Johnson's Russia List
#6088
20 February 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Note from David Johnson:
1. BBC: Alexander Koliandre, Russian guru upbeat on economy. (Boris Fedorov)
2. Reuters: Russia says capital flight down, wants investments.
3. Parlamentskaya Gazeta: THE POOR HAVE BECOME POORER.
4. RIA Novosti: RUSSIAN DOCTORS ATTACK TOBACCO.
5. pravda.ru: IT IS DANGEROUS TO WORK IN RUSSIA.
6. Moscow Times: Yulia Latynina, This Leaky Sieve Is No American Bubble.
(re Gazprom)
7. The Independent (UK): Robert Service, The men who prostituted mother
Russia. (review of Russia under Yeltsin and Putin: neo-liberal autocracy,
by Boris Kagarlitsky)
8. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Vasily Streltsov, THE GEORGIA WE HAVE LOST.
The Pentagon is not rushing to the Transcaucasus, it's already there.
9. eurasianet.org: Ariel Cohen, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON AND TBILISI WRESTLE
WITH INSTABILITY IN THE PANKISI GORGE.
10. BISNIS Bulletin: Oganes Sarkisov, TRICKS OF THE TRADE: Currency
Regulations for Travelers to Russia.
11. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Sergei Yevgenyev, INTERNAL DEFAULT. Russia is
running a risk of an internal default.
12. RIA Novosti: ORTHODOX-CATHOLIC CONTACTS FROZEN IN DEADEND: METROPOLITAN
CYRIL.
13. Itogi: Natalia Gorbunova, Russian TV Series. An interview with Valery
Todorovsky, the well-known film director and deputy general director for
cinematography at the RTR television station.
14. strana.ru: Michael Stedman, Less Power for Duma Drives Faster Reform,
Says Euro Think-Tank. External pressure gears up the pace of change.
15. Reuters: Oil majors in Kazakhstan eye more Caspian riches.
16. Financial Times (UK): Andrew Jack, Putin: a pragmatic push for closer
ties with the US: The Russian leader is pursuing a high-risk strategy to
win western support at a time when Moscow's importance is diminishing in
US strategic thinking.]
*******
#1
BBC
19 February 2002
Russian guru upbeat on economy
By BBC News Online's Alexander Koliandre
There is no wonder that Russia's officials and bankers are upbeat on
prospects for the country's economy.
Russia is in many ways experiencing its best post-communist years.
Economic growth is being fuelled by high oil and gas prices, political
stability, a devalued currency, and structural reforms adopted in the last
two years.
Even Boris Fedorov, Russia's former finance and tax minister, who is also a
non-executive director of Gazprom and a renowned sceptic, said things,
while far from perfect, are getting better.
Benchmark company
The fortunes of Gazprom, the world's largest gas production company, are to
some extent an acid test for those of the country's economy itself.
More than one fifth of Russia's export revenues come from gas.
The government controls 38% of Gazprom, but until recently was unable to
force the company to pay taxes.
Small investors were all-but neglected and mismanagement of the company was
shocking even by Russian standards.
'Milking the company'
Under the old management, millions of dollars went missing and the
governance was widely seen as lax.
"The company was out of reach of the law, which is not the case now", Mr
Fedorov told BBC News Online.
Last May the government succeeded in appointing Alexey Miller as chief
executive.
He has headed efforts by a new team to clean up Gazprom's murky books and
banish remnants of the old management, that were "milking the company", Mr
Fedorov says.
"The situation in Gazprom has been improved by 10%, but we need 1,000%
improvement," Mr Fedorov said.
He urged the company to get rid of non-gas businesses accumulated in the
past.
Gazprom owns various media companies, including NTV, a private TV company
founded by one of Russia's mighty moguls in the mid-1990s.
Mr Fedorov proposed that Gazprom should sell-off its media assets and avoid
the involvement in politics which characterised its past.
Accounting disputes
He was happier with the latest audit by PricewaterhouseCoopers on Gazprom -
an energy company that some observers have branded as "Russia's Enron".
Certainly some foreign investors have accused PwC of hiding Gazprom's
financial wrongdoings in attempt to keep the contract.
But Mr Fedorov said that the critics were trying to get a place on the
board of directors, gaining votes by attacking the management.
Indeed, Russia is not longer an "insider's market", he said, comparing
today's country to that of the days when the government would sell off
profitable state enterprises for a fraction of their value, in return for
financial support in presidential elections.
"Nothing like the loans for shares case is possible now", Mr Fedorov said.
He credited the improvement in economic conditions largely to Russia's
president, Vladimir Putin.
"For the first time we can see that there is a president, who is healthy
and able," Mr Federov said.
"He is Russia's main asset, apart from oil and gas."
Reform call
But it seems as that even Mr Putin is proving unable to fight the figures.
According to recent data, Russia's growth slowed in the past month.
Mr Fedorov urged the government to be more active in stopping ineffective
subsidies, in selling-off state assets, and letting more independent
directors to the boards of major companies.
Amid all the reservations, Mr Fedorov sounded optimistic.
He saw no reason for Russia to suffer again the crisis it did in 1998.
"I am more optimistic now, than then when I was a minister," he said.
"Probably because I was better informed then."
*******
#2
Russia says capital flight down, wants investments
MOSCOW, Feb 20 (Reuters) - Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said on Wednesday
that the amount of cash fleeing Russia abroad had fallen by almost $8.0
billion in 2001, and government policy should now focus on fighting
inflation and boosting investments.
Capital flight has been a key problem for successive governments as local
magnates sent billions abroad rather than invest in their crisis-ridden
nation. The flow was also linked by the authorities with the flow of money
laundering cash.
But Kudrin told a Finance Ministry meeting that capital flight in 2001 fell
to $17 billion, down $7.4 billion.
He said the share of capital flight in the country's balance of payments
had also fallen, going down to 10.9 percent in 2001 from 16.2 percent in
2000.
Russia has set up a special commission to investigate capital flight and
money laundering, part of pledges to an international money laundering body
to fight illegal funds.
However, several top domestic businessmen have in the last two years begun
to plough money back into the country. This has made Cyprus, a key offshore
tax haven for Russian money, one of the leading investors in the economy.
Kudrin said the government should also keep up its fight against inflation,
which hit 18.6 percent in 2001 and was well above original government
forecasts of 12-14 percent.
