern Federal District.
Reconstruction of the Chechen economy and society will be decisive in
bringing stability to Chechnya and the North Caucasus. After the immediate
need of humanitarian support for the Chechen population and for IDPs outside
Chechnya, the priorities for the Federal centre must be funding for the
reconstruction of Grozny, housing, the agricultural sector and the petroleum
industries. Reconstruction must also be linked to the return of IDPs, as the
revival of the Republic's economy will be dependent on their return. In
addition to supporting the return of IDPs, social reconstruction must also
involve instituting job-creation schemes, and health and education
programmes. The commercial sector will be key to the reconstruction process,
and the Russian corporate sector and Chechen entrepreneurs must be
encouraged to invest in major industries and other social services. The
establishment of co-ordinating bodies to facilitate investment and
humanitarian support would be helpful in achieving these objectives.
2.2.2. Initiate a political settlement process
A political settlement of the problems in Chechnya is essential, and
positive public commitments to ending the conflict and to the process of
reconstruction will be vital if a lasting settlement is to be achieved.
Critical for the settlement process are two issues:
(a) negotiations with armed separatist groups to end the violence; and (b)
the definition of Chechnya's legal status within the Russian federation.
This last issue cannot be a subject of negotiations with separatists -
decisions on the region's status must be taken by the Chechen people
themselves. Another key component of a lasting settlement will be the
development of strong and representative national institutions and the
conciliation of competing group interests. Democratic elections, and the
legitimate authoritative power they will provide for the Republic, must be
the focus of any settlement process in order to ensure a long-term
resolution of this protracted conflict.
2.2.3. Media and transparency of reconstruction and settlement efforts
When the role of the media is considered, it is essential that positive and
constructive policies be adopted with regard to radio and TV broadcasting in
and outside of Chechnya. Broadcasts should not only represent Chechen
society externally, but should be oriented to the needs of the Chechen
people. Awareness-raising can be used to help consolidate and encourage
peace-oriented sentiments within Chechen society, and to help dismantle
anti-Chechen feeling within Russian society. Transparency regarding
settlement efforts and negotiations will be key in consolidating public
support for any final settlement. Media projects can play an instrumental
role in supporting transparency of reconstruction and settlement efforts.
2.2.4. Ensure autonomy of Chechnya
A high degree of autonomy in the internal governance of the Chechen Republic
will help to ensure its status as an autonomous region of the Russian
Federation. This status would be underpinned by legal pluralism, with
co-existing centralised and local legal norms, membership of international
organisations and unions and other options within the framework of modern
federalism. In the immediate term, power in Chechnya should be consolidated
in a single structure, reporting directly to the highest Federal
authorities. During this current period of special governance under the
Chechen Republic administration, the formation of power structures must be
developed and finalised, with an emphasis placed on the building of trust
and co-operation between military and civilian structures and the
strengthening of elected local self-governing bodies. In addition, tensions
in inter-ethnic relations must be avoided by the enforcement of the Law on
Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples. There is a need for an official
statement guaranteeing the self-determination of the Chechen people and a
high level of governmental autonomy for the Chechen state within the
Federation. Such a public statement would serve to assure the Chechen people
that their social order and the cultural and religious traditions are
preserved.
2.2.5. Meet basic needs and protect Chechen IDPs and refugees
The Security Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation should define and follow priorities for the Caucasus, taking
steps to protect IDPs and refugees in the CIS countries. Those in need,
either IDPs or Chechens remaining within the Republic, should be supported
by targeted financial and humanitarian aid, pensions and benefits to victims
of war, and return and re-integration programmes. Law and order must be
upheld and the indiscriminate and unrestrained use of firepower must be
stopped. Special rules and codes of conduct for soldiers and combatants in
relation to the civilian population must be established and adhered to.
2.2.6. Strengthen law enforcement and the protection of rights in Chechnya
The rule of law and strong authorities are needed to achieve stability in
Chechnya. Equally important are traditional institutions, people's diplomacy
and the establishment of a commission on blood vengeance. The war must be
made unprofitable for warring parties through the reconstruction of the
Chechen economy and through the provision of effective socio-economic
solutions to problems of unemployment and poverty. The judicial system must
be urgently restored in order to deal with criminality within a legitimate
framework, and the population must be issued with passports or ID to allow
for freedom of movement. Both these initiatives would help end the practice
of hostage-taking and provide for the protection of human rights and
freedoms in Chechnya.
