#6041
[Second Issue of the Day]
#5
The Russia Journal
January 25-31, 2002
10 miles of Iron Silk Road
By ANDREI PIONTKOVSKY
The writer is director of the Center for Strategic Research.
It would be incorrect to say that the events of Sept. 11 changed the geopolitical situation in the world. Rather, they highlighted the changes already under way or that have already taken place.
As for Russia, with the joint operation with the West going on in Afghanistan, which is at the same time resolving the important matter of bolstering Russia’s security on its southern flank, the virtual conflict with the West that the Russian political "elite" fought with such enthusiastic passion has revealed itself as the farce it is. In this sense, Sept. 11 was the symbolic end of the cold war between the Soviet Union-Russia and the West.
The real security and survival issues facing Russia in the 21st century aren’t about whether tiny Estonia will join NATO, but about whether Russia will remain a key Eurasian power and keep its territory in eastern Siberia and the Far East. The matter isn’t one of someone causing a military threat to Russia in this region, though under certain circumstances this could happen. The problem is that if current trends continue, these territories will drift away of their own accord first economically and then demographically. The situation is particularly worrying in the Far East, where the Russian population is constantly declining and only 10 percent of the region’s economic ties are with the rest of Russia.
Many specialists see Russia’s presence in north-east Asia as not just a security issue for Russia, but as a global geopolitical issue. I’ve already quoted in the past the point of view of Thomas Graham, a member of the U.S. State Department’s strategic planning department:
"One thing is clearly evident: Stability in the Pacific region will find itself under threat if Russia’s presence in Asia continues to weaken. It is in the long-term strategic interests of the United States and most Asian countries to have a strong and economically prosperous Russia in east Asia. If this is the case, then our two countries, going on their clear common interests, should think together about how Russia can rebuild its economy in the Far East in such a way as to strengthen it sovereignty in this region."
While we get ready to think with our partners about how to rebuild our economy in the Far East, Korea is lobbying a project at the highest level that could become a catalyst for this process.
The project in question is a 14-kilometer railroad that would cross the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. This would link the trans-Korean railway with the trans-Siberian railway, creating the "Iron Silk Road," which would link the Pacific Ocean to Europe for the first time in history across the Russian territories of Siberia and the Far East.
It’s not that Russia doesn’t understand the importance of this project, which would enable it to become a Eurasian bridge between the dynamic economies of the European Union and the Association of South-East Asian Nations, or ASEAN. The Railways Ministry has already held talks with a number of European countries about extending the wide-gauge track sections so as to avoid spending time changing the wheels at the former Soviet border.
But the problem is that like virtually all the political, humanitarian and economic projects agreed on during South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s visit to Pyongyang, work on the Korean stretch of the railroad between Seoul and Shinuiju has come to a standstill, and after the failure of the latest cabinet-level talks in November is now facing uncertainty.
This helps explain why during his December visit to Europe Kim Dae-jung brought up the subject of the Iron Silk Road several times, including during a meeting of Nobel prize winners in Oslo and while addressing European parliament members in Strasbourg. He clearly hopes that the European Union, which is increasing its contacts with Pyongyang, will be able to put some pressure on North Korea and nudge it towards implementing its agreed projects with Seoul.
The North Korean authorities have been deliberately putting the brakes on all these projects recently, acting, it would seem, out of an instinctive fear that greater contacts with South Korea will be a potential threat to the north’s regime. This is despite the fact that no one in South Korea supports hasty unification. On the contrary, the south understands that the best scenario is one of gradual change with the North Korean "nomenklatura" keeping a hold on power.
And what is Moscow’s policy regarding Korea? To what extent does it fit the proclaimed principles of pragmatism and making economic interests a priority? Russia played host to comrade Kim Jong Il for two weeks last summer. Tens of thousands of Russian citizens found themselves mocked and 211 humiliated just in order to cater to the whims of the North Korean leader.
The authorities made vague noises about important state interests, including the trans-Korean railway, in an attempt to justify the situation. But once the beloved leader returned to his capital, Pyongyang’s position on inter-Korean cooperation became more hardline. Kim Jong Il, it seems, enjoys having a joke with Putin. His previous joke about abandoning his missile programs hasn’t been forgotten yet.
Let’s hope that Putin’s counterparts from the European Union can put Kim Jong Il in a more serious mood. Then maybe Kim Dae-jung could turn out to be right when he concluded his speech at the European Parliament with the following:
"Rudyard Kipling, who received the Nobel prize for literature in 1907, said, ‘East is East and West and West, and never the twain shall meet.’ But if he were alive today, he would have said instead, ‘East is West and West is East, and never the twain shall part.’"
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