"Budget policy should be based on the task of lowering inflation,
controlling the state of the financial market and creating stimuli for
investments into the real (production) sector," he told the meeting.
Kudrin said 2001 growth of five percent, one of the fastest in a world
overshadowed by a global slowdown, had been based on internal investment
and demand rather than external factors like high prices for oil, gas and
metals.
*******
#3
Parlamentskaya Gazeta
February 20, 2002
THE POOR HAVE BECOME POORER
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
Around 24% of Russian citizens, or 34.8 million people, had
incomes below the poverty line in the fourth quarter of 2001, which is
5 million fewer than in 2000.
Studies done by the Nationwide Living Standards Center show that
last year there was an overall rise in living standards in Russia.
Real incomes increased by 5.9%. However, the picture in the regions is
contradictory: purchasing power increased in 65 regions, but fell in
23 others, including some relatively successful territories (Tyumen
and Perm regions, Yamalo-Nenetsk and Khanty-Mansiisk autonomous
districts, the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania). The situation in the
Far East, Southern and Trans-Volga federal districts is the most
difficult. However, the most disturbing aspect is that the greatest
decline in purchasing power (32.4%) was observed in the relatively
poor Koryak autonomous district. The federal government attributes
this to a lack of initiative on the part of the regional
administration, which has got into the habit of waiting for assistance
from the federal government.
*******
#4
RUSSIAN DOCTORS ATTACK TOBACCO
WARSAW, February 19 /from RIA Novosti's Victor Nesterovich/ - Smoking
presents an ever greater problem in Russia, says Academician Oganov.
Raphael Oganov, Full Member of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and
director of the National Centre of Preventive Medicine, leads the Russian
delegation to an European conference of the World Health Organisation, which
proceeds in Poland's capital under the motto, "For an Europe Clean of
Tobacco".
Russia possesses the dubious honour of global, let alone European
leadership--smokers account for 63% of its male population, with a resultant
250,000 annual deaths. Though statistics for women are more optimistic, with
less than 10%, the smoking-related death rate here is at a dramatic 20,000.
Smoking accounts for an average 30% of deaths in Russia, and is primary cause
of 52% of cancers and 29% of cardiovascular diseases.
Russia's several recently passed smoking limitation bills are not enough to
cope with the global blight, which calls for a tough hitback, said Mr. Oganov
as he pointed out, to round off his address, an essential importance of
adopting and implementing a world framework convention for anti-smoking
efforts.
*******
#5
pravda.ru
February 20, 2002
IT IS DANGEROUS TO WORK IN RUSSIA
On February 19, Russian minister of labour and social development, Alexandr
Pochinok reported at the ministery’s collegium, that Russia lost more
people in works, than in wars. According to him, the losses in Chechnya in
Afghanistan were “much less.” Pochinok noticed that people died first of
all because of untidiness of works’ administration that tried to maximally
decrease cost of production, while neglecting industrial safety. Moreover,
equipment in most of industrial works has not been renewed for dozens of
years. According to Russian State Committee on Statistics, works with
unsatisfactory conditions of work make about 45 percent. In such factories,
over 6 million people work. As a result, over 500 thousand of Russians
became disabled workers every year.
As a matter of fact, there are troubles not only in protection of labour
sphere. Every year, several thousands of people die or are injured in car
accidents.
These problems seem not to be connected with each other. Though really they
have something in common – untidiness of administration. Of course, works’
directors and city administrations’ functionaries have many things to do.
Though it cannot justify their criminal negligence.
Russian citizen however are guilty of the situation too. If they are more
active while defending their rights in the court, leading persons would be
more chargeable. However, recently the number of suits brought by Russian
citizens concerning industrial injuries seriously increased. Most of such
suits are connected with determination of guilt’s degree and of statute of
limitation. Thanks to these addressed, the sum of the compensation could be
fixed.
In Russia, such compensations are being paid by Federal Fund of Social
Insurance. If the victim dies, his family gets single compensation. If the
victim remains alive, a monthly compensation is paid, while its rate
corresponds with the degree of the lost ability to work. This system of the
payments is rather complicated, though it is effective enough.
The problems of industrial injuries must have been noticed long ago. The
state should be interested in reduction of dangerous works. Otherwise,
Russia will further lose thousands of able-bodied citizens.
Oleg Artyukov
PRAVDA.Ru
Translated by Vera Solovieva
*******
#6
Moscow Times
February 20, 2002
This Leaky Sieve Is No American Bubble
By Yulia Latynina
Last week, Business Week magazine labeled Gazprom "Russia's Enron" based on
the fact that Gazprom's auditors, Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, signed off on
some truly unbelievable deals in its audits. PwC found nothing remarkable,
for example, in Gazprom's sale of 32 percent of Purgaz, a huge natural
gas-producing subsidiary, to Itera for $1,200. The true value of that 32
percent stake was at least $400 million.
Gazprom had no money to develop Purgaz, the auditor maintained, although at
the same time, Gazprom did scrape together a $616 million financial
assistance package for Itera.
The assertion that Gazprom is Russia's Enron testifies to a basic
misunderstanding of how the economy works in this country.
A Russian manager doesn't inflate the profits of his company in the hopes
of boosting the value of his stock options. He suppresses the company's
profits. Enron executives concealed millions of dollars in losses in its
subsidiaries; Gazprom executives poured millions of dollars in assets into
its subsidiaries.
And the Russian market, which is more or less immune to lies, barely reacts
to financial indicators. In 2000, the three largest metals producers --
Magnitogorsk, Novolipetsk and Cherepovetsk -- reported profits of 9
billion, 13 billion and 24 billion rubles, respectively. Yet their sales
volumes were practically identical.
It's not hard to imagine how Western markets would have reacted to these
figures. But in Russia, they elicit no reaction at all. The shares of these
three companies are valued pretty much the same.
And then there's Severstal. Eighty-six percent of the company's stock
belongs to general director Alexei Mordashov. Severstal recently reported
amazing profits in order to boost its share price before the stock was
floated on Western markets -- a strategy suggested by the company's wise
Western advisers. The presence of Western shareholders was supposed to
serve as added security in case of a takeover bid by the Urals Mining and
Metals Company. And the money received from stock sales was to finance the
purchase of shares in Magnitogorsk, which had also been targeted by the
Urals Mining and Metals Company.
