Johnson's Russia List
#6089
21 February 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Note from David Johnson:
1. RIA Novosti: RUSSIAN SECOND GRADERS WILL STUDY FOREIGN LANGUAGE.
2. Reuters: System fails millions of homeless kids in Russia.
3. Itar-Tass: Russian physicist rules out theft of weapons-grade materials.
4. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: NEWSPAPER EDITOR AND HIS FAMILY PUT UNDER
PROTECTION. (Yury Shchekochikhin of Novaya Gazeta)
5. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Irina Khakamada, Three Theses Concerning
Information Policy.
6. BBC Monitoring: Former TV6 manager says his attitude to Putin is dual.
(Kiselev)
7. gazeta.ru: TV6 Investment Agreement Near Completion.
8. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Military Unfit for New Toys.
9. Kennan Institute meeting: Women's Political Activism and Post-Soviet
Gender Culture in Russia.
10. Alexander Yanov: JRL discussion (Aslund and Reddaway).
11. Neil McGowan: Re: 6088-Service/Kagarlitsky. (re anthem)
12. Interfax: Oligarch praises Kremlin for "actively promoting Russian
business abroad." (Potanin)
13. Ekonomika i Zhizn: P. Zhukov, A YEAR OF MODERATE PESSIMISM.
14. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Vladislav Kulikov, Afghanistan Is Like Sphinx?
(U.S. Said Making Same Mistakes in Afghanistan As USSR Did in Its Day)
15. Reuters: Iran ties cloud Russia-U.S. partnership plans.
16. RFE/RL: Jeremy Bransten, Judge Says Popular Opinion Not Proper
Basis For Law. (Sergei Pashin)
17. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review.]
*******
#1
RUSSIAN SECOND GRADERS WILL STUDY FOREIGN LANGUAGE
MOSCOW, February 20, 2002 /From a RIA Novosti correspondent/ -- The Russian
Ministry of Education intends to introduce nationwide learning of foreign
languages beginning from the second grades of elementary schools, Deputy
Minister of Education Viktor Bolotov said in his speech at the international
conference "Development of International Partnership in Education and
Scientific Research". Bolotov also neglected today's opinion that more
attention is given to the learning of the English language than to the
learning of the other languages.
"This is not correct. It is important for us to teach not only the Spanish,
French, and German languages, but also the languages of the countries we are
closely cooperating with," the Deputy Minister said.
Speaking about the difficulties, which appear in connection with the foreign
languages teaching, Bolotov reminded that the Ministry of Education is
introducing a single graduation test exam. In this connection, Bolotov
proposed closer cooperation with the "tests experts" from all over the world,
particularly in the field of foreign languages.
*******
#2
System fails millions of homeless kids in Russia
By Peter Graff
MOSCOW, Feb 20 (Reuters) - Russia is letting millions of orphans and homeless
children slip through the social net and fall prey to drugs, crime and
illiteracy, Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov told parliament on Wednesday.
Russia has 700,000 registered orphans and children with no parental
supervision, but Ustinov said experts believe the real number is two or three
million.
"If we judge the spiritual and physical health of the nation by our youth, it
will be no exaggeration to say the health of the nation is in danger," he
told the State Duma lower house.
A barrage of statistics shows a system that is failing to protect children,
and getting worse. Children are increasingly likely to become both criminals
and victims of crimes, he said.
"Ever more frequently we come across cruel treatment of children, their
economic and sexual exploitation and trade in minors," he said. His office
has prosecuted 190 cases of children being sold in the last five years.
More than 1.14 million children were picked up by police for crimes last year
-- twice as many as a decade ago.
Russian teenagers were 7.5 times more likely to be addicted to hard drugs
than adults, yet there was no system in place to compel them to receive
treatment for addiction.
Russia is not only failing to keep its children off the streets, it is
failing to keep many of them in school.
For years Russia was proud of its high literacy rate. "But now, thousands of
children are not passing through educational institutions," he said.
"We often find teenage offenders whose education doesn't match their age.
Often they can't read at all."
A decade of post-Soviet economic decline has taken a severe toll on Russian
families, with steep declines in life expectancy, and explosions of drug use
and other social ills.
But many also say the hidebound Soviet-era welfare system has not moved with
the times, especially in cases of children.
Hundreds of thousands of workers in three ministries focus on child welfare,
and although there are horror stories of some orphanages, most are well run
and properly equipped.
But little aid is offered to families themselves, foster care is rudimentary,
and children who are not assigned to institutions have scant access to public
help.
Nearly all of the thousands of children living on the streets of Moscow come
from other parts of the country and are barred from the capital's schools or
orphanages.
Ustinov said President Vladimir Putin had written to parliament saying:
"There are many (child welfare) programmes that produce no results. Either
the programmes are bad or the bureaucrats are useless."
*******
#3
Russian physicist rules out theft of weapons-grade materials
ITAR-TASS
Moscow, 19 February, ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin: There is no
possibility of weapons-grade materials being stolen in Russia to make bombs,
a conference in Moscow on nuclear terrorism was told today by Aleksandr
Koldobskiy, a senior technician at the Moscow State Institute of Engineering
and Physics and candidate of physics and mathematics.
The country's nuclear installations have reliable security and are accessible
to only a small number of people, he said. "Not only that, but to make the
simplest type of nuclear explosive device or projectile you need a lot of
uranium-235, at least 40-45 kg in raw-material terms. With the existing
security arrangements it's simply impossible to steal that amount for
criminal purposes."
Reports of the theft or disappearance of nuclear material have nothing to do
with nuclear terrorism, he believes. "Of course there's nothing good about
the theft or loss of natural or slightly-enriched uranium (strontium, caesium
or cobalt), but even getting hold of the stuff won't bring terrorists any
nearer to creating nuclear explosives," Koldobskiy said.
*******
#4
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
February 20, 2002
NEWSPAPER EDITOR AND HIS FAMILY PUT UNDER PROTECTION.
Yury Shchekochikhin, the State Duma deputy and deputy editor of
the biweekly newspaper Novaya Gazeta, has been put under
protective guard along with his family after receiving threats
connected to an article by him that appeared in the paper's
February 18 edition. In that article, Shchekochikhin, who is
deputy chairman of the Duma's security committee and a member of
Yabloko, claimed that a criminal investigation by the Prosecutor
General's Office was ended after members of a criminal group
paid unidentified officials in that office US$2 million to close
the case (NTV.ru, Yabloko.ru, February 19).
