Johnson's Russia List
#6061
6 February 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Transcript of speech by Grigory Yavlinsky (and Q&A) at Carnegie
Endowment on Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges in Russia.
2. Obshchaya Gazeta: Maksim Glinkin, A Good Party for an Oligarch's 
'Daughter'. (Berezovskiy Seen Behind Story of Yabloko Accepting His Money 
To Fight Kremlin)]  

*******

#1
Transcript
Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges in Russia
Speech by Grigory Yavlinsky (and Q&A)
January 31, 2002
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Washington, D.C.

Moderated by: Andrew Kuchins, Director of Russian and Eurasian Program at
the Carnegie Endowment

ANDREW KUCHINS: Good morning and welcome to the Carnegie Endowment. My name
is Andrew Kuchins and I am the director of the Russian and Eurasian Program
here at the Carnegie Endowment. I want to first of all welcome Grigory
Alexeyevich Yavlinsky to Washington. By ways of an introduction in December
of 1993 Grigory Alexeyevich was elected as a deputy to the Duma of the
Russian Federation, and has served as Yabloko's head for the past eight
years. I think we all know that Grigory Alexeyevich has been at the
forefront of the barricades in Russian politics, consistently,
intelligently and passionately defending Russian democracy, promoting
economic reform, fighting for Russia's nascent civil society and free
media, criticizing human rights abuses and incompetence in two wars in
Chechnya, and a myriad of other issues which I don't have time to enumerate
this morning since we've come here to listen to Mr. Yavlinsky and not
myself. And while Mr. Yavlinsky strongly endorses Russia's improved
relationship with the United States, he has certainly not been shy about
criticizing deficiencies in U.S. policy toward Russia over the course of
the last 10 years.

Please join me in welcoming one of Russia's leading political figures, and
certainly its leading democrat, with a small "d," Grigory Alexeyevich
Yavlinsky.

(Applause.)

GRIGORY ALEXEYEVICH YAVLINSKY: Thank you very much for these wonderful
words about myself. I'm really very privileged to be here to have a chance
to speak to the audience live -- the audience of Carnegie. It's not for the
first time, but it's always very important for me and my friends in Russia
to have a chance to express our views on the most important issues of
Russian and world politics.

Today I'm going to share with you some ideas which I think are on the list
of the most important problems and challenges for Russia and the United
States, I think, in the current developments and in the beginning of the
21st century. 

I would start with the feeling which we had not so long ago, about six
months ago, summer last year, when Russian democratic forces and Russian
democratic movement had a feeling that we must be prepared for a very long
and difficult fight for basic principles. There was no window of hope six
months ago. You know, the developments which were at that time in the media
in Russia -- you know that it was a very painful situation in the Northern
Caucasus. In the foreign policy, there were the visits of the leader of
North Korea, visits to Fidel Castro, discussions with Iraqi and Iranian
leaders on a constant basis. So the feelings at that time were that we must
be prepared, and that there is no even hope that, after the 10 years of the
attempt of supporting Russian reform, the Western countries would be deeply
engaged in our democratic processes.

But things changed after 11th of September. I want to say openly that it
was certainly a tragedy, and I want once again to express my and my
colleagues' deep condolences to the American people, and to say that that
was a tragedy which certainly has no justification from any visible or
invisible point of view. But in Russia, we were very surprised by the
reaction of our president on that event. 

The choice which was made by Putin in September was made despite the views
and the position of the majority of Russian political elite. I was taking
part in a special meeting, and the president invited leading politicians of
the country to discuss the position of Russia in this dramatic situation,
by 21 people, the leaders of the Duma factions and also the representatives
of the Upper Chamber. And the question of the president was, what do you
think about the position of Russia which Russia should take in this
situation? And I want to say that from 21 persons which were around the
table, one said that it's necessary for Russia to support Taliban, and only
two said that the right thing is unconditional support to the
anti-terroristic coalition. All the others were arguing and giving the
arguments that Russia must be neutral. 

At the end of this meeting, the president declared his own point of view,
and his own point of view was unconditional support to the anti-terroristic
operation. So it is necessary to stress that Putin took this decision on
his own, with the very good understanding that at that moment he would not
have support from the majority of the political forces. Afterwards, the
situation changed because the majority of our political forces are always
going to join the president. And in that sense, it's a good sign, but at
that moment, that was a very special step.

Why the Russian president was prepared to take such a decision? Certainly
there were the tactical reasons for that. We had serious problems with the
terroristic forces in Afghanistan who had linkage with the same kind of
forces in the Russian territory, especially in the Northern Caucasus. And
maybe you don't remember, but the year before that, it was even a statement
of the Russian Security Council that Russia is prepared for the military
operation in the territory of Afghanistan; to bomb the bases of training
the terrorists there.

So, we had a lot of tactical - he had a lot of tactical reasons to take
this decision. Maybe it was the first time in our history when Russia was
able, by diplomatic means and by great steps of our president, to use the
possibilities of the other countries of the world to solve some of our
important and very painful problems. But I think that it was not only a
tactical choice. The further developments and the further position of the
Russian president showed that there was, and there is, also a strategic
approach to this cooperation. What means strategy in this sense? Strategy
in Russia-Western relations means new quality of those relations. 

First of all, I want to explain, if we are talking about the new quality,
what feeling we have in Russia about how the West sees Russia at the
moment, in the last five-10 years. It is true that the West sees Russia as
a country which can be an ally in the security issues, but also we have a
clear feeling that the West sees Russia -- that this ally must be limited
and under control. This is the view on Russia which was created in the 18th
century when Russian forces, Russian military possibilities were used to
strengthen the security of the European countries, but in the same time,
everybody was eager to limit and to control.