The result? Mordashov paid a whopping tax bill and Severstal's huge profits
were perceived by the market as a sign that Mordashov was in for some
serious problems.
One more thing. Enron was the product of a long evolution in corporate
bookkeeping. Then again, that evolution was moving in the direction of
practices mastered in the 1970s by the directors of Soviet state cotton
farms, who achieved fictional harvests and real awards with the help of
extremely creative accounting.
Gazprom is, above all, a primitive and ignorant organism. A friend of mine
once sold a small factory to Gazprom. In negotiations with a high-ranking
Gazprom executive, my friend laid out two options for working the deal.
Both were entirely legal, but one would cost Gazprom one-third as much in
taxes. The Gazprom exec asked for clarification. My friend obliged. Then
the exec, unable to understand the basic tax calculations involved, asked
my friend to draw the plan on paper. My friend did so, using euphemisms
such as "Object A" and "Object B" rather than real names. The Gazprom exec
studied the scheme, mulled it over, then scribbled an order in the
right-hand corner and sent it off with his secretary.
When the deal was concluded, my friend was given a copy of the paper. The
executive's command read: "Coordinate the tax-evasion scheme with the
accounting department."
Russian managers do not inflate the performance indicators of their
companies in order to pass the stock off on an unwitting public. They steal
from their companies behind the public's back, and the state's. So the
problems of America's bubble really have nothing to do with Russia's leaky
sieve.
Yulia Latynina is a journalist with ORT.
*******
#7
The Independent (UK)
20 February 2002
The men who prostituted mother Russia
Review by Robert Service
Russia under Yeltsin and Putin: neo-liberal autocracy, by Boris Kagarlitsky
(Pluto Press, Ł16.99)
That Russia is in a mess is hardly controversial. Its elections are
fiddled; its politicians are corrupt; its economy is run for the benefit of
a small group of exporters of natural resources; its welfare system has
collapsed; and its wars in Chechnya drag on.
The two presidents, Yeltsin and Putin, have turned to authoritarianism
whenever their interests are threatened. One of Yeltsin's prime ministers,
Victor Chernomyrdin, tried to offer comfort during the drama of transition:
"When it's all over, the survivors will laugh." Yet most Russians regard
the drama as tragic rather than comic; the degradation of a mighty state
and proud society feels to them complete.
Boris Kagarlitsky's book charts the process since 1991. As one of the few
remaining radical socialists in Russia, he contends that Yeltsin did an
unholy deal with "the West" for Moscow's élites to accrue power and wealth
in return for maintaining Russia as an uncompetitive capitalist country.
This deal, he argues, still holds true under Putin.
Yeltsin started with neo-liberal economic reforms; he engaged in political
manoeuvres, including the violent dispersal of the Supreme Soviet. He also
rejected the entire legacy of the USSR. The programme was signalled
ceremonially: Yeltsin scrapped the Soviet national anthem and introduced a
melody from the 19th-century patriotic composer, Glinka.
Putin's policies have confirmed the privileges of big business and local
political gangs. Like his predecessor, he has attacked Chechnya. And at
every point of crisis, he has caved in to American pressure. The only
stroke of luck for him was that Washington needed his assistance after 11
September 2001. Putin's support for American intervention in Afghanistan
licensed him to deal with the Chechens.
Yet Putin has avoided Yeltsin's verbal sharpness about the Soviet past. He
is the grandson of Lenin's cook and a former KGB operative, and he
celebrates the greatness of Russia under communists as well as tsars. His
government aims at a settled state and society and wishes its people to
feel proud of the country again. The melody of the Soviet anthem has been
reintroduced with new words, but the national flag is the old tsarist
tricolour.
Putin has embraced all the mainstream political parties. He has consulted
with the octogenarian anti- communist Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as well as
with the former KGB chief, Vladimir Kryuchkov. Politics under Putin are
meant to be inclusionary.
They are also supposed to be compliant. Putin wants public figures who get
in the way to suffer badly. When the TV station owner Vladimir Gusinski
declined to terminate a satirical show, he was briefly arrested. There but
for the grace of Putin go all the government's opponents.
It is a sorry tale, told with passion and competence. Kagarlitsky displays
an element of doubt only at the close when he declares his undiluted
optimism. He asserts that the post-Soviet settlement is so unstable that
there will soon be a revolution. It is hard to think he genuinely believes
this.
It is also difficult to accept that Russia is quite so unhappy as he
contends. Although Russians have lost much, they have also gained a lot.
They can swear about politicians. They can have a private life without
state interference. They can enjoy literature, popular music and sport. If
they have money, they can travel abroad. They are able to take up hobbies.
It might seem a small thing to us, but Russian people can take a new
delight in keeping dogs, cats and other pets.
They can look up their fortunes in astrology charts, in daily newspapers no
longer full of Leninist dogma. The stargazers are as unreliable in Russia
as everywhere. But the future of Russia and the Russians is not as gloomy
as this book insists.
The reviewer's new book, 'Russia: experiment with a people', will appear in
September
*******
#8
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
February 20, 2002
[lead story]
http://www.ng.ru/cis/2002-02-20/1_georgia.html
THE GEORGIA WE HAVE LOST
The Pentagon is not rushing to the Transcaucasus, it's already there.
Vasily Streltsov
For a third day high-placed Russian and Georgian politicians have been
pronouncing loaded phrases, in the deparaging sense, which are not acceptable
in diplomatic protocal. In reply to the suggestion of Igor Ivanov that bin
Laden might be hiding in the Pankisi gorge, a more than insulting answer
followed from President Eduard Shevardnadze, with the proposal to seek out the
terrorist in Ivanov's mother's house. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov
and Georgian Security Minister Valery Khaburdzania quickly jumped into the
frey, while the barbs of the Georgian side continued to carry a very offensive
tone.
People who understand international politics understand that Tbilisi has found
a serious argument, which would allow an absolutely economically weakened
country to speak with Moscow, if not from a position of strength, then from
something similar to that. Sources are informing NG that such an argument has
indeed been found. Yesterday American military personnel arrived in
Georgia. It
is a small group, possibly Army communications specialists or simply advisors
who are preparing the introduction of fundamental allied forces into the
Pankisi gorge. In any case, one can affirm with confidence that the Americans
have got their feet onto Georgian soil, and it is forever.