Shchekochikhin's accusations are connected to allegations that
two leading Moscow furniture outlets, Tri Kita (Three Whales)
and Grand, evaded import duties by falsifying the weight and
purchase price of the goods they had imported. Last August, the
State Customs Committee (GTK) confiscated millions of dollars of
furniture from Tri Kita's warehouse, which was returned after
the two stores' head, Sergey Zuyev, paid the GTK US$2.5 million
of US$5 million in fines. The stores subsequently won several
lawsuits against the GTK. Last November the Prosecutor General's
Office charged two top GTK officials, Marat Faizulin and
Alexander Volkov, with abuse of power. Last month the Prosecutor
General's Office questioned Mikhail Vanin and Boris Gutin--the
GTK's head and deputy head, respectively--about the committee's
alleged abuse of power in probing and fining the two furniture
stores.
According to some observers, the case has a political subtext.
Last October, Kommersant, citing unnamed sources in the
government, reported that among the co-founders of the Tri Kita
and Grand furniture stores were "firms belonging to the father"
of Yury Zaostrovtsev, a deputy director of the Federal Security
Service (FSB). Zaostrovtsev is reportedly in charge of
organizing relations between President Vladimir Putin and big
business and a leading member of the "Chekists" faction within
the Kremlin. Some observers believe the battle between the FSB
and the Prosecutor General's Office, on the one hand, and the
GTK, on the other, is part of an ongoing fight between the
Chekists and the "Family," the Kremlin faction made up of
Yeltsin-era holdovers, including Vanin (Moskovsky Komsomolets,
January 26; RBK, January 25; Moscow Times, January 24; see the
Monitor, November 29, 2001).
In his February 18 article in Novaya Gazeta, Shchekochikhin
quoted from what he said was a letter from Pavel Zaitsev, an
Interior Minister investigator who had been part of the team
probing the original contraband charges against Tri Kita and
Grand. Zaitsev said the sale of the contraband furniture through
the two stores, which had cost the state US$20 million in unpaid
customs duties, had been carried out by an "international
criminal association" based in Moscow that had "corrupt
relations with the highest echelons of power" and whose leaders,
"using employees of the Prosecutor General's Office, took all
possible measures to halt the investigation" and to discredit
both the investigators and the evidence they uncovered.
Ultimately, members of this criminal group paid unnamed
officials in the Prosecutor General's Office US$2 million to
close the case, Zaitsev claimed (Novaya Gazeta, February 18).
Over the years, various members of Novaya Gazeta's staff have
reportedly been threatened for their work. Most recently, Anna
Politkovskaya, the paper's Chechnya correspondent, left the
republic while investigating alleged murders of civilians by
Russian forces after receiving a warning she should leave
immediately. Politkovskaya left Russia for a time last year
after receiving threats related to articles she had written (see
the Monitor, February 11, 13).
*******
#5
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
February 20, 2002
Three Theses Concerning Information Policy
In any democratic country the press takes the shape of a power ministry
By Irina Khakamada, vice speaker of the State Duma and co-chairman of the
Union of Right Forces
(therussianissues.com)
I would like to make a few "sobering" points concerning the freedom of
speech, the subject discussed at the recent conference "Power of the Press
and Pressure from Power." The state and the media have been engaged in such a
long and noisy campaign against each other that in the heat of the struggle
they have forgotten about their natural missions.
The first point I want to make it this: the state pressures the press in any
democratic society. The press in any democratic country tries to be totally
independent in its quest for the position of a power ministry. I don't think
democracy is the ideal instrument to remove that contradiction.
Generally speaking, democracy is not the most convenient form of government.
This fairly sophisticated mechanism is based on balance, with one corporation
seeking to expand at the expense of another and society using levers to
regulate the balance.
I don't think developed democratic societies are totally free from the state
as far as information policy is concerned. Least of all this is true of
countries in transition. The authorities always tend to gain more ground by
curbing the freedom of information. Society is their partner and opponent,
forming the conditions for the development of a free press through public
organizations and political parties.
One of Russia's distinguishing features is that the transition period and
democratic reforms have undermined civil society here. Political parties as
an institution have not yet taken shape. Therefore, the authorities and the
press regulate their relationship themselves rather than through public
organizations. That is why conflicts between these two institutions are so
acute. This is a marked distinction between Russia and developed democracies.
For that reason, it is sometimes difficult to apply democratic experience to
Russia - Western recipes for this country seems quite formal.
My second point is that Putin is making enormous efforts to modernize the
country. People should appreciate this and understand that Russia will not
have another chance. However, information policy and freedom of the press are
generally not among the reformers' priorities.
Actually, what distinguishes the authorities' policies is economic
determinism. New economic rules and a new architecture for foreign policy are
expected to enable Russia to join the family of civilized nations and make it
competitive. This is a big mistake because when freedom of information gives
way to propaganda, this destroys the nation's intellectual potential.
The 21st century is a time when nations capable of extracting surplus value
from ideas and intellect will be the winners, not countries possessing more
nuclear weapons, oil or gas. A population poisoned by propaganda is not a
creative population - it is unable to compete with others. The Russian
authorities have demonstrated a measure of understanding of that fact by
making education one of their priorities. However, information policy does
not serve the nation's strategic and economic interests. It only serves the
authorities' current interests.
The press and the journalistic community are also faced with problems. I
think this side in the conflict could be criticized too, but there are very
many factors justifying the media's behavior. My impression is that our press
is no longer divided along ideological lines typical of a civil society -
conservative, communist and democratic. The media is divided on one primitive
principle: either "pro" or "anti" President Putin.
If you are "pro," no matter what the authorities do, they do it nicely. The
state-run television channel RTR is a classic example in this respect. We
might as well take an understanding view of what it is doing simply because
it is a state-run channel. If it creates a wild image of the state without
giving objective information, the state's image will suffer.
But still, look at the opposition press. In its attempts to build a
democratic country, it is also creating an idol out of the president. It all
boils down to whether you are with the president or not. If you are against
him, you are "one of us," if not, you are an "alien." If you are "one of us,"
everything going on in the country, good or bad, is supposed to be bad. This
patently Soviet complex has nothing to do with media strategy in a free
society. It reflects poor professionalism and ethics. After all, the press
has acquired enormous leeway over the past ten years of reform to become a
power ministry. Its methods are just as primitive as those employed by the
authorities.
Finally, there can be no freedom of the press without the economics of
freedom. There is no point in expecting favors from the authorities or
calling on them to be moral and adequate without encroaching on the freedom
of the press. Instead, the press should form its own professional lobby and
establish closer contact with political parties. It should campaign for a set
of laws that would create a transparent, competitive climate where the media
could be independent from one particular boss and still enjoy private
investment. That is the job of civil society and if the press is part of it,
it too must work toward that goal. If, however, the journalistic community
hopes to get all that as a gift from the authorities, then this means that
Russia is not a democratic country. It is a country where the press is still
committed to Soviet-style paternalism.