In the United States, both administrations - the administration of
Democrats or the administration of Republicans - looking on Russia as on
the country from a different world. It's very visible that they think that
Russia can be a friendly country, but also Russia may be no friendly
country; it depends on the situation. One of the most important lessons
which came from the past 10 years was the approach, which was never
certainly expressed clearly, that the leading politicians of the Western
countries, including the United States, never had a hope on the country.
They are their stakes only on groups which are in power. And this is very
important because with such an approach, everything is based on the
personal relations. If the group is collapsing, then the relations with
Russia, political relations, have no basis. And this is a disappointment,
and it gives the signal for criticizing Russia, for creating a pressure on
Russia.

This is a very important point because the approach -- when the Western
leaders are looking on the man in the Kremlin as on the man with whom they
have to establish friendship, with the purpose that this man would be
strong enough to keep, in a strong hand, all Russian people, and the
framework of the relations is the framework of making personal relations as
good as possible and to support him with the hope that he is the only one -
he and his team is the only one forcing Russia, which keeps Russia on
track, let's say, with a democratic reform. This approach was very well
known even before the recent times. The same relations were established
with Gorbachev, the same relations were established with Yeltsin, even with
the previous leaders that was also a very important element of the
relations. And such conditions -- from time to time, when Russia is trying
to give a hand and to express its will for cooperation, very often the
Western leaders see this as a weakness of Russia.

Between our two big countries inertia, non-confidence and even fear are the
basic things which are coming for centuries. And it can be wrapped in
different wordings, it can be put in a different way, but all the major
policymakers very often, almost all of them, feel the relations between our
two countries especially in this way.

What means in such conditions, in such a situation, this strategy, the
possibility for this strategic cooperation? I would put it in such a way:
What should Russia understand in such a situation what Russia should do in
order to find the way for the new quality of the relations with the West --
with Europe and the United States? Certainly, talking about this approach
for Russia a key issue is its internal domestic politics. The stable
relations with the West is possible if, and only if, Russia would have an
ongoing process on the - I would put it in such a way - on sharing the
common values which are non-negotiable. I'm not going to repeat all those
things. It's about the freedom, free speech, about democracy and other
extremely important basic things for such a time.

If you speak about the current political situation inside Russia, I can
make a list of the things which my party and I have a very critical will -
on what my party and I have a very critical view, and what we see as a most
important direction; what Russia should do but is not doing. First of all,
there's a media problem, freedom of speech. Secondly, it's dependence of
Russian juridical system; using this juridical system for political
purposes. Thirdly, it's the manipulations in the elections of all levels.
If you speak about the economy - and to put it in a very brief way, it's
the system in which the only possibility to make serious business, or even
unserious business, is to be related to the authorities. This is the
oligarchic system in which the business is possible only exclusively when
you have special relations with the authorities, whether it's a small
village or it's countrywide businesses.

In all these directions, Russia, in its internal policy at the moment, has
serious problems, and we are ready to criticize the domestic policy very
strongly because one of the final goals of such policies is to create in
Russia so-called controlled democracy, or manageable democracy, or
quasi-democracy -- kind of a Potemkin village. Russia is very experienced
in making Potemkin villages.

And this is certainly a new threat because when the old democratic
procedures formally exist -- but nevertheless, you have control on public
opinion and you are manipulating public opinion, and a small group of
people which is around the administration, for its own economic and
political interests are trying to manipulate all the country, especially
using the possibilities of electronic media. This is a kind of new
challenge. This challenge is trying to manipulate the people's choice. 

So, this are the tasks for Russia, and we clearly see them and we clearly
understand them. But there are some important issues for the Western
countries as well. For the West to come up to the new quality of the
relations between Russia and the West means, first of all, to accept and to
recognize Russian geostrategic interests, to accept and to understand that
Russia is the country which has the longest borders with the most unstable
regions in the world. Then, for Russia, security of its borders is question
number one, and is a vital question for the future.

Secondly, it's a clear understanding that Russia is a part of Europe, and a
clear message that the West expects Russia to be a full member of all major
world and European political, economic and security institutions in 20-25
years, let's say, from now, and also putting Russia in the system of
balances in the relations between the United States and Europe -- including
Russia in this system of relations.

It's also very important to create a new quality of the relations from the
point of view of the problems which we see the West have at the moment. To
speak, for example, about the vital interests of the United States, the
cooperation with Russia would certainly affect such sensitive issues like
current monopoly of OPEC on the oil problem. The real serious cooperation
with Russia is the way to de-monopolize the influence of OPEC in this area.

Secondly, I think that this new quality of relation can have a benefit
which would stabilize the situation with China, and make stability in China
from the point of view of the world and Russian security. I want to remind
you that Russia has one of the longest borders with China, and
Russian-Chinese relations is a subject for special analysis in this context.

Thirdly, after OPEC and China, I will speak about the nonproliferation
which I think is also one of the top priorities of the security, let's say
for - not only for United States, but for the world as well. Instability in
Europe may be the fourth point, the stability over the borders of Europe. 

Of these four issues, the clear benefits in strategic cooperation with
Russia must be the priorities in moving towards the new quality of the
relations.

Also, it's very important to say just now that successful operation in
Afghanistan, from my point of view, is only the end of the beginning. I
think that it's a much wider and much longer enterprise than what happened
in the last four or five months. And I think that at least 10 problems, or
10 issues in the world, which I don't believe that without close
cooperation among Europe, Russia, United States it is possible to find the
positive solutions.

So I want to underline that success in anti-terroristic operation in
Afghanistan must not create the feeling that everything is done, and the
key issue is to continue the war against the terror itself. There are
problems which are not less sensitive and important.

First of all, I would give 10 of them, and say it's the situation in the
Balkans, it's the Israeli-Palestinian situation, it's Pakistan and India,
it's the possible collapse of Indonesia, it's the tensions around Taiwan,
it's the war in Africa, it's the ecological problems, it's the traditional
international crime and drugs, it's European security, and it's certainly
North Korea, Iraq, Iran. I think that without Russia, I can't imagine that
neither of these problems can be solved in a positive way.