International society has already had the opportunity to be convinced that the
singular argument for speaking from a position of strength in modern
geopolitics is an American military presence. This was demonstrated by the
situation in Afghanistan, who was deserted by all of her allies, including
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. An this is demonstrated by the case of Gerogia,
where a small and weak republic allows itself to speak with Russia in an
offending tone.
The US is once again playing a very complex combination play with many moves,
in which the accent is clearly placed on the struggle with illegal terrorist
organizations, and as a result of which Russia turns out to be in a losing
situation. Russia faithfully supported the struggle with the Taliban and
formally it has won from this. But Russia has lost in the strategic sense, as
all of the southern tier has been blockaded by the USA. In order to completely
dominate on the territory of the former Soviet Union, the Americans needed a
military presence in the Caucasus. The best pretext for this was the struggle
with illegal armed formations. Afterwards a spreading of influence to
Azerbaijan and Armenia will follow.
It is very nice that preparations have already begun in Georgia for fall
exercises within the framework of the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program,
"Cooperative Partner-2002," in the course of which the actions of
international
forces will be worked out in the conducting of a complex anti-terrorist
operation. Applications for participation came from 16 countries, including
all
of the states of the south Caucasus. And if for Baku the further drawing
together with NATO is a continuation of the traditional policies of recent
years, then for Yerevan this could mean a definite change in foreign policy
priorities which, it seems, would be fully justified by the emerging
competition.
Russia, hopelessly losing, is feverishly searching for an opportunity to save
face. Events of recent days have demonstrated that Russia has been carrying on
a search for a pretext to withdraw from Georgia legally in the context of
diplomatic canons for a while now. In this context, the recent proposal voiced
by General Staff head Anatoly Kvashnin to withdraw the Transcaucasus Group of
the Russian military from Tbilisi "in a slapdash fashion" becomes
understandable. If this operation had actually been carried out in a condensed
period, then it could forever have been said that the Americans arrived in
Georgia already after the Russians withdrew, not giving a toss about their
presence.
*******
#9
eurasianet.org
February 19, 2002
MOSCOW, WASHINGTON AND TBILISI WRESTLE WITH INSTABILITY IN THE PANKISI GORGE
Ariel Cohen
Reports that al Qaeda fighters, possibly including Osama bin Laden himself,
have found refuge in Georgia are stoking pressure for outside military
intervention. Top Russian officials are once again hinting that Moscow may
feel compelled to intervene militarily to contain Islamic radicals in
Georgia. Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze is categorically opposed to
Russian intervention in the Pankisi Gorge, but he has indicated that he
would consider a Georgian-US joint operation.
The top US diplomat in Georgia, Philip Remler, helped focus attention to
the brewing crisis in the Pankisi with an announcement that al Qaeda
fighters had infiltrated the region. Georgian leaders have not disputed
Remler's assertion. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. In
recent days, Russian officials have fueled concerns with speculation that
bin Laden may be among those on the loose in the Pankisi Gorge - a claim
that Georgian officials deny.
Since mid-January Georgian security have attempted to crack down on
criminality in the Pankisi area. But the February 17 kidnapping of four
Georgian police officers on duty in the region underscores the weakness of
the state's authority.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov warned that Georgia's chaotic
conditions warranted the launch of an immediate anti-terror offensive. If
Georgia is incapable of conducting such operations, Ivanov hinted the
Russian military could take matters into its own hands.
"On the one hand, it is, of course, sovereign Georgia's business," Ivanov
told the Interfax news agency. "On the other, [should we really] sit and
wait and see how tensions mount there and how this region is turning into a
mini Chechnya, or mini Afghanistan?"
The prospect of Russian intervention clearly does not appeal to Georgian
officials. Shevardnadze on February 18 described the idea of a Russian
operation in the Pankisi area as "unacceptable."
At the same time, Shevardnadze announced that Tbilisi was considering a
joint security operation with the United States. "As for the possibility of
a future joint action with the U[nited] S[tates] special forces in the
Pankisi Gorge, we haven't yet had systematic discussions on that,"
Shevardnadze confessed. "But, if it becomes necessary, we have been and
remain ready for dialogue."
In his announcement about the presence of Islamic radicals in Georgia,
Remler indicated that Washington was willing to enhance security
cooperation with Georgia. The timing of his comments, some analysts
believe, may have been designed to forestall a Russian military move in
Georgia.
Most regional analysts and policy makers have known that the Pankisi Gorge
has served as a haven for Chechen separatists and other Islamic radicals
since the first Chechen war (1994-1996). The Chechen fighters and
terrorists connected with Afghanistan are allied with the radical Chechen
field commanders Shamil Basaev, Ruslan Gelaev and Khattab.
The Kremlin has complained for years that the Shevardnadze government has
covered up the Pankisi situation. According to a March 2001 report by the
popular Georgian TV channel Rustavi-2, Pankisi has become a supply base to
which the Georgian Ministry of State Security has transported Turkish aid
to the Chechen separatists. According to the Georgian Minister of State
Security Valery Khaburdania, the radical pan-Turkist Grey Wolves were the
conduit of assistance to the Chechens.
In the past, Moscow's complaints about the flow of aid to Chechens via the
Pankisi did not draw any reaction from Washington. Senior officials in the
US Department of State now say they are facing a dilemma on Pankisi. On the
one hand, securing independence and territorial integrity of Georgia is at
the top of the US agenda for the Caucasus. On the other hand, improving
relations with Russia, especially concerning the conduct of anti-terrorism
operations, has become a strategic priority.
According to the Georgian official, Azeri security officials tipped off
Georgian authorities about the terrorist penetration. Georgian security
officials announced February 9 that two foreigners with apparent ties to
Khattab had been arrested.
Editor's Note: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the Heritage
Foundation and author of "Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis"
(Praeger/Greenwood, 1996, 1998).
*******
#10
TRICKS OF THE TRADE: Currency Regulations for Travelers to Russia
BISNIS Bulletin, February 2002
by Oganes Sarkisov
Russia's foreign currency regulations are extensive and complex, and provide
numerous penalties for violations. These penalties apply to foreigners
visiting Russia who, in case of the failure to submit proper documents to
customs authorities upon arrival, can be banned from carrying out of Russia
even their own money. It is important to be aware of the procedure for proper
currency registration with Customs authorities, which should be implemented
by U.S. and other foreign travelers upon their arrival in Russia.