2.3. SPECIFIC RESPONSES FOR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND SECURITY
2.3.1. Economic reconstruction
Objectives
* Establish and implement a strategy and vision for the reconstruction and
further development of Chechnya;
* Restore infrastructure, social services and human resources in the
Republic; and
* Create a favourable environment for economic growth in the North Caucasus.
Recommendations
* Implement "normalisation" projects to stabilise people's lives;
* Support the creation of job and education opportunities in the Republic;
* Support the voluntary reintegration of IDPs/refugees in conditions of
safety;
* Support small and medium sized enterprises and their access to markets as
well as financial infrastructure;
* Support the development of agricultural initiatives;
* Restore basic infrastructure and social services;
* Promote measures to ease the movement of people, goods and capital;
* Establish and implement legal frameworks for effective economic growth;
and
* Promote access to independent and objective information.
Strategic principles
* Adopt participatory and inclusive approaches for reconstruction efforts;
* Carry out needs/capacity assessment surveys;
* Focus on "quick implementation" projects;
* Regionalise reconstruction to the North Caucasus;
* Support and strengthen management capacities;
* Integrate environmental considerations in reconstruction programmes;
* Raise awareness of reconstruction activities;
* Ensure that displaced people have a choice in their resettlement;
* Place emphasis on youth;
* Diversify job creation and business activities to include Chechens both in
and outside of Chechnya; and
* Establish monitoring mechanisms to ensure that reconstruction priorities
are implemented.
2.3.2. Law enforcement and the protection of rights (security)
Objectives
* Provide for the safeguarding of human rights and security of civilians;
* Prevent the privatisation of security in Chechnya;
* Support the construction of Chechen statehood and its institutions;
* Dismantle the criminal war economy in the Republic; and
* Work towards a demilitarised North Caucasus.
Recommendations
* Address impunity and prosecute the criminal deeds of Federal forces and
Chechen militants;
* Strengthen and make adequate law enforcement agencies in the Republic;
* Reduce incentives for violence;
* Engage in anti-corruption activities;
* Support the transfer of power to local civil authorities;
* Demilitarise the civilian population;
* Tackle "disappearances";
* Enhance confidence between local communities and law enforcement agencies;
* Establish and implement legal frameworks for law enforcement and the
protection of rights;
and
* Improve inter-ethnic relations - also through the media.
Strategic principles
* Work towards ending impunity;
* Do not lose sight of the need to move the political process ahead,
including the search for a political settlement;
* Allocate necessary funds;
* Pilot-test activities before widespread implementation; and
* Learn from positive achievements in neighbouring regions.
2.4. GAPS IN CURRENT STRATEGIES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Whereas remedial and long-term reconstruction activities are imperative,
dismantling the obstacles to peace, and preparing for peace is vital.
Furthermore, principles to guide the political settlement process are
needed.
2.4.1. Key obstacles to peace
* Inappropriate use of force toward the civilian population;
* The xenophobia that is dividing Chechens and Russians;
* The illicit economy of war that makes the conflict profitable for
different groups;
* Impunity for those that commit atrocities and human rights abuses;
* corruption; and
* Distrust between the Chechen civilian population and Federal and local
authorities.
2.4.2. Urgent preparations for peace
* Reconciliation amongst Chechens, and between Chechens and Russians;
* The restoration of economic infrastructure in the Republic;
* The strengthening of legal and good governance structures;
* Establishment of mechanisms to ensure the effectiveness and transparency
of reconstruction efforts by the Federal and Chechen authorities; and
* The introduction and enforcement of special rules for military and law
enforcement activities in the Republic.
2.4.3. Possible solutions
Xenophobia
Responsible media
Psychological aid to the conflict victims
Tolerance & Reconciliation projects
Focus on youth and children (education opportunities, psychological
assistance, leadership training, etc.)
Refugees adaptation / reintegration programs
War economy
Control illegal trade in weapons and ammunition
Effective business legislation / management
Job creation & microcredit projects
Economic infrastructure restoration
Favourable investment climate, investment forums
Focus on microprojects with rapid implementation
Develop social security services
Impunity
Strengthen rule of law, develop judicial system
Human rights monitoring
Strengthen local militia and other law enforcement agencies
Education & training of military
Special rules & regulations for security activities
Corruption
Effectiveness and transparency of reconstruction efforts
Mechanisms to monitor reconstruction projects implementation
Enforce control of use of finances
Enhance access of humanitarian agencies, media and NGO representatives to
Chechnya
Distrust
Symbolic acts of reconciliation
Develop civil society institutions
Support NGO networks including Chechen NGOs
Broaden consultations terms; involve Chechen population into the
reconstruction process
Establishment of representative and legitimate authorities in Chechnya
2.4.4. Principles to guide a political settlement
* Involve the organized groups of Chechen population in broad-based
political consultations;
* Enhance political coherence on tackling Chechen problems within and among:
(a) Federal institutions; (b) Chechen authorities; and (c) Chechen civil
society;
* Provide clarity on and communicate the political status of Chechnya as
part of the Russian Federation, and uphold the rights of Chechens as
citizens of Russia; and
* Make Federal and local Chechen authorities responsible and responsive to
the Chechen population.