So, I think that the events of 11th of September clearly demonstrate that
it's better to start thinking and doing real steps for the - looking for
the solutions in advance before the problem would face you in such a
terrible way as it happened in September. And the myth of the possibility
to create security in one separated country is simply a myth; the same myth
as Russia had trying to create a paradise of communism in one separated
country. So, it's a clear challenge, now, to face all of those problems;
and some, maybe others.

So to react in advance; so to be prepared. What was the first step? From
the Russian side, the first step was Russian reaction on the events of 11th
of September. What must be the second step? The second step, from my point
of view, is the preparation for having a new framework, international
political framework between Russia and the United States. Whatever it would
be as a document, agreement or memorandum, or even treaty, this is question
number three. But what is the most substantial? It's a new framework.

And I want here to stress, it is not NATO. NATO is completely a different
story. Russia would have its own relations with NATO, but this is not our
goal, simply to be number 20 or 21 or 25 or 126 in NATO. And it is not only
military treaties or agreements, as it was during the Soviet era, on
nuclear warheads, on disarmament, which is also very important, but it is
not a new quality, not in NATO nor such military kind of agreements. It's
creating a quality new mutual understanding which has its framework on
agreements which are signed.

Is Russia prepared for that, especially in the view which I was describing?
I understand all the contradictions in what I am saying, but I want to
answer this question, if Russia is prepared. What I can tell you for sure
-- as you know, as the leader of democratic opposition, I was Putin's
opponent in the elections. I was the man who was making the riots all over
the country, and in Moscow on more than 20,000 people when it was simply a
clash over independent television station NTV. I want to confirm everything
that I was saying at that time about my attitude to the manageable
democracy to the way Moscow is proceeding in the Northern Caucasus and in
Chechnya.

But now I want to say something new. Is Russia prepared? I have a feeling,
and I can give you the arguments, that the President of Russia, Mr. Putin,
is looking for such a possibility and giving very serious signals. For
example, Cuba, military base in Cuba, military base in Vietnam. Secondly,
very patient and very balanced reaction on the decision of the United
States on ABM, very balanced and very patient. Thirdly, balanced reaction
on the statement coming from Washington about expanding NATO to the Baltic
countries, which some did not so long ago. Finally, March, last year, even
before the events of 11th of September, the president of Russia is
delivering its proposals to the general secretary of NATO about creating a
Russian-European anti-ballistic defense system. By the way, there is no
response until today on such steps. 

That is the signals which also shows that the Russian president is looking
for new people around him, because the new strategy and new quality of
relations must be realized by new people with a different view. Because
what I want to say [is] it was astonishing also because two years he was
making a team, which I would try to make such an analogy. Two years he was
creating a team as to publish, let's say, Soviet Russia newspaper.
Sovetyetskaya Rossiya. It was a special team which was prepared especially
for this purpose, two years. Suddenly and unexpectedly for the whole team,
in one day he published instead of Sovetyetskaya Rossiya, the New York
Times with the same team. The team was very much surprised. But how long
can such a situation go on? 

There's one more question. All the signals in such a sensitive and
important political issues, which certainly are not only international in
Russia - everybody who knows Russia and understands it's also domestic
issues, knows that there is a chance; very serious chance. You also can see
that it's not only exclusively the position of the president. You can see
the letter, which is signed by most prominent Russian military scientists,
directly speaking about the necessity of creating a new framework in
relations between Russia and United States in military and strategic area.
And it is not a special letter to the president; it's an article or letter
which is published publicly, and you can find there are such people like
Mr. Velikhov, like Mr. Rogov, and the others. Why I'm saying about these
two famous Russian scientists, and very respected people, because I do
think that they would not sign such a letter if that is not a chance; if
they don't feel that that has some relation to the talk of the Russian
Kremlin bureaucracy.

I also want to tell you that it is not the only thing. The polls in Russia
showed something which was absolutely impossible to expect half a year ago.
The last poll, made by FOM, Russian special agency, saying that 55 percent
of Russian people knows very well about the new relations between Putin and
United States and support it. Seventy-five percent - 70 percent - are
supporting the alliance between Russia and United States in the war against
terrorism. And maybe it's one of the most important signs that in May of
last year it was 30 percent of the people who treats the United States not
like the enemy but like a friendly country. Now, in January, it's 48
percent. It's a serious move in Russian public opinion.

So, to summarize all that, what I was trying to say, I have a feeling that
it's the right time to enrich the statements about strategic partnership by
some real substance. I'm talking about possible agreement between Russia
and the United States on military and political issues in which the main
substance of this agreement would be the mutual guarantees on security and
borders in the 21st century. But not only that, much wider, including the
problems which I was expressing before.

The process on creating such a framework - maybe it will be several
agreements and whatever - I'm not talking just now about the bureaucratic
side of the issue. The process itself is extremely important for internal
positive changes in Russia. Such process means new people in the
government. Such process means a different orientation of those people
which are still there. Such process means qualitatively new perspectives
for the internal changes, not only international. From this point of view,
I want to say that the good relations, personal relations between President
Putin and President Bush, is absolutely necessary as a precondition for
that, but we also have this precondition. It is certainly not enough, but
the precondition is there, and that is also giving us a chance to think
about that.

In the last 20 years, I was speaking in Carnegie twice. The first time, it
seems to me - at least I remember that I was talking about important things
here; not simply telling the stories about Russian problems, but speaking
about something, what is substantial. First it was in '91 when I was
discussing in the United States a kind of a - in the United States it was
called "the Grand Bargain." In Russia it was a "Window of Opportunity". It
was the substance of that project was Russian deep and very serious
economic transformation with the cooperation with the West, and bargain
about Russian nuclear threat; things like that.