Russia is largely a cash economy. U.S. businesspeople traveling to Russia
should be prepared to make most local payments with cash. Credit card
payments for purchases of goods and services are available in many hotels,
restaurants, and shops in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but may not be in other
cities. Therefore, it is important to either bring cash to Russia and
properly register it with local customs authorities, or make sure that you
know how to obtain cash from abroad while in Russia.
How to Get Cash in Russia
Ways of getting cash from abroad while you are already in Russia exist, but
they are limited and costly:
* One can withdraw cash from one's own bank account in a foreign bank by
using cash machines that are available in Moscow and other big cities.
Usually such transactions are subject to a fee of 1-4 percent of the sum of
the transaction.
* Traveler's checks can be cashed at selected Russian banks and their
regional branches for a fee (for example, the Russian Savings Bank and Alfa
Bank charge a two percent flat fee and Vneshtorgbank charge 1 percent). The
representative office of American Express in Russia does not cash
traveler’s
checks, but cash operations are handled by the Delta Bank located in the same
building.
* International money transfer agents, such as Western Union, MoneyGram,
and (in the near future) RIA Express can transfer money from the United
States or Europe almost instantly, but such services are relatively expensive.
* Wire transfer to a bank account requires having an account in a Russian
bank and cannot be considered as a good alternative for short-term visitors.
Incoming wire transfer fees are 1-3 percent of the amount wired and can take
several days to clear.
* Personal checks are not a good solution. For a fee of 5 percent of the
amount of the check AmEx cardholders can cash their personal checks against
their credit cards, but only at the American Express office in Moscow.
Therefore, bringing in cash in Russia is the easiest and least expensive way.
However, U.S. travelers should be aware of the following currency regulation
requirements in order to avoid potential complications or problems.
What should be done upon arrival: Upon entry in the Russian Federation all
foreign currency being brought in should be declared on the customs
declaration form. Traveler's checks are subject to declaration upon entry and
can be carried out without limitation. Credit and debit cards are not subject
to limits and do not require any accompanying documentation. The customs
declaration should be presented to customs authorities at the port of entry
after passport control and after baggage claim procedures. It is important
that the declaration is reviewed and stamped by customs authorities. Since
the "Green Corridor" is for customs free entry, it is highly recommended to
go through the "Red Corridor."
What should be done for a safe departure: After the customs declaration is
stamped it should be kept in a safe place until departure from Russia.
Otherwise, one will not be permitted to leave the country with any foreign
currency. Upon departure, have the documents ready to present to customs
authorities.
Additional Tips
If during your stay in Russia you have received any sum from abroad through a
bank transfer (with or without opening a foreign currency account), it is
important to make sure that the local bank that receives the cash provides
you with a certificate Form No. 0406007. You will need to present this
document to Customs authorities when you depart from Russia, along with your
Customs declaration. Form No. 0406007 will confirm to Customs authorities
that you are taking out of Russia the money that you received through the
bank transfer.
It is important to know that in Russia, ATM slips received when withdrawing
foreign currency from cash machines are not recognized as adequate
documentation by customs authorities. Therefore, if you withdraw any sum from
your account through a cash machine, it is recommended to withdraw only the
sum that you plan to spend in Russia.
Additional Documents
Form TC-28 Certificate is another document that can serve as confirmation
that foreign currency has been brought into the Russian Federation. Customs
authorities issue a TC-28 certificate, when requested, by foreigners bringing
in sums exceeding $10,000.
Oganes Sarkisov is a commercial specialist with the U.S. & Foreign Commercial
Service in Moscow. He can be reached at: Oganes.Sarkisov@mail.doc.gov.
For more information on customs regulations, including currency issues, visit
BISNIS Online at www.bisnis.doc.gov.
This report is provided courtesy of the Business Information Service for the
Newly Independent States (BISNIS)
*******
#11
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
February 20, 2002
INTERNAL DEFAULT
Russia is running a risk of an internal default
Author: Sergei Yevgenyev
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE KREMLIN ALSO SEEMS TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE RUSSIAN FINANCIAL
SYSTEM. IT IS NOT RULED OUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE UP PART OF
ITS SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS. IT ALSO APPARENTLY INTENDS TO TAKE SOME
MEASURES AIMED AT ENCOURAGING REGIONS TO SEEK ADDITIONAL MONETARY
RESOURCES AND BE MORE THRIFTY.
The state of the Russian financial system had only been worrying
the Duma and the State Statistics Committee. However, the Kremlin also
seems to be concerned about it now. The other day, at his meeting with
United Russia members on distribution of powers between the federal
government and regions, Deputy Director of the Presidential
Administration Dmitry Kozak raised the question of whether the state's
functions are realistic. This means that the federal government
intends to voluntarily give up part of the obligations it has
undertaken.
Government officials prefer to keep quiet about which functions
these will be. As a representative of the Presidential Administration
told us, some of the probable proposals may sound so revolutionary
that it is too risky to talk about them yet. The most sensational
aspect of this issue is the fact that the government apparently
intends to take the slogan "Services can never be free of charge" as
its political motto.
According to Kozak, if the government decided right now to meet
all its social obligations as stipulated by the law, it would have to
spend at least 6 trillion rubles. Meanwhile, budget revenues for this
year will be around 2 trillion rubles, and budget spending will be
only 1.9 trillion rubles. The Presidential Administration does not
rule out that next year, only guaranteed budget items will be provided
with 100% funding. Other items will receive the remainder of budget
reserves.
Thus, a paradoxical situation is threatening Russia: while it
scrupulously services its foreign debts, it is threatened with an
internal default. Anyone can prove the nation's financial insolvency
now. If people read Russian laws attentively and demand everything
that the government has been owing to its citizens for the past ten
years, this sum would be substantial, even in terms of the budget of
the United States. The only reason why citizens aren't taking legal
action to demand their money is because they are ignorant of the law.
Kozak is sure that if all laws were literally observed today, there
would be complete chaos in Russia.