******
#6
BBC Monitoring
Russia: Former TV6 manager says his attitude to Putin is dual
Source: Ekho Moskvy news agency, Moscow, in Russian 1130 gmt 19 Feb 02
[No dateline as received] Recently resigned managing director of the Moscow
Independent Broadcasting Corporation (which owns TV-6) Yevgeniy Kiselev has
admitted that his attitude towards [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's
activity is dual.
Answering live a question by an Ekho Moskvy radio listener Kiselev said: "I
have neither made it a secret nor feared to admit that I did not vote for
Putin in 2000 elections. I voted for another candidate. However, after he was
elected the president I wanted Vladimir Putin to be my president as well".
"What happened to NTV and later to TV6 in spite of all our appeals to Putin
and our face-to-face meeting in 2001, did not help me to see Vladimir
Vladimirovich as my president,"- he stressed.
According to Kiselev "When Putin makes steps and takes decisions which me and
my colleagues think right, positive and meeting Russia's national interests
we support them and do so in public as well".
He said that in particular he meant the foreign policy chosen by the
president and directed at rapprochement between the USA and the western
countries as well as the renewal of political settlement in the Chechen
Republic.
"We can't support the president when he takes such decision as giving people
back Stalin's anthem,"- Kiselev said.
*******
#7
gazeta.ru
February 20, 2002
TV6 Investment Agreement Near Completion
By Ivan Chelnok
Talks on the new television project between the team of journalists headed by
Yevgeniy Kiselyov and a consortium of leading Russian businessmen are nearing
completion. One of the co-founders of the "consortium of investors", board
chairman of the Metalloinvest holding Oleg Kiselyov, has confirmed that
several prominent businessmen would become shareholders of the nascent TV
company. None of them, however, will get a controlling stake.
On March 27 the new company LLC TV6, will bid in the tender for the
broadcasting licence for the vacant 6th channel. Thus a group of prominent
Russian businessmen will help Yevgeniy Kiselyov and his team attempt to
return to the nation's TV screens.
In an interview with the Ekho Moskvy radio station on Tuesday, TV6 director
general Yevgeniy Kiselyov confirmed that he is continuing to discuss the
terms of financing for the new TV project with a group of potential
investors.
However, Yevgeniy Kiselyov refused to give the names of the members of the
so-called "pool of investor".
"Until a set of intelligible legal documents binding both us and our
investors to certain commitments is not signed, it is premature to talk of
anything else," the TV6 director explained. Yevgeniy Kiselyov said that he
and his team are insisting on five key principles, regardless of who finances
the prospective new channel.
"We have decided to take part in the tender for the 6th frequency in order to
get back on air but not at any cost. There are things we will never
transgress, principles we will never renounce," the TV6 director said.
Yevgeniy Kiselyov's principles are:
1 - "We shall revive news in our country as a profession, we shall report
about everything that is happening in our country and in the world, quickly,
truthfully, objectively, without omissions and propaganda, without regard to
anyone's discontent, even that of the highest authority."
2 - "We shall be a mirror into which the authorities will be able to look at
any moment to see what they really look like in the eyes of the voters."
3 - "We shall not be the television channel of any political party; we shall
not serve any candidate or political force during elections. We shall give a
voice to all participants of events and present all existing standpoints."
4 - "We shall not be an informational weapon under someone's control, will
not allow ourselves to be an instrument in the settlement of notorious
'disputes between economic entities', even if the parties involved in such
disputes happen to be our shareholders, creditors or advertisers."
5 - "We will uphold liberal democratic values, the priority of human rights,
the principles of civil society, market economy and enlightened patriotism."
The TV6 director general said on Ekho Moskvy that the future investors of the
new TV channel would have "to express their attitude towards these
conditions".
"I expect a clear, distinct answer from them: whether they accept our
position or not," Kiselyov said resolutely.
One of the co-founders of the consortium Oleg Kiselyov, the board chairman of
Metalloinvest holding confirmed on Tuesday evening that the so-called "pool
of investors" of TV6 has already been formed.
"We fully accept those conditions and consider the existence of an effective
television that would be watched by millions of our country's citizens
absolutely necessary," Oleg Kiselyov told Kommersant Daily.
Oleg Kiselyov agreed to disclose the names of the businessmen who have
already entered the consortium and implied that it is still open for new
members to join.
Those who have joined the TV6 consortium so far are:
1. Chairman of the board of the Unified Energy Systems RAO UES Anatoly
Chubais.
2. Governor of the Chukotka Region Roman Abramovich
3. Board chairman of Metalloinvest Oleg Kiselyov (on Wednesday morning he
resigned from that post)
4. Board member of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
Alexander Mamout
5. Director general of Russian Aluminium Oleg Deripaska
6. Director general of Unified Machine Works Kakha Bendoukidze
7. Director general Vympelkom (Bee-Line mobile communications) Dmitry Zimin
8. Head of MDM Bank Andrei Melnichenko
9. Board chairman of AFK Sistema Vladimir Yevtushenkov
10. President of SUAL holding Viktor Vexelberg
Mikhail Fridman of the Alfa Group, Mikhail Khodorkovsky of Yukos and the
owner of the Interros holding Vladimir Potanin have refused to join the
consortium, although initially they were named together with UES chief
Anatoly Chubais.
Former director general of Gazprom-Media Alfred Kokh, a controversial figure
who played a leading role in the seizure of the NTV company by the state
controlled gas giant in April 2001, had to withdraw from the consortium due
to the insistence of the TV6 journalists, who evidently are still wary of
him.
Neither Yevgeniy Kiselyov, nor Kokh have commented on the latter's exclusion,
but a "source close to the talks" told Kommersant that "even if Kokh has
gone, it's not forever".
In the near future the parties are to sign a declaration of intent.
Under the agreement between Kiselyov's team of journalists and the consortium
of businessmen, none of the shareholders will have a controlling stake in the
new TV company. TV6 staff will also have a stake, though reportedly no larger
than 10%.
*******
#8
Moscow Times
February 21, 2002
Military Unfit for New Toys
By Pavel Felgenhauer
The authorities have at long last begun to expose the real causes of the
Kursk nuclear submarine disaster in the Barents sea in August 2000 that
killed 118 sailors.
Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov has told reporters that there were no
foreign (U.S. or British) submarines near the Kursk when it went down. This
is the first formal affirmation by the authorities that navy chiefs were
lying when they insisted for more than a year that a mysterious "foreign
submarine" sank the Kursk.
Naval chief Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov confessed that the Kursk was sunk by
an explosion of fuel inside a faulty practice torpedo, which the navy uses
during exercises, reloads with fuel, and uses again. An error in procedure
during fuel reloading could have made the torpedo unstable and caused the
fatal explosion. Kuroyedov announced that in the future, torpedoes of this
type will be removed from service.