It was rejected first of all by Mr. Gorbachev at that time. He went to
London on his first G-7 meeting with a different plan. In August '91
happened a coup. Next time, I was making a presentation in Carnegie after
the presidential elections in '96. At that time, everybody was very happy
about the elections, the result of the elections, and it was very difficult
to explain that Russia is clearly approaching to the enormous economic
crisis, debt crisis, and only blind people are the people who can't see
that. It was autumn, '96. In August '98, this crisis happened. 

Now, 2002 is the third opportunity. It's coming from unexpected sides. It's
coming from international situations -- not so much from domestic but
international. And I think that main challenge of the 20th century was the
challenge of how to stop the communism, and the main challenge of the 21st
century is cooperation with Russia. With all problems we have, there is no
magician who can change everything in a day. The strategy that you have,
first solve all your problems and then you will give us a call saying that
everything is done, would never work. It's much more complicated. It goes
all together.

Russia certainly has a lot of problems, but close cooperation with the
West, substantial cooperation on the issues which I listed, is a possible
solution for our internal problems as well. The values which we must teach
ourselves to share and to realize must be supported -- must be supported by
cooperation. So the main message, let us make the changes after 11th of
September irreversible. Let us not go back to the times before the 11th of
September. It was a very nervous and very unpromising period of time. Let
us go forward, and it's better for the world and for Russia, and I'm sure
for the vital interests of the United States, to go forward together.

Thank you.

(Applause.)

MODERATOR: Thank you, Grigory Alexeyevich. You have presented a very, very
thoughtful challenge, I think, to all of us to think hard about how we
move, at least this bilateral relationship, and more broadly Russia's
relationship with the West, forward.

We have about a half an hour now for questions, discussions, comments. I'd
like to take the prerogative of the chair and ask you the first question. I
mean, I think that everyone in this room would agree that the United States
and Russia share a large number of common interests, and you enumerated
many of them in your presentation, and that many of these problems -
virtually all of these problems cannot be solved without Russia's
cooperation, I would agree with, and that to some extent there is ongoing
work on all of these issues. 

But you've really put forward a much more fundamental challenge, I think,
for Washington and for Moscow, and that is to come up with a more
far-reaching strategic framework; some kind of agreement between the United
States and --


[TAPE CHANGE.]


-- that is separate from NATO, separate from arms control agreements. And I
was wondering if you could try to elaborate and be more explicit as to what
do you see this agreement consisting of? I mean, you've mentioned as a
starting point, a guarantee of mutual security and borders. That's a major
step, but I was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about how you
envision this signed agreement, whatever we call it, and what it consists of?

MR. YAVLINSKY: Thank you. That is the issue which, frankly, I'm not daring
to explain because that is exactly the question. I play chess with a
partner, but not with myself. This is the issue, the main substance, the
key, the main knot of such possible agreement, or whatever, I just named
and you repeated.

I also can see there - and this is the way nonproliferation issues, energy
issues, in a substance of de-monopolization, arms control, these are the
ways -- creating a joint antiballistic missile system for Europe as an
umbrella. So, I see there are such elements which can be in there, and also
the war against terrorism and looking forward to what it can be in this
area. To be more wider I would say that maybe you never heard such an
expression about there is such a place in the world which I can call
Northeastern Asia. Northeastern Asia is a place for strategic economic
cooperation for the future. And this is the place in the world which can be
a support; which can play a major role in de-monopolization, the whole
issue concerning the OPEC.

So, at least these issues, the economic and military and security, just can
be the parts of these negotiations at the very beginning. Certainly all
this as a process -- I want to repeat that -- would have a positive
influence on the changes inside Russia. 

MODERATOR: Okay, let me turn it over to the floor. And the first person I
have is John Evans.

Q: Mr. Yavlinsky, you asked the question, is Russia prepared for such a
overarching strategic agreement? What makes you think that the United
States is in any way prepared for such a big step? We have, as our
neighbors, Canada and Mexico, and don't require anyone to help us secure
our borders. You have, as you've said yourself, a much more complicated
situation with your borders in that part of the world. 

It seems to me that what you're proposing is in the long tradition of a
Russian search for guaranteed mutual security, which has not been the
approach of the United States over the years. We have much more favored
defense arrangements. And I just wonder if you have any indications that
the United States may be receptive to this new initiative of yours? Thank you.

MR. YAVLINSKY: First of all, I want to underline that this is not simply my
initiative. It's not my initiative; it's the political line which comes
more from real politics of the last half a year. It's the logical
development of this line, it's not simply the initiative of one man or one
institution or one intellectual - it is not. 

Secondly, what I want to say that the events of 11th of September showed
that the word borders is a symbolic word now because the threats are very
special, very different from those which were in the previous century or in
the 19th century or 18th century. So I'm using this simply for better
understanding. In our case, there is an element of the borders themselves,
but for Europe and for the United States, it's much wider. It consists of
many things. Biological threat is also kind of a border. The terroristic
attack, which was all these ideas about the possible launching of some
missiles in five-10 years from the hands of the terrorists, or different
strange states, I would say, something like that. So it's much wider.

I can give you one example. For example, if it would be really a decision
to create a non-strategic anti-missile defense system for Europe. It's
almost impossible to do, physically, without Russian territory, without
using Russian possibilities. And now the point is our technological
possibilities. As you know, we still have them. So, that is one of the key
substances to see that it's qualitatively a new situation.

Now, the threats which one can see is coming in such a way that it is
impossible to have a secure Russia, having no secure United States, and
vice-versa. And that is simply the fact. We can agree on that move; we can
disagree on that move; we can go different ways; the administration can
say, no, we don't want it, we want simply to look at the eyes, we don't
want to make any signs, whatever, please. But what I think, that in a very
short period of time that would become more and more clear, that whether we
want it or not - is it a difficult problem? Yes. Is it controversial? Yes.
Would it be easy? No. But there is simply no other solution. Look at these
10 problems which I named. We can't settle, or put at least on the secure
way, without special cooperation. 