In reneging on social obligations, the government will be taking
a great political risk. Proposals of the commission on redistribution
of powers should be converted into bills, some of which may become law
by the end of the year. Thus, opposition candidates will gain some
important political mileage less then a year before the parliamentary
election.
However, the Kremlin's hierarchy can only benfit from these
plans. Redistribution of powers between the federal government and the
regions is taking place at the same time as reconsideration of
mechanisms of accountability.
According to out sources, the commission chaired by Kozak is
studying the possibility of introducing external administration for
financially insolvent regions. The essence of this idea is to make
regions more careful about how they spend their money and seek
additional financial resources. Besides, this measure will prevent
blackmail of the federal government by regional leaders. If a region
is unable to meet its obligations on its own, it may appeal to the
federal government for help.
(Translated by Kirill Frolov)
*******
#12
ORTHODOX-CATHOLIC CONTACTS FROZEN IN DEADEND: METROPOLITAN CYRIL
MOSCOW, February 19 /from RIA Novosti's Anna Bobina/ - As the Russian
Orthodox Church sees it, its contacts with the Roman Catholic Church are
frozen in an utter deadend, said Cyril, Metropolitan of Smolensk and
Kaliningrad, head of the Moscow Patriarchy Department of External Church
Relations, as he was addressing an audience at Moscow's State Institute of
International Relations.
He cited one of the latest manifestations of a cold spell--a cancelled visit
to Moscow, previously scheduled for the month's end, by Cardinal Walter
Casper, one of the most prominent dignitaries of the Vatican, and head of the
Pontifical Council "Cor Unum", which promotes Christian unity.
Metropolitan Cyril blames the Holy See alone for the controversy, with a
papal resolution recently prepared without duly notifying the Russian
Orthodox Church to establish four dioceses in the Catholic Church in
Russia--with their sees in Moscow, Novosibirsk, Saratov and Irkutsk--instead
of currently available provisional apostolic administrations.
The sheer presence of dioceses envisages particular territories going under
their jurisdiction with the entire population to be regarded as the Roman
Catholic flock, warns Metropolitan Cyril.
Interchurch contacts are going on despite all, and the Russian Orthodox
Church is willing to make agreements with the Holy See--in particular, to
obtain guarantees of a "correct status" of Catholic presence in Russia, said
the hierarch.
*******
#13
Itogi
February 19, 2002
Russian TV Series
An interview with Valery Todorovsky, the well-known film director and deputy
general director for cinematography at the RTR television station
By Natalia Gorbunova
(therussianissues.com)
Valery Todorovsky, one of the best Russian film directors and playwrights in
the 1990s, took office as deputy general director of the RTR television
channel two years ago. His decision to produce TV series bewildered many of
his fans and colleagues. Todorovsky has produced many films made by prominent
and outstanding film directors. And suddenly it's a TV series, a low genre
and a mass product on a state-owned channel. He is supervising the taping of
twenty other series, 12 of which have nearly been completed. RTR runs more
serials than any other Russian television channel. His interview with Itogi
correspondent, Natalia Gorbunova, follows:
I've never been an arrogant artistic extremist who divides genres into art
and trash, although there were things that I couldn't accept. Therefore, one
of the most important things that I learned on television was to respect
other people's tastes and to admit the fact that dozens of millions of
viewers want to watch films that I don't like. Changing their tastes is as
useless as trying to impose your own on them. The main collision on
television is between what "we" want to shoot and what "they" (the viewers)
want to see. It is clear that television in any country will only show films
with high ratings because it lives off advertising…Like everywhere else in
the world, national channels in Russia are aimed at broad masses of viewers
and have to adapt themselves to their tastes.
But don't they also have the ability to produce an enormous influence on
millions of people?
This can be said more about news or social and political programs. I am a
film producer and I am more concerned with other things. If television tunes
into only contemporary tastes, it cannot develop, experiment and search for
new forms, and if it doesn't develop it is doomed to die…Living only by
today's needs is simply short-sighted. Today, people like one kind of show.
However, a small micro-shift may totally change public demands in the next
year or two. Then whoever risked producing something new that might by a
happy coincidence meet viewers' changed expectations will gain an upper hand
over his competitors. Finding a compromise is the most painful and difficult
problem.
Preoccupation with ratings could pose another threat: in a bid to please
undemanding tastes, television forgets about its responsibility to television
viewers. Is this problem more acute for state-owned rather than private
channels?
I don't know. I am not the one who determines the channel's policy.
But TV series are also part of a channel's policy?
The difference between state and private channels is that the latter think
primarily of how to get their money back. A state channel that is not fully
commercial can, in my sincere opinion, sometimes afford to produce socially
significant works of art that may not have immediate success.
One of the most widespread complaints is the large presence of crime in
contemporary films and series. Last year, the Union of Right Forces (SPS)
announced a contest for the best script under the aegis "A normal life in a
normal country." The chairman of the organizing committee, sociologist Daniil
Donburei, accused artists of drumming a depressing version of reality into
people's heads. Communist Svetlana Savitskaya recently said the same on NTV's
Freedom of Speech. If the right and the left have closed in, perhaps, the
nation has really got tired of the criminal genre?
Two years ago all series producers thought that the criminal genre belonged
to TV's past. We thought that viewers were fed up and would say, "We've had
enough of the bloody scenes. We want something beautiful, human and
hilarious." But we were wrong. The viewer has deceived us because crime shows
still top all ratings. Does this say anything about the country in general?
All right. But why should a psychological drama be loaded with crime scenes?
Criminal intrigue is powerful support to a plot. For example, "The Moscow
Windows" series, a strong work by film director Alexander Aravin, did not
have a criminal aspect. A good series should create the feeling that the
viewer won't be able to sleep if he doesn't see the next show tomorrow.
Beautiful stories and interesting scripts are not enough to create this an
impression. Something ruder and more coherent is necessary. A criminal film
always has an element of suspense. That was what my favorite director Alfred
Hitchcock did in his time. He was the master of suspense. We should keep it
in mind that a series should always imply the question "What's going to
happen next?"
What can you say about America's "ER"? There is no crime there, but it seems
to keep its audiences in suspense.
