| JRL Home | Support the JRL | Subscribe to JRL E-Newsletter | RAS | OLD RW |
 
January 26, 2002:    #6040    #6041

#4
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
January 25, 2002
YANKEE, GO TO CHECHNYA!
Russia has been shown how to fight a war
Author: Vladimir Georgiyev
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]


A HUMAN LIFE HAS ALWAYS BEEN OF SMALL VALUE IN RUSSIA; SO RUSSIA IS 
PREPARED TO DEFEND ITS SOVEREIGNTY AT THE COST OF ITS SOLDIERS AND 
OFFICERS DYING IN CHECHNYA. IT IS HIGH TIME THESE TACTICS WERE 
CHANGED. RUSSIA COULD LEARN SOMETHING FROM THE US OPERATION IN 
AFGHANISTAN.

The end of last week and the start of this week were darkened by 
high casualties among Russia's soldiers in the North Caucasus. Seven 
servicemen of the 102nd Brigade of the Interior Forces were killed in 
a terrorist attack in Makhachkala. Around 14 soldiers were killed in 
Chechnya over January 14-21. This can be compared to the losses in the 
most active phase of the action in 1999-2000, and these casualties are 
incommensurable with the losses of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan over 
the past three months of the special operation against terrorist 
organizations and fighters of al Qaida. According to reports of the 
Pentagon, the casualties among U.S. soldiers were 11 people, and only 
two of them are supposed to be killed directly in skirmishes.

Meanwhile, there are some signs by which efficiency of the US's 
activity in Afghanistan and efficiency of Russia's activity in 
Chechnya can be compared. Firstly, as a matter of fact, Russia and the 
US both are opposing to the same enemy - field detachments of radical 
Islamists, organized in the likeness of the regular forces. They had 
enough Soviet weaponry, not small arms alone, but also artillery and 
tanks; these detachments had their own Air Force and means of air 
defense, had a united control center and acted in Afghanistan and 
Chechnya at the landscapes, having mountainous and sub-mountainous 
features; therefore, any special operations against these groups were 
very inconvenient. These forces seem to be (as before, actually) 
enjoying themselves with financial injections. This factor explains 
for their vitality. The forces also consisted of active mercenaries 
from Saudi Arabia, Somali, Yemen and other states.

Secondly, similar assessments of the enemy predetermined 
relatively similar methods of carrying out the action by Moscow and 
Washington in the primary phase. Active reconnaissance measures and 
air strikes preceded the initial phases of counter-terrorist 
operations in Chechnya and Afghanistan. Main strategic installations 
of the guerrillas, primarily their means of air defense and Air Force 
were destroyed first. Both states concentrated considerable groups of 
various forces and troops, primarily warplanes (bombers and fighting 
aviation), helicopters, landing troops and marine forces, and also 
special forces to carry out the military operations. They have been 
using local forces, hostile to terrorists, what have to a considerable 
extent made up for the success in the organization and performance of 
ground military operations. Troops of the Northern Alliance acted as 
local forces in Afghanistan, whereas in Chechnya these included field 
commanders and militia, opposed to Maskhadov, local police, religious 
activists, politicians, etc.

Thirdly, results of the first active phase of counter-terrorist 
operations turned out to be identical for Moscow and Washington both - 
the main guerrilla bases were destroyed, whereas the main terrorist 
forces were either eliminated or dispersed.

However, that is the juncture where similarities of the Chechen 
and Afghani operations end. The US reached its targets, set for the 
war against the Talibs within some more than three months, while 
Moscow has been pulling through the conflict over the past four years 
already; and this conflict seems to be endless. Russia and the US 
applied various tactics in the struggle against the guerrillas in the 
main phase of the battles. The Americans were bribing the main forces 
of the Talibs and had the Northern Alliance, supported by Iran, 
Tajikistan and Russia, as their main affiliate. At the same time, the 
US has never opened the phase of the ground action.

Now, resting on the UN and the world community, the Americans 
arranged active humanitarian and financial assistance, oriented for 
the revival of Afghanistan's economy. The fact that monthly spending 
of the Pentagon on the warfare was $2 billion is impressive, rather 
than the amounts advanced countries of the world promised to 
appropriate to Kabul at the international conference in Tokyo. The 
figure of $2 billion makes almost a quarter of the entire Russia's 
military spending for 2002. It means that considerably less money than 
in Afghanistan is spent in Chechnya. This fact proves once again a 
conclusion of Russia's human rights activists that Moscow has been 
defending its sovereignty in Chechnya by extensive methods - at the 
expense of lives of Russia's servicemen. At the same time, the 
spending on dispatching new kinds of weaponry into this "hot spot" 
remains almost the same. Moscow's attitude toward the refugees is 
similar. If subsidies for restoration of ruined houses had been issued 
to each Chechen family, there would not have been any refugees in 
Ingushetia.

According to the strange assessments of the federal command, 
peaceful life is supposedly established in Chechnya, and the number of 
active guerrillas has fallen to 300. Have these 300 guerrillas managed 
to kill 21 soldiers of the federal forces in a week? Around 7,000 
terrorists are in Afghanistan, various sources report; another 3,200 
Taliban are said to have been captured by the Americans with the 
assistance of the Northern Alliance. However, the casualties among the 
Americans are incommensurably smaller. Where is the logic? What is 
actually happening in Chechnya?

Most likely, having introduced the power of the federal 
authorities in Chechnya, Russia has been "winning over" sympathies of 
the population by means of commandant's squads and units of special 
forces, stationed in each village, rather than economic assistance; 
and that is Russia's main error. It appears that any Russian soldier 
or officer runs a higher risk of being killed or wounded than a U.S. 
serviceman in Afghanistan. A human life has always been of small value 
in Russia.

(Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin)
Back to the Top    Next Article

 
January 26, 2002:    #6040    #6041

 

- Back to the Top -

 
 

Internet Explorer users, click here for further assistance with online donations
\