Now, what you were saying about the American approach to the making
security treaties with the allies, or with anybody. Here I want to say that
I heard not so long ago that, as we are friends, we are not going to sign
any treaties with Britain or France or Germany or whatever. Sorry, but I
don't understand it, but you have a treaty about NATO. So you have
everything. You have so-called Article number 5, which was in a strange
situation after the 11th of September, to express that softly. Because what
I saw, that immediate support came from two countries in the world, Great
Britain and Russia, immediate and unconditional, to the limit of our
possibilities. And I want simply to remind that we were really allies in
the first World War, in the second World War, and now at the beginning of
the 21st century. Maybe that means something.

So, the answer is that the United States has a tradition of making special
agreements of such things, and it's not very new. 

Q: Yes, Charles Gati The question I'd like to ask you has to do with the
beginning of your talk and then the second half of your talk. 

At the beginning you spoke about values and the importance of that, and
those of us who care more for democracy and human rights than about
military bases appreciate that very much. On the other hand, when you spoke
about the new grand bargain, the rapprochement, you spoke about initial
Russian steps, greatly appreciated: Cuba, Vietnam, and the support against
Afghanistan. 

On the other hand, you made no mention of the kind of Russia with which we
would have rapprochement. So I would like you to speculate, what kind of
Russia is it going to be with which presumably the United States will make
some new arrangements, as you suggest? Is it going to be an electoral
liberal democracy? Is it going to be a semi-authoritarian Russia? Is it
going to be an authoritarian, China-like Russia? Because I think we ought
to know that before we get into this deal.

MR. YAVLINSKY: Thank you very much. That's a very interesting question. So
I don't think that I'm in a position to tell you in advance all the
conditions of this business, because I'm not sure of what would happen. The
only thing I want to say is that now it is not a bargain; it was a proposal
of the type of the bargain in the beginning of the '90s. Now it's not a
bargain, it's a joint venture to solve important problems together. And
it's a joint venture which is not because we like each other, not because
we are brothers and sisters, not because we are one civilization - all
that's here, but not because of that. Because simply the problems which we
have in the world can't be solved without this joint venture. And even
worse than that, if one of the partners of this joint venture would move in
the opposite direction, there will not be solutions in any - 20, 50 years
at all for no one of these 10 problems in the world. So it's a different
quality.

What I like in this situation, that this is not a kind of a making a favor
or politeness or love or - I don't know what, friendship. In Soviet time we
like to make treaties about friendship, okay? No, no, no, it's a different
story. It's a very pragmatic --Mr. Putin, from my point of view, is a very
pragmatic man, and he made his steps because he sees this pragmatism and
these solutions.

Now, what can I say? I want once again to repeat, until Russia would not be
able sincerely to share the key values of the modern Western society, our
life inside country would have a very unstable and very contradictive and
very difficult face, I will say. But it can't happen in one day. Even if
the president of Russia would be a man who's the author of all these
values, that doesn't mean that the country's going to move this way,
especially Russian bureaucracy. What means these signs which our president
gave with Cuba, Vietnam? It was unexpected by everybody inside the country,
including all the bureaucratic stuff. 

So it's something new - he's giving the lights. Now, it is possible to move
this way, and step by step, day by day, I believe we will have the positive
changes in these absolutely crucial issues because this cooperation, you
see the public opinion, how it's sensitive, how it's working, but that
means that that would bring us to changes at such time.

I read in one of the American newspapers a quote which was saying that
there is a special -- there is a relations -- positive relations between
the United States and Turkey, although the United States see a lot of
problems in Turkey, but it's recognized that Turkey is a very important
country and have a basis for different strategic joint steps. So this is
certainly a new approach, very difficult, which is the approach not for the
politicians, but for the statesmen, the people who are looking not on the
next elections only, but also about the future of the world and the future
of the country.

This is the challenge to the diplomats, this is the challenge to the
diplomacy, this is a challenge simply. It's difficult to create such a
framework with a country which is like what we have at the moment. But this
is necessary to do, and that would bring Russia to internal serious changes
in terms of new people in the government, in terms of new possibilities
inside the country, in terms of new orientation, because in Russia, this
question, is Russia a Western country or is Russia some kind of a Eastern
country, or maybe Russia is between two chairs, something like, I don't
know what, this is the key issue for all Russian literature and all Russian
intelligentsia and all Russian thinkers and all that. The question is, are
we prepared in the beginning of the 21st century to give the answer on
that? And we have first steps in this direction. If this answer would be on
the table, then a lot of things would change much quicker, much faster.

MODERATOR: Angela Stent.

Q: Thank you. I have a two-part, but related question. You yourself said
that President Putin made this decision very much on his own, and against
the advice of many people around him. The question we ask here now is,
five, six months later, has he been able to build up a consensus among the
elite on these issues? As you said, the Russian people support him. Who's
advising him on this? Is he taking most of these decisions by himself? And
if he is, does that, in the long run, create a problem for him?

And related to that is the question of, if this was taken as a pragmatic
decision, at what point does he need to show the Russian people some
concrete results from this? He did go out on a limb; he took decisions that
weren't necessarily popular. The grand agreement that you're proposing is
obviously further down the road, but is there - what's the timetable? Is
there an interim period by which it's very important for President Putin to
show that there have been concrete results, if you like, quid pro quos,
from the United States for his support?

MR. YAVLINSKY: First of all, for Mr. Putin to make the consensus is not a
very difficult thing. He's simply saying, this is the consensus.
(Laughter.) Are there anybody against that? And this is the consensus. The
same was with Gorbachev. The same was with Yeltsin. This is the Russian
tradition, but it doesn't mean that it's really a consensus. But visibly
it's a consensus. Even those who were saying that we have to be neutral,
that we have to support Taliban, now are saying we are the best friends of
the United States. And we just now have publications who are advising Mr.
Putin, and those people who are very, very anti-Western are just now, on
the first lines, that we were just whispering to his ear and we - everybody
knows that this is not true, simply, but everybody wants to present
themselves as a main advisor in this important way.