Ustinov pointed to sloppy conduct and lack of discipline as being among the
main causes of the Kursk disaster: Cockpit recorders on the boat were not
switched on during the August 2000 exercises, emergency rescue equipment was
disactivated, and so on.
Military prosecutors investigating the sinking of the Kursk say that if all
the requisite safety regulations had been adhered to before the Kursk left
port and during the exercise itself, the sunken submarine would have been
found by other Russian ships an hour or less after the explosion. This is
because an emergency buoy would have floated to the surface equipped with a
communications device that could have made it possible to contact the 23
sailors that survived the blast in the stern compartments of the Kursk. And
some or all of the survivors might have been saved.
Investigators have found that the stern emergency buoy of the Kursk survived
the explosion on board and was functional. This buoy was designed to be
released automatically in the case of a disaster; but the crew, to prevent an
undesirable self-activation that would have disclosed the location of the
submarine during exercises, had deliberately deactivated it.
Last December, after receiving a preliminary report from Ustinov, President
Vladimir Putin removed Northern Fleet commander Admiral Vyacheslav Popov from
military service, along with his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Mikhail Motsak,
and 12 other high-ranking naval officials for mismanagement of the exercise
in which the Kursk sunk.
But the public punishment of the guilty could hardly be called impressive.
After being ousted, Popov was soon appointed a member of the Federation
Council. Motsak is now an important federal government official in St.
Petersburg. And Kuroyedov, who many times publicly supported the fictitious
cover-up story that the Kursk was sunk by a foreign submarine, is still chief
of the navy.
Low morale and bad discipline in the ranks of the military has caused many
disasters in recent years. Hundreds of lives in Chechnya were lost because
drunken or otherwise unfit commanders put their own men in jeopardy. Drunk,
undisciplined or out-of-control soldiers have gone on sprees, abusing and
killing Chechens. The upshot is only greater resistance, putting Russia in a
situation in which it cannot possibly win.
Almost a year ago, Putin appointed his close personal friend and associate,
former KGB General Sergei Ivanov, as defense minister. Putin wanted Ivanov to
reverse the decline of Russia's military and begin long awaited reforms.
Ivanov recently told reporters that his greatest achievement since
appointment has been a drastic reallocation of defense spending and that in
the coming year up to 50 percent of the defense budget will be spent on
procurement and development of new weapons. But is there any sense in
procuring new weapons to arm Russia's undisciplined forces?
The Kursk was one of the country's most modern submarines. It belonged to the
Oscar II class, considered by Western naval specialists to be a very potent
sea weapon. However, it went down because of lack of discipline.
Moral and professional decay in the military has only been increasing while
Ivanov has been busy trying to procure new weapons. Recently, several
soldiers deserted from their units with arms and killed policemen, servicemen
and civilians -- more than 10 people in total. Control in military units
seems to be almost completely absent. If in its present state the military
receives new and more effective weapons, it may well do the nation
considerably more harm than good.
Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.
*******
#9
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002
From: "JOSEPH DRESEN"
Subject: meeting summary
(For more News Digests from the Woodrow Wilson Center, please visit
http://wwics.si.edu/NEWS/digest/digest.htm)
Women's Political Activism and Post-Soviet Gender Culture in Russia
February 11, 2002
Summary of a Kennan Institute meeting with Carol Nechemias, Associate
Professor, School of Public Affairs, Penn State University, Harrisburg; and
Ludmila Popkova, Director, Gender Studies Center, Samara State University
Popkova opened her presentation by examining political participation and
representation among Russian women. In discussions with female political
leaders in Samara, Popkova found that today's gender identities continue to
be influenced by Soviet-established values. Popkova stated that under
Soviet rule, gender order was institutionalized, impacting the perception
that women were secondary to men. The Soviet image of working mothers
reinforced the established gender order and furthered the needs of the
state. Popkova noted that this perception continues among the younger
generation, and that recent studies show that Russian women are less
sensitive than western women to male domination in the workplace or in
their personal relationships.
According to Popkova's research, women's political activism in Russia has
separated into two approaches. The first perspective is based primarily on
a gender neutral or professional position. Similar to western women's
movements, activist leaders do not use gender or gender-related issues to
establish women's rights in the political process. The second and more
popular approach among Russian women is more gender sensitive. Activists
use biological and gender related differences to prove that women belong in
the political process. Popkova noted that the popularity of this view is
evidenced by the fact that nearly all female candidates in the latest
election used this approach in their political campaigns.
Nechemias began her discussion by noting that there has been a decline in
the proportion of women in the State Duma during Russia's democratic
transition and that women hold less than 4 percent of high-level government
positions. Nechemias stated that this discrepancy illustrates how communism
discredited the idea of women in Russian politics. Under communist rule,
women (especially working mothers) were used as symbolic figures in
communist propaganda, but were absent from key decision-making bodies like
the Politburo and Central Committee of the Communist Party. Russians remain
skeptical about women as serious political figures, viewing them instead as
decorative elements of Russian political society.
According to Nechemias, women political leaders have not had much success
in Russian politics. Nechemias noted that womens political influence has
suffered since the defeat of the Women of Russia movement in 1995, its
split in 1996, and the failure to develop a unified, effective strategy for
contesting the 1999 election. Nechemias also stated that although many
Russians believe in equality, many feel that no "real" woman would pursue a
high powered political career. Nechemias contended that members of the
Russian political elite do not fear a distinct women's vote, and therefore
do not address women's issues or promote women's candidacies.
Both speakers concluded by saying that in contemporary Russia, the identity
or categorization of womens rights is currently failing. According to
Popkova, women must establish their rights as individuals first, and then
work collectively to achieve women's rights as a whole. Nechemias finished
by saying that activist leaders must work from the grassroots level up to
establish political viability with Russian politicians.
Blair Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute, (202) 691-4100
*******
#10
From: "Alexander Yanov"
Subject: JRL discussion (Aslund and Reddaway)
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002
Dear David, to tell the truth I had no intention to meddle in the public
flagellation of Mr. Aslund by the champions of Mr. Reddaway that's going on
lately on JRL. To my mind, both Mr. Reddaway and Mr. Aslund equally
represent extremes in the ongoing debate on the Russian drama of the 1990s.
In both books the grain of truth is so heavily compromised by ideological
prejudice that very little of it remains in the end. It's just that at the
moment Mr. Reddaway's extreme is more fashionable and Mr. Aslund has to
suffer.
One thing seems to me unforgivable though. And this is Mr. Reddaway's
flippant invasion into my territory of expertise, that is Russian imperial
nationalism. Why would he say that Zyuganov's victory in the 1996
presidential elections might have been better than Yeltsin's is
incomprehensible to me. It reveals, I am afraid, something more than simple
misunderstanding of the nature of change in a post-socialist empire, be it
Russian or Serbian.