That means we haven't learned to produce this kind of show so far. And then,
the level of understanding the content is also very important. We are
currently working on a new series called "The Brigade." This is going to be
the first serious Russian gangster saga that will show the country's most
recent history through they eyes of organized crime and will cover the period
from 1987-1988 to today. This is a subculture that has penetrated all spheres
of our society over the last fifteen years in the form of vocabulary,
literary cliches, cinema and anecdotes. I love this show. I think it's a good
combination of serious themes and enthralling intrigue. The stunts, pursuits
and brawls are up to international standards.
Can the enormous popularity of TV series be used for solving ideological
problems? For instilling some positive ideas in mass consciousness, for
instance?
It would be naive to think that series will help solve some cardinal problems
and influence the ideas of millions of people. A national idea, so to speak,
is formed on the basis of what a person sees, hears, reads and understands in
this world. The educational role of art was strongly exaggerated by the
Bolsheviks. Perhaps, they were able to use it to their own advantage when
they could filter and sift out everything people were not supposed to see.
Filtering is no longer possible now that the country has become more open.
The fact that people can enter into a kind of dialogue about the realities in
which we live is another thing. This dialogue can drag on for years. By
saying "we," I don't mean myself. It's more likely to be Oleg Dobrodeyev or
Alexander Akopov who head the channel and work out its general line. In fact,
all television channels, including RTR and ORT, are searching for a national
idea, hope, faith and the happy future as they understand it. The more
channels we have, the more versions and vectors we are going to have. Thus,
we stand a better chance to arrive at some general conclusion in the end.
******
#14
strana.ru
February 19, 2002
Less Power for Duma Drives Faster Reform, Says Euro Think-Tank
External pressure gears up the pace of change
By Michael Stedman
Concentration of power within the presidency and the government - alongside
less of a say for the Duma - will drive privatization decisions and speed up
the process this year, a Moscow research institute helping steer Russian
reforms said Monday.
The forecast came in the latest issue of "Russian Economic Trends", a monthly
analysis by the European Union-funded Russian-European Center for Economic
Policy (RECEP).
Plans for 2002 target sell-offs for approximately 430 joint stock companies
in which the state holds shares, with minority holdings of less than 25
percent in almost two-thirds, and more than half the voting equity in ten
percent, the think-tank reported.
"As with the sales of small state stakes in banks, the aim of privatization
is not so much to earn money for the budget as to free the state from
unnecessary assets," said RECEP Executive Director Eric Brunat.
In a review of Russia's reform process, the center said "outside influence"
had been a powerful incentive for speeding up the pace of change.
"There are cases where it is obvious that purely domestic efforts would not
have brought about the rapid results which were achieved by threats of
international sanctions or opportunities for gaining foreign goodwill," the
report said.
Money-laundering law was a clear example, and Russia had moved swiftly to
adopt laws designed to remove its name from the Financial Action Task Force
list of countries seen to be flouting the rules.
A new Financial Monitoring Committee set up to implement the legislation had
started work this month, and hopes were that Russia would not be on the
blacklist after this summer, the experts added.
"Besides its other extensive implications for the Russian economy, the
rapprochement between Russia and the World Trade Organization and Russia's
coming membership will be of significance for the enactment of relevant laws
and honoring of international practices in Russia," RECEP noted.
"Among other things, this will affect customs practices, implementation of
which varies widely in different parts of the country, and which are often
subject to corruption and misconduct.
"Pressure from a strong international organization should be an effective
tool in addressing the problem," the center's report observed.
*******
#15
ANALYSIS-Oil majors in Kazakhstan eye more Caspian riches
By Dmitry Zhdannikov
ALMATY, Feb 19 (Reuters) - Western oil majors active in Kazakhstan are
eagerly awaiting new tenders for oil exploration in the Caspian Sea but say
plans to revise tax terms in existing contracts might undermine investor
confidence.
Kazakhstan is fast emerging as one of the world's major new oil provinces
and all its most exciting new fields -- Kashagan, potentially the biggest
of all, Tengiz and Karachaganak -- are in or near the Caspian in the
northeast of the ex-Soviet state.
The oil firms say they now hope Kazakhstan will announce at the same time
as new tenders a long-term stable economic regime in its part of the
Caspian Sea, which experts say could one day yield as much oil as the North
Sea.
"The state has indicated it has up to 100 new offshore blocks to offer
soon. This might be the most important event since the discovery of oil in
Kashagan," said an official of a Kazakhstan-based international oil major.
Kazakhstan has won some $13 billion in investment from many of the world's
largest firms since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The mostly
long-term contracts to tap its oil and gas reserves have been the driver
behind impressive economic growth.
Kashagan, Kazakhstan's first offshore project, led by Italy's Agip, is
believed to be the biggest new field discovered
since Alaska's Prudhoe Bay.
Kazakhstan has long been praised as having one of the best post-Soviet
investment climates, but it has said it would revise the tax regime in
long-term contracts with Western firms, which are currently enjoying
benefits from recent cuts in other taxes.
Western oil and diplomatic sources, who prefer to speak on condition of
anonymity, expressed concern over possible changes to contracts with life
spans of 25 years or more, saying talk of the move has sent a worrying
message to potential investors.
"We know that several companies have been approached for tax issues, but we
hope that at least there is no threat of revision of contracts themselves,"
a Western diplomatic source said.
Industry sources said the fact that all Western oil firms had different
agreements similar to production sharing deals with the state, and were
holding separate talks with no coordination on the issue, was adding to the
uncertainty.
But they said oil firms have recently moved closer to agreeing that more
coordination would be needed when Kazakhstan offered new offshore blocks
for extremely expensive exploration, which can be done only with the help
of Western money.
"The future of Kazakhstan's oil industry largely depends on the Caspian.
And we hope that when tenders are called the state also establishes a new
stable regime in this area, or at least says it intends to do so," a source
in a European major said.
WHAT DOES THE SEA HIDE?
The Kazakh government is remaining silent on the location of the new
offshore blocks, but experts says they should be close to Kashagan and
Russian waters, where important reserves have already been found by Russian
major LUKOIL.
Kazakhstan plans to triple oil output in 15 years from 900,000 barrels per
day now, as its giant onshore fields Tengiz and Karachaganak, operated by
ChevronTexaco and BG, boost production and the first offshore oil comes
onstream at Kashagan after 2005.
"Geological surveys show there is little hope of big new onshore
discoveries in Kazakhstan, so the main focus is now on the Kazakh shelf," a
source in a European oil major said.