So, although I am from Byzantia, I have no answer who's whispering in his
ear. Simply I don't know, really, because I was very surprised -- that was
a very, very real thing when he listened to everybody and then said, now I
will tell you what is the decision. And everybody says, okay, now we want
to hear, and everybody was surprised by that, okay? I was very happy
because I was advocating this decision. I was trying to give the argument
that there is no place to sit between chairs, there is no simply place. If
you try to sit between chairs, you would have a result between chairs.
That's the only thing, that we have to give unconditional support.

Now, I want to say, this is not an issue of a price list. A big part of the
Russian political elite are saying that for our support, we should ask
Americans to pay. They had a long, long price list. And they were ready
even to fight with each other which price list is more attractive, and were
trying to bring this price list to him. And once he said, I'm not making a
bargain. I'm doing that because it's a vital interest of Russia. And I'm
not going to ask the US to help us with economy, to give us money, or to do
this or to do that. No, no, it's not about that. It's about the future and
about the future of Europe and the world. So there is no such timetable. It
is not the Gorbachev time when he needs a loan to show the people that in
the shops it would not only be bread, but also some piece of cheese for a
while, if he would take a loan. No, it's different. Sorry. He's not looking
even for that. And he's not asking that. And we, as a country, are not
using the tragedy of the United States as a way to make us a little bit
richer, or something like that. This is not a normal relations. And I'm
happy that Russia is not doing such things. 

So, and this is a very good sign, that even all those who were coming and
saying "Ask them to restructure the debt, ask them to go to the Paris Club,
ask the IMF to help, ask them for investments, ask them for that." No. No.
He's not doing that, and that's a very good sign. 

MODERATOR: Except that it might be easier for us to do those other things. 

MR. YAVLINSKY: The only thing I want to say is that there'll be a visit of
Mr. Bush to Russia. So, because it's such a schedule, such a framework. And
that can be just a possibility of doing something. 

MODERATOR: Okay. I've got a fairly lengthy list, so let's move on, please.
I've got Marc Zlotnik next.

Q: Well, actually, my question is very similar to Angela's. Let me just
follow up a little bit on it. And that is, you know, if something short of
this grand bargain you're talking about is what the reality turns out to be
and, you know, the U.S. isn't ready to go as far as, you know, John
suggested, but, I mean, if Russia sort of continues to be oriented towards
the West in the policies that Putin's pursuing, there'll be slow movement.
But I guess my question's really what is enough. And you sort of raised the
specter of August, '91, August, '98, if this third opportunity is lost. You
know, how sustainable, you know, is this move towards the West, you know,
if things -- if what the West and the U.S. ends up being willing to do is
sort of short of the expectations you laid out, but nonetheless -- and
clearly there've been some frustrations since September, you know, on
Moscow's part. But can it continue moving forward, and how strong is the
opposition, and at some point will Mr. Putin or those around him have to
give up and sort of try a different policy if it ends up being somewhat
frustrating?

MR. YAVLINSKY: I'm not a speaker to make eschatological scenarios, and I'm
not a Hitchcock. I'm not telling you terrible stories between myself and
yourself saying that something terrible would happen. There is such a nice
Russian expression: what will happen? What will happen? Nothing would
happen. It would be like now. That's it. I'm talking about improvement. But
we can leave it as it is. So simply it would go as it is going just now
with all the possible consequences of that, which is very understandable if
you would see the list of the problems, problems of the United States.
There're three of them. I call them "world problems." What would happen?
Nothing would happen. I would fight for democracy. I would challenge the
President. I'm going to continue my work. I have a party. We have just 75
departments in almost all regions of Russia. We are preparing ourselves for
the next elections. We are going the same way. So we are doing our job. We
would continue, because it's our vital interest, and we're not making the
U.S. a favor. We're doing that because Russia needs that. That's the only
thing I can say. But you can -- look, what can happen in the Balkans? What
can happen in Israeli-Palestinian relations? What can happen in
India-Pakistan, and so on and so forth? Look at this, and you will see what
can happen. 

I have no specials, sorry. Simply, I said to you, told you that happened
twice. And as you know, when the leader is coming too fast forward and the
political elite is somewhere backwards, it creates some problems. How they
would be developed in Russia, it's very hard to say. 

Secondly, I want to say that, you know, politics is such a thing that there
is no vacuum. If you're not doing positive steps, you're doing negative. If
we are going to make the old list of things which are very disturbing from
the side of the United States in the last year, it'll be a very impressive
number. Simply, I'm a guest. I'm not going to give this list to you. You
know it. But it's a long thing, a long thing. The last is that we are not
going to destroy the warheads, the nuclear warheads; we are going to store
them. In the Russian language, that means one thing. Russia is an enemy.
That's the only reading of such an idea. There is a difference, because all
these warheads are needed if Russia is perceived as an enemy, not for any
other country, because the potentials of the other countries are different.
Maybe this is a different idea, but it's necessary to negotiate it. It's a
very long list of problems of such type.

So if we are not going to go to the positive direction, then, as a given,
it would be moved to the negative direction. And I'm not going to explain
all that. Simply, I have a lot of worries about that. 

MODERATOR: Toby Gati

Q: Grigory, what foreign policy has given us, September 11th, it can also
take away. And I wanted to ask you, having listened to the President last
night when he called three countries "an axis of evil," did it sound to you
like the U.S. was going to take Russia into account in deciding, for
example, whether to attack Iraq or to take any other steps? And do you see,
or have you talked to people here for whom Russia is part of the problem,
not that it's a terror state at all. It isn't and hasn't been. But that it
supports countries which the President outlined as supporters of terrorism,
and therefore the image of Russia is not always just on our side, but it
can be seen as a supporter of countries with whom we have a real problem
and possibly a military problem?