My criterion is clear. As experience tells us, there could have been two
kinds of transformation that both empires might have gone through in order
to join the world community. One was the pro-Western Gorbachev-Yeltsin kind
leading eventually -- for all their sins -- to Putin's "turn to the West"
after September 11. The other was the anti-Western Milosevic-Zyuganov
imperial kind leading to global confrontation. The price of the first was
the dominance of quasi-democracy and colossal corruption. The price of the
second was the dominance of imperial nationalism and genocide.
Both kinds of transformation made immense suffering of the people
inevitable. Yet to say that genocide is better, albeit marginally, than
corruption is, one must agree, rather astounding.
It's hard to believe that Mr. Reddaway hadn't read any of Zyuganov's
books (there are almost a dozen of them available, including a PhD
dissertation). And if he had, how did he manage to miss the two main points
repeated in all of them without exception? The first point is that Russia
without the empire is not Russia at all, just a bloody stamp of a nation.
The second is that reconciliation between Russia and the West is ruled out
forever. Since the West's ultimate goal has always been "the destruction of
Russia's statehood and culture and the imposition upon the nation a
lifestyle alien to it" (meaning of course democracy).
Just imagine now what could have happened to the world during the
bombing of Serbia and "patriotic hysteria" of the Spring 1999 if the Kremlin
had indeed been ruled then by President Zyuganov pushing as he did at the
time for a unification of Serbia with Russia in order to confront the
Western allies with all her nuclear might.
I have the benefit of being aquainted with Gennady Zyuganov personally
and I can testify that there is not much difference between Milosevic's
drive for Greater Serbia and Zyuganov's for Greater Russia.To give you a
better sense of these imperial passions, let me quote a professional writer
who expressed them much more eloquently than Zyuganov himself with his
hopelessly dull officialise. I am talking about Dmitri Balashov, a
historical novelist (2 million copies of his book were sold in 1994) and of
course the most loyal follower and co-thinker of Zyuganov's.
Here is an example: "What is this so called Kazakhstan if not a
legitimate territory of two former Cossack regions? Restore them, and there
is no independent republic of Kazakhstan anymore. This is what our rulers
would do immediately if they have indeed been guided by Russia's interest"
(i.e., if Zyuganov were president). And that is only the beginning of what
this Zyuganov's alter ego had to say. "We must fight for Russia," he
continued. For "unless we fight we will be exterminated like roaches and
rats... I have six sons, four of them already of age when a man can take up
arms. And although I am an old man, I can still hold a rifle as well. I vow
on these pages: When it starts, I'll go to fight and my boys will go with
me... We will restore Russia, our Holy Rus' -- yes, the same one, from the
Baltics to the Black Sea, from Kuril islands to Carpathian Mountains. United
and indivisible."
Thank god, it never started -- precisely because of Yeltsin's victory in
1996.
In light of this, Mr. Reddaway's preference of Zyuganov looks not just
bizarre. It reveals that in his zeal to expose the corruption of the Yeltsin
regime he missed the real complexity of political change in a post-socialist
empire entirely. And none of his champions in the JRL discussion paid any
attention to that. This is what's really distressing about the discussion.
*******
#11
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002
From: Neil McGowan
Subject: Re: 6088-Service/Kagarlitsky
I enjoyed and appreciated Robert Service's review
of Boris Kagarlitsky's book. It's rare that my background
(as a musicologist) is of much use to me these days, but
I did have a small point to raise to complement, rather than
contradict what Prof Service has written.
Certainly Yel'tsin did away with the USSR Anthem. However,
the tune - I use the word advisedly - that replaced it was
already battle-tested - it had done sterling service as the
anthem of the RSFSR (in the days when each Soviet Republic
had its own anthem, as well as having "Soyuz nerushimi..."
as the overall anthem of the Union). It also announced the
9pm evening tv news for several years. Glinka wrote it
as ceremonial music to be played as the fountains of the
Grand Cascade at Peterhof were set in action.
Although I very much liked the Glinka anthem, it's therefore
not entirely true to say that it marked any kind of cut with
the Soviet past by Yeltsin. Its lack of lyrics (although it is
by no means the only wordless anthem in the world) was
also a factor in its untimely end, albeit that Glinka's
noble strains were put aside for the return of something
decidedly more tub-thumping in tone.
*******
#12
Oligarch praises Kremlin for "actively promoting Russian business abroad"
Interfax
Moscow, 20 February: Russia's leaders are actively promoting Russian
businesses abroad, Interros spokesperson Larisa Zelkova quoted the company's
chief Vladimir Potanin as saying. Potanin met President Vladimir Putin today.
Potanin said that "the president and the government's consistent policy of
promoting Russian companies on international markets is strengthening the
positions of Russian business abroad, and is positively influencing the
socioeconomic situation in Russia".
Potanin informed Putin of prospects for the implementation of large-scale
projects by the holding's member-companies. He said the Siloviye Mashiny
concern was planning to take part in the privatization of Ukrainian
electricity-generating equipment enterprises, including Turboatom in Kharkiv.
He also informed Putin on how contracts under the agreements reached by
Norilsk Nickel and Finnish Outokumpu, which were signed in September 2001 in
the presence of the Russian and Finnish presidents, are being negotiated. In
accordance with the general agreement, a new ore-dressing enterprise is to be
built in Norilsk, and the capacity of the operating ore-dressing factory in
the town of Talnakh (in Taymyr Autonomous District) is to be increased. The
projects are estimated at 230-250 million US dollars.
******
#13
Ekonomika i Zhizn
No. 7
2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
A YEAR OF MODERATE PESSIMISM
By P. ZHUKOV, Cand.Sc. (Economics)
Most probably, economic issues to be discussed by society
and the authorities in 2002 will include terms and conditions
of Russia's entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the
amounts of customs duties, and also the question of what the
monetary policy should be like - more mild, with the deliberate
weakening of the rouble in line with the inflation level (or
even lower), or more tough, with the deliberate strengthening
of the rouble.
One can state today that domestic producers suffered a
serious defeat in their competition with imports. Growth rates
of industrial production in Russia were much lower that the
growth of imports in 2001.
----------------------------------------------------------------
January-September 2001 (percent of the respective 2000 period)
----------------------------------------------------------------
105.2% - industrial output
120.2% - imports
----------------------------------------------------------------
This is largely due to the fact that the quality of
domestic consumer (non-food) goods is still rather low, while
their prices have nearly levelled with those of similar
imported commodities.
Domestic producers will not be able to resolve the problem of
enhancing the quality of goods without modernising their
enterprises, which requires investments in equipment and
technologies.
At present, the volume of imports is even lower than the
1998 level (by 20-25 percent), while the prices of exported
goods are much higher than before the August crisis.
Russia's exports in 2002 are forecasted to amount to 80-90
billion dollars, and imports - 55-60 billion dollars, which
gives a rather good trade surplus of 25-30 billion dollars.