2.5. STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACE RECONSTRUCTION IN CHECHNYA
A number of contextual factors and dilemmas need to be considered for
effective reconstruction in Chechnya.
2.5.1. Contextual factors
(i) The international campaign against terrorism:
* the moderate response level of Federal authorities in Chechnya to the
threat of terrorist attacks needs to be sustained; it is necessary to ensure
that the rights of the civilian population are not infringed upon;
* the initial openness by President Putin to talks on limited terms
(decommissioning of weapons) has to be sustained, and the terms broadened;
and
* donor interest in Chechnya should not be sidetracked by events in
Afghanistan; it is necessary to continue to provide the emergency relief to
the IDPs outside Chechnya, but longer-term transitional activities and
micro-level developmental projects inside the republic should be regarded as
a matter of priority.
(ii) Access for humanitarian agencies to the Chechen population, and for the
Chechen population to humanitarian agencies needs to be enhanced with
security guarantees to the international and local members of staff.
(iii) Chechen leaders (including youth leaders) should be empowered to
affect national and international reconstruction priorities.
(iv) Pockets of peace should be sustained and reinforced. The use of
religious and secular leaders as guarantors of peace should be enhanced in
order to expand the number of these peace zones. Reconciliation projects
need to be launched in such areas.
(v) Trust has to be built between the Chechen population and authorities.
(vi) The media has to be drawn on to reduce xenophobia, prepare a climate
for settlement, and enhance transparency in settlement and reconstruction
efforts.
(vii) Leaders of local administrations, and moderate Chechen leaders have to
be protected by law enforcement and security agencies.
(viii) A reduction in the availability of small arms, and the destruction of
mines and unexploded ordinances is critical.
2.5.2. Dilemmas
(i) Who should be involved in settlement talks given the multiplicity of
actors, aversion to groups involved in atrocities, and the need to manage
spoilers?
(ii) How should the local fall-out of the international anti-terrorism
campaign be managed?
* With the dry up of external support for extremist groups, kidnapping and
ransoming may again become the main fund-raising basis for extremist groups.
(iii) How to demilitarize the Republic when people need weapons for
protection?
(iv) How can the tension between the need for political stability during a
normalization period be reconciled with the need for elections and a
legitimate Chechen government?
(v) How can on-going local level negotiations be built upon and their
success be protected?
(vi) Assuming that reconstruction will not occur on a massive scale, how can
the use of available resources be maximized?
(vii) What political, economic and social measures be implemented to
safeguard the success and sustainability of any settlement?
3. CURRENT AND PAST EFFORTS IN RELATION TO THE POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
PLAN
This section provides a brief analysis of how the projects implemented in
the region correspond to the Response Directions identified in the Plan.
Basic conclusions can be drawn from lists of projects undertaken in the area
outlined in the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal and reports
from the Russian Government.
The donor response to the The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the
Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) has been uneven. First, there was a
downward trend in donor interest, reflecting changing donor priorities.
Second, because the agriculture and economic recovery sectors did not
receive any support, projects in these sectors were not implemented in 2001.
While the survival of population was not affected by this, the projects
planned under these sectors could have played an important role in providing
civilians in need with alternative means of subsistence, and provided in
some measure a basis for temporary integration thereby reducing tensions and
lowering reliance on humanitarian assistance. The 2002 Appeal seeks
$31,946,549: including $780,000 for projects on economic recovery and
infrastructure, $2,268,271 on protection/human rights/rule of law, and
$1,118,500 on agriculture, addressing the above concern.
A brief analysis of how the projects implemented in the region correspond to
the Response Directions identified in the Plan follows below:
The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the North Caucasus (Russian
Federation) spent a total of $37,871,324 (as of 5 February 2002) on 30
projects in the region in 2001. Of these, 24 projects (89,44% of funds)
focused on providing humanitarian aid for civilians, IDPs or refugees,
addressing Response Direction 5. Only 1 project (2,5%) addressed Response
Direction 3 aiming to optimise coordination between humanitarian actors in
the region, 2 (3%) focused on Security (Response Direction 6) and 4 (5,5%) -
addressed Response Direction 1, instituting job-creation schemes and
educational programmes.