MR. YAVLINSKY: And so the question?

Q: Well, the question is, how did you interpret that speech, for example,
on Iraq, and do you see a possibility of there being Russian views taken
into account, and how would that work out? There are deadlines. The U.N.
Security Council action on sanctions, for example. So do you see those
being resolved in this new spirit?

MR. YAVLINSKY: That's one of the problems related to the previous question.
I'm just saying that there's a momentum in Russia that can be very
cooperative. What would happen in that would not go this way. I don't know.
But just before leaving Russia, I can tell you that Mr. Putin very
explicitly and very clearly said that one of our priorities is and would be
non-proliferation. Very clearly and very strongly he said that. 
Certainly Russia is a very complicated thing. But if you want to have real
results on that, it's a question of real technology. I mean technology of
relations, technology of how to do that. It's a big, huge country.
Thousands, maybe millions of people are engaged in all that. And to say
that the President has everything under control, every unit, everything,
it'll be too much. Also for that purpose, it is necessary to establish such
a dialogue. It's necessary to establish the kind of a framework, because I
think that it's not only to Europe or the United States, it's also a threat
for us. It's a very serious issue. But I don't want to put it in such a way
that, as it was before the 11th of September, both of us is going to make
steps to make problems to each other, big, small, minor, there, here. This
is too dangerous. This is too dangerous, because the world is very fragile,
and it's too dangerous trying to have such a competition of such type. It's
too dangerous to put, let's say, some part of the Russian elite in the
feeling that the only thing they can have an ear, let's say, in the United
States is to make something that the United States would pay attention to
that. 

It's better to normalize all that. It will be much more secure.

So, officially, it's our priority. The President is saying it's a priority,
nonproliferation and all such things. But if we want to make it practical,
this is one of the important part of these discussions. I don't want paper
or -- not on paper. These are different issues. But it's a question of such
type.

MODERATOR: Okay. We have time for one more question. I apologize to all of
those who we're not going to be able to get to this morning. And the last
question is right here.

Q: You spoke about the media as being -- the freedom of speech as being the
number one problem. The question is, do you see that the situation with the
media is changing for the better in Russia? Essentially, you have Putin
consolidating the media so that any dissident voices are being forced out
under the guise of business irregularities or bankruptcies. It looks like
he's winning the power struggle against Gusinsky and Berezovsky. How is
media consolidation and government monopoly going to play into the efforts
to make Russia a more open country, more flexible and change the internal
situation in Russia?

MR. YAVLINSKY: At the moment, the situation in the Russian media is very,
very bad, the worse since '90, '91. We have only one thing. We have a state
television and state propaganda, and whatever. So this is a good story.
This is one of our very serious problems. But that's why I started, because
it's absolutely clear. And this is a deep problem. And certainly there are
some business issues, but this is not about business. This is a political
thing. It's clearly a political thing. 

But that's just the problems which we have to solve. This is our internal
things, and this is our vital interest also. Certainly you are welcome to
invest. But to establish independent media is our task. Nobody can solve
that for us. Nobody can make Russia independent media. We are able to see
CNN, so that's the only thing you can do for us. You can translate it in
Russian. That will be interesting. But that's the only thing you can do.
All the other media we have established ourselves. 

And one more point. It was one special example. While the meeting between
our president and President Bush, as far as I know, it was such a talk
about one event, which was in Pakistan. At some point of this
anti-terroristic war before, I think at the very beginning, the group of
Taliban representatives came to Russian Embassy in Pakistan asking for
weapons. And they were under control of the Pakistani security. They were
them. And then Putin asked President Bush whether he knows about that. He
said that he didn't. Russia certainly rejected the request. But look at how
difficult it is, well, even in that situation. That was the evidence, what
means really the new quality of the relations. They came to ask. The
Pakistani security was not giving information to your secret services. 

Okay.

MODERATOR: Grigory Alexeyevich, we're very thankful for a very thoughtful,
stimulating, and, indeed, provocative presentation and discussion this
morning. You've articulated a very large challenge for all of us in the
course of the months and years ahead. I know you're going to be
articulating this challenge to leaders in the Bush administration and on
the Hill later on today and tomorrow. And I wish that those discussions go
well and that we see some positive results.

Let me just conclude by saying that we don't want to wait five more years
to see you again here in Washington. So please come soon and a little more
often.

Thank you.

MR. YAVLINKSY: Thank you very much.

*******

#2
Berezovskiy Seen Behind Story of Yabloko Accepting His Money To Fight
Kremlin  

Obshchaya Gazeta
31 January 2002
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Maksim Glinkin:  "A Good Party for an Oligarch's 'Daughter'"

Last week it finally transpired where Boris Berezovskiy, whose last 
television channel has been taken away from him, is laundering his 
millions.   It turns out that the out-of-favor oligarch now has two main 
projects:   The Chechen war and the Yabloko party.   Yavlinskiy has 
allegedly agreed to fight Putin in Moscow using Berezovskiy's money and 
the separatists are fighting in the Caucasus using money from the same 
source.   The bearings of one credit line were taken by FSB [Federal 
Security Service] special officers; the other supply channel was 
unearthed by political commentators from two of the capital's newspapers 
and one Internet publication. 

Neither the former nor the latter are adducing any evidence and, 
naturally, are not disclosing their sources.   The FSB is citing the 
secrecy of the investigation while the authors of the journalistic 
investigations get by without any references at all although they 
underpin their evidence with worldly logic.   Liberal Russia, they say, 
does not have any political weight but it has Berezovskiy's money.   On 
the other hand, Yabloko has a name but has run out of money.   So Boris 
Abramovich had decided to give his rich but ignoble bride away to a poor 
but highbred groom.   They say the proud Yavlinskiy balked initially but 
then recognized that a marriage of convenience is better than starvation. 