However, prospects for export-oriented raw materials and
metallurgical sectors in 2002 are not too good. Oil prices
will, most probably, range between 17 and 19 dollars per
barrel; they will hardly drop below 16 dollars per barrel.
However, the prices of metals have already dropped more than
oil prices (by 20 to 30 percent, and more).
Experts believe that in 2002 the economies of the United
States and the European Union will overcome the recession and
display some sort of growth. Perhaps, this will result in the
overall stabilisation of prices for Russian exports, though
losses from the already adopted protectionist measures are
inevitable. Most probably, this will lead to a fall in economic
growth rates in Russia in the first quarter of 2002 and,
consequently, lower economic indicators than in 2001 (GDP may
grow by 3 instead of 5 percent). However, it seems growth will
still continue, while recession is hardly possible. In 2002,
growth should be due to internal factors, i.e., consumer demand
(wage rises for public and private sector workers) and the
investment boom.
----------------------------------------------------------------
2001 as against 2000
----------------------------------------------------------------
Population's money incomes grew by 31.2%
Real disposable incomes rose by 5.9%
Retail trade turnover increased by 10.8%
----------------------------------------------------------------
The potential of the Russian market of consumer goods
makes it possible to assume that Russia will become more
attractive for investment in their production this year than it
was last year.
Experts of consulting companies point to foreign
investors' growing activities and a stronger tendency towards
repatriation of Russian capitals for investments in the "points
of growth." Giving due consideration to this circumstance,
exporters (of oil, gas, steel, etc.) diversify their financial
groups. They make investments in effective projects in other
fields and attach more attention to boosting supplies of
investment goods to Russia's domestic market and switching over
to the production of highly processed commodities (up to the
final product). Leading Russian ferrous metals producers
partially compensate for the fall in their exports to Europe
and the United States (caused by protectionist measures) by
increasing supplies to the domestic market and expanding the
production of pipes, automobiles and heavy industry goods.
Today, the government and the Central Bank are confronted
with a complex dilemma: either to curb inflation by limiting
money supply and lowering the rouble rate as against the dollar
(thus sacrificing our economic growth and encouraging the
further expansion of imports), or gradually correct the rouble
rate, thus stimulating economic growth while permitting higher
inflation.
Which road will be chosen?
It depends on many factors, including political ones. At
the same time, we should not forget that a sharp and
considerable weakening of the rouble may cause a surge in
inflation and reduce composite demand, which will immediately
tell on economic growth.
However, such a steep growth in imports as was registered in
2001, as well as a fall in prices for exported goods, are clear
and doubtless signals that the rouble should be weakened in
order to improve conditions of trade and restore the
equilibrium.
*******
#14
U.S. Said Making Same Mistakes in Afghanistan As USSR Did in Its Day
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
19 February 2002
Article by Vladislav Kulikov: Afghanistan Is Like Sphinx?
The United States is gradually starting to make the
same mistakes in Afghanistan as the ones that had painful consequences
for the Soviet Union in its day. Of course, on the surface all looks
quiet, moreover, so quiet that forecasts made by General Staff analysts,
who predicted many years of headaches for the Americans, look
embarrassing. Apparently, however, the Americans' situation, indeed, is
not as good as it looks.
In the southern provinces, particularly around Kandahar, where,
incidentally, resistance to the Soviet troops had started, the Americans
are beginning to realize that the Taliban has not been destroyed, it
merely went underground. Around 1,000 militants are being currently
kept captive at the U.S. military base in Afghanistan's southern capital;
they are waiting to be transported to Cuba.
The base has fought back two attacks and there are reasons to believe it
is just the beginning. Two servicemen of the U.S. 101st Airborne
Division were wounded in the first shootout. The attackers managed to
approach the Americans almost to a 50-meter distance. To fight back the
attack the airborne rangers launched helicopters and opened
heavy-artillery fire. During the course of hot pursuit they managed to
capture seven Afghans who turned out to be... local police officers.
They were all released.
A regular battle was fought the following day. A correspondent of
Reuters, who witnessed the events, heard explosions and saw flashes of
tracer bullets. The base's large territory was ablaze. Three
helicopters burned down literally in front of him.
However, it is believed in Washington that the British journalist got
something wrong. As for the American media, they provide purely
Soviet-style coverage of the events. It was said about the Kandahar
fire that it had been caused by a flare that accidentally fell on the
ground. Allegedly, it set the grass on fire and it started to burn.
According to a patriotic CNN, no other damage was done except to the
grass itself. Therefore, eyewitnesses should not believe their eyes.
When Kandahar was ablaze Radio Liberty's website reported that the new
governor of the Paktia province had arrived in its capital Gardez and
that a conference had been held in Berlin to discuss the creation of
Afghanistan's police. That was all.
The case of the Hercules transport aircraft that crashed in one of
Afghanistan's southern provinces is as mysterious as that of the attack
on Kandahar. According to the official version, the pilot made a
mistake during an unsuccessful landing. It was not explained why he had
an urge to land at the world's end and not in Kandahar, Bagram, or Kabul.
Again, according to the official version, there were no casualties,
only eight persons were wounded. As they say, "believe it or not."
It is difficult to get rid of the thought that the Americans are not
saying everything. And their lame explanations spoil the impression.
After all, if the airborne rangers merely saw the attacking Taliban in
their dreams and if in truth they simply fired at one another and opened
chaotic fire the following day again, it is even worse. The U.S. Army
in this situation is reminiscent of a bunch of helpless rookies. It
would have been better to admit the attack, for at least this version is
more heroic.
In any case it is clear that the Americans have embarked on the same path
the Soviet Union once traveled. Russian people do not need to be
reminded what happened at the end of that path. That said the
situation, probably, will not be identical. The people who know
Afghanistan well, claim that the issue of resistance in that country is
the issue of timely advance payment. If the militants acquire a good
sponsor, foreign troops will face the music. Thus far, however, there
are no obvious candidates for the role of feeders of the opposition,
which the United States played in its day with regard to the mujahedin.
However, for the first several years Afghans fought against the USSR even
without massive support from abroad.
*******
#15
ANALYSIS-Iran ties cloud Russia-U.S. partnership plans
By Jon Boyle
MOSCOW, Feb 20 (Reuters) - The Iranian foreign minister's abrupt no-show in
Moscow reflects Russia's struggle to reconcile its desire for closer ties to
Washington with its economic and security interests in the demonised Islamic
republic.
Some Moscow-based diplomats and analysts were scratching their heads over the
snap decision by Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi to cancel a
long-scheduled visit.
But some newspapers said the move was the result of pressure from visiting
U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who made plain on Tuesday
Washington's irritation at Moscow's close ties with a state it considers part
of an "axis of evil."