Additional Humanitarian Assistance for the Northern Caucasus (Russian
Federation) was $41,962,547 (as of December 2001). Of the 62 projects, four
with 4,6% of the total funds spent, addressed Response Direction 1, Job
creation and education schemes. Only one project (0,04%) addressed the
Response Direction 3, Media and transparency of reconstruction and
settlement efforts. The rest of the projects addressed Response Direction 5
Providing humanitarian aid for civilians, IDPs or refugees, accounting 95,4%
of the funds spent.
The 3rd graph demonstrates, that funding in the North Caucasus is
predominantly focused on projects aimed to meet the basic needs of
civilians, IDPs and refugees (92,5% of funds). Only few projects were
oriented on Job creation and educational schemes (5,2%) addressing Response
Direction 1, Transparency regarding settlement efforts - Response Direction
3 (1,2% of the total funds spent); and Security, addressing Response
Direction 6 (1,1 % of the total funds spent).
Response Direction 2 (Initiate a Political Settlement Process) and Response
Direction 4 (Ensure the Autonomy of Chechnya) were not addressed by any of
the projects analysed.
The government of Russia is implementing the Programme on Restoring the
Economy and the social Sector of the Chechen Republic, approved on 25
January 2001 with a total budget of 14.4 billion roubles ($496,5 million) of
which $155,1 million was allocated from the federal budget and the rest was
to come from off-budget sources. According to the Foreign Ministry Press and
Information Department ii , 2 billion roubles ($68,9 million) of budgetary
funds has been transferred in early 2001 with another 1,5 billion roubles
($51,7 million) allocated in August-September 2001. A federal state unitary
enterprise Directorate for Construction and Rehabilitation Works in the
Chechen Republic has been established within the State Committee for
Construction (Gosstroi) of Russia. On 23 August 2001, the government
endorsed a similar support programme for 2002 and subsequent years. The
governmental programme addressed mostly the economic reconstruction,
transportation, fuel and energy, as well as the communications sector.
Important progress was also reached in restoring the educational system (447
schools, 3 higher education colleges and 12 professional vocational schools
began operation) and public health system (53 hospitals, 32 polyclinics, 46
doctor's outpatient clinics and 175 medical assistant-obstetrician stations
were set up). The programme is addressing also the media sector in Chechnya.
The newspaper circulation ranges from 3,000 to 10,000 copies (1 republic
wide newspaper and 10 district newspapers), whereas television covers
approximately 70% of the territory and 80% of the population of Chechnya at
present.
The Russian Prosecutor General's office has opened 293 probes of crimes
committed against the civilian population during the 1999-2001
counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic. An investigation,
however, is being conducted only on 179 cases and 57 cases have reached a
pre-trial stage. So far, 11 servicemen have been found guilty and sentenced
to different terms of imprisonment.
Programmes under UN Inter-Agency Appeal and the government of the Russian
Federation cover all response directions outlined in this Post-conflict
Reconstruction Plan, however, very little or no progress was achieved on the
following directions due to the lack of political will, lack of coordination
on programme design and implementation or insufficient allocation of
resources:
* Transitional and developmental activities including income-generating
projects in non-agricultural sectors;
* Political settlement through negotiated agreements with groups of
combatants on: (a) decommissioning of weapons; and (b)
reintegration/emigration based on an amnesty for combatants who have not
committed war crimes. Furthermore, settlement has to involve the
participation of the Chechen population in broad-based political
consultations;
* Security sector reform involving gradual transfer of policing functions to
local Chechen militias controlled by the regional administrations and
abandoning the mop-up operation strategies that bring about serious
violations of human rights;
* Establishment of mechanisms to ensure the effectiveness and transparency
of reconstruction efforts by the Federal and Chechen authorities; and the
introduction and enforcement of special rules for military and law
enforcement activities in the Republic;
* Resolving the problem of access to the population of Chechnya by
humanitarian relief providers with guarantees of personnel security.
Total humanitarian assistance in response to the 2001 Consolidated
Inter-Agency Appeal for the Northern Caucasus (January 2001-December 2001)
was $71,648,177. The total amount of contributions outside the frameworks of
the Appeal, therefore, was $36,342,901. The key donors and channels through
which the contributions were made are represented in the table and graphs
below:
[not here]
*******
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