Whereas the FSB's theory still has to be investigated by Interpol, the 
Yabloko sensation lasted for less than a day.   Liberal Russia's leaders 
immediately stated that there could be no question of their joining 
Yavlinskiy's party.   Yavlinskiy's party members made an analogous 
statement.   Other Duma experts to whom our colleagues went for 
clarification only laughed:   The news of a sudden alliance between 
Yavlinskiy and Berezovskiy provoked nothing but smiles from people who 
know anything at all about politics. 

"People have been making matches for us all down the line!" Yabloko Press 
Secretary Yevgeniy Dillendorf laments.   "When we were discussing the 
firing on the White House, we were called reds and exposed as being in a 
secret alliance with the Communists.   When we did not agree to support 
the government version of the budget, we were repainted as 'pinkos.'   
Recently, literally the day before the Christmas holidays, we were 
accused of having sympathies with the Petersburg security officials 
fighting Voloshin.   Moreover this was done by the very same journalist 
who has now thrown Yabloko into the camp of Berezovskiy's friends." 

Incidentally, this is the second time over the last three years that the 
label of "Berezovskiy supporter" has been stuck onto the party.   Using 
sources that were just as well informed, the press included Boris 
Abramovich in Yavlinskiy's party's election list in the Duma 1999 
elections.   Yavlinskiy's party members even had to put out a 
counter-slogan to disavow this "relationship":   "Apples [Yabloki] do not 
grow on birch trees [Berezy]." 

The malevolent spin doctors are probably already convinced that the more 
fantastical the piece of news, the easier the public will believe it.   
After all, Yavlinskiy and Berezovskiy have never hidden their mutual 
antipathy.   In August, when promoting Liberal Russia, the ex-oligarch 
said at one press conference:   "The rightists have discredited 
themselves, betrayed the rightist cause, and become an adjunct to the 
authorities and there is no faith in Yabloko."   Yavlinskiy's party 
members have always paid Berezovskiy back in the same coin.   "We have 
never had any contact with Berezovskiy," party Deputy Chair Sergey 
Mitrokhin says.   "The possibility is simply ruled out.   Both in light 
of his reputation and the extremely negative role he has played in the 
Russian economy and politics.   Neither can there be any coalition with 
Liberal Russia while Berezovskiy is included in its political council." 

In a word, those who launched this newspaper "canard" had no need to 
reckon on it flying for long.   Which makes it all the more interesting 
to understand who started all this and why.   People in Yabloko itself 
immediately suspected that the mudslinging was organized by someone from 
the SPS [Union of Right-Wing Forces].   The SPS does indeed appear in a 
very favorable light in the notorious articles against a backdrop of the 
helpless pottering of politicians from rival political structures. 

Yavlinskiy's party members also know that the rightists are very 
resentful toward them for their criticism of Nemtsov's beloved 
brainchild, the plan for military reform with six-month conscription.   
The fact that Yabloko's main military expert, Aleksey Arbatov, spoke 
against the SPS's program was not enough.   Yavlinskiy did not support 
his colleague Nemtsov at the Duma leaders' meeting with the president 
either.   So the spreading of the rumor of a secret alliance with 
Berezovskiy could be interpreted as a symmetrical response to Yabloko. 

The rightists, however, categorically deny any involvement in this 
scandal.   People in the SPS office on Malaya Andronyevskaya admit that 
they are dissatisfied with Yabloko over the latest demarches but claim 
that they still count it their ally and it would perhaps not be to their 
advantage to sully their partner's reputation.   Many people in Yabloko 
itself also doubted that the order for the malevolent spin-doctoring came 
from the friendly organization.   Some supposed it was the work of 
Pavlovskiy's hands.   A previous scandal surrounding Yabloko -- 
Vyacheslav Igrunov's high-profile departure with the ensuing performance 
of denunciation -- has also been linked to the well-known political 
scientist. 

Losing themselves in conjectures, the Yabloko members began to conduct 
their own investigation.   In the upshot it turned out that the order 
came ... from Berezovskiy himself.   It is true that he originally 
planned to publish this version only in Gazeta.ru but the news spread 
quickly in journalistic circles and the result was that it surfaced in 
some newspapers as well.   It is amusing to observe how this information 
changed depending on the authors' sympathies as it moved from publication 
to publication; the first source talks about BAB [Boris Abramovich 
Berezovskiy] very respectfully, whereas the other media emphasize either 
the criminal origins of his money or the failure of the Liberal Russia 
project.   The result is that this action's initial objective was 
distorted to the point of being unrecognizable.   It was a simple one:   
To show that even such principled politicians as Yavlinskiy are going 
after Berezovskiy's money.   Which means Boris Abramovich is popular, his 
reputation is not so bad, and, most importantly, he is still capable of 
seriously influencing Russian political life. 

There may have been another incidental aim:   To cause Yabloko and the 
SPS to fall out.   Rumors that the articles were prepared either with the 
direct participation or the tacit approval of the rightists began to 
spread almost immediately after these articles appeared.   Besides, there 
really are people in the SPS who are dissatisfied with the alliance with 
Yabloko while one of the main lobbyists for getting closer to 
Yavlinskiy's party, Viktor Pokhmelkin, has left the SPS. 

Finally, a blow was dealt to Yabloko itself, which BAB seemingly 
considers his main rival on the rightist oppositionist flank.   But the 
effect could turn out to be the reverse.   At any rate, the numerous 
scandals of last year only boosted Yavlinskiy's party's popularity.   Its 
ranks swelled by almost double -- from 7,000 to 13,000 people over the 
year.   This is despite the fact that the first two television channels 
were closed to Yabloko's leaders:   They declared a boycott in revenge 
for the campaign to defend NTV [Independent Television] and against the 
importation of spent nuclear fuel.   Yavlinskiy's party members may be 
being helped by the lack of coordination of their enemies' actions.   
Gagging on the television is always compensated by a large amount of PR 
in the newspapers. 

*******