"They (the Americans) told Vladimir Putin who his friends are," the
Kommersant daily headlined its front-page article.
Other observers suggested Moscow decided it would be tactless to sign a new
cooperation deal with Iran during Bolton's visit, prompting Kharrazi to call
off his trip.
Putin has striven to fix Russia in the Western orbit, offering stalwart
support for the U.S. war against terrorism launched in the wake of the
September 11 attacks against the United States.
Putin earlier this week stripped a senior official of his control of the
atomic energy ministry, a driving force in nuclear exports to Iran.
That could point to a desire not to antagonise Washington, although Sergei
Markov, foreign policy editor of the Kremlin-linked strana.ru website, said
it was unclear if the two events were linked.
RUSSIAN FRUSTRATIONS
Russian officials are frustrated by Washington's go-it-alone approach which
brushed aside Moscow's concerns on missile defence and security, and its
economic interests.
And some complain that Putin has little to show for ditching Moscow's
traditional truculence towards America.
"If the U.S. wants a real strategic alliance with Russia it must be so
profitable that it could give up its relations with Iran," Markov said. That
meant opening Western markets to Russian arms firms and giving them a role in
missile defence.
No such deal is on the table, but there has been talk of rewarding Russia's
support over Afghanistan by boosting U.S. imports of Russian crude, an issue
officials from the two countries discussed on Wednesday in Moscow.
Viktor Kremenyuk, deputy director of the USA-Canada Institute, said Moscow
was not ready to curtail lucrative nuclear power and arms contracts with
Iran.
Putin earlier this month opposed blacklisting states, and senior officials on
Wednesday again rejected U.S. accusations it was helping Iran develop
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
Russia's top space and aviation official Yuri Koptev said the United States
had presented "expressions of concern" on 14 occasions recently, but had
failed to produce any evidence.
"Looking for a black cat in a dark room when he isn't there is something we
cannot do," said Koptev, who met Bolton on Monday.
Russia needed to find a way to balance its ties with the United States and
Iran, Kremenyuk said, for Russia had many reasons to maintain good relations
with Iran. They include a money-spinning contract for a nuclear power plant
at Bushehr, a deal with Iran and other littoral states over the Caspian Sea's
oil riches, and the fragile situation in Afghanistan.
"Mr Bush should understand that neither the Russians nor the Europeans are
ready to sacrifice their relations (with Iran) simply because the American
president says so," Kremenyuk said.
U.S. RHETORIC
Markov said Washington would soon replace its anti-Tehran rhetoric with
discreet U.S. diplomacy with moderate Iranian leaders.
"As conflict with Iraq becomes inevitable, to combine that with conflict with
Iran would be politically extremely dangerous," said Markov. It could unleash
Kurdish nationalism, destabilising neighbouring U.S. ally Turkey and oil
markets.
But the immediate prospects of that happening appear remote. Bolton made
clear on Tuesday that Washington was incensed by leaks of rocket and nuclear
know-how from Russia to Iran.
He said it was "very important" that Russia, the United States and the West
"treat the question of nuclear and missile proliferation in the same way."
*******
#16
Russia: Judge Says Popular Opinion Not Proper Basis For Law (Part 1)
By Jeremy Bransten
When Russia joined the Council of Europe in 1996, former President Boris
Yeltsin imposed a moratorium on executions, in line with the organization's
statutes, and promised to strike the death penalty from Russia's law books
within three years. So far, Moscow has not honored its obligation, and on 15
February -- ahead of a formal vote on the issue -- a majority of legislators
in the State Duma passed a resolution calling on President Vladimir Putin to
resume executions, in light of overwhelming public demand.
Will Russia become the odd man out in Europe on the issue? What lies behind
Russians' continued support for capital punishment, and can this stance be
defended? In Part 1 of a two-part series, RFE/RL correspondent Jeremy
Bransten discusses the death penalty and Russia's criminal justice system
with one of the country's leading former judges and would-be reformers.
Prague, 20 February 2002 (RFE/RL) -- State Duma legislators clearly were in
tune with Russian public opinion when they voted overwhelmingly in favor of a
resolution urging President Vladimir Putin to lift Russia's six-year-old
moratorium on executions on 15 February.
According to the latest surveys, some three-quarters of Russians favor the
death penalty. Putin, although he has pronounced himself in favor of
abolishing the punishment, added fuel to the fire recently in a speech
blasting law-enforcement officials for their apparent inability to stem
rising crime.
In March, Russian legislators will have to decide whether to ratify Protocol
Number Six of the Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights, which calls
for the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime and whose passage is
mandatory for all states in the organization. Out of the Council of Europe's
more than 40 members, only Russia and Turkey have failed to ratify the
article.
The Council of Europe's official stance is that the death penalty can no
longer be regarded as an acceptable form of punishment from a human rights
perspective. The Council calls it an "arbitrary, discriminatory, and
irreversible sanction" that has the potential to be misapplied while being
ineffective as a preventive measure.
Kristina Pencheva, of the Council of Europe's Directorate for Human Rights,
refused to speculate on what might happen to Russia's membership in the
prestigious organization if deputies vote to reinstate the death penalty. But
she told RFE/RL the Duma resolution is viewed very negatively in Strasbourg.
"Instead of moving closer to ratification, which would be in line with the
commitment which they undertook when joining the organization, the recent
resolution on behalf of the State Duma in the sense that ratification is
premature, addressing President Putin with an appeal that this should not
happen, is very much not in line with the standards that the Council of
Europe is upholding and has throughout its 43 member states," Pencheva said.
"And secondly, it's a very unfortunate development in our view."
While European countries may have abolished the death penalty, many capital
punishment advocates argue that Russia, like the United States, has a
different history and social conditions than the continent and must be
allowed to deal with crime in its own way. They point to Russian Interior
Ministry statistics, which show the number of homicides in Russia rising from
29,000 in 1995, before the death penalty moratorium, to 32,000 in 2001.
Sergei Pashin -- now retired from the bench -- is one of Russia's pre-eminent
judges. He was tasked by former President Boris Yeltsin, at the start of
Russia's emergence as an independent state in the early 1990s, with drafting
a new post-Soviet criminal code, which he did, before being pushed out by
conservatives in 1995. That liberal code, says Pashin, is now being largely
undone by Putin, with the emphasis being put on government control of the
judicial process and harsh punishments, creating a climate in which
re-adoption of the death penalty seems almost natural.
In fact, Russia's Supreme Court ruled in 1999 that once all of the country's
regions have put in place a jury system for murder trials, death sentences
could once again be handed down.
Pashin spoke at length on the issue to RFE/RL by telephone from Moscow: "Many
norms regarding judicial reform have been adopted now, including new rules of
criminal procedure, amendments to the law on the status of judges and a law
on bodies falling under the Association of Judges in Russia. I believe that
these series of laws contradict the concept of judicial reform which the
Russian parliament adopted in 1991. They are acts of counter-reform.