Western analysts currently put Kazakhstan's oil reserves at 10 billion
barrels and expect them to rise to 30-35 billion including finds on the
shelf, although Kazakh officials have said Kashagan alone might contain up
to 50 billion barrels.
"I would not overestimate the offshore potential as happened in
Azerbaijan's Caspian, where a number of huge offshore projects collapsed
after exploration wells turned dry," said a Western source active in
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.
Another source said years of dispute between Iran and the post-Soviet
Caspian states, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia and Azerbaijan, on how to
divide the sea might cause problems when tenders for new blocks are held
close to Russian waters.
Even Russia and Kazakhstan, which take a similar approach on how to divide
the sea, have not managed to avoid tensions over one offshore block which
is claimed both by Russia's LUKOIL and Kazakh state oil firm Kazakhoil.
********
#16
Financial Times (UK)
20 February 2002
Putin: a pragmatic push for closer ties with the US: The Russian leader is
pursuing a high-risk strategy to win western support at a time when
Moscow's importance is diminishing in US strategic thinking
By ANDREW JACK
During the cold war, the slightest change to an arms control agreement
between the superpowers was the subject of elaborate and abstruse protocol.
Last December, when the US announced its withdrawal from the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, President George W Bush gave little weight
to Russian objections.
President Vladimir Putin was left to put the best gloss possible for Russia
on a situation over which he had little control. In exchange, he hoped to
gain at least a written accord with the US on mutual cuts in ageing and
costly nuclear weapons stocks - possibly to coincide with a US-Russia
presidential summit in Moscow in May.
But John Bolton, US undersecretary of state, yesterday cast doubt on the
timing of such an agreement. After meeting counterparts in Moscow, Mr
Bolton said "difficult issues" remained between the two sides, including
verification and transparency, which were unlikely to be resolved by the
May summit.
Washington's approach to the ABM Treaty illustrates the altered state of
US-Russian relations. Even so, Mr Putin has embarked on a high-risk
strategy to turn it to his advantage. At the expense of alienating much of
his own domestic elite, he has taken two significant steps towards the west
to bring him closer to his goal of modernising Russia.
Two weeks after September 11, he lent strong support to the US-led
coalition against terrorism, by offering use of Russian-controlled air
corridors, intelligence-sharing and dropping any objections to US use of
Central Asian bases. A few weeks later, he went further, announcing closure
of Soviet-era bases in Cuba and Vietnam.
Behind such initiatives were concerns about the very real threat facing
Russia of unrest along its long borders in the Caucasus and Central Asia -
and the incentive of warmer relations with the west. Another, more
compelling, reason was the stark fact that, after more than a decade of
neglect, the country's armed forces were overstretched.
A long line of incidents highlight the problems of corruption, indiscipline
and decay in the country's armed forces. Earlier this month two
paratroopers deserted from their regiment in the Russian town of Ulyanovsk,
stealing weapons and killing 10 people before they were shot.
Theft and waste are widespread, according to Russian military sources. And
recent instances of fires in missile bases, and removal of nuclear
materials from naval camps, have served to emphasise the necessity for
change. The armed forces, at the country's nerve centre under communism,
have become marginalised.
Mr Putin's appointment of Sergei Ivanov, one of his most trusted
confidants, as defence minister last summer was the clearest indication of
the high priority he was giving to reform. Shortly after his nomination, Mr
Ivanov himself summed up the urgency of his challenge, saying: "The state
of the armed forces is difficult, if not critical."
But in Moscow's desire to maintain a significant Russian military presence,
one of the biggest hurdles is the country's increasingly modest budget.
Even after substantial funding rises under Mr Putin, total planned defence
expenditure for 2002 stands at less than Rbs500bn (Dollars 16.2bn, Pounds
11.3bn, Euros 18.5bn), a fraction of the spending rise alone for the US
announced last month by Mr Bush.
While the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US added a fresh sense of
urgency to some Russian moves, Mr Ivanov said last week he had decided to
close the costly Cuban and Vietnamese military bases long before the attacks.
"We need a civilian defence ministry, and a serious reform of military
education," argues Andrei Kokoshin, a member of the parliamentary defence
committee and a strong critic of the defence establishment's lack of
transparency and inadequate management of the armed forces.
The Russian armed forces are both top and bottom-heavy, with large numbers
of generals involved in bureaucracy; a demoralised conscript base, plagued
by bullying, indiscipline and desertion; and too few non- commissioned
officers, discouraged by low pay and morale. They have also been drained by
combat in the past two years. Since Mr Putin authorised military occupation
of the breakaway republic of Chechnya in late 1999, up to 90,000 troops
have been based in the region and several thousand have been killed.
Russia has long claimed that radical Islamic groups play a significant role
in funding and helping train rebels in Chechnya, and in Central Asia. Mr
Putin himself threatened missile attacks on Afghanistan in 2000, and warned
of an "arc of instability" from the Philippines to the Balkans.
As a result, officers such as Valery Manilov, the army's former chief
spokesman, argue that Russia is far more attuned to the new post-cold war
threats of terrorism than the west.
Yet, with the legacy of the Soviet Union's bloody war in Afghanistan in the
1980s still fresh, and military resources stretched, fresh Russian military
engagement is both politically and technically impossible. The US-led
coalition fulfilled Mr Putin's threats to bomb Afghanistan more effectively
than Russia could have done.
The challenge for Russia now is that it is losing influence in its
traditionally captive Central Asian zone in the process, as foreign troops
and diplomats and aid workers establish themselves for what may turn out to
be a very long "temporary engagement".
Mr Putin has to balance his limited alternatives against hopes that the
west will provide him sufficient support to justify his pro-western
position to a sceptical domestic elite. That justification could come in
various forms, possibly in written arms reduction agreements, accelerated
Russian admission to the World Trade Organisation and greater input or
influence on the Nato alliance.
A crucial indicator of whether Mr Putin can expect to reap the rewards he
so urgently needs could come in May, when the US has pledged to provide a
written arms reduction agreement in time for a planned summit in Russia of
the two leaders. If no agreement is offered, it would be further proof of
Russia's diminishing presence in US strategic thinking. This is third in a
series of five articles on the global impact of US military power. See
www.ft.com/usmilitary
******
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With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and
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