Decisions taken by the president enable the strengthening of law-enforcement
bodies, that is to say the police and the public prosecutor's office -- they
have received new powers -- while failing to promote the defense of human
rights. And as regards the independence of judges, it is now seriously
threatened."
Pashin said the new emphasis on repression over rehabilitation will only
create more crime in Russia. He added that experience leads him to agree with
the Council of Europe that the death penalty has no deterrent effect on crime.
"I would not say that capital punishment can be a deterrent to crime. Many of
those I have judged believed that if they were caught they would definitely
be sentenced to death. It was only afterwards, while already in detention,
that they understood that the law also allowed for a prison term for their
crimes. So the belief that they would definitely be shot, if caught, didn't
prevent them from committing their crimes," Pashin said. "It seems to me that
social change, such as doing away with poverty, is a better way to prevent
murders committed for the purpose of material gain. As concerns murders
motivated by jealousy or domestic disputes, they won't be stopped by the
death penalty."
Published data from law-enforcement agencies indicate that in Russia, as in
the majority of countries, most murders happen between neighbors or relatives
in the heat of argument. The weapon of choice: a kitchen knife. Premeditated
killings form only a small percentage of the overall murder rate.
"Different countries have different experiences. If we look at Britain, which
abolished the death penalty in the 1960s, there was no growth in premeditated
murders following this decision," Pashin said. "I myself was a judge for many
years and oversaw cases in which the death penalty was a possibility, and I
have to say I never raised my hand to shoot someone who was found guilty
because, as a rule, they were just sad cases. In five years as a judge, only
once was I called to judge someone accused of a contract murder. Most
murderers brought into court are people who have committed murder during a
household dispute or unintentionally during an assault or burglary."
Pashin said politicians and journalists should be wary of public opinion
polls that purport to show massive public support for the death penalty.
"Experience with juries demonstrates that many people who took part in
surveys and behaved harshly, demanding the death penalty and the strongest
punishments, saw with surprise once they became jury members that the
criminals before them were basically sad characters. And those juries tend to
find for the defendant or else they call for more lenient sentences," Pashin
said. "Those who speak 'a priori,' and those who have actually experienced
our justice system and understand how risky it is to trust that system with
our fate, are two totally different sets of people."
Even if the number of capital punishment stalwarts is genuinely high in
Russia, Pashin argued that this is not a sufficient argument for killing
convicted criminals.
"In very few countries was capital punishment abolished by referendum. There
were such examples, but as a rule people support the death penalty. And the
less educated and poorer a population is, the more it demands hangings or the
firing squad. Therefore, the only option is to observe international
commitments, respect human rights as they are enumerated in the Constitution
-- the right to life is part of our Russian Constitution -- and act wisely,
despite the wishes of the population," Pashin said.
The sad irony is that conditions in Russia's notorious prison camps are so
miserable that the presidential pardons commission periodically receives
letters from inmates sentenced to life who request the death penalty, as a
more "humane" option. For the first 10 years of their incarceration, lifers
are allowed two brief visits and one parcel per year. They are kept in tiny,
squalid cells and are often underfed, with the resulting likelihood of
contracting tuberculosis or other potentially deadly communicable diseases.
But Pashin said it would be unconscionable for the Russian government to use
these prisoners' cries of desperation as a justification for reinstating
capital punishment: "It is true that conditions in the prison camps and
especially for those sentenced to life imprisonment are not the best. They
are torture. But I have never believed that capital punishment can be defined
as humanism. I believe that human life -- even in the harshest conditions --
is sacred. Yes, I know that there have been some letters from prisoners
addressed to the presidential pardons commission, in which prisoners
sentenced to life have asked to be shot, saying it would be a humane act from
their point of view. But the position of the population is one thing, the
position of a prisoner is another, and the position of the state is yet
another matter. The state cannot take away the life of its citizens and
should concentrate instead on prison reform."
Editorialist Vladimir Dobrenkov, writing in the newspaper "Vremya MN"
recently, warned that Russian politicians ignore popular will at their peril:
"The people are not going to remain silent much longer. They want the
authorities to listen to them and take their opinion into account. What
Russia needs is a nationwide movement For Justice, Social Order and
Individual Security."
Although surveys consistently show that Russians have little confidence in
their current justice system and thus believe in the possibility of judicial
errors being committed, such appeals for law and order have gone down well
with the general public.
Russian politicians, on the death penalty issue, face a choice: follow the
rest of Europe or strike out on their own, once again delineating a separate
path for Russia.
(Part 2 of this series examines the rest of Europe's experience with capital
punishment. What drove Europe's politicians to seek the death penalty's
abolition, often in the face of popular opposition and what has been the
experience since that time?)
*******
#17
ORT Review
www.ortv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu)
Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and
Policy at Boston University
HEADLINES,
Wednesday, February 20, 2002
- Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the ministers of defense,
finance and labor to discuss the financing of the Ministry of Defense, the
Armed Forces reform and the increase in military wages.
- The presidential bill on Russian citizenship was reviewed in the second
reading at the State Duma. The bill will make it more difficult to
receive citizenship; applicants will have to prove their knowledge of the
Russian language and the Constitution; applicants who do not have
relatives in Russia will have to reside in the country for 10, instead of
5, years before getting citizenship.
- Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov met with the leaders of the major oil
companies to discuss reports that OPEC will set further production cuts.
- State Duma deputies are visiting Nizhny Novgorod to observe the
alternative civil service program in action.
- The search for a deserter continues in the Stavropol krai. He has
killed two people; according to the latest reports he is wounded.
- A helicopter and three tugboats evacuated 270 fishermen from a
break-away ice floe in the Gulf of Finland; 10 had originally refused to
be rescued, not wanting to abandon their cars.
- President Putin met with Prime Minister Kasyanov to discuss budget
relations between the center and the regions. Putin also met with
Kemerovo Oblast Governor Aman Tuleev and with Interros head Vladimir
Potanin.
- President Putin met with the leaders of the Supreme, Arbitration, and
Constitutional Courts to discuss judicial reform. In particular, he
emphasized the importance of getting 200 regional courts "into decent
shape" and making sure that the money allocated for this does not seep
back to the center.
- Soldiers in Chechnya have made available the video of the latest special
operation in Starye Atagi.
- Prime Minister Kasyanov announced that the government has solved the
problem of foreign debts. Russia will be able to pay on schedule in 2003.
*******
Web page for CDI Russia Weekly:
http://www.cdi.org/russia
Archive for Johnson's Russia List:
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson
With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and
the MacArthur Foundation
A project of the Center for Defense Information (CDI)
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20036